Skip to content Skip to navigation
University of Warwick
  • Study
  • |
  • Research
  • |
  • Business
  • |
  • Alumni
  • |
  • News
  • |
  • About

University of Warwick
Publications service & WRAP

Highlight your research

  • WRAP
    • Home
    • Search WRAP
    • Browse by Warwick Author
    • Browse WRAP by Year
    • Browse WRAP by Subject
    • Browse WRAP by Department
    • Browse WRAP by Funder
    • Browse Theses by Department
  • Publications Service
    • Home
    • Search Publications Service
    • Browse by Warwick Author
    • Browse Publications service by Year
    • Browse Publications service by Subject
    • Browse Publications service by Department
    • Browse Publications service by Funder
  • Help & Advice
University of Warwick

The Library

  • Login
  • Admin

Co-ordination failure, moral hazard and sovereign bankruptcy procedures

Tools
- Tools
+ Tools

Ghosal, Sayantan and Miller, Marcus (2003) Co-ordination failure, moral hazard and sovereign bankruptcy procedures. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation. Working papers (University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation) (No.112).

[img]
Preview
PDF
WRAP_Ghosal_wp11203.pdf - Requires a PDF viewer.

Download (615Kb)
Official URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/research/wo...

Request Changes to record.

Abstract

We study a model of sovereign debt crisis that combines problems of creditor co-ordination and debtor moral hazard. Solving the sovereign debtor’s incentives leads to excessive ‘rollover failure’ by creditors when sovereign default occurs. We discuss how the incidence of crises might be reduced by international sovereign bankruptcy procedures, involving ‘contractibility’ of sovereign debtor’s payoffs, suspension of convertibility in a ‘discovery’ phase and penalties in case of malfeasance. In relation to the current debate, this is more akin to the IMF’s Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism than the Collective Action Clauses promoted by others.

Item Type: Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HJ Public Finance
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Faculty of Social Sciences > Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Debts, Public, Moral hazard, State bankruptcy, International finance, Debtor and creditor
Series Name: Working papers (University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation)
Publisher: University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation
Place of Publication: Coventry
Official Date: March 2003
Dates:
DateEvent
March 2003Published
Number: No.112
Number of Pages: 36
Institution: University of Warwick
Status: Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version: Open Access (Creative Commons)
Funder: Economic and Social Research Council (Great Britain) (ESRC), University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR)
Grant number: R000239216 (ESRC)

Request changes or add full text files to a record

Repository staff actions (login required)

View Item View Item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics

twitter

Email us: wrap@warwick.ac.uk
Contact Details
About Us