Jennings, Sarah (2010) The dialectic of conscience within Hegel's philosophy of right. PhD thesis, University of Warwick.

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Abstract

This thesis provides a detailed analysis of the dialectic of conscience within Hegel’s
Philosophy of Right. It aims to show that Hegel provides a fundamental role for
conscience within the state and, thus, that Hegel preserves the right to subjective
freedom within ethical life. In doing so, it aims to unite divided opinion on the role of
conscience within Hegel’s political philosophy and to further disarm the charge that
Hegel’s state advocates repressive or authoritarian political structures.
In order to pursue this argument, this thesis first examines the emergence of conscience
within the morality section of the text. It presents the moral conscience as the fruition of
subjective freedom; as possessing the right to produce its own convictions and
determine for itself what is good. However, it then continues to highlight the necessarily
formal nature of the moral conscience and claims that, because of this formality, the
content of conscience is always contingent. As such, the moral conscience is always in
danger of willing evil; and it is precisely this danger that necessitates the move into
ethics. The moral conscience is sublated by the true, ethical conscience.
This thesis presents its own reading of the Aufhebung from the moral conscience to the
true conscience of ethical life, which it believes properly reflects the dialectical
progression of freedom within the text. It argues that, during the process of Aufhebung,
the essential moments of moral conscience are retained and only the negative aspects
are lost. In particular, it claims that conscience’s right to produce its own convictions
(and, thus, the right to subjective freedom) is preserved within ethical life, but that the
contingency of conscience is not. As such, true conscience (unlike the moral
conscience) wills the good both in and for itself. This does not mean that true
conscience cannot make mistakes. But it does entail that true conscience cannot put its
own convictions beyond criticism. For this reason, this thesis also maintains that the
formal conscience of morality, in its non-aufgehoben form, has no place within the
ethical realm.
This thesis locates true conscience’s function in the disparity between the actual and the
existing state. It argues that, in recognising the rational principles inherent in society
and by transforming the existing world to conform more faithfully to these principles,
true conscience plays an essential role in keeping the state in line with its own, rational
essence. However, it also maintains that this type of immanent critique extends only to
reform, and not to not radical, social criticism. The thesis concludes by describing true
conscience’s role in the legislative power.

Item Type:	Thesis (PhD)
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831. Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831 -- Political and social views, Conscience
Official Date:	July 2010
Dates:	Date Event July 2010 Submitted
Institution:	University of Warwick
Theses Department:	Department of Philosophy
Thesis Type:	PhD
Publication Status:	Unpublished
Supervisor(s)/Advisor:	Houlgate, Stephen ; Siep, Ludwig
Sponsors:	Arts & Humanities Research Council (Great Britain) (AHRC)
Extent:	181 leaves
Language:	eng

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