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SUBGAME-PERFECT ATTAINMENT OF MINIMAX PUNISHMENTS IN DISCOUNTED 2-PERSON GAMES
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UNSPECIFIED (1995) SUBGAME-PERFECT ATTAINMENT OF MINIMAX PUNISHMENTS IN DISCOUNTED 2-PERSON GAMES. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 47 (1). pp. 1-4. ISSN 0165-1765.
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Abstract
Necessary and sufficient conditions are given for minimax payoff levels to be attained in a subgame-perfect equilibrium of repeated two-person games for sufficiently low discounting.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
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Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions | ||||
Journal or Publication Title: | ECONOMICS LETTERS | ||||
Publisher: | ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA LAUSANNE | ||||
ISSN: | 0165-1765 | ||||
Official Date: | January 1995 | ||||
Dates: |
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Volume: | 47 | ||||
Number: | 1 | ||||
Number of Pages: | 4 | ||||
Page Range: | pp. 1-4 | ||||
Publication Status: | Published |
Data sourced from Thomson Reuters' Web of Knowledge
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