Harrison, Mark (2004) The fundamental problem of command : plan and compliance in a partially centralised economy. Comparative Economic Studies, Vol.47 (No.2). pp. 296-314. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ces.8100101

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Abstract

When a principal gives an order to an agent and advances resources for its implementation, the temptations for the agent to shirk or steal from the principal rather than comply constitute the fundamental problem of command. Historically, partially centralised command economies enforced compliance in various ways, assisted by nesting the fundamental problem of exchange within that of command. The Soviet economy provides some relevant data. The Soviet command system combined several enforcement mechanisms in an equilibrium that shifted as agents learned and each mechanism's comparative costs and benefits changed. When the conditions for an equilibrium disappeared, the system collapsed.Comparative Economic Studies (2005) 47, 296–314. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ces.8100110

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions D History General and Old World > DK Russia. Soviet Union. Former Soviet Republics
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Soviet Union -- Economic conditions -- 20th century
Journal or Publication Title:	Comparative Economic Studies
Publisher:	Palgrave Macmillan Ltd.
ISSN:	0888-7233
Official Date:	14 June 2004
Dates:	Date Event 14 June 2004 ["eprint_fieldopt_dates_date_type_modified" not defined]
Volume:	Vol.47
Number:	No.2
Page Range:	pp. 296-314
DOI:	10.1057/palgrave.ces.8100101
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access

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