

University of Warwick institutional repository: <http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap>

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick

<http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap/34787>

This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.

Please scroll down to view the document itself.

Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to cite it. Our policy information is available from the repository home page.

THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY

AND

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

1945-1975

Nigel Ashford.

Submitted for a Doctorate in Politics

University of Warwick,

Department of Politics,

February, 1983.

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements	iii.
Summary	iv.
Abbreviations	v.
Introduction	1
1. The Nature of the Conservative Party	9
2. The European Party, 1945-1951	36
3. "With, but not of, Europe", 1951-1960	89
4. The First Application, 1961-1963	134
5. A Renewed Commitment, 1963-1970	204
6. To Be Or Not To Be, 1970-1972	262
7. Still the Party of Europe, 1972-1975	312
8. The Distribution of Power within the Conservative Party and the European Issue	361
Bibliography	400

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Large numbers of people assisted in the preparation of this dissertation, so I hope they will appreciate if they are not all mentioned by name. My thanks are due to: all those interviewed for background information and confirmation, many of whom requested that they remain anonymous; the librarians at the University of Warwick, the University of London, Paisley College of Technology and especially the Conservative Party Archivist at the Bodleian Library, Oxford; Conservative Central Office for providing access to material, much of which was not made generally available to researchers, and especially to Lord Thorneycroft, Geoffrey Block, Alan Smith and Tessa Eardle; and to the following organisations for permission to examine their records, the Conservative Group for Europe, the Anti-Common Market League, the Conservative Anti-Common Market Information Service, the Bow Group and the Monday Club. Dr. William Paterson, my supervisor, provided much help and encouragement, as did several friends and colleagues, Dr. Michael Turner, Dr. David Judge and Maria Stepek. My final thanks must go to my parents for their encouragement and sacrifices over an even longer period of time. This dissertation is, in a small way, a sign that their sacrifices were not wasted.

SUMMARY

Much of the study of the British Conservative Party has been concerned with the power of the Party Leader. Two conflicting interpretations have been presented: the monolithic view that power lies essentially in the hands of the Leader, and the pluralist view that power is widely dispersed within the party. This dissertation examines the validity of these interpretations with regard to the question of Britain's attitude to European integration from 1945 to 1975, an issue which has traditionally been seen to support the monolithic view. The primary method of investigation in this study has been the examination of primary sources in the archives of the Conservative Party and other relevant bodies, supported by interviews with participants.

The Introduction presents the two interpretations and demonstrates that the monolithic view has been widely presented as the correct one to explain the party's position on European integration. Chapter One reviews the literature on the distribution of power within the Conservative Party. Within the framework of the various elements that make up the party, the issue is examined chronologically. Chapter Two examines 1945 to 1951; Chapter Three, 1951 to 1960; Chapter Four, 1961 to 1963; Chapter Five, 1963 to 1970; Chapter 6, 1970 to 1972; and Chapter Seven, 1973-1975. The final chapter argues that the electoral orientation of the Conservative Party leads to a pluralist distribution of power, and that the study of the European issue supports that interpretation. This thesis substantially undermines an important source of support for the monolithic interpretation and provides additional support for the pluralist view of the distribution of power within the Conservative Party.

ABBREVIATIONS

A.C.M.L.	- Anti-Common Market League.
B.i.E.	- Britain in Europe.
C.A.C.M.I.S.	- Conservative Anti-Common Market Information Service.
C.A.P.	- Common Agricultural Policy.
C.A.T.O.R.	- Conservatives Against the Treaty of Rome.
C.B.I.	- Confederation of British Industry.
C.C.O.	- Conservative Central Office.
C.G.E.	- Conservative Group for Europe.
C.I.A.	- Commonwealth Industries Association.
C.P.C.	- Conservative Political Centre.
C.R.D.	- Conservative Research Department.
E.C.C.	- European Co-ordinating Committee.
E.C.C.S.	- European Union of Conservative and Christian Democrat Students.
E.C.S.C.	- European Coal and Steel Community.
E.D.C.	- European Defence Community.
E.D.P.	- European Democrat Party.
E.E.C.	- European Economic Community.
E.F.T.A.	- European Free Trade Area.
E.L.E.C.	- European League for Economic Co-operation.
E.M.	- European Movement.
E.U.W.	- European Union of Women.
F.B.I.	- Federation of British Industry.
F.C.S.	- Federation of Conservative Students.
F.T.A.	- Free Trade Area.
F.U.C.U.A.	- Federation of University Conservative & Unionist Associations.
G.L.Y.C.	- Greater London Young Conservatives.

I.C.C.S.	- International Union of Conservative and Christian Democrat Students.
M.E.P.	- Member of the European Parliament.
N.A.C.	- National Advisory Committee.
N.A.F.T.A.	- North Atlantic Free Trade Area.
N.A.T.O.	- North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
N.C.P.	- Notes on Current Politics.
N.E.I.	- Nouvelles Equipes Internationale.
N.F.U.	- National Farmers Union.
N.U.E.C.	- National Union Executive Committee.
O.E.E.C.	- Organisation for European Economic Co-operation.
O.R.C.	- Opinion Research Centre.
T.U.N.A.C.	- Trade Union National Advisory Committee.
U.E.C.D.	- European Union of Christian Democrats.
V.A.T.	- Value Added Tax.
W.E.U.	- Western European Union.
Y.C.	- Young Conservative.
Y.E.D.	- Young European Democrats.

Introduction

Discussions of the Conservative Party have traditionally emphasised the powers of the Leader. McKenzie, in his seminal work on British Political Parties, stated, "The most striking feature of the Conservative party organisation is the enormous powers which appear to be concentrated in the hands of the Leader". (1) "It would be difficult to envisage a more tight-knit system of oligarchic control of the affairs of a political party". (2) Samuel Beer, in his classic study of Modern British Politics, stressed that "The Tory conception of the wide and independent authority of Government and parliamentary leaders implies that they will have a very free hand to do what they think best". (3) Official party documents tend to confirm this view. The Maxwell Fyfe Report described the Leader as "the main fountain and interpreter of policy". (4) Hoffman stated that "the party constitution accords what appears to be close to dictatorial powers to the Leader of the party in the matter of policy-making". (5) This view has been described as a monarchical or a Hobbesian model of the distribution of power within the Conservative Party. (6)

McKenzie saw the power of the Leader as arising from three factors: his security of tenure, the wide range of appointments within his control, and his exclusive right to determine party policy. Beer found the source of his power as arising from the ideology of the party which stresses hierarchy, authority and leadership. Nigel Fisher emphasised the security of tenure, that "a Prime Minister who is in good health and enjoys the support of his Cabinet colleagues is virtually immovable", (7) while Gamble stressed the ability of the Leader to manipulate the party to support his policies. (8)

An alternative, and more pluralistic, view of the Conservative

party has been presented. Pinto-Duchinsky argued that in practice "informal manoeuvres and compromise between leaders, M.P.s and local associations are essential to the maintenance of party unity and to the formation of policy". (9) Behrens believed that the huge formal authority of the Leader was circumscribed within defined limits and involved a high degree of consultation with other elements of the party, which he described as "the traditional form of conversation". (10) Norton and Aughey found the Hobbesian model less useful than "a traditional family" model, which emphasised the responsibilities as well as the rights of the various elements of the party. (11) The monolithic and pluralist models are competing descriptions of the Conservative Party.

The monolithic view of the Conservative Party has been supported by studies of Britain's attitude to European integration. These studies have placed heavy emphasis on the role of the Party Leader in creating Conservative support for Britain's involvement with European unity. The story of the Conservative attitude to Europe has been written in the names of three men: Winston Churchill, Harold Macmillan and Edward Heath.

Most studies of Britain and her post-war relations with the rest of Europe start with Churchill's speech in Zurich in 1946 and his call for a United States of Europe. (12) Duncan Sandys stated that "it was Churchill's voice which first called upon Europe to unite". (13) Most Conservative publications on Europe referred to Churchill's role as an inspiration of the European Movement in the immediate post-war period. Churchill was seen as the chief spokesman for the European idea in Britain at this time.

The role of Harold Macmillan in the first application for British membership of the European Community in 1961 has received considerable

emphasis in most discussions of this event. Lindsay and Harrington, in their history of the Conservative Party, believed that "The conversion of the Conservative party to the Common Market was one of the more remarkable of Macmillan's political achievements, for the whole enterprise stood in flat contradiction to all the traditional instincts of the party, which were for national sovereignty at any price". (14) Ronald Butt shared this view that "the decision taken by the Macmillan government flew in the face of most of the instincts of the Conservative Party, and most of the traditional interests supporting it....The Prime Minister himself was the decisive factor". (15) Drew Middleton wrote that "without Macmillan the Tories would never have approached Europe and that if Britain does enter Europe it will be because of his leadership. The role of Harold Macmillan in this great decision has been stressed intentionally....The decision to seek union with Europe was Macmillan's... in the sense that the will of the Prime Minister dominated the Cabinet". (16) Greenwood and Wilson attribute the lack of intra-party opposition to Macmillan. (17)

A similar attribution of power in this issue was given to Edward Heath. Kitzinger felt "It was this personal commitment to Europe on the part of the Party Leader which prevented the Conservatives from giving up in the course of the sixties, prevented them from opposing Harold Wilson's attempt to enter the Community, and then committed the Conservative Party to pursue that application when on all the evidence the majority of local associations and a very large section of the parliamentary party were distinctly cool or hostile". (18) "He knew what he wanted; British entry to the Common Market. Britain joined". (Rose) (19) Burch argued that his interest in EEC not only explains British entry, but also Conservative policies on taxation and

agriculture. (20)

The thesis of this study is that the role of the Conservative Party and the European issue supports the pluralist view of the nature of the party, and not the monolithic view of most of the literature on Britain and Europe. This thesis will argue that the view that European policy was decided personally by the leader and against the wishes of the rest of the Party is mistaken. The success in getting the Party to support British involvement with Europe has been attributed to the tremendous power of the Leader. Whilst not rejecting the importance of the Leader, this thesis emphasises the role played by the other elements of the Party in determining European policy.

A leader can successfully lead the Party in new directions only when there is already widespread support for movement in that direction. Macmillan was able to lead his Party into applying for EEC membership because many of the elements in the Party and associated with it were already pro-European. Such groups included the early 'Europeans' in the Cabinet, a group of vocal young M.P.s in the Parliamentary Party, some parts of the voluntary side especially amongst the youth sections, the advisers in Central Office, most of the intellectuals in the Party, much of industry and agriculture, the Tory press and the target voter. Those groups believed to be opposed to entry, the Commonwealth lobby, the right and agriculture were by no means united in their opposition. Under Heath nearly all parts of the Party favoured membership, even though there was considerable criticism of the way in which Heath attempted to carry out the policy. Outright opposition was confined to a distinct, if vocal, minority. By the time of the referendum in 1975 most Conservatives actively participated in the campaign, through

Party or non-Party structures, without the necessity of a strong lead from above. Support for British participation in Europe was not confined to the Leaders.

This study will attempt to demonstrate this thesis by examining the part played by the various elements of the Party during the stages of development of Britain's relations with Europe. Chapter One provides an understanding of the structures, both formal and informal, of the Conservative Party. Later chapters will use this presentation of the different elements as a framework to study activity during the various periods of development from 1945 to 1975. Chapter Two presents the beginning of the positive Conservative attitude to Europe in the immediate post-war period of 1945 to 1951 when they were in opposition to the Labour Government. Chapter Three examines the position of the Conservative Party in government from 1951 to 1960. The first application for membership of the European Economic Community, considered in Chapter Four, was made in 1961, discussed through 1962 but vetoed by General De Gaulle in early 1963. The response to the veto and the later restatement of a Conservative commitment to seek membership during the period 1963 to 1970, mainly spent in opposition, is covered in Chapter Five. The Conservative Government elected in 1970 vigorously pursued British entry until membership was achieved on 1st January 1973, discussed in Chapter Six. The Conservative response to membership and the referendum campaign of 1975 is examined in Chapter Seven. This study therefore examines a 30 year period from 1945, when the idea of European unity first arrived on the political agenda in Britain, to 1975 when the British people endorsed British membership of the European Community in a referendum.

The Conservative Party and European integration is assessed

through a re-examination of secondary texts, the study of the records of the Conservative Party deposited at Nuffield College, Oxford, and through a series of interviews. Secondary texts on Britain and Europe and on the Conservative Party were examined for evidence concerning the Party's participation in this issue. Records of the Conservative Party, primarily of Conservative Central Office and the Research Department, were deposited at Nuffield College, Oxford. They are, however, covered by the 30 year rule as with Cabinet records which would have effectively excluded most of the period of this study. Fortunately special dispensation was obtained from Lord Thorneycroft, then Party Chairman, to examine records up to 1975. The papers were not well kept by the originators so were frequently incomplete, and the archivists had not yet been able to properly organise and record the material. Despite the incompleteness, they provided considerable new evidence as to the activities of Central Office and their assessment of Party opinion. These records were supported by the archives of groups such as the Conservative Group for Europe and the Anti-Common Market League. The third source was a series of interviews with participants in the events described here, both pro and anti-marketeers. Regrettably many of them preferred to remain anonymous, partly from a desire not to re-open old wounds. It was, therefore, decided not to use new information that could not be directly attributed, but to use the interviews to confirm or deny statements of fact and to assist in a more accurate judgement of events.

The thesis presented here is that an examination of the Conservative Party and European unity supports a pluralist conception of the distribution of power within the Conservative Party.

Introduction

References

1. R. McKenzie, British Political Parties, (London, Heinemann, 1963), p.21.
2. ibid, p.291.
3. S. Beer, Modern British Politics, (London, Faber, 1969), p.246.
4. The Committee on Party Organisation, (Maxwell Fyfe Report) (CCO, 1949), p.32.
5. J.D. Hoffman, The Conservative Party in Opposition, (London, Macgibbon & Kee, 1964), p.126.
6. R. Rose, The Problem of Party Government, (London, Penguin, 1976), p.154.
P. Norton & A. Aughey, Conservatives and Conservatism, (London, Temple Smith, 1981), p.241.
7. N. Fisher, The Tory Leaders, (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977), p.3.
8. A. Gamble, The Conservative Nation, (London, Routledge, Kegan & Paul, 1974).
9. M. Pinto-Duchinsky, "Central Office and 'Power' in the Conservative Party", Political Studies, 20, (1972), p.1.
10. R. Behrens, The Conservative Party from Heath to Thatcher, (Farnborough, Saxon House, 1980), p.4.
11. Norton & Aughey, op cit, p.242.
12. A. Watson, Europe At Risk, (London, Harrap, 1972), p.15.
R. Lieber, British Politics and European Politics, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1970), p.16.
13. European Movement, Europe: the Case for Going In, (London, Harrap, 1971), p.97.
14. T. Lindsay & M. Harrington, The Conservative Party 1918-1979, (London, Macmillan, 1979, 2nd edition), p.214.
15. R. Butt, The Power of Parliament, (London, Constable, 1969, 2nd edition), p.373.
16. D. Middleton, The Supreme Choice, (London, Secker and Warburg, 1963), p.102.
17. J. Greenwood and D. Wilson, "The Conservative and Liberal Parties" in M. Kolinsky, Divided Loyalties, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1978), p.160.
18. U. Kitzinger, Diplomacy and Persuasion, (London, Thames and Hudson, 1973), p.150.

19. R. Rose, Politics in England Today, (London, Faber, 1974), p.215.
20. M. Burch, "Approaches to Leadership in Opposition" in
Z. Layton-Henry, Conservative Party Politics, (London, Macmillan,
1980), p.169.

CHAPTER ONE: THE NATURE OF THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY

An assessment of the role of the Conservative Party in the issue of European integration requires an understanding of the organisational structures of the Party and the debate about the role of the Leader within them.

This chapter will examine the role of the Leader, the Cabinet or Shadow Cabinet, the Parliamentary Party, the National Union, Central Office, the informal associates of the Party and the Conservative electorate. In the rest of this dissertation the role played by the various elements of the Conservative Party in the development of the Party's approach to Europe will be examined.

The Leader

The power of the Conservative Party Leader is said to rest on four factors: (i) the security of tenure of the leader; (ii) the large number of appointments available to the Leader, of the Cabinet, front bench spokesmen, honours, and Central Office; (iii) the leader's role as the policy-maker; and (iv) the acceptance of the authority of the Leader. McKenzie emphasised the first three and Beer the final factor.

Until 1975 the Leader, once chosen, had unlimited security of tenure with no formal means of removal available. The process of selection changed considerably during the period of this study. For 20 of the years covered, and for the previous years in the Party's history, the Leader had emerged through a period of consultation among leading figures of the Party. This was the process for the selection of Churchill, Eden, Macmillan and Home. The advantage of this method was the avoidance of Party disunity. As one M.P. expressed it at the

election of Bonar Law in 1911,

"Great leaders are not elected, they are evolved....
The leader is there, and we all know it when he is
there....If one voice of doubt is raised now it will
be seized upon and will be magnified into party
disunion at a most critical time. That I sincerely
hope we may avoid". (1)

Controversy failed to be avoided in 1957 with the Queen's involvement
in the choice of Macmillan, and in 1963 when the selection of Home
caused great public disunity and the refusal of Iain Macleod and
Enoch Powell to sit in the Cabinet. Macleod wrote a strong attack
on selection by "the magic circle". (2)

In response to the failure to perform the function of avoiding
disunity, Home introduced a new system of election by the votes of
the Parliamentary Party. Designed to achieve a leader with broad
based support, a candidate needed an overall majority plus 15% of the
votes cast on the first ballot. A second ballot was then held, and
if no candidate received the requisite weighted majority, a third
ballot was taken on the alternative vote system which favours the
least unacceptable candidate. As an official party publication
noted, "The new procedure makes no provision for periodic re-election
and the Leader of the Party remains in office until he resigns". (3)
With the private expression of dissatisfaction with his leadership,
Home resigned in 1965 and Heath was elected under the new procedure.

The lack of a formal procedure to remove the Leader was raised
during a period of intense dissatisfaction with Heath after the two
electoral defeats of 1974. The rules were amended to require an
absolute majority and 15% of all eligible voters, and provision for
regular election at the start of a new Parliament and each Parliamentary
session. Mrs. Thatcher then challenged Heath and to general surprise
defeated him on the first ballot, and was elected on the second
ballot. Thus the formal security of tenure has ended.

It is not clear, however, that these formal changes have made a substantial difference to the position of the Leader. As McKenzie stated, "When appointed the leader leads and the party follows, except when the party decides not to follow - then the Leader ceases to be Leader". (4) Fisher quoted Churchill that "The loyalties which centre upon number one are enormous. If he trips he must be sustained. If he makes mistakes they must be covered. If he sleeps he must not be wantonly disturbed. If he is no good, he must be pole-axed". (5) The leadership has been far more insecure in reality than in theory, when party pressure can be identified as an element in the change of every leader in the post-war period. The more significant question is whether the mere holding of the position brings with it considerable power, when a formal position may be held with little opportunity to make the decisions. The powers of the Leader must be examined.

The second source of power has been identified as the power of appointment. As Prime Minister, he appoints all the ministers, not only the Cabinet of around 20 people, but also the 60-70 ministerial appointments. As Leader of the Opposition, he appoints the Leader's Consultative Committee, commonly known as the Shadow Cabinet, and other front bench spokesmen. The Chief Whip is appointed to manage the parliamentary party, and the Leader has numerous honours, such as Knighthoods and Peerages, to reward loyal backbenchers. On the party organisation he appoints the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Party organisation to run Central Office, the Chairmen of the Research Department, the Party Treasurers and the Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Advisory Committee on Policy. The importance of these appointments will be examined later in this chapter.

The third factor is the power of the Leader to make policy. The Leader has the sole responsibility for the making of policy. Party

policy is what the Leader says it is. The election manifesto and other policy documents are the responsibility of the Leader. The Maxwell Fyfe Report described him as "the main fountain and interpreter of policy....Endorsements and pronouncements on Party policy are the prerogatives and responsibility of the Leader". (6) As Conservative principles are viewed as highly flexible and "electoral perspectives are the ideology of the leadership", (7) the Leader is believed to have a very wide range of choice in the selection of policy.

In practice the Leader must conduct a wide range of consultation before deciding policy. The Cabinet or Shadow Cabinet, the Parliamentary Party, Central Office, the Advisory Committee on Policy and the National Union will all participate in the discussion of policy. What is practical, what is acceptable within the party and what is electorally acceptable are all major considerations apart from the personal wishes of the Leader. It is accepted that the final decision rests with the Leader, but that decision is rarely taken without extensive consultation throughout the party, and if that advice is consistently ignored there could be the public expression of intense dissatisfaction.

The fourth factor is the Tory belief in authority, hierarchy and deference, which places considerable power in the hands of the Leader. This power is legitimated by a Tory view of the Constitution which "trusts men of the governing class to do 'what is necessary' in any particular set of circumstances. As the nature of governing requires wide discretion for the governors, the capacities of the governing class justify their independent authority". (8) Layton-Henry described this as the theory of authoritative leadership. (9) This is best seen in the emphasis on loyalty to the leadership and a reluctance to publicly express criticism. Maxwell-Fyfe claimed that "loyalty was

the Tories secret weapon". (10) The acceptance of the right of the Leader to make decisions and the duty to support him provides him with great authority. 13

However that authority is not unlimited. Authority, by its very nature, is voluntary and can be withdrawn. Authority implies responsibility, a responsibility to make considerable efforts through consultation to ensure that the decisions are correct, and responsibility to accept the consequences of his decisions. The relationship is more one of a Lockean contract than a Hobbesian one. In the Hobbesian model the Leader as Leviathan is given absolute power and total obedience, which will only be removed in the most extreme of circumstances. In the Lockean model the Leader is given wide authority to act within certain limits, that the policies shall be acceptable within Conservative principles and lead to electoral success. The party may reasonably discuss whether the Leader's policies fit their two criteria, and therefore consent or loyalty may be withdrawn.

Cabinet/Shadow Cabinet

The Cabinet or the Shadow Cabinet, and other front bench positions, are appointed by the Leader, who decides the allocation of responsibilities. Unlike Labour, there is no group elected by the parliamentary party from which the Leader must select his spokesmen. A Leader, therefore, could in theory select a group of loyal 'Yes-men', as Heath was accused of doing in the 1970-74 government. (11) In practice there are severe limits on choice. Constitutionally they must be Members of Parliament, proving a considerable restriction compared to the power of the U.S. President. Leading M.P.s, with considerable support in the Parliamentary Party, cannot be excluded,

as with James Prior in the Thatcher government. Political skill and standing are not always to be found in abundance. A large number of the Cabinet or Shadow Cabinet will already be automatic choices. There are real limits to choice. (12)

The theory of collective responsibility is still respected, at least in Conservative governments, and is usually applied in the Shadow Cabinets too. The sheer range of issues that need to be considered prevent close supervision by the Leader, and in practice the initiative for most policy developments rests with the Minister or Shadow spokesman. Chris Patten, secretary to the Shadow Cabinet for much of the 1974-79 period, wrote, "The Shadow Cabinet is in effect the collective policy-making body in opposition, and because of the additional strength which this gives to any policy statement, no sensible leader would have it otherwise". (13) Punnett, in the most detailed study of opposition politics, has also noted the importance of the role played by individual spokesmen. (14) Any Leader requires substantial information as to what is practical, acceptable to the party, and electorally rewarding, and uses the Cabinet or Shadow Cabinet as a significant source of this information. No Leader can successfully impose his policies against the will of "the big beasts in the jungle", the senior political figures represented in the Cabinet or Shadow Cabinet.

Parliamentary Party

The Conservative Parliamentary Party has been viewed as little more than lobby-fodder in support of the party line. The evidence for this is found in the high degree of party cohesion in parliamentary votes. If a three-line whip is established, the degree of intra-party dissent is likely to be small, if any. The Leader is thus presented

as being able to rely on a pliant parliamentary party. The reasons presented for this cohesion are several: the power of dissolution; the withdrawal of the whip; career aspirations; the power of the whips' patronage; appeals to loyalty arising from group identity; and fear of deselection.

The power of dissolution is supposed to strike fear into the minds of M.P.s that an election might lead to the loss of their seats. Butt, however, argued that "Dissolution, in circumstances of a revolt by an important section of the parliamentary party supporting the Government is likely to be potentially more dangerous to the party leaders than to the rank and file. The outcome is likely to be loss of office for all the leaders - whereas only some of the rank and file are likely to lose their seats". (15) The power to withdraw the Whip from a member would lose that M.P. some of the organisational advantages of party membership in the House, and above all threaten the possibility of re-election to the House. The Whips, however, have found it too heavy a form of discipline, ineffective when it has been applied, and creates an impression of disunity which they wish to avoid. The Whips have allowed the practice to go into disuse, "as it looks suspiciously like a blunt instrument". (16)

Ministerial office, or the position of spokesman as a preliminary to such office, is the traditional ambition of backbenchers, and this lies in the hands of the Leader. Dissent, however, is no automatic handicap to promotion and indeed may be an advantage. Rebels may be appointed in order to co-opt them and reduce their rebelliousness. Mackintosh claimed "some backbenchers are appointed precisely in order to reduce the number of vocal opponents of government policy". (17) Francis Pym, when Chief Whip, believed that "Very often a rebel becomes appointed because he's a good chap in his own right and he disagreed

for a perfectly legitimate reason". (18)

The function of the whips is commonly seen as applying strict coercive discipline, in support of party policy in Parliament, but their weapons are nothing like as fearsome as their name implies. "The main functions of the whips", said Norton, "may instead be identified as those of communication, management and persuasion". (19)

The whips provide a means of two-way communication between the leadership and the backbenchers, organise the parliamentary timetable to be confident of a majority, and exercise some informal persuasion. They have no powers of coercion.

Apart from ministerial office, there is minor patronage in the form of honours, knighthoods, etc., for a member or his constituency chairman, selection for parliamentary delegations abroad, or pairing with opposition M.P.s. Jackson believed that patronage was "a significant factor in the relationship between Tory leaders and backbenchers". (20)

While these may have a marginal value in specific circumstances, they are unlikely to make any substantial difference on any particular issue or to affect any large number of M.P.s at any particular time.

The sense of group identity or loyalty has been identified, by Schwartz and Lambert, as a significant factor in Conservative cohesion. (21)

The homogeneity, and prior socialisation, of Conservative M.P.s leads to a high degree of party identity and desire to demonstrate group loyalty. The strength of this influence on party voting will depend on the degree to which M.P.s generally identify with the leadership and its policies. Informal group pressures can also operate in the direction of dissent as well as loyalty, or at least may operate weakly upon potential dissenters.

The final factor leading to party cohesion is pressure upon the

M.P. by his constituency association of a threat not to readopt him if he does not follow the party line. Norton, after his exhaustive study of Conservative dissent in 1970-74, concluded that, "Although not sufficient to ensure complete cohesion in the parliamentary Conservative party...constituency party pressure (actual or anticipated, especially the latter) would nevertheless appear to be a very pertinent factor in helping contain the incidence of intra-party dissent". (22) This issue will be examined later in this chapter.

The emphasis on party cohesion in parliamentary votes has the weakness of failing to emphasise the numerous opportunities that exist for backbenchers to influence policy, and the existence of other sources of revolt other than votes on the floor of the House. Jackson argued that an "adequate adjustment or accommodation process is required to maintain a stable and cohesive party". (23) The leadership is able to receive messages from backbenchers as to their opinions, and this can be reflected in party policy.

The 1922 Committee is the representative body of Conservative backbenchers. (24) In government, Ministers attend by invitation to explain their policies and to listen to backbench opinion. In opposition, front-benchers may attend. The Chairmen and the Executive Committee are elected by the backbenchers, and represent their views towards the Leader. The election is considered to have great political significance, as in the election of du Cann as chairman when Heath as Leader was known to be hostile. The Committee meetings provide an opportunity for frank and private discussion on party policy. There also exist party specialist committees (currently 20) on a variety of areas, such as Agriculture, Foreign Affairs and Trade. They provide a forum of contact and debate between frontbenchers and backbenchers involved in a particular area, and provide an important source of

information to party spokesmen on feelings among M.P.s with a direct interest in an issue. The committee officers are elected by the backbenchers, and the election is often seen as a reflection of political temperature. There is an opportunity for dissidents to demonstrate their degree of support in these elections and the committees. There are also ad hoc committees formed, such as the policy committees of the Opposition years in 1965-1970, and Parliamentary representation upon the Advisory Committee on Policy.

Opportunities for expressions of dissent, other than through a parliamentary vote, exist in numerous forms, through Early Day Motions, amendments to legislation, speeches, questions and in private party meetings. (25) None of these have the seriousness of a negative parliamentary vote and thus provide plenty of opportunity for the expression of dissent, without any direct consequences for the party. The power of the Leader to obtain the assent of the parliamentary party is not unlimited.

National Union

The National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations is the national organisation of the voluntary side of the party, made up of the constituency associations. The National Union from its inception has been viewed as a supportive rather than initiatory organisation. At its foundation in 1867, the Chairman declared that it was "not a meeting for the discussion of Conservative principles in which we are all agreed, it is only a meeting to consider by what particular organisation we may make these Conservative principles effective among the masses". (26) Henry Raikes M.P., one of the inspirations of the National Union, stated, "The Union has been organised rather as a...handmaiden to the party, than to usurp the

functions of party leadership". (27) Maxwell Fyfe viewed the role as "an organisation which is an educative political force and a machine for winning elections". (28) The National Union thus is given no policy-making function.

A major activity of the Union is to organise the Annual Conference, to which 4,500 or more party activists attend. As David Clarke pointed out, "The members of the Conference are representatives and not delegates. Their associations do not mandate them to vote in a particular way. The resolutions passed are not binding on any part of the party". (29) The resolutions for debate are chosen by a sub-committee of the General Purposes Committee, and are usually expressions of vague, general support for Government or Party policy. Front-benchers respond to the debate before the vote in order to indicate to the representatives the position of the platform. Most of the motions carried are passed with overwhelming majorities or even unanimously. The primary functions of the Conference are to demonstrate party unity to the country and to boost the morale of party workers. "As a sounding board of Party opinion and as a demonstration of the strength and vigour of the Party, it is without rival". (David Clarke) (30) Similar remarks apply to the Central Council, a mini-conference held every spring.

Constituency Associations are expected to be oriented towards electoral functions, with fund-raising to raise campaign funds and social activities to raise funds and to keep together workers required at election time. McKenzie commented on the Model Rules for associations that "It is clear that the primary purpose of the local Associations is to conduct propaganda and to raise funds with a view to securing the election of Conservatives to public bodies. It will be noted that the list of objects contains no reference whatever to

the discussion of policy; there is no hint that the constituency associations are expected to formulate their views on national and international issues and forward them to the National Union". (31)

A study of virtually any association will confirm that the primary function is seen as the preparation and organisation for elections, and not political discussion or policy-making.

One area of constituency activity with significant political consequences is in the selection of parliamentary candidates. The role of Central Office in the selection process will be examined later. The selection is carried out by the Association, usually by a committee of the Association leaders and formally endorsed by the Association members, although there have been occasions when a short list has been drawn up by the committee but with the final decisions taken by the membership. The two major studies of the selection process, by Ranney and Rush, found that political considerations were a rare influence. Rush concluded that "Political considerations seldom have any bearing on the deliberations of the selection committee". (32) These and other studies suggest that political issues or loyalty are rarely the cause for the removal of an M.P. or candidate, but are more likely due to personal factors or constituency neglect. (33)

The National Union is organised at an Area level, with eleven Area Councils for England and Wales, and a separate organisation for Scotland. The Areas do organise some activities but primarily their role is as a channel of communication between the constituency associations and the national level.

The Central Council is formally the governing body at the national level, but it is very large (about 1,500) and only meets once a year, so effectively the National Union is run by the Executive Committee (NUEC), which elects the officers of the National Union, and appoints

its representatives to other bodies, such as the Advisory Committee on Policy. The NUEC, and particularly its Chairman, is the main spokesman for the views of the National Union to the rest of the Party.

The National Union also has a number of National Advisory Committees (NAC) representing special interests within the Party. The two main committees are the Women and the Young Conservatives, who usually have ex officio representation on the important committees. Other Advisory Committees are the Federation of Conservative Students (FCS), the Conservative Trade Unionists (CTU), the Conservative Political Centre (CPC), Local Government and Education. The NAC's organise their own activities, their own conferences and sometimes their own publications and publicity.

The National Union is primarily concerned with organisational maintenance rather than policy-making, but possibilities exist for the expression of political views through resolutions to the Party Conference, the Central Council or the National Union Executive Committee, the CPC discussion groups (see below), through the National Advisory Committees and their conferences, and frequently through informal channels.

Central Office

Conservative Central Office (CCO) is the professional side of the Party. It is run by the Chairman of the Party organisation, sometimes a Deputy Chairman and usually three Vice-Chairmen, all appointed by the Leader. The Chairman is usually a major political figure in his own right, and probably a Minister when in government. The vice-chairmen are usually responsible for the list of approved parliamentary candidates, the Women's organisation and the youth

sections.

The main policy oriented section of CCO is the Conservative Research Department (CRD), run by a Chairman and a Director appointed by the Leader, with 20-30 researchers. The CRD has three main functions. The first is to provide briefs for the specialist backbench committees, and when in opposition, the front-bench spokesmen. Secondly, it is to help the formulation of long term policy through the provision of proposals to the Shadow Cabinet, as secretaries of policy groups, and in the preparation of general policy statements, such as the election manifesto. Thirdly, it provides information, either in response to specific requests from M.P.s, or as a general assistance to Party speakers and workers. It provides a Campaign Guide during elections and pamphlets of facts and figures called Notes on Current Politics. (34) It has a semi-autonomous existence from the rest of Central Office and, until recently, was located in a separate building.

The Organisation Department is concerned with the degree of electoral organisation of the Party throughout the country. It provides aid to local associations, mainly operating through the Area Offices, which have their own Area Agents and Deputy Area Agents. (35) As well as a Speakers' Section, the Department provides the staff for the National Union and its Advisory Committees, although for a time some of these activities were carried out in a Department of Community Affairs. A major function is regular contact with the paid professional agents in the constituencies.

Political education work is the responsibility of the Conservative Political Centre, which publishes pamphlets and organises Conferences and courses. A major activity is the CPC Two-Way Movement of Ideas where Party members locally are encouraged to discuss a political

issue and transmit their views to the Party, including the Minister or Shadow Minister. This plays an important function in the transmission of policy down from the leadership, and the opinions of the party members up to the leadership. (34) The role of Swinton Conservative College should also be mentioned as a national residential education centre, which organised conferences and courses, and for a time published the Swinton Journal, until the College was closed in 1975.

Other sections of Central Office are the Publicity Department (now Communications), the International Office, the Board of Finance, and the Standing Advisory Committee on Candidates (SAAC). SAAC establishes a list of approved candidates, from which the constituency associations may select their parliamentary candidate, and is made up of representatives from the National Union, the Parliamentary Party and the Party organisation. The Advisory Committee on Policy meets within Central Office to advise the Leader on policy, with representatives of the backbenchers, the peers, the National Union, Central Office, the CRD and the CPC. King felt that "the Advisory Committee does not decide anything; it does not even initiate. Its importance is as a sounding board - as one way of keeping party leaders from getting too far out of step with their followers". (37)

The power of Central Office, as an instrument of the Leader, has been a constant theme in much academic and public discussion. McKenzie argued that "The political secretariat is in effect the personal machine of the leader" (38) and that "The political bureaucracy, responsible to the Leader of the Party, is just as fully in control of the affairs of the Party as it was in the heyday of Captain Middleton 60 years ago". (39)

The Leader's control of Central Office is said to arise from his

extensive power of appointment, through the Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen, and the Chairman and Director of the Research Department. These top appointments are viewed as creating a Central Office personally loyal to the Leader and his policies. Pinto-Duchinsky has argued that the loyalty of these professionals is to the Party, rather than the Leader. (40) Most of the staff are permanent and of long service, whose professional careers are tied to the Party as an institution. A good example of this permanence is the career of Michael Fraser (now Lord Fraser), Director of the CRD 1951-64, Deputy Chairman 1964-1974, Chairman of the CRD 1970-74 and brought back from retirement to run the Party's referendum campaign. He thus held a prominent position under six Leaders, and was described by Ramsden as "the best adjutant the Party ever had". (41) This institutional loyalty meant that in times of conflict, when the leadership itself was in dispute, as in 1965 over Home and 1975 over Heath, CCO remained neutral. Even the Party Chairman could not be guaranteed to be a personal loyalist, e.g. du Cann as chairman in 1965-67 had poor relations with Heath. The attractions of the post are not so very great for a leading politician, especially when in office, and the Leader's preference may not be acceptable to the rest of the party, as with Jim Prior in 1974. (42) CCO is not simply the "personal machine" of the Leader.

The second part of this claim is that Central Office has the power to impose the will of its master upon the voluntary side of the Party. This power is based on its control of candidates, its ability to undermine the position of rebel M.P.s and its control of the local Associations through a variety of means. On candidates, it is widely held that political conformity is necessary to be placed on the candidates list and that CCO can place the candidates it desires in safe seats. (43) This belief was widely held by anti-marketeers during

Heath's leadership. McKenzie believed that S.A.C.C. "in no way ensures popular or non-professional control over policy with respect to candidates...(because) final authority lies with an official of the Central Office who is a direct personal nominee of the Leader" (i.e. the Vice-Chairman for Candidates). (44) Rush, after his study, concluded that "there is no evidence that...the vice-chairman...can and does over-rule the decisions of the SAAC". (45) He also argued that their primary concern was with personal qualifications and qualities rather than policy positions. The 'purge' of the List that occurred under Heath was primarily concerned with these qualities, although there may have been one or two removals due to concern over contacts with the National Front and Protestant para-militaries.

On the ability to place candidates, Rush's view that they have no such power, is supported by Ranney. Lord Kilmuir believed that associations "are so independent that pressure in favour of a candidate is an almost certain method of getting someone else adopted". (46) Two examples would be that of Douglas Hurd, of the CRD and a close aide to Heath, who several times failed to get selected in the late sixties, and the failure of Paul Channon to be selected for a Euro-constituency even though it was widely known that Mrs. Thatcher wished him to be Leader of the Conservatives in the European Parliament.

' Central Office has sometimes been accused of seeking to undermine rebel M.P.s, a charge made by several anti-market M.P.s Pinto-Duchinsky claimed that "it normally does not withdraw its services from a Conservative politician with whom the leader is in disagreement", continuing to organise speaking engagements and distribute their press releases. (44) When rebels have been in trouble with their constituency associations, and when Central Office has intervened, it has been on the side of the rebels, e.g. over the Suez rebels, on the

grounds that intra-party fighting damages the Party. (48)

The third source of power is said to be a wide variety of instruments, such as patronage and through the agents. CCO has a distinct absence of material incentives, such as finance or honours, and is reliant upon the voluntary co-operation of associations. The constituency agents, while centrally trained, are employed by the Association, and are expected to show their primary loyalty to them. An attempt to centralise the employment of agents to ensure their most effective deployment was prevented by constituency fears of the loss of control over their agent. (49) Agents are an important source of information to CCO via the Areas, but are not under central control. (50)

Associations have a high degree of autonomy. (51) Lord Woolton described his relations as Party Chairman with the constituency associations.

"I had, on paper, no control over their activities: they selected their candidates; they selected their agent, and employed him; they arranged their meetings, and were at liberty to make direct approach to any speaker they desired. I depended on the good will...in the creation of a headquarters staff that would be so efficient in performance and so approachable in manner that their influence would overcome their lack of authority". (52)

This discussion is not designed to claim that the Leader has no influence nor that Central Office is powerless. The Leader and the professionals share a common aim of gaining or retaining Conservative control of government, and the image of a strong leader and a united party is an important element in that success. CRD has some influence on policy arising from its expertise and close proximity to decision-makers. CCO can influence the constituencies through its authority and distribution of political material, and the leadership by its assessment of constituency opinion.

The Informal Party

Much misunderstanding of the Conservative Party has arisen from a concentration on the formal structure of the Party, to the neglect of the informal channels of contact, which create political communities within the Party that are both vertical and horizontal. The informal Party consists of 'ginger groups', explicitly Conservative and desiring to influence the Party on policy issues; the traditional interest groups which try to influence all governments but which may have a special attachment to the Conservatives; the 'Tory press', broadly supporting the Conservatives but not uncritically; and finally the Conservative voter (or potential voter) with no direct contact with the Party but an ever-present concern for it.

One debate about the Conservative Party has been whether it is a Party of factions or tendencies. Rose has argued that the Conservatives are a party of tendencies, a stable set of attitudes but with politicians varying with the issue, rather than of factions, groups of organised members united on a broad set of issues over a period of time. (53) This was supported by studies of backbench behaviour. (54) Seyd has challenged this argument. While recognising that Conservative factions differ from those in the Labour Party, he argued that factionalism does exist and has been growing. His discussion on 'factional upsurge' emphasised that "on the issue of entry into the EEC, the supporters and opponents of the Conservative government's policy established organisations" and that "the EEC was the major factor" in the rise of parliamentary rebellion. (55) The study of the pro and anti-EEC groups may contribute to that debate.

Despite impressions to the contrary, 'ginger groups' are not a new phenomenon within the Party. The Primrose League was founded in 1883, and the India Defence League was active in the 1930s. There has,

however, been an increasing degree of activity by these groups. The best known is the Bow Group, formed in 1951, as a forum for the intelligent discussion of Conservative principles and policies. (56) It operates through the publication of pamphlets, a quarterly journal Crossbow, study groups, speaker meetings and conferences. The Group has no collective policy, but it became "a shorthand phrase for the Tory left", (57) "hardly to be distinguished from radical liberalism, and sometimes even from socialism", according to T.E. Utley. (58) Lately the Group has become more associated with the neo-liberal right. The Group denies that it is a 'pressure group' concerned with the promotion of a particular ideological line, although it has become associated with certain policies, such as pro-Europe and selective welfare benefits. Rose believed that the Group had some influence exercised through their informal contacts with M.P.s and Leaders.

By contrast, the Monday Club has a clear political line on the right. Formed in 1961 to promote an alternative to the Bow Group for traditional conservatives, the Club later became a mass organisation claiming 10,000 members at its height in 1971. The Club was torn apart by internal strife in the mid-70s, from which it has never fully recovered. Defence, race and Rhodesia were some of the issues of special concern to the Club, but was strongly divided on Europe. Seyd concluded that "the influence of the Monday Club on the Conservative Party leadership...would appear to be negligible. (59)

The 'left' or 'progressive' tendency was organised in 1963 as Pressure for Economic and Social Toryism (PEST). Originally based on the universities, it later opened its activities to all sympathisers and created a list of parliamentary supporters. Never a mass organisation, PEST sought influence through publications, meetings and conferences. In 1975 it merged with two other smaller groups to

form the Tory Reform Group. Throughout its existence, it was strongly pro-European and federalist.

The European issue led to the creation of single-issue groups within the Party. The Conservative Group for Europe (CGE) was formed in 1969 (as the European Forum) and acted as a focus for Conservative 'Europeans'. On the anti-market side, a number of organisations existed, some of them short-lived. The Anti-Common Market League in 1961 was the first, the Conservative Anti-Common Market Information Service (CACMIS) 1971-72, and Conservatives Against the Treaty of Rome (CATOR). There were also non-party organisations within which Conservatives were active, such as the European Movement and Keep Britain Out. These are all discussed later.

The economic interest groups of the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) and the National Farmers Union (NFU) are not formally allied with any party, but they perceive that the Conservatives are more open to their interests than Labour. (60) The party is aware of the value of their support in reaching their members, and is therefore sensitive to their views. The exact relationship is difficult to establish. Gamble noted that the party has "never been the mouthpiece for business interests", and Grant argued that the relationship has not been well understood. (61) A study of this European issue should help to illuminate the relationship.

The relationship between the Tory-inclined press and the Party has received little attention, and is rather ambivalent. On the one side, while the editors and many of the journalists may be sympathetic to the Party, they do not wish to lose less partisan readers and they recognise that news, not Party propaganda, sells newspapers. For the Party, the press is an essential means of communication to their supporters but the Party's inability to control the interpretation of

events makes them cautious in their relations. The Daily Telegraph has been described as the "chief orchestrator of opinion amongst Conservative Party members and activists". (62) A clearly aligned newspaper, it provides a forum for the discussion of Conservative policy, including some by influential Tory journalists, William Deedes, Peregrine Worsethorne and T.E. Utley. The Times is less partisan, but is widely read amongst M.P.s and has many informal contacts with the Party. The former editor, William Rees-Mogg, had been a Conservative candidate, and Norman Fowler, the current Secretary of State for the Social Services, was the paper's Home Affairs correspondent. The Financial Times is seen by the Party as a useful reflection of business and financial opinion. The popular press (the Express, the Mail and the Sun) is interesting for the Party for their mass circulation rather than the quality of their commentary.

The weekly press also deserves consideration. The Economist is widely read among businessmen and politicians, and provides news coverage and commentary in a distinctive style. The self-description as extreme centrist has meant an anti-Communist foreign policy, market economics, liberal on social issues, and strongly pro-European. With contributors from all parties, it has usually taken a special interest in the Conservatives. The Spectator has been more clearly a Conservative journal of opinion. For most of the post-war period it has been liberal, with Ian Gilmour as a proprietor and Iain Macleod as an editor, which also included being pro-European. In the early seventies it took a right-wing, populist tone with journalists like George Gale and Patrick Cosgrave, strongly anti-market. While a small circulation journal, it is well read in Conservative circles.

The final element in the informal party is the Conservative voter or potential voter. Always electorally aware, the Conservative Party

is concerned to both influence and understand their voters. The institutions of the informal party are both a major channel to reach the voters with the Party's messages, and an imperfect reflection to the Party of the state of public opinion. Public opinion polls have proved to be another useful source, and the Party has conducted some of its own polls. However, the judgement of public opinion remains an uncertain business, based more on skill and judgement than scientific certainty.

Conclusion

The debate about the relative importance of the Leader and the other elements of the Party has been explored. The role of these various elements will now be examined during the stages of development of Party policy from 1945 to 1975 in the following chapters. In chapter 8 the issues discussed in this chapter will be examined in the light of the information presented to illuminate and test the pluralist thesis of the distribution of power within the Conservative Party.

References

1. Quoted in R. McKenzie, British Political Parties, (London, Heinemann, 1963), p.34.
2. R. Churchill, The Fight for the Tory Leadership, (London, Heinemann, 1964).
I. Macleod, "The Tory Leadership", Spectator, 17th January 1964.
3. D. Clarke, The Conservative Party, (CCO, 1970), p.79.
4. McKenzie, op cit, p.145.
5. N. Fisher, The Tory Leaders, (London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1977), p.3.
6. The Committee on Party Organisation, (Maxwell Fyfe Report), (CCO, 1949), p.32.
7. A. Gamble, The Conservative Nation, (London, Routledge, Kegan & Paul, 1974), p.8.
8. S. Beer, Modern British Politics, (London, Faber, 1969), p.247
9. Z. Layton-Henry, "Democracy and Reform in the Conservative Party", Journal of Contemporary History, 13, (1978), p.655.
10. Lord Kilmuir (Maxwell-Fyfe), Political Adventure, (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), p.324.
11. P. Norton & A. Aughey, Conservatives and Conservatism, (London, Temple Smith, 1981), p.251.
12. R.M. Punnett, Front Bench Opposition, (London, Heinemann, 1973), p.139.
13. C. Patten, "Policy-Making in Opposition" in Z. Layton-Henry, Conservative Party Politics, (London, Macmillan, 1980), p.23.
14. Punnett, op cit, p.261.
15. Butt, The Power of Parliament, (London, Constable, 1969, 2nd edition), p.330.
16. J.A. Cross, "The Withdrawal of the Conservative Party Whip", Parliamentary Affairs, 21, (1967), pp.166-175.
17. J. Mackintosh, The Government and Politics of Great Britain, (London, Hutchinson, 1970), p.58.
18. A. King & A. Sloman, Westminster and Beyond, (London, Macmillan, 1973), p.108.
19. P. Norton, Conservative Dissidents, (London, Temple Smith, 1978), p.163.

20. J. Schwartz & G. Lambert, "Career Objectives, Group Feeling and Legislative Party Cohesion: British Conservatives 1959-68", Journal of Politics, 33, (1971), pp.399-421.
21. R. Jackson, Rebels and Whips, (London, Macmillan, 1968), p.251.
22. Norton, op cit, p.199.
23. Jackson, op cit, p.21.
24. P. Goodhart, The 1922 Committee, (London, Macmillan, 1973).
25. H. Berrington, "The Conservative Party: Revolts & Pressures 1955-61", Political Quarterly, 32, (1961), pp.363-373.
M. Barnett, "Backbench Behaviour in the House of Commons", Parliamentary Affairs, 22, (1968), pp.38-61.
26. McKenzie, op cit, p.151.
27. ibid, p.146.
28. Maxwell-Fyfe Report, p.28.
29. Clarke, op cit, p.88
30. Clarke, "The Organisation of Political Parties", Political Quarterly, 21, (1950), p.88.
31. McKenzie, op cit, p.244.
32. A. Ranney, Pathways to Parliament, (London, Macmillan, 1965).
M. Rush, The Selection of Parliamentary Candidates, (London, Nelson, 1969), p.280, p.100.
33. Ranney, op cit, p.75
J. Biffen, "Constituency Leaders", Crossbow, (Autumn 1960).
34. On the CRD, see J. Ramsden, The Making of Conservative Party Policy, (London, Longman, 1980).
A. Beichman, "The Conservative Research Department", Journal of British Studies, 13, (1974), pp.92-113.
A. King, "How the Conservatives evolve policies", New Society, 20th July, 1972.
35. D. Wilson, Power and Party Bureaucracy in Britain, (Farnborough Saxon House, 1975).
36. A. Aughey, Constituency Attitudes and Policy Formulation, (Hull Papers in Politics, 1981).
37. King (1972), op cit, p.122.
38. McKenzie, "Power in the Conservative Party", British Journal of Sociology, 6 (1955), p.124.
39. McKenzie, op cit, p.291

40. M. Pinto-Duchinsky, op cit, p.6.
41. Ramsden, op cit, p.105.
42. D. Butler & D. Kavanagh, The British General Election of October 1974, (London, Macmillan, 1975), p.37.
43. See, for example, Holt and Turner, The Battle of Baron's Court, (London, Macmillan, 1968), p.257.
44. McKenzie, op cit, p.219.
45. Rush, op cit, p.19.
46. ibid, p.34; Ranney, op cit, chapter 2; Kilmuir, op cit, p.41.
47. Pinto-Duchinsky, op cit, p.7.
48. Rush, op cit, p.33; Kilmuir, op cit, p.159.
49. Z. Layton-Henry, The Chelmer Inquiry, (University of Warwick Research Paper, 1978).
50. R. Frasure & A. Kornberg, "Constituency Agents and British Party Politics", British Journal of Political Science, 5 (1975), pp.459-476.
51. Wilson, op cit. Wilson & Pinto-Duchinsky, "Conservative City Machines", British Journal of Political Science, 6, (1976), pp.239-244.
52. Lord Woolton, Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. The Earl of Woolton, (London, Cassell, 1959), p.333.
53. Rose, "Parties, Factions and Tendencies", Political Studies, 12, (1964), pp.33-46. See also Rose, The Problems of Party Government, (London, Penguin, 1976), chapter 12.
54. S.E. Finer, H. Berrington & D. Bartholomew, Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons 1955-59, (London, Pergamon, 1961).
H. Berrington, Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons 1945-55, (Oxford, Pergamon, 1973).
55. P. Seyd, "Factionalism in the 1970s" in Layton-Henry, (1980), op cit, p.235.
56. Rose, "The Bow Group's Role in British Politics", Western Political Quarterly, 14, (1961), pp.865-878.
57. Economist, 16th January 1960.
58. Telegraph, 18th February 1960.
59. Seyd, "Factionalism in the Conservative Party: the Monday Club", Government and Opposition, 7, (1973), p.481.
R. Copping, The Story of the Monday Club, (London, Current Affairs Information Service, 1972).

60. W. Grant and D. Marsh, The CBI, (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1977).
S. Blank, Industry and Government in Britain, (Farnborough, Saxon House, 1973).
P. Self and H. Storing, The State and the Farmer, (London, Allen and Unwin, 1962).
61. Gamble, op cit, p.320
Grant, "Business Interests and the British Conservative Party",
Government and Opposition, 15, (1980), pp.143-161.
62. Gamble and Seyd, Conservative Ideology and Electoral Strategy in Britain Since 1964, (Paper to the European Consortium for Political Research, Brussels, 1979), p.18.

Background

The immediate post-war period saw the establishment of the foundations of European integration. Continental Europe had been devastated by war, with the destruction of economic, social and political life. Such conditions led to the great attraction of European unity for many Continental Europeans, with its promise of an end to intra-European wars, co-operation towards economic recovery, and strength against the super-powers, especially the threatening neighbour of the Soviet Union. There was therefore a tremendous emotional desire for European unity, particularly on the right.

The situation in Britain, however, was somewhat different. Britain had emerged as one of the chief victors, and considered itself an equal partner to the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union. Britain as a nation-state, political leadership, the industrial base, Imperial Preference, the Commonwealth were not discredited by the war. Thus the Labour Government, and to a lesser extent, the Conservative opposition, while not unsympathetic to some aspects of the movement towards European unity, felt no sense of urgency. Britain saw Europe as only one of three circles of power, together with the U.S.A. and the Commonwealth and Empire, of which Britain was the focal point. The different situations of Britain and the Continent led to contrasting and conflicting perceptions of the method and direction of European integration. Many European politicians saw the need for supranational institutions to which national interests, and nationalist military interests, would be subordinated, and which would provide the political strength for Europe to behave as an independent actor on the world stage. These people favoured a new supranational institutional framework. The British, however, saw European integration as

developing upon the lines of intergovernmental co-operation designed to restore the nations of Europe to their former position. They favoured pragmatic, functional and intergovernmental institutional developments.

This contrast in approaches dominated the several attempts at European integration in the post-war period. It was at the insistence of the U.S.A. that their development programme for the recovery of Europe, the Marshall Plan, led to the creation of the O.E.E.C. (the Organisation of European Economic Co-operation) in 1948 to administer the programme through a European Payments Union and the liberalisation of intra-European trade. It was the British Government, however, who insisted that the O.E.E.C. should be an intergovernmental body, and not one with supranational elements as desired by the French. The Treaty of Brussels between the Benelux countries, France and Britain in 1948 was signed primarily as a common defence instrument against the Soviet Union but the British Government saw the Treaty as a preliminary to the involvement of the U.S.A. and Canada as well in a common defence, as provided by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (N.A.T.O.) in 1949. As with the O.E.E.C., the British Government frustrated attempts to turn the Council of Europe, created in May 1949, into a supranational body. While a Consultative Assembly was created, power lay firmly in the hands of the intergovernmental Committee of Ministers.

Frustration with the slowness of integration led to the bold announcement of the Schuman Plan in 1950, whereby the French Government offered to merge the coal and steel industries (vital to the ability to conduct war) with Germany, and any other European nation. While eventually six nations joined the European Coal and Steel Community (E.C.S.C.) in April 1951, the British Government felt unable to join because of the creation of the High Authority, a supranational decision-making body over whom the national governments would have no veto. In October 1950 the French Prime Minister, M. Plevin, launched

the idea of a European Army, based on similar supranational ideas to the Schuman Plan. This plan also met with a lack of support from the British Government.

Throughout this series of attempts at European unity, the Conservative Opposition had appeared far more positively disposed to these developments than the Government. The election to power of the Conservatives in October 1951 was thus seen as opening a new era in British participation in European integration. Our concern here is to examine the role and response of the various parts of the Conservative Party to these developments between 1945 and 1951.

The Leader

Despite the overwhelming defeat of the 1945 election, Winston Churchill remained the dominant figure of the Conservative Party, especially in the field of foreign policy, where he was virtually given a free hand. Disappointed at the way he had been treated by the British public and perhaps bored with details of domestic policy, Churchill was highly attracted to the role of international statesman. His frequent visits abroad met with considerable attention and a spontaneous welcome. During these visits he made two major and significant speeches. The first was at Fulton, Missouri, in March 1946, when he spoke of the iron curtain which had dropped over half of Europe and this marked the beginning of what became known as the Cold War. (1) While he emphasised the close relationship of the U.S.A. and the U.K., he also spoke of a new European unity which would include the defeated powers. The second was in Zurich, in September 1946, which gave great impetus to the European movement with his emotional demand that "we must build a kind of United State of Europe". (2) The endorsement of the European Movement by an internationally respected

statesman of the stature of Churchill helped to place these ideas on to the political agenda. Churchill thus emerged, without any conscious decision by himself, as a symbol of the European idea. In return he was flattered by the attention which he thus received, and pleased to have found an issue to establish him as a statesman of the future as well as of the past.

Duncan Sandys, Churchill's son-in-law, played a major role in creating the United Europe Movement in 1947 to campaign for the European idea in Britain, and persuaded Churchill to become chairman. The Movement provided Churchill with a major non-partisan platform to project himself as a major national leader as well as a party leader, such as at the launch of the Movement at a mass rally in the Albert Hall in May 1947.

In May 1948, as part of the campaign to inspire European public opinion, the International European Movement organised the Congress of Europe in the Hague, to which political, industrial and cultural leaders from the different European countries were invited. Despite the presence of many national government ministers, Churchill was one of the dominant figures of the Congress, gave a tremendously well received speech to the Congress, and was elected President of the International European Movement. The Congress passed a resolution calling for the establishment of a Constituent Assembly to represent the people of Europe, and this provided the inspiration for the creation of the Council of Europe. To the disappointment of federalists, it was an intergovernmental organisation, but it was a European political organisation with a wide remit of aims and interests, and it did provide for the creation of a Consultative Assembly to act as a voice of European public opinion. The Assembly, based in Strasbourg, was to represent European opinion and not national governments, and so

the British delegation was an all-party one. The decision of Churchill to lead the delegation was seen as further evidence of his commitment to the European idea. The Conservative delegation, known as 'the Tory Strasbourgers', was of high quality and played an active role in the Assembly.

The next attempt at European unity was the Schuman Plan for a coal and steel community. Membership of such a community was firmly rejected by the Labour Government because of the federalist element of the High Authority, which would have meant the subordination of the British coal and steel industry to a supranational authority. Churchill, while also suspicious of federalism, strongly condemned the Government for failing to even participate in the discussions on the same basis as the Netherlands with the right "to reserve its freedom to go back on the acceptances of these general principles...if it should prove in the future that these principles raise serious objections in practice". (3)

While Churchill proposed the creation of a European Army to the European Assembly on 11th September 1950, shortly before the Plevin Plan in October, those proposals, developed by Macmillan, were quite different from the Plevin proposals which quite explicitly tried to introduce the supranationalist approach of Schuman to the European Army. The Conservative approach was based on intergovernmental safeguards, so that the military experts would report to a Committee of Ministers, vital national rights would be protected, and every government would have the right of withdrawal after 12 months notice. Thus the policy of Churchill and the Conservatives was to encourage European developments while removing their supranationalist elements to enable British participation. Ernest Bevin, the Labour Foreign Secretary, quickly made it clear that he thought the Plan mistaken, and

favoured NATO as the sole military organisation.

As the general elections in 1950 and 1951 approached, as partisanship became more intense, and as opportunities for British leadership in Europe were missed, Churchill became more and more bitterly critical of the Labour Government, whose attitude to European questions, he attributed to "personal jealousies and party rancour". (4) He accused the Labour Government of being forced to make concessions to a united Europe "in the least possible degree, at the last possible moment and in a grudging manner". (5) The electoral campaign of 1951 was fought with what was seen as a clear difference of attitude between the Labour Government and the Conservative Opposition.

The subsequent inaction of Churchill as Prime Minister in the European field requires some explanation of his attitude in opposition. The first point to note is that Churchill's commitment to European unity was at the level of 'the broad stroke'. He had an emotional commitment to the need for European unity as the safeguard of Western civilisation, but this commitment did not translate into specific proposals about how this should be achieved. Such considerations were left to others. Thus in his speech to launch the European Movement at the Albert Hall he saw Europe as "a system of beliefs and ideas which we call Western Civilisation...and we are here to proclaim our resolve that the spiritual conception of Europe shall not die". (6) Later in the speech he stated "We know where we want to go, but we cannot foresee all the stages of the journey, nor can we plan our marches as in a military operation". (7) In his speech to the Congress of Europe, he said that the strength of the European Movement came "from our sense of common spiritual values", (8) and argued against rigid structures of constitutions. "That is a later stage, and it is one in which the leadership must be taken by the

ruling governments". (9) Macmillan described Churchill's approach to the European Army as typical. "At that stage, as indeed in many aspects of his European policy, Churchill had no clear or well-defined plan....His purpose was to throw out general ideas and give an impetus towards movements already at work. It was for others to find detailed solutions". (10) Churchill saw his role, and that of the European Movement, as the creators of a European public opinion to which national governments would respond with concrete proposals. It was not his job to provide the bricks, only the inspiration to build the house.

This broad commitment to the European idea enabled Churchill to avoid spelling out the role that Britain would play in a united Europe. It is clear that he believed in Britain's role as the focal point of the three circles of the U.S.A., the Commonwealth and Empire, and Western Europe. He accepted that this would involve Britain as a participant in a united Europe. "It was clear from his words that he contemplated a system in Europe in which Britain should play a leading role, not merely cheer from the side-lines", wrote Macmillan. (11) Churchill believed that British leadership was a requirement to achieve unity, "the mother country must be a prime mover". (12) This European role did not conflict with Britain's role towards the other two circles. He told a Conservative rally, "The conception of (sic) United Europe joined together in amity and fact, though not perhaps as yet in form, in no way conflicts with the fraternal association of the English-speaking Commonwealth and States". (13) He told the House of Commons that "this European policy of unity can perfectly well be reconciled with and adjusted to our obligations to the Commonwealth and Empire of which we are the heart and centre. I cannot believe that those difficulties will not be settled by patience and care". (14) This is

a perpetual theme in Churchill's European speeches, although there is little evidence to suggest that he considered how those conflicts could be resolved.

At other times, he was ambiguous about the nature of Britain's role, presenting Britain as a friend and supporter but not necessarily as a member. In his Zurich speech he spoke of Britain together with the U.S.A. and hopefully the Soviet Union as "friends and sponsors of the new Europe". (15) In his first published work on Europe in 1930, he wrote "We have our own dreams and our own task. We are linked but not comprised. We are with Europe but not of it". (16) Miriam Camps wrote, "It should be noted that although he called strongly for European unity, he did so in lofty but imprecise language and in a way that made it clear that Britain, although working closely with the Continent, would not in any real sense become 'integrated' with the Continent". (17) There exists, therefore, contradictory views over Churchill's attitude to membership of a United Europe.

However, a discussion of his attitude to federalism supports the view that he accepted the need for Britain's membership. Churchill was not opposed to federalism in principle, but felt that institutional discussion was not the best road to European unity, that federalism was then unacceptable to the British people, and anyway he probably found such debates rather tedious. He has normally been depicted as an anti-federalist. Yet there is reason to believe that he saw federalism as the possible future development of a United Europe. In his Zurich speech, he talked of "a kind of United States of Europe", (18) which has been interpreted as simply an example of his high-flown rhetoric. After the 1945 election defeat Churchill's wife told their doctor that Winston had told her, "If I were 10 years younger I might be the first President of the United States of Europe". (19)

For Churchill to become President, it would require both that Britain was a member of such a federation, and that the office would have some power and responsibility. In his Albert Hall speech he said, "There are several working bodies which are working directly for the federation of the European States and for the creation of a Federal Constitution of Europe. I hope that may eventually be achieved". (20) He accepted that a loss of sovereignty would be necessary. He told the Congress of Europe, "It is said with truth that this involves some sacrifice or merger of national sovereignty. But it is also possible and not less agreeable to regard it as the gradual assumption by all the nations concerned of that larger sovereignty which can alone protect their diverse and distinctive customs and characteristics and their national traditions". (21) He told the House of Commons that "national sovereignty is not inviolable". (22) He was unwilling to rule out the possibility of a federation in the long term, but saw it as a political impossibility in the near future. "To imagine that Europe today is ripe for either a political federation or a customs union would be wholly unrealistic. But who can say what may not be possible in the future". (23) Churchill did not exclude the possibility of a federal Europe or Britain's membership of it.

This, of course, does not mean that he was a federalist in the sense used in the post-war debates, such as at the Congress of Europe. Federalists were those who believed that the best or only way forward was the creation of a federal Constitution for Europe which national governments would accept due to the creation of immense pressure from mobilised European public opinion. The federalists concerned themselves largely with discussing the nature of such a constitution. Churchill, however, felt that this was premature. The current

objective was to mobilise public opinion in favour of the idea of a united Europe, which might be estranged by constitutional debates. "It is not for us at this stage to attempt to define or prescribe the structure of constitutions. We ourselves are content, in the first instance, to present the ideal of (sic) United Europe, in which our country will play a decisive part, as a moral, cultural and spiritual conception to which all can rally without being disturbed by divergencies about structure". (24) At the United Europe Exhibition in 1948 he said "My advice is not to attempt at this stage to define too precisely the exact constitutional form which will ultimately emerge. We would do better to concentrate our united efforts on immediately practicable steps". (25) Churchill was also conscious that British public opinion and the Conservative Party was not at that stage willing to accept supranationality. He made clear that the steps towards European unity that he supported did not imply federalism, and should be acceptable to the British public. He urged the Hague Congress, "Let us adopt nothing and say nothing that if we were ourselves charged with the responsibilities of Cabinet Ministers, we would not be prepared to ask our Parliaments to do". (26) He argued, in regard to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, that "The creation of a deliberative European Assembly naturally involves no transfer of sovereignty and raises no constitutional problems whatsoever". (27)

Thus it is argued here that Churchill was not opposed to a long term solution of a federal United States of Europe, but felt that it was a strategy which might follow the mobilisation of opinion but should not precede it, and that in the current climate of opinion in the Conservative party and the British electorate it was not a viable proposition, and therefore any serious politician would be wasting his

time championing such a cause. Britain should play a leading role in European unity, and not simply as a supporter, but no faster than was acceptable to British opinion.

The final point to make about Churchill's attitude was his intense desire to make the issue a national and all-Party one, and not a partisan issue. He told a Conservative rally, "This is not a Party theme. It is one to which all parties in our island should and will subscribe". (28) There were several considerations that led to the adoption of this position. Firstly, he felt that the issue was of such importance that it was 'above Party politics' and continually stressed the all-Party nature of the United Europe Committee. (29) "The movements towards European unity cannot be a monopoly of any party". (30) "Let us try to keep the idea of a United Europe above the Party divisions which are inevitable, permissible and indeed tolerable in all free countries". (31) Secondly, he was conscious, both as a former Prime Minister and a prospective one, of the need for the European Movement not to impose on the responsibilities of Governments - that the British Government was speaking on behalf of the British people, and that function should not be confused by anything that the European Movement do or say. Rather he saw the role of the European Movement to create a public opinion which would enable the Government to act in the desired direction. "Of course, we understand that until public opinion expresses itself more definitely, Governments hesitate to take positive action. It is for us to provide the proof of solid popular support, both here and abroad, which will give the Governments of Europe confidence to go forward and give practical effect to their beliefs". (32) He continually expressed the view that there was no conflict between the activities of the United European Movement and the Government. "I

must say a word about our unofficial Committee for a United Europe, and also about its limitations. I am most anxious to re-assure the Government and the Foreign Secretary on this subject. We do not aspire to compete with Governments in the executive sphere. What we seek to do is to build up moral, cultural, sentimental and social unities and affinities throughout all Europe, or all those parts of Europe where freedom still reigns. Nothing in the activities of our unofficial movement and committee can hamper the progress of the policy of Her Majesty's Government". (33) "We are not seeking in the European Movement...to usurp the functions of Government. I have tried to make this plain again and again to the heads of the Government". (34)

Churchill's recognition of the responsibilities of Government and the need for a bipartisan foreign policy made him committed to the all-party nature of the European Movement. This meant that he was most careful not to present the European idea as Party policy. While the European issue was frequently referred to in his speeches to Party supporters(although rarely the main theme), it was always presented as a view which Conservatives should support rather than as Conservative Party policy. He told the Primrose League, "I ask my friends in the Conservative Party, which I have the honour to lead, to give the whole question their earnest consideration". (35) To a Conservative rally, "I commend the cause of a United Europe to the Conservative and Unionist Party in Great Britain. This is not a Party theme", almost as if he was a non-Party speaker. (36) To the Women's Conservative Conference, "I have always tried to keep this Movement outside and above Party politics, and I shall continue to strive to do so". (37) While his prestige as Party leader inevitably encouraged Conservative support for a United Europe, that support was not sought as Party

leader. There were none of the appeals to Party loyalty, or trust in the Party leadership that were to be seen later. The issue was to be judged by Conservatives on their merits as a policy for Britain not as Party policy.

It was his strong insistence on this approach that made him so angry with what he perceived as the partisan nature of the Government's actions. He criticised the proposal to form a European Association of Socialist Parties and warned the Government, "I hope that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary will not commit the great mistake and failure of duty of trying to divert this move of European unity into Party channels". (38) He attacked the Government over its hostility to the Congress of Europe. "One of the least creditable actions of the Socialist Government and Party was their attempt, their vain attempt, to sabotage the Congress of Europe at the Hague three weeks ago....This is very small -minded behaviour and unworthy of the gravity of the issues at stake". (39) "The British Government have gained very little credit in any quarter by their handling of this large issue, and petty and personal jealousies, arising from the fact that I revived this idea of a United Europe two years ago in a speech at Zurich, have clouded the vision of some of them". (40) "The attitude of the Socialist Party...has hitherto been far from creditable and below the level of these important world and human events. Petty personal jealousies and party rancour have marred their action and falsified their principles". (41)

Churchill was no doubt naive in believing that there could be a separation in the eyes of the public, the Conservative Party or the Labour Party, between Churchill as Party leader and Churchill as international statesman. The United European Movement was seen by many in the Labour Party (not entirely incorrectly) as an attempt to

re-establish Churchill's prestige in the world and at home and, therefore, a threat to their own power in Government. Herbert Morrison, Labour Deputy Leader, refused a request to speak to the European Movement in these words. "I think that it was most unfortunate that both Winston Churchill and Duncan Sandys should have been placed in positions of responsibility as this was bound to make the situation difficult for our people....My people have strong suspicions that the European Movement was working in association with the British Conservative machine at Strasbourg against the Labour representatives and this leaves very unpleasant impressions". (42)

Sidney Silverman told the 1948 Labour Conference that Churchill was "merely trying to pull a United Europe into existence in order to recapture that platform we took from him in 1945". (43) Whatever Churchill's own attitude, it was inevitable that his position on Europe should have been seen as an implicit challenge to the conduct of foreign policy of the Labour Government. The charge of partisanship was already widespread before his critical comments on the Labour Government's approach from late 1948 onwards.

The role of Churchill in Conservative attitudes towards Europe was clearly a major one. As the war-time Prime Minister, his views on foreign policy were given great respect and he was virtually given a free hand. He inspired that positive attitude towards the idea of a United Europe which has existed in the Party ever since. However, his role should not be exaggerated. He himself tried very hard to play down his role as Party leader when promoting the European idea, he did not use the full weight of the Party machine behind the European Movement, and he did not seek to commit the Party totally to his views on Europe. He was well aware of the existence of fears and concerns about Europe in the Party leadership, the Parliamentary Party and the

Party workers, which acted as some constraint on his public utterances. The Conservative Party was also part of that public opinion he hoped to win over to the European cause, and he did not treat it as an obedient and quiet follower. As we shall see, opinions in the leadership were by no means uniform.

Shadow Cabinet

Churchill dominated his Shadow Cabinet, because of his personality, his position as an international statesman, and the absence of many Conservative leaders due to the 1945 losses. Gradually many of them returned, but it took some time to develop an effective Shadow Cabinet. For most of this period, it was rather a loose group which acted as a discussion forum as much as a decision-making body.

In the Shadow Cabinet there was a consensus in favour of European unity. Differences existed over (i) whether Britain needed to be a member of a European union, or merely a supporter; (ii) whether British membership would conflict with her commitment to the Empire and Commonwealth; and (iii) whether a United Europe inevitably meant some form of federalism. However, as is common in committees, the concrete issues facing them rarely presented themselves in these clear-cut terms. It was not until the Schuman Plan that these differences were forced to the surface. During this period the Shadow Cabinet was concerned with presenting a more positive attitude towards the concept of European unity than the Labour Government, without discussing details. The Shadow Cabinet was agreed on the need for European unity, especially as part of a wider Western Union, to act as a bulwark against the Soviet Union. There was little problem in supporting Churchill's promotion of the European cause, while it remained in general terms. Indeed a number of the Shadow Cabinet themselves

played an active role in the European Movement, such as Duncan Sandys, David Maxwell-Fyfe, Harold Macmillan, Leo Amery and Oliver Stanley.

Duncan Sandys, as Churchill's son-in-law, played a significant role in influencing him to associate himself so strongly with the European idea. Sandys was the organiser of the United European Movement in Britain and the Hague Congress, and was the enthusiastic and energetic driving-force behind the United European Movement. Sandys believed in the need for European Unity as "the surest means of turning the tide of Communism and tyranny", ⁽⁴⁴⁾ in the necessity of full British participation to achieve that goal, and in the lack of any fundamental conflict with Britain's Imperial role. At the 1949 Party Conference, Sandys presented an amendment in the foreign affairs debate, calling for all measures towards European Unity "consistent with the full maintenance of the unity of the British Empire and continuing collaboration with the U.S.", ⁽⁴⁵⁾ in order to make clear to the Party the leadership's close support for the cause.

Sandys recommended "the functionalist approach. This involves no federal constitution and no irrevocable transfer of sovereign powers". ⁽⁴⁶⁾ "I have never been a keen federalist, or a federalist". ⁽⁴⁷⁾ He believed federalism was impractical but feared a split with the Continental European Movement. "It is best that they should learn this for themselves". ⁽⁴⁸⁾ He forthrightly rejected claims that European unity involved a federalist system. "No-one of this side of the House has seriously recommended that a federal system should be instituted in Europe or that we should join it". ⁽⁴⁹⁾ Sandys was a committed supporter of British participation in European unity on a functionalist basis, that the way forward was through the creation of intergovernmental organisations with responsibility for specific and limited functions.

Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe was a major figure in the Shadow Cabinet, author of the Maxwell-Fyfe Report which helped reform the post-war Conservative Party, and another enthusiastic European. He "accepted with enthusiasm" (50) Churchill's invitation to join the Executive Committee of the United European Movement, attended the Hague Congress and was a member of the Conservative delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. He became a leading and much respected figure in the Assembly, where he played a major role as Chairman of the Legal and Administrative Committee in the creation of the European Convention of Human Rights. Like Sandys, he was a functionalist, giving his unqualified support to those "who believe that the way to greater union is the common attack on varied problems and the function of co-operation inherent in their solution". (51)

With the tremendous respect in which he felt Britain was regarded in the rest of Europe, the exercise of leadership, understanding and responsibility by Britain would have led to the establishment of European unity on terms quite acceptable to Britain. It was with a tone of considerable regret, and almost bitterness, that he noted that failure in his autobiography. "It seems almost incredible were it not true that we should so contemptuously have thrown over an opportunity for leading Europe into an economic, military, moral and cultural unity without parallel in her long and tortured history. The Europe of 1950 was avid for British leadership". (52)

Harold Macmillan was a third European enthusiast among the Shadow Spokesmen. He was active in the European Movement at the Hague Congress, Chairman of a Commonwealth Conference organised by the European League for Economic Co-operation (E.L.E.C.), and Chairman of the Central and East European Committee of the International European Movement. Macmillan's attitude to the situation of the Empire, and

the federalist/functionalist debate is not so clear. Publicly he endorsed the pre-eminent role of the Empire. He described the Empire as "the centre and pivot of the Grand Design", (53) and stated that if a choice had to be made between Empire and Europe, no M.P. "would hesitate for a single moment....I do not believe that this choice forces us...an absolutely unreal dilemma...our first duty, of course, lies to the Empire". (54) Nigel Forman expressed doubt "whether he was voicing his own intellectual opinions". (55)

Macmillan's position was that British participation was vital to the success of European Unity. "I do not think it (the Council of Europe) can survive yet alone achieve its purpose, without full British participation. Yet if it perishes, the last hope of peace will perish with it". (56) He was strongly critical of the lack of support provided by the British Labour Government. However, he also recognised that there was insufficient support in Britain for any supranationality. "One thing is certain, and we may as well face it, our people will not hand over to any supranational authority the right to close down our pits or our steelworks". (57) He himself accepted the "merging of sovereignty in practice not principle" (58) but recognised the political restraints on such a policy.

There were other members of the Shadow Cabinet, such as Leo Amery and Oliver Stanley, whose support for European unity was clear, but for whom the price they were willing to pay was smaller. Leo Amery was a member of the European Council of the United European Movement, and his importance lay in his strong identification with the cause of Empire. His support for European unity was a strong demonstration in many people's eyes that there was no incompatibility between Europe and Empire. Indeed he argued that European unity was desirable in the interests of the Empire. "European unity is of vital significance

to the whole Commonwealth, and it is our duty and interest to share actively in the task of promoting it. We and other members of the Commonwealth can do so without detriment". (59) At the same time his opposition to federalism was made absolutely clear: "The real solution would seem to lie, not in the direction of federalism, but in that of securing effective co-operation between governments as governments". (60) He attacked "the misplaced enthusiasm of certain advocates of European unity who can only think in terms of a federal constitution" (61) and said it was "essential to make it clear to our Continental friends that if and when it comes to anything in the nature of a surrender of sovereignty...we must stand outside". (62) The support of Amery was significant both in demonstrating the breadth of support for European unity, but the limits beyond which much support would not go. Another figure who reassured the Empire was Oliver Stanley who was a well-respected party figure, a former Colonial Secretary and another member of the European Movement's Executive Council.

The most difficult role to explain in the 1945-51 period is that of Anthony Eden. He is generally regarded as one of the main causes of the failure of greater British involvement in European integration. Yet it was while he was Shadow Foreign Secretary and a respected figure in foreign affairs in his own right, that the general Conservative commitment to Europe was established.

Eden supported European unity. During the war he saw some form of federation as a war aim, in 1947 welcomed the Marshall Plan as the first step to European unity, (63) and was anxious to encourage Franco-German co-operation, but he viewed Britain's role as an external supporter. His interest was in Western unity, in which a United Europe would play a significant role together with the U.S.A. and

Britain and her Empire. The Empire was the basis for Britain's position as a world power, so "For us in this House as a whole, the welfare of the Commonwealth and Empire must always be first consideration". (64) From this perspective British participation in any federation was impossible. He spoke against a Commons motion on federalism, and stated at Columbia University, "This is something we know in our bones we cannot do". (65) "We continuously encouraged close co-operation and unity between the continental powers but we did so from the reserve position that we would not accept a sovereign European authority". (66) His "lack of enthusiasm for the movement for Western European Unity" (67) was certain, but lacks a clear explanation. Macmillan wrote, "I have never understood why Antony Eden stood aloof". (68)

An explanation may be found in the multiple impact of a number of factors. One was Eden's close personal relationship to Bevin, "one of his few personal friends in politics". (69) Foreign policy debates were often between the two front benches on one side and a group of dissidents, either on the left or the right, on the other. Eden believed in a bipartisan foreign policy and was opposed to the use of foreign policy as a partisan weapon. He felt that much Conservative criticism of the Government on the European issue was simply an attempt to make party points. "He tended to believe that it was all a 'party stunt' of Winston's". (70)

A second factor was the strong influence of the Foreign Office, with whom he had served for a long period of time. The Foreign Office was opposed to any firm commitment to British participation in European unity. Despite being in opposition, when politicians often lose touch with officials (and therefore become more open to radical ideas), Eden's close contact with Bevin included contact with the

officials, and their influence upon him remained strong. One biographer wrote that "he did not wish to diverge from the Foreign Office, who certainly commanded more of his loyalty and affection than the Conservative Party was ever able to do". (71) A third factor was his lack of involvement with the Continental Europeans, which consistently led him to underestimate the strength of Continental feeling. Those involved with the European Movement were highly conscious of the gap between Continental and British opinion and sought to bridge their gap, while often being infected by Continental enthusiasm. Eden's attendance at the Hague Congress however was only as a result of strong pressure from Churchill, and his lack of enthusiasm was evident. Kilmuir placed great importance on Eden's absence from the Conservative delegation to the Council of Europe. "His absence from the meetings of the Council of Europe in those exciting and very moving months of its existence was a great misfortune for himself, Europe, and the Conservative Party and the cause of world peace". (72)

Another factor was his poor relationship with Churchill. There was a significant difference in assessment of the Soviet Union, with Eden taking a less hostile position. Churchill believed that Eden was behind several attempts to remove him as leader, while Eden felt that Churchill was using foreign policy for domestic party advantage. Their relations were not close. Despite Eden's position as Shadow Foreign Secretary, he played no effective role in the development or articulation of European policy. He lacked any commitment to a policy in which he had not participated, and viewed it as Churchill's policy rather than that of the Conservative Party.

The final factor was that "at root Eden was an Atlanticist with a view of Great Britain as a world power whose aspirations had

scarcely altered since the inter-war years". (73) Eden believed that Britain could remain as one of the major powers together with the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union, with her position as head of the Empire. It was for this reason that he argued that "the first consideration of the U.K. must always be the welfare of the Commonwealth". (74)) He perceived this as a most formidable obstacle to British participation in a united Europe, so he preferred to encourage unity from outside rather than as a leader within.

Thus the Shadow Foreign Secretary was not committed to the spirit of much of the Conservative discussion on European policy, but while there was no need to establish any concrete positions then this situation, and the presence of other sceptics, did not matter a great deal. However, once decisions had to be made, these differences clearly emerged. The issue that brought differences to the fore was the Schuman Plan. In May 1950 Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, proposed the merger of the coal and steel industries of the war-time enemies of France and Germany, and opened the proposal to other nations. The specific nature of the proposal was the creation of a supranational Higher Authority, over which the national governments would have no control. The presentation of this concrete proposal, which required a British response, brought to the surface the differences within the Shadow Cabinet.

Some urged a positive response. Macmillan tried to arouse support and "expressed alarm at the somewhat tepid reception given so far in British official circles to the Schuman proposals....If the plan is pursued and implemented, it will be a wonderful step forward. But if it fails, it will mean a serious deterioration. It will be more than a set-back. It will be a disaster". (75) He wrote to the Times as Chairman of E.L.E.C. (76) and sent an urgent minute to

Churchill urging that a Commons motion be placed in support of the Plan. (77) The 'Europeans' recognised the problem of the supranational authority but wanted the party to understand the attitude of the Continentals. They recognised that a federal solution was unacceptable in Britain, but feared that no British participation would destroy the Plan completely, and believed that Britain could achieve the necessary changes to make the Plan acceptable. Thus Macmillan's minute read:

- "3. There is, of course, no Schuman Plan in existence....There is a plan to have a plan.
- 4. But this is the very reason why Britain should be in from the start. Then we can mould the plan to our pattern.
- 5. If we are not in:
 - either (i) the whole thing will collapse, and with it all real hope of European co-operation;
 - or (ii) the Governments will, in due course get complete control". (78)

Maxwell-Fyfe felt the Plan was too ambitious and would fail.

"My general impression is quite clear, namely that it is unworkable". (79)

He felt that British participation was essential to ensure that something would be saved from the Plan and in a form acceptable to Britain. Eccles argued that without British participation the Higher Authority would have considerably more power, while British participation would ensure a more acceptable solution.

There was, however, considerable opposition within the Shadow Cabinet by what Maxwell-Fyfe described as "many of the most dominant figures on the Conservative benches". (80) Eden, Salisbury and Stanley were opponents. Their arguments against were on grounds of sovereignty, and that the British coal and steel industries would not

be better off in such an arrangement. (81)

A compromise emerged. In the Commons, the Conservative position was to attack the Labour Government for their hostile attitude, and urge British participation on the same basis as the Dutch who had agreed to participate but without any prior commitment. Eden very reluctantly endorsed this position, the first time that he did not follow the Foreign Office position on a major issue. He accepted the collective Shadow Cabinet position put through by Churchill under the strong influence of Macmillan.

The Commons debate was held on 26th and 27th June 1950 on the Conservative motion

"That this House requests H.M.G., in the interests of peace and full employment, to accept the invitation to take part in the discussions on the Schuman Plan, subject to the same condition as that made by the Netherlands Government, namely, that if the discussions show the Plan not to be practicable, freedom of action is reserved".

The basis of the Conservative case was that Government hostility was based on partisan motives; that the Plan was anti-national planning; that socialist governments would be in the minority; and that the trade unions feared the loss of their negotiating power. Eden presented the motion in a rather half-hearted manner, which contrasted greatly with Churchill's scornful attack on the Government. Max Beloff has described the debate as "noteworthy as being the only occasion in this period when a Parliamentary Opposition attacked the Government for its unwillingness to proceed faster in the direction of European integration". (82)

The second part of their policy was to seek to influence Continental discussion through the Macmillan-Eccles Plan, which was presented to the Assembly of the Council of Europe on 15th August 1950.

Macmillan has described the three main differences from Schuman.

- "1. The experts who co-ordinate the coal and steel industries will be responsible to a Committee of Ministers, and therefore the link with the underlying Parliaments is kept.
2. The basic social, economic and strategic interests of each country are safeguarded from encroachment by the experts.
3. Any member can withdraw on giving 12 months notice and any member can be expelled by the others". (83)

The proposed coal and steel community could exist under the Council of Europe, as perhaps the first of a series of functional organisations with which nations could choose to associate, "integration à la carte" (Sandys). However, as Max Beloff noted, "This was far removed indeed from the ideas of the supranationalists and the scheme met with little response in the Assembly where it was allowed to die in committee". (84) This compromise formula had at least managed to keep together a united Shadow Cabinet, until the next issue of a European army.

Churchill recognised that the Soviet threat required all the resources of the West to combine in defence, and that included German rearmament and participation. When the issue was raised at the European Assembly in August 1950, Churchill decided to propose a motion calling for the immediate creation of a European Army as the means to enable German rearmament. "We should make a gesture of practical and constructive guidance by declaring ourselves in favour of the immediate creation of a European army under a unified command, and in which we should bear a worthy and honourable part". (85) This was presented in the form of a general idea rather than any considered plan. The motion was endorsed by the Assembly.

On October 24th 1950 the French Government presented the Pleven Plan for a European army, with German participation, integration at

unit level, a supranational authority à la Schuman, a European Minister of Defence, European Budget and a European Parliament for defence. The Conservative reaction was to reject the Plan as of little military value but to fear that failure would set back co-operation. Churchill described the plan as a "sludgy amalgam", (86) and felt that there was too much mixing of nationalities to create an effective military force. The Conservative position was to favour national divisions with a Supreme Commander, the centralisation of supply, the standardisation of arms, but no elaborate or supranational authority. Sandys, speaking for the Party in the Commons, supported a European Army as the only framework for German rearmament but opposed the Pleven Plan because it would hinder co-operation through N.A.T.O., proposed a European Minister of Defence, and favoured a European Parliament instead of democratic control through a joint committee of national parliaments. (87)

Eden's position was somewhat different. He favoured a European Army to encourage Franco-German entente. "I had no quarrel with the conception of a European Defence Community. On the contrary, I liked the idea, for I have never thought that my country need have any apprehension on account of a closer union between the nations of continental Europe". He, however, was opposed to British participation in a European Army. He also endorsed the Conservative opposition to Pleven. "I feared that the plan, imaginative as it was, might fail for just that reason. It seemed to attempt too much, to ask more of the nations concerned than they could freely give and then the outcome might be disillusion, leaving Europe in disarray". (88)

Eden's contribution was to urge that a European Army should be created within an Atlantic Army, leaving the nature of Britain's position ambiguous. (89) The issue of the Army was still unresolved

when a second election was called and the Conservatives were called to form the Government, when the different attitudes would re-emerge.

Parliamentary Party

The Parliamentary Conservative Party was devastated by the 1945 election with the loss of many seats. Gradually it restored itself in morale, but the 1945 intake included a large number of inexperienced M.P.s. Due to the presence of Churchill and Eden, foreign affairs was largely left to them. There was a heartfelt desire to unite again the socialist government, and so to avoid strong intra-party conflict.

There was in the Commons a small group of European enthusiasts who made most of the running on this issue. Most M.P.s were willing to follow the lead from the leadership. While in support of the general concept of European unity and especially Western union, they were hostile to federalist experiments. There was also a group of opponents, however, who never provided a coherent critique of the European issue, although they often articulated fears which were felt more widely.

The most prominent backbench speaker for European unity was Bob Boothby, an articulate, irascible and independent-minded Tory from Aberdeenshire East. Boothby spoke frequently inside and outside the Commons on two necessities for him: the need for Europe to develop as a 'third force' between the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union, and the need for democratic regional economic planning, which would provide a middle way between laissez-faire capitalism on the one side, and communism on the other. Together these two concerns led him to believe that this was the end of the era of the sovereign state.

The concept of sovereignty was obsolete. "The smaller nations

of Western Europe, of whom we are one, cannot hope to survive politically or economically in isolation". (90) "War is inherent and endemic in a world of completely independent sovereign states". (91) European unity must involve the surrender of sovereignty. "If it is to be anything more than a meaningless phase, it must involve some merging or pooling of national authority or sovereignty for defined purposes". (92) Boothby believed in the need for some supranational authority and supported an Early Day Motion in favour of federalism in 1948, but was aware that many Conservative backbenchers were suspicious of such ideas.

His first objective was to avoid the absorption of Europe into either the U.S. or Soviet blocs. "Unless we get together in pursuit of a common political and economic policy we shall, inevitably, sooner or later, be absorbed into one or other of the great economic or political blocs which surround us". (93) His fear of American dominance led him to vote against the American loan agreement in 1945. (94) He also feared that the only alternative to voluntary co-operation was domination by the Soviet Union. He believed that there was "only one alternative to the regional planning of Europe by mutual agreement, and that is yet another attempt at unification of the European economy by force, or by the threat of force". (95) He attributed the failure to achieve peace after World War 1 partly "to our refusal to abandon the obsolete economic doctrines of laissez-faire and multi-lateral free trade, and our refusal to accept the modern economic concept of regional planning and organisation, both for economic and defence purposes". (96) He felt that Western Europe could combine the best of the Soviet Union, economic planning but without the loss of democracy, and the U.S.A., with its democracy and freedom but without its "free knock-about capitalism". (97) Thus

Boothby presented a Third Force approach, which was not widely supported in the Parliamentary Party or shared by his fellow 'Europeans'.

There was a group of enthusiasts, around 60, who took many opportunities to express their support for European unity. They contributed to many debates and participated actively in the work of the European Movement. Boothby and Leslie Hore-Belisha were on the Executive, and Julian Amery was a member of its Central and East European Commission. Boothby, Walter Elliot, Henry Hopkinson, Hore-Belisha and Colonel Hutchinson attended the International European Movement in Paris. 23 Conservative M.P.s attended the Hague Congress, one of the most impressive single delegations. Three Conservatives (Boothby, Sir Peter Macdonald, Peter Roberts) joined an all-party ad-hoc drafting committee on an Early Day Motion which called for a long term policy of Britain's membership of a federal Europe, which achieved support from over 60 Conservative M.P.s ⁽⁹⁸⁾ A later Early Day Motion, welcoming the Council of Europe, received over 65 Conservative votes. ⁽⁹⁹⁾ This group also provided a number of the Conservative members of the European Assembly, including Boothby, David Eccles, Lady Tweedsmuir, Henry Hopkinson and Christopher Hollis. None of this is to suggest there was anything like an organised European faction. There did, however, exist a number of individual minds who were thinking along similar lines, and who co-operated on an ad hoc basis, such as over a particular Early Day Motion.

The ideas of this group can be represented by the expressed views of Anthony Nutting, a young and rising star in the Party, and Sir Peter Macdonald, a respected spokesman for this viewpoint. Nutting castigated the Labour Government for their failure to provide a lead. "How long has the time been ripe to organise Western Europe?

I should have thought that the time was now over-ripe". He saw the need to unite against the Soviet Union, Europe was already divided, and the cold war had begun. He rejected the Third Force idea proposed by some Labour supporters of Europe and Boothby, saw Western Europe as part of a wider Western Union, and expressed the opinion widely shared among Conservative Europeans' that "Surely we in this country, in Western Europe, are the only people who can give a lead to Western Europe today". (100)

Sir Peter Macdonald, a more traditional backbencher, accepted the need for federation and the loss of sovereignty, and helped draft the Early Day Motion calling for "a long-term policy...to create a democratic federation of Europe". He fervently rejected the view that there was a conflict between Europe and the Commonwealth. "The charge made against the promoters of this Motion is that we are leaving the Commonwealth behind...in the whole of my political life, I have been devoted to the interests of the Commonwealth". (101)

He mentioned support from Smuts of South Africa, MacKenzie-King of Canada and Fraser of New Zealand.

In the same debate Boothby rejected such charges. "What nonsense those people write and talk who say that the idea of the British Empire and Commonwealth and of a United Europe are contradictory or clashing ideas. On the contrary, they are entirely complementary". (102)

He argued that British participation would help the Commonwealth because Britain would then be part of a great power, and could provide access to European markets. (103)

While the group were federalists in the long term, they accepted that progress should be at a pace widely acceptable. Boothby attacked one approach, the Interlaken Plan, as "an orgy of constitution-mongering to no useful purpose", (104) which created a bad image in

Britain. Lady Tweedsmuir accepted that "if political federalism is not possible, we must achieve things on a functional basis". (105) Sir Arthur Salter accepted federal union as the ultimate development, but felt it should be achieved through dealing with immediate problems. "Although it is well that we go step by step...we should have an idea of the direction which we are going". (106)

Thus the 'Europeans', the first of what critics call the Euro-fanatics, provided pressure on the leadership, helped to create a positive attitude to Europe among other backbenchers, and while accepting federalism as a long-term aim, accepted that a slow pace may be necessary to obtain broad acceptance among Conservatives and the nation. There were few outright opponents to a European policy. Aidan Crawley, then a Labour M.P., claimed that no clear Conservative attitude existed, and Conservatives were strongly divided. "There is a deep division on both sides of this House, between parties and throughout the country". (107) If so, the determined opponents were able to find few spokesmen in the Commons. Only 3 opponents emerged in the parliamentary debates - Lord Hinchingsbrooke, Sir Herbert Williams and Harry Legge-Bourke.

Hinchingsbrooke was a member of the reformist Tory Reform Committee and saw the United Nations as the instrument to bring peace. Western union he saw only as a threat to world peace. "I do not believe that a Western bloc will serve to increase our security, or that of the other countries proposed to be included in it....It will be resented by the Dominions who will think that our industrial effort is being diverted from them into Europe; it will be resented by the U.S. who are, above all, concerned to see that the potentialities for conflict in Europe are reduced, and not increased. It will increase apprehension in Russia, and play right into their

hands by prolonging the game of power politics....I believe the policy of the Western bloc to be a stupid and childish game of *tu quoque*". (108)

Sir Herbert Williams, described by Forman as "a typical backwoodsman",⁽¹⁰⁹⁾ strongly opposed the European Movement, the Council of Europe, the Schuman Plan and a European Army. "I should not shed any tears if the Council of Europe never met again....(The European Movement) represent nobody but themselves, and they do not bind the rest of their parties in the faintest degree....I am completely opposed to our participation in the Schuman Plan. I do not believe in what is described as a European Army...(the Hague Congress is) the reverse of what I regarded as some of the fundamental principles of the Conservative Party". (110)

Legge-Bourke was somewhat more moderate. "I am, before anything else, a nationalist....I am in favour of the Council of Europe, but I am in favour of it only on one set of terms, and that it remains as a council and does not become an international pressure group". He opposed the Council of Europe having limited function but real powers; was against a unified army although favoured a combined army, because "I oppose a political authority"; and opposed the Schuman Plan as "very dangerous indeed for the British Commonwealth". (111)

They proposed several Early Day Motions of their own, but they did not obtain substantial support. Two amendments which explicitly rejected federal union (33/47A) and which required the prior agreement of the Commonwealth (33A/47) attracted only 15 signatures, compared to 60 for federalism and 65 for the Council of Europe. On the Schuman Plan they were only able to get 6 Conservative abstainers (Legge-Bourke, Enoch Powell, Gerald Nabarro, McAdden, A.V. Harvey and Sir John Mellor)⁽¹¹²⁾ despite a claim that "a lot of Tories would not vote.

They said that they would not go into the Lobby to hand over our coal and steel industries to Europe". (113)

Why did they fail to generate more support? They clearly articulated fears that were widespread among Conservative backbenchers, in particular over the effect of the Commonwealth and the loss of sovereignty. Colonel Hutchinson said, "We wait with interest the plan...to see how far that integration can be consolidated and made compatible (with the Commonwealth) with the other aims, that is the closer integration of Europe with which I also agree". (114) John MacLay stated, "I am very nervous about the extreme idealist advocates of the federal idea", warned that it would require many stages to achieve Western union, that the national governments would have to do much of the work, and yet even he hoped that "we could bit by bit gradually hand over sovereignty until we achieved the kind of federal world which I think most people would like to see achieved". (115)

The majority of backbenchers appeared to have been convinced that Western unity was a necessity to stop Soviet domination, and that European unity was an essential part of any Western co-operation. Concerned about loss of sovereignty and the Commonwealth, they appeared to have confidence firstly in Churchill's leadership on the issue, and secondly that British participation would mean British leadership and therefore a Europe on British terms.

Even when the issue came to a decision point over Schuman, backbench support remained. A meeting of the M.P.s was held on 19th June 1950 to discuss Schuman. According to Macmillan, over 80 were present, 23 spoke in favour of Schuman and only 2 or 3 against. "There was an overwhelming majority that the party should give a lead and that a motion should be tabled. Some who afterwards spoke in the debate and were believed to have special knowledge of the industries

concerned had given their support. The younger elements were anxious for a clear and positive attitude". (116) In the Commons debate, influential backbenchers such as David Eccles, Quintin Hogg, Harold Watkinson and Julian Amery spoke in support. Edward Heath also gave his maiden speech in favour. "There were a few speeches expressing doubt from the Conservative benches, but a great body rallied to the lead which Churchill and Eden gave". (117)

The Parliamentary Party only provided a limited restraint upon the leadership. Their fears were already represented in the Shadow Cabinet, while they generally supported the pro-European position of the Party. Even when the issue was presented in a concrete form, over the Schuman Plan, the bulk of backbenchers had no problems in supporting the Shadow Cabinet position.

National Union

The ordinary party members tended not to discuss political issues a great deal, unless requested by the leadership. On this question, the party membership was encouraged to discuss Europe by the leadership. Churchill frequently mentioned the issue at Conservative meetings and rallies, even while emphasising its non-partisan nature. He also sought to calm fears over the Empire. "I cannot think, and here I come to the issue which I know is much in your minds, that the policy of a United Europe as we Conservatives conceive it can be the slightest injury to our British Empire and Commonwealth". (118) European Review, information on the Council of Europe, European Movement literature and speakers were distributed to local Associations. The Conservative Political Centre, the political education wing of the Party, published a pamphlet by Boothby and encouraged discussion groups on the topic, and the Women's

organisation discussed it at their Central Council in 1948. All this represented a desire from the centre for Conservative grass-roots support for the European ideal.

At Party conferences, uncontroversial motions on the Empire provided the main foreign policy debates until 1949. In 1948 two speakers emphasised that Imperial Preference must come before trade with Europe, while two other speakers supported European co-operation. In 1949 European unity was discussed for the first time at a Conservative Conference. At an earlier debate on Imperial Preference, the concept of the three circles was reiterated by Eden. The motion on European Unity, proposed by Sandys and John Foster M.P., stated:

"That this Conference welcomes the creation of the Council of Europe and promises its support for all practical measures to promote closer European Unity, consistent with the full maintenance of the unity of the British Empire and continuing collaboration with the U.S.". (119)

Unusually an amendment was called for debate, proposed by Hinchingbrooke, M.P., and Michael Astor, M.P., but it was accepted by Sandys and carried by a large majority. Sandys' proposing speech emphasised the necessity of European unity to defeat Communism and to provide bigger markets, and that the protection of the Empire was a precondition for British participation in a United Europe. "I submit to you that where Mr. Amery leads no Empire man need hesitate to follow". Hinchingbrooke emphasised that he was not against the main motion, but wished to strengthen the three circles. The speech by Leo Amery was an important one. He stated that conference would not accept unity which impaired the Empire, spoke against federalism and emphasised that "a free and friendly Europe is an essential element in our Imperial defence". The only opposing speaker noted that the motion called for unity not co-operation, and that it was

impossible to serve two masters at the same time. All the other speakers (Eccles, Boothby, Macmillan, Martin Madden) endorsed the motion, noting that Imperial Preference had been accepted by the Council of Europe (Eccles), that a rejection of the motion would be a rejection of Churchill (Boothby), and that all unity meant was "the decision to act together on a number of questions where action taken together can be more effective than taken separately" (Macmillan).

The motion was adopted overwhelmingly with only two dissentients. The debate emphasised several factors: that the party activists were broadly pro-European; that there was some concern about the effect on the Empire but they were satisfied with the reassurances received; that all the well-known speakers in the debate were on the European side, and the opponents could not field one prominent spokesman; and finally that on issues of this kind the party was happy to place its confidence in the hands of Churchill.

While the 1950 conference did not debate Europe, contributions favoured the integration of European armies to enable a German contribution, and noted the lack of conflict with the Commonwealth. Further support came from the Central Council, an annual mini-conference, which in 1948 unanimously adopted a motion welcoming the Treaty of Brussels and looking "forward to a further widening and enlarging of this pact in the field of defence and economic collaboration with the approval and support of the countries of the British Commonwealth of Nations".

Further evidence of European feeling in the constituencies came from a report on the Two-Way Movement of Ideas by the C.P.C. (120) In November 1949, a pamphlet by Boothby on European union was distributed to Associations, together with a list of questions designed to stimulate discussion and provide an indication to the party

headquarters of feelings on the issue. The summary of the 485 reports received stated that support for the ideal was "almost without exception". It was seen as anti-Communist, and essential to the peace and prosperity of Europe and the world. However, it involved a number of decisions "which may appear to conflict with accepted ideas and long-standing policies". On the question on sovereignty, "reluctantly the majority accept the principle that Britain must be prepared to surrender some of her sovereignty if she is to play her part in the creation of a European Union". They were divided on industrial development, where economic co-operation was favoured but not planning. The majority accepted there would be some conflict with the Commonwealth, which led some to oppose European unity, but the majority felt that it was in the long term interests of the Empire and policies should be adjusted. Most favoured the inclusion of colonies in the Western Union, while some favoured a Union of English-speaking peoples. On a European Parliament, some wanted detailed plans for a constitution and some wanted direct popular elections. Most favoured representation on the basis of population (not just by nation), appointed by national governments, but representatives should not vote on a national basis. This survey of constituency opinion, more representative of the political activists than the ordinary members, suggests a recognition of the problems involved, but that these were outweighed by the economic and defence advantages. They were surprisingly willing to accept the loss of some sovereignty. This suggests both a lack of naivety, and a deeper commitment to the concept of Europe than might have been expected.

Another source of evidence is resolutions submitted by constituency associations or area organisations to the National Union Executive Committee (NUEC) for consideration. (121) These resolutions showed

that the Empire remained the primary international interest of constituency activists. In 1948 resolutions began to appear on Europe, which were all positive. On 28th March 1948 Yorkshire Area passed a resolution, with 572 present and only 10 against, urging a conference of democratic parties in Europe in the belief that "the United States of Europe will readily materialise". Sympathetic motions also came from Home Counties North, West Midlands Women's Advisory Council, and North West Women (on support for a European Army). The national affiliates also considered the issue in various ways. The Women's Conference debated Europe on 21st April 1948 and passed a positive motion. The Young Conservatives were active in sending representatives to the Hague Congress and attending several meetings on the Continent. The Federation of University Conservative Associations debated and passed a motion in 1948, calling upon the party to submit a definite plan for Western European unity. Thus all the indications are that support was as strong, if not stronger, among the affiliated organisations as in the party as a whole.

Taking the temperature of the rank-and-file Conservatives on any issue is always difficult, but the evidence that exists, despite its inadequacy, all tends to support the conclusion of broad support. The evidence comes from Conference debates and votes, the C.P.C. survey, and the activities of affiliates. The cause of this support seems to have two prime causes: trust in Churchill's judgement, and fear of the Soviet Union. They even seem to be prepared to sacrifice at least some sovereignty and some of the Imperial relationship in order to achieve European unity.

Conservative Central Office

Conservative Central Office did not play a major role in the

discussion on Europe. Apart from the distribution of literature, only the Research Department, C.P.C. and the Overseas Committee were involved and even these only to a very limited degree.

This was the period of the great revival of the C.R.D., when it was led by Rab Butler and desk officers included Macleod, Maudling and Powell. However, it concerned itself very little with this issue, partly because the C.R.D. concentrated on broad principles rather than details, and partly because effort was directed towards domestic affairs, where both Butler's interests and the most votes lay. A significant event was the appointment of Ursula Branston in 1946 as a foreign affairs desk officer. She became Head of the Foreign Affairs Section in the 1950's, and according to Ramsden, "she certainly had a considerable influence on policy, through a close working relationship with Anthony Eden". (122) Branston supported a European approach. She presented a brief on 8th December 1949 to the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, which argued:

1. Europe must unite with or without Great Britain.
2. United without Great Britain would be politically disastrous.
3. United with Great Britain would mean British leadership.
4. Political change could be achieved through the evolution of co-operation.
5. "At all costs the idea of a federal power in Europe should be discouraged at the present time". (123)

She argued for "common action in certain specific matters" and that the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe should be a European Political Authority, acting as a European body and not simply inter-governmental, with the possibility of infinite development as Europeanism grew from strength to strength.

In August 1950 she wrote a pamphlet on the Schuman proposals which was distributed widely to M.P.s, candidates and speakers. (124) The pamphlet described the proposals in factual detail, and presented the Conservative response as positive and the Socialists as hostile. Another Foreign Affairs Committee brief, on the European Army, presented the Sandys compromise plan, explained the Conservative objections to Pleven, and emphasised that acceptance of Pleven was not a precondition to discussion. (125) Branston strongly supported European co-operation, and feared that without British participation it would develop in unfortunate directions. In a brief in 1953, while understanding why federalism was unacceptable to Britain, she argued that if Britain had given leadership, federation could have been avoided. (126) Thus the limited influence that did come from the C.R.D. supported a positive attitude to Schuman and the European Army.

The Conservative Political Centre, the new political education wing of the Party, organised the discussion groups on European union in 1949 in the Two-Way Movement of Ideas, and published as pamphlets for discussion About Western Union by Boothby in January 1949, Conservatives and Peace by Nigel Davies, M.P., and European Union by T.E. Utley in March, 1951, all pro-European.

The Conservative Overseas Committee, set up in 1949 to deal with contacts and publications on overseas affairs, had its primary interest in Commonwealth affairs, but it also considered the question of contacts with similar continental parties. An instruction from Butler "ruled out any question of formal alliance with kindred parties represented at the Assembly". (127) They showed an interest in the Nouvelles Equipes Internationales, a loose organisation of Christian Democrats, and endorsed Young Conservative membership of its youth

section, as the N.E.I. was described as "a unit of the European Movement and was therefore working for Western union under Mr. Churchill's general leadership". (128) Soon, however, the Young Conservatives withdrew. Anthony Nutting, the Young Conservative representative, explained that the N.E.I. "was running a policy in Europe with which the great majority of the Conservative party fundamentally disagree, i.e. federalism, and for that reason he was withdrawing from the British Committee. The Committee concurred". (129)

Europe was not a significant issue for Central Office, although it did contribute to the stimulation of debate on the issue, acting within the broad outlines of party policy in favour of European unity but against federalism.

The Informal Party

In the immediate post-war period, there were none of the intra-party "ginger groups" that were to emerge later, except for the Tory Reform Committee, which was exclusively parliamentary and concerned with domestic issues. The European Movement was an all-party body and included leaders from all three parties, but it was frequently accused of Conservative bias. It was generally considered "strongly Conservative in its leanings", (130) partly because of Churchill's leadership and partly because most of its membership appeared to come from Conservatives. Attempts to destroy this image, and to encourage Labour and Liberal participation, led to concern within the Party that the Conservative interest was being ignored, leaving power in the hands of Socialists and Federalists. These feelings emerged over the poor Conservative representation at a European Economic Conference organised by the European Movement on 20th-25th April 1949, which was discussed by the Overseas Committee. Henry Hopkinson, from the Research

Department, felt "very strongly that there is now a danger that a United Europe and all that that involves, having been largely a Conservative conception and enjoying considerable support from our Party, is now tending to fall more and more into Socialist hands". He was supported by Pat Hornsby-Smith who complained that "In the general desire to ensure that the Movement is non-political, we have deliberately weighted the Conference with trade unionists, free traders and socialists on the British side...". (131) Macmillan was asked to call a meeting to try to encourage greater British participation. It was widely believed by both Conservatives and Labour that the bulk of the European Movement membership and of those who attended the large number of meetings throughout the country were Conservative, which reflected a certain level of support on the issue from some Conservatives.

The sectional interest groups from industry took little interest in Europe, seeing it as primarily a foreign policy issue. Some parts of industry were attracted by the removal of trade barriers, promoted by the European League for Economic Co-operation (E.L.E.C.). Churchill attracted industrial funds into the European Movement, and Lord McCowan of I.C.I. held periodic fund-raising lunches. ELEC organised the Westminster Economic Conference, 20th-25th April 1949, primarily to attract industrial support for European unity. (132)

The Conservative press adopted a position similar to the Party, very sympathetic to developments towards European unity while cautious over the cost to the Empire. An editorial in the Times stated that, "For us Empire ties must always come first, but, if by a Western Union we can help to create more settled political conditions on the European continent, that will be a contribution to the peace of the world". (133) The Times welcomed the Schuman Plan and urged a

positive response from the British Government. (134) An exception, and one that proved to be of substantial duration, was the Express. Its proprietor, Lord Beaverbrooke, was against British participation because of the effect on relations with the Empire and the U.S., although he was not against Continental unity. (135) He strongly attacked the European Movement, without ever naming Churchill for whom he had great respect, (136) and in 1949 the Express launched its famous campaign for Empire Free Trade.

The Economist adopted from the first a strongly pro-European position with which it has been identified ever since. In 1947 it congratulated itself that "The Economist was one of the earliest, and has been one of the most persistent advocates of a closer association of the Western European Nations". (137) It accepted the need for the surrender of some sovereignty. "The European nations must transfer and merge some portion of their sovereign rights". (138) It recognised that this would create problems for the Commonwealth (139) but claimed that "the active pursuit by the British Government of greater political unity would not weaken Atlantic unity or compromise Britain's relations with the Commonwealth". (140) It severely criticised the Labour Government for "the record is one of a steady pouring of cold water", (141) and asked it "to forget the association of these ideas with Mr. Churchill and examine them on their merits". (142) Thus the Economist provided important intellectual support for Conservative opinion-formers on the European issue.

The Spectator, another journal widely read by Conservatives, was rather more cautious. While it welcomed European co-operation, it felt that priority should be given to the United Nations. (143) While it favoured some form of confederation, it firmly rejected federalism. "It is a complete fallacy to maintain that there cannot be effective

European union without European federation". (144) The Spectator emphasised "how narrow was the real difference between Government and Opposition", (145) in that both supported European unity but rejected federalism. In an article on 'Schuman and the Conservatives' it was this anti-supranationalism that was emphasised. (146) Thus, The Spectator, while quite within the Conservative policy of pro-unity/anti-federalism, emphasised the latter rather than the dangers of a failure to create European unity.

The sources of the politicians' perceptions of public opinion are many, varied and not always reliable. Those that were available to politicians suggested that the concept of European unity received a positive response from the electorate. One source was the success of the European Movement, with a large speakers panel of around 130; great strength in schools and universities (the second largest group at Oxford); large audiences at their meetings, a few of over 1,000; and over 3,500 regular subscribers to their newsletter. The European Movement attracted considerable support, especially among Conservatives and the young.

Two major polls were conducted on Europe. The first, published by the Express, showed wide support for European unity. 65% favoured economic integration, 68% military integration and a surprising 58% political union. Whether those polled (or the electorate in general) had a clear understanding of the implications of these policies may be doubted, but they did reveal a general sympathy to Europe. The 16% who took a firm anti-integration position gave two reasons, that Britain should avoid continental entanglement, and that they feared that this approach would increase the likelihood of war. (147)

A second opinion poll, conducted March-June 1950, confirmed the positive attitude of the electorate towards European unity, although

also a low saliency. 54% felt that European unity would be good for them, and 80% felt that it would make a contribution to world peace. The second poll may have shown slightly less support because the sample was less biased towards Conservatives than the first one. (148)

Public opinion was the major target of Churchill's campaign on Europe. However Churchill calculated public opinion, by the time of the elections in 1950 and 1951 he appears to have concluded that public opinion had not sufficiently expressed itself. At the Party Conference in 1950, which he knew must precede an election, Europe received only a passing reference in his speech. He seems to have believed that no votes were to be won on the theme of European unity. It played a less significant role in his speeches as the elections approached. In the two manifestos the Empire and Commonwealth received far greater attention. The 1950 manifesto simply said "Hand in hand with France and other friendly powers we shall pursue the aim of closer unity in Europe", and in 1951, "We put first the safety, progress and cohesion of the British Empire and Commonwealth of Nations. On these foundations, we will labour for a united Europe". (149)

Conclusion

During the period of the post-war Labour Government, Churchill and to a lesser extent the Conservative Party was associated with the cause of European unity, mainly as a barrier to the Soviet Union but also to help restore the European economy. There was little dissent at any level of the Party for a policy in support of European developments but rejecting federalism. Both federalists and anti-Europeans were few and active only in Parliament. The Party generally accepted those broad parameters of party policy and were willing to

leave to Churchill and the Shadow Cabinet the interpretation of that position to particular issues. Throughout this period, Conservatives presented the concept of European unity in a positive light, and thus created in the Party and amongst their supporters a broadly positive attitude to European integration. Faced with specific decisions, on the Schuman Plan and the European Army, it was much more difficult to find a consensus. Two different assessments of continental opinion played an important role in these different attitudes. The 'Europeans' recognised how strong opinion on the Continent was for some form of supranationality or federalism, and partly infected by that enthusiasm and partly because of the fear of a split between Britain and the rest of Western Europe, they were willing to make some concessions towards supranationality, while unwilling to accept federalism. The 'Europeans' also felt that a united Europe was only possible with British participation. The alternative to no British involvement was no European unity, which they felt would leave Europe divided against the Soviet Union. As they also believed that Britain would be the leader in any European organisations and be able to move them in the direction that Britain wanted, they were more willing to make initial sacrifices to see those institutions created. The sceptics were less sensitive to Continental opinion and less willing to make gestures in their direction. They were more accurate in their perception that their Continental allies could unite without Britain. Thus the sceptics were less willing to pay any sort of price to belong to European developments.

It is important not to exaggerate the differences among Conservatives in this period. There was general agreement that European unity was a positive development, but the 'Europeans' felt that it could only occur with Britain, while the sceptics felt that it

would happen simply with British support. There was agreement that Britain remained a major power, but the 'Europeans' felt that power would be enhanced within a united Europe while the sceptics feared that it would be restricted to only one of the three circles. All agreed that the Empire and Commonwealth remained central, but the 'Europeans' believed that the Empire would be strengthened by the European association while the sceptics felt that it would reduce attention to imperial affairs. All accepted that federalism was not a feasible option for Britain, but the 'Europeans' were willing to make some gestures in that direction while the sceptics were not. Thus there was a high degree of consensus on the strategy but considerable differences on tactics. As the Conservatives moved into power as the Government, these tactical differences were to emerge into sharp focus.

REFERENCES

1. Winston Churchill, The Sinews of Peace, (London, Cassell, 1948), pp.93-105.
2. ibid
3. H.C. Debates, Vol. 476, 27th June 1950, c.2143.
4. Randolph Churchill (editor), Europe Unite, (London, Cassell, 1950), p.494.
5. H.C. Debates, Vol. 469, 17th November 1949, c.2222.
6. R. Churchill, op cit, pp.77-78.
7. ibid, p.79.
8. ibid, p.312.
9. ibid, p.316.
10. Harold Macmillan, Tides of Fortune, (London, Macmillan, 1969), p.217.
11. ibid, p.127.
12. R. Churchill, op cit, p.83.
13. ibid, p.117.
14. ibid, p.230.
15. W. Churchill, op cit, pp.198-202. See also Henry Pelling, Winston Churchill, (London, Pan, 1977), p.567.
16. Saturday Evening Post, 15/2/30.
17. Miriam Camps, Britain and the European Community 1955-1963, (Princeton University Press, 1964), p.6.
18. W. Churchill, op cit, p.
19. Lord Moran, Winston Churchill: The Struggle for Survival 1940-1965, (London, Constable, 1966).
20. R. Churchill, op cit, p.80.
21. ibid, p.312.
22. H.C. Debates, Vol. 476, 27th June 1950, c.2157.
23. R. Churchill, op cit, p.465.
24. ibid, p.80.
25. ibid, p.365.

26. Quoted in Nigel Forman, The European Movement in Britain 1945-1954, (Doctoral Dissertation, Sussex University, 1973), p.186.
27. R. Churchill, op cit, p.466.
28. ibid, p.117.
29. ibid, pp.117, 129.
30. ibid, p.495
31. ibid, p.231
32. ibid, p.84.
33. ibid, pp.229-231
34. ibid, p.495.
35. ibid, p.65.
36. ibid, p.117.
37. ibid, p.294.
38. ibid, p.231.
39. ibid, p.341.
40. ibid, pp.416-417
41. ibid, p.494.
42. Quoted in Forman, op cit, p.262.
43. ibid, p.190.
44. Sandys Papers 9/11/44.
45. Verbatim Conference Report 1949.
46. H.C. Debates, Vol. 457, 31st October 1948, C.1410.
47. ibid, c.1423
48. Sandys Papers, 9th November 1949.
49. H.C. Debates, Vol. 480, 13th November 1950, c.1410.
50. Lord Kilmuir, Political Adventure, (London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1964), p.174.
51. H.C. Debates, Vol. 480, 13th November 1950, c.1489.
52. Kilmuir, op cit, p.186.
53. Verbatim Conference Report 1949.

54. H.C. Debates, Vol. 469, 17th November 1949, c.2323.
55. Forman, op cit, p.262.
56. H.C. Debates, Vol. 469, 17th November 1949, c.2327.
57. Douglas Evans, While Britain Slept, (London, Gollancz, 1975), p.14.
58. H. Macmillan, (1969), op cit, p.207.
59. European Movement, European Movement and the Council of Europe, (London, Hutchinson, n.d.), p.152. See also European Review, (July 1950).
60. ibid, p.142.
61. Verbatim Conference Report 1948.
62. Verbatim Conference Report 1949.
63. H.C. Debates, Vol. 438, 19th June 1947, c.2238-2240.
64. H.C. Debates, Vol. 450, 5th May 1948, c.1272.
65. Sir Anthony Eden, Full Circle, (London, Cassell, 1960), p.36.
66. ibid, p.29.
67. Kilmuir, op cit, p.146.
68. H. Macmillan (1969), op cit, p.156.
69. David Carlton, Anthony Eden: A Biography, (London, Allen Lane, 1981), p.285.
70. Kilmuir, op cit, p.177.
71. Carlton, op cit, p.285.
72. Kilmuir, op cit, p.177.
73. Carlton, op cit, p.285.
74. Times, 30th April 1949.
75. H. Macmillan (1969), op cit, p.189.
76. Times, 22nd May 1950.
77. H. Macmillan (1969), op cit, pp.193-194.
78. ibid, p.194.
79. Sandys Papers 20th November 1950
80. Kilmuir, op cit, p.186.
81. H. Macmillan (1969), op cit, p.192.

82. Max Beloff, New Dimensions in Foreign Policy, (London, Allen & Unwin, 1961), p.90.
83. H. Macmillan (1969), op cit, p.197.
84. M. Beloff, op cit, p.90.
85. H. Macmillan (1969), op cit, p.217.
86. ibid, p.220.
87. H.C. Debates, Vol. 480, 13th November 1950, c.1410.
88. Eden, op cit, p.32.
89. H.C. Debates, Vol. 480, 13th November 1950, c.1410.
90. H.C. Debates, Vol. 419, 20th February 1946, c.1251. See also
H.C. Debates, Vol. 450, 5th May 1948, c.1372.
91. H.C. Debates, Vol. 450, 5th May 1948, c.1374.
92. ibid, c.1373.
93. H.C. Debates, Vol. 419, 20th February 1946, c.1252.
94. Hugh Berrington, Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons 1945-1955,
(London, Pergamon Press, 1973), p.166.
95. H.C. Debates, Vol. 419, 20th April 1946, c.1252.
96. ibid, c.1247.
97. ibid, c.1252.
98. Berrington, op cit, p.167.
99. ibid, p.169.
100. H.C. Debates, Vol. 446, 22nd January 1948, c.410.
101. H.C. Debates, Vol. 450, 5th May 1948, c.1292.
102. ibid, c.1382.
103. Robert Boothby, My Yesterday, Your Tomorrow, (London, Hutchinson, 1962), p.91.
104. News of the World, 5th September 1948.
105. H.C. Debates, Vol. 480, 13th November 1950, c.1447.
106. H.C. Debates, Vol. 448, 18th March 1948, c.1357.
107. H.C. Debates, Vol. 438, 19th June 1947, c.2236.
108. H.C. Debates, Vol. 423, 5th June 1946, c.2044-2045.
109. Forman, op cit, p.318.

110. H.C. Debates, Vol. 480, 13th November 1950, c.1458-1463.
111. ibid, c.77-84.
112. Andrew Roth, Can Parliament Decide, (London, Macdonald, 1971), p.38.
113. H.C. Debates, Vol. 480, 13th November 1950, c.1454.
114. H.C. Debates, Vol. 446, 21st March 1948, c.472.
115. H.C. Debates, Vol. 448, 18th March 1948, c.1344-1345.
116. H. Macmillan (1969), op cit, p.195.
117. ibid, p.197.
118. R. Churchill reprinted six speeches to Conservative audiences which included extensive references to Europe. The quotation is from a speech to a Conservative Mass Meeting in R. Churchill, op cit, p.417.
119. Verbatim Conference Report 1949.
120. CPC Two-Way Report 1949.
121. Resolutions from NUEC Minutes, 1945-1951.
122. John Ramsden, The Making of Conservative Party Policy, (London, Longman, 1980), p.127.
123. Ursula Branston, Changes in the Political Structure of Europe, Foreign Affairs Committee Brief, 8th December 1949.
124. The Schuman Proposals, (Notes on Current Politics NCP), 17th May 1950.
125. The European Army, Foreign Affairs Brief, 9th February 1951.
126. Ursula Branston, Britain and European Unity, NCP, August 1953.
127. Overseas Committee Minutes 19th July 1949.
128. ibid, 17th May 1949.
129. ibid, 3rd April 1950.
130. Arnold Zurcher, The Struggle to Unite Europe 1940-1958, (New York, New York University Press, 1975), p.22.
131. Overseas Committee Minutes, 4th May 1949.
132. Forman, op cit, p.154.
133. Times, 19th February 1949.
134. Times, 11th May 1950.
135. A.J.P. Taylor, Beaverbrook, (London, Hamilton, 1972), p.588.
See also p.575.

136. ibid, p.609.
137. Economist, 31st May 1947.
138. ibid, 15th April 1948. See also ibid, 14th June 1947.
139. ibid
140. ibid, 1st April 1950.
141. ibid, 20th November 1948.
142. ibid, 26th April 1947.
143. Spectator, 24th January 1947; 16th May 1947; 23rd April 1948.
144. ibid, 9th June 1950. See also 28th January 1949, and an article by Harold Nicholson strongly critical of the federalists, 27th April 1950.
145. ibid, 30th August 1950.
146. ibid, 11th August 1950.
147. Daily Express, 13th October 1948.
148. Forman, op cit
149. F.W. Craig, British General Election Manifestos 1900-1974, (Chichester, Political Reference Publications, 1975).

Background

The Conservatives became the Government in October 1951, amidst considerable expectations on the Continent of a far more vigorous European policy than had existed under Labour. (1) They were, however, to be bitterly disappointed, as the Conservatives in power adopted a cautious approach. Eden announced that Britain would not participate in the European Army, which Kilmuir described as the single, most important act in destroying Britain's credibility on the Continent. (2) The new government also rejected the idea of membership of the ECSC. The Continentals felt a great sense of betrayal. Paul-Henri Spaak, President of the Assembly of the Council of Europe, resigned in anger with charges of duplicity, and Paul Reynaud, the French Prime Minister, spoke contemptuously of how the Conservatives were in favour of European unity when in opposition but against it when in government. (3) This opened a period during which Britain was willing to participate in European co-operation but only on terms which excluded any supranationalism, and in which the Continent treated Britain with suspicion as seeking to frustrate their attempts at a more federal approach to Europe.

This decade, therefore, was filled with numerous initiatives by Governments and politicians on the Continent to create European institutions on a supranational basis, some of which succeeded and others failed, while Britain presented alternatives based on intergovernmental co-operation designed to avoid a divided Europe, a constant fear of British governments under Churchill, Eden and Macmillan. The Schuman Plan led to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (E.C.S.C.) in August 1952, with six members of France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg. A treaty

to create a European Defence Community was signed on 27th May 1952 following from the Pleven Plan but it was rejected by the French Assembly in August 1954, partly due to fears that without Britain, Germany might become dominant. M. Paul-Henri Spaak, as President of the ad hoc Assembly of the ECSC, presented a draft statute for a European Political Community in March 1953, but the idea was never taken up by any of the national governments. Concerned with the need to relaunch the European Idea, the Messina Conference was held in 1955, out of which developed the European Economic Community and Euratom in 1957.

The British Government responded to these developments with a refusal to participate in these institutions together with their own set of competing proposals. In 1952 Eden proposed that the ECSC and any other European institutions that might develop should be brought within the auspices of the Council of Europe, so that member governments could decide to affiliate on a case by case basis, but as this was perceived as an attempt to water down the supranational element in the various proposals, it received a cold response from the Continent. In 1954, following the breakdown of the EDC, Eden proposed a revision of the Treaty of Brussels, in which the Western European Union (W.E.U.) secured the presence of British troops on the Continent without the unilateral power of withdrawal, designed to ease French fears of German domination and thus enable German rearmament. In February 1955 Britain formed a Treaty of Association with the ECSC. In 1956 Eden launched his Grand Design to bring together in one Assembly the various Western parliaments of the Council of Europe, the Western European Union and the ECSC, but was opposed by the Six who saw in this proposal further evidence of British unwillingness to support a supranational community. Britain initially participated in the Messina talks but

91

withdrew in November 1955, due to fears of supranationalism and to a failure to take the discussions seriously. (4) As proposals for an economic community emerged from those discussions, Britain proposed a Free Trade Area (FTA) which would include free trade in industrial products but not in agriculture, would have only a limited impact on Commonwealth trade, and avoided any commitments of future political development. This was far from the intentions on the Continent so received little support, although negotiations were conducted and broke down in November 1956. Another British initiative was the European Free Trade Area, creating in 1959 free trade in industrial products between seven European nations (Britain, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, Portugal), designed to act as a bridge-builder towards the EEC, which might eventually be persuaded to join, but EFTA was perceived as a rival by the Six. Despite the series of initiatives by British Governments throughout this period, their objective of a united Europe on intergovernmental lines was not achieved. In fact, their main fear of a divided Western Europe was the result, and this contributed to their re-examination of Britain's attitude towards the Six which eventually led to their formal application for membership, to be discussed in the next chapter.

The Leader

Winston Churchill returned to power closely associated with the European idea, yet throughout his second premiership he allowed foreign policy to be conducted in a way widely perceived to be hostile to European developments. He backed Eden's position opposing British membership of the ECSC and the EDC, no longer participated in the activities of the Council of Europe, and presented no initiatives of his own. There are three causes for his lack of a strong European

policy. Firstly, he still conceived of Britain as a great power, 92 especially as it was the only other power besides the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union with the atom bomb. Eden argued that Churchill had always envisaged a Grand Alliance of the West, and not an exclusively European institution, that Churchill like Eden was essentially an Atlanticist rather than a European. (5) However, the difference between them was that Eden felt that Atlanticism excluded British participation in European developments while Churchill saw no contradiction between the two positions. Churchill's attention was drawn to more exciting opportunities on the world stage, (6) so Europe became a low priority.

The second cause was that the Continentals were developing supranational ideas that were unacceptable to British opinion. The European Coal and Steel Community included a Higher Authority with the power to over-ride national governments and this was unacceptable to British interests. While he had been a proponent of a European army, he was determinedly opposed to the mixed manning of the Pleven Plan. "What he himself had in mind for such an Army was, as he put it, a bunch of faggots bound together, stronger as a bunch than as individual sticks, but each retaining its individual characteristics in the bunch. Pleven's Army, he says, is a bunch of wood pulp". Despite strong U.S. pressure, the U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson reported that "On the EDC, Churchill remained unreconstructed to the last". (7) Thus, for Churchill, European unity was developing in an unacceptable direction. This may have been inevitable as his commitment to the broad concept of unity may have been difficult to translate into agreement with its specific and detailed realisation.

The third factor was the position of Eden as his natural successor. Kilmuir, who had the experience of seeing Churchill in both Cabinet and

Shadow Cabinet, believed that "Winston Churchill was determined not to oppose his successor", so that Eden and the anti-Europeans were always "supported hesitantly but inevitably by Churchill" in the Cabinet. (8)

An old European Movement friend, Edward Beddington-Behrens, believed that Eden's influence led Churchill to exclude 'Europeans' such as Macmillan, Maxwell Fyfe, Sandys, Eccles and Thorneycroft from any position in the field of foreign affairs. (9) Churchill's age and illness made Eden's succession simply a matter of time and therefore made him reluctant to propose policies which would be opposed by his Foreign Secretary and successor. The initiation and conduct of European policy was left to Eden and the Foreign Office.

Eden's role as Prime Minister in European developments were limited primarily because of his short period in that office, from April 1955 to January 1957, and his preoccupation with Suez during much of this time. As discussed earlier, he viewed Britain's role as an external supporter of Continental unity, and that any British involvement should be limited and intergovernmental. Eden's response to Messina was that there were opportunities for limited co-operation on communications and energy, but that anything grander was only utopian. The failure of the EDC and the lack of enthusiasm for supranationalism by the French and German governments confirmed his scepticism that major developments were unlikely. The Spaak Committee was seen as a sop to the Belgian government. Thus he never took Messina or the Spaak Committee very seriously. In 1956 his Grand Design to bring together the assemblies of the various European institutions was part of his attempt to obtain British influence on developments without any commitments. His first choice as Foreign Secretary, Harold Macmillan, occupied that post for only 9 months from April to December 1955. Eden wished to retain a high degree of

control over foreign policy, and this led to conflict with Macmillan's desire to be an active Foreign Secretary, including in European affairs. (10) Eden replaced him with the more compliant Selwyn Lloyd. In the only manifesto produced under his leadership in 1955, the sole mention of Europe was "the major defence commitment through the Western European Union". Eden's control of foreign policy continued whether as Foreign Secretary and Premier, as did his attitude to European unity.

Macmillan's interest in Europe was well established by the time he became Prime Minister in January 1957. However, his immediate priority was to re-establish the dispirited and divided party after Suez, and to win the forthcoming general election in 1959 which to the surprise of early forecasters he did with the biggest majority since the war. The manifesto gave no mention of Europe. Macmillan was highly concerned about a divided Europe, initiated an extensive examination of Britain's European relations soon after the 1959 election, and was a strong proponent of a European Free Trade Area, which he hoped would bridge the gap between the Six and the rest of Western Europe. While his own conviction that Britain would have to join the EEC probably became established in late 1960, he accepted earlier on in his premiership that Britain's relations with the rest of Europe would have to become much closer and tried to educate opinion, including Party opinion, of this necessity. How this concern ended in a formal application of membership is the subject of the next chapter.

The Cabinet

The tensions that existed within the Shadow Cabinet, came to the surface soon after the formation of the new government. The Cabinet discussed what should be the attitude of the new government towards

the European Army. Eden dominated this discussion, supported by Salisbury and Oliver Stanley, against Maxwell Fyfe, and the compromise that emerged was that British participation could only be achieved on intergovernmental terms. Maxwell-Fyfe, then Home Secretary, gave a carefully prepared and agreed statement to the Consultative Assembly in November 1951:

"I cannot promise full and unconditional participation, but I can assure you of our determination that no genuine method shall fail for lack of thorough examination which one gives to the needs of trusted friends.... There is no refusal on the part of Britain". (11)

That same night Eden announced at a press conference in Rome the refusal of Britain to participate in a European Army. According to Boothby, Maxwell-Fyfe was "on the brink of resignation". The Assembly was stunned and demoralised by the decisions. The Conservative delegation sent, on 3rd December, a formal protest to Churchill:

"We venture to appeal to you to take some action designed to restore British prestige in the Consultative Assembly, and to show that H.M. Government mean to play their part in the military, defence and economic development of a united Europe". (12)

Churchill did not reply.

Thus at an early stage Eden's dominance was established. Towards suggestions by Anthony Nutting, Minister of State at the Foreign Office, and Sir Gladwyn Jebb, Ambassador in Paris, that Britain should leave a certain number of divisions on the Continent in lieu of participation in the EDC, Eden reacted "like a kicking mule". (13) Eden successfully excluded leading Europeans' from the field of foreign affairs, and his authority was rarely challenged. Supported by the Foreign Office, he believed that both the ECSC and the EDC were bound to fail. According to Maxwell-Fyfe, "none of the other members had the knowledge or experience to question or contradict Eden's policies. I doubt if a

Foreign Secretary has enjoyed quite so much independence since Lord Rosebery". (14) Eden's biographer wrote that "his position was immensely strong...Eden's strength was reflected in his standing in the Cabinet. As the obvious successor to an aged Prime Minister he could rely on most of his colleagues not daring to cross him". (15)

Boothby is rather unfair in his criticism of Maxwell-Fyfe, Macmillan and Sandys that they "did nothing about it". (16) They were inevitably much involved in the running of their departments: Maxwell-Fyfe at the Home Office, Macmillan at Housing where he made his reputation by reaching the unexpected target of 300,000 houses completed in one year, Sandys as Minister of Supply and later Housing and Local Government, and David Eccles as Minister of Education. These positions provided little opportunity or time to intervene in European affairs. However, Macmillan mentions informal discussions between them although Eccles and Sandys were not in the Cabinet. (17) When opportunities did arise they tried to influence policy in a European direction. Macmillan considered resignation over the lack of Cabinet support for British association with the EDC on 13th March 1952, sought British association with the Spaak Committee discussions, and upon his appointment as Chancellor in January 1956 "injected a sense of urgency" on the consideration of possible courses of action. (18) Sandys promoted association with the ECSC and introduced the motion in the House of Commons ratifying the Association agreement in 1955. (19) Maxwell-Fyfe suggested to Eden as Prime Minister that a new clear call for Britain-in-Europe should be issued. (20) David Howell later congratulated Thorneycroft, Eccles and Macmillan for their continued support for Europe. "Those who had once expressed hopes for a united Europe out of office kept up the struggle when in power". (21) However, this occasional involvement could not match the power of Eden

and the Foreign Office, with the endorsement of Churchill.

However, with the increasing role of economic policy in European co-operation, and with the position of Macmillan as Chancellor and Thorneycroft as President of the Board of Trade, they were able to press the idea of a FTA. Thorneycroft has emphasised that "the Conservative Party's trading policies at that time really stemmed from Imperial Preference. This was the Ark of the Covenant to the Conservative Party". (22) There was a Cabinet consensus against a customs union because of the need to protect the Commonwealth, and on the exclusion of agriculture from any FTA although Thorneycroft believed that arrangements could have been made over agriculture and Commonwealth imports, but there was little Cabinet support for that view. Macmillan told the House of Commons that:

"I do not believe that this House would ever agree to our entering arrangements which, as a matter of principle, would prevent our treating the great range of imports from the Commonwealth at least as favourably as those from the European countries. So this objection, even if there were no other, would be quite fatal to any proposal that the U.K. should seek to take part in a European Common Market by joining a Customs union". (23)

The Cabinet, including Eden and the British negotiator, Payment-General Reginald Maudling, who were both otherwise 'sceptics', saw the value of the FTA. The FTA negotiations, however, failed as it further underlined the differences in aspirations between the British and the Six.

Soon after the 1959 election, John Profumo, Minister of State in the Foreign Office, told the W.E.U. that since the election the Government had been "examining each facet of our relations with the Governments of the six-power communities to see where they can be improved" and that Britain was "determined to draw closer to Europe". (24) The Government attempted to improve relations through

extensive bilateral contacts, reform of the OEEC and the creation of EFTA. However, as Camps stated, "Had the British Government reached the point of seriously considering the Six, the decision to proceed with the EFTA would presumably never have been taken, for by tying itself to a group of low tariff countries and to a number of neutral countries, the U.K. was obviously adding to the problems which would have to be settled in a future negotiation in these terms". (25)

Profumo even told the Consultative Assembly that Britain was prepared to reconsider the question of her membership of the ECSC and Euratom but not the EEC. (26) This presented a consensus within the Cabinet that 'bridge-building' with the Six to avoid a divided Europe was essential, but EEC membership was not an option.

The position of the Cabinet in this decade appears to have been fairly consistent after the initial disagreements. The row over the European Army was the start of the recognition of Eden's dominance. Little opportunity existed then for new British involvement with the Six. The 'Europeans' supported Eden's attempts at promoting European co-operation while favouring something more radical. However, as developments on the Continent moved away from perceived British interests, with the establishment of organisations with a strong supranational element (at least in theory) and policies such as a customs union and agricultural free trade, they also accepted that the Six would develop in a different way and that the best Britain could hope for was 'bridge-building' institutions such as the FTA and EFTA. There appears to have been no group who favoured Britain's membership of the EEC nor any group who opposed the search for European co-operation, even while there may have been differences over the importance given to a European policy. Serious differences were not to re-emerge until the issue of British

The Parliamentary Party

As in the Cabinet, there was general agreement in the Parliamentary Party that close relations with the West was an important objective but that membership of any supranational institution was impossible. This was expressed by Aubrey Jones M.P., when he stated in an article that "I have never seen how Britain can reconcile the Head of the Commonwealth with a European federal community", but began with the view that everyone is agreed that Western Europe must be united. (27) There was always broad based support for the Government's attempts at improved co-operation with Europe. There were some who actively promoted the European cause, and a few who were active opponents, but the bulk of the party was willing to follow the general direction of the Cabinet.

The appointment into the Government of many of their leaders, such as Maxwell-Fyfe, Eccles, Macmillan, Thorneycroft and Sandys, left the Conservative 'Europeans' rather weak. Active in the European Movement were Boothby, Sir John Hutchinson, Maurice Macmillan, Lady Florence Horsburgh and Geoffrey Rippon. (28) Others included Julian Amery, John Biggs-Davison and Martin Madden. Boothby was as individual as ever. He was re-appointed to the Conservative delegation at the Council of Europe despite some opposition, and then completely absorbed himself in the politics of Strasbourg. (29) He became estranged from the Conservative Government as it failed to participate in European developments, and frustrated ideas presented in Strasbourg. He actively promoted British participation in an EDC because, as he argued in 1952, "the French will never agree to this unless and until we are ourselves part of the EDC". (30) "Sooner

or later we must face the fact that there can be no hope of European unity, or of European defence, except on the basis of British participation". (31)

Boothby's enthusiasm was much stimulated by his membership of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, and membership of this body influenced many Conservative M.P.s to adopt a more European position. A large number of Conservative M.P.s had experience in the Assembly as normally one served for only three years. The group, known as the Tory Strasbourgers under the leadership of Lady Horsburgh, acted as individuals and therefore were not committed to the British Government line. They refused, however, to affiliate to any of the party groups that existed both in the Council of Europe and the WEU, following the general position of the Party. Not until 1958 was there any discussion on forming an independent group together with the Scandinavians and the Irish.

However, despite their interest, they had little influence on national policies. (32) One reason must include the rather poor quality of many of the members. David Howell rather kindly explained that they were "not second Elevens, they are first Elevens without strong opening bats". (33) Few of them were to achieve ministerial office. There were exceptions, the most prominent being Peter Kirk. However, apart from increasing the number of sympathisers on the Conservative backbenches, the Council of Europe delegation had a very limited influence.

Another group of 'Europeans' was the Empire men around Leo Amery who combined commitment to European union, the Commonwealth and Empire, anti-federalism and hostility to the super-powers. The Amerys were very influential in the European Movement during the Conservative Government. (34) Julian Amery was a strong supporter of European

unity, but felt that if it developed towards federalism, Britain could not participate but should associate herself as closely as possible. Thus he believed that the Schuman Plan involved too great a loss of sovereignty, but Britain should support developments from outside if necessary, "as a pillar from within or as a buttress from without". (35) Bernard Braine saw a natural alliance between the Commonwealth and Europe against the super-powers. (36) John Biggs-Davison described the U.S.A. as The Uncertain Ally, and blamed federalism in Europe on the U.S.A. He rejected federalism and therefore EEC membership but wanted to give Europe the same preferences as the colonies and an "intergovernmental association of sovereign governments". (37)

A third group of younger 'Europeans' included Peter Kirk, Geoffrey Rippon and Martin Madden, who were active on the backbenches and frequently participated in European debates, but David Howell felt that "what has been lacking in the Tory Party is a younger generation of outspoken European idealists to replace those who moved into high office. It is the miserable silence from their ranks which accounts for the failure of Conservative thinking to advance further after 1958". (38)

There was no active group of anti-Europeans until the early 1960's, although individual M.P.s voiced their opposition to British participation in Continental developments without the usual qualifications of the importance of European co-operation, and they voiced their feelings that the Empire and Commonwealth was neglected in the pursuit of European interests. Hinchingsbrooke opposed German rearmament and the E.D.C., and described it as "a pious nightmare" and "a military nonsense". (39) Sir Gerald Nabarro was "the only outspoken opponent", according to the Conservative Research Department, of the

FTA. (40) Harry Legge-Bourke was a frequent critic of any federal relationship with Europe. The Expanding Commonwealth Group was formed to reverse the neglect of the Commonwealth, publishing pamphlets in 1956 and 1958. (41) It included some anti-Europeans such as Hinchingsbrooke, Anthony Fell, Robin Turton and Paul Williams, but also some Empire Europeans, such as Julian Amery and Biggs-Davison. Therefore it did not take an explicitly anti-European position. The 1956 pamphlet saluted "efforts of Continental Europeans to achieve closer economic unity" and favoured Europe's association with the Commonwealth.

In a study of the 1955-59 Parliament, Conservative M.P.s were identified as 28 European stalwarts, 76 Empire Europeans, 63 Empire Moderates, 64 Empire stalwarts and 27 uncommitted. This division was seen as a contest of generations. The pre-1950 intake were more Empire-oriented, the 1951 intake were equally split while the 1955 group included two Europeans for every Empire man. The younger M.P.s tended to be European, the older Empire. The safe seats tended to have Empire men but this was largely a result of their date of entry into the House. The study also discovered the fact that Oxford graduates were more European and Cambridge more Empire, but could provide no reasonable explanation! (42)

Varying attitudes of M.P.s emerge during the discussion of concrete proposals. On 10th July 1956 Conservatives led by Rippon presented an Early Day Motion calling for British participation in the Spaak Committee, which attracted 89 signatures. (43) The motion called for "an agreement in principle on the establishment by stages of a Common Market in Western Europe", and urged participation in negotiations to enable British participation in a Common Market. Signatures included Robert Matthew, Sir Keith Joseph, Arthur Holt, John

Rodgers, Harold Steward and Boothby. Another Early Day Motion calling for a European Conference to further unity attracted 100 signatures. (44) Harry Legge-Bourke responded with two Commonwealth motions which rejected British participation in any supranational economic organisation, which attracted 9 signatures between them. (45)

In a debate on 26th November 1956, the conflicts emerged between Martin Madden and Gerald Nabarro. The Government's position was presented by Harold Macmillan as Chancellor. "When we see a significant move in Europe tending to strengthen the old world, we must, I think, at least try to find a way whereby, without weakening or moving counter to our other interests we may be associated with it". (46) Martin Madden wanted British membership, (47) Nabarro opposed involvement in an economic organisation with the rest of Europe as high wages, the welfare state and high taxation would put Britain at a competitive disadvantage. Macmillan felt that a big market would enable high costs, while Thorneycroft's response was that Nabarro's argument was a case against high taxation not a Common Market.

There was very high support for the Grand Design, especially by those at the Council of Europe, and demands for British leadership were expressed at a Commons debate on 8th February 1957. (48) Similarly there was support for the EFTA, although the CRD had to deal with many inquiries from M.P.s about its effects on particular industries. In 1958 an Agricultural Policy Committee of M.P.s was set up to monitor agricultural opinion on EFTA. (49) Generally speaking, EFTA was supported but with little enthusiasm. When the Commons met to ratify the EFTA Treaty, attention was concentrated on how it would improve relations with the Six, and the Chancellor, Heathcoat Amory, failed to convince the House that it would. (50) Thorneycroft, now a backbencher,

and others argued that the Government should seek other approaches such as tariff harmonisation, and should even consider common institutions.

Thorneycroft pursued this approach of new proposals with two articles in The Guardian, 4-5th May 1959, which argued for a common industrial tariff, free entry for food, and a reduction in Commonwealth preferences in return for greater Commonwealth access to the markets to the Six. ⁽⁵¹⁾ Even he, however, did not propose British membership of the EEC.

Concern over the inadequacy of EFTA as a response was again expressed by a Conservative motion calling for "firm proposals" for the EEC, which was signed by all the officers of the Conservative Committee on Foreign Affairs on 24th September 1960. ⁽⁵²⁾ On 25th July 1960 a statement organised by the Common Market Campaign called for negotiations to obtain British membership of the EEC, and was signed by 15 Conservative, 23 Labour and 3 Liberal members. ⁽⁵³⁾ The Conservative M.P.s included Peter Kirk, David Price, Sir Peter Agnew, John Foster, Fred Corfield, Martin Madden and Robert Matthew. This was the first declaration of support by M.P.s for the idea of EEC membership, and was an early sign of the campaign which led to the eventual decision to apply for membership by the Government.

The Parliamentary Party during this decade shared the general position of the Government, that close relations with Western Europe were essential but membership of any federal structures impossible. There were some M.P.s who felt that the Government did not give European relations a sufficiently high priority, and criticised British initiatives when they did occur as inadequate. They provided a reminder to the Government not to neglect this issue, and a source of backbench support for their initiatives. On the other hand, these

initiatives produced only isolated opposition, although particular constituency concerns were expressed. However, until the question of the membership of the EEC appeared on the agenda, there was no substantial body of M.P.s against greater co-operation with Continental Europe.

National Union

National Union Conferences, both national and Central Council, between 1951 and 1957 usually reiterated its support for the three circles, but rarely debated Europe as such. One motion in 1953 (not debated) on the Commonwealth brought forth an amendment by Barney Hayhoe and Julian Amery to also include to work "for closer economic co-operation, as proposed in the Strasbourg Plan, with like-minded European countries" to ensure that the European circle was not neglected. (54) The only European debate was in 1954, on German rearmament and the WEU, a motion called for debate even though only two resolutions had been received from local Associations, so it reflected a positive decision by the Party leadership that the issue should be debated rather than a reflection of constituency demand. The motion welcoming the WEU was proposed by William van Straubenzee, who welcomed British leadership after the collapse of the EDC, congratulated the Continentals for trying to build on federalism, noted that Britain had accepted majority decision-making and to maintainance of a large Army on the Continent, and said that this would not weaken the Commonwealth. Martin Madden urged the necessity of new political institutions because common defence requires a common foreign policy, and to give new authority to Strasbourg and "some real power in a limited sphere to evolve and debate foreign policy and arrive at a European foreign policy on a democratic basis". Julian Amery

reiterated his familiar themes of the need for British leadership, the unacceptability of federalism, that a united Europe would be based on intergovernmental co-operation and that European unity would strengthen the Commonwealth. Harvey emphasised the importance of Franco-German co-operation, while Henry Hodgkinson gave a passionate speech that Europe must be united before it is too late. "We must pledge ourselves as total Europeans". Eden endorsed the motion, noting Commonwealth support for the WEU, and it was passed. This debate suggests that Europe was still viewed positively among Conservative activists, even while not receiving a high priority. (55)

The first major and potentially controversial debate was on EFTA in 1957. 18 constituency resolutions were received on this issue, and as always the Party leadership examined these resolutions as an expression of Party opinion. On this occasion David Dear of the CRD prepared a special report for the Party Chairman, Lord Hailsham, on political attitudes to EFTA. (56) His report stated that "there is a wide measure of support for what the Government is trying to do - to open up wider opportunities for our export trade and to prevent us from being virtually excluded from the new Common Market in Europe". The Conference resolutions confirmed this, with 12 in approval with the normal reservations, 2 neutral or possibly hostile and 1 specifically concerned with the glove industry. Dear noted that these reservations (Commonwealth, agriculture) were important as they were the reason why Britain could not join the Common Market, that not everyone in the Conservative Party supported the plan, and drew attention to the Daily Express group, who were saying "that the Government is abandoning the Commonwealth and destroying Imperial Preference", and the "very natural anxieties of some industrialists who feel that their particular business may be adversely affected".

Dear could also have noted that many of the motions were highly positive, references to the advantages of a large market and the benefits to the Commonwealth, five even without the usual reservations, and also the complaint by two motions of the lack of information. (57)

The NUEC chose a motion for debate which welcomed EFTA as providing a large market while excluding agriculture and preserving the Commonwealth tie. In his proposing speech Michael Jopling said that the advantages were great, that any one enthusiastic to include agriculture was not in the majority, and that if a choice had to be made it would be the Commonwealth, but this was not the choice as the Express had tried to suggest. Unusually an amendment was proposed and accepted for debate, that accepted rather than welcomed EFTA and included the "expansion of Commonwealth trade and safeguards for British industry". The proposers of the amendment showed that they did not even accept EFTA, were Empire First men, and attacked "Liberal ministers in Tory governments". The other four speakers divided equally for and against the amendment, with a claim that it was "a British scheme for British advantage", Anthony Fell M.P. arguing that in speaking against EFTA he was not speaking for a faction, and the fear that British industry could not face European competition, which was booed. David Eccles wound up the debate arguing its political importance as a bridge-builder, that industry was protected against unfair competition, agriculture was protected and the Commonwealth was in support. The amendment was defeated by a considerable majority, and the motion passed with similar support. (58)

The next major debate was in 1960 on European Unity and Trade. Nine motions were received: 3 for co-operation without reservations; 3 for co-operation with Commonwealth protection; 1 urging EEC membership; and 1 reiterating the three circles. (59) The motion

presented urged the necessity of bridge-building between the Six and the Seven. The spirit of the proposers, if not the words of the motion, was support for membership of the EEC, as they argued that agriculture needed a change in method, that Imperial preference was of declining value to the U.K., and that we must convince the Europeans that we are interested. John Paul complained that his amendment was not called and that the Party was thinking too much about Europe and too little about the Empire. Gordon Pears (a Bow Grouper) spoke against the motion, because entry into the EEC on those terms would dilute it and be "immoral", and co-operation would not solve the problem. The arguments were overwhelming for "entry on acceptable terms". The final speaker condemned the last two speakers as extreme, and expressed the view that a motion to join the EEC would have been rejected. Heath responded to the debate with the points that a large market would provide great economic benefits, the dangers of European disunity, the Government would only join with the agreement of the Commonwealth and EFTA, the enthusiasm especially of the young for the EEC, Commonwealth came first and that he "believed in a better system" for agriculture. The motion was passed by an overwhelming majority. (60) This debate helped to influence the Party to recognise the importance of European unity and trade, and the problems of EEC membership were recognised but downplayed. Once again the anti-Europeans failed to obtain substantial support but showed that there was at least some support for their fears in the Conference.

During the 1950's the affiliated organisations, the YC's, FUCA, and the Women played an active role in European affairs, and provided the base for much of the 'European' support at Conference. In 1952 the Young Conservatives joined the European Youth Campaign "which is educational in character and seeks to promote no given

solution to European problems" and from which they could withdraw "if anything untoward developed, e.g. insistence upon federalism", obtained Overseas Committee approval to join a federation of Conservative and Christian Democrat Youth organisations, urged Conservative representation at the N.E.I., published an article in Young European, supported a European Youth Campaign rally, organised a study visit to Strasbourg, sent a delegation to the European Youth Assembly in the Hague, and held regular meetings of the External Relations Committee. (61) This began the trend for a programme of European activities, including participation in European Youth Campaign activities, a study weekend with the Belgian and French Christian Democrats and participation in the 2nd European Youth Parliament in Vienna, known as the 'Junior Strasbourg'. (62) These activities led to a paper from the Secretary of the Overseas Bureau urging greater emphasis on Commonwealth and colonial affairs. Europe, however, remained an important area of European Youth Campaign activity, so that in 1956 Barney Hayhoe was elected *Chairman of the British National Committee of the European Youth Campaign*, and the Campaign published a pamphlet by James Driscoll, Young Conservative Vice-Chairman, later re-published by the C.P.C. as Our Trade with Europe in 1957. The Young Conservatives increasingly took the initiative in promoting overseas Party contacts, both bilaterally and multi-laterally, as in their international conference on European co-operation chaired by Nick Scott, 7th-9th October, 1960.

The Federation of University Conservative Associations (FUCA) were also active, in the European Youth Campaign, in bilateral relations at international conferences, and eventually in 1961 in the formation of the International Union of Conservative and Christian Democrat Students (ICCS) together with Continental student organisations.

The Women, rather more tentatively, followed a similar path. In 1953 and 1954 they sent observers to conferences of Continental Christian Democrat Women, but were conscious of the Party position against formal alliances. Rather timidly, in May 1954, they agreed to Alison Tennant becoming a Vice-President of the Christian Democrat organisation but only in a personal capacity. In December 1954 Alison Tennant proposed affiliation to the organisation, now called the European Union of Women (EUW). However, the Overseas Committee expressed the view that "the idea of direct participation in an international organisation with a prevailing political complexion was a new one, and contrary to previous directives and practices and therefore the decision would have to be made by the Foreign Secretary".⁽⁶³⁾ In February 1955, Eden agreed to membership and the Women joined the EUW, followed by the creation of a British section of the EUW in March 1956, thereafter playing a very active role. The Women's Conference debated EFTA on 21st May 1956 and unanimous support was expressed after an amendment was accepted on Commonwealth safeguards. A similar motion was passed at their Conference on 21st May 1958. European affairs played an ever present role in the Women's activities, e.g. their Swinton College course on 28th-31st October 1960 had a European Affairs session with Maurice Macmillan, M.P.

Thus throughout the 1950's European activities played an important role in the Young Conservatives, Student and Women's organisations, providing a base of support for Europeanism in the Party, and educating prospective politicians in European Affairs. While pressure from the Party members did not play an important role in government or Party policy-making for Europe in the 1950s, the creation of this base was to prove vital, perhaps decisive, in the debate of the early 1960s.

Central Office

The CRD provided factual information on European developments, and an analysis of possible future developments, all within the broad policies of the Government, aimed at Party leaders, M.P.s and parliamentary candidates.

A major brief was presented by Ursula Branston in August 1953. (64) This described the positive approach of Conservatives towards European unity expressed by Churchill and Eden; explained that federalism was a barrier to British participation, while expressing the view that if Britain had given a lead in the late 1940s, federalism could have been avoided; and noted the Government's desire for association with the ECSC and EDC. Branston regretted the tendency to see federalists as extremists, for they must be seen within the context of Christian influence upon European unity and the tendency by federalists to regard the Commonwealth and NATO as British special pleading. In other words, she attributed much of the difficulties to a lack of understanding between Britain and the Continent. She ended, "Let us preserve in things essential, unity; in things not essential, liberty; in both, charity".

As a primary function of the CRD is to brief the Party on developments, the next period of activity was over the FTA and EFTA in 1956-59 when a number of briefs were prepared. The first, in September 1956, explained the Government's position towards the Spaak Committee. (65) This brief said that "The Government has stated that it has a completely open mind on the question of a European Community, and will be guided by its sense of the proper harmony of the interests of Britain, the Commonwealth, Europe and the free world as a whole". Edward Boyle, Economic Secretary of the Treasury, is quoted as saying that in "the finest and fullest sense - this will be a major policy

decision". The author of the brief took a somewhat strong position. "The 64 dollar (sic) question is can the U.K. afford not to be associated? She would preserve the great majority of Imperial Preferences. She would not sacrifice her Commonwealth links; and she would acquire a special relationship with those countries which take 25% of her trade". Three basic facts were noted: the Six was the most rapidly expanding market in the world; the 9/10th of the Commonwealth imports that were agricultural or primary, which did not compete with European goods, would enter duty free or would be excluded from a Common Market; and the Six were a great power. The brief ended "The major political decision on British policy is awaited" but the author's position was clearly in favour of a FTA.

Another brief, by James Douglas, confirmed the CRD position in favour of negotiations for a FTA. (66) The brief repeated the view that agriculture, and therefore the Commonwealth, would not be greatly affected. "The area of possible conflict between the European Common Market idea and our traditional Commonwealth trade is thus much smaller than might be supposed". The advantages would be a large market and the accumulation of capital. The summary was therefore in favour of negotiations because they would influence them, without detrimental effect on Commonwealth agriculture. Further briefs reported evidence of support for a FTA, from a public statement organised by E.G. Thompson of 50 prominent Conservative-oriented personalities, EDM's and Commons debates, the Economist, and the results of an FBI Survey. (67)

Douglas also responded to a number of letters from M.P.s expressing concern. To Lady Davidson, M.P. he wrote of the dangers of exclusion and that the Government was seeking a third way, "a way of associating with this new initiative in Europe in such a way as to avoid the dangers and grasp the opportunities". (68) He assured Harold Gurden

M.P. that the Economist "presents Britain as rather more committed to the Spaak proposals than she in fact is". To Soames, Air Minister, he quoted the position of Macmillan and Thorneycroft, and noted that Nabarro was the "only outspoken opponent". (69) He described Victor Morgan M.P. as "a very good and...honest expression of the political neurosis that I fear is affecting a good many of our supporters - an inconsistent combination of economic defeatism and national susceptibilities". (70) There were many similar letters mainly concerned with the fears of particular industries. Douglas thus attempted to present the Government's position which changed in response to events, and to calm the M.P.s concerns.

The campaign by the Daily Express was clearly having an impact at this time. A letter from the Conway Agent raised the Express theme of the Government acting without a mandate. (71) Heath asked the CRD to consider whether the figures presented in the Express pamphlet Your Future were correct. The main argument was that Britain could not stand competition from lower wage levels and a lower standard of living on the continent, to which Macmillan was quoted in reply that wages were not the only factor in costs. A speech by the Economic Secretary was distributed, with his conclusion that "The FTA is desirable, it is not essential". (72)

A brief sent to Butler emphasised that the Government's proposals were for an industrial FTA to calm his concerns over his agricultural constituents. (73) David Dear presented his assessment of opinion to Hailsham in October 1957 just before the Party Conference, noting that despite reservations there was wide support in the Conservative Party, industry and the Labour Party. (74)

Another brief noted that the agricultural industry was sceptical despite Government promises, because they regarded easier access to

the U.K. for agriculture as being the quid pro quo for the reduction of European tariffs against British industry. (75) The result was a strong statement by Maudling to the OEEC that "none of the countries represented here...would propose a system whereby their agriculture would be exposed in the FTA. We all protect our agriculture in one way or other, and intend to go on doing so". (76) This statement and one saying that "there will be no free trade in agricultural and horticultural products" helped to calm some NFU fears.

In January 1957 special notes for speakers on the FTA were produced. (77) It noted the British Government had proposed the FTA in response to the threat created by a common market of the Six. The FTA proposed fair competition, economic co-operation and the exclusion of agriculture, acknowledged in the Treaty of Rome as different. FTA created both dangers and opportunities, but the opportunities far outweighed the dangers. A series of briefs on EFTA were produced in an attempt to keep up to date, including one for the Conservative Parliamentary Committees on Trade and Industry, Finance and Agriculture. (78)

By late 1960 the CRD appears to have taken the view that Britain should consider applying for EEC membership. A widely distributed pamphlet was a factual presentation of Britain's trade position but it concluded that "it should not be construed that Britain is unsympathetic towards the wider aims and ideals of the Six". (79) Another pamphlet on European unity provided an historical survey of Conservative European policy noting that federalism was the major political obstacle. It ended by questioning how far federation was implied in the EEC, and suggesting that the British-Continental division was psychological not actual. (80) A brief by Peter Minoprio at the trade desk suggested that there were only three alternatives: the EEC would accept a FTA; Britain would join the Treaty of Rome; or

there would be a negotiated agreement between the EEC and EFTA. ⁽⁸¹⁾ The CRD proposed on 20th December 1960 that the Y.C.s should adopt the theme, Commonwealth and Common Market, for their discussion groups. James Douglas gave a speech at a Swinton Conference in December 1960 which said that the problems with the Treaty of Rome were not insuperable, that the dangers outside the EEC were grave, that political will could solve the technical problems, and that it was dangerous to exaggerate the differences between Britain and the Six. ⁽⁸²⁾ The CRD in the late 1950s, while never exaggerating the Government's position, tried to pave the way in their briefs to M.P.s for a more radical position. While it would be an error to believe that a clear CRD position was taken, evidence from the briefs suggests that there was an accepted consensus in favour of more radical policies and eventual British membership of the EEC.

The CPC in the 1950s played a minor role on Europe compared to its later activities. Its journal, Objective, although edited by a 'European', Richard Bailey, faithfully reflected Conservative Party policy, both that federalism prevented British participation ⁽⁸³⁾ and that the opportunities were greater than the risks with the FTA. ⁽⁸⁴⁾ The CPC published Our Trade with Europe in February 1957 by James Driscoll, a strong proponent of British participation in the FTA, but it also published pamphlets by the Expanding Commonwealth Group. ⁽⁸⁵⁾

The Overseas Committee endorsed a paper in July 1951 on their future role, which stated that "our closest political links are and should be with the Commonwealth countries generally, and then with Europe and the U.S.A." and that contacts would only be with individuals and not organisations. "It is obviously undesirable (to) promote a Conservative International overseas". ⁽⁸⁶⁾ This was their position throughout the 50's although events both external and internal (the

activities of Y.C.s, FUCA and Women) forced them to give more attention to Europe and to establish some limited inter-Party contacts. They endorsed Y.C. membership of the European Youth Campaign with the understanding of withdrawal if it should adopt federalism, and the Women's membership of the European Union of Women only after Eden's agreement. In October 1952 they organised a visit to Strasbourg and agreed to urge greater interest in European unity, although there is little evidence of any activity resulting from this decision. (87)

In response to a call from the Conservative delegation at Strasbourg for a revival of the European Movement, the Committee considered that a mass revival was out of the question, but they would continue "influencing existing organisations in favour of Strasbourg's efforts". (88)

In May 1954 there started a long discussion on relations with the Christian Democrats, which led to the decision in December 1955 that the "Party should seek optimum representation at international NEI functions, on an observer basis". (89)

By 1959 "a Continental federation of parties was hoped for, association with which, in some form, could in due course be considered". (90)

Thus the Overseas Committee played very little role on Europe in the 1950s, following the initiatives of others rather than leading.

The semi-autonomous Swinton Journal published three articles on Europe in the 1950's. The first by Aubrey Jones M.P. emphasised the conflict between the Commonwealth and federalism, but also the need to co-operate with the ECSC. (91)

J.A. Hendry, a Swinton College tutor, argued the advantages of a FTA, that the Commonwealth was no alternative and Britain must be careful not to try European patience too far. (92)

William Rees-Mogg, a journalist with the Financial Times, argued that if the EEC failed there was no problem, but if it succeeded that would create great problems for Britain's overseas

trade because the FTA was impossible, EFTA was inadequate, and the value of Commonwealth preferences was declining. (93) The Swinton Journal provided another outlet for views that were not outside Government policy but pointed it in a more radical direction.

The Informal Party

The Bow Group was formed in 1951. While it does not take collective positions on policy issues, the Bow Group leadership did provide a clear pro-European lead, in terms of its pamphlets, and articles published in their journal, Crossbow, established in October 1957. Russell Lewis, a Group chairman and later an employee of the Community Information Office in London, reported that in 1958 when they adopted a broad editorial policy for Crossbow, one of the major themes was "a recognition that our future lay with a united Europe". (94) In 1956 the Group published their first pamphlet on Europe, The Challenge from Europe, by Russell Lewis, which argued the case for the FTA but noted the benefits would not be very great. (95) He disagreed with the Express pro-Empire position by noting that Canada would not join such a policy because of the U.S.A., that the Empire was not self-sufficient and that the Commonwealth market was growing only very slowly. The main benefit would be the competitive stimulus to industry. Lewis looked to further co-operation with the EEC, for increasing trade in agriculture and the free movement of capital and labour. The pamphlet also explained in the appendices Euratom with which the author, Anthony Morris, argued Britain could associate, and the EEC. The pamphlet, therefore, argued in favour of the FTA, but also of further European commitments.

In Crossbow articles appeared arguing for a more adventurous European policy, and for EEC membership. Jock Bruce-Gardyne

felt that Britain had ignored developments towards European unity when Britain did not participate in them. In a special issue in Spring 1958 Patrick Jenkin argued the case for membership of the EEC, Jock Bruce-Gardyne wanted the EEC to be more liberal and outward-looking, and Sir Robin Williams argued for better European-Commonwealth relations. Henry Gelber believed that political union was more important than economic, and Britain should join if only it would accept federalism. David Howell presented his criticism of the lack of effective 'European' leadership among the Tories. (96)

There was, therefore, a strong pro-European feeling within the Bow Group which easily moved into favouring British membership of the EEC. This helped to identify Europe with the younger, intellectually able and more forward-looking members of the party, and therefore helped to make Europe an attractive political proposal for the Conservatives.

As Nigel Forman has discussed, the European Movement (EM) went into decline after the election of the Conservative Government in 1951. (97) The Conservative Party continued to take a benevolent attitude to the Movement, especially as the Movement itself, under the influence of the Amerys, was careful not to move far from the Government's own position. In the organisation of an ELEC monetary conference, Lady Elspeth Rhys-Williams told Sandys "We would, of course, be working with the full co-operation of the Foreign Office, and would not put up anything (at the Conference) that was not acceptable to the Government". The Movement's journal, the European Review, under Lady Rhys-Williams' editorship, even criticised the Continentals in 1953 for developing in the wrong direction. Its policy, prepared by Julian Amery, was one based on the co-operation of nation states working through functional authorities responsible

to a Committee of Ministers. Faced with financial bankruptcy, Leo Amery, the Movement Chairman, obtained Churchill's agreement to run it on a care and maintenance basis only. The European Movement was thus at a low level of activity, in a generally supportive role towards the Government.

In 1954 there was an attempt to revive the European Movement, led by the Conservative delegation in Strasbourg. A rally was held at the Caxton Hall on 15th January 1955, at which the speakers included Boothby and Leslie Hore-Belisha, to which the Party encouraged Conservative representation. In May 1957, it organised a visit to the High Authority in Luxembourg for prospective parliamentary candidates, including 12 Conservatives. Lord Poole, Party Chairman, told the Party in May 1957 to take a positive attitude towards it. "We could make a good deal of use of this organisation" in furtherance of Government policy towards Europe. The Overseas Committee welcomed the appointment of Humphrey Berkeley, the CPC's Political Education Officer, as Director-General of the Movement in April 1957. A mass Britain-in-Europe meeting was held in Central Hall, Westminster, on 9th July 1957, which Macmillan, Churchill and Boothby addressed. The Party feared disturbances by Empire Loyalists so the Organisation Department distributed 1,000 tickets to local associations to try to ensure a friendly audience. (98) The U.K. European Movement were dissatisfied with the attention given to the Common Market by the International European Movement, and decided to conduct its own campaign for broader European unity. (99)

With the approval of the Government, the European Movement organised, on 19th-21st February 1958, a European Industrial Conference of employers and trade unionists throughout Europe to discuss the problems of the Common Market and the proposal for its association with

a FTA. (100) The Conference enhanced the Government's policy, and was addressed by Derek Heathcoat-Amory, the Chancellor, Reginald Maudling, the FTA negotiator, and Sir David Eccles, President of the Board of Trade. This was an example of where the close relationship between the Government and the European Movement was mutually beneficial.

To support the new EFTA, the European Movement organised a government and industrial conference of the Seven in London in Autumn 1960, to which the Government gave strong support, with speeches from Macmillan, Selwyn Lloyd, Maudling and Heath. The role of the European Movement in the 1950s was supportive of the Government's position in favour of inter-governmental co-operation in a wide United Europe, and it was able to provide concrete support through its international contacts. In return the Government and the Party provided its own form of support for the European Movement.

The British industrial organisations took little interest in European affairs in the early 1950s, as it was considered as an aspect of foreign affairs, rather than of economic affairs. With the movement towards economic aspects of European unity with the Spaak proposals for a common market, these organisations took a greater interest in European affairs, although it was primarily in a reactive rather than initiatory role. This was partly a result of the fragmented nature of the organisation of British industry, with the Federation of British Industries (FBI), the National Union of Manufacturers (NUM), the Institute of Directors, the Association of British Chambers of Commerce (ABCC) and the City.

The Party took a close interest in the position of these organisations towards the FTA and EFTA. The CRD reported an FBI survey of its members' attitudes towards the FTA, which found of the 128 trade associations surveyed 52 were in favour, 15 wanted negotiations,

27 were against, 22 don't know and 12 were divided. (101) Of the member companies, 479 were in favour, 147 against and 38 don't know. 9 out of the 10 regional councils favoured negotiations. The CRD urged the need for close consultation with the FBI.

The FBI met with the Board of Trade on 2nd November 1956 and expressed their broad support for the FTA but insisted on the need for safeguards against unfair practices and the need for close consultation with the Government at all stages of the negotiations, which the Government accepted. On 2nd October 1957 a joint report was produced by the ABCC, FBI and NUM in support of the FTA but with three requirements, that Imperial Preference be maintained, food be excluded and no common external tariff towards the rest of the world, which were already part of the Government's proposals. This information led David Dear, in his report to Hailsham, to conclude that "the weight of opinion is in favour of negotiations", but it was not prepared to pay too high a price. (102)

The FTA negotiations had forced the FBI to co-operate with other industrial federations opposed to a customs union, and they made their own proposals. (103) They were an early promoter of the idea of a FTA among the 'Outer Six', and on 17th December 1958 they issued a joint statement with the Swedish Employers Federation calling for the establishment of such an association. According to Camps, pressure from British industry was an important element in the Government's decision to support the EFTA rather than negotiations with the Six, but after initial zeal the FBI took a more cautious approach. (104)

Thus, apart from close consultation over the details of negotiations and a short period in the winter of 1958-59 of pressure for EFTA, the FBI and other industrial organisations played a passive role in the development of Government policy. Blank believed that

"the FBI was never effective as a pressure group" because the leadership was never able to take a firm position, and Leiber stated that "there is no doubt that in the crucial phrase of decision-making the FBI as an organisation lagged behind the British Government". (105)

Although the Government and the Party were very sensitive to industrial opinion, it was rarely clearly expressed, so the Government had a relatively free hand in this area.

The situation with the agricultural organisations was more clear-cut. In none of these negotiations did the Government seriously consider the abandonment of national agricultural protection. The exclusion of agriculture was an important element in the Government's inability to join the Common Market of the Six and the failure of the FTA negotiations. Lieber described the NFU as "the critical factor. Had the Union, by some transformation, become a positive advocate of a common agriculture policy, there would have been little likelihood of agriculture remaining outside the European arrangement". (106)

The reason for NFU hostility was the disruption that would have occurred in their relationship with, indeed some might say 'capture' of, the Ministry of Agriculture. "The NFU would have to seek allies among other European farm organisations instead of relying on its close relationship with the British Government. This prospect explains the Union's distaste for European integration". (107) The CRD reported that the National Farmers Union nonetheless remained sceptical because of their fears that easier Continental access to the U.K. in agriculture would be the quid pro quo for British industrial access to the Continent. (108) A statement by Maudling to the OEEC saying that "there will be no free trade in agriculture and horticultural products" helped to assuage NFU fears. (109)

The economic interest groups, in industry and agriculture, played

a very limited role in Government policy-making towards Europe which was conducted primarily as an aspect of foreign affairs. While the Government was extremely sensitive to their opinions, their broad policy was not constructed to respond to pressure from these organisations.

The opinion of the quality press was also closely monitored by the CRD. The press generally took a view similar to that of the government, that co-operation with the rest of Europe was important but that membership of any supranational organisation was impossible.

The Economist continued its support for European unity and in September 1956 called for "an unequivocal public statement of support for a FTA" from the Government and warned of the dangers of hesitation. (110) In response to concern expressed by Harold Gurden, an anti-European M.P., Douglas of the CRD commented that the Economist was inclined to assume that its own views were also those of the Government and "hence presents Britain as rather more committed to the Spaak proposals than she in fact is". (111) After the collapse of the FTA negotiations, the Economist carefully considered the question of membership of the EEC, especially in a series of editorials in November and December 1958. Finally, on 27th December 1958, it became the first major journal to advocate full membership, although very much in the form of testing the water. It was sceptical of the value of EFTA compared to the EEC, (112) and finally, in June 1960, came out unequivocally for membership with "due flourish and after appropriate consultations with fellow members of EFTA, we believe that Britain would be wise to make an offer of full-scale participation in the European common market and community". (113) Similarly the Spectator urged a more positive approach to Europe. In a series of articles and editorials it expressed great scepticism as to the value of EFTA.

An editorial claimed that EFTA would fail to get Britain closer to the EEC, and that the gains of EFTA membership were probably less than the losses from not being in the EEC. (114) Selwyn Lloyd was frequently criticised for being insufficiently 'European' (115) and Europe was described as the most important single question facing the Chancellor of the Exchequer. (116) The Spectator was thus an early supporter of British membership and highly critical of the Government's position.

The daily press was rather more cautious. The Times reported that on the FTA, "the obstacles are many, varied and formidable". (117) It supported EFTA as a bridge to the EEC, (118) but was firmly hostile to any federalist entanglements. (119) The paper finally came out in favour of entry in September 1960. (120) The other Conservative papers tended to take a similar development. They supported EFTA (121) but favoured an even closer relationship to Europe, (122) and eventually came to support British entry. (123)

The Express was the only Conservative oriented paper to take a strong hostile stance to European links in favour of Empire Free Trade. It rejected the EEC on a wide range of grounds, including national sovereignty, an independent foreign policy, the Commonwealth and the protection of agriculture. Its influence caused great concern to the pro-European elements in the Party. It published in 1957 a pamphlet, Your Future, which argued that any European arrangements should have Commonwealth agreement, and that Britain could not face the competition from lower wage levels and the lower standard of living on the Continent. Heath was concerned enough to ask the CRD to provide a critique of the pamphlet. (124) The Express was seen as the major encouragement of intra-party opposition with their claim that "the Government is abandoning the Commonwealth and destroying Imperial Preference". (125) The Express was also the first to raise the question of a 'mandate'

for European entanglements, which received a sympathetic response from some Conservatives. (126) The Express editorialised on a pro-European inter-departmental report in summer 1960 that the report was a "blueprint for disaster", and meant "soaring prices for the housewife,... ruin for the small farmer" and "betrayal of Empire producers". (127) While the position of the Express did not prevent the Government from promoting European negotiations, it was aware and concerned about any impact that the paper might have in encouraging opposition in the Party to any agreements which the Government might make.

Electoral opinion on Europe in the 1950's was sympathetic to European co-operation, suspicious of institutional links but above all the issue was of low salience. Within those parameters the Government had a wide scope of action. A poll in November 1952 showed 62% in favour of European Unity, in January 1957 58% favoured a close British-European partnership, and in March 1959 54% favoured joining the EEC for trade reasons. There were, however, limits to that support. In November 1952 only 19% favoured membership of the European Army, with 65% in favour of the status quo and 16% don't know. The same poll also showed that only 23% favoured membership of the ECSC, with 47% against and 30% don't know. A poll in July 1960 revealed 49% favoured European co-operation with only 13% against, but if there were "political implications" these figures change to 22% for and 35% against. A question stating whether membership would be personally good or bad, asked in summer 1961 before the Government's announcement, found 28% thought that it would be a good thing, 19% bad and 53% that it would make no difference. This poll, like the others, found Conservatives provided greater support for entry. (128) The Conservative assessment of the electoral value of Europe as an issue can be seen in that the only mention in the 1955 manifesto was a

reference to the WEU, and there was no reference in the 1959 manifesto. (129)

Conclusion

The disappointment with the record of the Conservative government in the early 1950s expressed by the Continentals was largely based on a misunderstanding of the Conservative position, although the Conservatives and especially Churchill must take much of the blame for that misunderstanding. The 'Europeans' in the U.K. largely supported the Government's position of European Unity on an inter-governmental basis. The Conservative Governments were consistent throughout this period in their objectives, and those objectives were supported almost totally within the Conservative Party. It was events on the Continent, and the Government's response to them, which caused some inter-party conflict. It was felt by some in the Cabinet, in the Parliamentary Party, in the Conservative delegation at Strasbourg, in the CRD, in the younger elements such as the Y.C.s and the Bow Group, in parts of the press, that a more positive response to European developments, even when British participation was not possible, would have led to a better relationship with the Continent and especially the Six, and avoid the great fear of both Government and 'Europeans' of a divided Europe. The role played by the Conservative 'Europeans' was to raise Europe in the list of Government priorities, and to maintain a steady if not especially great pressure upon the Government to develop initiatives towards the rest of Europe. The anti-'Europeans' were not a significant influence, largely because their objectives of agricultural protection, Commonwealth preference and no federalism were shared by the Government. Their fears that any institutional entanglements with the Continent implied the abandonment of these objectives however

was not shared by the Government. The main influence of the anti-'Europeans' was to encourage the Government to continually demonstrate to the public and the Party that their policies were perfectly consistent with those objectives. They had little effect on those policies themselves. There was, therefore, in the 1950s, a broad national and Party consensus which the Government shared. It was when the dual objectives of a European unity without supranational institutions appeared to be incompatible that the Government had to re-examine that consensus.

CHAPTER 3REFERENCES

1. Alan Watson, Europe at Risk, (London, Harrap, 1972), p.194.
2. Kilmuir, Political Adventure, (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), p.186.
3. Watson, op cit, p.124.
4. Michael Charlton, "How and Why Britain Lost the Leadership of Europe", Encounter, (August 1981), pp9-21.
5. Times, 24th March 1965.
6. H. Macmillan, Tides of Fortune, (London, Macmillan, 1969), p.506.
7. A. Carlton, Anthony Eden: A Biography, (London, Allen Lane, 1981), p.312.
8. Kilmuir, op cit, p.189, p.193.
9. Edward Beddington-Behrens, Look Back, Look Forward, (London, Macmillan, 1963), p.186.
10. Kilmuir, op cit, p.294.
11. ibid, p.187.
12. R. Boothby, Recollections of a Rebel, (London, Hutchinson, 1978), pp.221-222.
13. R. Boothby, My Yesterday, Your Tomorrow, (London, Hutchinson, 1962), p.84.
14. Kilmuir, op cit, p.193.
15. Carlton, op cit, p.294.
16. Boothby (1978), op cit, p.223.
17. Macmillan (1969), op cit, p.465.
18. ibid, p.472. See also Miriam Camps, Britain and the European Community, (London, Oxford University Press, 1964), p.30, p.53.
19. Camps (1964), op cit, p.45. H.C. Debates, Vol. 281, 21st February 1955, c.881-887.
20. Kilmuir, op cit, p.284.
21. David Howell, "Where are the Tory Europeans?", Crossbow, (Autumn 1960).
22. Charlton (August 1981), op cit, p.10.

23. H.C. Debates, Vol. 430, 26th November 1946, c.37-38.
24. Camps (1964), op cit, p.234.
25. ibid, p.216.
26. Peter Kirk, "The British Question Mark to Europe" in W.E.U.: Ten Years of Seven-Power Europe, (Paris, W.E.U., 1964).
27. Aubrey Jones, "Britain and Europe", Swinton Journal, June 1955.
28. Beddington-Behrens, p.189.
29. Boothby (1978), op cit, p.219, p.210.
30. Boothby (1962), op cit, p.84.
31. Times, 12th July 1954.
32. Kenneth Lindsay, European Assemblies, (London, Stevens & Sons, 1960); Ernst Haas, Consensus Formation in the Council of Europe, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1960).
33. Howell, op cit.
34. Nigel Forman, The European Movement in Britain 1945-1954, (Doctoral Dissertation, Sussex University, 1973), p.354.
35. H.C. Debates, Vol. 494, 6th December 1951, c.494.
36. Samuel Finer, Hugh Berrington and David Bartholomew, Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons 1955-1959, (London, Pergamon Press, 1961), p.88.
37. John Biggs- Davison, The Uncertain Ally, (London, Johnson, 1957).
38. Howell, op cit.
39. H.C. Debates, Vol. 494, 6th December 1951, c.2656; H.C. Debates, Vol. 524, 24th February 1954, c.651.
40. James Douglas, CRD, to Christopher Soames, Air Minister.
41. The Expanding Commonwealth, (CPC, November, 1956).
The Expanding Opportunity: the Commonwealth, (CPC, September, 1958).
42. Finer et al, op cit, pp.185-197.
43. Early Day Motion 101/55, 10th August 1956. See Times, 12th July 1956; The Common Market: Western Europe, (CRD, n.d.).
44. Early Day Motion, 12th December 1956.
45. Early Day Motion 110/55, 30th August 1956; 4/57, 11th November 1956.
46. H.C. Debates, Vol. 561, 26th November 1956, c.561.

47. ibid, c.124-127.
48. Max Beloff, New Dimensions in Foreign Policy, (London, Allen and Unwin, 1961), p.112.
49. John Ramsden, The Making of Conservative Party Policy, (London, Longman, 1980), p.198.
50. H.C. Debates, Vol. 615, 14th December 1959, c.1055-1180.
51. Guardian, 4-5th May, 1959.
52. Times, 25th June 1960.
53. Robert Pfalzgraff Jr., Britain Faces Europe, (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969), p.39.
54. Conference Handbook 1953.
55. Verbatim Conference Report 1954.
56. David Dear, The Political Attitudes to FTA Proposals, (CRD, 3rd October 1957), report to Lord Hailsham.
57. Conference Handbook 1957.
58. Verbatim Conference Report 1957.
59. Conference Handbook 1960.
60. Verbatim Conference Handbook 1960.
61. Overseas Committee Minutes 1952, *passim*. An alternative, but more limited, source of information is the National Union Reports in the Conference Handbook.
62. ibid, 1953 and 1954.
63. ibid, 6th December 1954.
64. Ursula Branston, Britain and European Unity, (CRD, August 1953).
65. A. Rogers, European Common Market: Ongoing and Development of the Plan for Its Latest Revival, (CRD, 28th September 1956).
66. James Douglas, Britain and a European Common Market, (CRD, 10th October 1956). See also briefs to the Conservative Parliamentary Finance Committee, Britain and European Trade, (CRD 26th October 1956); Notes on Trades Policy, (CRD n.d.); EFTA, (CRD 27th February 1957).
67. Statement on the U.K. and a European Common Market, (CRD 8th October 1956); Common Market: Western Europe, (CRD n.d.); European Trade Policy, (CRD, 22nd November 1956).
68. Douglas, CRD, to Lady Davidson, 23rd October 1956.
69. Douglas to Soames, n.d.

70. Douglas to Victor Morgan, n.d.
71. David Dear to Heath, March 1957.
72. Speech by the Economic Secretary on 9th March, (CRD, 25th March 1957). See, Latest Developments, (CRD, 26th March 1957).
73. Notes on FTA Developments for R.A. Butler, (CRD, 3rd September 1957).
74. Dear to Hailsham, 3rd October 1957.
75. Agriculture and the Free Trade Area, (CRD, 11th November 1957).
76. Maudling to the OEEC, (CRD, n.d.).
77. Notes for Speakers on the FTA, (CRD, 6th January 1958).
78. Peter Minoprio, EFTA, (CRD, n.d.).
 ibid, European Trade, (CRD, 15th May 1959).
 ibid, EFTA, (CRD, 23rd November 1959).
 Special notes for Sir J. Henderson-Stewart, 20th February 1958,
 and Lord Poole, n.d.
79. Britain's Trade Policy, (NCP, CRD, 11th July 1960).
80. European Unity, Political Issues, (NCP, CRD, 8th August 1960).
81. Minoprio, Britain and Europe, 20th July 1960.
82. Douglas, "Six's and Seven's: the Background", Swinton Journal, March 1961.
83. The Objective, (CPC, May 1954).
84. ibid, May 1957.
85. The Expanding Commonwealth, (CPC, November 1956). The Expanding Opportunity: The Commonwealth, (CPC, September 1958).
86. The Future Role of the Bureau, 23rd July 1951.
87. Overseas Committee Minutes, 6th October 1952.
88. ibid, 21st June 1954.
89. ibid, 3rd May 1954 - 5th December 1955.
90. ibid, 16th June 1959.
91. Aubrey Jones, "Britain and Europe", Swinton Journal, June 1955.
92. J.A. Hendry, "European Trade", Swinton Journal, September 1957.
93. W. Rees-Mogg, "Problems of Overseas Trade", Swinton Journal, October 1959.

94. Russell Lewis, Symposium on Intellectuals and Conservatism, Swinton Journal, Summer 1968, p.17.
95. Lewis, The Challenge from Europe, (Bow Group, 1956).
96. Jock Bruce-Gardyne, "Odds Against Free Trade", Crossbow, Spring 1958; Bruce Gardyne, "Growing Up Pains", Crossbow, Spring 1960; Henry Gelber, "Europe: Association without Integration", Crossbow, Summer 1960; Howell, "Where are the Tory Europeans", Crossbow, Autumn 1960.
97. This paragraph based on information in Forman, *passim*.
98. Overseas Committee Minutes, *passim*.
99. Beddington-Behrens, *op cit*, p.188.
100. *ibid*, pp.192-198. Camps (1964), *op cit*, p.231.
101. European Trade Policy, (CRD, 22nd November 1956).
102. Dear to Hailsham, 3rd October 1957.
103. Free Trade to Europe, (Paris, 14th April 1958) in Camps (1964), *op cit*, p.212.
104. Camps (1964), *op cit*, p.215.
105. Stephen Blank, Industry and Government in Britain, (Farnborough, Saxon House, 1973), p.7. Robert Lieber, British Politics and European Unity, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1970), p.97.
106. Lieber, *op cit*, p.54.
107. Peter Self and Herbert Storing, The State and the Farmer, (London, Allen and Unwin, 1962), p.209.
108. Agriculture and the Free Trade Area, (CRD, 11th November 1957).
109. EEC and EFTA, (CRD, 11th December 1957).
110. Economist, 22nd September 1956.
111. Douglas to H. Gurden, 16th November 1956.
112. Economist, 26th March 1960.
113. *ibid*, 11th June 1960.
114. Spectator, 8th January 1960.
115. *ibid*, 8th April 1960, 17th June 1960, 8th July 1960.
116. *ibid*, 8th July 1960.
117. Times, 1st October 1956.

118. ibid, 2nd June 1960.
119. ibid, 20th May 1959.
120. ibid, 8th September 1960.
121. Telegraph, 20th May 1959. Mail, 24th November 1959. Financial Times, 20th July 1959.
122. Financial Times, 19th November 1959. Mail, 17th November 1959.
123. Telegraph, 25th July 1966.
124. Dear to Heath, March 1957.
125. Dear to Hailsham, 3rd October 1957.
126. For example, see correspondence between CRD and Conway Agent, n.d. Summer 1957.
127. Express, 14th July 1960.
128. On opinion polls, see Forman, op cit, passim; Pfalzgraff, op cit, p.42; Kenneth Waltz, Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics, (London, Longman, 1968), Chapter 8.
129. F.W. Craig, Britain General Election Manifestos, 1900-1974, (Chichester, Political Reference Publications, 1975).

Background

During 1960 Harold Macmillan came to the personal conclusion that Britain would be best situated within the EEC, but doubted that the country would accept it. Over the Christmas period of 1960-61, Macmillan decided that Britain should apply, and directed himself to gaining broad support for that policy, especially from the Cabinet. The Cabinet discussed how Britain could join during the spring of 1961 and gradually Cabinet opinion moved in the direction of acceptance of negotiations. Hints began to emerge that the Cabinet was seriously interested in membership. The Government began a series of consultations with the Commonwealth, EFTA and the Six. On 27th July 1961 the Cabinet agreed to apply for membership, and seek acceptable conditions. On 31st July 1961, Macmillan briefly announced it to the Commons, that these negotiations were to see whether satisfactory arrangements could be made to meet the interests of Parliament, Commonwealth and EFTA, and that no agreement would be made without the approval of the House and consultations with the Commonwealth. (1) Two days later a full scale debate, lasting 13 hours, was held on a motion reflecting the cautious approach of the Government.

"That this House supports the decision of H.M. Government to make formal application under Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome in order to initiate negotiations to see if satisfactory arrangements can be made to meet the special interests of the United Kingdom, of the Commonwealth and of the EFTA; and further accepts the undertaking of H.M. Government that no agreement affecting these special interests or involving British sovereignty will be entered into until it has been approved by this House after full consultation with other Commonwealth countries, by whatever procedure they may generally agree". (2)

The motion was passed on August 3rd by 313 votes to 5 (4 Labour, 1 Conservative) with the Labour Party and 25 Conservatives abstaining.

Long, difficult and detailed negotiations were conducted by Edward Heath as chief negotiator with the Six and the Commission of the EEC from September 1961 to January 1963. During the negotiations debate raged within Britain, with a movement of opinion in the direction of the anti-marketeers. The Government was reluctant to campaign for the principle of membership while negotiations were still being conducted. A major event was the Commonwealth Conference in London, 10-19th September 1962, where Europe was the main topic. The communique did not oppose the British policy, but considerable disquiet was expressed, and the Government failed to achieve the passive acceptance that it had sought. The Party Conference at Llandudno, October 1962, provided a surprisingly overwhelming endorsement of Government policy. In November 1962, however, the Conservatives did badly in six by-elections, in particular losing South Dorset to Labour due to the intervention of an independent Conservative anti-marketeer, Sir Piers Debenham, which rocked the Party. The Government awaited successful negotiations in order to launch a major and, they believed, election-winning campaign.

Then President De Gaulle delivered a bomb shell at a press conference on 14th January 1963. He said the question was whether "Great Britain can at present place itself with the Continent and like it, within a tariff that is truly common, give up all preference with regard to the Commonwealth, cease to claim that its agriculture be privileged, even more, consider as null and void the commitments it has made with the countries that are part of its free trade area. That question is the one at issue. One cannot say that it has now been resolved. Will it be one day? Obviously Britain alone can answer that". (3) This was virtually a French veto, and the negotiations soon broke down, on 29th January 1963. At the end,

Heath made it clear that this did not mean the end of the Government's European policy. "We in Britain are not going to turn our backs on the mainland of Europe or on the countries of the Community. We are a part of Europe by geography, tradition, history, culture and civilisation. We shall continue to work with all our friends in Europe for the true unity and strength of this Continent". (4)

Macmillan also emphasised in a television broadcast on 31st January 1963 that for the sake of Europe and the free world, Britain would continue to seek further co-operation with Europe. The breakdown was a serious blow to the Party's election prospects.

This period was marked by two interacting sets of activities. On the one side were the negotiations, not only with the Six but also EFTA and the Commonwealth. On the other was the domestic debate on the wisdom of British membership. Most of the work on this period has concentrated on the negotiations, and the impact of the domestic debate upon the negotiations, and the claim that the lack of domestic enthusiasm seriously weakened Britain in the negotiations. (5) Our concern is with the debate within the Conservative Party, and in particular the claim that Conservative support for membership was primarily a factor of the power of Harold Macmillan as Prime Minister and Party Leader.

The Leader

There has been much discussion of the reasons that Macmillan came to the conclusion that Britain should enter the EEC. Factors included the strength of the free world, the need for a large market, the 'cold shower' of competition on British industry, the economic benefits of the Community and the influence that Britain could have in the world through the EEC. (6) Another factor was Macmillan's need

to find a new theme for the next election, that the Conservatives had been in power for 10 years and look a tired and exhausted administration, and the Conservatives needed to attract the support of the young and the new upwardly mobile middle class. (7) Europe provided the mixture of idealism and 'progressiveness' that Macmillan felt could win the next election. He was also influenced by the interests which called for membership, such as the Treasury and the Foreign Office, parts of industry, the City, the U.S.A. and most of the press. Conservative Central Office recommended the application as an election-winner. Thus while the strategic and economic interests of Britain were the primary determining factors, the electoral interests of the Conservative Party were an additional consideration.

Most commentators have placed considerable emphasis on the role played by Macmillan, indeed that he was the sine qua non of the British application. Ronald Butt argued that "it was not a decision arising out of urges from the traditional streams of influence of the Conservative Party....In truth, the decision taken by the Macmillan government flew in the face of most of the instincts supporting it". "The Prime Minister himself was the decisive factor" and his final section is headed "Macmillan's achievements". (8) Drew Middleton said that "without Macmillan the Tories would never have approached Europe and that if Britain does enter Europe it will be because of his leadership. The role of Harold Macmillan in this great decision has been stressed intentionally....The decision to seek union with Europe was Macmillan's...in the sense that the will of the Prime Minister dominated the Cabinet". (9) T.E. Lindsay and Michael Harrington in their history of the Conservative Party claimed that "the conversion of the Conservative Party to the Common Market was one of the more

remarkable of Macmillan's political achievements, for the whole enterprise stood in flat contradiction to all the traditional instincts of the Party, which were for national sovereignty at any price". (10)

The view that this decision was a major break for the Conservative Party is endorsed by Macmillan himself. He felt that there were "many very anxious Conservatives. It is getting terribly like 1846", (11) thus comparing the issue with the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 which split the Party and effectively excluded the Party from office for 28 years (except for a brief period 1867-68). "I don't see how the Conservative Party can avoid some sort of split on this issue". (12) For this reason Macmillan adopted a very cautious approach, designed to carry along the Cabinet, Parliament, the Party and the Country. Richard Neustadt believed that he did this "by disguising his strategic choice as a commercial option". (13) He presented the talks as exploratory, talks about talks, and emphasised the economic advantages rather than the political consequences. A good example of his caution was his handling of Sir Robert Menzies, the Australian Prime Minister, "the only person Harold Macmillan was really frightened of", because of his popularity with the Conservative Party. Menzies was "softened up by Macmillan" with "lavish and skilled hospitality". (14) From such a dramatic perspective on the difficulties of gaining party acceptance of the decision, it is easy to attribute the success in achieving Party support to Macmillan's skill. As Macmillan himself said, "The opposition of the 'anti-Marketeers'...had proved a complete, almost ludicrous, failure". (15) The failure of his opponents to obtain any substantial body of support within the Party is largely attributed to Macmillan's skilful handling.

A theme of this chapter is that this view severely exaggerated

the danger to Party unity and underestimated the already substantial support that existed within the Cabinet, the Parliamentary Party, the rank and file activists, Central Office, the ginger groups and associated interest groups, the Party press and the electorate. This is not to denigrate the skill that Macmillan did display, only to rebut the exaggerated influence attributed to that skill and attributed to the power of the Prime Minister and Conservative Party Leader.

The Cabinet

On 27th July 1960, Macmillan reshuffled his Cabinet, a consequence of which was to place 'Europeans' in a number of sensitive positions. Duncan Sandys went to the Commonwealth Relations Office, Christopher Soames to Agriculture, Lord Home became Foreign Secretary with Edward Heath as his number two with special responsibility for Europe as Lord Privy Seal, and Thorneycroft became Minister of Aviation. It is denied by Bruce-Gardyne and Lawson, who had good contacts within the administration, that the reshuffle was carried out in order to promote the Europeans. (16) The main factor was to provide the Government with a new look, which involved the promotion of a new generation more oriented to Europe.

The Cabinet had a strong group of 'Europeans'. Sandys had long been identified with Europe, as had Thorneycroft. Soames at Agriculture was also a strong 'European', although he had accepted earlier arguments that membership was a political impossibility. (17) Lord Kilmuir, Lord Chancellor, and Sir David Eccles, Minister of Education, had been early 'Europeans'. Iain Macleod, Colonial Secretary but also Party Chairman, was convinced of the electoral benefits of membership, that an idealistic approach would attract the young and the new middle class to the Conservatives. He told his Association in April 1962

that "as a nation we should thrill to the challenge. I believe we have nothing to fear but much to gain". Fisher noted that Macleod, like Macmillan, "sensed and expressed the need to look towards new areas of vitality, political and economic, to a wider sweep of ideas and events, and to the exciting prospects which seemed to be opening in Europe". (18) Europe appealed to his romantic nature, while what appealed to his political nature was the fact that young people, professionals and white collar workers, the target group for the elections, were especially in favour of membership, as Macleod told the Cabinet.

At the Foreign Office, Home and Heath were two convinced but moderate 'Europeans'. Home's primary concern was the power of the Soviet Union, and therefore with the dangers of a divided Europe. By 1961 he had concluded that "the U.K. could not afford to stay out of the European Community" because of the declining value of Commonwealth preferences, the threat from the Soviet Union, and the need to inspire the young with the philosophy of freedom. (19) One biographer described his position as one of strong conviction without crusading enthusiasm. (20) Home was especially important because of the confidence placed upon him in the Conservative Party. Henry Fairlie reported that "his value in holding rank and file opinion is more and more obvious". (21)

Edward Heath had been an early sympathiser of Europe, giving his maiden speech in favour of the Conservative motion on the Schuman Plan. However, as Chief Whip he had acted to restrain 'European' M.P.s, and was reluctant to accept the post in the Foreign Office after only a few months at the Ministry of Labour. The Economist later suggested several reasons for Heath's choice as chief negotiator: that he was close to Macmillan, was held in high esteem by the Six, had the

confidence of the Party "who regard him rightly as a convinced but not a fanatical European" (Thorneycroft was rejected as too fanatical), his experience as a chief whip, and his ability to simplify complicated issues. (22) It also stated that if he was a success, that would make him a candidate for the leadership. A close political friend and biographer described him as "a convinced European, believing that Britain's future can best be assured by the sort of association that he was called upon to negotiate". (23) Thus there was in the Cabinet a large group of ministers strongly in favour of British membership, even if some like Sandys or Soames were more committed than others like Home or Heath.

There was, of course, also a group of people highly sceptical of the EEC, although this group was smaller, including Butler, Maudling and Hailsham. (24) The most important sceptic was Butler, although it has been said that "Butler had doubts about everything". (25) Butler was particularly concerned about the farmers in his constituency, especially the tomato-growers, and acted as a spokesman for agricultural interests within the Cabinet. Soames described him as "the keeper of quite a number of Conservative consciences, including the conscience of the countryside". Butler himself explained that his doubts were "actuated by the fact that all my life I'd represented a farming constituency, and all my life I'd been connected in one way or another with the NFU". (26) He even complained that European Community officials were speaking about agriculture in Britain! (27) Macmillan handled Butler by appointing him chairman of the negotiations committee, where his belief in team-work and Party unity led him to work for a successful negotiation. A tour of farmers convinced him that agricultural opinion was not so hostile as he had thought. "Butler himself says that he came around with the farmers". (28) He put his

full support behind the policy and indeed at the 1962 Conference gave a highly successful speech attacking Labour's opposition with the phrase "For them a thousand years of history books. For us, the future". (29) Yet clearly Butler acted as a restraining influence on the speed, though not the direction, of Government thinking, and was never fully converted to support. In his autobiography significantly there is no mention of the application. (30)

Maudling was a strong believer in free trade and, in his role as negotiator towards the FTA and EFTA, was very sceptical of the economic benefits of the EEC. In his autobiography he wrote that "The economic advantages were difficult to assess", while recognising the political case was stronger. (31) "We wanted a special position which recognised our Commonwealth ties and our world-wide status. We were not altogether unjustified in this point of view". Maudling probably played an important role in delaying the Cabinet commitment to membership. In May 1961, he told Boreham Wood Young Conservatives that it was "inaccurate" to say that the Government had decided to join. (32) It was also noted that Maudling was "conspicuously missing" from the visits to the Commonwealth carried out in June 1961. (33) Once the decision had been taken, he concentrated on his concerns at the Colonial Office, and after 13th July 1962 as Chancellor of the Exchequer.

Lord Hailsham was identified as the third sceptic, and indeed as the potential leader of the opposition within the Cabinet. (34) This exaggerated Hailsham's position. He claims that he was an early supporter of a united Europe in defence of European civilisation, describing his speech for British participation in the Schuman talks as "one of the most significant I ever delivered". (35) During his period as First Lord of the Admiralty in 1956 he talked of "my already

developed commitment to Europe". (36) He expressed his concerns about some of the conditions of membership, because the EEC had developed along less favourable lines than if Great Britain had already been in, but he was not opposed in principle. He accepted that participation in a United Europe was the "only reasonable prospect if we are to offer to our countrymen a life under the rule of law for civilised men". (37)

It has been claimed that speeches by Macleod and Frederick Erroll, President of the Board of Trade, in late 1962 were the public appearance of a Cabinet rebellion. (38) On 3rd November 1962 Macleod stated that Britain must not pay too high a price for membership, and that she must keep her agricultural system until the end of the transition period. Erroll claimed on 10th December 1962 that it would be unfortunate but not a disaster if Britain failed to enter. However, these speeches should rather be seen as an attempt to strengthen Heath's bargaining position during a particularly difficult period of negotiations.

Thus the role of the sceptics should not be exaggerated. They had their own conditions to be met in the negotiations, and they may have had their doubts that these conditions could be met, but they were not opposed to membership in principle. Because of the breakdown in negotiations, it can never be known if conditions acceptable to them could have been found, but the degree to which the prestige of the Government and the electoral prospects of the Party were tied to a successful entry, suggests that they would have accepted the terms that were emerging. Heath has strongly emphasised that the application for membership "was a Cabinet decision. It wasn't just a Prime Ministerial decision. The great majority of the members of the Cabinet felt strongly that our future lay with Europe, and many of them

(including my generation) had made up our minds about this a long time ago...it was a Cabinet decision in which the great majority were firmly and strongly behind making an application to join the Community". (39). Indeed, there is no evidence that any members of the Cabinet (or any other member of the Government) considered resigning over the issue.

The Cabinet agreed to negotiate unanimously on 27th July 1961, and it was felt even before then that no Minister was likely to resign over the issue. (40) There was never even a suggestion of a resignation during the negotiations. There was a major reshuffle on 13th July 1962, the Night of the Long Knives, when one-third of the Cabinet was sacked. This was generally perceived as strengthening the 'Europeans' (41) but this should not be seen as the cause. Macmillan was still concerned to present a new and dynamic image to his administration, and sought to bring in a number of new faces. The dismissal of Lord Kilmuir, Sir David Eccles and Selwyn Lloyd certainly did not strengthen the 'Europeans', or the promotion of Maudling to Chancellor. By the end of 1962 all Ministers were publicly speaking in favour of the policy, and according to the Economist this squashed rumours in the constituencies that Macmillan lacked Cabinet support. (42)

Thus without denying Macmillan's skill in handling the Cabinet, and particularly Butler, the divisions within the Cabinet were never as great as many commentators have suggested. Once acceptable terms seemed possible, and membership even electorally attractive, the Cabinet united in support of the negotiations and the search for membership under acceptable conditions.

Parliamentary Party

Inevitably with the actual application the initiative on Europe

lay with the Government, and the 'Europeans' in the House were cautious not to undermine the Government's negotiating position or domestic support. This group was primarily the younger members and those who had participated in the European Assemblies. A few urged the Government to join the EEC first and negotiate conditions after, and twelve Conservative M.P.s signed a memorandum circulated by Lord Gladwyn to that effect in June 1961. (43) However, once negotiations had begun they acted to strengthen the Government's negotiating position.

At the Western European Union (WEU) in late May 1961 a motion urging British membership of the EEC was adopted by 65 to 1, and supported by all the Conservatives there except Sir John Eden who voted against in principle, and Ronald Russell who abstained because of Commonwealth preferences. (44) The others strongly endorsed membership, but without haste or at any price. Maurice Macmillan urged joining; Sir John Maitland feared that the treatment of agriculture was too superficial; Anthony Kershaw felt that the slow approach was right and this was not "a slow and reluctant conversion" but the "gradual evolution of a technical problem"; Monty Woodhouse presented the political arguments for membership; and Kirk urged the mutual advantages of British membership. "We are not going down on our knees to beg anyone to take us in since we have a great deal to offer".

At the next WEU Assembly in December 1961, a report on agricultural problems brought Conservative supporters to emphasise the difficulties with Robert Matthew saying that these could be resolved and Sir John Maitland felt that the problems had been ignored in the report and so voted against the report, while noting his support for British membership. (45)

At the Council of Europe Assembly the Conservatives reacted to the patronising attitude of the Commission and some speakers from the Six who felt that Britain had to join from necessity. Maurice Macmillan said that Britain had "no more to gain from success and no more to lose from failure than other European countries". Kirk noted that the application had been made before the recent balance of payments crisis. "While devoutly hoping that the negotiations may be successful, I say frankly that, at the moment, I give them a 50-50 chance, the principle reason being the relationship between the U.K. and the Commonwealth". (Anthony Kershaw). Ronald Russell, an anti-marketeer, noted Sandys' statement that if a choice had to be made, the Commonwealth would come first. Maitland argued that the responsibility for agriculture should not be given to a supranational Commission, while Kershaw favoured such transfer. "It is necessary for the Common Market to have some compulsive powers in order to ensure that countries do what they are told in the ultimate interests of all". (46)

Heath told the WEU Assembly in June 1962, that the Government's objective was to find solutions to the problems involved. Sir James Scott-Hopkins and Robert Matthews urged the need for guaranteed entry of Commonwealth products into Europe. A number of Conservatives abstained over a motion on European Political Union because of its federal implications (Scott-Hopkins, Mayhew, Sir John Rogers, Russell, Prior-Palmer). (47) The Conservatives also impressed on the Six their reservations about the protraction of the negotiations and about the introduction of new EEC regulations during the negotiations. "As a result public opinion in Britain was hardening" (Maurice Macmillan). (48)

The delegations thus had representatives of all strands among M.P.s - the anti-marketeer in principle (Sir John Eden), the anti-

marketeer based on Commonwealth fears (Russell), the pro-marketeer if agricultural protection (Maitland), confederalist Europeans' (Scott-Hopkins, Mayhew) and even federalists (Kirk, Nicholas Ridley). The bulk of the delegation favoured British membership but feared that displays of enthusiasm on their part could weaken the Government's negotiating position. Therefore, strong contributions like the one by Peter Smithers were rare. (49) However, its importance was that they provided a reliable source of backbench support for the Government in parliamentary debates, and their support was solid despite the ups and downs of the negotiations.

It should also be stressed that support was broadly based in the Parliamentary Party and not only of the 'progressive' variety. While the 'left' were predominantly pro-European, a great deal of the 'right' were the same, although less prone to federalism. There were comments that the Suez Group provided a base for the anti-marketeers, (50) but leading Suez Group figures were notable 'Europeans', such as Sandys and Julian Amery. Lord Salisbury, described by the Economist as the only right-wing Tory of national status, was for membership. (51) They were staunch Commonwealth men who guaranteed in the eyes of many M.P.s that Commonwealth interests would be protected. Other right-wing enthusiasts were Sir Peter Agnew and David James. (52)

A mention should be made of the role of Sir Tufton Beamish the respected Chairman of the Conservative Foreign Affairs Committee from the centre of the party, also with well-established Commonwealth connections. He conducted a visit to the Commonwealth to reassure them that the Government would protect their interests and on his return reported that criticisms expressed by Menzies and others did not represent Commonwealth opinion, which was much more sympathetic to Britain's application. (53) An article by Beamish was circulated to

constituency journals in July 1962.

In October 1962 a Parliamentary Advisory Committee on the Common Market was set up to advise the Party on opinion within the Parliamentary Party and the constituencies. ⁽⁵⁴⁾ The Chairman was William Deedes, Minister without Portfolio responsible for the Government's public relations, and members were mainly European backbenchers - William Aitken, Beamish, William Gough, Stephen Hastings, Lionel Heald, Marcus Kimball, Kirk, Gilbert Longden, Maurice Macmillan, Robert Matthew, Gerald Nabarro, James Prior and William Root. The group met weekly and at their meeting on 22nd October 1962 emphasised the importance of the diffusion of information. On 31st October 1962, they discussed the need to brief backbenchers by providing a reading list of back-up services provided by CCO. Beamish and Kirk sought to draw up a list of experienced 'European' M.P.s, and questions were directed to Heath's department in response to queries received by M.P.s from their constituents. Concerns expressed were the effect on Britain's religious practices especially on Sundays, the fear that it would increase tension between East and West, the effect on jobs, and on the standard of living. A continual theme was the need for more information and the complaint that the Government should have started its information campaign much earlier. The main issues were seen as agriculture, the cost of living, jobs and the demand for a referendum. Surprisingly, the Commonwealth did not appear to most M.P.s and their constituents as the primary issue that it was for most of the anti-marketeers. Concern was expressed that displays of enthusiasm, such as at the Llandudno Conference, would weaken Britain in the negotiations. Upon the breakdown of negotiations, the Group hoped that it would not exclude future membership, urged the need for stronger contacts with the Six, decided to meet fortnightly, and

urged an information campaign "the essential purpose of which was to tell people the basic facts of life on which the Foreign Secretary had to operate with Britain outside the Common Market", designed to destroy the concept of the Commonwealth and EFTA as a satisfactory alternative. On 9th May 1963, the Group was suspended until Europe once again became 'active politics'.

The 'Europeans' in the Parliamentary Party, therefore, adopted a low profile after Britain's application, concerned with supporting the Government's negotiating position, but often expressing privately the fear that the lack of a strong campaign by the Government left the field to the anti-marketeers.

The anti-marketeers also covered the broad spectrum of the Parliamentary Party, from the right, left and centre. The leadership came from the centre, former ministers Derek Walker-Smith and Robin Turton. While they used all the normal arguments against membership (the Commonwealth, agriculture, EFTA and sovereignty), the main concern of this group was the sovereignty question, reflecting their careers as lawyers. Walker-Smith was the closest the anti-marketeers had to a leader. He presented "the most eloquent and most elegant speech against the Government's decision" during the July 1961 debate. (55) A special concern was the different legal and constitutional historical development between Britain and the Six. On 5th July 1961 Turton asked the Prime Minister why Britain had applied for full membership under Article 237 instead of association under Article 238. (56)

The small group of anti-marketeers from the 'progressive' wing, essentially Peter Walker, a former Young Conservative Chairman, and Sir Robin Williams, a former Bow Group Chairman, were concerned with pushing Britain towards the new Commonwealth. While both left and

right saw the Commonwealth as a reason for not joining the EEC, they were thinking of rather different Commonwealths, the left of the developing countries and the right of the Anglo-Saxon Dominions, so co-operation was not close. There were also differences on tactics. Walker wanted to organise a research team to investigate the potential for expansion offered by Commonwealth markets, and present their proposal to meetings of Commonwealth ministers. (57) This was a different approach from the public campaigning favoured by the other anti-marketeers. Walker himself went on a Commonwealth tour to find support for his ideas. The importance of Walker was that he might have attracted support from the left and the Young Conservatives, normally considered pro-European. However, he failed to bring substantial support with him.

The most vocal and prominent group of anti-marketeers were from the right-wing, such as Anthony Fell and John Biggs-Davison, who were "more of a source of embarrassment than of strength", (58) in particular because of their personal attacks on Macmillan. Upon the announcement of talks, Fell asked, "Is the Prime Minister aware that his quite shocking treatment, full of double talk, has had the effect on one of his previous supporters, that he now thinks the Prime Minister a natural disaster?" (59) Fell also wrote to Macmillan demanding his resignation, publicly attacked him and urged Party members to withdraw their support from their M.P.s. (60) Harry Legge-Bourke made a personal attack on Macmillan which met an embarrassed public silence and considerable private criticism amongst Conservative M.P.s. (61) The talk of the Earl of Sandwich, the former M.P. Viscount Hinchinbrooke and the President of the Anti-Common Market League, also caused embarrassment with xenophobic references to "frogs and huns". (62) John Biggs-Davison was a

'European' who would not, however, tolerate any supranationalism as a threat to the Commonwealth. He wrote a short book expressing his view that Europe and Commonwealth co-operation could be and should be achieved, but not through British membership of the EEC. (63) This was, however, too sophisticated for many of the anti-marketeers. He also attacked Macmillan as another Robert Peel, that his "betrayal of British agriculture and Commonwealth preference will destroy the Party of Macmillan". (64)

A reference should be made to Sir Anthony Hurd, Chairman of the Conservative Agricultural Committee, who potentially was a source of tremendous influence upon the agricultural M.P.s. At an early stage he forcefully expressed the apprehensions of the agricultural lobby to Macmillan at a meeting of the 1922 Committee in May 1961. (65) At the early stages he sought to protect agriculture in the negotiations but as the EEC developed their Common Agricultural Policy while the negotiations were conducted, Hurd took a firm anti-market position. On 23rd November 1962 he said that "the British electorate just would not take sharply increased food prices on our entry into the Common Market. Nor will the Conservative Party put back a network of food subsidies as a palliative for high consumer prices. It is well to say this bluntly". (66) He was a significant signature to an anti-market motion on 31st December 1962 congratulating the Government on their firm negotiating stance over agriculture.

The anti-marketeers presented a series of motions and amendments in the House of Commons. On 21st June 1961, 7 Conservative M.P.s signed an amendment warning of the dangers of membership, and on 26th July 1961 Walker-Smith and Turton presented an amendment expressing concern over the loss of sovereignty, which attracted 49 signatures. (66) On the motion on the application, there was only 1

Conservative vote against, but 25 Conservative abstentions. On 10th October 1961, Walker-Smith presented an amendment emphasising sovereignty, agriculture and the Commonwealth. The CRD prepared a brief on the amendment which stated that the Government accepted a limited loss of sovereignty, was pledged to a prosperous agriculture, and felt that the Commonwealth would benefit from membership. (68)

On 21st March 1962 30 Conservatives signed a motion demanding that the Government make "Completely clear to the Common Market the assurances of the Secretary for Commonwealth Relations that if we cannot secure special arrangements to protect the vital interests in the countries of our own Commonwealth partnership, Britain would not join the Common Market". Butt argued that its significance was that "it was signed not merely by prominent campaigners against the Government's policy, but also by a considerable number of moderates who had hitherto seemed uncommitted". (69)

On 31st July 1962, 40 Conservative anti-market M.P.s tabled a motion designed to attract the widest possible support urging the Government to "stand firm and to insist on definite assurances for Commonwealth trade and for our agricultural and horticultural policies". (70)

During the Commons debate on 3rd August 1962, the Tory anti-market amendments attracted 40 signatures, which the Economist claimed was only half the sponsors hoped for. (71)

On 13th December 1962 47 Conservatives signed a motion congratulating Heath on his firmness over agriculture and urged equal firmness on other issues, even if that should lead to a breakdown in the negotiations. (72)

This was a more significant motion in that it attracted the signatures of Anthony Hurd, Sir Donald Kaberry, a former vice-chairman of the Conservative Party organisation, and Sir James Duncan, an influential Scottish member. (73)

Despite the predictions of a widespread Conservative revolt, the

anti-marketeers only obtained the support of around 40 M.P.s, with perhaps 12 last-ditchers. (74) Why did they fail to attract more support? A major cause was the lack of a leader of stature.

Walker-Smith and Turton were respected ex-ministers but they were never perceived as real heavy-weights. They were seen as men of both moderate views and moderate stature. Julian Critchley noted the importance of the fact that they had no leader of real calibre. (75)

The second problem for the anti-marketeers was that they were labelled (unfairly as this chapter has argued) as simply right-wingers, and not particularly respectable ones either. (76)

They were associated with the xenophobic and hysterical language of a couple of M.P.s and the Daily Express. Thirdly, they appeared old-fashioned and reactionary,

while the progressive, younger and 'forward-looking' parts of the Party were identified with the European cause. The presence of Peter Walker failed to change that image. Another problem was that many M.P.s resented the suggestion that in supporting the Government they were betraying the Commonwealth and the farmers. Ted Leather M.P.

(an Australian) told a public meeting that "The British people should know that the vast majority of Tory M.P.s are heartily sick of a tiny minority who are apparently prepared to say anything in the cause of self-publicity. What I find particularly galling is that they are called the pro-Commonwealth group. They ought to be called the

anti-Commonwealth group. Most of them know nothing of the Commonwealth's history or the views of its members". (77)

A final problem was that criticisms of Macmillan's European policy was often seen as an attack on Macmillan as Party leader and his general policies which, in the speeches of a few such as Fell, they were. The danger that this

created for gaining the support of M.P.s was clearly seen by Walker-Smith and Turton, and they stressed that their position in no way

indicated opposition to Macmillan's leadership. However, they were unable to remove that impression. The anti-marketeers were disunited and never looked anywhere like gaining the support of a majority of Conservative M.P.s. (78)

Support for the Government in the Parliamentary Party remained fairly firm throughout this period, despite considerable fluctuations in morale. It seems likely that the vast majority, about 310, of Conservative M.P.s would have supported membership terms also acceptable to the Cabinet. (79) Despite constant Party and press speculation that a major parliamentary revolt was imminent, such a revolt never took place. (80) There were three potential occasions for revolt.

The first was the Commonwealth Conference in September 1962, described by the Economist as "potentially...the most explosive internal situation since the repeal of the Corn Laws", (81) and speculated that many Conservative M.P.s might follow that Commonwealth opposition. The Government were hoping for a passive acceptance at the Commonwealth Conference, but considerable disquiet was expressed by Commonwealth leaders. In fact, there was 'Still No Revolt', (82) and the Conference may have strengthened the Government as many M.P.s resented both the demands and language of the Commonwealth leaders which showed little concern for the interests of Britain. (83) Furthermore, M.P.s seemed to have received little evidence that the Commonwealth was a major concern of their constituents. (84)

The second predicted revolt, as noted by Macmillan, was after the Conservatives did badly in six by-elections in November 1962, and in particular the loss of South Dorset to Labour due to the intervention of an anti-market independent Conservative. (85) Naturally M.P.s became very concerned at the potential loss of their seats as an

election was expected in the next 18 months. Particular concern was expressed by agricultural M.P.s to the Whips. (86) The Government, and the CRD, conducted a campaign to play down the role that Europe played in the by-elections, argued that it was the result of a lack of successes, and that in a successful entry lay the best hope for re-election. CCO in their report on the by-elections claimed that Europe was not a major factor, except perhaps in South Dorset where there were also important local factors such as the popularity of the independent Conservative, Sir Piers Debenham, a former chairman of the local Association. (87) MacLeod argued that the difficulties of the Government would disappear once the negotiations were over and the Government could campaign vigorously for Europe. (88) The Parliamentary Advisory Committee attributed the loss to the visible drift of the Government, and the lack of progress in the negotiations. (89) The defeated candidate in Derby North believed that Europe was not an important factor in his defeat. (90) While undoubtedly the by-elections rocked the Parliamentary Party, after consideration Europe did not emerge as the major factor in the minds of Conservative M.P.s and indeed the desire for any success strengthened support for a successful outcome of the negotiations.

The third source was the long lingering concern, potentially the most dangerous, over adequate safeguards for British agriculture and horticulture. Butt believed that 100 M.P.s had reservations primarily over agriculture. (91) The NFU was very active in expressing their concerns, and during the negotiations the EEC were developing their own Common Agricultural Policy. The South Dorset by-election shook rural M.P.s and the Conservative Agricultural Committee expressed the fear that in a general election the Conservatives could lose 80 rural seats. The concern over an agricultural revolt was strengthened by

the emergence of Sir Anthony Hurd as an anti-marketeer. The negotiations broke down in January 1963 so it is difficult to predict whether these fears would have translated into open revolt. Ramsden suggested that it would. "There is little doubt that the (Agricultural) Committee and the Party in general welcomed the failure of the negotiations, on the grounds that a serious source of friction could thereby be avoided or postponed". (92) This, however, exaggerates the degree of agricultural opposition. There was evidence that the NFU did not represent a consensus among farmers, as Butler discovered in his agricultural tours. "I began to see that the farmers thought...they would get just as good a deal". (93) Sir Richard Nugent, a former agricultural minister, pointed to the strength of the agricultural lobby in the Six. (94) British agriculture was seen as being more efficient than its Continental competitors and therefore would benefit from agricultural trade. Camps argued in her analysis of the August 1961 debate that among the concerns expressed during the debate, agriculture was "a very poor third. There was general recognition that for the most part British farmers were as efficient as, or more efficient than, continental farmers, that continental farmers were more important numerically (and therefore more powerful politically) than British farmers and could be counted on to press for the protection of agricultural interests, and that existing British agricultural support schemes were almost sure to be changed in the relatively near future, whether or not Britain joined the Common Market". (95) As far as the state of negotiations at the time of breakdown are concerned, Camps argued that an acceptable agreement could have been expected. (96) There was no agricultural revolt as predicted and there is reason to believe that there would not have been. When the application collapsed, there were no major

recriminations by M.P.s of the behaviour of the Government, but considerable disappointment that an important success had been denied them in the future forthcoming election. "Tory M.P.s know that triumphant entry into Europe offered the Party the best chance of recovery, and that hope has been dashed". (97) Neither did the response of the Parliamentary Advisory Committee, with its call for an information campaign on European trade, suggest an incipient revolt. (98)

The bulk of the Parliamentary Party supported the Government's policy. The anti-marketeers were at a maximum 40, and only about 12 were last-ditchers. About 100 M.P.s may have had reservations but would have been satisfied with terms that could reasonably be expected to have been achieved. All the predicted revolts came to nothing. In other words, 1962 never looked like 1846.

National Union

The Party Conferences in 1961 and 1962 received even greater attention than usual as revolts from the rank and file were predicted. For the 1961 Conference a large number of resolutions, 41, on the Common Market and Commonwealth were received.

Yes:	WITHOUT RESERVATIONS	4
Yes if:	EFTA/COMMONWEALTH/AGRICULTURE	4
	COMMONWEALTH/AGRICULTURE	3
	AGRICULTURE	1
No unless:	COMMONWEALTH/AGRICULTURE	3
	COMMONWEALTH/SOVEREIGNTY	2
	COMMONWEALTH/AGRICULTURE/SOVEREIGNTY	2
	SOVEREIGNTY	1
	AGRICULTURE	1
	COMMONWEALTH/EFTA	1
	COMMONWEALTH/SOVEREIGNTY/EFTA revoked	1
	COMMONWEALTH FIRST	13
No:	WITHOUT CONDITIONS	3
	UNCLEAR	2

Few of the resolutions took an unambiguous position for or against the membership. Most resolutions took a position in favour and so urged that particular interests should be protected, or a position against unless certain conditions were met. However, the way the resolutions were phrased is a good indication of how they were leaning. It should be noted that there was a clear attempt to obtain 'Commonwealth first' motions, several of which were presented by Roger Moate, Peter Walker and Paul Williams. Three of the nine motions on agriculture also presented fears about membership. The resolutions sent in, therefore, while not completely hostile, reflected widespread concerns, and led to predictions of great trouble at the Conference. (99)

The Agriculture debate, just before the Commonwealth one, was fairly balanced in its attitude towards EEC. The motion chosen for debate asked that agricultural support should be made clear, especially if Britain entered the EEC, and the proposer was pro-EEC and argued that the level of support was more important than the method. He was supported by another speaker who believed that if it was in Britain's interests to join, then agriculture would act responsibly. The two speakers against the EEC expressed the considerable apprehension of many farmers. Soames, in his winding up speech, noted that the very high cost of subsidies created a problem whether in or out of the EEC but that would have to await negotiations.

The motion chosen for the Common Market and Commonwealth debate urged that Britain should negotiate a closer association compatible with the Commonwealth, EFTA responsibilities and pledges to British agriculture, a motion with deliberately broad appeal. (100)

Surprisingly, perhaps because of the fear of charges of unfairness, an amendment by Derek Walker-Smith was also chosen for debate. This

amendment urged no approval of membership if "surrender of sovereignty, or inconsistent with pledges to British agriculture and horticulture, or with the continuance by the U.K. of its traditional role in Commonwealth and world affairs". The Economist reported that ministers expected the amendment to be passed, but considered it not very important as the wording simply repeated the conditions of the original motion. (101)

The proposer, Andrew Bowden, did not deliver a rallying cry for British membership but a cautious and conditional acceptance. The case for membership was based on the need for Western unity against Communism and he argued that a limited amount of sovereignty should be sacrificed in that cause. He also repeated the theme that if a choice had to be made between Europe and the Commonwealth, then "all here" would endorse the Commonwealth. The seconder, David Lane, was more positive, noting the benefits to the Commonwealth of British membership. Walker-Smith, introducing his amendment, argued that membership meant integration not association and eventual European political union. It was an argument against on principle. The long debate was balanced except for a speech by a minister, Heath, in the middle of the debate, who restated the political and economic case and tried to calm specific concerns such as those over the monarchy. Other speeches mentioned the declining value of Commonwealth trade; Roger Moate of the Anti-Common Market League argued that the EEC meant federation and that "free trade has not paid"; Nigel Birch, M.P., asked, "But are we to be the only country in the Commonwealth which is not sovereign?"; an anti-marketeer complained that "Sometimes the Government has been apt to look complacently upon the Conservative Party as the patient oxen which draw the bandwagon, regardless of the tunes the band is playing and the frequent changes of instrument".

After Heath's speech, John Biffen welcomed the unusually vigorous debate uncontrolled by the platform, said that Imperial Preference was not the Clause IV of the Conservative Party and urged rejection of the amendment; one anti-marketeer was heckled; Patrick Jenkin of the Bow Group argued that influence was more important than sovereignty; Hinchingsbrooke predicted the Common Market would break up; and Legge-Bourke asked Conference not to undermine Heath's position. Sandys wound up the debate with a strong speech with many references to the Commonwealth, and sensing the mood of the Conference, urged rejection of the amendment. (102) He sat down to a standing ovation. The amendment was overwhelmingly rejected and the original motion overwhelmingly passed.

Macmillan then spoke to Conference, with an emphasis on the East-West struggle after the building of the Berlin Wall. "It is with this in mind that we have approached the question of Europe and the Common Market". Bernard Levin in the Spectator argued that the vote was an impressive display of political unity, that the speakers were carefully chosen and that the anti-marketeers were steamrollered. (103) Certainly the speakers were carefully chosen but it is not clear that the anti-marketeers were unfairly treated. Their amendment was called, when amendments are rarely called at Conservative Conferences and when there was little difference in substance, if there was in tone, with the motion. The speakers were balanced, except for the Heath speech, and it was apparently only decided to ask for the amendment to be rejected near the end of the debate. (Sandys could have urged acceptance of the amendment without in any way creating new conditions for the Government). The mood of the Conference was interpreted by Sandys and the platform as more pro-European than they expected, as was reflected in the vote on the amendment. The vote could be interpreted not as a massive sign of support for membership, but of a

strong unwillingness to reject membership as a matter of principle, as demanded by the anti-marketeers.

The 1962 Conference at Llandudno created even greater speculation as to the likelihood of a revolt. There were a number of developments which caused the party organisers considerable concern. There was the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference with what was perceived as the considerable emotional attachment to the Commonwealth by the rank and file. There was the claim by Lord Montgomery that Winston Churchill had told him he was "entirely against the Common Market". The opinion polls showed declining support both for Europe and the Conservative Party. The negotiations had been dragging on without notable progress in the eyes of the public. The anti-marketeers had made most of the running in public, the Government had kept a low profile during the negotiations and ministers feared that the antis would be highly organised at the Conference. (104) The Party leadership and Conservative Central Office conducted a vigorous campaign to avert a defeat at Llandudno. Winston Churchill was persuaded to write to Association Chairmen denying Montgomery's story. "In my conception of a Unified Europe, I never contemplated the diminution of the Commonwealth". As the Economist noted, "Radical innovation is best sold to a Conservative audience by persuading them that the change is rooted in the past". (105) Macmillan responded to pleas from Macleod for strong leadership on this issue, with a television broadcast and a pamphlet which put forward the case for membership in a positive fashion. Macmillan was concerned to influence the Conference debate although he would not speak to Conference until after the debate, and so he wrote a pamphlet published by the CCO Britain, Commonwealth and Europe. (106) The pamphlet was well received by the press and conference delegates, and was felt by the

National Advisory Committee on Publicity and Speakers to have "received outstanding publicity in the press and on T.V.". (107)

The Conference resolutions were far more favourable to Europe (although fewer Europe motions were received, only 31 compared to 59 on taxation and rates). Butt's analysis was that "only 3...were absolutely against joining, while 19 underwrote the Government's policy - leaving the balance to voice varying degrees of anxiety". (108) The Economist felt that half the motions were pro-European with lip service to agriculture and the Commonwealth, 12 gave qualified support while 4 were against. (109) Analysis based on the author's examination of the resolutions is: (110)

Yes:	WITHOUT CONDITIONS	10
Yes, if:	EFTA/COMMONWEALTH/AGRICULTURE	5
	EFTA/COMMONWEALTH	1
	COMMONWEALTH	2
	COMMONWEALTH/AGRICULTURE	1
	EFTA/COMMONWEALTH/AGRICULTURE/SOVEREIGNTY	1
No unless:	EFTA/COMMONWEALTH/AGRICULTURE	1
	COMMONWEALTH	1
	ECONOMY/PEACE/COMMONWEALTH	1
No:		5

Of interest are the reasons given for favouring membership: four mention the free world; three prosperity; three peace; one industry; and one the developing countries.

The Conference Chairman opened the debate with a reference to its importance and the attempt by the National Union to present equal sides. (111) The motion was again a broad one supporting membership for the unity of the free world, and the prosperity of the U.K., Commonwealth and Europe. An amendment was proposed by Robin Turton calling for firm pledges and opposing federalism. He was heckled with shouts of "no" when he claimed that the Commonwealth Conference had rejected membership. David Clarke, his seconder, was also heckled

with similar shouts when he claimed that the majority of the young were against membership. John Selwyn Gummer said that Conservative Students were six to one in favour. Several speakers expressed confidence in the Government. Butler spoke in the middle of the debate and gave a vigorous attack on Gaitskell and the Labour Party. "For them a thousand years of history books, for us the future". He argued that the young "regard this as the greatest adventure of our time" and that the amendment was unnecessary. Butler's speech was enthusiastically received, and marked a decisive turn in the debate. (112)

Harmer Nicholls M.P. spoke for the amendment, saying "we are the farmers' Party" and was received quietly. However, the speech of John Paul, the ACML Chairman, was continuously interrupted by shouts of 'rubbish', 'nonsense' and 'no'. Walker-Smith summed up for the anti-marketeers, with his familiar themes of the Commonwealth, sovereignty and "Britain can have no part in federation". Heath concluded the debate with references to the open and frank debate, argued the political and economic case for membership and said that much had been gained for the Commonwealth in the negotiations. The debate was described by the Spectator as dull and serious, full of sober earnestness. (113)

The amendment was then defeated overwhelmingly. Macmillan estimated "only 50 or so out of 4,000 voting for it". (114) The short debate on Imperial Preference between Peter Walker and Sir Robin Williams versus Patricia McLaughlin and Sandys also revealed the belief in Europe-Commonwealth co-operation as not alternatives. The agriculture motion urged a move to subsidies to increase production and efficiency. Stephen Hastings, a right-wing M.P., noted the concerns of farmers but expressed confidence in their ability to compete. Soames repeated the view that reconsideration of the

agricultural support system was necessary in or out of the EEC. In the debate on Conservative principles, all references to Europe were favourable, by Barney Hayhoe, Tom Stacey and Muriel Bowen. The Conference was, therefore, a great endorsement of Britain's membership.

Once again the commentators were surprised. One delegate was quoted as saying, "If somebody had told me 3 months ago, or even 3 weeks ago, it would be like this, I would have said he was mad". (115) Henry Fairlie argued that the result was not due to stage-management but "to the process of education - which enabled a mass, democratic Party to become a support of Government, instead of a hindrance to Government as it is in the Labour Party - is a genuinely original contribution which the Conservatives have made to the development of political institutions". (116) He gave particular praise to Michael Fraser and the work of CCO. The Economist noted that the Conference hurdle had been passed "with almost derisory ease", the antis had appeared "scattered, isolated and made to look absurd" while the pro-Europeans were "larger, noisier" and heckled the opposition. (117) Both politicians and press were amazed at the enthusiasm for Europe, with many people wearing bold 'Yes' badges. (118)

A number of reasons can be suggested for the overwhelming success for the Government's European policy, at the Llandudno Conference. First the Government, and especially Macmillan in his broadcast and pamphlet, at last came out strongly in favour of British membership without all the cautious conditions. Membership was presented as something to be welcomed and not merely an unfortunate necessity. Second was Butler's speech which finally ended speculation that the Cabinet was badly split with Butler as chief opponent. Thirdly, the Labour Conference the previous week had come out against membership with a well-publicised speech by Gaitskell. Membership thereupon

became a Party issue and strengthened partisan support for the Government, especially as exploited by Butler. Another factor was that the Commonwealth Conference had in fact strengthened the 'Europeans' due to widespread resentment created at the attitudes expressed, particularly by New Commonwealth leaders. The 'Europeans' also successfully associated Europe with the young, with frequent references to youth's support for Europe, with several young pro-European speeches, and the active support of Young Conservatives expressed in badges and heckling. The Conservative Party is concerned with its old fashioned image as a Party and is particularly open to suitable ideas which they consider to be of appeal to the young. Finally, as Fairlie pointed out, mention must be made of the immense preparations for the Conference carried out by CCO to produce that result, discussed later in more detail.

Two other major sources of information on constituency opinion were a weekend Conference at Swinton Conservative College, 5-7th May 1961, and reports from Area Agents. A full report on the Conference was written by Stephen Abbot of the CRD. (119) The conference divided into four groups (Trade, Commonwealth, Agriculture, Institutions) and all groups agreed that Britain should not sign the Treaty of Rome as it stands, but the balance of advantage lay in membership if certain conditions could be met - Commonwealth, EFTA and sovereignty. The Agricultural Group was confident that satisfactory arrangements could be made. A clear majority were in favour of membership, and felt that some sacrifice would be worthwhile. The arguments expressed for membership were Western unity, the danger of exclusion, the benefits of a large unit, the fear that capital investment would go to the Continent, and the advantages of increased competition and efficiency and that decisions would be open to British

influence. A large number of questions were raised during the weekend, including political instability in the EEC, the strength of socialism and trade unions, and the inward-looking nature of the EEC. Abbott made three suggestions: that the uncertainty of the negotiations increased fears, that the Party must consider the alternatives, and the public must be given far more information.

In August 1962 the Area Agents were asked to provide an assessment of public opinion on Europe in their areas. (120) The London Report, which they interpreted primarily as an assessment of Party opinion, concluded that "the general public is confused and ignorant", noting the influence of Beaverbrooke, the generation gap on this issue, that Conservatives believe that competition will make people work harder and the widespread feeling of a lack of information. The Northern Area reported a hardening of opinion; that Conservatives wanted more information before crystallising their own attitudes; that some felt very strongly about sovereignty; the decline of Commonwealth opposition; and the division within the agricultural community. Yorkshire reported that "The Beaverbrooke Press Campaign is making a substantial impact", a "hardening of opposition", the demand for more information, and concluded that "provided necessary safeguards are obtained much of the current opposition in the Party may be fairly easily converted". East Midlands estimated 60% for and 40% against, repeated the complaints of lack of information, that opinion was hardening, and that Conservatives believed membership would help curb the trade unions. The West Midlands Report thought there was a slight pro-European majority, with the hardening of opposition mainly because of the Commonwealth and sovereignty, the great demand for information, and reported that Peter Walker was "over-playing his hand" with his Association. The North West showed a majority for,

but confused and doubtful. Sovereignty was of low importance, the Commonwealth of interest to the right-wing and women, and agriculture was divided. The East reported opposition hardening. The South East reported the area very divided, with growing opposition due to the Express, the ACML and the French. The pro-Europeans came especially from the "thinking section of our Party" and the young, while the antis were older and more rural. If a Conservative M.P. took a stand, like Kirk at Gravesend, he could have a considerable influence. A majority were probably against but opinion could be swung round if negotiations were a success, but that required a campaign. Wessex reported that the antis were now stronger than the pros, the West that the antis were mainly extreme right.

There was a remarkable consensus in their reports on a number of points: opposition was hardening; the important role of the Beaverbrooke press; the association of the ACML with the right wing; the demand for information; the importance of the Commonwealth to a few; agriculture was divided between the large and small farmers; the old versus the young; elements of anti-Americanism and xenophobia; and that the Party could be swayed into support with a vigorous campaign. The Organisation Department concluded that supporters were larger in number but less informed and vocal, that the uncertainty was undermining support, and the need for the Government to provide more information. This report helped to persuade the Government of the need for an active European campaign.

The Young Conservatives maintained their pro-European stance. The 1961 Young Conservatives' Conference received six motions urging European co-operation and seven for British membership. The Conference passed a motion urging the Government "to ensure Britain's full and active support for the formation of an economically and

politically integrated Europe" by a small majority, a debate to which Heath replied. (121) There was an attempt, probably inspired by Walker, to increase interest in the Commonwealth, with a Young Conservative Policy Group, and the distribution of a discussion document on "A Changing Partnership". (122) Europe, however, remained the major theme, with a special course on the Common Market for Area Officers at Swinton in Autumn 1962. Area Agents consistently reported support for Europe from the Young Conservatives. The 1962 Conference did not debate Europe, but received twenty-five motions in favour, and only eight against. At the 1962 Party Conference the Young Conservatives distributed "Yes" badges and helped to create the feeling that the young were pro-European. After the breakdown of negotiations, the Young Conservatives' Conference, with 1,400 representatives, passed by an overwhelming majority the motion "realising that the breakdown of negotiations...presents a challenge to Europe, the Atlantic Alliance and the free world as a whole, urges H.M. Government to do all in its power further to develop European co-operation in all fields".

The Conservative students were in a similar position. At their Conference in March 1961, they urged the Government "to take immediate steps to join the EEC" by 51 votes to zero with 15 abstentions. In 1961 they helped to form the International Union of Conservative and Christian Democrat Students (ICCS) with Continental groups. John Selwyn Gummer told the 1962 Party Conference that FCS was six to one in favour.

The women did not debate Europe at their conferences, although a session on the Common Market was held at their Swinton course in October 1962. The North West Area Agent suggested that women were more emotionally attached to the Commonwealth. Apart from this,

here is little evidence to suggest that sex was an important variable within the Party on this issue.

The Conservative Trade Unionists voted by a large majority at their Conference in March 1962 "in favour of Britain's entry...so long as the entry does not adversely effect the standard of living, and the social welfare services and safeguard the interests of Commonwealth countries and British agriculture". (123) The West Midlands Trade Union chairman resigned against membership but the Area Agent reported that the majority of the Conservative Trade Unionists were in favour. (124)

The NUEC constantly discussed the problem of political education on Europe, and criticised the Government for not keeping the Party and the electorate better informed. 58,000 copies of a leaflet on the Common Market were sold to 79 Associations, which was more Associations than for any other leaflet. (125) The NUEC also came to the conclusion that Europe was not a primary factor in the poor results of spring 1962, a view endorsed by the defeated candidate for Derby North. (126) At one NUEC meeting the need for a good team of speakers on Europe was raised. (127) Heath came to a meeting of the NUEC to describe the negotiations and to answer their questions. The National Union Advisory Committee on Publicity "urged to give all possible thought to methods of ensuring that the momentum of the Common Market Campaign, which had been achieved at the Party Conference, should be maintained in the near future". (128)

In conclusion the speculation that the Conservative rank and file would be in revolt against the Government proved to be unsubstantiated. The view that this was avoided simply due to deference towards the leadership ignores the many other factors discussed here. Opinion in the Party was 'soft' on this issue, but when the Government made

its position clear and when Party information was distributed and considered, when the positive case for membership was presented, the Party members quickly established a pro-European position. Many members were ahead of the Government in their support for membership. The observer must distinguish between a policy supported merely because it is supported by the Party leadership, and a policy supported after the Party leadership has presented its arguments which members can consider against those of the Government's opponents. What occurred in the summer and autumn of 1962 was the active campaign urged by the Economist and some of the Europeans'. However, it was to be aborted after De Gaulle gave his infamous "Non!"

Central Office

Soon after the 1959 election, the CRD began its preparations for the next election, following the view of Michael Fraser, the Director of the CRD, that they are won between elections and not during the campaign. (129) Two early conclusions from their discussions were the establishment of a youth policy as "the most urgent" of the long term policies that needed development, and the renewal of confidence in Britain's position in the world to soften the widespread feeling about Britain's post-war decline. (130) Britain's membership of the EEC was felt to assist in both of these strategic objectives. Most of the CRD officials became convinced both of the political and electoral advantages of membership, and helped to convince Iain Macleod, the Party Chairman. Throughout the negotiations there was a committee of officials under Paul Dean to evaluate the electoral impact of the negotiated terms and to plan Party publications on various assumptions about the outcome of the negotiations. The CRD emphasised that electoral benefits required

actual entry, and that only a commitment to enter or actual negotiations would be damaging during an election. "If entry had been successfully negotiated on what could be presented as favourable terms, it might well open new vistas for Britain in the public mind - to the credit of the Conservative Party". (131) The CRD and Macleod were eager for the negotiations to finish so that an offensive campaign could be conducted, "preaching the cause with missionary fervour, and trying to rob the Liberals of every stitch of their more respectable clothes", as the Economist reported. (132) This approach was illustrated by Macleod's talk to the NUEC on the loss of the Orpington by-election. "It was the fact that at a time when we were ceasing to be the greatest imperial power in the world, the country as a whole was not sure where it was going as a country....A reappraisal of the position was necessary and what mattered was to find out a way to give the country a real sense of purpose again, which only the Conservative Party can do, so that the country continued to play a part in the world as it had always done....The real task of the Conservative Party was to convince the people...that they are still one of the greatest Nations in the world". (133)

During the negotiations the CRD produced a vast number of briefs and pamphlets aimed at ministers, M.P.s and Party members. They had several functions including the provision of information on the negotiations, the concern to keep attention on the strategic objectives amidst the discussion of individual problems, to monitor anti-market feeling and to reply to the many questions sent to ministers and M.P.s

The regular series of publications published by the CRD gave special attention to Europe. Weekend Talking Points were sent to M.P.s and candidates as suggested topics for their weekend speeches,

and eight of them during this period dealt with Europe, describing the reasons for the applications, the developing state of the negotiations, the 1962 Conference as an "overwhelming vote of confidence" in the leadership on the Common Market, and the difficulties Britain faced after the breakdown. (134) Notes on Current Politics (NCP) was a series of pamphlets distributed to M.P.s and subscribers dealing with topics in some detail, providing both detailed factual information and Party policy on the topics. Pamphlets were produced on Britain and Europe, Agriculture, Questions, the negotiations, and the Commonwealth. (135) A special series of seven briefs called Common Market Topics were produced for M.P.s by Guy Hadley, dealing with Agriculture, the cost of living and EFTA. One brief suggested that M.P.s might include a reference to Europe in their New Year messages to their constituency journals. Another emphasised the difference between Liberal and Conservative attitudes to Europe. "Liberals would go charging into Europe with all the reckless enthusiasm of the Light Brigade....Many Liberals are ready to pay almost any price for joining the Common Market. Conservatives are not". (136)

The full use of Party publications for the campaign was urged by Peter Minoprio, who in a memorandum to Fraser emphasised the need to sell the policy once a decision had been reached. He criticised the language used in Party publications as remote from the ordinary man, and requested punchy answers for speakers and workers in response to the questions that were frequently raised. (137) In July 1962 he surveyed the full range of publications on Europe produced by CCO and noted the different role played by different publications - factual information in the NCPs, the Foreign Affairs Survey aimed at foreign affairs specialists and concentrating on the political aspects,

leaflets by the CPC and the Publicity Department for members and voters, the weekly newsletter to Party activists, and the Pocket Politics and Talking Points to speakers. (138) Despite all this, CRD continually received requests for more literature.

M.P.s were naturally a major target for the CRD. Briefs were produced as usual for the appropriate Parliamentary Committees, e.g. on the European Assemblies for the Foreign Affairs Committee, and on the Movement of Foreign Workers in the EEC for the Trade Committee. In addition the Parliamentary Advisory Group was created, serviced by Guy Hadley, and many briefs were produced in response to questions received by M.P.s, much of which was incorporated into the regular publications - on the Walker-Smith amendment in October 1961, on sovereignty, on the Common Market and religion, and on the issue of whether the Government had a mandate. (140) M.P.s were thus provided with a mass of information designed both to strengthen their own commitment and to enable them to reply to questions received from constituents.

Another major activity was the monitoring of anti-market activity within the Party. Copies of their publications were collected, and briefs written to inform the Party leadership of anti-market activity. (141) Minoprio monitored agricultural opposition, reporting to Macleod the opposition of the Farming Express, wrote a special article on agriculture for constituency journals, and a brief on Questions Farmers Ask. (142) A brief on questions to the Labour Party on Europe was also produced. (143) Much of this literature was also directed at Party activists, in particular to gain a favourable result at the Party Conferences. Henry Fairlie in the Spectator attributed the success of the 1962 Conference to Fraser. (144)

The CPC also produced a collection of activities and publications.

Butler told the CPC in August 1961 that "what is immediately needed is the building up of an informed body of opinion in support of the Government's policy". (145) The National Advisory Committee on Publicity and Speakers complained about the lack of briefing of Party workers, and in response a series of seminars was organised in 1962, to which every Association could send six representatives, and speakers included Soames, Maudling, Heath, Thorneycroft and Macmillan. (146) In May 1962 a Swinton weekend conference on the Commonwealth and the Common Market was organised, and the theme of the regular Oxford Summer School was 'The New Europe' in June 1962, which attracted a record number of students. The CPC published a pamphlet in July 1962 The New Europe, based on the Summer School, and Britain in Europe for the Bow Group in January 1962. The Swinton Journal published articles on the Commonwealth by Richard Bailey and World Trade by Robert Carr, arguing that the Commonwealth need not prevent membership of the EEC and that Britain's influence in the world was more important than sovereignty and depended on economic strength. (147) Short pamphlets aimed at CPC discussion groups included a special European series on the Commonwealth, Agriculture, Sovereignty, Social Security and European Political Unity. (148) The discussion pamphlet on the Commonwealth and the Common Market produced the largest number of reports for some years. Throughout 1962 the CPC organised 1,300 meetings at schools, conferences and briefings, the main subject of which was the Common Market, and the CPC had difficulty in responding to the demand for speakers on Europe. (149) The major emphasis of CPC political education in 1962 was Europe.

The Publicity Department also produced literature aimed primarily at the ordinary voter. They produced a series of 16 one-page leaflets in Autumn 1962 called 'Common Market, Common Sense', for sale

to Associations for door to door delivery. They also produced literature based on important ministerial speeches and television broadcasts, a short Question and Answer leaflet, a Progress Report, and the views of Industrial Leaders. Undoubtedly their most successful publication was Britain, Commonwealth and Europe by Macmillan, published just before the Party Conference in October 1962.

The CCO produced the largest quantity and variety of literature on one theme they had ever produced up to that time. This reflected the fears of Party divisions, its perceived importance to electoral success, and CCO commitment to that policy. The need to campaign was a continuous theme from the CRD.

The Organisation Department also monitored Party opinion. A major assessment of public opinion (usually interpreted as Party opinion) was conducted by the Department through the Area Office Agents in August 1962. (150) They used their intelligence service to monitor activity and feeling. Macmillan even told local agents at Llandudno, "You have great influence in the constituencies. Make sure that on this Market issue your local Party does not rock the boat". (151) The Department reported that Walker-Smith saw no difficulties if his Association supported the Government, and it urged the provision of speakers to the local CPC Conferences. (152) They reported the success of the six special briefings held in September 1961 and on the local activities of the ACML. Using their day-to-day contact with the constituencies, the Organisation Department was able to help provide the Party with information on constituency Party feelings.

An entirely different role existed for the Overseas Bureau, which began to be active in inter-Party relations, in response to the view that "the Foreign Office favours special attention to the Continentals"

and that the Christian Democratic Nouvelles Equipes Internationales (NEI) was "a convenient, if at present inadequate, means of inter-party liaison among party-political friends". (153) The EUW held its Assembly in London in July 1961, the ICCS held a Conference on 'One Europe' at Winchester in July 1962, the Party participated in a preparatory Committee of the NEI with Nicholas Ridley, for the first time made an effort to attract Continental guests to the Party Conference, and the Young Conservatives attempted to join the International Union of Young Christian Democrats. (154) In September 1961 and 1962 study visits to Strasbourg were arranged for parliamentary candidates, whose reports were highly pro-European. The Study Group in 1962 recommended "the pressing need for a fuller liaison with comparable parties" on the Continent, and the Overseas Bureau Chairman, Lady Emmett, requested a Committee on Links with Europe. This met with opposition from R. Allan, Party Treasurer. "Money is given to us in order to get votes and win elections. Evelyn Emmett's efforts, admirable though they are, do not get a single vote for the Tory Party at a general election". The Committee on Links was set up on 10th December 1962 under Macleod, discussed papers on the role of the groups in the European Assemblies by Ursula Branston and on the NEI by R. Milne, and on the Party's Role After Brussels by Branston, which argued there was a good case for the Party to present a European image, but the Committee fizzled out without being formally disbanded, meeting last on 4th March 1963. However, the work of the Overseas Bureau had changed in a significant way as formal inter-party links were now encouraged by the Party leadership and the Bureau's response to the breakdown was to urge the Party's full membership of the NEI. (155)

The CCO played a very important role in this period: by urging the leadership to conduct a more positive campaign by monitoring the

extent of anti-market feeling within the Party; by providing M.P.s with arguments to respond to their constituents' questions; and by providing basic information to Party workers. Much of the credit for the limited opposition to the Government's policy in the Party must go to the CCO.

The Informal Party

A number of anti-market organisations were created soon after the decision to apply. Keep Britain Out was primarily free trade Liberals, the Forward Britain Movement was mainly Labour and trade unionists, while the Anti Common Market League (ACML) was Conservative-oriented and the most active. Other minor groups existed such as 'The True Tories', under Major-General (Retired) Richard Hilton, and the League of Empire Loyalists. The only group to which the Conservative Party gave considerable attention was the ACML.

The ACML had its origins in a meeting held on June 26th 1961 by Peter Walker, M.P., and former Young Conservative Chairman, of mainly Young Conservatives interested in the Commonwealth. It was followed by further meetings on August 3rd and 15th, at which opinion was divided on the nature of the organisation. Walker was the spokesman for the view that it should be a research and information organisation designed to promote the Commonwealth and solely open to Conservatives, while John Paul, a former Chairman of South Kensington Conservative Association and a former parliamentary candidate, argued for opposition on all grounds with no special emphasis on the Commonwealth, that it should be a campaigning organisation, and that it should be willing to fight the Conservative Party if necessary. (156)

The group supporting Paul's position decided to form the ACML with

John Paul as Chairman, and YC's David Clarke and Michael Shay as Treasurer and Secretary. The ACML declared itself "a Conservative body dedicated to preventing the Government from plunging this country into the EEC" and aimed "to influence public and parliamentary opinion in every possible way to achieve a reversal of the disastrous decision announced on August 2nd to negotiate British entry into the Common Market". (157) Paul was the driving force, with his home as headquarters and his wife, Diane, as secretary. They were entirely dependent on voluntary workers until May 1962 when they had a paid secretary, and by January 1963 three paid staff. Paul himself became so involved with the campaign that he lost his position as research director of Mobil Oil in Britain. He reported that he was "offered the choice of resigning or being sacked. It was put to me that my anti-common market activities were incompatible with my position as a director of an American-owned subsidiary". (158) There was some early speculation that Mobil was funding the League, but the League had to rely on individual donations, and was continually in debt. The appointment of Sir Jeffrey Reynolds as Treasurer eased the situation, leading to substantial donations of £2,000 from Garfield Weston and £250 from the Commonwealth Industries Association (CIA), but the League was never financially secure. The League recieved a special donation of £35,000 for a Rally to the Commonwealth in September 1962. (159)

Considering their weak organisational basis, the ACML conducted an impressive range of activities. They organised a large number of meetings, starting with one at the Kensington Town Hall on 4th June 1961, often attracting an audience of over 200. (160) Their main speakers were M.P.s Walker-Smith, Turton, Fell and Biggs-Davison, Lord Hinchinbrooke, Sir Arthur Bryant, the popular English historian, who also contributed articles to the Illustrated London News and wrote

an anti-market book. (161) In 1962 they claimed to have organised 240 meetings, with 35 public, 35 educational, 34 Rotary and Business Clubs, and 20 NFU meetings. (162) Some meetings were organised in co-operation with the CIA and the Farming Express. They advertised in journals like the Rotarian offering to supply speakers. One meeting at the Central Hall Westminster attracted an audience of 2,000, and the South East Agent reported that their meetings were well-attended. (163) They published and distributed a recruitment leaflet, 1 million copies of a Common Market Quiz, 10,000 copies of their pamphlet Britain not Europe, and 600,000 stickers 'Commonwealth not Common Market'. (164) They also distributed the pamphlet, A Call to the Commonwealth by Peter Walker and Derek Walker-Smith which was treated respectfully by 'Europeans' despite its attempt to present the Commonwealth as a realistic alternative to the EEC. (165) Altogether the ACML distributed around 2 million pieces of literature, which almost matched the success of Central Office. (166) It was active in promoting resolutions to Party Conferences and their leaders contributed to several debates. It actively supported independent anti-market Conservative candidates in by-elections at Lincoln, Derby North, Newcastle Central and, most notably, Dorset South, where they claimed to have contributed 50 canvassers. (167) Membership was advertised in the Times, Telegraph and Express. One advertisement in the Express on 24th June 1962 attracted 735 replies. By the end of 1962 they claimed a membership of 30,000. (168)

The ACML made up in commitment what they lacked in numbers and finance, and yet they failed to have the major impact that had been predicted. The reasons are threefold. Firstly, the leadership had very limited political experience, except for Paul himself. Most of them were Young Conservatives, and the great bulk of the burden of

running the organisation fell on Paul's shoulders. While M.P.s were active as speakers, they were not active as organisers and no M.P. was on the Committee in this period. This was a deliberate decision to leave out M.P.s made in an early committee meeting. (169) They lacked political experience, or as the CRD put it, they were individuals without any big guns. (170) Secondly, they became identified with the lunatic right. Paul was quoted by the Spectator attacking Merchant Bankers "who have only recently come to this country from the Continent and cannot wait to get back" and describing Prince Philip as "this German-born Prince" (which he later denied). Hinchingsbrooke was quoted as referring to the city merchants' origins in Hamburg and Frankfurt and saying that "those of us in Britain who oppose the Common Market don't want to subject ourselves to a lot of frogs and huns." (171) The xenophobic and hysterical tone of some ACML speeches alienated those such as Peter Walker. Thirdly, the ACML appeared to be disloyal both to Macmillan as Party leader and the Conservative Party as a whole. While Walker-Smith and others sought to distinguish between their principled opposition to the EEC and their support for the Government and Macmillan as Prime Minister, the ACML attacked Macmillan in quite personal terms. From the very beginning the League threatened to run candidates against the official Conservative Candidate. The Constitution adopted on 9th February 1962 authorised the Committee to "select prospective parliamentary candidates where desired to contest constituencies to fulfil the aims of the League and to take all possible action for the success of such candidates". (172) While the ACML itself never put up candidates in this period, it did support unofficial anti-market candidates. The Conservative nature of the organisation also became weakened. Advertisements making a direct appeal to Conservatives were dropped, membership was open to

anyone and not just Conservatives, and their publicity material was changed to broaden their appeal. "Initially the League was formed to represent the views of dissatisfied Conservative voters. Now, however, a large proportion of the League's members no longer support the Conservative Party as such". (173) This alienated many potential supporters whose loyalty to the Conservative Party was more important than their hostility to the Common Market. Thus the ACML failed to provide a broad enough umbrella for anti-market feeling within the Party.

The Monday Club was formed in 1961 as a right-wing ginger group within the Conservative Party, but Europe was not one of the main inspirations in its creation, and members, like the rest of the Right were divided over the issue. G.K. Young, an active figure in the Monday Club, saw the new Commonwealth as anti-European, sovereignty as no guarantee of national survival, and a united Europe as an escape from U.S. domination. "Our good name has gone in Europe and we have lost our power of independent action vis-a-vis the U.S., while the Commonwealth has become a political liability rather than an asset". (174) He urged that we swallow our pride and "after joining on whatever terms the Six have been prepared to offer us to throw ourselves in furthering its political and social aims". (175) These 'Europeans' favoured Europe as a third force independent of the two super-powers and based on a Europe of Nations. Hinchingsbrooke, another prominent Monday Clubber, was President of the ACML and represented a substantial body of opposition. At a vote in January 1963, there was a majority against British membership, while the Club decided to have no policy. The significance of the Club at this time was that, although it represented in many people's minds the sort of Conservative who was anti-market, in fact it played no role in the inspiration of

the formation of the Club and the Club's members themselves were strongly divided.

The Bow Group by contrast was perceived as the forum for the younger, more 'progressive' elements of the Party and was associated with the pro-European cause. Julian Critchley, a former Bow Group Chairman, described the Group as convinced Europeans, although warned that might not be to the policy's advantage because of its progressive image. (176) This is not an entirely accurate depiction of the Group, which included pro-European economic Liberals such as Russell Lewis and Jock Bruce-Gardyne, and pro-Commonwealth 'progressives' such as Sir Robin Williams, a former chairman. The majority of the Group leadership, however, were strongly pro-European. An editorial in their journal, Crossbow, endorsed membership, and another editorial complained of the half-hearted nature of the Government. (177) Most of the articles on Europe argued for membership on a wide variety of grounds, and rebutted the case against membership, e.g. with a detailed look at the impact on British law. (178) The Group also published, under the auspices of the CPC, the pamphlet, Britain in Europe. The main theme of Bow Group writers during the negotiations was to urge a greater commitment to political and economic unity from the Government. The importance of the association of the Bow Group with Europe was that Group members represented the young, educated middle class that were the electoral target of the next election, and helped reinforce the feeling in the Party that entry was both supported and in the interests of the young. Contrary to Critchley's fears, the Group played a reinforcing role in the intra-Party debate on Europe.

The European Movement had established close relations with the Government during the period when relations with Europe were a high

priority. Macmillan even instructed CCO to give the European Movement a maximum of £30,000 on the argument of Lord Poole that British entry would help the Conservative Party to win the next election. Lord Aldington, Party Vice-Chairman, agreed to liaise with the European Movement, but avoided any financial relationship. Most unusually CCO provided names of local constituency officers who might be willing to assist in setting up local European Movement branches. (179) The European Movement, however, included elements who were luke-warm towards membership, lacked flexibility in approach and organisation, and was too close to the position of the Government. Therefore, the Common Market Campaign was created in the summer of 1960 as a small all-party group aimed at informed opinion. (180) The Directing Committee included Kirk as Secretary, and Martin Maddan. The Campaign produced a Statement on Europe with 140 signatures, including a number of Conservative M.P.s and Conservative opinion-formers. (181) There was a separate Labour Common Market Campaign so the Campaign concentrated on the Conservative Conferences in 1961 and 1962, producing special Common Market Broadsheets. The impact of the European Movement and the Common Market Campaign was limited but useful.

A brief mention should be made of the economic liberal Institute of Economic Affairs, yet to have the major political influence of more recent times, but important among economic liberals within the Party. Its position was that if membership increased free trade then it was welcome, but if not alternatives should be examined. It published The U.K., Commonwealth and Common Market by James Meade in April 1962 which was lukewarmly in favour of membership, that Britain "should join if liberal, outward, but not if a tight parochial European bloc". The pamphlet was well received as a thoughtful

contribution to the debate but the Economist felt that it did not recognise that outside Europe, Britain would be more protectionist. (182)

That same year the IEA published a second edition, which seemed even more sceptical of the benefits of membership, which the Economist criticised as based on liberal nostalgia that a preferable alternative could be found. (183) The IEA pamphlet represented a scepticism among some economic liberals, but nothing like outright opposition.

The FBI had been urgent proponents of EFTA, but were much more cautious over the EEC. The FBI were internally very divided, with mainly the larger industries in favour while the smaller industries and trade associations were opposed. (184) The staff themselves were opposed. The FBI were, therefore, unable to play a major role in the discussions. An early statement noted that any decision to apply would be primarily political rather than economic. (185) On 15th July 1961, the FBI published a statement that "a large majority of us are of the opinion that it is right not to become committed to formal negotiations with the Six until existing differences over the problems outlined above (i.e. in their aide memoire) have been so far narrowed as to offer the prospect of a satisfactory conclusion". (186) The Government applied for membership twelve days later.

Thus the FBI was not a primary factor in the Government's decision. If the FBI had taken a firm position against membership, then the Government's position would have been undermined, but no clear position was possible. However, when the negotiations failed, the FBI were swift in placing an advertisement in the Financial Times saying that membership now had to be put behind it. (187)

Other sources of information of industrial attitudes were more positive. The Institute of Directors was in favour, with the exception of the aged Chairman, Sir Edward Spears. (188) The Area

Agents' assessments were that industry was largely in favour, with some industries hostile due to particular circumstances. (189) A Sunday Times poll of industrialists showed them strongly pro-European. (190) The Spectator reported that the City was firmly committed. (191) One not unexpected source of industrial opposition was the Commonwealth Industries Association (CIA), based on political opposition over the Commonwealth and sovereignty, which directed its attention towards the Conservatives with 10 Conservative M.P.s on its executive council and the distribution of leaflets to all Conservative M.P.s and Constituency Associations. (192) However, broadly speaking, industry played a supportive or neutral role during this period.

The protection of agriculture was a major issue in this period and one of the conditions established by the Government for participation in the EEC. The monitoring of agricultural opinion was constant. The NFU took an early position of suspicion towards membership encouraged by a change in the NFU Presidency from a pro- to an anti-European. (193) The NFU was kept well informed on the negotiations by the Government, while it actively sought to influence M.P.s to ensure the Government's responsiveness to their concerns. Numerous meetings were arranged with M.P.s and candidates in agricultural constituencies. Butler and Sir Anthony Hurd acted as spokesmen for agriculture in the Cabinet and the Parliamentary Party. The NFU became increasingly hostile. The journal, Farming Express, came out against membership in April 1962, noted by the CRD, and offered to organise meetings for the ACML. (194) Harmar Nicholls, M.P. told the 1962 Conference that the NFU was against membership and stated "We are the farmers' Party". The poor vote in rural by-elections in winter 1962 increased the concern of agricultural M.P.s. The NFU announced in late 1962 that unless the conditions

were renegotiated, "the Union would have no alternative but to oppose U.K. entry". (195)

The agricultural lobby was potentially the most serious source of intra-party opposition. Why did it not have more influence over the Government? Firstly, farmers were by no means united behind the NFU's position. There were a number of farmers, especially in wheat and barley, who would gain from the proposed C.A.P. An opinion poll in October 1961 showed 42% of farmers in favour with 39% against membership. Agricultural opposition was no means monolithic. Secondly, there was reason to believe that agriculture would be stronger within the EEC considering the political strength of the rural vote on the Continent compared to the U.K. Thirdly, the Party was well aware of the dangers and Peter Minoprio, at the CRD's Agriculture Desk and a convinced European, was active in producing information to calm the agriculture lobby. He argued, in a memorandum to Macleod, the case for the agricultural benefits of membership, and those arguments were distributed in a series of Party leaflets and pamphlets, and a special brief on "Questions Farmers Ask". (196) Finally, the power of the agricultural lobby was much exaggerated. Butler stated "that it wasn't so much that the Lobby was powerful - because it's very small, isn't it - but I was powerful". Self and Storing, in their study of the NFU, concluded that the political importance of agriculture had been exaggerated and that it was doubtful that its influence could have excluded Britain from entry. (197) The Government was sensitive to the interests of agriculture, but not convinced that the NFU correctly interpreted those interests and sought to convince farmers that the Government's interpretation was a better one.

The Economist remained a vigorous supporter of membership, which presented the intra-party debate as between the progressive left and the reactionary right. They believed that Europe was a good political move for the Conservatives but urged the necessity for a strong campaign by the Government. They noted that "the truth is that though the Conservative Party has genuinely accepted the idea of European Union, the EEC has not had time to establish itself as an institution around which Tory emotions could constellate". (198) The Economist provided an unswerving supporter of membership and a proponent of the need for an active campaign.

The Spectator was another firm support of entry, both in its leader columns and in providing a forum for 'Europeans' such as Peter Kirk, Lord Altrincham, Roy Jenkins, Anthony Hartley and Julian Critchley. The leader column took a strong position for entry and called for a "softening-up campaign" by the Government. (199) The economic column by Nicholas Davenport presented the economic case for membership and showed that there was considerable industrial and financial support for membership. There was plenty of critical comment upon the anti-marketeers. (200) The Spectator urged a more vigorous leadership, and even that the Government should take a lead toward supranationalism. (201) It took the view that only Europe could provide an election win for the Conservatives, as the only issue of sufficient size and significance to capture the imagination and enthusiasm of the electorate, that would make "an appeal to the country's imagination and a renewal of their own ideals". (202) It "could make the most successful - and rightly successful - appeal to the electorate since the Labour Party in 1945, said simply that it was time for a change". (203) The Spectator appeared as the voice of progressive Toryism in favour of membership.

The Tory newspapers also remained in support of entry, (204) and the Telegraph and the Times even produced special pamphlets on Europe, presenting the EEC in a positive way. However, they also took a strong line over the conditions, e.g. over Commonwealth temperate foodstuffs, (205) and the Times even discussed the possibility that the price of membership could be too high, (206) so their role was not always helpful to the Government.

The 4.3 million circulation Express conducted a very strong campaign against the EEC, under the personal direction of Lord Beaverbrooke. He viewed the EEC as the political subjection of Britain, and there was a strong anti-German and anti-American spirit in the campaign. For a period the First and Second World Wars were described as the First and Second German wars. The Express argued in favour of Empire Free Trade, against the loss of sovereignty, encouraged hostility towards foreigners, especially Germans, and aroused fears over the standard of living. It asked its readers, "Do you want to be British? Or are you willing that you and your children should belong to some British-French-German hotch-potch?". (207) The Express sought to demonstrate popular opposition, to act as a mouthpiece for opponents and to influence the uncommitted.

The Express gave considerable, and almost wholly critical, attention to the issue in its news and editorial columns. A Fact-a-Day was printed with critical 'facts'. Special leaflets were produced, 'Questions and Answers on the Common Market' and 'You and the Common Market', and a pamphlet by Conservative M.P. Lord Lambton. Advertisements were placed in other newspapers quoting prominent opponents such as the industrialist Sir Jock Campbell, the historian Sir Arthur Bryant, Viscount Montgomery and Clement Attlee. (208) Publicity was given to the activities of the A.C.M.L. A campaign

was conducted to remove Macleod from the Party Chairmanship. (209) Beaverbrooke offered money and publicity to Eden if he would lead an anti-European campaign, but Eden was in poor health. (210) He also wrote to the South Norfolk Conservative Association offering a £1,000 contribution to "any good candidate" opposed to the Common Market in the by-election and made enquiries about North Somerset. (211) The paper even threatened to oppose the Government at the next election. (212)

The Express played an important role as a rallying-point for Conservative anti-marketeers, and the points that it made were frequently raised in meetings and letters to M.P.s, especially its demand for a new mandate either in an election or a referendum. As Windlesham noted, "no one likes to be alone with an unpopular opinion" and the paper showed readers that they were not alone. (213) The Area Agents reported the Express influence to be considerable, (214) and opinion polls showed Express readers to be more anti-market than most other newspapers. (215) The influence of the Express was significant but should not be exaggerated. Even after months of campaigning a Gallup poll in early 1962 found that Express readers were 45% in favour of entry, 29% against with 26% don't know. (216) The tone of its campaign was strident and xenophobic and "the leading protagonists of the cause do their best to dissociate it from the strident efforts of Lord Beaverbrooke and his standard-bearers, Lords Montgomery and Lambton". (217) Furthermore, according to Macmillan, the paper came to fear that it might be boring its readers. (218) The Express campaign was of concern to the Government and the Party but it never caught the popular imagination as Beaverbrooke hoped and the Government feared.

The attitude of the electorate was highly volatile during the negotiations but usually favourable. Windlesham argued that the

Government believed that the positive attitudes of most opinion-leaders would eventually influence the views of opinion-holders. The Government's conditions were a response to specific interests rather than the demands of public opinion. "There is nothing to suggest that the three main British reservations...were imposed by public opinion....From July 1961 to January 1963 the role of public opinion was no more than a residual check on any extravagant extensions of pro-Common Market policy". (219) Opinion polls charted the fluctuations reflecting the state of negotiations.

Support was relatively stable while opposition was more volatile, always with substantial numbers undecided. Supporters tended to provide general statements of support while opponents had very specific concerns (the Commonwealth, unemployment, prices). (220) Attitudes to the Government influenced attitudes on Europe as Conservatives were more favourable, while opposition tended to rise with the unpopularity of the Government. Support for membership was strongly influenced by partisan support for the Conservative Government, while the Government hoped that a pro-European position would improve attitudes towards the Government.

Naturally the Government was concerned about the state of public opinion, especially with regard to its effect on an election. Macleod produced a memorandum on public opinion for the Cabinet on 18th September 1962. (221) "He reported that the country was evenly divided and that opinion on Europe was volatile, with swings of up to 10% occurring within a month or two". The floating opinion was, on balance, against "though this could easily be reversed...the country's head was convinced, but its heart was not. He thought that there was a real need for an idealistic approach; that the support of the young and of the opinion formers was the key and that the issue should be

presented 'with trumpets', as the next great adventure in our country's history...he argued strongly for an unequivocal lead by the Government and by individual Members of Parliament". The Cabinet accepted this interpretation and believed that a Government campaign after negotiations were completed would successfully turn people in favour and result in electoral gains, so public opinion was not a major constraint.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the role of Harold Macmillan in Britain's application to the European Community, while significant, has been exaggerated. The opposition to that policy has been over-estimated. Within the Cabinet there were many supporters, while the sceptics never felt strongly enough to resign or attempt to lead an intra-party opposition. The parliamentary party was overwhelmingly in favour, drawing support from all sections of opinion among M.P.s, while the anti-marketeers failed to secure prominent backbench leadership and became associated, if unfairly, with hostility to Macmillan's leadership and extreme right-wing opinions. The often predicted revolt, in 1846 style, never occurred.

The Conference debates revealed even greater support than the leadership expected, as indicated in the decision to reject Walker-Smith's amendment in the 1962 Conference. This is not to under-estimate widespread concerns among constituency activists, but these concerns were not translated into any principled opposition to membership. Once the government and the party had clearly expressed the case for membership, many of those concerns were calmed.

Central Office provided a significant role in a number of respects. The CRD specialists provided intellectual support for the economic

and political advantages of membership, and urged the need for a more positive campaign to present those advantages to the Party and the electorate. Their belief that membership would provide great electoral advantage to the Conservatives and support other aspects of the electoral strategy influenced Macleod, the Party Chairman, reinforced Macmillan's instincts and helped to strengthen pro-European feeling and undermine opposition within the Cabinet and the parliamentary party. M.P.s were kept well informed by CRD publications, which provided them with the means to answer constituents' queries.

The monitoring of anti-market opinion informed party leaders and strategists both that anti-market feeling among certain groups was exaggerated (the parliamentary party, the right, industry, agriculture) and that the anti-market propaganda was influential on a significant body of opinion but that opinion could easily be swayed by a vigorous campaign. The provision of basic information to constituency associations helped their natural inclinations to support party policy. To Central Office must be given considerable credit for translating party sympathies and concerns into positive endorsement.

The Anti-Common Market League conducted a remarkable campaign but due to the weaknesses identified earlier they failed to have any significant impact upon government and party policy. The Monday Club was divided and the Bow Group was largely enthusiastic. The economic interest groups, such as the FBI and the NFU, expressed their concerns but never exercised any veto power over government policy. The press and weekly journals were nearly all supportive except for the somewhat hysterical Daily Express.

Electoral consequences are always of considerable significance to a rational-efficient party like the Conservatives. Opinion polls revealed considerable fluctuations, but party strategists predicted

that successful negotiations would result in a major swing of opinion towards entry. The polls also revealed that target groups, such as the new middle classes and the young, were especially pro-European.

The evidence suggests that, had negotiations been successfully concluded, there would have been no major intra-party opposition to membership. Macmillan's cautious approach may have been useful in handling the Cabinet and the parliamentary party but it may also have failed to adequately convey to the Party and the electorate the case for British membership, and thus the anti-marketeers made a greater impact than otherwise would have been the case. Even then, Conservative support was firm and widespread. Macmillan's decision to apply for membership was a necessary, but not sufficient, cause of Conservative support. There were many other factors, previously under-estimated, which made the Conservative Party the Party to decide to join Europe.

CHAPTER 4

REFERENCES

1. H.C. Debates, Vol. 645, 31st July 1961, c.928-931.
2. H.C. Debates, Vol. 645, 2nd August 1961, c.1480.
3. Camps, Britain and the European Community, (London, Oxford University Press, 1964), p.475.
4. ibid, p.492.
5. See, for example, Camps (1964), op cit, and Nora Beloff, The General Says No, (London, Penguin, 1963).
6. Harold Macmillan, At the End of the Day, (London, Macmillan, 1973), Chapter 1. Camps (1964), op cit, Chapter 9.
7. Jock Bruce-Gardyne and Nigel Lawson, The Power Game, (London, Macmillan, 1976), p.46.
8. Ronald Butt, "The Common Market and Conservative Party Politics 1961-62", Government and Opposition, Vol. 2, No. 3, (April 1967), pp.372-386. See Bruce-Gardyne and Lawson, op cit, p.71.
9. Drew Middleton, The Supreme Choice, (London, Secker and Warburg, 1963), pp.102-103.
10. T.E. Lindsay and Michael Harrington, The Conservative Party 1918-1978, (London, Macmillan, Second Edition 1979), p.214.
11. Macmillan (1973), op cit, p.8. See Robert McKenzie, Observer, 18th June 1961.
12. ibid, p.12.
13. Richard Neustadt, "White House and Whitehall" in Antony King, The British Prime Minister, (London, Macmillan, 1969), p.141.
14. Bruce-Gardyne & Lawson, op cit, p.55. Nora Beloff, op cit, p.138.
15. Macmillan (1973), op cit, p.333.
16. Bruce-Gardyne & Lawson, op cit, p.62. Other commentators imply that it was a deliberate attempt to strengthen the 'Europeans'. George Hutchinson, Edward Heath, (London, Longman, 1970), p.91. Camps (1964), op cit, p.314.
17. ibid, p.53.
18. Nigel Fisher, Iain Macleod, (London, Purnell, 1973), p.222. See Middleton, op cit, p.115.
19. Alec Douglas-Home, The Way the Wind Blows, (Glasgow, Collins, 1976), p.174.

20. John Dickie, The Uncommon Commoner, (London, Pall Mall Press, 1964), p.161.
21. Henry Fairlie, "Conservatives and the Common Market", Spectator, Vol. 201, p.236.
22. Economist, 26th August 1961.
23. Hutchinson, op cit, p.96.
24. Butt (1967), op cit, p.380. Lieber, op cit, p.202.
25. Bruce-Gardyne & Lawson, op cit, p.58. See N. Beloff, op cit, p.108.
26. Charlton, Encounter, October 1981, p.30, p.31.
27. Party Chairman's File, (CRD, n.d. 1961). This was in response to a complaint from Dudley Williams, M.P. Heath felt that there was nothing objectionable in this activity.
28. Bruce-Gardyne & Lawson, op cit, p.58.
29. Verbatim Conference Report 1962. The origin of the speech lies with a memorandum from Michael Fraser to Butler, (CRD, 28th September 1962).
30. R.A. Butler, The Art of the Possible, (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1971).
31. Reginald Maudling, Memoirs, (London, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1978).
32. Economist, 6th May 1961. Camps (1964), op cit, p.337. H.C. Debates, Vol. 640, 17th May 1961, c.1398.
33. ibid, 24th June 1961.
34. N. Beloff (1963), op cit, p.109.
35. Lord Hailsham, The Door Wherein I Went, (Glasgow, Collins, 1975), p.106.
36. ibid, p.133.
37. ibid, p.106.
38. Lieber, op cit, p.203.
39. Charlton, Encounter, October 1981, pp.22-23.
40. Economist, 3rd June 1961.
41. Lieber, op cit, p.202.
42. Economist, 13th October 1962.
43. Economist, 3rd June 1961.
44. Guy Hadley, WEU Assembly 29th May 1961-1st June 1961, (Foreign Affairs Committee Brief, CRD, June 1961).

45. ibid, WEU Assembly 11-15th December 1961, (Foreign Affairs Committee, CRD, December 1961).
46. ibid, Council of Europe Assembly 18-29th September 1961, (CRD n.d.).
47. ibid, WEU Assembly 4-8th June 1962, (Foreign Affairs Committee Brief, CRD, n.d.).
48. ibid, WEU Assembly 3-6th January 1962, (Foreign Affairs Committee Brief, CRD, n.d.).
49. Camps (1964), op cit, p.364.
50. Henry McClaren, "Anti-Market", Crossbow, October 1962.
51. Economist, 15th September 1962. See Economist, 16th June 1962.
52. Roy Jenkins, "Teetering Towards Europe", Spectator, Vol. 207, p.6.
53. Butt (1967), op cit, p.384. Tufton Beamish, "The Common Market Down Under", Spectator, Vol. 209, p.551.
54. Parliamentary Advisory Committee on Common Market, Minutes.
55. Camps (1964), op cit, p.361. See Julian Critchley, Spectator, Vol. 207, p.312; Henry McClaren, "Anti-Market", Crossbow, October 1962.
56. Camps (1964), op cit, p.358. H.C. Debates, Vol. 643, 3rd July 1961, c.560
57. Economist, 19th August 1961.
58. McClaren, Crossbow, October 1962.
59. H.C. Debates, Vol. 664, 2nd August 1962.
60. Lord Windlesham, Communication and Political Power, (London, Cape, 1966), p.154, to which Macmillan replied with a thank you. Report on Anti-Market Activity, (Organisation Department 30/8/62).
61. Economist, 10th February 1962.
62. Lieber, op cit, p.210.
63. John Biggs-Davison, The Walls of Europe: Commonwealth or Common Market?, (London, Johnson, 1962).
64. Commonwealth Industries Association, Monthly Bulletin, September 1962, p.11.
65. Economist, 20th May 1961.
66. Times, 24th November 1962.
67. Pfalzgraff, op cit, p.41.
68. Minoprio, Walker-Smith Amendment, (CRD, 10th October 1961).

69. Butt (1967), op cit, p.381.
70. Lieber, op cit, p.205.
71. Economist, 4th August 1962.
72. Camps (1964), op cit, p.462. Times, 24th November 1962, 14th December 1962. Lieber, op cit, p.205.
73. Windlesham, op cit, p.174.
74. Butt (1967), op cit, p.383.
75. Critchley, Spectator, Vol. 207, p.313.
76. For frequent references to the anti-marketeers on the right, see Spectator and Economist passim.
77. Spectator, Vol. 209, p.296.
78. Economist, 18th June 1962.
79. Spectator, 25th May 1962.
80. Economist, 17th June 1961, 1st September 1962, 15th September 1962.
81. Economist, "Not Since the Corn Laws", 1st September 1962. See Economist, "Menzies in London", 7th June 1962.
82. Economist, "Still No Revolt", 15th September 1962.
83. Economist, "Commonwealth and Conservatives", 22nd September 1962.
84. Parliamentary Advisory Committee on Common Market, 5th November 1962, 12th November 1962.
85. Macmillan (1973), op cit, p.333.
86. Lieber, op cit, p.131.
87. Pfalzgraff, op cit, p.111. Lieber, op cit, p.127.
88. Ramsden, op cit, p.212. Fisher, op cit, p.223.
89. Parliamentary Advisory Committee on Common Market, 26th November 1962.
90. National Union Executive Committee (NUEC), 3rd May 1962.
91. Butt (1967), op cit, p.383.
92. Ramsden, op cit, p.213.
93. Charlton, Encounter, (October 1981), op cit, p.31. Bruce-Gardyne & Lawson, op cit, p.58.
94. Economist, "No Peasants Revolt", 17th June 1981. It later apologised for the suggestion that he had been 'put up' by the Government.
95. Camps (1964), op cit, p.363.

96. ibid, p.494.
97. Economist, 2nd February 1963.
98. Parliamentary Advisory Committee on Common Market, 11th March 1963.
99. Spectator, Vol. 207, p.495. Economist, 30th September 1961, 7th October 1961.
100. Verbatim Conference Report 1961.
101. Economist, 14th October 1961.
102. Economist, 14th October 1961. Verbatim Conference Report 1961.
103. Spectator, Vol. 207, p.529.
104. Economist, 13th October 1962.
105. Economist, 16th August 1962. Macmillan believed that opposition was growing. Macmillan (1973), op cit, p.138.
106. Macmillan (1973), op cit, p.140.
107. Economist, "Macmarket", 13th October 1962. NUEC, 8th November 1962.
108. Butt (1967), op cit, p.385.
109. Economist, 29th September 1962.
110. Conference Handbook 1962.
111. Conference Verbatim Report 1962.
112. See Economist, 13th October 1962.
113. Spectator, Vol. 209, p.582.
114. Macmillan (1973), op cit, p.140.
115. Spectator, Vol. 209, p.582.
116. Spectator, Vol. 209, p.584.
117. Economist, 20th October 1962.
118. ibid Camps (1964), op cit, p.453.
119. Stephen Abbot, Swinton Discussion Weekend 5-7th May 1961, (CRD n.d.).
120. Public Opinion Assessment by Area Agents, (Organisation Department, August 1962). A second series of reports in September 1962 largely confirmed the earlier reports.
121. NUEC, 25th February 1961. Conference Handbook 1961. Economist, 4th March 1961.
122. NUEC, 21st February 1962; July 1962.
123. NUEC, 17th March 1962.

124. West Midlands Area, Public Opinion Assessment, (Organisation Department, August 1962).
125. NUEC, 5th April 1962.
126. NUEC, 3rd May 1962. See talk to NUEC by Macleod on by-election defeats, 5th April 1961.
127. NUEC, 7th June 1962.
128. NUEC, 8th November 1962.
129. Ramsden, op cit, p.208.
130. ibid, p.210.
131. Butt (1967), op cit, p.376.
132. Economist, 2nd June 1962.
133. NUEC, 5th April 1962.
134. Weekend Talking Points
 - Britain and Europe, 10th June 1961
 - Britain and the Common Market, 12th August 1961
 - Britain and the Common Market, 23rd August 1962
 - Common Market Negotiations, 11th August 1962
 - Britain, the Commonwealth and Europe, 22nd September 1962
 - Party Conference, 20th October 1962.
 - Brussels Breakdown, 2nd February 1963.
 - The Future After Brussels, 16th February 1963.
135. Notes on Current Politics
 - Agriculture, 16th April 1962
 - Common Market Questions Answered, 8th June 1962
 - Debate on Common Market, 25th June 1962
 - Commonwealth and Common Market, 8th October 1962
 - Britain and Europe, 4th March 1963.
136. Common Market Topics
 - Reading List, 7th November 1962
 - Agriculture, 14th November 1962
 - EFTA, 21st November 1962
 - Cost of Living, 28th November 1962, 12th December 1962
 - New Year Message for Constituency Journals, 17th December 1962
 - Our Attitude to Europe, 2nd January 1963.
137. Minoprio, Common Market Publicity, memorandum to Macleod, 6th September 1962.
138. Minoprio, Party Publications on Common Market, CRD 13th July 1962.
139. Council of Europe Assembly 24th April 1961 and passim (CRD)
The Movement of Foreign Workers in the EEC, (CRD, 1961).

140.. Parliamentary Assembly Committee on Common Market

Walker-Smith Amendment (CRD, 10th October 1961)

Sovereignty (CRD, 24th July 1962)

Common Market and Religion, (CRD 23rd July 1962)

A Special Election?, (CRD, 3rd October 1962).

141. AMCL, (CRD n.d.); John Paul and ACML, (CRD n.d.). ACML and Express publications were in CRD files.
142. Note on Montgomery By-Election, Minoprio to Macleod, (CRD n.d. 1962). Minoprio, Agriculture and Common Market, (CRD, 2nd November 1960). Minoprio, Questions Farmers Ask, (CRD, October 1961).
143. Questions to the Labour Party on Europe, (CRD, 13th July 1962).
144. Fairlie, Spectator, Vol. 209, p.584.
145. CPC National Advisory Committee, 3rd August 1961.
146. National Advisory Committee on Publicity, 11th August 1961.
147. Richard Bailey, "Commonwealth and Europe", Swinton Journal, March 1961. Robert Carr, "Britain and World Trade", Swinton Journal, September 1961.
148. CPC European Series:
- Commonwealth and Common Market, March 1962
- British Agriculture and Horticulture and the Common Market, March 1962
- National Sovereignty in the EEC, March 1962
- Social Security in the Common Market, August 1962.
149. On the CPC see NUEC passim.
150. Public Opinion Assessment by Area Agents, op cit.
151. Andrew Roth, Heath and the Heathmen, (London, Routledge, Kegan and Paul, 1972), p.164.
152. East Hertfordshire Conservative Association and Walker-Smith, (Organisation Department, 28th September 1961).
153. Overseas Bureau, 17th May 1962, 19th July 1962.
154. ibid, passim.
155. ibid, passim. Committee on Links, passim.
156. Windlesham, op cit, p.171.
157. ACML, (CRD, n.d.).
158. Daily Telegraph, 5th September 1962. John Paul and ACML, (CRD n.d.).
159. ACML Minutes 7th May 1962, and passim.

160. Anti-Market Activity, (Organisation Department, 1st September 1961).
Spectator, Vol. 209, p.361.
161. Sir Arthur Bryant, A Choice for Destiny: Commonwealth or Common Market, (Glasgow, Collins, 1962).
162. ACML New Year Newsletter, 31st December 1962.
163. ibid. Windlesham, op cit, p.173. South East Area, Public Opinion Assessment, (Organisation Department, August 1962).
164. ACML (CRD n.d.); ACML Newsletter, August 1969.
165. Spectator, Vol. 208, p.812.
166. Lieber, op cit, p.212. Windlesham, op cit, p.178.
167. ACML Minutes, 29th June 1962 and *passim*.
168. Lieber, op cit, p.212.
169. ACML Minutes, 17th October 1961
170. ibid, p.209. Windlesham, op cit, p.173. McClaren, Crossbow, October 1962. John Paul and ACML, (CRD n.d., September 1962).
171. "Tory Antis", Spectator, Vol. 209, p.295 and denial, p.361.
"The Antis", Spectator, Vol. 208, p.677. For Hinchingsbrooke on "frogs and huns" see Lieber, op cit, p.210.
172. ACML Minutes, 9th February 1962.
173. ibid.
174. G.K. Young, Masters of Indecisions, (London, Methuen, 1962), p.35.
175. ibid, p.149.
176. Critchley, "Pros and Antis in the Conservative Party", Spectator, Vol. 208, p.94.
177. Crossbow, Spring 1962, July 1962.
178. Crossbow, New Year 1962, Spring 1962, July-August 1962, October 1962, January 1963.
179. Organisation Department, December 1962.
180. Windlesham, op cit, p.164.
181. ibid, p.270.
182. Economist, 7th April 1962.
183. James Meade, U.K., Commonwealth and Common Market: A Reappraisal, (London, Institute of Economic Affairs, November 1962).
Economist, 24th November 1962.

184. Bruce-Gardyne and Lawson, op cit, p.56. Lieber, op cit, p.58.
185. FBI Review, February 1961.
186. Butt (1967), op cit, p.376.
187. Bruce-Gardyne & Lawson, op cit, p.56.
188. Crossbow, October 1962.
189. Crossbow, October 1962.
190. Sunday Times, 2nd September 1962. Windlesham, op cit, p.156.
191. Peter Dickinson, "Banks and the Common Market", Spectator, Vol. 207, p.642.
192. Lieber, op cit, p.103.
193. ibid, p.120.
194. Note on Montgomery By-Election, Minoprio to Macleod, (CRD n.d.). ACML Minutes, 29th June 1962.
195. "N.F.U.", Spectator, Vol. 209, p.292.
196. Note on Montgomery By-Election, op cit. Minoprio, Questions Farmers Ask, (CRD, October 1961).
197. Charlton (October 1981) op cit, p.31. Self & Storing, op cit, p.229.
198. Economist, 2nd February 1963.
199. Spectator, Vol. 206, p.782.
200. ibid, Vol. 207, p.279; Vol. 208, p.94. p.452, p.677; Vol. 209, p.296, and passim.
201. ibid, Vol. 208, p.844.
202. ibid, Vol. 208, p.779; Vol. 209, p.528.
203. ibid, Vol. 208, p.528.
204. Telegraph, 24th April 1962, 18th July 1962. Sunday Times, 15th July 1962.
205. Telegraph, 6th June 1962, 8th August 1962. Times, 5th June 1962. Mail, 31st July 1962.
206. Times, 1st October 1962.
207. Express, 6th January 1962.
208. Taylor, op cit, p.648.
209. Spectator, Vol. 208, p.672. Economist, 2nd June 1962.

210. N. Beloff, op cit, p.134.
211. Taylor, op cit, p.648.
212. Express, 4th June 1962.
213. Windlesham, op cit, p.162.
214. Area Agents "Public Opinion Assessment".
215. R. Jowell & G. Hoinville, Britain Into Europe, (London, Croom Helm, 1978), p.22.
216. Lieber, op cit, p.224.
217. McClaren, Crossbow, October 1962.
218. Macmillan (1973), op cit, p.134.
219. Windlesham, op cit, p.158.
220. Jowell & Hoinville, op cit, pp.19-20.
221. Fisher, op cit, p.223.

Background

The breakdown of the negotiations in January 1963 was a major shock to Macmillan and the Conservatives, destroying both what Macmillan had hoped would be his crowning glory, and what Party strategists had seen as one of their best electoral assets. By the end of the year Macmillan had retired, and on 11th November 1963, Lord Home surrendered his peerage to become Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Prime Minister and Party Leader. Despite a remarkable come-back during the election by the Conservatives, Labour won the general election on 15th October 1964, when the mention of Europe in the Conservative Manifesto was "perfunctory". (1)

In early 1965 Conservative interest in Europe began to be renewed, especially among 'Tory Gaullists'. They were interested in stronger Anglo-French relations, especially when the Luxembourg compromise had shown France to be a forceful opponent of supranationalism within the EEC. De Gaulle's concept of a 'Europe des États' was more attractive to them than federalism. This support contributed to the election of Edward Heath as Leader on 2nd August 1965 rather than Reginald Maudling. The Labour Government was operating on a slim majority, and so at a favourable opportunity, i.e. on 31st March 1966, went to the country. Membership of the EEC was one of the main Conservative themes of the election campaign, during which Labour Leader, Harold Wilson, attacked Heath for being too eager to enter. Upon the re-election of the Labour Government, however, Wilson concluded that membership was necessary, and he announced on 10th November 1966 that the question of membership would be explored anew with the Six. On 2nd May 1967 the Labour Government made the second application, with Conservative endorsement, supported in the Commons

by 488 votes to 62, with 26 Tory, 36 Labour and 2 others voting in the No lobby. The second application received the same fate as the first, a French veto. With the resignation of De Gaulle and an expressed willingness by all Six governments to negotiate, the Labour Government made the third application in December 1969, but before the application had proceeded very far, the Labour Government was removed from office by the election on 18th June 1970, whereupon the Conservatives pursued vigorously the negotiations, as discussed in the next chapter.

These years were marked by three elections, two changes in government, three Party leaders and two applications for membership of the Community. Europe was an ever present issue, without being at the forefront of British public debate.

The Leader

The French veto was a bitter blow to Macmillan, who never recovered from the destruction of his main electoral campaign theme and what he perceived as the main legacy of his statesmanship.

Macmillan wrote

"in a moment of something like despair I recorded:
All our policies at home and abroad are in ruins.
Our defence plans have been radically changed
from air to sea. European unity is no more;
French domination of Europe is the new and
alarming feature; our popularity as a Government
is rapidly declining. We have lost everything
except our courage and determination" (2)

His biographer, Anthony Sampson, reported that "Macmillan was dispirited, tired and bewildered". During a visit to Rome, "he suddenly burst out, with an emotion which astonished the Italians, to say he was not interested in these details, that he only wanted to make one thing clear - that for him the events of the past week had been a complete disaster, and he did not know what to do next". (3) As the Observer

commented, "Instead of seeming a far-sighted statesman, he suddenly seemed a gambler who had miscalculated the odds". (4) Macmillan was battered by defeat, scandal and illness, which led to his resignation by the end of the year. Europe played an important role in destroying the image of Supermac, and in undermining public confidence in his leadership.

After a bitter public fight, Home emerged as the new Leader and Prime Minister on 11th November 1963. (5) Home shared the general disappointment over the veto, but he decided that membership was not a possibility in the short term and Europe played no role in the Conservative election campaign of 1964 when less than two years before it was to have been the centrepiece. The manifesto simply stated that problems could best be solved in a partnership between America and a united Europe, that there was no possibility of negotiations to enter the EEC and that the Conservatives would work with EFTA, the Council of Europe and the WEU, "for the closest possible relations with the Six consistent with our Commonwealth ties". (6) Home described membership, in a BBC interview, as a "dead duck". (7) He was criticised by the 'Europeans' for this approach. The Economist accused the Conservatives of cowardice in having rebuffed their most imaginative initiative. Home displayed little interest, yet in 1962 he had given "one of the most forceful and basic of all speeches on the political reasons". (8)

In early 1965 renewed interest in Europe encouraged Home to reaffirm the Party's commitment to the EEC in a speech to the Young Conservatives on 13th February 1965. "If...the Europe of the future will be one of the great installations of power - economic, military, and political - then Britain must not shirk her role of helping to shape its destiny". (9) Some Conservatives were beginning to envisage a nuclear relationship between France and Britain, as a means

of entry into the EEC, with Britain's nuclear relationship with the USA seen as an important source of French hostility. ⁽¹⁰⁾ Home's position was that an initiative would be premature at least for the next couple of years, but that it remained a long term objective of the Conservatives to develop closer relations with Europe.

With constant criticism of his style of leadership, Home decided to resign and an election was held for the leadership under the new rules by which the Parliamentary Party elected the Leader. Heath defeated his main opponent, Maudling, on 27th July 1965, by 150 votes to Maudling's 133 and 15 for Powell. Heath attributed his victory in part to his identification with the European cause. ⁽¹¹⁾ Camps argued more cautiously that "the fact that Mr. Heath was chosen leader of the Conservative Party in preference to Mr. Maudling showed that his known sympathies for 'joining Europe' were no liability, and probably an asset". ⁽¹²⁾ The Spectator believed that "perhaps in the end (Europe) was decisive", because Maudling was viewed as not a passionate 'European'. ⁽¹³⁾ Heath's election as leader should not be seen as a vote on Europe, but a vote for a policy of change rather than caution, the desire to present the Conservatives as a reforming party of progressive change to compete with Labour. Vigorous support for Europe was one of the policies which made Heath appear as the more radical of the two main contenders. No-one, therefore, should have been surprised that Heath placed Europe high on his list of priorities. Soon after his election, in September 1965, the Party produced Putting Britain Right Ahead, which made a clear commitment to eventual membership.

"In maintaining peace, in seeking disarmament, in promoting economic development, in safeguarding and expanding our commerce, in building up our strength to exert political influence in the world, we can best achieve our objectives in a wider grouping.

It was on these grounds that Britain sought

suitable conditions for membership of the EEC - a prospect unwelcome to the Labour Party. It is on these grounds that when the present difficulties and uncertainties in Europe are resolved, we believe it would be right to tackle the first favourable opportunity to join the Community and to assist those who wish, in the Commonwealth and in EFTA, to seek closer association with it. Until this becomes possible, a future Conservative Government will co-operate with other European countries in joint policies in the common interest". (14)

In the 1966 election Heath made Europe the second of the five main themes of the campaign, partly because it was an issue which divided Labour, was endorsed by most of the press, and was supported by those target voters who took a position. The manifesto stated:

"Work energetically for entry into the European Common Market at the first favourable opportunity. Prepare for entry by relating the development of our policies to those of the Common Market, whenever appropriate. Encourage co-operation with other European countries in joint projects which need not await our membership of the Common Market: particularly where large-scale scientific and technological resources are called for". (15)

Heath spoke frequently on Europe during the campaign, attacked the Labour Government's unwillingness to make the changes necessary to enable British entry, and stated that it had "always been known that Mr. Wilson has been anti-European". Wilson responded with a description of Heath "rolling around on his back like a spaniel at any kind gesture from the French" and reiterated two conditions of membership: full independence in respect of foreign and defence policies, and the right to buy food in the cheapest markets. (16) These conditions were viewed by the Conservatives as incompatible with the Treaty of Rome.

Heath's commitment to Europe was clear, but what was the nature of that commitment? He saw Europe as a new centre of power within the Atlantic Alliance, based on economic union first, followed by defence and foreign policies. His vision was a confederalist rather

than a federalist one. "In my judgement the unity of Europe will in the end be achieved by European Governments forming the habits of working together". (17) He was perceived as a quasi-Gaullist, as his speeches reflected an anti-American and pro-French bias. (18)

In the Commons debate on 17th November 1966, he said:

"What Europe is about is the redressing of the balance on the two sides of the Atlantic - redressing the balance in trade, finance, defence and in political influence. What they ask themselves is: Is Britain prepared to be a member of the Community which is deliberately setting out to do that, and to accept the changes in its own relationship which are involved? That is the question which they are asking and it is the question to which the country has to give an answer. That is the reason I believe in a European policy, because it is desirable and it is for the good of the Western World as a whole that Europe should be developed, should be strengthened, should be more prosperous, and should be a counter-balance to the other side of the Atlantic. This cannot happen at once. But Europe is thinking in those terms and, unless we show that we are thinking in those terms, we shall not be acceptable to the Europe which is developing today". (19)

France was the main object of his strategy. On 27th November 1965 he went to Paris to convince the French of the Conservative commitment. (20) His response to France's departure from the military wing of NATO was compliant. "What is required at the moment is not to go around...condemning De Gaulle and the French" but to "get down to the fundamental problems of working out the structure of NATO". (21) He strongly attacked Government attempts to improve relations with the Five, e.g. through the WEU. (22) "We would be wrong to isolate France by creating new institutions without her. Even if it were to succeed which I doubt, such a policy would only repeat in different form, the same errors from which Britain has suffered these last five years. A Europe without France in the long run makes as little sense as a Europe without Britain". (23)

One idea that Heath promoted was Anglo-French co-operation over

nuclear weapons, that "the British and French nuclear forces should be pooled to form a joint deterrent which would be held in trust for Europe". (24) In an interview in the Sunday Times Heath repeated his two-pillars concept of the Atlantic Alliance, and the concept of joint Franco-British weapons held in trust for the other countries of the EEC if they wished. (25) This idea was not developed in any great detail but was designed to strengthen the impression that Britain was closer to De Gaulle's concept of Europe than France might think, and served to demonstrate Britain's willingness to establish her independence from the USA.

Heath ordered a detailed consideration of Conservative policies that should be implemented upon gaining office. Douglas Hurd of the CRD told Heath, "This is the first serious attempt by a political party in Britain (?the world) to prepare itself not simply for winning the election but for the real business of government". (26) A vast array of committees met to consider and propose a large number of reforms, and in Heath's eyes many of the reforms proposed would ease membership of the EEC. (27) There was to be a shift from direct to indirect taxation and the introduction of Value Added Tax, which was a part of the Community's taxes, in place of Purchase Tax. Agricultural support was to be changed towards import levies and import protection as in the Common Agricultural Policy. Trade Union legislation was to be reformed along Continental lines to allow competitive efficiency to be achieved. Social services were to be moved towards selective benefits and a greater insurance element.

When Labour applied for membership in 1967, this caused some embarrassment to Heath, as Europe was one of the main themes for his argument about the Great Divide between Conservative and Labour. (28) Heath welcomed the Government's decision whilst expressing scepticism as to its sincerity and the handicap of Labour's hostile record.

Privately he was convinced that the application would fail and was faced with the problem of how to support the application while criticising the Government's methods. He made his position clear in a speech at Harrogate that the Government should accept the Treaty of Rome, negotiate transitional arrangements and seek areas of co-operation outside the Treaty. (29) James Douglas of the CRD recognised that if there were no criticisms of the conduct of the negotiations, it would be difficult to blame the Government after they failed. He recommended Heath to send a secret memorandum acknowledging the pressure to criticise the negotiations but stating that nothing should be done to prejudice a successful outcome. The memorandum could then be released after the failure. Heath, however, rejected this idea. (30) Hurd recommended that support should be restrained and cautious but the criticism should come after the breakdown.

After the second veto in December 1967 when the Labour Government left the application on the table, Heath re-emphasised the need for Anglo-French nuclear entente and to seek co-operation outside the framework of the Treaties. While membership remained the ultimate objective, Heath pursued the search for alternative forms of co-operation, in particular over defence. However, this did not receive widespread support in the Party. Hurd, in a memorandum to Brendan Sewill, noted that "In putting forward these ideas he is well ahead of opinion in the Party and in the Press, and I think that most people have been advising him not to develop the theme any further. (31) Thus the idea was not presented in any concrete form.

With evidence of increased hostility to Europe in opinion polls and the Party, together with the ever-present fear of another failure, Heath's position on Europe in the 1970 election was rather more cautious than in 1966, or indeed in 1967. The manifesto, while noting

the long term advantages of membership, said "obviously there is a price we would not be prepared to pay". Only after negotiations will we know if the price is fair. "Our sole commitment is to negotiate, no more, no less". The Government would then report to Parliament and the country, and listen to their constituents. (32) The tone was hopeful but not enthusiastic.

The Nuffield election study reported that "all party leaders... took a common line - in essence, 'we must look at the terms but we should go in if the terms are right'". (33) Heath emphasised more than previously the importance of the terms than the need to demonstrate Britain's commitment, which had been a frequent theme of his in the years before the election. Europe was not one of the major themes of the campaign, in contrast to 1966. A widely distributed leaflet on Ten Reasons for Voting Conservative did not mention the EEC. Thus by 1970 the Conservatives, including Heath, did not see Europe as an election winner, and there was a deliberate decision to play it down as an issue.

There can be no doubt that Heath kept the EEC as "the vital core of Conservative strategy". (34) What may be disputed is that Europe was central because Heath was leader. There is evidence, considered in this chapter, that Heath's position, while genuine, also reflected attitudes widely found within the Conservative Party. "Tory Gaullism" was a widespread phenomenon in the Party in this period. The Economist noted the existence of anti-American feelings within the Party, among the right and businessmen afraid of U.S. competition, so that the Tory Party is "palliated by their belief that going into Europe will be, politically and industrially, an anti-American action". (35) Policies on the reform of taxation, agriculture, trade unions and social services emerged from the study groups without any central guidance and conscious demand for coherence. When Heath

favoured an option outside the consensus with the Party, over Anglo-French nuclear entente, it remained a personal idea and not Party policy. When public and Party opinion was seen as less favourable to membership, Party policy became more cautious. In summary, Heath's European policy was not one simply imposed upon the Party as his personal views.

The Cabinet and Shadow Cabinet

After the veto, the Cabinet shared the view of both Macmillan and Home that no new initiative should be made in the short term and acquiesced in the brief reference to Europe in the 1964 manifesto. In early 1965 Sandys and Heath made statements together with Home on the importance of European Unity, ⁽³⁶⁾ and there was clear recognition that some form of political and defence union would be a necessary element in that objective, including the possibility of Anglo-French nuclear weapons. After Heath's election, Europe played a central role in Conservative policy, but this appears not to have caused any great opposition within the Shadow Cabinet. The conflicts that did exist were not about the principle of membership but concerning its importance in the Conservative profile in opposition, and the tactical means of obtaining entry. As part of the major programme of policy development, the committee on foreign policy was set up, including Sandys and Soames, one of whose concerns was to develop a clear European policy. ⁽³⁷⁾ In this period the emphasis shifted from the economic advantages of membership to the political advantages and especially the increased influence in the world it would provide Britain. This was significant in a decade when Britain became more strongly aware of her decline as a world power.

Sandys was an advocate of a European nuclear force, although he emphasised that it should be within the Atlantic Alliance. ⁽³⁸⁾

Heath adopted this policy with some enthusiasm but it never achieved widespread support within the Shadow Cabinet. Home, the Shadow Foreign Secretary, defended an independent nuclear deterrent, and there is no evidence in his speeches, despite his frequent references to the need to strengthen defence against the Soviet Union, that he seriously considered an Anglo-French deterrent as a useful contribution to that end. (39) The lack of Shadow Cabinet support prevented the adoption of that policy.

The issue that had provided the source of greatest difficulty over Europe within Macmillan's Cabinet, agriculture, did not create similar concern in the Shadow Cabinet. Shadow spokesmen on agriculture, first Soames and then Joseph Godber, were convinced of the need to change the system of agricultural support due to its heavy cost to the taxpayer, and an obvious alternative was that of import duties as in the C.A.P. They argued the case for the change on the basis of its merits, with the additional and valued bonus that such a policy would make it easier to obtain membership. Soon after his appointment to Agriculture in 1960 Soames "decided then that we were going to have to change our agricultural support policy anyway, because we couldn't afford to go on". (40) In March 1966, Soames argued that farmers ignored the positive benefits of the C.A.P. and that farmers could join the Common Market "eagerly and with confidence". (41) Godber, who succeeded Soames in 1966, was another advocate of the benefits of the C.A.P. to farmers. (42) There appears to have been no difficulty in gaining Shadow Cabinet support for the new policy of import duties.

The Shadow Cabinet agreed to support the Labour Government's application in 1967 and endorsed a three line Whip in the Commons debate. However, with the second veto, some members of the Shadow Cabinet urged the consideration of alternatives to membership.

These included Maudling, Hogg and Lord Balniel. (43) Maudling in particular expressed concern that the price of preventing another veto would be at the expense of relations with the U.S.A. (44) In December 1967, the Shadow Cabinet considered a paper on the alternatives prepared by Gordon Pears of the CRD, but no alternative presented itself as sufficiently attractive to substitute for the pursuit of membership. (45) Thus, despite the expression of some concern, no alternative policy was found satisfactory by the Shadow Cabinet.

This is an appropriate point to discuss the role of Enoch Powell. As Minister of Health he had supported the bid for membership under Macmillan. He emerged as the major critic of the Commonwealth, and of Britain's defence role of East Suez, and a proponent of Britain as a European military power. In a series of articles in the Times in 1964, published under the pseudonym, 'A Conservative', he described the Commonwealth as "a gigantic farce", felt that it prevented "closer commercial relations with western Europe" and argued that Western European defence rather than NATO would provide "the possibility of independent action". (46) T.E. Utley argued that Heath's appointment of Powell as Shadow Minister of Defence was designed to carry out "one of the most crucial and pressing of missions - the destruction of the Imperial Legend which was so important a part in the mythology of the Conservative Party". (47) Powell believed that "Britain's essential interest is to equip herself to make a massive contribution to the defence of Western Europe in a conventional war". (48) At the 1965 conference he said that "the U.K. is a European Power" which required a European alliance and the abandonment of a presence East of Suez. This speech was only approved by Home after several changes. (49) In a Times article,

he attacked 'The Myth of the Commonwealth', and in his speeches called for Britain's defence to concentrate on Western Europe. (50) Thus Powell was a strong supporter of a European orientation in Conservative policy.

On 20th April 1968 Powell made his famous 'rivers of blood' speech on immigration and race relations which led to his dismissal from the Shadow Cabinet and caused the expression of considerable public support for him. Powell emerged as a significant figure within the Conservative Party. Roth claims that Powell was approached by anti-marketeers as a speaker soon after his dismissal from the Shadow Cabinet, but in fact the ACML discussed that possibility and concluded that "this was extremely unlikely as he seemed to have a deepseated dislike of the Commonwealth". (51) Powell had become more sceptical about the EEC as the argument shifted from the economic advantages, to which he was sympathetic, to political union, to which he was opposed. On 29th March 1969, he gave his first public speech in opposition to membership. He said, "I am a European...I supported Macmillan on balance...I had doubts in 1966...but now I feel the EEC has failed". (52) He emerged as the spokesman for the anti-marketeers in the Party which they had lacked for so long. It was to considerable surprise that Powell spoke on the economy rather than Europe at the 1969 Conference, but that fear contributed to the Shadow Cabinet's decision to be more cautious at that Conference. At the 1970 election, his own election address proclaimed, "The Conservative Party is not yet committed to Britain entering the Common Market. I shall do my utmost to make sure that we never do", and he urged that all candidates should make their position on Europe clear. (53) A clear distinction must be made between Powell's role in Heath's Shadow Cabinet, which was

broadly a supportive one, and that as a backbench dissident, when he decided on grounds of parliamentary sovereignty to oppose membership.

Thus within the Shadow Cabinet there was no substantial opposition to the policy of seeking membership, although some felt that too much emphasis had been placed upon it during many of the years in opposition.

Parliamentary Party

There were few recriminations in the Parliamentary Party after the 1963 veto as it was accepted the Government had done its best, and "the Tory Party always closes ranks in adversity". (54) The 'Europeans', however, were concerned at the lack of a stronger commitment. The Parliamentary Advisory Committee urged stronger contacts with the Continent to enable future membership, and an information campaign of which the essential purpose was to tell people the basic facts of life on which "the Foreign Secretary has to operate outside the Common Market" and preparations for a future application. (55) This committee was suspended in May 1963 until Europe was again an active issue politically.

Kirk warned, in 1964, that another approach would not occur soon, but that the discussion was shifting from an economic to a neo-political one. (56) Julian Critchley proposed a motion in the summer of 1964 on a multi-lateral nuclear force as a bridge to Europe, which received 15 signatures from the younger pro-Europeans, (57) while Thorneycroft and Amery indicated support for a deal with France over nuclear weapons. (58) All this represented concern that the European issue should not be neglected. In April 1965 the One Nation group of M.P.s produced a pamphlet, One Europe, published by CPC and edited by Nicholas Ridley. This pamphlet argued that the

first essential was to change those parts of British life in conflict with continental conditions, followed by the need to demonstrate enthusiasm. The pamphlet was signed by 18 M.P.s and was felt also to reflect the views of those Group members in the Shadow Cabinet. (59)

With the commitment expressed in Putting Britain Right Ahead, the 'European' M.P.s were more satisfied with the Party's position. A number of Conservative M.P.s were active in the European Movement. In 1966, 22 Conservative M.P.s sat on the Executive Committee of the Movement, and in the late 1960's several M.P.s were mentioned by the Movement for their active support - Christopher Chataway, Harry Hynd, Robert Matthew, Geoffrey Rippon, Sandys, Julian Amery, Maurice Macmillan, Tufton Beamish and David Howell. (60)

The anti-marketeers obtained only a very short term benefit from the veto when they obtained 50 signatures for a motion calling for the strengthening of Commonwealth trade. (61) In 1965, however, Conservative support for integration was stronger, so that in November 1965, 6 anti-marketeers claimed that they were not opposed to membership in principle but only to rigid conditions in the Treaty of Rome. (62) Ronald Butt attributed the decline of the Conservative anti-marketeers to the need for the greater protection of agriculture, the decline of support for the Commonwealth, the demonstrated independence of France within the EEC and thus evidence of the weakness of the federalist aspects of the EEC. (63)

The vote on the 1967 application saw only 26 Conservative anti-marketeers, despite the fact that the application was by a Labour Government and without the stronger appeal of loyalty to a Conservative Government decision. The Conservatives adopted a three line Whip although they knew that would be defied by as many as 30 Conservative M.P.s. In the Commons debate of 8-10th May 1967, Turton proposed an

amendment regretting the application, but his supporters were the familiar faithfuls such as Sir Ronald Russell, Ronald Bell and Walker-Smith. The amendment was defeated by 487 to 62, with 26 "entirely right-wing Conservatives". (64) Thus they failed to broaden their base within the Parliamentary Party.

With the second veto, the anti-marketeers had another opportunity with the promotion of the North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA) as an alternative, and the appearance of Powell as a potential leader. Apart from himself and his ally, John Biffen, he added no additional supporters to the anti-market group. Biffen's position on Europe was close to Powell's, that membership had made some sense in 1962 but that the EEC had since developed in the wrong direction towards supranationalism and managed markets. (65) Their addition may have added much to the intellectual quality of the anti-marketeers, but little to their numbers and it further strengthened their image as a narrowly right-wing group opposed to the leadership.

Among M.P.s support for Europe was steady. In 1964 only 11% of Conservative candidates mentioned Europe in their manifestos in line with the low priority given by the leadership. In 1966, 50% of candidates mentioned Europe. (66) The discussion was largely conducted in three forums: the Foreign Affairs Committee which was concerned with general decisions and provided an opportunity to sound out non-specialist opinion; the Committee on Europe (Policy Research) which was concerned with details and tactics and involved more specialists M.P.s; and the Co-ordinating Committee on Europe designed to co-ordinate activity in Parliament and to keep the Shadow Cabinet informed of parliamentary opinion. (67)

The Policy Committee of the Foreign Affairs Committee was one of 20 Policy Study Groups formed as part of Heath's policy-making exercise.

This committee formed a sub-committee on Britain and Europe. (68)

Paul Williams, an anti-marketeer, demanded to know why there was not also a Commonwealth group. (69) This sub-committee considered a number of broad topics. The debate on federalism was between those who rejected federalism outright, (Peter Thomas, Paul Williams) and those who argued that no specific position need be adopted (Norman St. John Stevas, Beamish, Douglas Dodds-Parker). Jock Bruce-Gardyne argued that a commitment to the aim of political union was essential, while Eldon Griffiths felt this was an issue for the future. Bruce-Gardyne also argued for Anglo-French nuclear co-operation and the abandonment of a special relationship with the U.S.A., while St. John Stevas and Thomas were sceptical of this approach. The committee saw the way forward through the promotion of co-operation in particular fields such as agriculture, space and nuclear energy. The Committee finally adopted a paper, based on one produced by Sir Anthony Meyer and Eldon Griffiths, which saw three main arguments in favour of membership (economic, technological, political), urged a new Conservative Government to review its application, and while recognising that this was "a fundamental, not to say, a radical decision", the British people would support it. This paper was included in the final report of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

The Committee on Europe (Policy Research) was formed in May 1966, at Heath's request, under the chairmanship of Lord Balniel. It was made up of 20 M.P.s and 1 or 2 CRD members, and its "main function has been studying various aspects of British entry to the Common Market and producing papers on them". (70) This committee allocated the study of particular areas between its members. It decided to form a tactics committee, independent of the front bench, led by Sandys and Ridley, but it only lasted for four months. A large

number of papers were considered by the committee. It was decided that the Sterling Area was not really a problem, that for Meyer's proposal of a European Technological Community "the time was not yet ripe to put forward this idea as final Party policy", and that the Party should attack the incompetence of the Labour Government's application, disassociating itself from the execution but not the intention of the policy. Biffen argued that there was "a significant amount of latent anti-Europeanism in the Party which would come out into the open if we appeared too enthusiastically pro-European", while Ridley feared that another failure would boost Tory anti-European feeling.

The Committee therefore considered a paper by Gordon Pears of the CRD on Other Ways Into Europe, if early entry was not an available option. ⁽⁷¹⁾ Pears argued the need to avoid a policy vacuum if the application was rejected and to avoid the accusation that the Party was so tied to the Common Market that it could think of no other way to advance Britain's interests. The paper rejected non-European alternatives because "Anything that runs the risk of taking us away from Europe must be rejected, anything that could take us close to Europe is worth considering". Association under article 238 deserved further study; an association between EFTA and the EEC would be very complicated; the removal of non-tariff barriers within EFTA would only provide very limited gains; the Western European Union could be used to promote a European defence policy; and ad hoc co-operation in specific fields could be encouraged. The paper concluded that the case for the EEC was the case for a united Europe. If the EEC was not available, then other means to achieve the same objective should be examined. This paper was adopted by the committee.

The reaction to the second veto was a search for other approaches. Ridley argued that "you can make Europe without France", but Biffen argued against this special dialogue with the Five, and against a technological or defence community. He wanted the harmonisation of legislation to enable a real European market. Bruce-Gardyne and Biggs-Davison argued for greater co-operation with France; a Commonwealth and Europe Group argued for association under Article 238 as part of "an irrevocable commitment at the end of a specific period", and Peter Blaker presented a paper on NAFTA as "an acceptable alternative" but this was rejected by Biffen and Biggs-Davison. In summary, no coherent alternative emerged amongst the confused response.

In December 1967, Home appointed Richard Wood to as chairman "to examine the present situation and recommend Party policy for the period during which entry into the Common Market could be expected to be denied us", to consider co-operation with the EEC, NAFTA, the Commonwealth and EFTA. The committee was to study the evidence and pass judgements, but it also failed to find an alternative. The Committee on Europe (Policy Research) reflected the attitude among M.P.s in its support for membership and a lack of an alternative strategy.

The Common Market Co-ordinating Committee allocated responsibilities between its members with chairman Balniel with general responsibility, Anthony Buck for legal and constitutional affairs, Patrick Jenkin for trade, taxation and sterling, Paul Dean for social policy and Jim Prior for agriculture. The terms of reference were not to seek detailed solutions, but to identify the issues and become informed about them. The Committee was to inform the Shadow Cabinet, examine domestic legislation for their European implications,

consider the possibilities for harmonisation, react to the negotiations and prepare Parliamentary questions, Ten Minute Bills and Adjournment Debates. In practice this committee was not active but it did develop well-informed individual M.P.s

These committees provided much opportunity for M.P.s to discuss and develop their ideas on Europe, and reinforced the view that membership was a necessity. However, the committees also reflected a widespread feeling that the policy research programme was not well considered and contributed little to the development of Party policy, except as a reflection of backbench feeling to the front bench.

The second veto created widespread unease. (72) M.P.s who were not considered anti-marketeers believed that Britain would have to adjust to life outside the EEC (Rippon, John Boyd-Carpenter, Edward du Cann). (73) There existed the possibility of an alternative in NAFTA. In the summer of 1967 an all-party motion received 100 signatures for a feasibility study on NAFTA. Neil Marten, M.P., wrote a paper on NAFTA and wanted it published by CPC, but that was vetoed by Heath. (74) On 23rd January 1968, the Foreign Affairs Committee listened to Sir Maurice Wright, Chairman of the Atlantic Trade Study Group, who argued that NAFTA could eventually include the EEC and that the U.S.A. would support the idea if Britain favoured it. Gordon Pears wrote that "NAFTA is a non-starter, but there are quite a few people in the Parliamentary Party who still want to pursue the idea". (75) Sir William Gorell-Barnes, the influential Chairman of the Conservative Agriculture Committee, favoured the idea. Support for the idea disappeared when there was no indication of interest from the U.S.A., but it represented a sign of despair amongst M.P.s that membership would become a genuine

possibility. This feeling of malaise continued until the 1970 election and influenced Heath and the Shadow Cabinet to adopt a more cautious position, reflected in his speech in Paris. (76) The 1970 Commons debate on the application demonstrated a lack of enthusiasm with the familiar arguments expressed by the familiar spokesmen, Sandys and Walker-Smith. (77) An article in the Spectator speculated that Powell would emerge as the leader of a powerful, politically dangerous anti-European policy. (78) The 'Europeans' were disappointed at the lack of leadership on Europe and with Heath's Gaullism, and Kirk rebuked Heath so sharply that Heath refused to talk to him for six months, according to Roth. (79) Eldon Griffiths, with Gordon Pears, organised an unofficial group of 'Europeans', but this was greeted with hostility by Heath and the group decided to proceed very cautiously to avoid antagonising the leadership. (80) David Howell, M.P., felt that "the pro-European section of the Party is crumbling before our eyes". (81) The feeling among M.P.s in the late 1960's was not one of hostility to the EEC but a scepticism that membership was likely and the fear that too much of the Conservative case depended on the idea of membership.

National Union

At the 1963 Conference, the motions expressed regret at the failure and hoped for eventual membership. (82) No debate was held on Europe, but the Commonwealth debate suggested that the Commonwealth was not seen as an alternative and in the Foreign Affairs debate most speakers urged continuing interest in Europe. (83) There was no conference in 1964 because of the expectation of an election.

In 1965, with a re-awakening of interest in Europe, 24 resolutions were submitted supporting membership and there were no anti-European

resolutions. (84) The agricultural motion supported a move from deficiency payments to import duties, and Godber insisted that they "stand on their own as a coherent programme" and not just to enable entry. The external affairs debate was on a three circles motion and the proposers expressed their support for Europe, but an amendment based on Putting Britain Right Ahead, and more explicitly 'European', was proposed by Peter Fry and Peter Thomas. All the speakers placed Europe as the first circle. The amendment was carried by an overwhelming majority and the final motion unanimously. (85) The Economist asked "Where now are the Commonwealth men who fought against the European Common Market to the last ditch? Gone, one must record, quite gone". (86) This was the first conference since the war without a Commonwealth or Empire debate, and the defence debate was dominated by Powell's assertion that Britain was now a European power. As one speaker said in the debate, the Tory party has returned to a strong and full-blooded commitment to the Unity of Europe.

At the next Conference in 1966, 12 resolutions submitted were pro-European, mainly emphasising the economic benefits with no anti motions. 10 resolutions on defence supported a presence East of Suez but several emphasised that this was not in conflict with Europe. Only 1 of the agricultural resolutions was opposed to import controls. (87)

The agricultural debate again reaffirmed support for the new policy of import duties. The motion on external affairs urged a reappraisal of policy to give proper priority to a united Europe equal to the U.S., proposed by Sir Anthony Meyer. Support was expressed by most speakers for a whole-hearted commitment, several mentioned Meyer's European Technological Community, but opposition to the motion was expressed by David Lane because there was no

mention of the Commonwealth although he supported European unity.

Home ended with a re-statement of the political reasons for European unity.

"Britain and Europe today are forfeiting priceless advantages in the accumulation of wealth, which is the basis of all security, and in political authority and influence by allowing EFTA and the EEC to continue to be separate. A unified Europe would strengthen the economy of every partner; it would make the defence budgets of every country much less onerous; it would give... scope for technical advantage, and industrial co-operation on a hugely increased scale, a scale sufficient to make the Continent of Europe an equal partner with the U.S. and the Soviet Union".

The motion was adopted unanimously. In the debate Jim Spicer said that the Party was no longer divided on Europe. (88)

The 1967 Conference, however, was held in a different atmosphere after the second veto. The resolutions were more mixed; 10 urged the continued search for membership (3 asking for changes in domestic policies); 3 had specific conditions on New Zealand, agriculture and education; 2 supported NAFTA; and 2 wanted a search for alternatives. The agricultural resolutions supported the new policy as the removal of a major obstacle to membership. (89)

The motion for debate called for greater European unity. Three critical amendments were proposed, one by Fred Hardman of TUNAC, and Gordon Pears advised Home that no amendment be called, but if so call the most anti-European and defeat it. (90) Home called no amendments. The debate was almost consistently in favour of European unity even if membership was not an immediate option. The motion was adopted unanimously.

There was a concerted attempt by anti-marketeers to have a debate on NAFTA at the 1968 conference. 12 pro-NAFTA resolutions were submitted, proposed by traditional anti-marketeers like Walker-Smith, Roger Moate and Harmar Nicholls. (91) No debate was

held on the Common Market or NAFTA. According to the Spectator poll of delegates, this caused some dissatisfaction as 14% wanted a debate, the second highest issue after immigration. (92) Thus Conference reflected the interest in an alternative found among M.P.s

The 1969 Conference took on a particular significance just before an expected election in 1970. The submitted resolutions reflected a strong surge of opposition:

For:	6
Against unless conditions:	3 - Sterling 1 Agriculture 1 Monarchy/Commonwealth/ Agriculture/Cost of Living 1
Against:	2
Withdraw Application:	2
NAFTA:	2
Alternatives:	3
English-Speaking union:	2
Doubts:	2
Referendum:	3
More information:	4

Even the agricultural resolutions, which had been largely favourable in earlier conferences, had 5 with reservations with 9 in favour of the new system. (93) The Economist felt that opposition now came from more moderate elements in the Party, and Powell had now emerged as "the most natural leader of the emotional right-wing" providing a grave new challenge. The leadership, therefore, approached the Conference with a more cautious endorsement of Europe. (94)

The motion for debate stated that Conference was convinced of the influence for good of Britain in world affairs, and that joining

the EEC would be a major contribution to the security and prosperity of Britain. The proposer, Eldon Griffiths, emphasised Britain's influence through Europe, but noted that the price could be too high. The opposition included Walker-Smith with his traditional concerns, and Neil Marten, who stated that a vote against the motion was not against Heath's leadership. To some surprise, Powell did not speak in this debate. Support for the motion came from Sandys and two enthusiastic speeches from Young Conservatives David Atkinson and Eric Chalker noting the support of the young. Home's response to the debate was a deliberately cautious one, noting that no final decision would be made before the negotiations had finished, and without close consultation. The only decision was to negotiate. (95)

On the show of hands, the Chairman declared the motion carried by a very large majority but Walker-Smith insisted on a ballot. After much confusion, as ballots are unusual at Conservative Conferences, the result was declared accompanied by much applause and cheers. It was 1,452 votes to 475. (96) The verdict was a more decisive one than the leadership had expected.

The Spectator poll of delegates showed that they felt that the Common Market debate was the best of the Conference, partly because it was the first not dominated by the leadership. No one thought the Common Market should be a major election issue, even though 73% of the delegates polled were pro-European, and only 19% against with 6% don't know. (97)

Heath ended the Conference on a more positive note, with Europe as a major theme and a promise that the facts would be put before the public. Heath emerged with his leadership more firmly established but concerned not to increase intra-party divisions before the election. (98)

Other evidence of constituency feelings suggests the pattern of

increased support in 1965, with more concern after the second veto. Europe was never debated in this period at Central Council, but in 1967 it endorsed the movement to agricultural import levies. The CPC discussion groups in 1965 came out strongly for membership with an emphasis on the advantages of a large market. Agricultural opposition was in deep decline, while some fears still continued to exist. Support was for a confederal structure and against direct elections to the European Parliament. There was little support for an Atlantic Community and some anti-American feeling. The report ended with a demand for more information. (99) The NUC also received several resolutions welcoming the pursuit of entry by the leadership. (100) In summer 1967 CPC discussed two briefs on co-operation with Europe. Home, in his reply, saw three main points in the reports: the demand for more information; the need to prepare for entry; and the need to join, with the groups emphasising the economic over the political advantages. On another brief on Britain's role in the world, constituency opinion was against a European nuclear force. (101) In 1967 the NUC received motions expressing reservations, one from the South East region and adopted unanimously said that "in view of public controversy, the Conservative Party should now re-issue an up-to-date summary of the advantages and disadvantages of joining the EEC", while another urged no commitment to join without a referendum. Opposition even began to appear to the new agricultural policy. (102) In February 1970 in a CPC discussion on food and agriculture, 145 discussants were against the new policy while 282 were in favour. (103)

The Young Conservatives took a consistent and enthusiastic position in favour of Europe despite the difficulties. At their February 1963 Conference, 14 resolutions were enthusiastically for a

united Europe with only 3 against. The motion, "realising that the breakdown of negotiations presents a challenge to Europe, the Atlantic Alliance and the free world as a whole, urges H.M. Government to do all in its power further to develop co-operation in all fields", was adopted by an overwhelming majority of the 1,400 delegates. (104)

Home used the opportunity of his speech to the Young Conservatives' Conference on 15th February 1965 to reassert Conservative support for Europe, as did Heath in his 1966 speech, when he committed the Conservatives to join at the first favourable opportunity. (105) The

Young Conservatives' National Advisory Committee supported withdrawal from East of Suez in September 1966, and a European orientation in defence. (106) The Greater London Young Conservatives (GLYC)

emerged at this time as an active 'progressive' force within the Young Conservatives and the Party. At the 1966 Party Conference, Eric Chalker GLYC Chairman, attacked the Commonwealth and claimed that Young Conservatives were desperate for European Unity. At the GLYC Conference in March 1967, Paul-Henri Spaak was the guest speaker and his speech was published by CPC. (107) Gordon Pears attended the

Conference for the CRD and reported a majority of 4 to 1 in favour. (108)

In June 1967, the Young Conservatives held a joint weekend with Conservative Students on Europe at Swinton College; and Europe was a major theme of their Action '67 campaign. At the 1969 Party Conference the platform called two Young Conservatives to speak on Europe. David Atkinson argued that the youth vote depended on Europe, and Eric Chalker reported that a Party survey had found that 73% of young people in Britain felt that they had more in common with other young people than older people in Britain. The Young Conservatives were also active in the Conservative youth international, the Conservative and Christian Democrat Youth Community (COCDYC).

Throughout this period the Young Conservatives were consistent and enthusiastic champions of the European cause, and used by the leadership in identification with that policy.

The Federation of University Conservative Associations, which became the Federation of Conservative Students (FCS) in April 1967, were also strong a supporter. In 1963 they submitted a resolution to the Party Conference on the danger of Europe as a third force without Britain, and so the need for maximum political, economic and military links with Europe. The Party paid for them to organise a conference for the International Conservative and Christian Democrat Students (ICCS) in July 1963. In 1965, their annual Conference adopted, by an overwhelming majority, the motion that "the Conservative Party should make all possible efforts to see that Britain joins the Common Market as quickly as possible" and submitted it to the Party Conference. In 1967 the theme of their discussion groups, for which the CRD prepared a special pamphlet, was Britain's Relations with Europe; they participated in the Campaign for a European Political Community; and Spencer Batiste, representing FCS, spoke at the Party Conference for Europe. FCS was also active in ICCS, with Ian Taylor as Chairman in 1969. (109) FCS was another reliable source of youth support.

The women were less interested in Europe. Their reaction to the first veto was to congratulate Heath on his negotiating performance, and urge the protection of British and Commonwealth interests. In 1965 the 2,500 women's Conference endorsed Home's statement and urged the opposition "to put before the people the advantages to be gained by such co-operation" by a large majority. (110) The women shared the same sense of unease in the late 1960s. Kate Macmillan, the Vice-Chairman for Women, and wife of Maurice Macmillan, wrote a calming letter in November 1969 when she admitted that there was much confusion

in the branches, rebutted the sovereignty argument and reassured that "All the Conservative Party is committed to do is to start negotiations if a favourable opportunity arises". (111)

The women thus reflected attitudes throughout the Party with the exception of the consistently pro-European stance of the youth sections: support for European co-operation in 1965, endorsement of Heath's strong position in 1966, agreement to support the 1967 Labour application but considerable disillusion after the second veto, and an uneasy and fruitless search for an alternative. This uneasiness within the Party influenced the softer approach of the Party leadership by the end of the decade.

Central Office

The CRD was bitterly disappointed with the French veto in 1963, both for short term electoral considerations and long term foreign policy objectives. One senior official stated:

"Europe was to be our deus ex machina; it was to create a new contemporary political argument with insular Socialism; dish the Liberals by stealing their clothes; give us something new after 12-13 years; act as a catalyst of modernisation; give us a new place in the international sun. It was Macmillan's ace, and de Gaulle trumped it. The Conservatives never really recovered". (112)

The CRD emphasised that there was no easy alternative and that the long term implications of the veto were very bad. (113) Ursula Branston, in a paper on The Party's Role After Brussels, argued that there was a good case for the Party to present a European image, (114) but the CRD accepted the position of the leadership that membership was not a practical option in the existing circumstances. (115)

The CRD naturally welcomed the emphasis on policy-making under Heath and were actively involved in the policy study groups. The

Economist saw the CRD as "the most influential" of the different groups influencing the Party in a liberal direction, (116) and their work gave them a close relationship with Heath. Brandon Sewill, the new Director, proposed that efficiency and Europe should be the main themes, which eventually were merged to become the theme of the 1966 manifesto. (117) Sewill was concerned that the Labour Party would pinch Conservative policies, "for example Europe", (118) and so the CRD emphasised the lack of trustworthiness and commitment to Europe of Wilson and the Labour Party as evidenced by the import surcharges, the cancellation of the European Launcher Development Organisation (ELDO), and the lack of support for Concorde. (119)

Gordon Pears, at the European desk, was a passionate 'European'. In a memorandum to Sewell on 26th April 1966, he urged the need for proselytising on Europe, not policy-making, "with the aim of consolidating a large and growing body of informed support within the Party....We should recognise that while there is widespread acceptance within the Party for our current policy on Europe, there are as yet comparatively few informed and committed enthusiasts for it... (support) needs developing until it is proof against shocks of any kind". He urged the creation of a Foreign Affairs Forum, Parliamentary European co-operation, greater participation in the European Movement, better representation at European Assemblies, and a European Section at the CRD. (120) Pears was the secretary, and wrote a number of briefs, for the Common Market Co-ordinating Committee, the Committee on Europe (Policy Research) and the European Policy Group of the Foreign Affairs Committee. Sewill told Pears on 1st June 1966 that one of the jobs of the Committee on Europe (Policy Research) was to mark antis. "You as a member of the CRD must have nothing to do with activities against - or even attempting to influence - other

members of the Conservative Party. The Research Department must serve the Party as a whole and never get involved in arguments between different sections of the Party - even when these involve official Party policy". (121) In this work he was assisted by other European enthusiasts, Guy Hadley and Douglas Hurd. One of Pears' continual complaints was the lack of information to the constituencies.

Sewill's fears came to fruition with the Labour application and the CRD tried to criticise Labour for the suddenness of their conversion and their lack of preparations, without damaging the application, (122) especially as they shared Heath's view that the application would fail. Heath met with Pears, Hadley and Hurd on 20th December 1966 and 5th June 1967 to discuss European policy. At the December 1966 meeting it was agreed that a veto was likely. Heath restated the basic policy: to accept the Treaty, to make transitional arrangements and to discuss other issues outside the Treaty. He supported Anglo- French defence co-operation but not a European defence community, rejected the idea of a European Technological Community and asked Hadley to examine legislation for their European implications. Hurd recommended that Heath emphasise the long-term nature of the European policy which required preparation at home and would not be affected by any veto, a position adopted by Heath. "It sounds obvious but it is a point which an amazing number of people particularly in the Party do not grasp". (123) In a memo from Douglas to Heath on the tactics if/when the negotiations fail, he wanted criticism on the grounds that a divided Labour government made a full commitment difficult but this was vetoed by Heath (presumably because he feared it would undermine the application), so he recommended that Heath write a secret memorandum

to the Shadow Cabinet, CCO and CRD acknowledging the pressure to criticise the negotiations but nothing should be done to prejudice them. This memorandum could then be leaked when they failed. A memorandum was prepared by Hurd and Pears but Heath rejected the idea. (124) Hurd's recommendation was that a second veto should be treated as "a temporary setback" and Heath's support should be tempered and cautious but critical afterwards. (125) Pears urged that Heath speak on Europe at the Party Conference or it would imply lukewarm support, but he must establish a boundary between support and criticism of the Government. (126)

After the veto CRD advice was generally to study the alternatives to the EEC to pacify dissatisfaction and to demonstrate their inadequacies. Pears warned that Conservative support was already subject to considerable strain in the country and the Parliamentary Party, so tactically alternatives should be examined, the leadership should mute its support and discussions should be conducted to strengthen Conservative commitment. (127) Sewill, in April 1967, had requested Hadley to prepare a study of alternatives even if to say there is no alternative. (128) Sewill suggested to Heath that he should make a striking initiative in the European nuclear approach. (129) There was much confusion as to the correct response to the second veto.

Pears was highly concerned about the Party's response. In private correspondence with David Howell, he described the Wood Committee as "One can say that it is expected to be as pro-European as official Party policy is at the moment. And who can say how much that is....The leadership seems very unlikely to do anything whatever over the next few months to stimulate pro-European feeling in the Party so those individuals who feel this to be necessary - as I do and as I am sure you do - will have to do it". (130)

Their fears were justified. The Party took a much more cautious position, with little reference to Europe in the mid-term manifesto of October 1968, Make Life Better, a commitment only to negotiate, statements that entry would occur only after full debate and even, according to Ramsden, the consideration of the inclusion of a reference to a referendum or a free vote in the 1970 manifesto. "It was also decided, late in the day, to stick to the original commitment to leave a decision on the Common Market to Parliament, rather than throwing in the idea of a referendum, on the argument that Parliament would not act directly against public opinion on such a vital issue: the question whether or not to allow a free vote was considered and deferred". (131)

The CRD were deeply involved in policy-making in the Heath opposition, and they were unanimously in favour of membership - Sewill the Director, Pears, Hadley and Hurd on international affairs, Tim Boswell on agriculture and Brian Griffiths on economics.

The CPC published a series of pamphlets and organised many activities on Europe throughout this period. The CPC participated in the re-emergence of interest in Europe in 1965 with the publication of two pamphlets. One Europe was produced by the One Nation group of M.P.s, edited by Nicholas Ridley and signed by all the group members except those in the Shadow Cabinet. (132) The pamphlet argued the economic, defence and political cases, urged that the first essential was to alter those parts of British life in conflict with continental conditions, and the need for an enthuasistic approach. The One Nation Group was no longer as influential as in the immediate post-war period and was now primarily a dining club, but it did express support from the backbenches. Later in 1965 the CPC published A Europe of Nations by the Cambridge University Monday Club. Meyer's idea of a European

Technological Community was promoted in a 1966 pamphlet. The case for the introduction of the Value Added Tax both on its merits and to ease future membership was argued by Stephen Sherbourne of the CRD. Most unusually it published a speech by a non-Briton and a socialist, Paul-Henri Spaak, to the Greater London Young Conservatives, while Europe and Technology by Manfred Macioti, and Europe and the Law, by the Society of Conservative Lawyers dealt with specific areas. Eldon Griffiths, M.P., and Michael Niblock of the CRD tried to promote Anglo-French nuclear entente in an early 1970 pamphlet. (173)

Europe was a major theme of CPC activity in 1967-68. It was the theme of the regular Oxford Summer School in 1967, an important feature of three discussion group topics, and a visit to NATO and the EEC was organised in Spring 1968. The master briefs introducing the discussion groups were written by Ben Paterson, CPC Deputy Director, and later Member of the European Parliament. (134) The change in agricultural policy was the subject of several CPC publications and discussion groups, but while it was mentioned that the new system would make membership easier the virtues of the system itself were emphasised. (135) The CPC thus fulfilled a role of promoting information and discussion on Europe and floated ideas to gauge Party reaction without any official commitment, such as the European Technological Community, and Anglo-French Nuclear Entente. Swinton Conservative College also contributed to political education with the publication of several articles and the organisation of several conferences on Europe. (136)

The Overseas Bureau was uncertain how to respond to the 1963 veto. The Committee on Links fizzled out without being formally disbanded, and the Bureau repeated its position that there was no question of alliances with parties in other countries, with no favourite parties. (137)

With the election of Heath as Leader, there was a greater emphasis on inter-party relations and a greater willingness to seek a formal relationship. In November 1965, the NEI, with whom the Conservatives were loosely associated, became the European Union of Christian Democrats (UECD) which prompted discussion of forming their own organisation. Heath himself went to Rome to urge Conservative membership of the UEDC, and in a letter hoped for a favourable decision within the next few weeks, but membership was obstructed by the opposition of the Italian and Dutch Christian Democrats. (138)

In 1966 the Bureau agreed to give urgent attention to multilateral links with like-minded Continental parties and Heath gave his support to the idea of an alternative organisation with the CDU and Scandinavian Conservatives. (139)

In 1967, the first Conservative and Christian Democrat conference was held at Kalsruhe under the auspices of the CDU and against the strong opposition of the Italian Christian Democrats (DCI). The Conservative position was that the "missing friends" would be drawn into any organisation by demonstrating its success, so regular meetings were held known as the Inter-Party Meetings. The importance of these relations led to the translation of the Party publication, Make Life Better, into French and German. The Bureau continued to organise visits to Strasbourg for prospective parliamentary candidates which increased the strength of their support. An example was the report of the group in October 1966 which urged the need to include European integration in Party publicity. (140)

There were also several organisations associated with the Bureau. The Conservative Commonwealth and Overseas Council was primarily interested in Commonwealth affairs but it set up a Commonwealth and European Group under Sir William Gorell Barnes, which could have

emerged as a focus of anti-market feeling. The Group produced five detailed papers on agriculture, institutions, social policy, economics and Britain's economic policy. With the second veto, the Group set up an alternatives sub-committee which heard evidence in December 1967 from Sir Michael Wright, Chairman of the Atlantic Study Committee, the main proponent of NAFTA. The idea of Association status was promoted but only as part of the transition period with an "irrevocable commitment at the end of a specified period (5 years?)" The Alternatives sub-committee under J. Harvey rejected NAFTA because it would divide the free world. In May 1968, the Council organised a conference on Commonwealth-Common Market Alternatives, which however found no satisfactory alternative to the European Community. (141) Thus the most Commonwealth-oriented element in the Party did not oppose Britain's entry, even after the second veto.

Another body was the Foreign Affairs Forum designed to encourage the discussion of foreign affairs in the Party especially among parliamentary candidates. According to Gordon Pears there had been opposition to the creation of the Forum as foreign affairs spokesmen feared that their relative freedom of action would be constrained by rank and file discussion. He felt that "it tends to attract anti-Europeans" but with Meyer as Chairman it did not act as an anti-European force. (142)

Thus CCO was strongly committed to the European policy and through publications, briefs, conferences and informal contacts promoted the view that membership was the only realistic policy option.

The Informal Party

The Bow Group had been strongly identified with Europe, and so the publication of an anti-European pamphlet soon after the first

veto caused considerable interest and claims of intellectual somersaults. It had been decided by only 21 votes to 17 that it should be published. (143) No Tame or Minor Role was written by anti-European Bow Groupers led by Leonard Beaton, Timothy Raison and Sir Robin Williams, which argued the case for the Commonwealth as the centre of Britain's international relations and against European Community membership. (144) Raison in his 1964 Penguin special Why Conservative? saw Europe as only the third of the three circles. (145) This, however, was a reflection of the pluralism within the Bow Group rather than any change in the attitude of most Bow Groupers, evidenced in the critical review of the pamphlet published in the Bow Group magazine. (146) The Group published in December 1965 a pamphlet placing Europe at the centre of Britain's role in the world, and rejecting the Commonwealth as too large and complex to provide sufficient cohesion. The method of joining was to be a declaration of interest accepting political unity, the pre-membership alignment of policies and a Technological Association. It was highly critical of the Gaullist ideas then current in the Party and urged support for the Atlantic Nuclear Force. This pamphlet, edited by Leon Brittan, was more representative of feeling in the Bow Group. (147)

Crossbow continued to provide a forum for Conservatives critical of the anti-marketeers, of the lack of enthusiasm within the Party, of Tory Gaullism and in support of a clear commitment to a defence and technological role in Europe and political union. (148) Laurence Reed, a prominent Bow Group member, actively promoted the idea of European Technology, in a book and a Bow Group pamphlet. (149) During the height of Conservative scepticism during this period and a weaker commitment by the leadership, the Bow Group published in February 1970 a pamphlet emphasising the long-term case for membership, implicitly

critical of the emphasis on the terms that the leadership was then making. (150) It was one of the best-selling pamphlets of the Bow Group since its foundation.

Throughout this period the Bow Group leadership was firmly pro-European, on political and defence grounds as much if not more than economic ones, and all the chairmen were in favour of entry. The editor of Crossbow was always a 'European' except for Simon Jenkins. The Group provided substantial intellectual and political support for that policy.

The Monday Club was a strong critic of Heath's leadership but on Europe never provided an effective challenge, because many of its leaders were convinced 'Europeans': Julian Amery, Duncan Sandys, John Biggs-Davison and Geoffrey Rippon. The anti-marketeers were probably stronger among the rank and file membership but their only leaders were Victor Montagu, the former Viscount Hinchinbrooke, and Teddy Taylor. The Monday Club 'Europeans' were supporters of De Gaulle's concept of Europe des patries. The Cambridge University Monday Club published A Europe of Nations explicitly confederalist, anti-American and in favour of Anglo-French nuclear entente. Stephen Hastings M.P. saw the need to choose between the three circles, rejected the USA as a loss of independence and the Commonwealth as weak and against British interests, and saw Europe as a potentially mighty state. Amery urged an Anglo-French concord in the Daily Telegraph, while Biggs-Davison noted that both Britain and France rejected federalism. George Pole, an active Monday Club member, believed that with States in a wider federation, the freedom of the individual might be more secure. The 'Europeans' in the Club were intellectually and politically dominant even if not in terms of numbers. (151)

There was anti-market activity within the Club but it was handicapped by a lack of an alternative. After the second veto a sub-committee on alternatives was created by Patrick Wall as Chairman of the External Affairs Committee and a proponent of Atlantic Union. The Study Group on NAFTA, however, was keen to emphasise that it was merely a feasibility study implying no commitment. The NAFTA approach received little support because it conflicted with a widespread feeling within the Monday Club that the USA was not to be trusted. The division of opinion within the Club was expressed in a pamphlet in which Meyer and Montagu discussed the virtues and evils of the European Community, and in a lively meeting where no majority view emerged. The Executive took the view that the Club should have no policy on membership. The 'Europeans' were dissatisfied with several aspects of the European Community and through a Group on British-European Relations under Biggs-Davison sought to find additional means of co-operation, but ultimately they recognised that European co-operation required membership and were optimistic about changing the European Community from within in alliance with the French. Thus the Monday Club, a major source of opposition to the leadership generally, did not provide opposition on Europe. (152)

The Society of Conservative Lawyers (formerly the Inns of Court Conservative Society) was another informal Conservative body which examined the issue of Europe, with particular reference to the legal implications of membership. Their Common Market Committee, under Lionel Heald, was set up in 1967 and carried out a series of detailed studies of twelve specific areas of the implications of membership. Some of the best of them were published by the CPC as Europe and the Law. The significance of their work was that it undermined the legal opposition to the European Community which was

so important to Walker-Smith and Turton.

The Anti-Common Market League was unsure how to respond to the first veto. Options considered were the formation of a new political party, a merger with other organisations such as Leo Russell's Commonwealth Association, and a change of name. It was decided to keep the League in existence as the issue was expected to come to the fore after the general election. (153) The ACML supported three independent candidates in the 1964 election but they received less than 3% of the vote. Paul was keen that Heath should be opposed. "Heath must be unseated, otherwise there was a very real danger of his being selected as a future leader of the Conservative Party", but he acknowledged that "the last effort had clearly established that independents at general elections were a waste of time and effort". (154) By 1964 it declared that "The League is non-Party" although "it began by catering primarily for Conservatives". (155)

The League continued at a very low level of activity, although there was an attempt to revive it with a petition and the creation of a Petition Council of prominent anti-marketeers. The Council took a long time to be formed because of the difficulty of obtaining the membership of a prominent member of the Labour Party. While the petition eventually attracted 764,107 signatures, this was over a period of 5 years and it was not formally submitted until May 1972. (156) The League rarely met during this period and never again played the central role as the focus of Conservative anti-market feeling that it had played in 1962.

The best hope for the anti-marketeers after the second veto was the ability to present an alternative, the North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA), which would link EFTA with the USA and Canada. Hurd reported that the antis had rallied around the idea, promoted by the Atlantic

Trade Study Group. The Group was formed in 1967 by Hugh Corbet, a Times journalist, Professor Harry Johnson, and Leonard Beaton, former Director of the International Institute of Strategic Studies. Maxwell Stamp Associates produced a report for the Group, which concluded that "The direct effects of joining EEC would not be as advantageous as joining the North Atlantic Free Trade Area". (157) They also produced other reports supporting the NAFTA case.

Neil Marten wrote a paper on NAFTA for the Committee on Europe (Policy Research) which he wanted published as a CPC pamphlet but this was vetoed by Heath. The NAFTA campaigners organised several conferences, including one in February 1968 in London, and a two day event at Sussex University in July 1968. This idea attracted the support of some economic liberals, such as Roy Harrod and Edward Holloway, who were concerned with the inward-looking nature of the European Community, and the interest of Lord Watkinson, a former Minister of Defence, Lord Boyd, former Colonial Secretary, and Hugh Fraser M.P. The NAFTA idea, however, foundered on the lack of U.S. interest, (Bruce-Gardyne wrote that in America it only existed in the mind of Jacob Javits) and the anti-Americanism of the Right. Thus the anti-marketeers were unsuccessful in replying to the question posed to them frequently by the 'Europeans', "what is your alternative?". (158)

The Commonwealth appeared less and less as an alternative. Several organisations were created to promote relations with the Commonwealth, such as the Commonwealth League for Economic Co-operation and the British Commonwealth Union, but their leaders, Rippon and Biggs-Davison respectively, were 'Europeans'. The failure of many Commonwealth countries to retain democracy, the assertive nature of many Commonwealth leaders, and fears over coloured immigration weakened commitment to the Commonwealth. Montagu had even urged that the Commonwealth be wound up after the 1969 Commonwealth conference, and

Powell had explicitly rejected the Commonwealth and Empire as central to Britain's role in the world. Thus there was no popular Commonwealth organisation as a focus for anti-market opposition. (159)

However, neither did the European Movement provide a satisfactory home for Conservative pro-marketeers. The European Movement was a mixture of businessmen, who provided the finances and the audiences, and federalist intellectuals, who provided the ideas and the policies. There was the familiar complaint from Conservatives about their lack of influence. Pears complained about the lack of Tories in the European Movement, apart from Howell, and the need to encourage Conservative participation, not to take it over but to curb its federalism. The Campaign for European Political Unity was launched in July 1966 and attracted the support of 150 M.P.s, and yet still in September 1968 Martin Madden felt there was a need to get a hard core of 'Europeans' together. The need for an explicitly Conservative group led to the creation of the European Forum on 20th May 1969 of "Conservatives who wish to further the Party's European policy", with Heath, Macmillan and Home as honorary officers. The aim was to have only a small membership, about 150, of opinion-leaders, 50 M.P.s and 100 prospective parliamentary candidates and activists. The Forum held several briefing conferences, one in conjunction with the Bow Group; encouraged parliamentary questions through David Howell; provided speakers for local party meetings; organised an Anglo-French conference; and published a pamphlet by Nicholas Ridley, Towards a Federal Europe. (160) This organisation was to come into prominence under the Heath Government as the Conservative Group for Europe.

The Confederation of British Industry was formed in 1965 from an amalgamation of the Federation of British Industries, the British Employers' Federation and the National Association of British

Manufacturers. Its first appraisal of the EEC in 1966 concluded that there would be "a clear and progressive balance of advantage to British industry" in membership. The C.B.I. urged an application by the Labour Government. The CBI's position was reaffirmed in January 1970 with the report 'Britain in Europe - A Second Industrial Appraisal'. The CBI played a very limited role on Europe in this period, which was based on a policy of cautious support, with emphasis on the terms and necessary preparations. (161) The Commonwealth Industries Association continued its hostility to the EEC, provided a forum for Conservative anti-marketeers in its journal, Britain and Overseas, edited by Edward Holloway and published an anti-market leaflet. (162) The NFU, on the contrary, played an active role on Europe, even while its own position changed. Its initial position was continued hostility to membership and the C.A.P. A. Winegarten, NFU's Chief Economist, stated that "none of the conditions which the Union regarded as essential in 1961-63 would be met if the U.K. were to enter the Common Market unconditionally" and the NFU published a letter, during the 1966 election, criticising the Conservative position. "The Conservative Party have thus apparently withdrawn from their earlier position and seem to be prepared to go into the Community on the basis of the CAP". The NFU prepared a study of the implications of the CAP, a summary of which was widely distributed to M.P.s on the eve of a Common Market debate in November 1966. The study claimed that the CAP would increase the cost of living, mean a sharp change in the method of agricultural support, and would increase the cost of foodstuffs. However, opinion among farmers was not so hostile, as some farmers such as large cereal growers would benefit. The Guardian reported in January 1967 that farmers were divided almost equally. The arguments of the Conservative spokesmen that the system of deficiency

payments was too expensive and that import levies would increase domestic agricultural productions won much support. In 1967 the NFU published British Agriculture and the Common Market which accepted the principle of levies and the CAP provided that the system was the same for everyone and that certain changes in the application of the CAP were made. The NFU President in 1969, G.T. Williams, attacked the levy system, but with increasing dissatisfaction with the farm price reviews under the Labour Government and declining farm incomes the moderate pro-European position reasserted itself in 1970. During the 1960's the NFU changed its position from opposition to the CAP to critical support combined with protection for the most vulnerable elements of the agricultural interests. (163)

The Economist remained a consistent champion of Europe. After the first breakdown it urged a number of bridge-building exercises to pave the way to future membership, such as the reduction of tariffs and the creation of multinational defence institutions. (164) It was strongly critical of the Conservatives for their failure to continue to promote Europe, especially during the 1964 election campaign which it attributed to cowardice. (165) It warmly welcomed the strong position taken by Heath and Putting Britain Right Ahead, which "loudly says the right things on the Common Market", but was very suspicious of his overtures to the French and the anti-American tone of some of his remarks. (166) It was also severely critical of the way that the Conservative leadership tried to avoid Europe, or at least downplay its importance in the run up to the 1970 election. (167) The Economist, thus was a critic from a more 'European' position.

The Spectator throughout this period was another staunch supporter on Europe. It believed that there was no alternative to membership and it was the job of leaders to make the electorate

understand why this was so. In 1966, it said that "Europe is the supreme issue in this election". It was a supporter of a multilateral nuclear force "put...in trust for Europe". (168)

The Conservative press continued to support entry, and expressed considerable scepticism towards the sincerity of the Labour application in 1967. The Daily Telegraph, for example, stated that "no sensible person" was against joining Europe. (169) The press provided a forum for the neo-Gaullist ideas of some Conservatives, such as Nigel Lawson in the Financial Times and John Grigg in the Guardian. (170) The influential commentator, Peregrine Worsethorne, wrote in the Sunday Telegraph, "The principal new reason why it is necessary today to reopen the question of Britain moving closer to the Six is that the U.S., seen from London, is beginning to look much less satisfactory as an ally than any time since the alliance began...the only chance Britain and Western Europe have of protecting their own interests is to act in concert". (171) When the commitment was under a cloud, the Telegraph published a series of articles in November 1969 reiterating the importance of membership over a wide range of policies, which was then published as a pamphlet". (172)

The Express maintained its opposition. "Anyone who thought that the Express's attitude would change after the death of Lord Beaverbrooke was mistaken". (173) The Express reaffirmed its opposition in the 1964 and 1966 elections. "The Daily Express must register anew its determined opposition to the Market, whether it comes stealthily through Mr. Wilson or bluntly through Mr. Heath". (174) Sir Max Aitken, Beaverbrooke's son, confirmed to the ACML that "the Express remained definitely anti-market" and he promised them his full support. (175) However, Europe did become a less central issue in the newspaper and received less coverage. The ACML complained that

it could no longer get letters printed and that "whilst Sir Max Aitken appeared to promise a lot when they last met him, nothing had come out of it". (176) The paper's problems over attacking a central plank of Conservative policy were eased by Labour's application and a lower profile on the issue by the Conservatives. In 1970 it described the Common Market as "the most momentous issue of all", but without any commitment to a referendum there was no difference between the parties and therefore they were able to endorse the Conservatives. (177)

The electorate remained unstable throughout this period, reflecting the changing position of the parties and the degree of confidence about membership. In 1964 Europe was not an issue as neither party considered membership a possibility in the short term. In 1966 Europe appeared not to have been an issue which directly affected the decision of many voters, and there is no evidence to suggest that the Conservative position actually lost votes. CCO commissioned a survey poll by ORC in spring 1967 which showed a substantial decline in support, together with a sharp rise in antis and don't knows, although the pro-Europeans remained in a majority of 51% to 33%. Conservative supporters, however, now had considerable doubts. 78% believed that food prices would rise as a result of membership, including a majority of supporters. Conservative support was soft and based on support for the Party. The issue was one of low salience for all but a few. However, opposition was based on particular concerns, such as the cost of living, not general hostility to the idea of Europe. (178)

However, with the Labour application in 1967 opinion swung very rapidly in favour of membership. Jowell and Hoinville attribute this to the agreement of all three main parties, the continuing balance of payments crises, the declining support for the Commonwealth and the

endorsement of Wilson. (179) By February 1970 opinion had swung yet again with only 22% in favour, because of the feeling that they had been rejected twice, that Britain would not lead within the European Community, prices, and the feeling that Britain needed protection from outside competition.

Not surprisingly, the Conservatives did not emphasise the issue in the campaign. The Nuffield Election Study suggested that it was the second most important doorstep issue, but that there was in practice no difference in the swing for pro or anti Conservative candidates. (180) It was an issue of some concern to the voters but not of sufficient salience to them nor was the difference between the parties so clear as to affect voting behaviour.

Conclusion

This period was marked by great shifting moods within the Conservative party in response to events outside their control. The first veto was a shock to its electoral strategy and long term foreign policy. The low profile on Europe presented by Home concerned many 'Europeans'. In 1965 there was a revival of Conservative interest, due to a number of factors. There was increasing recognition of the high cost of supporting agriculture and a search for a cheaper alternative, and import levies, as in the CAP, appeared to provide that alternative. The Commonwealth was a declining symbol for Conservatives as member countries became more assertive and independent, even aggressive in some eyes, and the sense of family ties was looser as black nations became a more prominent part of the Commonwealth. The decline in Commonwealth trade also served to weaken the existence of pro-Commonwealth interests. Another factor was the view that Britain's future lay with advanced technology, and

that technology required both the considerable investment and large markets that Europe could provide. The independent position of the French towards the Community, endorsed in the Luxembourg Compromise, strengthened the Tory Gaullists who desired a united Europe but a Europe of Nations and not a federalist unity. Their arguments that entry would not damage Britain's independence was more plausible with France as an example. Anti-American feeling and a desire to avoid dependence on the U.S.A. also found expression in Tory Gaullism.

The election of Heath as party leader was a significant event in confirming that the Conservatives would remain the party of Europe. Heath ensured that in Putting Britain Right Ahead, the 1966 manifesto, and in his speeches that Europe was a consistent theme of Conservative policy. In this he was supported by most of the Cabinet, the parliamentary party, the constituency associations, Central Office, the party ginger groups and the Tory press. There was little opposition, outside of the traditional anti-marketeers, to support for the principle of membership.

However, there was concern over the ability to translate that policy into an electoral asset. Between 1963 and 1967 membership appeared as a remote possibility and therefore without any immediate benefit electorally. The Labour Government's application in 1967 threatened to remove an issue that was meant to divide the parties. The second veto intensified these concerns, and encouraged the search for an alternative. That search proved to be fruitless, but weak support for membership in the opinion polls sustained opposition to the European policy as a central element in party strategy. Recognition of this led to the more cautious stance of Home at the 1969 conference and of the manifesto in the 1970 election, with its commitment to negotiate, "no more, no less".

The case for membership became stronger during this period, in the eyes of many Conservatives, just as the possibility of achieving membership became more remote. A series of arguments, political, defence, agricultural, international, technological, were strengthened by the events of the 1960's, and thus confirmed the view that Britain's membership of the European Community was in the country's long term interest. However, two important conditions that would enable membership, the attitude of the French Government and public opinion, either remained or became even greater obstacles to the fulfilment of that policy. Belief in the wisdom of British membership remained widespread within the party, but due to those obstacles, many in the Party sought alternatives which might eventually lead to membership without alienating potential voters. It was the perception of membership as a long term objective which led to the diminished enthusiasm and interest in the late 1960s.

Heath followed as much as led over European policy. When the intra-party climate was good, as in 1966, Heath was able to take a vigorous pro-European position. When optimism over the likelihood of early membership was low, he adopted a more cautious approach, as in the run up to the 1970 election. Rather than the leader of a pro-European faction within the Party, he was frequently criticised by Tory 'Europeans' for failing to give a stronger lead. As noted in this chapter, Kirk was critical of Heath's lack of leadership. Heath opposed the creation of an unofficial group of 'Europeans' under Eldon Griffiths; David Howell, M.P., felt that the pro-Europeans were crumbling; and Gordon Pears of the CRD felt that the leadership could not be relied upon to stimulate pro-European feeling. Thus during the 1960's, under Heath's leadership, the Party was not dragged into a policy it did not support, but remained committed to membership as a

long-term objective.

CHAPTER 5REFERENCES

1. Miriam Camps, European Unification in the Sixties, (London, Oxford University Press, 1967), p.155.
2. Macmillan, At the End of the Day, (London, Macmillan, 1973), p.367.
3. Anthony Sampson, Macmillan, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1968), p.222.
4. Observer, 13th October 1963.
5. See Randolph Churchill, The Fight for the Tory Leadership, (London, Heinemann, 1964).
6. F.W. Craig, British General Election Manifestos 1900-1974, (Chichester, Political Reference Publications, 1975).
7. N. Beloff in Pierre Uri, From Commonwealth to Common Market, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1968) p.87. David Butler and Uwe Kitzinger, The British General Election of 1964, (London, Macmillan, 1965) p.132.
8. Economist, 4th April 1964.
9. Telegraph, 15th February 1965.
10. Camps (1967), op cit, pp.163-164
11. Beloff in Uri, op cit, p.55
12. Camps (1967), op cit, p.164
13. Spectator, Vol. 251, p.140
14. Putting Britain Right Ahead, (CCO, September 1965). This commitment received much comment, e.g. Times, 7th October 1965; Spectator, Vol. 251, p.435
15. Craig, op cit.
16. David Butler & Anthony King, The British General Election of 1966, (London, Macmillan, 1966), pp.111-112. CRD, Campaign Guide 1970, (London, CCO, 1970), p.617.
17. Heath, "Realism in Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs (September 1969), reprinted in full in Hutchinson, Edward Heath, (London, Longman, 1970), p.204.
18. Economist, 26th March 1966, 19th March 1966. Beloff in Uri, op cit, p.56. Heath denied the charge of anti-Americanism in Heath, Old World, New Horizons, (London, Oxford University Press, 1970), p.74.
19. H.C. Debates, Vol. 736, 17th November 1966, c.766. CRD (1970), op cit, p.618.

20. Economist, 27th November 1965.
21. ibid, 19th March 1966.
22. CRD (1970), op cit, p.621.
23. ibid, p.622.
24. Heath (1970), op cit, p.4.
25. Heath interview with Ronald Butt, Sunday Times, 15th October 1967.
26. Ramsden, The Making of Conservative Party Policy, (London, Longman, 1980), p.233.
27. R.A. Butler (ed), The Conservatives, (London, Allen & Unwin, 1977), p.471. Heath, The Conservative Goal, (CPC, March 1966).
28. Heath, The Great Divide, (CCO, October 1966).
29. Heath to CRD, 20th December 1966.
30. Douglas to Heath, 11th August 1967. Heath, 12th December 1967.
31. Hurd to Sewill, 29th January 1968, 14th November 1967.
32. Craig, op cit.
33. David Butler and Michael Pinto-Duchinsky, The British General Election of 1970, (London, Macmillan, 1971), p.159.
34. Ramsden in Butler (1977), op cit, p.471.
35. Economist, 26th March 1966.
36. Camps (1967), op cit, p.163.
37. Beloff in Uri, op cit, p.55.
38. Camps (1967), op cit, p.164.
39. Spectator, Vol. 219, p.261, suggested that Home was highly sceptical.
40. Charlton, "How Britain Lost the Leadership of Europe", Encounter, (October 1981), p.29.
41. Soames, The Common Market and British Agriculture, (Bedford, 26th March 1966, CRD).
42. CRD, Agricultural Fears, (24th November 1966, CRD).
43. Auberon Waugh, "Europe No Help to Party", Spectator, Vol. 219, (1967), p.707. George Catlin, The Atlantic Commonwealth, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1969), p.82.
44. Sunday Times, 2nd July 1961.

45. Gordon Pears, Brief for the Shadow Cabinet on Alternatives, (11th December 1967, CRD).
46. Humphrey Berkeley, The Odyssey of Enoch, (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1975), p.58. Russell Lewis, Principle in Politics, (London, Cassell, 1979), pp.80, 101, 103.
47. T.E. Utley, Enoch Powell, (London, Kimber, 1968), p.103.
48. ibid, p.108.
49. Berkeley, op cit, pp.58, 25. Douglas Schoen, Enoch Powell and the Powellites, (London, Macmillan, 1977), p.14.
50. Times, 15th January 1966. See also Times, 20th July 1966, 15th October 1966.
51. A. Roth, Can Parliament Decide, (London, Macdonald, 1971), p.374. ACML Minutes, 15th November 1968.
52. Powell, The Common Market: the Case Against, (Kingswood, Elliot Right Way Books, 1971), pp.9-16.
53. Schoen, op cit, p.52.
54. Economist, 2nd February 1963.
55. Parliamentary Advisory Committee Minutes, 28th January 1963, 18th February 1963, 11th March 1963.
56. Peter Kirk in WEU: Ten Years of Seven Power Europe, (Paris, WEU, 1964).
57. Spectator, Vol. 213 (1974), p.6.
58. Camps (1967), op cit, p.163.
59. Nicholas Ridley, One Europe, (CPC, April 1965). Shadow Cabinet members were Heath, Maudling, Macleod, Joseph, Powell.
60. European Movement Annual Reports 1966-1969.
61. Economist, 2nd February 1963.
62. ibid, 27th November 1965.
63. Butt, Financial Times, 4th November 1966.
64. Economist, 13th May 1967. Phillip Norton, Dissension in the House of Commons 1945-1975, (London, Macmillan, 1975), p.269.
65. Biffen, "Tory Nationalism", Solon, (October 1969).
66. Butler & King (1966), op cit, p.103.
67. Pears to Richard Wood, 9th November 1967.
68. Foreign Affairs Committee Minutes, 11th March 1965 - 6th August 1965.

69. Ramsden, op cit, pp.246-247
70. Pears to Wood, 9th November 1967. Committee on Europe (Policy Research). Minutes, 25th May 1966. Papers were considered on EFTA, Agriculture, Nigeria, Australia, Taxation, New Zealand, Industry, Social Services, Institutions, Sterling, Area, Commonwealth, NAFTA, EFTA.
71. Pears, Other Ways Into Europe, CRD, 2nd May 1967.
72. Pears to Sewill, 23rd November 1967.
73. Spectator, Vol. 219, p.707.
74. Hurd, Marten's Paper on NAFTA, CRD, n.d.
75. Pears, 2nd January 1968.
76. Times, 6th June 1970. R. Punnett, Front Bench Opposition, (London, Heinemann, 1973), p.207.
77. David Walder, "House of Commons Debate", Spectator, Vol. 224, p.296. Angus Maude was suspected as the author.
78. "Crabro", "Election and Europe", Spectator, Vol. 224, p.810. Angus Maude was suspected as the author.
79. Roth (1971), op cit, p.9, and confirmed privately.
80. Pears to Howell, 16th January 1968.
81. Howell to Pears, 15th January 1968.
82. Conference Handbook 1963.
83. Verbatim Conference Report, 1963.
84. Conference Handbook, 1965.
85. Verbatim Conference Report, 1965. CRD, Party Conference 1965, (NCP, CRD, October 1965).
86. Economist, 16th October 1965, 23rd October 1965.
87. Conference Handbook, 1966. Economist, 1st October 1965.
88. Verbatim Conference Report, 1966. CRD, Party Conference 1966, (NCP, CRD, October 1966). Economist, 1st October 1966.
89. Conference Handbook, 1967.
90. Pears to Home, n.d.
91. Conference Handbook, 1966.
92. Spectator, Vol. 221, p.537.
93. Conference Handbook, 1969.

94. Economist,
95. Verbatim Conference Report, 1969.
96. On the debate, see Guardian Conference Report, (London, Guardian, 1969); CRD, Party Conference, (NCP, CRD, October 1969) CRD (1970), op cit, p.623.
97. Spectator, Vol. 223, p.507.
98. Economist, 18th October 1969.
99. Summary of CPC Report, 1965.
100. NUEC, 13th January 1965, 15th February 1965, 29th September 1965, 26th June 1965.
101. Summary of CPC Reports, 1967.
102. NUEC, 29th June 1969, 12th February 1970.
103. CPC Report, February 1970.
104. NUEC, 16th February 1963.
105. Beloff in Uri, op cit, p.55. Heath, The Conservative Goal, (CCO, 1966).
106. NUEC, 24th September 1966.
107. Paul-Henri Spaak, Face to Face with Europe, (CPC, May 1967).
108. Pears, GLYC Conference, 16th March 1967.
109. NUEC, passim.
110. ibid, passim.
111. Katherine Macmillan, Open Letter to Conservative Women, (CCO, November 1969).
112. Butler & King, op cit, p.79.
113. Britain and Europe, (NCP, CRD, 4/3/63). Brussels Breakdown, (CRD, 2nd February 1963). Future After Brussels, (CRD, 16th February 1963).
114. Branston, The Party's Role After Brussels, (CRD, n.d.).
115. Britain's Role in World Affairs, (CRD, 4th March 1963).
116. Economist, 9th January 1965.
117. Ramsden, op cit, p.247.
118. ibid, p.254.
119. Two Years of Labour, (NCP, CRD, 14th November 1966).
120. Pears to Sewill, 3rd February 1966, 26th April 1966.

121. Sewill to Pears, n.d.
122. Conservative Work in Opposition, (NCP, CRD, 24th July 1967).
123. Hurd to Heath, 5th July 1967, 1st August 1967. Heath to Hurd, 12th July 1967. Hurd to Heath, 21st April 1967.
124. Douglas to Heath, 11th August 1967.
125. Hurd to Heath, n.d.
126. Pears to Heath, n.d.
127. Pears, 5th December 1967.
128. Sewill to Hadley, 28th August 1967.
129. Sewill to Heath, 29th January 1968. Hurd to Sewill, 29th January 1968. Hurd, 14th November 1967.
130. Pears to Howell, 16th January 1968.
131. Ramsden, op cit, p.276.
132. Ridley, One Europe, (CPC, April 1965) discussed in Crossbow, July 1965.
133. Cambridge University Monday Club, A Europe of Nations, October 1963. A. Meyer, European Technological Community, December 1966. Sherbourne, VAT: A Tax for Our Time, September 1966. P.H. Spaak, Face to Face with Europe, May 1967. M. Maciotti, Europe and Technology, February 1968. Society of Conservative Lawyers, Europe and the Law, E. Griffiths & N. Niblock, Towards Nuclear Entente, March 1970.
134. Britain's Place in Europe, May 1967. What Joining Would Mean, June 1967. Britain, Europe and the World, August 1967.
135. Food and the Farmer, October 1966. Agriculture and Food, February 1970. Godber, The Farming Future, January 1970.
136. Hugh Beesley, "Britain and Europe Since the Breakdown", Swinton Journal, March 1964. Dorothy Wilson, "Welfare in Britain and Europe", Swinton Journal, Summer 1968. Kenneth Ross, "The Common Market", Swinton Journal, Winter 1968. Clive Rassam, review of EEC Books, Autumn 1969. Russell Lewis, "Political Aspects of the Common Market", Swinton Journal, Winter 1970.
137. Overseas Bureau, January 1965.
138. ibid, 16th November 1965, 22nd February 1966.
139. ibid, 16th November 1965, 22nd February 1966.
140. ibid, passim.
141. Sir Maurice Wright to the Alternatives Sub-Committee, (Conservative

- Commonwealth and Overseas Council, December 1967). David Bagnell, Alternatives: Association Under Article 238, 19th March 1968. J. Harvey, Possible Alternatives, April 1968.
142. Pears to Sewill, 24th April 1966. Pears to Wood, 9th November 1967.
 143. ACML Minutes, 29th May 1963.
 144. No Tame or Minor Role, (Bow Group, September 1963). Economist, 21st September 1963. Spectator, Vol. 211, p.335.
 145. Timothy Raison, Why Conservative?, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1964), Chapter 8.
 146. Christopher Johnson, "Alternatives to Europe", Crossbow, October, 1963.
 147. L. Brittan et al, A Smaller Stage: Britain's Role in the World, (Bow Group, December 1965).
 148. Crossbow, January 1965, April 1965, July 1965, January 1968, April 1968, October 1969.
 149. L. Reed, Europe in a Shrinking World, (London, Oldbourne, 1967); Ocean-Space: Europe's New Frontier, (Bow Group, May 1969).
 150. L. Brittan et al, Our Future in Europe: the long term case for going in, (Bow Group, 14th February 1970).
 151. Cambridge University Monday Club, A Europe of Nations, (CPC, October 1965). See Economist, 16th October 1965. S. Hastings, Conservatism Tomorrow, (Monday Club, October 1966). J. Amery, Telegraph, 23rd January 1967. Biggs-Davison, Europe: Faith not Despair, (Monday Club, n.d. 1967). Monday Club Newsletter June 1965. July 1965, July 1969, October 1969. Biggs-Davison, Telegraph, 22nd January 1970. E. Rhys-Williams, "Julian Amery", Monday World, Spring, 1970.
 152. Monday Club Newsletter, March 1967, November 1967, April 1968, June 1968, December 1968, March 1970. Tom Stacey, A Defeatist America, (Monday Club, April 1970). Biggs-Davison (1967), op cit. Meyer and Montagu, Europe: Should Britain Join?, (Monday Club, n.d., 1969?).
 153. ACML Minutes, 22nd February 1963, 29th May 1963.
 154. *ibid*, 29th May 1963, 3rd March 1965.
 155. Press Information, 31st March 1964.
 156. ACML Minutes, 20th June 1967, 13th November 1967, 4th September 1972, and *passim*.
 157. Maxwell Stamp Associates, The Free Trade Option: Opportunity for Britain, (Maxwell Stamp Associates, 1967) p.46.
 158. Hurd, Marten's Paper on NAFTA, (CRD, n.d.). Catlin, op cit. Edward Holloway, "NAFTA" in M. Ivens and C. Bradley, Which Way?, (London, Michael Joseph, 1970). Bruce-Gardyne, Spectator, Vol. 220 (1968), p.589.

159. Taylor, Beaverbrooke, (London, Hamilton, 1972), p.664. Monday Club Newsletter, *passim*. Montagu, Telegraph, 16th January 1969.
160. Pears, 24th June 1966. European Seminar, Sussex University, 13th-15th September 1968. Robert Skidelsky, Spectator, Vol. 224, (1970), p.296. European Forum Minutes, 20th May 1969, and *passim*.
161. Lieber, *op cit*, p.268. Hurd, 5th July 1967. Uwe Kitzinger, Diplomacy and Persuasion, (London, Thames and Hudson, 1973), pp.259-260.
162. Britain and Overseas, *passim*. Twelve Reasons Why Britain Should Not Join The Common Market, (CIA, 1967).
163. CRD, NFU, March 1966. Times, 21st November 1966. Financial Times, 22nd November 1966, Guardian, 26th January 1967. Spectator, Vol. 218, (1967), p.194. Economist, 25th January 1969. Bruce-Gardyne & Lawson, *op cit*, p.57.
164. Economist, 2nd February 1963, 9th February 1963.
165. *ibid*, 12th October 1963, 25th January 1964, 4th April 1964.
166. *ibid*, 9th October 1965, 5th March 1966, 19th March 1966.
167. *ibid*, 14th September 1969.
168. Spectator, Vol. 10, pp.88, 183, 249. Vol. 216, p.347. Vol. 218, p.545.
169. ACML Minutes, 6th December 1963.
170. Camps (1967), *op cit*, p.177.
171. Sunday Telegraph, 21st February 1965.
172. Britain and the Common Market, (Daily Telegraph, November 1969).
173. Butler & King (1966), *op cit*, p.161.
174. Daily Express, 19th March 1966.
175. ACML Minutes, 7th December 1966.
176. ACML Minutes, 22nd January 1968, 5th November 1968.
177. Butler and Pinto-Duchinsky, *op cit*, p.246. Lieber, *op cit*, p.221. Daily Express, 17th June 1970.
178. ORC Report to CCO, 29th March 1967 - 2nd April 1967.
179. Jowell and Joinville, *op cit*, p.27.
180. Butler & Pinto-Duchinsky, *op cit*, pp.326, 405.

Introduction

The Conservatives won a surprising victory in the 1970 election and the new Government immediately pursued the application to the Community as a major priority. The negotiations were conducted first by Heath's close friend Anthony Barber, who became Chancellor upon the death of Macleod, and then by Geoffrey Rippon. The negotiations were marked, as previously, by the conflict between seeking to negotiate with the Community the best possible terms from a position of strength, and the need to convince public opinion of the necessity of British entry. 'European' critics felt that the former was the Government's strategy to the neglect of the latter, which was a major contribution to the swing against entry among public opinion that occurred during the negotiations.

The negotiations were successfully completed in May 1971, and the Cabinet unanimously recommended in the White Paper acceptance of the terms, but there was a considerable difference of opinion within the Cabinet as to when Parliament should vote on the principle of entry on the terms obtained, as soon as possible in July or in the Autumn. The negative state of public opinion led to considerable pressure from M.P.s to delay the vote until the Government had been able to conduct a strong campaign. During the summer a vigorous campaign by the Government, the Conservative Party and the European Movement to turn public opinion in favour of entry met with considerable success.

The vote on the principle of membership was taken in the Commons on 28th October 1971, which achieved a majority of 112, with 39 Conservatives voting against and 2 abstentions. The large majority was due to the support of Labour 'Europeans', who were, however, unable

to commit their votes for the passage of the detailed legislation.

The actual legislation, the European Communities Bill, was a long and detailed bill which occupied much discussion and 104 divisions, with the ever present danger of a defeat for the Government. The Second Reading was taken on 17th December 1971. The Third and final Reading, on 13th July 1972, received a majority of 17, with only 16 Conservative opponents and 4 abstentions. Many then felt that at last the debate on membership, which had occupied much political time and energy for over a decade, had come to a conclusion, and attention could be turned to other issues.

The Leader

Much of the praise for the Conservative victory of 1970 was given to Heath, as the one person who seemed to have been convinced that victory was likely, and for his pursuit of a consistent campaign strategy, despite the expression of apprehension by some Conservatives during the election. *"The Conservative success gives Mr. Heath a unique authority which is wholly new to him"*. Europe quickly emerged as the major priority of the new Prime Minister, although as the Economist noted, "Europe has not been in the forefront of Mr. Heath's campaign". ⁽¹⁾ Heath became personally very identified, and very pre-occupied, with the pursuit of membership, to an excessive degree in the minds of some within the Government. He followed the negotiations very closely, and the good relations he established with the French President Pompidou at the Paris summit in May 1971 were felt to be a significant factor in the success of the negotiations. Heath was closely identified with the pursuit of membership.

Heath was particularly criticised by anti-marketeers for pursuing a policy which, according to the opinion polls, lacked public support.

During the election campaign on 27th May on BBC television, Heath had stated that "No British Government could possibly take this country into the Common Market against the wishes of the British people". (2) After this was picked up by anti-marketeers, Heath responded on 2nd June that "I always said that you couldn't possibly take this country into the Common Market if the majority of people were against it. But this is handled through the Parliamentary system". (3) Anti-marketeers however insisted that this was a commitment to obtain public endorsement before membership. Heath was thus portrayed as 'Dictator Heath' dragging the British people into the European Community against their will, and using all his legitimate and some illegitimate powers to obtain entry. One critic described Heath as a Latter Day Charlemagne, imposing European unity by force. (4) Another critic commented on Heath's "degree of insensitivity to the British parliamentary tradition, never mind the popular will". (5) The Spectator, under the editorship of George Gale, took a highly populist and anti-Heath position.

There was a widespread feeling, not only among anti-marketeers, that Britain was being 'bounced' into Europe without adequate discussion and thought. Heath wanted to have an early parliamentary vote in July, but was persuaded in the Cabinet to postpone the vote until October. During the summer the Government and Party conducted a massive campaign to change public opinion to ensure a large majority in the Commons, and a remarkable shift of opinion in favour of membership did occur.

Heath saw Europe as a central element in the policy of the Government, and therefore viewed the issue as a vote of confidence in the Government as a whole. He wanted membership to be achieved with Conservative votes and not to have to depend on Labour support. However, there were many who felt that the issue was of such importance that M.P.s should be allowed to express their views in a free vote.

During the election Macleod embarrassed Heath by appearing to endorse a free vote, and Neil Marten claimed that Heath "had accepted the principle of a free vote". (6) Heath frequently reaffirmed his belief in a three line whip. On 12th July 1971 at a press conference he declared, "it does seem to be a strange approach...that you ask your party for support on a whole variety of issues, but when you come to a major issue such as this you say, 'Well, of course, we will withdraw all the normal means of organised government and sit back and do nothing'. We as a government are absolutely entitled to ask our supporters to support us in the lobby". (7) Only at the last minute and with great reluctance, when it was clear that Conservative votes would be insufficient, and that a free vote would make it much easier to obtain Labour votes, did Heath agree to a free vote.

The discussion on Heath and Europe was part of a more widespread feeling that Heath was insensitive to alternative opinions to his own, surrounded himself with those who shared his views, excluded from the government any potential dissenters, and ignored parliamentary and party opinion. Ramsden commented that Heath "had an understandable wish to be remembered as a statesman-like Prime Minister rather than merely as a political partisan, no doubt in part an over-reaction to his predecessor, and this made him more open to advice from the civil service than from his Party". (8) Hurd also cautiously told Heath, "there is a general impression at all levels within the Party that this administration is in fact less politically conscious than its Conservative predecessor". (9) Norton attributed to Heath a major responsibility for the rise in dissident votes during the Heath administration. (10) In other words, Heath was accused of prime ministerial government, which strengthened the determination of the anti-marketeers and caused considerable irritation amongst pro-marketeers.

The role of Heath was seen as crucial in obtaining British membership. Kitzinger claimed that, "The Conservative Party took its most decisive step towards British entry into the EEC 8 years before 1973" when it elected him as Leader. (11) Douglas Evans felt that "The character and personality of Edward Heath were crucial ingredients in the attitude of the Conservative Party towards the EEC". (12) Richard Rose put it most bluntly that Heath "knew what he wanted; British entry into the Common Market. Britain joined". (13) Thus Heath was seen as in a similar role to Macmillan during the first application as the sine qua non of British membership.

Cabinet

Heath's Cabinet was made up almost exclusively of either committed 'Europeans' or deeply loyal friends. Home as Foreign Secretary, Macleod as Chancellor, and Rippon at Defence were old-established 'Europeans', and John Davies, at Trade and Industry, had demonstrated his commitment as Director-General of the CBI. Anthony Barber as chief European negotiator, Jim Prior at Agriculture, Peter Carrington at Defence, Francis Pym as Chief Whip, Willie Whitelaw as Leader of the House of Commons, were personally loyal. Peter Walker was now a supporter of membership and a Heath loyalist. Two potential opponents, Maudling at the Home Office and Hogg as Lord Chancellor, were placed into offices which were not much concerned with Europe and contributed little to these discussions. (14) Decision on Europe were taken by an Inner Group of loyalists consisting of Heath, Home, Rippon, Barber, Carrington, Pym and Whitelaw. (15)

It was a frequent accusation that Heath had deliberately excluded all anti-marketeers from the Government. (16) This was said to include junior ministers. The support for Europe among junior ministers

"is not surprising for it recognises that any anti-market ministers are likely to find life extremely uncomfortable" (Economist)⁽¹⁷⁾ The Government wished to avoid any embarrassing resignations over Community membership. Neil Marten was offered a post provided he made a commitment not to resign if the Government did agree to join. Marten refused to give that promise and so the offer was withdrawn.⁽¹⁸⁾ One exception was Teddy Taylor at the Scottish Office, but this was attributed to the small number and poor quality of Conservative M.P.s from Scotland.⁽¹⁹⁾ His later resignation was predictable. There were two significant exclusions from the Government, which were sometimes attributed to Europe. The first was Enoch Powell, who had emerged as a major political figure with substantial popular support, and it was argued that the Conservative victory was attributable to Powell's influence.⁽²⁰⁾ Europe, however, was certainly only a minor aspect of his exclusion from office. His remarks on race were a sufficient factor. A less dramatic exclusion was Edward du Cann, a noted sceptic on Europe. The cause here was probably due to the bad personal relations between them that developed during du Cann's period as Party Chairman in 1965-1967 rather than to any political differences over Europe.

Macleod died in July 1970 soon after the formation of the Government. This was a great loss to the Government, especially over Europe, as the Government needed a rousing speaker to inspire support for the policy, in contrast to the well-informed but rather mechanistic image of most of the Government, including Heath. The Economist commented that, after negotiations, "then his real moment of destiny, the time when all his political skill would have been called into play, would have arrived. Mr. Heath has acquired authority; Sir Alec has always had respect; Mr. Maudling has always been intelligent. But when

the day comes for this Government to stand up and declare itself, the European case will be put the worse to the party and to the country because Macleod will not be putting it". (21) His biographer felt that "we should certainly have joined the European Community with greater public enthusiasm and excitement if Macleod had lived to put the case for doing it". (22)

Barber replaced Macleod and Rippon was his successor as European negotiator. Rippon had been active in European affairs for a long time, as the Mayor of Surbiton in the Council of European Municipalities and as a backbencher, and had an additional advantage of having been a member of the Monday Club and with some influence on the right of the party. Rippon was a highly successful negotiator with the European Community, even if he acted as if all problems could be solved over coffee and cognac. However, he appeared insensitive to the fears and doubts of the anti-marketeers and sceptics, and was criticised for his high-handed treatment of the Commons when he reported back on the negotiations. The Times reported that his reports to the Commons "have been unhappy occasions...his manner brusque, bordering on the contemptuous...he gives the impression of feeling that all this talk in the House is a waste of time, that most M.Ps are fools anyway and the only thing to do is get the unpleasant and distasteful task over as quickly as possible". (23) However, he later adapted to these criticisms. "He has toned down his earlier over-exuberance to show a courteous and sympathetic face to those in doubt and anxiety", (24) and his 'new empire' approach, with Britain as the leader of Europe in the world, was attractive to many Conservatives, especially on the right.

The negotiated terms were generally perceived as good, and in response to Labour criticisms, several prominent Labour ex-ministers

claimed that they would have been acceptable to the previous Labour Government. The Spectator, now anti-market, claimed that several senior ministers were sceptical (although no names were suggested) and the Cabinet uncommitted. (25) The Cabinet, however, agreed unanimously to endorse the terms. The only resignations were those of Teddy Taylor, as expected, and Jasper More, a junior Whip. The terms, however, do not appear to have been a major factor in Cabinet acceptance, although Carrington did claim that "until recently" his agreement depended on the terms. (26) Most of the negotiations were over the terms of the transition period while the Treaty of Rome was accepted without change. The manifesto commitment has been "to negotiate; no more, no less", but the prestige of the Government, and particularly that of Heath, had become so closely associated with Europe that the rejection of the terms would have been extremely difficult.

The critical feelings expressed concerned the over-emphasis on Europe in the Government's strategy to the neglect of other issues rather than over the policy. All Cabinet members belong to the Conservative Group for Europe (C.G.E.) (except the Lord Chancellor for constitutional reasons) and supported the acceptance of membership. There was, however, a large difference of opinion over the tactics. Heath and Rippon wanted a parliamentary decision as soon as possible after the completion of the negotiations, in June 1971. They argued that a quick vote would benefit from the successful conclusion of negotiations and avoid anti-marketeers criticising specific details of the agreement. Pym and Whitelaw, however, argued for a three months delay to enable M.P.s to consult with their constituents. The M.P.s were said to be in "a nervous state" over recent losses in by-elections and local elections, and were fearful of the criticism from voters of being bounced into Europe without full public discussion. After

considerable debate within the Cabinet, Heath reluctantly accepted the delay. (27)

A second dispute was over whether the vote should be considered a vote of confidence or left to a free vote. Heath made clear his own position in response to a question at the Conservative Central Council on 14th July 1971, that the Government had a right to expect the support of Conservative M.P.s on an issue central to the Government's policies and reaffirmed his position as late as 11th October in a Panorama interview. (28) However, opinion in the Cabinet favoured a free vote. On 18th October 1971 Pym recommended a free vote. The arguments presented were that only an additional ten Conservative anti-marketeers would vote against, that public opinion favoured a free vote, and that the vote would be won due to the support of an additional 30 Labour votes. (29) Cabinet members were concerned that Europe should not leave any permanent divisions within the Party, and so at a meeting of the Inner Cabinet Heath reluctantly accepted the Cabinet position.

The Cabinet was thus united on the policy of European membership, and only if the terms had been completely disastrous would the Cabinet have rejected membership. However, there were Cabinet members critical of the priority placed on Europe to the neglect of other aspects of Government policy, and there was strong opposition to a July vote and a three-line Whip in October. Thus the Cabinet was not simply the rubber-stamp that it was often portrayed.

Parliamentary Party

Soon after the formation of the Government, there began speculation as to the degree of Parliamentary support and opposition, and this speculation continued until the third Reading in July 1972.

The enthusiastic 'Europeans', about 50 backbenchers, were concerned that during the negotiations the European case would go by default, with the ground left to the anti-marketeers, as many felt had occurred in the 1962 debate. These M.P.s were organised in the Conservative Group for Europe (formerly the European Forum) under the chairmanship of Sir Tufton Beamish, and they conducted a campaign to maximise support, in close co-operation with the party whips and Central Office. Norman St. John Stevas, Secretary, wrote a memorandum, distributed to Party Chairman Peter Thomas, Rippon, Pym and Whitelaw. (30)

He argued that the Party's position during the election, of a commitment only to negotiate, was tactically understandable but politically dangerous and the positive case went by default. The European Community was unpopular because of the decline of the European idea and the domination of the debate by the antis. He recommended

- 1). an accurate assessment of Conservative Parliamentary opinion, in which he could use his experience during the Abortion Act of 1967;
- 2). an attempt to win waverers;
- 3). tabling pro-European motions in the House of Commons;
- 4). the use of Parliamentary Questions as a top priority; and
- 5). the presence of 'Europeans' at Party meetings, especially the 1922, Foreign Affairs and Agriculture Committees.

The programme of activities was carried out by the CGE. St. John Stevas surveyed the Parliamentary Party on the issue and provided useful information to the Whips. Four half day seminars were organised in May 1971, aimed at doubters, which attracted an average attendance of 30 M.P.s with experts and ministers Home, Prior, Davies and Soames. An Anglo-French Parliamentary Conference was organised in Paris on 30th April-1st May 1971, with 20 doubters, and a visit to Brussels. Intense

informal lobbying also took place. By the First Reading over half the Conservative M.P.s were members of the CGE. The work of the CGE was highly significant because it provided reliable intelligence to the Whips, and informal pressures on doubters from colleagues rather than from the top.

The anti-marketeers were the traditional ones, such as Walker-Smith and Turton, but with the addition of three Powellites (Powell, Biffen, Body) and the loss of Walker and Biggs-Davison. 30 anti-marketeers had retired at the 1970 election and only 20 newcomers joined them. (31) An addition was Nicholas Winterton who won the Macclesfield by-election in 1971. He had been selected largely for his anti-market views, had spoken against Europe at the 1970 Conference and these views were vocally expressed during the campaign, much to the embarrassment of the Government. After his election his opposition was modified. The Economist reported that he was prepared to "think again if the terms for entry turn out to be considerably better than they appear to be". He wrote to the Spectator that "I am in fact a strong anti-marketeer personally but no doubt you will appreciate that I cannot speak as yet on behalf of the Macclesfield constituency". (32) Eventually he voted in the Government lobby. The Powell group was not always appreciated by some of the other antis because it appeared to make them more of an anti-Heath rebellion, while they were concerned not to split the party permanently on the issue. They met informally in the 1970 Group, known as Derek's Diner, which was registered with the Whips and met about three times a year with a membership of a maximum of 56. Speakers included Heath and Maudling. In practice this group was very loose, and so there was an informal working group which tried to co-ordinate anti-market activity, which included Walker-Smith, Turton and Powell. This group encouraged critical Early Day Motions and

Parliamentary Questions. Early Day Motions received 40 signatures (23rd July 1970 including 18 new M.P.s) and 19 (22nd June 1971). (33)

Their strategy was to seek a very small 'European' majority on the principle so that faced with public opposition and the prospect of defeat on the detailed legislation, the Government would withdraw the bill. While their numbers fluctuated, mainly downwards, they were never large enough to be a dominant influence within the Parliamentary Party.

There were also a number of clearly identifiable doubters. Sir Harry Legge-Bourke, chairman of the 1922 Committee, was highly sceptical, and even discussed with his Association the possibility of organising a postal ballot of his constituents. He was also suspected of writing an anonymous article in the Spectator urging Heath's removal, which he denied. (34) William Clarke wrote to the Party Chairmen saying that his decision would depend upon the terms and noting the strong opposition of his constituency. (35) Ray Mawby was a doubter who held four public meetings in his Totnes constituency to help him decide. Du Cann was another doubter, together with some with specific concerns over New Zealand and sugar. The most interesting doubter was Philip Goodhart, who was a prominent and articulate spokesman for a referendum. His views were considered "mildly favourable" and his book of 1964 suggested support for Western Europe. (36) However, he was concerned over the lack of public endorsement of this major constitutional issue. He wanted a CPC pamphlet together with St. John Stevas arguing the pros and cons of a referendum but it was vetoed by Heath. (37) He urged a national referendum, and decided to hold a local referendum in his own constituency of Beckenham and to abide by the result if there was a 30-40% turnout. This was highly sensitive to the Government as it was accused of action without a mandate. Pym met

personally with Goodhart to persuade him to change his mind, but to no avail. The vote was: Yes 3,737 to No 3,587, a favourable majority of 170. It was the only local referendum in which the European Movement conducted a strong campaign because the vote of an M.P. was committed to the result. Goodhart voted with the Government. (38)

The assessment of Parliamentary opinion began early with a CRD survey of election addresses. Of the 329 studied, 154 had mentioned Europe, 123 had supported the manifesto position, 24 were anti-market and 6 more had asked for a referendum. (39) In December 1970 the CGE conducted their first survey with 195 for, 22 against, 45 doubtful and 60 uncanvassed. In January 1971 a more complete study found 218 for, 33 against, with 75 doubtfuls (half leaning for and half against). The Whips' assessment found more antis: 194 for, 62 against and 70 doubters. Further estimates were made in April, July and August. The July estimate of 42 antis proved to be the most accurate prediction. (40)

The pressure from M.P.s was in favour of delay in the vote to the Autumn. Legge-Bourke argued that M.P.s needed a reasonable chance to discuss with their constituents, and many backbenchers wrote to Heath and Whitelaw calling for time to consult with their constituents and convince them. (41) Typical were the two new M.P.s for Bolton, Laurence Reed and Richard Richmond, who sought a six weeks delay to talk to their constituents. Many of these M.P.s, like Reed, were convinced 'Europeans' but wanted to be able to present their arguments to their constituents and appear open to questions and fears. Strong backbench pressure helped to convince Heath of the wisdom of delay.

There was also backbench pressure for a free vote. The 1922 Committee recommended a free vote in July 1971, and the anti-marketeers also requested it. The Economist claimed that the anti-marketeers were against a free vote because they would gain only 5-6 votes and lose the

propaganda value of a forced decision. (42) This interpretation, however, ignored their belief that they would obtain much more support than that, and their concern not to split the Party any more than necessary. Walker-Smith said that the free vote was "welcome but tardy". (43) A decisive role was played by the CGE assessment that a free vote would at most increase the overall No votes by two.

The six day debate, 21st-22nd, 25th-28th October 1971, on the principle of membership was opened by Home. Most of the contributions were predictable. Conservative anti-market speakers were Turton, Nabarro, Russell, Bullus, Taylor, Maude, Harmar Nicholls, Walker-Smith and Powell. Two surprises were William Clarke who described entry as a gamble and, therefore, was reluctantly voting against, and du Cann who said that there was little economic advantage and abstained in the vote. The final vote was 356 to 244, with 69 Labour M.P.s voting with the Government and 20 abstentions, disobeying their Party's three line Whip. The Conservative votes were 284 for, 39 against and 2 abstentions, du Cann and Patrick Wolridge-Gordon. The Government majority of 112 was greater than anyone in the Government had expected. (44)

The Government's problems, however, were not yet over. The Whips were faced with getting majorities on all the detailed legislation in committee and on the floor of the House, and the Labour 'Europeans' said that the Government could not rely on them to save it on the future votes. 14 Conservative M.P.s stated that they would now accept the majority decision and support the Government on the legislation, e.g. Clarke, Jessel, More and Wolridge-Gordon. (45) The Times claimed that "the Conservative anti-market group collapsed" but this was an exaggeration. The Conservative anti-market vote was unpredictable, but ever-present, and the pressure on them by Whips,

colleagues and Associations continued. Heath even requested a meeting with them, of which 9 saw him, 4 changed their votes and 2 refused to see him. (46) On the Second Reading there were 309 Conservative votes for, 15 against and 5 abstentions. There was a small tactical group of Powell, Biffen and Marten, with Biffen as unofficial Whip, which tried for a series of wrecking amendments rather than defeat on the 2nd and 3rd Readings. They were known as the R (for Resistance) Group. A new strategy for them was their support for a referendum. On 14th March 1972 Neil Marten and 5 others put down an amendment calling for a consultative advisory referendum, and welcomed the decision of President Pompidou to hold a referendum on British entry in France. Marten wrote to the Times that "The Government should welcome a consultative referendum as a means of convincing our future partners in the Common Market that the people of this country are not being dragged in against their will and instinct, but that we are joining with the full-hearted consent and enthusiasm of the people". (47) Their support fluctuated widely from 1 to 15 on the guillotine motion. (48) On the 3rd Reading on 13th July 1972 there were 16 negative votes and 4 abstentions. Norton described this as the "most persistent Conservative intra-party dissent in post-war history". (49)

A most controversial issue was whether some of the pressures brought upon the antis and the doubters were illegitimate. The Government certainly used a wide range of instruments at their disposal to obtain a maximum vote: the Whips, fellow M.P.s, the use of promotion prospects, personal meetings with Heath and other ministers, committee assignments, foreign trips, etc. The antis claimed that the Government went beyond the normal practices by trying to mobilise local Associations against their M.P.s. Powell described these attempts as "utterly immoral". (50) "Over there an honourable member, who has

stood by his cause for years, is explaining to his friends that his heart is with them still and he wishes them success, but he has no means of support apart from his parliamentary salary, and his family must come first. With him goes, to vote for what he detests, a man who declared from a score of platforms to applauding audiences that he for one would be no party to it; but lately, it appears, he discovered that he had 'difficulties in his constituency', and the mighty voice is hushed. There goes another, a second and a third, who know the sorrowful secret written in their election addresses but who also know that there is a big redistribution of parliamentary boundaries and the main thing (is it not?) is to be sure of a seat in the next House". (51)

Norton has documented in detail the difficulties of Conservative anti-marketeers with their Associations. (52) 21 of the 33 M.P.s who voted against entry were known to have had problems with their associations. Most of the problems took the form of criticism of the M.P.'s actions and a statement of support for the Government's policy and not of threats to deselect them. The Association officers were usually satisfied by an undertaking not to bring down the Government, given by several M.P.s. The most serious problems concerned Neil Marten and Ronald Bell.

The relations between Marten and the Banbury Conservative Association were extremely serious. On the morning before the Central Council meeting on 14th July 1971, the Association officers met with the Party Chairman, Peter Thomas. This has been presented as a deliberate attempt by Central Office to influence the Association to bring pressure to bear. (53) The meeting, however, was called at the initiative of the Association Chairman, who wrote to Thomas on 1st July reporting that there was considerable hostility towards the M.P. and that the

Association had received many letters of complaint and cancellations of subscription. The Association letter requested a pro-European article from Thomas for the constituency journal to balance Marten, and the Chairman later requested speakers for all meetings to speak against Marten. (54) On 12th August 1971 the Association executive passed a motion, by 49 votes to 10, expressing confidence in the Government's policy and calling for a three-line Whip.

Marten believed that this had been instigated by CCO and wrote to complain. Thomas replied that "I can assure you, however, that Central Office would not give any encouragement to any attempt to embarrass or undermine a Conservative Member of Parliament". (55)

Relations between M.P. and Association remained strained throughout the voting on the Bill, and there was thought to have been an attempt to deny re-nomination. However, Marten was re-adopted without challenge in 1973.

Ronald Bell was faced with re-adoption due to the redistribution of his constituency. A general meeting of the Association voted by 654 votes to 525 against his automatic re-adoption as candidate. Another meeting voted on the nomination between Bell and Frederick Sylvester, eventually giving 781 votes to Bell to 514 for his opponent. Norton suggested that this had a restraining effect on Bell's opposition in the House.

Despite the belief of the anti-marketeers themselves, there was no concerted attempt centrally to encourage Associations to remove their M.P. The Organisation Department did discover that 22 of the anti M.P.s would face major redistribution of their constituencies and therefore re-selection, but there is no evidence that this was used in any deliberate way. (56) CCO certainly did concentrate speakers and literature distribution in their constituencies, and Association motions

in support of the Government were encouraged, but there was never any attempt to unseat M.P.s. This was because Pym and Michael Faaser were both determined not to leave the Party permanently damaged, because Associations themselves are highly concerned to protect their autonomy against CCO interference and because the Associations on their own initiative applied tremendous pressure. There may have been individual actions of forming opposition but there was no planned or determined attempt to unseat M.P.s. The impetus for local party discipline came from the local Associations themselves as they feared that the Government itself was in danger, but Norton's conclusion is that constituency party pressure had only a marginal effect on voting. (57)

National Union

The 1970 Conference was the first held after the general election, and thus was much of a victory rally. There were 22 favourable resolutions, 8 unambiguously, 10 if the terms were right and 3 if Britain and the Commonwealth were protected and 1 if pensions were protected. There were only 5 hostile motions, which were against unless certain specific interests were protected, the cost of living/commonwealth/sovereignty 1, horticulture 1, monarchy and democracy 1, and agriculture 1, with 1 pro-NAFTA. Seven resolutions called for full information, 3 for and 1 against a referendum, and one for direct elections to the European Parliament. The pro-European resolutions gave a diverse series of reasons (security 1, economic growth 2, defence 1, voice in the world 2, sense of purpose 1, peace 1, technology 1). In the agriculture resolutions, all four mentioning Europe were favourable. (58)

The motion chosen for debate was that it was in Britain's long term interests to join if satisfactory terms could be obtained, proposed by

Leon Brittan from the Bow Group and Norman St. John Stevas from the CGE. The anti-marketeers were unknowns (including Winterton before his selection for Macclesfield) with the usual Young Conservative and FCS speakers on the 'European' side. Rippon ended the debate with a reminder that the EEC was about more than economics. The motion was declared passed overwhelmingly. A ballot was requested but that was ruled out of order. Europe was a major aspect of Heath's closing speech. (59)

The Spectator poll of representatives reported 57% for Europe, 41% against and 2% don't know; that 10% wanted a referendum and that included both pro and anti-marketeers; and that 90% of anti-Heath representatives were anti-Common Market. (60) This report should be treated with some suspicion as this degree of opposition was not demonstrated in the vote on the motion, and this poll showed a dramatic swing against Europe from earlier polls at the same time as the Spectator itself had turned against.

Concern was expressed within the Committee on Europe that opposition might be organised for the Central Council in spring 1971, and therefore special efforts were made to ensure 'European' resolutions and speakers were presented. Russell Lewis, CPC Director, wrote to CPC Regional Chairmen requesting European resolutions, as did Kate Macmillan and Sara Morrison through the Women. (61) The result was a series of 15 resolutions, some of which were positive subject to the terms, some expressing particular concerns such as agriculture and others with the traditional demand for more information. The debate was held on the most positive resolution, to which Rippon replied.

One unusual development was the calling of a special Central Council meeting of 14th July 1971. This meeting was, decided the NUEC, held "for the specific purpose of enabling the Prime Minister to accept

the invitation of the National Union to address the Central Council at the earliest possible opportunity after the publication of the Government White Paper on the terms negotiated". (62) Many resolutions had been received from Associations requesting an opportunity for a discussion on the feelings of Party members.

The meeting, chaired by active 'European' Dame Unity Lister, consisted of a 40 minute speech by Heath followed by one hour of questions. About 2,000 representatives were present, and they gave strong support to Heath's position with frequent applause throughout his speech. The questions reflected mainly concerns and fears rather than outright opposition, on the size of lorries, the licencing of insurance, and people on fixed incomes. The loudest applause came for Heath's defence of Parliamentary democracy and the Party Whip as the appropriate method of deciding the issue. The NUEC felt that it had been "a great success" and were especially delighted with the media coverage, and the Economist concluded from it that "It is a party which has confidence and trust in Mr. Heath to lead Britain into the Market". (63) The meeting thus satisfied demands that Associations should be allowed to discuss the terms, while at the same time demonstrating rank and file support for Heath and his policy.

The 1971 conference was a most significant conference as it was held after the terms had been negotiated, was more representative than the Central Council meeting and was held before the vote in Parliament, and was expected to have some influence on the size of the Conservative rebellion. The resolutions were overwhelmingly 'European'. 53 were unequivocally pro-European, 16 mentioning the excellent terms, while 7 expressed concerns over particular areas (horticulture 1, fishing 3, fixed incomes 3). Only 7 resolutions expressed their clear opposition, but 3 urged membership only with the full hearted support of the British

people and 4 urged a free vote. The reasons given for entry were again varied: influence in the world 12, prosperity 13, a united Europe 9, peace 4, economic growth 3, security 3, large market 2, defence 1, less developed countries 1 and our children's future 1. These resolutions reflected the shift from economic to political arguments within the Conservative Party. (64)

The debate was conducted on a Young Conservative motion, welcoming entry, and noting the pooling of sovereignty and the political opportunities. The debate was dominated by the 'Europeans', including both the young and the established as Sandys and St. John Stevas. Opposition was led by Powell and Walker-Smith. The mood of the Conference was decidedly 'European', with the jokes of St. John Stevas well received, and Walker-Smith's speech interrupted by a cry of 'cheer-up' and much laughter. The 'Europeans' were clearly in control and Rippon provided an unnecessarily long speech in reply. The vote was overwhelmingly in favour of the motion, but Heath insisted on a card vote. After the usual confusion while the vote was taken, the result was 2,474 votes to 324, a vote of 8 to 1. The vote was a strong endorsement of entry and helped to relieve some of the pressure on some of the more cautious M.P.s. (65)

The anti-marketeers believed that until spring 1971 the local Associations were strongly against entry but were swung by the summer campaign. (66) Even the Economist in April 1971 wrote that Association Chairmen "are mostly insular men who, if no compelling reason of party loyalty or local opinion exists to persuade otherwise, are more likely than not to discourage their M.P.s from supporting entry". (67) The situation was, however, more complex than that. Chairmen were naturally wary over issues which offended some members and even activists were sensitive to the concerns of important constituency groups such as

farmers and many shared the widespread feeling that there had been inadequate information and discussion. However, this should not be interpreted as hostility. When motions were discussed by Associations, the decision was normally in favour of entry, e.g. the Isle of Wight by 33 to 1, North Devon 62 to 2 and Putney 80 to 20. (68) Even the Scottish conference, which had hitherto been seen as cool due to the fears of the fishing and hill-farming interests, endorsed the policy by 600 votes to 50 on 18th May 1971. (69)

What is undisputed is that the Associations were overwhelmingly for entry by Autumn 1971. The CPC discussion groups in October 1971 expressed their strong support. The main arguments were seen as benefiting the economy and the influence of Britain in the world. A number of problems were raised: over fishing, agriculture, the legal situation, sovereignty, the veto, Communism in EEC countries, the free movement of labour and old age pensions. The groups urged that in order to convince public opinion, the facts must be simplified. (70)

Conservative strategists were well aware of the value of the Young Conservatives for their campaign. St. John Stevas, in his confidential memorandum, argued that special use should be made of the Young Conservatives because they contributed both idealism and enthusiasm which was frequently lacking from the 'European' side. (71) At the 1970 Conference, David Atkinson, Young Conservative Vice-Chairman, was one of the speakers, and there was noisy and active support for Europe from Young Conservatives led by Greater London. The 1971 Conference was held on a Young Conservative motion, and the vote was greeted by a Young Conservative demonstration including balloons and Euro-dollies in the national costumes of the EEC countries, which the Express described as "more like an American Convention than any momentous act of history". (72) The Young Conservatives were firm

and enthusiastic, as were the FCS. At the 1970 conference FCS held a joint meeting with the CGE and Chairman Roger Mountford spoke in the debate. At their 1971 Conference a motion opposing membership on any terms was overwhelmingly defeated. Many Conservative students participated in minibus tours in summer resorts distributing literature organised by the European Movement in summer 1971, and their Swinton course in September 1971 was on Europe and the Third World. The FCS Conference in March 1972 found substantial majorities for a European Defence Community, and reaffirmed support for a united Europe based on direct elections and control of the Commission by the European Parliament. (73)

The Women were quieter on Europe, although their leaders Kate Macmillan and Sara Morrison were active in encouraging pro-European resolutions. The discussion on the EEC at their 1971 Conference found all pro-European speakers. (74)

TUNAC was of concern to the CCO. "Anti-Market feeling is particularly strong in this section of the Party, where there is a substantial feeling that entry could have an adverse effect on living standards as well as employment prospects". (75) There was a danger that a European motion could be defeated, especially as the vote was taken before the ministerial speech. Special effort was called for. Eventually a motion was passed by a substantial majority expressing the fullest confidence in the Government but urging that it should explain to the old that their standard of living will increase at the same rate as the average worker. (76)

The claim that grass roots Conservatives were anti-market is unsubstantiated. Concern was expressed over particular interests, Association Chairmen were naturally concerned about any divisions within their local Associations, and there was sensitivity to any electoral

damage from the issue. However, there is much evidence of support even before the summer campaign: the motions to the 1970 Conference, the Central Council, the enthusiasm expressed at the special Central Council meeting, the Y.C.s and FCS. The summer campaign was a success in calming fears, providing answers to specific concerns and in generating some enthusiasm, but was neither designed nor conducted as a conversion campaign.

Central Office

The importance of Europe to the Party was easily understood in CCO and recognised by the creation of two committees on Europe (merged in July 1971). The Committee on Europe was chaired by Michael Fraser. They recognised that a major campaign was necessary to turn the Party from doubters to enthusiasts. Russell Lewis, CPC Director, presented a paper on Educating the Party, which argued that the pros had been outclassed by the antis and urged the need for factual information, produced by the Central Office of Information and the Foreign Office; a team of regional information officers; the training of the right kind of speakers; and the production of briefing material for speakers. (77) The Committee on Europe decided that the issue should be debated at all kinds of Party meetings, preferably by Ministers, and Rippon was requested to speak to the NUEC as an example, which he did in January 1971; that local activity should be stimulated through Association officers, agents and Young Conservatives, simple leaflets should be produced; an opinion poll carried out by Opinion Research Centre; and the publication of Ministerial speeches. (78) The Committee acted as the co-ordinator of the various activities of the Party and the assessor of opinion within the Parliamentary Party and the Associations.

Their first step was to try to assess opinion. M.P.s were

tested through an examination of election addresses, and a CGE survey. An ORC poll was commissioned, which confirmed that public opinion was hostile, including 48% of Conservatives, mainly because of the cost of living. The poll suggested that peace and prosperity were the most favourable arguments to use, and that the public remained very ill-informed. Douglas reported the poll to the Committee emphasising that the overwhelming obstacle was prices, but that "public opinion is not implacably opposed...There is confused, not hostile opinion.... Much better public relations is needed to convince people that Europe is a good idea. But I believe that there is a large number waiting to be convinced". (79)

The campaign, therefore, was directed at converting doubters into supporters, by providing factual information, by dealing with the fears raised by anti-marketeers and presenting the positive arguments for membership. Michael Fraser was very concerned to keep intra-party divisions to a minimum, and so strong action against the antis was avoided seeking not to damage relations permanently and they made an attempt to make Party members feel involved in the decision. (80)

The Committee also discussed how to handle by-elections, and local referendums. There was the possibility that Labour would propose a referendum on Europe so CCO was sensitive to the potential importance of local referenda. There was some evidence of support for the idea of a national referendum among local Conservatives, (81) and a number of local referendums were organised, mainly, but not only, by antis. The problem was how to handle them. Niblock recommended that Party material should be available in bulk, and backbench M.P.s should be encouraged to debate, but otherwise the Party should avoid giving them publicity. (82) Rippon requested that the referendum in his own constituency of Hexham should be ignored. Geoffrey Block produced a

paper arguing strongly against a referendum and supporting a commitment to the 1970 manifesto. (83) The Committee decided that each referendum should be handled locally with no special central involvement. The local referenda were surveyed by Donald Harker who reported that only the Beckenham one organised by Philip Goodhart could be taken seriously. The turnouts had been low, and M.P.s, like Prior, had dismissed them as a farce. (84) CCO was satisfied that they did not demonstrate massive opposition, influence parliamentary opinion, or provide encouragement to the idea of a national referendum.

CRD produced considerable coverage on Europe in their publications, concentrating on factual information and ministerial statements, with titles like Common Market Facts, British and Europe, Interim Report on the negotiations, Common Market Prospects for Britain, and European Community Bill, a detailed study of the bill. A number of information sheets were produced by Tim Boswell, Stephen Sherbourne, Robin Turner and Michael Niblock, aimed primarily at M.P.s, dealing with topics such as a critique of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) report, the Werner Report, European Monetary Union (EMU), the Vedel Report, EEC Court of Justice and the Community's Treaty-Making Powers. Griffiths and Niblock, in April 1970, and Forman in December 1971, visited Brussels and conducted high level negotiations to keep the CRD well-informed on recent developments within the Community. (85) Their most popular publication was Europe: Words to Remember, which provided a large number of quotations by Conservative, Labour, Liberal politicians and non-party influentials, which provided useful quotations of Wilson and other Labour politicians in their more pro-European moods. The CRD also manned a Common Market Answering Service to deal with queries from M.P.s and candidates, which answered over 100 questions between 2nd August 1971 and 7th September 1971. (86) In pursuing

Fraser's policy to minimise permanent divisions, CRD publications on the general activities of the Government did not provide a major emphasis on Europe, in presenting the Government programme or achievements. (87)

The CPC, under the vigorous leadership of Russell Lewis, concentrated on the publication of pamphlets aimed directly at the anti-market arguments, and the provision of local trained speakers. The pamphlets dealt with prices written by Diana Elles, sovereignty by Beamish and St. John Stevas, and the regions by George Gardiner.. (88)

A number of pamphlets were produced on defence, all of which noted the need for European co-operation. (89) A CPC Contact brief on the Common Market, written by Ben Paterson, argued the economic case, which provided the basis for the CPC discussion groups. (90) There was a discussion over whether to produce a pamphlet arguing the case for and against a referendum, between Goodhart and St. John Stevas, but this was vetoed after a critical article by David Wood in the Times argued that it would suggest an indecisive attitude towards the idea. (91)

The veto was bitterly criticised by Goodhart, and also by the pro-European Greater London Young Conservatives.

The CPC recruited speakers and organised a voluntary speakers conference on 30th January 1971; invited Home to give the CPC lecture at the 1971 Conference which linked Britain's foreign policy to the EEC; and encouraged CPC Chairmen to sponsor Association resolutions for the Conferences and Central Councils. (92) Lewis independently wrote Between Rome or Brussels? for the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), aimed at the economic liberals, which argued for the liberal, free market nature of the Treaty of Rome and attributed alternative developments within the Community to the lack of fidelity to the Treaty. (93)

The Swinton Journal published articles on 'Political Aspects of the Common Market' by Lewis, 'Britain in Europe' by Beamish which dealt with anti-market critics in a tone of disappointment rather than anger, and 'Developing European Institutions' by Barney Hayhoe. (94)

The Organisation Department organised a series of seminars in summer 1971 at Manchester, York, Cambridge, Bristol and London with big speakers like John Davies, Keith Joseph, Prior, Thomas and Rippon, although it was criticised for being too business oriented with too many non-Party speakers. (95)

The Publicity Department produced a series of 17 leaflets under the title of Europe and You, dealing with a wide range of issues. All of these were sent to Rippon for checking by the Foreign Office. They were distributed to local Association Chairmen in April 1971, designed for general distribution and to satisfy their demands for simple material. They proved extremely popular, with sales of over 200,000 despite demands for even simpler leaflets. Also distributed were 2 million copies of the short white paper through the Party, or through the European Movement if the Association was hostile. (96) An idea for a Party Political Broadcast on Europe was vetoed by Rippon. (97)

Two issues that arose for CCO were the question of balance, and of timing. Several anti M.P.s, Neil Marten, William Clarke, John Wells and Richard Body, complained that CCO publications were one sided. Marten wrote to the Party Chairman that M.P.s attacked Conservative literature because of "the general principle of putting out pamphlets which are bound to be attacked by Conservatives and, therefore, creating divisiveness, while others thought that such pamphlets would discredit C.O. 'objectivity' and that they would irritate Party subscribers". In another letter he wanted anti-market literature distributed through CCO. (98) This raised the sensitive point of

intra-party conflict and the role of CCO in such conflicts. Thomas' reply was clear that it was the job of CCO to support the Government even if some M.P.s were opposed.

Another issue was the timing of the Conservative campaign. Some, such as Lewis, were concerned that, during the negotiations, the initiative was left to the anti-marketeers and attention was concentrated on the details of the terms rather than the broad case for entry, and they wanted Party activity to begin as early as possible. However, Douglas told Hurd on 19th February 1971 that "there does appear to be general agreement amongst Ministers that pulling out too many stops before the negotiations are safely past the crucial stage would damage the outcome". (99) Douglas felt that the negotiations were the key factor in swinging public opinion, that the climax should be in July, but that after the holidays "it seems to me to be pretty hopeless". However, CCO opinion was generally that a longer campaign would increase and consolidate Party support and avoid the anti-market criticisms of 'bouncing', and this was the recommendation of the influential Michael Fraser.

The Informal Party

The attitude of the Bow Group towards Europe was discussed in a special European issue of Crossbow in July 1971. After repeating the traditional disclaimer of no corporate viewpoint, it acknowledged that "The Group has always contained many passionate Europeans, including the last 5 or 6 Chairmen, and is probably broadly in favour of entry", even while there had been strong antis such as Simon Jenkins, a former Crossbow editor". (100) "The majority of Bow Group M.P.s will vote with the Government - even Tim Raison, who has always been lukewarm, has recently prepared himself and his constituents, in an Evening

Standard article, for a re-examination of issues that look likely to end in a European decision. Only John Biffen...and possibly Toby Jessel, are likely to vote against the Government".

The same issue had a strong editorial, noting that "Although it has been the economy, not Europe, that has lost by-elections for the Government, it has been generally accepted that a favourable attitude to Europe should be prudently played down on the hustings. It is up to Mr. Heath to ensure that the European case is put well and realistically, so that the success of Britain's application not only ceases to be thought a liability in by-elections, but becomes a major plank in the Conservative Party's eventual platform". The issue also included pro-European articles on defence by Leon Brittan, Industry by Campbell Adamson of the CBI, Institutions by Bruce-Gardyne and Agriculture by Scott-Hopkins, and reassuring articles on the Commonwealth by Arnold Smith, Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, and New Zealand by Sir Denis Blundell.

Two Bow Group pamphlets were Rich Man's Club? by Leon Brittan et al in January 1971 which argued the benefit to developing countries of membership, and Peace Has Its Price, published by CPC, which argued for Anglo-French nuclear entente and a European Defence Force within NATO. The Bow Group therefore remained a strong source of support among young and ambitious Conservatives.

The Monday Club was very severely divided over Europe with most of the leadership favourable while the membership was more generally hostile. David Levy, the Deputy Editor of their quarterly magazine, Monday World, argued that "whether we like it or not our future is intimately involved with that of our European neighbours", that "co-operation with our European equals is surely closer to self government than is our present slide into the economic slavery of

American domination....A Europe of Nations shall be the framework for a truly conservative revolution". (101) Biggs-Davison produced a eulogy on De Gaulle and his belief in a European confederation of nations. Rippon, a Monday Club member, was the guest speaker at the Annual Dinner in January 1971. Most Monday Club 'Europeans' were concerned to reject federalism, with a critical editorial on the special Central Council meeting for its denigration of national differences, and Jonathan Guinness complained that the real case for Europe was ignored by the One Worlders, who dominated the debate. (102)

However, this did not reflect opinion among the membership. The Newsletter was filled by largely anti-market letters and Monday World with anti-market advertisements. The Young Members held a conference on Europe on 7th January 1970 with Body versus Amery as speakers which reflected hostile opinion in the audience. At the Annual General Meeting on 28th April 1971 a motion that the Monday Club is against Britain signing the Treaty of Rome was carried. At a conference on 2nd October 1971 members voted by 66 to 47 against membership. (103)

Feelings ran so high that the Executive decided that the Monday Club should take a neutral attitude and barred pro and anti groups inside the Monday Club. This, however, was seen as an attempt by the leadership to ignore the anti-market feelings of the membership. Tim Stroud, Chairman of the Young Members, proposed a compromise that the antis would not work within the Monday Club to leave the European Community while the pros would not work for federalism. This, however, produced little support as few Monday Clubbers were federalists. Eventually a compromise was reached at a policy conference on 1st July 1972, where G.K. Young, Chairman of the EEC Study Group, reported that the majority were against membership and the Government had no mandate. A motion was proposed by anti-marketeers Harvey Proctor and

Gordon Middleton that the Monday Club notes the lack of support and so is unable to ratify the decision to enter. This was accepted by 25 votes to 3. The Monday Club was so concerned with its internal divisions that it was unable to influence the debate. (104)

After the 1970 election, the European Forum renamed itself the Conservative Group for Europe to make its party character clear, and David Baker stepped down as chairman to enable an M.P., Sir Tufton Beamish, to lead the CGE. The CGE divided itself into three functional groups, on Parliament and Government, Party and Country, and relations with the Continent. The first group was the main field of activity, as discussed earlier, and was the main reason for the presence of Beamish on the Committee on Europe. The other areas, though, were not neglected. At the 1970 conference they held a joint meeting with FCS; in January 1971 they formed three advisory committees on Young Conservatives, women and agriculture; produced speakers' notes; organised a chemical industries conference; and published three pamphlets, with speeches by Rippon and Home and on the industrial advantages by Tom Boardman, M.P. (105) On 16th November 1971, the CGE decided that its role for 1972 should reflect this 3-pronged approach - to encourage the antis to support the legislation, to maintain public support and to help create a centre-right alliance in Europe. (106) The CGE's main contribution was in strengthening backbench supporters and influencing informally the uncertain backbenchers.

The CGE, as an integral part of the European Movement, tried to ensure that balance was achieved in European Movement activities, and supported European Movement publications and activities. Lord Harlech, a former Tory Minister, became European Movement Chairman on 30th January 1971, and Donald Harker of the Organisation Department joined the Campaign Committee of the European Movement to achieve a high level

of contact with the Party. Whitelaw became chairman of the information programme to ensure publications were acceptable to the Conservatives, and in return Conservatives were encouraged not to overpraise Labour 'Europeans' and thus embarrass them. The European Movement was active in the local referendums, especially in Beckenham, and distributed literature from CCO when the local Associations were hostile. The European Movement was thus able to fulfil certain functions which would have been difficult for the Government or Party officially. (107)

The Anti-Common Market League, now under the chairmanship of Sir Robin Williams, maintained its existence but acted primarily as a support group for the Common Market Safeguards Campaign, to which it handed over its funds. It distributed 50,000 copies of an election leaflet, organised a debate under the auspices of the Monday Club at the 1970 Party Conference, and continued to collect signatures for the petition, but primarily it simply supported the activities of other organisations.

One group of free traders were based around the *Open Seas Forum*, which took its name from a quote from Winston Churchill. "Each time we must choose between Europe and the Open Seas, we shall always choose the Open Seas". While an all-party group, it was dominated by Conservative anti-market M.P.s with Richard Body M.P. as Chairman, and Michael Clark Hutchinson, Edward Du Cann, Toby Jessel, Roger Moate and Robin Turton on the Council. The Forum favoured "the idea of a wider free trade area based upon the principles of EFTA", and its main concern was attacking Community membership. It published a series of pamphlets by economists on the economic case against membership, with Harry Johnson, James Meade and Peter Oppenheimer as authors, and during the negotiations another series highlighting the negative impact on specific industries such as the banana, fishing and tobacco industries. (108)

Body demanded for the Forum equal space at Conservative conferences but Peter Thomas replied that it was not the job of Central Office to distribute anti-government literature. (109) The Forum was the inspiration for the book, Destiny and Disillusion, with articles on agriculture by Body, industry by Sir John Hunter chairman of Swan Hunters, monetary union by Brian Griffiths, World Trade by Harry Johnson and the strategic implications by Leonard Beaton. (110)

Another group was the Conservative Anti-Common Market Information Service (CACMIS), formed at the inspiration of the leading anti-market M.P.s, who felt the need to demonstrate grass root Conservative support for their position. The President was Turton, the Vice-Presidents Walker-Smith and Marten, with Roger Moate as Chairman, a new M.P. who had been active as a Young Conservative in the creation of the ACML, and an unpaid Director, Jim Bourlet. The refusal of Central Office to distribute anti-market literature provided the reason for creating CACMIS, which was limited to providing information and guidance. CACMIS published 6 well-produced leaflets called 'The Common Market and You' on Australia, Key Questions, the economy, sovereignty, prices and the regions, which were cleverly very similar in design to the official Party leaflets. Packages of literature, including a copy of Powell's The Common Market: the Case Against were sent to every Conservative agent to distribute to the 1971 Conference delegates. A bookshop was set up at the 1971 and 1972 Party Conferences and leaflets, an article by Teddy Taylor and other anti-market literature were distributed to all on their mailing list. CACMIS was not a membership organisation but a distribution network to anti-market Conservatives. After the vote on the principle of membership, CACMIS tried to strengthen the resolve of anti-market M.P.s to vote against the details of the bill. Heath and Pym were quoted that "the vote on principle was not a vote of

confidence in the government, so how could the details be?". Their activity caused considerable concern at CCO ⁽¹¹¹⁾ but on 19th December 1972 CACMIS was ended as a separate organisation.

The Common Market Safeguards Campaign distributed a pamphlet to all Conservative Associations; British Intelligence Publications published anti-market pamphlets; the weekly magazine Time and Tide was anti-market and anti-Dictator Heath; Donald Johnson a former M.P. wrote and published the vitriolic Ted Heath: A Latter Day Charlemagne: Europe Slave or Free?; and some Conservatives supported Keep Britain Out, including Body and Sir Iain McTaggart, and 5 Conservative candidates from safe Labour seats. At a Keep Britain Out rally Tim Keigwin, the parliamentary candidate for North Devon, claimed that over the past 7 years pro-Europeans had been infiltrated into marginal seats. KBO organised several of the local referendums in the view that popular opinion was intensely anti-market. However, by the autumn the antis have "seen what they believed was grass root opposition to the market drift away". ⁽¹¹²⁾ Conservative antis felt support for Europe had been bought, that they had been overwhelmed by the sheer size and money of the pro-market campaign and that if the debate had been balanced then public opinion would have been on their side.

The C.B.I. had come to adopt a strongly 'European' position under John Davies and Campbell Adamson as Director-General and Sir John Partridge and Sir Arthur Norman as President. They co-operated closely with the Government during the negotiations, while strongly endorsing the principle of membership. Between 1970-1972 they conducted a campaign amongst their members to explain the economic advantages of membership. This position was endorsed by the overwhelming majority of their members and by all the Regional Councils. There was some little opposition led by Sir John Hunter, of Swan Hunters

the shipbuilders, and a number of small firms expressed fears as to the effects upon them. The CBI, however, was a firm ally and co-operated closely with the broad campaign effort. It had close links through John Davies to the Government; Campbell Adamson addressed a CGE seminar on the Industrial Advantages on 19th May 1971 and contributed an article to Crossbow in July 1971; and the CBI were always willing to provide business spokesman as speakers.

The NFU stated that it "wisely refrained from taking up a pro and anti-position on the general principle of Common Market membership". (113) The Union was much more apprehensive about the future of British agriculture outside the Community and aware that agricultural support depended on the general health of the economy. It concentrated on obtaining the best possible terms during the negotiations without any commitment on the principle. After considerable discussion among the agricultural community, the NFU's Council concluded that "There is no doubt that among producers generally the response to the terms as negotiated by the Government is a positive one. British agriculture for its part is confident of its ability to respond to the challenge presented by membership of an enlarged community". (114) Farmers therefore did not provide a major source of Conservative anti-market feeling as in the early 1960s.

The Economist maintained its pro-European position. It was highly critical of the lack of leadership during the negotiations, and felt that the pro-Europeans "were found largely silent, inert and generally wanting". (115) On the debate over a quick bill versus the Autumn, they acknowledged the arguments on both sides but urged July, as they felt that movement was toward the antis, but they remained optimistic because they believed that public opinion was "more lethargic and sceptical than deeply hostile". (116) The Economist was important in

maintaining confidence among businessmen and the Party that membership remained both in the interests of Britain and that it was a policy that would become popular with the British people.

The Spectator became highly critical of membership under the editorship of George Gale and took a populist, Anglo-Saxon position, calling for a community of white English-speaking nations, because "Australia, Canada and New Zealand are familial and Africa is not". (117) It published articles by Harry Johnson on the economic case against, by Legge-Bourke in favour of a unilateral decision to reconsider Britain's trading preferences, and 'A Senior Conservative' which viewed entry as "a form of abdication". (118) Editorials argued that membership was "folly and treachery", supported anti-market Conservatives who risked their political futures and felt that this issue overrode partisan loyalty. (119) The Spectator thus provided a forum for anti-market Conservatives, although it probably suffered from a rather hysterical tone on its editorial page.

The Conservative press (except, of course, for the Express) remained consistently pro-European, while allowing some space to critics. The Financial Times provided extensive coverage on the Common Market, while its columnist, C. Gordon Tether, took a strongly hostile position. The editor of the Times, William Rees-Mogg, provided a highly favourable, sometimes even enthusiastic, support in the editorial columns, while Peter Jay, the economics editor and son of leading Labour anti-marketeer Douglas Jay, argued the case against on the economic pages. Peregrine Worsethorne, an influential columnist, was highly sceptical of the pro-European arguments, but the Daily Telegraph emphasised that "We have supported entry in principle from the start and consider the present terms acceptable". (120) It opposed the idea of a free vote, published a successful guide to the Common Market, and was confident

that the public would accept the decision of Parliament. (121) The Daily Mail, while moderately favourable, expressed much more concern over the failure to convince public opinion. (122) The pro-Market press (both Tory and Labour), were well catered for by the media breakfasts, organised by Geoffrey Tucker, former publicity director for the Conservatives on behalf of the European Movement, which provided them with useful pro-market information and opinion.

The Express continued its campaign against British entry, and presented itself as the true voice of the British people. However, after the Parliamentary vote on principle, it accepted the decision. "A mistake - a great mistake has been made. But it has been made by the House of Commons, and the Daily Express accepts the verdict of the freely elected British Parliament". (123) Much to the disappointment of many anti-marketeers, it did not support the campaign to fight the bill on every occasion.

Public opinion on Europe was highly volatile in this period, with substantial opposition in 1970 and *early 1971 changing to support by* autumn 1971. Public opinion was extremely important because of its effect on the voting of M.P.s and because of Heath's declaration that Britain would not enter without the wholehearted support of the British people. While he claimed that this support was expressed through Parliament there was a widely held feeling that public opinion was being ignored by the Government and the fear of the effect this would have on the Conservative vote at the next election. So opinion polls were studied with interest even more intense than normal.

The ORC conducted three polls on Europe for CCO, in April 1967, August 1970 and July 1971. The second poll 5-9th August 1970 showed 33% for with 53% against, which however showed improvement from a poll in February 1970 which was 18% to 70%. The poll showed that only 10%

were very strongly for with 26% very strongly against; that men were more for than women; that Conservative voters were only marginally more 'European' than Labour voters with Liberal voters very anti; that a majority, including 25% of the antis, supported negotiations; that the primary anti issue was the cost of living mentioned by 38%, while issues such as the Commonwealth or British identity received only 3%; that the main pro arguments were trade, long term benefits and anti-isolation; 62% supported a referendum including a majority of pro-marketeers: that competition, prosperity and peace were the best issues in favour of Europe. and that most people were poorly informed. (123)

The interpretation of Douglas of the CRD was that opinion was not fixed and could be swung in favour with a proper campaign.

The third poll showed that 60% of Conservatives thought that the agreement was reasonable; 56% were still against and only 30% for but this revealed a significant shift in favour; the cost of living remained the main issue, although sovereignty was now raised by 9%; 50% felt that we were entering too quickly; 90% felt that Britain would join; and most significantly that if there was Party polarisation there would be little change in voting, with 2% of Labour going to the Conservatives, 1% of Conservatives to Labour, and 7% Liberals to Labour. (124)

James Douglas was the opinion poll expert in the CRD and his assessment was that opinion was volatile because they think they are expressing views about something different. They were in favour in 1960 because they felt British industry needed a kick, now they were against because of the price of butter. (125)

Opinion therefore was sceptical but not hostile. By the time of the Parliamentary vote, opinion had shifted enough in favour that the claim that Parliament was acting against the will of the people had lost much of its force.

The advice that the Government received from the opinion polls, most of the press, and from Central Office was that opposition was volatile and could easily be swung by a strong campaign emphasising the merits of membership. As the summer of 1971 demonstrated, this assessment proved correct.

However, significantly, this was not due to a simple appeal to party loyalty. While support for entry rose from 30% to 45% between April and June 1971, support for the Government slumped from 48% to 39%. Kitzinger points out that while there was a remarkable 30% shift among Conservative voters between May and July 1971, there was another remarkable shift among Labour voters of 14% in the same direction, despite the clear opposition of the Labour leadership. (126) Thus there were other significant influences, other than the party, on the swift change in public opinion.

Conclusion

The role of Edward Heath in obtaining British membership has been seen as crucial with the powers of Prime Minister and Party Leader providing him with the necessary instruments to achieve his goal. This is a view presented both by pro-marketeers such as Kitzinger and anti-marketeers like Evans. However, as with the assessment of the role of Macmillan earlier, this view underestimates the existence of forces within the Conservative Party (and outside) which showed that same objective.

The Cabinet was unanimous in recommending entry, even if some were not enthusiastic. Others, however, were just as committed as Heath. While attitudes to the Common Market was a factor in the selection of government ministers, it was not the decisive factor, for example with regard to Powell or Du Cann. Among junior ministers, Neil Marten was

the only anti-marketeer approached to give a commitment not to resign over the issue, although there were other M.P.s less publicly associated with that position. There is little evidence to suggest that the make-up of the government would have been much different if the issue of Europe had not existed.

In the parliamentary party the earliest study by the CGE in December 1970 found overwhelming support for the policy, with 195 in favour and 22 against out of 322 M.P.s. The CGE backbenchers were active in using friendship and personal relations in the campaign. The Whips, the official representatives of the party leadership, had little influence on the final outcome for a number of reasons. The instruments available to them were very limited and the potentially most useful, ministerial appointments and honours, were undermined by Heath's policy of low ministerial turnover and restricted patronage, while the rest has been described by Norton as the "Small change of political life.....unlikely in itself to influence particular votes and was not apparently employed". (127)

Secondly, the Whips made little attempt to influence the strong anti-marketeers because of their publicly established position. Thirdly, the Whips wanted backbench co-operation on other issues before the House about which M.P.s might not have felt so strongly. Finally, the Chief Whip, Francis Pym, was highly concerned to minimise the long term damage to party cohesion.

The support for entry amongst constituency activists has been underestimated. Kitzinger claimed that "In early 1971 there can be little doubt that the majority of associations was rather opposed to entry" but provides no evidence for this view. (128) Norton claimed that "One may infer from the shift in opinion reflected in the party that many local activists supported entry because it was Conservative

Government policy - hence an issue of loyalty to the party - and not primarily on the merits of the case for entry". (129) Here Norton confuses Conservative voters represented in opinion polls with the much smaller number and more politically informed Conservative activists. These activists had for a number of years listened to speakers, read party literature and discussed at CPC or Association meetings the issue, and thus were far more aware of the reasons that led the party leadership to believe in British membership. Surveys show that the more informed people were the most pro-European and party activists could be expected to be amongst the better informed.

Evidence from constituency resolutions to the 1970 and 1971 Party Conferences and 1971 Central Council, from the votes on the motions at those Conferences, the feedback from the October 1971 CPC discussion groups, the attendance and enthusiasm at the special Central Council meeting do not suggest a hostile party reluctantly endorsing a policy purely out of party loyalty. This is not to deny the existence of much confusion among party activists due to the complexity of the issue, concern over the potential electoral impact or the role of party loyalty in tipping the balance of those who were uncertain. However, the claims that most associations were hostile in early 1971 or that a change of opinion occurred among activists during the summer due to party loyalty is unsubstantiated. The majority of party activists could probably be described as moderately or mildly pro-European, but more concerned about the continuation of the Government than any specific issue.

Central Office was committed to the European policy on substantive grounds and believed that, after an effective campaign, it would not be electorally damaging, indeed could be presented as a major achievement of the Government. Central Office worked extremely hard

producing and distributing a massive amount of literature. Sir Michael Fraser was committed to conducting a successful campaign without any permanent split in the party, and so was very careful not to appear to be pressing the local Associations of rebel M.P.s. Literature was provided but more extensive campaigning was left to the CGE or the European Movement. The professionals would have preferred an earlier campaign but they were restrained by ministerial considerations over the negotiations. Central Office was enthusiastic and eager to conduct the campaign on Europe.

The informal elements of the party remained broadly pro-European. The Bow Group was critical of the early lack of leadership. The Conservative Group for Europe were active on a number of fronts but especially in Parliament. The CBI conducted their own intense campaign, the NFU eventually supported entry, while the Economist and the press vigorously supported entry. The Monday Club was led by pro-marketeers but prevented from activity by grass roots opposition. The Anti-Common Market League was virtually defunct; the Open Seas Forum only reached a fairly limited audience; CACMIS was successful but only formed in June 1971; while Conservative anti-market activity was spread amongst a number of organisations. The Express continued its fight, now joined by the Spectator. The Tory anti-marketeers lacked an adequate focus for their activities that was provided on the other side by the CGE.

The shift in public opinion during the summer of 1971 was due to a number of factors, of which party loyalty was only one. The perception of the negotiated terms as satisfactory, the attraction of a strong Government with a clear policy, distrust of what appeared as unprincipled opposition by the Labour Party and confused signals to Labour voters, the massive information and propaganda campaign, and

that many voters only then gave serious consideration to the issue with the clear possibility of membership, all contributed to public endorsement of entry by October 1971.

There is no attempt to deny the importance of the role played by Edward Heath in this period, but to emphasise that much of the Conservative Party had the same goal as himself, entry to the European Community, and on tactics, over an October vote and a free vote, won over the opposition of the Party Leader.

CHAPTER 6REFERENCES

1. Economist, 20th June 1970
2. BBC Election Forum, 27th May 1970
3. Yes to Europe, (London, CRD, 1975), p.4.
4. Donald Johnson, Ted Heath: Latter Day Charlemagne, (London, Johnson, 1971).
5. Douglas Evans, While Britain Slept, (London, Gollancz, 1975) p.39.
6. Butler & Pinto-Duchinsky, The British General Election of 1970, (London, Macmillan, 1971), p.159. Times, 14th December 1970.
7. Times, 13th July 1971.
8. Ramsden, The Making of Conservative Party Policy, (London, Longman, 1980), p.294.
9. ibid, p.295.
10. Norton, Conservative Dissidents, (London, Temple Smith, 1978) Chapter 9.
11. Kitzinger, Diplomacy and Persuasion, (London, Thames & Hudson, 1973), p.147.
12. Evans, op cit, p.37.
13. Rose, Politics in England Today, (London, Faber, 1974), p.215.
14. Maudling does not mention Europe in his memoirs of the Heath government. Maudling, Memoirs, (London, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1978), Chapter 10.
15. Kitzinger, op cit, p.159.
16. Evans, op cit, p.36, p.41.
17. Economist, 2nd January 1971.
18. Kitzinger, op cit, p.154.
19. Roth, Can Parliament Decide?, (London, Macdonald, 1971), p.108.
20. J. Wood, Powell and the 1970 Election, (Kingswood, Elliott Right Way, 1970).
21. Economist, 25th July 1970.
22. Nigel Fisher, Iain Macleod, (London, Purnell, 1973), p.322.

23. Times, 23rd June 1971.
24. Economist, 2nd January 1971.
25. Spectator, 6th January 1971.
26. Economist, 7th August 1971.
27. Kitzinger, op cit, p.163. Economist, 13th June 1971, 19th June 1971.
28. Listener, 21st October 1971.
29. Economist, 23rd October 1971. Norton, op cit, p.70.
30. St. John Stevas, "Memorandum on Britain and the Common Market", August 1970.
31. Norton, op cit, pp.65-66.
32. Economist, 13th June 1971. Spectator, 10th July 1971.
33. Kitzinger, op cit, p.162. Norton, op cit, pp.66-67.
34. Economist, 3rd July 1971. Times, 7th July 1971. Spectator, 12th June 1971.
35. Clarke to Thomas, 10th March 1971. Clarke was a member of the CGE!
36. Economist, 3rd July 1971. Sunday Times, 11th July 1971. Goodhart, In the Shadow of the Sword, (London, Michael Joseph, 1964), Chapter 3.
37. "CPC Pamphlet on Referendum", Chairmen's Correspondence, 20th January 1971.
38. For the full story, see Goodhart, Referendum, (London, Tom Stacey, 1971); Goodhart, Full Hearted Consent, (London, Davis Poynter, 1976).
39. Committee on Europe, 9th December 1970.
40. ibid, 2nd February 1971. Norton, op cit, p.67. Kitzinger, op cit, pp.169-176.
41. Economist, 29th May 1971, 19th June 1971. Roth, op cit, p.130.
42. Norton, op cit, p.69. Kitzinger, op cit, p.165. Economist, 23rd October 1971.
43. Times, 20th October, 1971.
44. H.C. Debates, Vol. 828, 21st-22nd, 25th-28th October 1971. Hurd, An End to Promises, (London, Collins, 1979), p.69.
45. Norton, op cit, p.71.

46. Times, 21st January 1972. Norton, op cit, p.72.
47. Goodhart, 1976, op cit, p.39.
48. Norton, op cit, p.76.
49. ibid, p.80.
50. Richard Ritchie, editor, A Nation or No Nation?, (London, Batsford, 1978), p.40. Times, 14th February 1972.
51. ibid, p.43.
52. Norton, op cit, pp.177-191.
53. ibid, p.186. Goodhart, 1976, op cit, p.35.
54. Banbury Association Chairman to Thomas, 1st July 1971.
55. Chairman's Correspondence.
56. Organisation Department, 1st November 1971.
57. Norton, op cit, p.190.
58. Conference Handbook 1970.
59. Verbatim Report 1970.
60. Spectator, 225 (1970), p.430.
61. Committee on Europe, 9th December 1970, 5th January 1971, 19th January 1971, 16th February 1971.
62. NUEC, 10th June 1971.
63. The Address by the Prime Minister to Central Council, (London, CCO, 1971). NUEC, 22nd July 1971. Economist, 17th July 1971.
64. Conference Handbook 1971.
65. Verbatim Report 1971. Economist, 16th October 1971.
66. Evans, op cit, p.50.
67. Economist, 10th April 1971.
68. NUEC, 20th April 1971, 2nd May 1971, passim.
69. Economist, 22nd May 1971. "Use of Conservative Conferences", CRD, Spring 1971. Joint Tactical Committee, 18th May 1971.
70. CPC Discussion Report, October 1971.
71. Stevas, "Memorandum on Britain and the Common Market", August 1970.
72. Express, 14th October 1971.

73. FCS Main Mail *passim*.
74. Committee on Europe, 9th December 1970, 16th February 1971.
75. "Use of Conservative Conferences", CRD, Spring 1971.
76. TUNAC Conference, 15th May 1971.
77. R. Lewis, "Educating the Party", to the Tactical Committee, 28th August 1970.
78. Committee on Europe, 10th November 1971.
79. Douglas, 'Common Market: Public Opinion' to Committee on Europe, 9th February 1971.
80. Kitzinger, op cit, p.164.
81. NUEC, 28th January 1971.
82. Niblock, Referenda, (CRD, 26th November 1970).
83. CRD, 19th May 1971.
84. Harker, EEC and Referenda, (CCO, August 1971).
85. Griffiths and Niblock, Visit to Common Market 29-30th April 1970, (CRD n.d.). Forman, Brussels Visit 7th December 1971, (CRD n.d.).
86. Joint Tactical Committee, 17th August 1971.
87. Programme of Conservative Government, (CCO, 3rd August 1970). Year of Achievement, (CCO, September 1971).
88. Elles, Housewife and the Common Market, (CPC, April 1971). Beamish and Stevas, Sovereignty: Substance or Shadow?, (CPC, July 1971). Gardiner, A Europe for the Regions, (CPC, August 1971).
89. Bow Group, Peace Has Its Price, (CPC February 1972). John Stanley, American Troops in Europe, (CPC, April 1972). Anthony Hartley, Spectre of Security, (CPC, July 1972).
90. Common Market, (CPC, October 1971).
91. CPC Pamphlet on Referendum, Chairman's Correspondence, n.d.
92. Home, Great Britain in the 70's, (CPC, November 1971). Committee on Europe, 9th December 1970, 19th January 1971.
93. Lewis, Between Brussels and Rome, (London, Institute of Economic Affairs, 1971).
94. Lewis, "Political Aspects of the Common Market", Swinton Journal, Winter, 1970. Beamish, "Britain in Europe", Swinton Journal, August 1971. Hayhoe, "Developing the European Institutions", Swinton Journal, Spring 1972.
95. European Seminars 25th May 1971 - 11th June 1971, (Organisations Department, n.d.).

96. Joint Tactical Committee, 6th July 1971.
97. Committee on Europe, January 1971.
98. Marten to Thomas, 19th March 1971, 24th April 1971.
99. Douglas to Hurd, 19th February 1971.
100. Endymion, "The Bow Group and the Market", Crossbow, July 1971.
101. David Levy, "The European Perspective", Monday World, Summer 1970.
102. Biggs-Davison, "De Gaulle", Monday World, Winter 1970.
Editorial, Monday World, Summer 1971. Guinness, "Europe: the Real Case", Monday Club Newsletter, 9th July 1971.
103. Brian Copping, The Story of the Monday Club, (London, Current Affairs Information Service, 1972), p.20.
104. Monday Club Newsletter, January 1972 and passim.
105. Rippon, Britain and Europe, (CGE, March 1971).
Home, Our European Destiny, (CGE, June 1971).
Boardman, Supermarket, (CGE, September, 1971).
Committee on Europe passim.
106. CGE Executive Committee, 16th November 1971.
107. Kitzinger, op cit, chapter 7. Economist, 30th January 1971.
Joint Committee on Europe, 6th July 1971, 27th July 1971.
108. H. Johnson, Our Entry: Implications for the World Economy.
J. Meade, The Economic Arguments.
Anon, Sovereignty - Going Up in Smoke.
P. Oppenheimer, What Economic Case?
109. Chairman's Correspondence, n.d.
110. Evans, Destiny or Disillusion?, (London, Gollancz, 1971).
111. CACMIS (Organisation Department, n.d.). Joint Tactical Committee, 21st September 1971. CACMIS Newsletter, passim.
112. Economist, 25th September 1971.
113. Kitzinger, op cit, p.263.
114. NFU and the Common Market, (NFU, 23rd September 1971).
115. Economist, 22nd May 1971.
116. ibid, 29th May 1971, 12th June 1971, 19th June 1971.
117. Spectator, 225 (1970), p.23; 226 (1971), p.72.
118. Johnson, "A Case Against", Spectator, 226 (1971), p.218.
Legge-Bourke, "Reassertion of Sovereignty", Spectator, 226 (1971), p.121. A Senior Conservative, 225 (1970), p.677.

119. ibid, 225 (1970), p.584; 226 (1971), p.186, p.246.
120. Telegraph, 16th August 1971.
121. Telegraph, 16th July 1971. Walter Farrar, editor, Daily Telegraph Guide to the Common Market, (Glasgow, Collins, 1972).
122. Mail, 9th September 1971.
123. Express,
124. Opinion Research Centre Poll on the Common Market for CCO, 5th-9th August 1970.
125. ibid, July 1971
126. Douglas to Hurd, "Public Opinion", 19th February 1971.
127. Kitzinger, op cit, p.363.
128. Norton, op cit, p.173.
129. Kitzinger, op cit, p.177.
130. Norton, op cit, p.178.

CHAPTER 7STILL THE PARTY OF EUROPE 1972-1975Introduction

Britain became a member of the European Community on 1st January 1973. However hopes that the issue of membership was now settled were not met, as an active element in the Labour Party called for withdrawal. At the February 1974 election, Labour made Europe an issue with a statement in the manifesto that they wanted a total renegotiation and that they would give an opportunity to the people to decide on the issue, although whether this would be through an election or a referendum was kept vague. Heath declared, "It's not an issue. We are in the Common Market and we stay in the Common Market", but Wilson responded that "Try as he can, Mr. Heath cannot dodge the question of the Common Market".⁽¹⁾ Powell also made Europe an issue by not standing as a Conservative candidate, by speaking at two Get Britain Out rallies, and by his declaration that he had voted Labour by postal ballot before the election day explicitly on this issue.

The Conservative manifesto presented a cautious but clear endorsement of British entry, emphasising the advantages for the economy and British influence in the world.

"We have now been a member of the Community for a little over a year. While it is, therefore, far too soon to attempt a complete assessment of the implications for Britain of this historical step forward, it is already clear that we are better able to secure our national interests both economic and political within the Community than would have been possible had we remained outside... We have made it clear that we are not satisfied with every aspect of Community arrangements, and have sought - and will continue to seek - changes when these are desirable....Renegotiation of the Community in the sense of reforming its practice and redefining Britain's place in it, is a continuous process, which can only be conducted from within, and in which we are already playing

a full part". (2)

The Conservatives lost the election, although with more votes than Labour. Europe was later presented as one of the major achievements of the Heath administration, but it was not one of the major Conservative themes of the campaign. There was some speculation that Powell and Europe had led to the Conservative defeat, but there is little evidence that intensity on this issue was sufficient to change many votes.

The Labour Government began renegotiations of the terms of membership, which a major section hoped would eventually lead to withdrawal. In the October 1974 election, Europe was described in the Conservative manifesto as "by far the most historic achievement of the last Conservative Administration", (3) but again received little attention as a campaign theme. Labour meanwhile repeated its promise that the British people would be consulted on the results of the renegotiations "through the ballot box". On 23rd January 1975 Wilson finally confirmed that the consultation would be through a referendum. Due to the very strong divisions within the Government, a referendum was seen as the best way to resolve these divisions. (4)

During the renegotiations the Conservatives were preoccupied with the question of the Party Leader. Faced with considerable criticism, Heath presented himself for re-election. On 4th February 1975, to considerable surprise, Margaret Thatcher received 130 votes to 119 for Heath; Heath withdrew from the contest, and Mrs. Thatcher easily beat Whitelaw in the second round on 11th February 1975.

In March 1975 Wilson announced that the renegotiations had been successful and that the Government would recommend the British people to vote in favour of staying in the Community. The Conservatives were placed in a difficult situation of wishing to welcome improvements

in the conditions achieved in the renegotiations without repudiating their own set of negotiations. The position adopted was to welcome the improvements but to emphasise that they could have been achieved in the normal process of Community discussion. Whitelaw stated that "the undoubted improvements in Community arrangements from the United Kingdom's point of view could have been obtained in the course of the Community's normal development and without the whole business of renegotiation under threat of withdrawal". (5)

Mrs. Thatcher took the opportunity in the debate to reiterate the Conservative commitment to the Community under her leadership, and gave as her three principal reasons peace and security, guaranteed food supplies and a future world role for Britain. On the vote to accept the new terms on 9th April 1975, only 8 Conservatives joined the No Lobby, while a majority of Labour M.P.s voted against the recommendation of their own Government.

On the legislation for the referendum, the Conservatives opposed the referendum on the grounds that it was an attempt to break Treaty obligations, that it was intended to be binding on Parliament, that it would undermine Parliamentary democracy, that it was an unreliable method of political decision, and that it created a precedence for future referenda. Mrs. Thatcher led the opposition in the Commons debate on March 9th, and only 5 Conservatives voted in favour of the referendum. The Conservatives maintained their principled opposition through the Second and Third Readings of the Bill, but assisted its speedy passage.

With the vote in March to hold a referendum, the Conservative Party put its full support behind the Yes Campaign, with both its own campaign and full participation in the umbrella organisation, Britain in Europe. The vote on 5th June 1975 was:

Yes	17,378,581	67.2%
No	8,470,073	32.8%.

The policy thus had the popular endorsement, at least on 5th June 1975, that the Conservatives had feared would be lacking. Although most anti-marketeers declared that they would accept the decision, the issue refused to remain dead, and at the time of writing remains on the political agenda. That, however, is beyond the bounds of this study.

Leader

After Britain's entry, Heath turned his attentions elsewhere, partly in response to the feeling that Europe had already taken too much of the Government's energy to the neglect of other pressing problems, partly due to the continuing unpopularity of Europe in the opinion polls and partly as a deliberate policy in the hope that a lack of attention would lead to a passive acceptance. Sir Christopher Soames was appointed a Commissioner, Sir Peter Kirk was made leader of the Conservative delegation to the European Parliament and Heath made some references to Europe in the 1973 Conference speech, with a call for the participation of the Commonwealth in the Community, a common policy towards the USA, reform of the CAP and a new regional policy. However, these policies were not vigorously pursued and other initiatives, such as direct elections to the European Parliament, were firmly opposed by Heath.

This approach came in for considerable criticism from Conservative 'Europeans'. Norman St. John Stevas expressed grave concern at a CGE meeting at the failure of the Government to put over the European case and asked that this concern should be expressed to the Prime Minister. (6)

This was taken up by the Overseas Committee who expressed intense

dissatisfaction with the Government's low profile due to its feared electoral impact. Kenneth Clarke, representing the Prime Minister, claimed that there had been "a conscious change of mind in the Government and a recognition that the policy of deliberately playing down Europe had been a mistake", ⁽⁷⁾ but there is little evidence of any change in the Government's tactics. Soames was also felt to have made an oblique attack on Heath's nationalism. ⁽⁸⁾

The Economist claimed that it was "Time for Ted to Stop the Rot", and that many businessmen and Conservatives felt there had been much loss of goodwill over Britain's response to the oil crisis. "It is felt by the CBI...that Mr. Heath has been particularly to blame in starting the scramble towards petty nationalism in Europe" and quotes one businessman about Heath that "He rightly got the credit for bringing us in, but when he was really needed last year, he abandoned ship and let it sink". ⁽⁹⁾ It also criticised that "His Government, and notably his senior members, have not said as much about the EEC as they might have, either in public or in Parliament", ⁽¹⁰⁾ although it believed in September 1973 that "the great man in Number 10 is now stirring from his long Eurosleap". ⁽¹¹⁾ However, Heath gave Europe little attention during the 1974 elections on the grounds that it was no longer an issue, but he did not even take up the question of what a Conservative Government would do inside the Community.

During the leadership election, Europe was not an issue which divided the candidates, but it was reflected amongst their supporters. The most fervent marketers tended to support Heath as the man of Europe, while anti-marketers had their own natural reasons for supporting the alternative candidate. One Conservative anti-marketeer, who was also close to Mrs. Thatcher, stated that "almost certainly all of them voted for Margaret Thatcher". ⁽¹²⁾ It was a protest against

the way that Heath had treated them, a hope that under a new leadership there would be more opportunities for opponents or lukewarm supporters of the Community, and an underestimation of Thatcher's commitment to membership. However she could never have been elected without the support of many of the marketeers.

There was much discussion as to Thatcher's views on Europe. Anti-marketeers liked to feel that she shared much of their position. Powell said, "She was never a committed Marketeer, though she accepted, as a condition of leadership, the European commitment; she left the referendum campaign largely and thankfully to Heath (when it began there was no certainty that Heath would have a triumph)....There is no point in the new Conservative leadership spiking itself on the commitments of the former discredited leadership". (13) Cosgrave felt that "All in all, she was certain to find herself more at home with the Tory members of the National Referendum Campaign than with their opponents, among whose ranks were to be found those most critical of her leadership". (14)

Evidence for this view was found in her changes in the Shadow Cabinet with the dismissal of six members, all 'Europeans' and including Rippon, and their replacement by people who were at least not prominent enthusiasts. She asked John Biffen to join but he declined until after the referendum. Particular concern was expressed at the selection of Reginald Maudling as Foreign Secretary.

The CGE wanted her to play a more active role in the referendum campaign, to make more European speeches and to send a letter to all Association Chairmen. (15) There was a widely held scepticism among Conservative 'Europeans' about her perceived lack of commitment to Europe and the Yes Campaign.

However this underestimates her own position. Thatcher was a

convinced marketeer, but lacked Heath's emotional involvement. She was a pragmatic 'European' who saw clear advantages to Britain in the field of peace and security, a bigger market and a world role for Britain. She took an early opportunity, in the Commons debate on the renegotiated terms, to vigorously reassert her support for the Community. (16)

The selection of her Shadow Cabinet was a reflection of the existence of the few anti-market M.P.s and the larger number of lukewarm ones amongst her supporters. None of her appointments had difficulties in endorsing the Conservative position in the campaign. Her choice of Maudling was taken only after great consultation, and with the support of Home. (17)

Soon after her election she told the Conservative campaign committee that she was keen to make a major speech on Europe at the appropriate time, which the committee felt would be May. (18) She decided that she would only speak from Conservative platforms and not for Britain in Europe, but this was in response to Wilson's decision to speak only on Labour platforms, and she feared that to do otherwise would weaken her position as Party leader. (19) She launched the CGE campaign on 16th April, under the watchful eye of its President Edward Heath, with a strong speech claiming that Conservatives have pursued the "European vision for almost as long as we have existed as a Party....Conservatives must give a clear lead and play a vigorous part in the campaign to keep Britain in Europe....We must play our full part in ensuring that Conservative supporters say 'Yes to Europe'". (20) The content of her speech was lost as attention was directed to her presence on the same platform as Heath.

She gave another strong speech on 28th April to Area Agents urging them to use all their influence to encourage local Conservative

activity; wrote a letter to all Conservative M.P.s urging their active support; mentioned Europe in all her speeches and ensured that they were always included in press handouts. (21) The Federalist, a journal published by young federalists and normally very quick to criticise any deviation from fervent Europeanism, stated that "Mrs. Thatcher...has stirred herself mightily and delivered some excellent speeches on Europe which makes her position quite clear, and firmly slapped down those in the Party who wanted the referendum for Conservative advantage". (22)

There were suggestions that she begrudged Heath's role in the campaign. However, she indirectly offered the Conservative leadership of the campaign to him which he rejected; (23) she did not exclude him from the Britain in Europe launch on 26th May as claimed in some of the press; (24) and after the campaign publicly congratulated him in the House of Commons in a question to Wilson, "Is the Prime Minister aware that all of us on this side of the House and many of that side would wish to give the campaign honours to (Mr. Heath)?" (25)

In different circumstances, she might have been expected to play a bigger role, but there were a number of specific factors which prevented that. She was aware that Conservative anti-marketeers were amongst her supporters; she was eager to heal the wounds of the past and to reunite all in the Party after the referendum; she was reluctant to help Wilson in his intra-party difficulties; she was still settling into her new leadership, without strong self-confidence; she was relatively inexperienced in foreign affairs; and she was unwilling to appear to be competing with Heath. Her support for Britain in Europe was clear and unequivocal, but her priorities lay elsewhere. The attention that the Conservative Party gave to the referendum, and the resources that were contributed to it, was a

result of the forces within the Conservative Party and not due to her own political priorities.

Cabinet and Shadow Cabinet

The Heath Cabinet had been united in favour of membership but it supported the redirection of energies away from Europe and towards other matters. John Davies was the Minister for Europe, but the Economist attacked him for merely being a co-ordinator between the various departments rather than an initiator of European policy. (26) The European Co-ordinating Committee expressed the view that the Cabinet had decided to give Europe a low profile because of a possible general election. (27)

The election of Mrs. Thatcher as Leader led to a number of changes in the Shadow Cabinet, with the departure of Rippon, Walker, Carr, Paul Channon, Nicholas Scott and Peter Thomas, and the entry of Airey Neave, Timothy Raison (who had been a lukewarm supporter of Europe), Sally Oppenheim and George Younger. The replacement of Rippon by Maudling as Shadow Foreign Secretary caused some speculation that it was an indication of a less 'European' approach. but it was motivated primarily by a desire to have an experienced politician in that position, and a 'progressive' in a field which would not involve him extensively in economic policy questions. The new Party Chairman, Lord Thorneycroft, was a long established 'European'.

The Shadow Cabinet was united in opposition to the principle of the referendum, as undermining parliamentary democracy, but considered a paper from the European Co-ordinating Committee which noted that 80% in opinion polls favoured a referendum and that an attempt to wreck the referendum bill could prove to be highly unpopular. There was also the fear that a delay on the referendum could irritate voters

into a more hostile stance. The Shadow Cabinet therefore decided to oppose the bill on the Second and Third Readings, but otherwise not to cause delay. The easy passage of the bill was contribution to the opposition by John Peyton, the Shadow Leader of the House. "I must remind the Government of how much they are indebted to the Opposition for the exceedingly reasonable, restrained and sensible way in which they received a Bill which was based on a rather unwelcome dodge and device adopted by the Prime Minister in a moment of difficulty for himself". (28)

There was no dissent in the Shadow Cabinet that the Conservative Party should campaign for a Yes vote. William Whitelaw, Deputy Leader, was given responsibility for the Conservative role in the campaign. He was chosen partly for his acceptability to the pro-marketeers in the other parties, and partly as a symbolic gesture to him and his supporters as the defeated candidate for the leadership. Whitelaw acted as Deputy President of Britain in Europe, and kept an eye on its activities for the Party. During the campaign, the main Conservative spokesmen were, apart from Mrs. Thatcher, Whitelaw, Maudling, Heath, Carrington, Rippon and Home. Maudling, was one of the Conservative spokesmen at the launch of Britain in Europe on 26th March 1975, and contributed to several press conferences, debates and newspapers. As Shadow Foreign Secretary, he could have been expected to play a more active role, but his failure to do so was attributed more to his general lack of activity rather than any doubts about the policy.

The Shadow Cabinet, during this period, therefore provided no opposition or criticism of the Party's pro-European stance.

Parliamentary Conservative Party

One of the early decisions following membership was the selection of the Conservative delegation to the European Parliament, which before direct elections in 1979 were nominated from M.P.s and peers by the Whips. It was decided by Heath to select as Leader of the delegation a junior minister with a political future rather than a retired minister, and the choice fell on Peter Kirk, Minister for the Navy, "because of my long experience of Council of Europe affairs...as well as my support for the European idea going back long before I first entered Parliament in 1955". (29) There was some confusion over the delegation, with leaks to the Times and promises of a selection committee of backbenchers. The final delegation was chosen by the Whips and included mainly committed 'Europeans', chosen for their specialist knowledge including the anti-market lawyer, Sir Derek Walker-Smith. The Economist, however, complained that "British Conservative M.P.s in Strasbourg are, with a few exceptions such as Mr. Peter Kirk, lightweights". (30)

The Group had to decide whether to join one of the political Groups already in the European Parliament or to create one of their own. Eventually they formed the European Conservative Group together with two Danes. This was a topic of some controversy as there was a lobby concerned with developing a centre-right alliance in the European Parliament and favoured membership of the Christian Democrat Group. Negotiations were conducted on joining the Christian Democrats, and it was believed by Egon Klepsch, Christian Democrat Group Leader, that an agreement to join had been made, despite the known opposition of some within his Group. However, a separate group was formed, partly because, as Kirk claimed, "there was a strong feeling that our supporters would take only just so much, and that if

the first thing we did was to change our name and apparently bring religion into politics, this would cause uproar", ⁽³¹⁾ partly because it was felt the Conservatives could have greater influence as a separate Group, and partly, according to his critics, because Kirk wanted the status of a Group Leader.

On the first day of the new Parliament, Kirk gave a speech calling for changes in the procedures of the European Parliament, which had a great impact, and was well covered in both the British and Continental press. ⁽³²⁾ The British Conservatives had a considerable influence on the method of working of the European Parliament, especially through the introduction of Question Time, and helped to invigorate it. However, its impact in the European Parliament was not reflected in the attention that the Group received in Britain, either in the Parliament or the media. There was a group of backbenchers led by Nick Scott who tried to bring Europe to Parliament's attention but it had no official recognition. This was the subject of considerable concern among Conservative 'Europeans'. ⁽³³⁾

As a response to these problems, a European Policy Committee of M.P.s was created, and met for the first time on 18th June 1974. The Chairman was Sir Anthony Royle, Secretary Hugh Dykes, and responsibilities were devolved to a number of M.P.s. A group of M.P.s, led by Peter Blaker, wrote a paper on the renegotiations; and another, led by Hurd, wrote a paper on the referendum. Other responsibilities were the European Parliament (Dodds-Parker); alternatives if the renegotiations failed (led by Marten); the long term political development of the EEC (Ridley et al); Liaison (St. John-Stevas); the link with the Nick Scott Group (Dykes and Robin Turner); Links with the European Movement (Forman); the Media Group (Geoffrey Tucker, ex-Director of Publicity); and links with Labour 'Europeans' (Royle

and Tucker).

The papers were requested to be completed in a short period of time, and by 26th July 1974 papers on renegotiations and the referendum were presented. Blaker reported that a CPC pamphlet signed by Rippon would comment on the renegotiations; Home would have an article published in the Telegraph; and his own views would be published in World Today. (34) The Hurd paper reported on the arrangements made by the various European groups in preparation for a referendum. This paper was submitted to the Shadow Cabinet. Backbenchers, however, followed their leadership in giving little attention to Europe in their election addresses in the two 1974 elections, only 22% mentioned it in the February election and 27% in the October election.. (35)

Hurd held an informal meeting on 27th November 1974 with backbenchers on the Conservative approach to a referendum. He reported to Michael Wolff, the Director of CCO, that there was strong opposition to counting the vote by constituency as this could be embarrassing. There were "strong feelings, much stronger than I had supposed, that the Party's own efforts should not be on a constituency basis. It was felt that if we used our own constituency organisations we would create a lot of local problems and reduce the number of Labour and Liberal voters for Europe". (36) The backbench recommendation was for a campaign conducted at the national level and through the media.

The Parliamentary Party was virtually unanimous against the principle of the referendum, and all but 5 Conservatives went into the opposition lobby on 11th March 1975. There were some comments on how M.P.s so concerned with parliamentary sovereignty could favour referendums. The details of the bill were much discussed within the party's Legal and European Affairs Committees, and there were a number

of M.P.s who wished to do everything possible to stop the bill. The Whips office had some difficulty in persuading M.P.s and peers to follow the Shadow Cabinet's policy of allowing its passage. (37)

On April 9th the Commons voted by 398 votes to 172 to endorse Britain's continued membership of the Community. The Labour Party divided equally on the issue, with 137 supporting the Labour Government's recommendation to stay in, and 145 voting against, including 7 Cabinet Ministers and half the junior ministers. By contrast the overwhelming majority of Conservatives voted in the government lobby, with only 8 votes against with 18 who did not vote. (38)

There had been speculation that some Conservatives might try to embarrass or even defeat the Labour Government by refusing to support it in the lobbies. The Economist declared that "The monolithic Tory vote in support of the government had not really been anticipated.... Any hope of mobilising a viable Tory campaign against the market must seem immensely forelorn". (39)

One reason for the small anti-market vote was that several anti-marketeers now accepted that Britain was in, and it should make the most of it. Derek Walker-Smith stated that

"In 12 years, through 4 Parliaments, I have spelt out both inside and outside the House two basic propositions. First, entry to the EEC would entail a material surrender or transfer of sovereignty....The second was that membership of the Community once entered into would in principle and in practice be irrevocable....We cannot break our treaty obligation without a breach of international law and good faith. Therefore, if we are to be true to ourselves and our tradition, we have no option in the matter". (40)

A similar position was taken by Hugh Fraser.

A second factor was that any hope that the new Leader would take a more ambivalent approach to Community membership was squashed by a firm and vigorous speech during the debate by Mrs. Thatcher. "It

has been suggested in some quarters that my Party might fight it tempting to withdraw support in order to embarrass the Prime Minister. But we have voted consistently for Britain in Europe by a large majority and would not think of performing U-turns on this issue". (41)

Initially Tory backbenchers were not encouraged to play an active role in the campaign, partly because of fears that this would alienate anti-market Conservatives, and partly in case they alienated vitally important Labour voters. (42) However, as the lack of Conservative opposition became clear and the campaign developed strong anti-Left themes, M.P.s were encouraged to play an active role, some even being requested to set up local Britain in Europe groups. (43) Indeed many were swept into the enthusiasm of the campaign. Goodhart quoted one M.P. "who had been far from enthusiastic about the European cause in its early days, saying 'I never thought that I would care so much'". (44)

The anti-market M.P.s found themselves much depleted. Only 8 Conservative M.P.s and one peer (*Turton, now Lord Tranmire*) actively campaigned for a No vote. Neil Marten was their leader, and became Chairman of the National Referendum Campaign (NRC), the anti-market co-ordinating body. He was a widely respected figure, with ministerial experience and considered a moderate, but not a strong enough personality to create a real impression amongst the public. (45) Sir Ronald Bell, chairman of Conservatives Against the Treaty of Rome (CATOR), was viewed as an extremist; John Biffen and Richard Body were closely associated with Powell; Teddy Taylor was active mainly in Scotland; Roger Moate was a young and inexperienced M.P. There was no Conservative anti-marketeer of real political weight, and the media had great difficulties in finding one to balance a Labour pro-marketeer.

As well as Walker-Smith and Fraser, they had lost Enoch Powell.

In May 1973 he refused to campaign for the Conservative candidate in a by-election because of his views on Europe, and in June 1973 at Stockport called for principles before Party, and in response to a question stated that he would prefer Labour rule if they would return sovereignty. (46) He was faced with increased opposition within the Wolverhampton South West Conservative Association, especially from Tettenhall ward, and the Association was bitterly divided. Powell announced that he would not stand as a candidate in the February 1974 election, and his replacement Nicholas Budgen was pro-EEC. During the election campaign he spoke at several Get Britain Out rallies, and at Birmingham urged a vote for Labour on the EEC issue, and later he stated that he had voted Labour by postal ballot. Whether his intervention had any influence is disputed. (47)

With his own decision not to stand as a Conservative due to the Party's commitment to Europe, he became very critical of Conservative antis who remained in the Party, accusing them of corruption. (48) Powell returned to the House as an Ulster Unionist in October 1974. He made 6 major speeches during the referendum and received some media coverage. However, in one opinion poll only 46% correctly identified his position. (49) Some antis felt that he would be a negative reference point for some voters and others were embarrassed to share a platform with him. The general conclusion was that he had very little impact on the referendum result. (50) His presence in the Conservative Party could have provided the prominent leadership the Tory anti-marketeers required. Instead his recommendations to vote Labour in the 1974 elections had undermined him as a serious influence on Conservative voters.

One anti-marketeer might have played a significant role if his stand had not been taken so late. Edward Du Cann was chairman of the

1922 Committee, and had abstained in 1971 and in April, but had told the House that now Britain was in, we should make a success of it. (51) It was with considerable surprise, and much embarrassment to the Party, that Du Cann told his constituency on 3rd June that half the Conservatives were anti-market.

"...the Conservative Party is divided too. The divisions may show much less than the split in the Labour Party...but it is none the less real.

It is muted for one good reason. The Conservative Party is naturally loyal to its leaders, past and present, and wishes to support them, or at least not to be seen to oppose them, wherever possible.

Were this not so, I have no doubt that at least as many Conservative Party members would be publicly seen to be against our remaining members of the EEC as are in favour. Perhaps there might even be a majority for withdrawal...

There is always a higher loyalty than Party loyalty - loyalty to one's country, and what one honestly believes to be her best interests". (52)

The speech received considerable publicity (after widespread distribution of a press release by Du Cann), and Conservative strategists feared that it might influence Conservative voters at the last minute. However, Mrs. Thatcher's response at the next morning's Central Office press conference that the Party showed an unprecedented degree of unity on this issue seemed more plausible than Du Cann's exaggerated claims. The speech was met with strong criticism from other Conservative M.P.s. David Crouch stated that "Mr. Du Cann is obviously completely out of touch with Conservative thinking. One thing that is certain to come out of this referendum...is that we shall have to elect a new Chairman of the 1922 Committee". (53) In November Du Cann was re-elected unopposed due to a desire not to cause any permanent divisions in the Party.

The situation in the parliamentary party was very different in

1975 from 1971. Tory M.P.s were even more united in favour of membership; the Conservative inclination to accept membership once Britain was in had depleted the anti-market ranks; the focus of opposition to Heath as Leader was replaced by a desire to support a new Leader who, whilst not changing the policy, was more sympathetic in its espousal; and there was no prominent anti-market leader amongst the Tory ranks. 1975 was neither 1962 nor 1971.

National Union

After entry, Associations remained in support of membership, even if most Associations preferred to concentrate on other issues. 'Europeans' urged more action by the Party, particularly concentrating on direct elections to the European Parliament and the creation of a centre-right alliance. In 1972, 27 resolutions on Europe were received for the Party Conference, only 2 negative. 6 referred to the need for centre-right co-operation and 3 to direct elections to the European Parliament. (54) The 1972 debate was held on a motion urging the Government "to take positive initiatives in the Common Market". There was a determined effort to debate direct elections with the proposal of 7 amendments, and intense lobbying for them to be called which, however, they were not. The debate was mainly concerned with new EEC policies such as EMU and regional policy, although Marten continued his campaign for a referendum, and talked about 'If' Britain entered, 11 weeks before entry. Tom Spencer of FCS launched their campaign for a European Democrat Party of centre-right parties. Home wound up by saying that the public mood was to stop talking and get on with the job, opposed the referendum as unconstitutional, and mentioned several policies that could be developed. The motion was passed by an overwhelming majority. (55)

The traditional Spectator poll of conference representatives found 263 in favour of entry and 77 against. It found even higher figures believing that membership would benefit Britain, with 278 to 68. (56)

In 1973 12 resolutions called for direct elections, together with 28 other European resolutions mostly positive. (57) There was no debate on Europe but a discussion on overseas affairs, where those who wanted to speak on direct elections were not called. Home in his speech placed EEC membership within the context of Britain's position in the world. Heath in his speech closing the conference devoted much time to discussing Europe, and several European policies, but with no mention of direct elections, which he opposed. (58)

Motions received by the NUEC reaffirmed support for membership and attacked the idea of a referendum. As the referendum approached, several Associations sent motions of support to the NUEC with no or insignificant votes against. (59) The Central Council in March 1975 again overwhelmingly endorsed membership.

Within the NUEC the leadership came under some criticism for not providing a lead over Europe and the referendum. In August 1974 the Chairman of the National Society of Conservative Agents requested guidance for Associations, which the Party Chairman, Whitelaw, promised in the future. (60) In January 1975 Frances Chambers attacked the "lack of action by the Party in this matter. She suggested that there had been no encouragement to do anything and commented upon the difficulty she had experienced in trying to find out who, within the Party, was responsible for action that should be taken". Whitelaw responded that, "our Party is absolutely committed to the policy of staying in Europe", and that "we would be doing everything possible to enlist maximum amount of support for this objective....However, it is

difficult to conduct a campaign until it is known when and how the referendum will operate" and promised more information as soon as possible. (61)

Early surveys revealed that only 30 Associations had at least one of the Chairman, Agent or candidate anti-market, and in the end only 2 Associations, both in rock solid Labour seats, voted against Europe. The Party Chairman wrote to Association Chairmen in February 1975 urging activity everywhere, with the "utmost energy though in a manner which is as non-partisan as possible", and co-operation with allies. Some Associations refused to co-operate with other Parties, but Whitelaw believed that apart from the letter not "much more guidance could be given from the centre". (62)

Associations demanded to know what assistance, especially financial, could be expected for the referendum campaign. (63) There was much talk among constituency associations that a great deal of money would be available for them to spend. They were to be disappointed.

In response Guidelines for Constituencies was produced by Miles Hudson, CGE Director. This envisaged 3 stages: a preliminary stage to inform activists; maximum information during the renegotiations; and the campaign itself of 3-4 weeks when literature should reach every voter. Hudson presented 4 alternatives: the Association could conduct its own campaign; it could co-operate with Liberals and the Labour Committee for Europe within the Local BiE; there could be a campaign just by Conservatives but not officially by the Association; or individual Conservatives could operate within the local BiE without the involvement of the Association. "If it is possible to co-ordinate the efforts of all those who are active, from whatever Party or organisation, this would clearly be an advantage. But this should not be done if the result would be a serious split in the Association".

The Association should appoint a leader responsible for the campaign, distribute literature, provide speakers, raise finance mainly locally, write letters and participate in phone-ins, in other words "as much political activity as possible on Europe". (64) Much concern was expressed that the Associations would sit out the campaign, and leave activity to the local Britain in Europe groups, which individual Conservatives could join if they wished. The Economist, for example, doubted that they would get out the Conservative vote. "At the local level the Tory referendum campaign will seldom be more than lukewarm". (65)

CCO however was surprised at the positive response from the grass roots. The CPC discussion groups on Europe: Yes or No? in April 1975 found 94% Yes, 4½% No and 1½% Don't Know. It proved difficult to get an exact assessment on meetings held, but by 10th March 1975 350 meetings had already been held by Associations and there were probably over 500 by the end. (66) There was a heavy sale of Party materials, while several million were distributed free. Agents and Associations were continually demanding more money and literature for distribution. Most Associations in fact co-operated well with other parties within the BiE, despite some friction. Christopher Soames, the Conservative EEC Commissioner, who spoke extensively at Conservative meetings reported that "He found more than expected local activity generally, less division in the Party than anticipated, and wide variation in the forms of local activity". (67) One Conservative organiser from the East Midlands wrote that, "Towards the end of the campaign, where no groups existed, we persuaded the Party organisations to reform themselves into official committees". By the end of May 88% of the BiE local groups claimed to have the official support of the local Conservatives. (68) The Economist reported that "co-operation between Labour pro-marketeers and Tory activists has gone surprisingly

well at constituency level". (69) Thus the campaign produced greater enthusiasm and less intra-party division than CCO expected.

The youth sections were very critical of the lack of European activity by the Party. At the 1972 Conference the Y.C.'s presented 2 motions, urging direct elections and democratic control by the European Parliament, and Conservative membership of the European Union of Christian Democrats, and they issued a leaflet complaining about the suppression by the Party managers of a debate on direct elections. (70) Lynda Chalker, Vice-Chairman, spoke in the debate in support of direct elections. The 1973 Y.C. Conference passed a motion in support of a United Europe and democratic control. By the end of the year the Young Conservative N.A.C. adopted a policy, by 23 to 13, in favour of a European Federation or a United States of Europe. (71)

FCS adopted motions at their Annual Conferences in favour of a European Defence Community, and direct elections in 1972 and unilateral direct elections at the same time as the next general election in 1973. They were particularly active in the Campaign for the European Democrat Party (EDP). In July 1972, an EDP Charter was adopted at a conference in London by student and youth representatives from 8 countries. At the 1972 Party Conference, Tom Spencer, the new ECCS Chairman, spoke on the EDP unveiling a Vote EDP poster, and a leaflet was distributed. FCS instigated an all-party seminar organised by Students for a United Europe (SUE) on "European Political Parties - is the time ripe?" at Cambridge 12-16th April 1973; a research programme comparing European centre-right parties, which led to the publication by CPC of Foundations for Alignment by Scott Hamilton; and an EDP Campaign Conference in Edinburgh, 3rd-6th January 1975.

The Young Conservatives and FCS, concerned on the low level of European activity, formed Young European Democrats (YED) in January 1974, whose aims included "to work for a more federal Europe". The YED National Council "was dismayed at evidence of continuing emphasis on the part of Conservative Elders on the alleged need to pursue a low profile on Europe. Young Conservatives, FCS and YED were absolutely agreed that this was a certain recipe for disaster and reeked of a lack of self-confidence over the issue of Europe...the Young Conservatives had for some time been pressing for political organisation and direction on the European Front within the Conservative Party as there was a complete lack of co-ordination". (72) YED organised briefing seminars and conferences, and encouraged European activity among the youth sections.

Soames launched the Young Conservative referendum campaign at the Young Conservative Conference in February 1975, with their own literature, badges and stickers. FCS also conducted its own campaign, urged "the Party to use all its resources to endorse an affirmative result", campaigned within the National Union of Students, organised a Campaign Committee, and produced its own leaflets, stickers, badges and beer mats with the slogan "We've got to get in to get on". The Young Conservatives and FCS also provided the backbone of Youth for Europe and Students for a United Europe, providing most of the personnel and resources, which led to some conflict with the Young European Left and the Young Liberals.

Tom Spencer of FCS was Chairman of Britain in Europe Youth Steering Committee; Michael Fallon, formerly of FCS, was the Youth Officer; FCS controlled Students for a United Europe; and the magazine, the Federalist, was written mainly by young Conservatives, edited by former FCS chairman Andrew Neil. Tom Spencer also became personal assistant

to Sir Con O'Neill, BiE President. Greater London Y.C.s organised the massive Youth for Europe rally in Trafalgar Square, which was described by Roy Jenkins as receiving the best publicity for any BiE event. (72) The Y.C.s predicted that 90% of their members would vote Yes. Britain in Europe were eager to promote the impression that youth was in enthusiastic support of membership, and thus persuade voters that it was in the interests of their children and grand-children. It was primarily through the work of the Young Conservatives and Conservative students that this image was successfully conveyed to the public.

The Women organised a European Union of Women (EUW) conference at Oxford in September 1973, debated Europe at their 1974 conference with Baroness Elles replying, and decided that the Chairman of the British section of EUW would automatically be Vice-Chairman (Europe) of the Women's Advisory Committee. Even the TUNAC conference, traditionally less enthusiastic about Europe than other parts of the Party, in March 1975 urged, by an overwhelming majority, moderate trade unionists to vote Yes. (73)

Central Office

The CRD was considering the difficulties for the Party of activity in the European Parliament even before the third reading of the membership Bill. Michael Niblock produced a memorandum on 'The Role of the CRD in the Context of the European Parliament', which was to provide a link between MEP's and the Government, MEP's and the Parliamentary Party, and MEP's and the Party. There would be considerable problems in communications on Europe between the different elements of the Party, which would require the appointment of a small European group. (74) Niblock reported to Prior on the

preparations for the European Parliament, which included the need for information to be given to the Westminster M.P.s and the creation of an ad hoc group of backbenchers (the Nick Scott group). (75) Niblock also produced a report on "Thinking European", and how the Government should handle the Party, by making clear at an early stage upon what issues they would take a hard-line. (76)

During 1974 the CRD was naturally taken up with the two election campaigns, and followed the leadership's decision to give Europe a low profile.

In response to 'European' pressure on the lack of activity, in November 1974 Whitelaw asked Lord Fraser to set up a European Co-ordination Committee (ECC) "to co-ordinate activity within the Party in regard to European developments over the next year, and to keep in touch with other bodies and individuals in the same field". It was a small group with Fraser as Chairman, Michael Wolff Director-General, Richard Webster Director of Organisation, Alex Todd Director of Publicity, William Waldegrave representing Heath, Chris Patten Director of the CRD, and Nigel Forman of CRD as Secretary. It was this group of people which organised and co-ordinated the Conservative contribution to the referendum, meeting every Monday. Their terms of reference were to co-ordinate Conservative Party activity at all levels in preparation for a likely referendum, and to contact other bodies outside the Party with similar objectives, and to make proposals for action to safeguard membership. (77)

In November 1974 Forman presented a paper on how the Party should handle the question of the referendum, with 4 options: to accept the inevitability of a referendum and offer no parliamentary opposition, but this would be unpopular with M.P.s and many Conservatives; to oppose the referendum on the 2nd Reading only, which was a sign of weakness;

try and wreck it which would be consistent but unpopular with 80% of the public in favour of a referendum; or fight it in the Lords, which would delay it but raise other constitutional issues. Forman recommended a free vote. (78) The paper was adopted by the ECC and sent to the Shadow Cabinet.

Forman presented another paper on the campaign which recommended full co-operation with Britain in Europe; nothing should be done to undermine Labour or Trade Union 'Europeans'; the campaign should begin immediately and be given the highest priority. He presented detailed proposals for Parliament, the Party organisation, the CRD and the media. The campaign themes should be the advantages of membership and the dangers of withdrawal, with minor themes of jobs, the children's future, the EEC cares, special interests and "Who Wants Out". (79) The ECC decided not to have a particular Conservative slogan but to adopt the general one of Britain in Europe.

The first activity was to organise 12 regional conferences in the first three months of 1975 with Soames as the main speaker. They were a great success, with a high acceptance rate, an average of 300 participants per conference, and 80% of the Associations expressed an interest in following up the conference. (80) There were several difficulties. Wolff had to convince Soames to allow the press, while he would have preferred to speak more freely without them; (81) Soames offended some with his response to a question that "I believe going into Europe is based essentially on the capitalist system", (82) which should show people the wisdom of having "a government which believes in free enterprise and the capitalist system"; and Forman temporarily vetoed the distribution of "some of the more suspect publications" of the European Movement at the seminars. (83)

An ORC poll was conducted for the Party, and Forman reported

that the strongest argument for the antis was the price of food; there was the need for some idealism for the young; the EEC must be seen to help the poor; Government information would have a considerable influence; and the Conservatives must avoid a Party battle, by excluding arguments such as it weakens the trade unions, and Conservative speakers should always consult with Labour 'Europeans' when entering Labour areas. A high poll would probably be good, but it might bring out Labour voters. (84)

The ECC decided against a canvass and for a literature drop; for a special campaign budget; against a separate Conservative campaign in case that alienated Labour voters; formed a publicity group to prepare Conservative literature; agreed to monitor the media for Britain in Europe; and created an Information Unit under David Knapp which received few inquiries. (85) A detailed campaign guide was produced after instructions from Mrs. Thatcher, but it was late and there was some confusion as to whether Mrs. Thatcher should write a foreword. Eventually it was published without a foreword. (86)

Six Conservative leaflets were produced, including a controversial anti-Left one, and altogether CCO distributed 10 million leaflets (3½ million Conservative, 6½ million Britain in Europe), more than in any general election. (87)

The CPC remained active on Europe even before the likelihood of the referendum, with the publication of several pamphlets on Europe, on industry, agriculture, the centre-right, the views of Soames, Kirk and Davies, and 'Our Future in Europe' by Rippon which re-stated the case for membership and against withdrawal, and Europe was also included in pamphlets on VAT, energy and Western civilisation. (88) Two CPC discussion briefs on Europe were produced in November 1972 and April 1975. The first found two-thirds of participants in favour of direct elections

even if that meant a federal Parliament. There was some support for a European Parliament, half nominated and half elected; concern over the turnout; and support for monetary union and a Regional Policy. The second report found 94% support for membership and almost total opposition to a referendum. (89) The CPC organised a special conference in Belgium on "Britain's Prospects in the European Community", 24-26th November 1972; a weekend Conference in June 1973 and a one day symposium in London on 25th January 1974, which attracted 400 participants.

The Swinton Journal published a number of articles on Europe. Kai-Uwe von Hassel gave the annual Swinton Lecture on Conservatism and Christian Democracy in Europe, Bessborough wrote on a technological Europe, Paterson on A European Welfare State?, Michael Berendt of the EEC Information Office on agriculture, and Robin Turner and Derek Prag on the internal problems of the EEC. (90)

The Overseas Committee, under Lady Elles, provided a forum for Conservative 'Europeans', and it discussed three main aims: the development of centre-right co-operation, a stronger influence on European activities, and the encouragement of greater European activity by the Party. The Committee discussed a change of name for the European Conservative Group and suggestions included Democratic Centre, European Centre and Centre Democrat, and these ideas were discussed with Party Chairman Lord Carrington, but this made no progress. (91)

The Inter-Party Meeting between centre-right parties became more established, and an International Office under Sir John Peele was set up to deal with external Party contacts. The Committee also discussed the lack of Conservative influence in the European Movement and the European Community Information Office. Beamish argued for the "importance of such an appointment" of a Conservative in the European

Community Information Office, and a similar point was made by Niblock. The CGE agreed to try to exercise more influence on the European Movement.

Lady Elles wrote to Carrington in October 1973 that "Considerable concern was expressed about the increasing anti-market feeling in the country and the apparent lack of publicity and stimulus to our European activities and justification for Government policies in Europe. There was strong feeling that an energetic publicity campaign was required to counteract the increasing socialist anti-market propaganda and to explain and report on our policies and achievements". (92) She urged the appointment of a senior Cabinet minister as responsible for the campaign. Carrington responded that Vice-Chairman Geoffrey Johnson-Smith was responsible for publicity. Eventually the protest of the Committee and other 'Europeans' led to the response that "Number 10 now recognised that it had been a mistake to play Europe in low profile" and that there was "a conscious change of mind in the Government and a recognition that the policy of deliberately playing down Europe had been an error". (95) Lady Elles immediately presented a series of proposals, and met with Rippon to discuss whether, and if so how actively, to press the case for Community membership; Wolff called a CCO meeting on 17th August 1974 to examine the function of the Party machine in this regard, which eventually led to the creation of the ECC; and the European Policy Committee of M.P.s was formed on 18th June 1974.

Central Office had followed the decision of the Government to give Europe a low profile, but once it had been decided, with the creation of the European Co-ordinating Committee, that Europe was to become a major priority for the Party, Central Office gave it their full attention. There were a few, such as the Director of

Organisation Richard Webster, who doubted the value of the campaign, but that view was not widely shared.

The Informal Party

The Bow Group produced a detailed memorandum on Europe in October 1972 by David Baker CGE Deputy Chairman, Peter Ratzer and Bernard Brooke-Patridge, which called for institutional reforms implying a federalist direction, and detailed proposals for direct elections. ⁽⁹⁴⁾ However, Europe featured less and more critically in Bow Group publications. An Alternative Manifesto in October 1973 re-affirmed support for membership but added "We shall not hesitate to make Britain's interests clear to the rest of the Community. We are not prepared to pay a high price for entry into the EEC without the guarantee of concrete benefits now and in the future", ⁽⁹⁵⁾ and presented a confederalist conception of the EEC. Crossbow published a critical article on Peter Shore and Europe in January 1974, but at the same time a Group pamphlet on The First Year in Europe was not a ringing endorsement, describing the most fundamental impact as the destruction of national sovereignty. ⁽⁹⁶⁾ During the debate from late 1974 to the referendum day, the only contribution was a debate on sovereignty in Crossbow, and two pamphlets arguing for and against a referendum. ⁽⁹⁷⁾ The Group had gradually moved to the right, and in 1975 elected Patricia Hodgeson as chairman, who was outspokenly right-wing. "She is out of tune with her members only in being lukewarm about, if not actively against the Common Market". ⁽⁹⁸⁾ The move to the right had not changed the Group's basically favourable position, but it had developed a more confederalist and less idealistic approach. There was none of the great enthusiasm that had come from Bow Group members and publications of the past.

The Monday Club had continued to be disrupted by internal disputes. There was a bitter fight for the chairmanship in July 1972 which Jonathan Guinness won by 676 votes to 228 for Richard Body, 48 to Tim Stroud. The battle was repeated in May 1973 with 625 votes to Guinness and 455 to G.K. Young. Many members resigned, rebels were expelled, some branches banned and a rival Tuesday Club formed. The division was between a leadership which pursued a responsible opposition within the Conservative Party, and the rebels who were willing to support candidates against the official Conservative and some even flirted with the National Front. Attitudes to Powell were an important element in this division. The editor of Monday World, supporting the leadership, wrote that "we are an elitist group bent on rationalising right-wing policy and selling it to those in power. The temptation to be drawn by frustration or emotion into anti-Establishment and anti-hierarchical populism, which is totally alien to the Tory tradition, must be resisted". (99)

Europe was one of the issues which divided the Club. Guinness was identified with Europe while Body was a prominent anti. The Club newsletter was filled with letters between those who supported or at least accepted membership, and those who urged withdrawal and cited hostile public opinion. (100) The former view won. A Monday Club Policy Document stated "The Monday Club will back the Government in the assertion of British rights and sovereignty within the Community, in drastic amendment of the CAP and in the curbing of bureaucracy in Brussels. We hold that the nation remains the greatest European political reality". (101) Even Biffen in a speech to the Monday Club argued that "the talk is Community, the action is national" and that membership could be accepted if national co-operation was the way forward. (102) The Monday Club published a series of speeches by

Julian Amery which included his European speech to the 1974 Party Conference, and a pamphlet against a referendum because "voters may be led by appeals to prejudice, parochialism, jingoism and anti red herrings". (103) During the referendum the Monday Club did not take a position.

The Conservative Group for Europe was uncertain of its role after entry, which led to a big debate based on proposals presented by David Baker and E.G. Thompson. It organised supper meetings, one day conferences, a Swinton weekend conferences, organised a stand and a reception at the Party Conferences, a European Evening, briefly a journal 'Tory European', and had attracted 1,000 members by January 1974.

The CGE had three main concerns. Firstly, "the CGE fulfilled an admirable function in preventing the European Movement being dominated by the Socialists" (Beamish). (104) One of its aims was "to ensure that Conservatives were given full representation both within the Movement itself and in delegations and groups sent to meetings and Conferences in the Community". (105) The CGE was an integrated part of the European Movement and the source of much of its membership, but there was a widespread feeling that power lay in the hands of the Director, former Labour candidate Ernest Wistrich. Douglas Dodds-Parker M.P. complained that "The Socialists had the European Movement behind them". (106) There were frequent complaints about the content of Movement publications and it was agreed that "unless formal representation of some sort were arranged, then the Group would not distribute future issues of these publications". (107) The Economist reported that many Tories "believed that the European Movement is a socialist-ridden organisation living off capitalist money. They want the CGE to take a more active line, for instance, by using its majority to demand more than

parity in the decision-taking committees. Some are even going so far as threatening to replace the present Chairman, Lord Harlech with Sir Tufton Beamish". (108) No coup was attempted but relations remained difficult.

The second concern was the lack of both government and party support to the European Conservative Group in the European Parliament. The Group even had to add to Peter Kirk's salary as Group Leader to make it up to that of a junior minister that had surrendered upon taking up the post with the Group. This arrangement ended with the February 1974 election and the move to opposition. The Group believed that it was the responsibility of the Government to support the ECG. In that absence they set up a European Representation Fund and Lord Carrington spoke to a private dinner on 3rd December 1973 to help raise funds for the CGE and the Fund. It was not, however, a great success, as the businessmen present also felt that it was a governmental responsibility.

Their greatest concern was over the lack of Party activity on Europe. The Chairman, Sir Gilbert Longden, felt that the Party had much to gain or lose on Europe at the next election and that it was of "vital importance that we should communicate the urgency of putting this across at all levels of the Party". (109) However, "the CGE was not equipped with the money or the organisation to spread the gospel to the grass roots. This could only be done through the Party, and, its organisation". (110) St. John Stevas expressed "grave concern at the failure of the Government to put over the European case...it was vital that there should be a strong lead from the centre" and urged that the Chairman should "approach the Prime Minister - as the President of the Group - and explain to him our concern about the situation and ask that a strong lead be given". (111) This remained a constant

theme of CGE meetings and the Chairman felt it necessary to stress "that however much the Committee felt that the Government had been ineffectual in influencing public opinion on Europe, the Government remained fully in favour of Europe". (112)

After a meeting with Michael Wolff, the new Party Secretary-General, the Chairman reported that "the need was recognised to abandon the low profile that the Party had taken in the past over Europe". (113) Wolff discussed the matter with Heath, which resulted in several speeches on Europe. The CGE Director, Jim Spicer, reported that he was confident that action would be taken and that Europe would be a definite priority for the Party in 1975. (114) A speech by Wolff to the CGE Council on the Party's European Campaign was met with comments that it was "too little and too late", and that "the essential orders have not yet been issued to the potential troops by the High Command". (115) Even after the referendum Miles Hudson, the Director, reported that "the Conservative Party could have done more than it did". (116)

With the likelihood of a referendum Miles Hudson was appointed CGE Director in November 1974 and co-opted onto the ECC. Hudson had worked at the CRD and as an adviser to Home at the Foreign Office, and became fully integrated into the Central Office Campaign. The CGE became more active through the recruitment of more prominent members, the organisation of Association meetings, visits to the European institutions, the re-establishment of links with Labour and Liberal M.P.s, a rally at Central Hall and a conference in Scotland. Its referendum campaign was launched by Mrs. Thatcher. The CGE continued its criticism of the Party's performance, wanting a meeting of Association Chairmen and a more vigorous involvement of Mrs. Thatcher. Hudson stated that in Associations "he found a great deal of goodwill towards the European cause and few misgivings about

internal Party dissension on the matter". (117) The CGE did not play the Parliamentary role of 1971-72, but it was a useful source of contact with Labour and Liberal 'Europeans', and it provided a source of local activists who provided the enthusiasm within the local Associations.

The European Movement was marked by extreme suspicion by many Conservatives, but it did provide the forum for co-operation with other parties, and by autumn 1974 a liaison group for a possible referendum campaign was formed with Chairman Lord Harlech, Treasurer Timothy Sainbury, Royle, Alistair McAlpine, representing the Conservatives. The European League for Economic Co-operation (ELEC) was another forum aimed primarily at industry and the trade unions, with Hurd as Director, Rippon as Chairman and McAlpine as Treasurer. (118) It was a meeting between the Movement and ELEC which led to the creation of Britain in Europe.

The European Movement was viewed as an unacceptable vehicle for the pro-European campaign, partly because of the considerable Conservative hostility, partly because of doubts as to its efficiency, and partly because of its "extreme" federalist image. Relations between Britain in Europe and the European Movement proved difficult, and the operations were separate with Britain in Europe at Old Park Lane and the European Movement remaining at Whitehall Place. Preparations for the creation of Britain in Europe began in late 1974 with Fraser as a member of the Steering Group. The ex-civil servant, Sir Con O'Neill, was appointed chairman, and a number of important positions were given to Labour men, President, publicity director, research director and press officer, but most of the lower profile positions went to Conservatives mainly because of their greater experience, e.g. Roger Boaden was seconded from CCO to organise the mass rallies, McAlpine

and Bruce-Gardyne on finance, and Tucker on publicity. Whitelaw was only one of the Britain in Europe Vice-Presidents but in practice he acted as Deputy President and co-operated closely with Jenkins. As Butler and Kitzinger noted, "the Conservative Party was providing much of the administrative backbone of the Britain in Europe campaign". (119) However, the Conservatives were very sensitive to the need for a good Labour vote. The Conservatives and the European Movement wanted the Britain in Europe launch in January 1975, but due to the problems of the Labour Committee for Europe the official launch was not until 26th March 1975. At the launch, because of the lack of a third prominent Labour spokesman, there were only two spokesmen from each party. (120) There was always a balance between the parties on Britain in Europe platforms despite frequent difficulties in obtaining Labour speakers. The Conservatives were always careful to avoid friction, but there were some suspicions that some Labour people were abusing their position to avoid too much criticism by their own Party. Fears were expressed about the suitability of some Britain in Europe literature and broadcasts, and Royle was asked to monitor Britain in Europe broadcasts from the Conservative point of view. (121) 3½ million Britain in Europe leaflets were distributed through the CCO. The Conservatives were willing to submerge their Conservative identity in order to obtain a maximum Yes vote. Lord Fraser reported to the ECC that "Co-operation at the top of the BiE all-Party effort was on the whole extremely good and better than could have been conceivably anticipated". (122)

The activities of Conservative anti-marketeers were spread amongst a number of organisations. The biggest anti-market organisation was the Common Market Safeguards Campaign but it was dominated by trade unionists and Labour Party members, so with the

exception of Neil Marten, it was generally avoided by Conservatives. Get Britain Out (GBO) was run by Christopher Frere-Smith, a former Liberal candidate, but it attracted the support of most Conservative anti-marketeers, and provided a platform for Powell. Richard Body and Sir Iain McTaggart were active in GBO, and Marten, Bell and Moate spoke at GBO meetings. The Anti-Common Market League, under the chairmanship of Sir Robin Williams, was forced to share offices with the Safeguards Campaign, and was able to conduct little activity. In 1973 and 1974 it manned anti-market bookshops at the Conservative Conferences. Despite frequent appeals, Powell refused to become a Vice President of the League. (123) In October 1974 they attempted to distribute material to all Conservative Associations. The Trident Group was an explicitly Conservative anti-market group under Victor Montagu, but, apart from a letter to local Associations and the distribution of some car stickers, it was an obscure organisation. British Business for World Markets was free trade oriented, started by Anthony Fisher, one of the founders of the Institute of Economic Affairs, and run by Wilf Proudfoot, a former Conservative candidate, attracting little support outside of a few Yorkshire businessmen. Tory anti-market activity failed to find a coherent focus

Despite considerable suspicions between the different groups, they agreed to form the National Referendum Campaign (NRC) on January 7th 1975, with Neil Marten as chairman. Friction between the groups continued, and the NRC operated primarily as a co-ordinating body. The NRC was largely dependent on the trade unions for finance, staff and organisation on the ground, but this was disliked by some Conservatives. Butler and Kitzinger quoted one Twickenham lady. "I found myself driven to consort with Communists, international socialists, left-wing Labour Party members and Marxists on the issue.

Only a most passionate love of this country gave me the stomach to do so". (124)

The need for an explicitly Conservative anti-market appeal led to the creation of Conservatives Against the Treaty of Rome (CATOR) by Ronald Bell M.P. and Hugh Simmonds from Bell's Beaconsfield constituency. CATOR spent £600 on 140,000 leaflets and wrote to every Association. It claimed that 4 out of 5 Associations had replied that they were taking no part in the campaign. These claims were dismissed by Central Office. CATOR failed to have any impact, partly because it was organised at a very late stage in the campaign, and partly because of its populist tone. It expressed no faith in the judgement of the Establishment, "when we remember that the conventional wisdom has been wrong about nearly every major political issue this century". This style was not welcome to those like Marten who wanted to return to a full role in the Party in the future. Above all, CATOR and the Tory anti-marketeers in general failed to influence many voters because of the identification of the anti-market cause with the Left. CATOR complained that "A myth has grown up that those of us who are opposed to the EEC are a motley crew of Marxist extremists out to destroy Britain...the existence of CATOR (is) itself a repudiation of this charge". (125) CATOR indeed was explicitly created to dispel that image, but it failed to do so. Tory anti-marketeers, such as the Anti-Common Market League, recognised that throughout the campaign there had been a "slippage of right-wing anti-common market voters" and attributed the lack of a Conservative anti-market vote to the Red Smear and Benn. (126)

The CBI remained committed to Community membership, and conducted its own campaign under the slogan, "Think It Over", with briefing kits, leaflets and posters, spending £50,000. A Special Operations

Unit under Richard Dixon was created, John Whitehorn became the CBI representative to BiE, and Liaison Officers were appointed throughout the regions. The CBI lost no opportunity to restate its position. One example was a statement on 22nd March 1975. "The CBI has long asserted that the chief benefits of membership would be slow to materialise; today it must stress that the disadvantages of withdrawal would come swiftly. It is more than ever convinced of its original view that membership carries a long term balance of advantage; it is increasingly conscious of the fearful dangers of withdrawal". (127)

The CBI's position that industry was overwhelmingly in favour of the Community was confirmed in surveys by the European Representation Fund under Lord Selston, which found 91% of the 200 biggest companies in favour (128) and an Economist/ORC poll which found 95% Yes, 2% No and 3% Don't Know. (129)

The National Farmers Union also called for a Yes vote. The NFU Council stated in March "that it will be in the long term interests of British agriculture for the U.K. to remain a member of the European Community". (130) The NFU Chairman, Sir Henry Plumb, was an active campaigner.

The Conservative press remained consistently pro-market. The Telegraph repeated its commitment, stating that there was "an intellectual, moral and spiritual value" in the Common Market. (131)

It did, however, create concern among Tory strategists when it published an article by the respected Tory journalist, Peregrine Worsethorpe, urging a No vote as a way to bring down the Wilson government. (132)

This was quickly repudiated by Mrs. Thatcher and certainly did not represent the paper's editorial viewpoint. "The Times is a committed European newspaper" summed up its position. (133). The Financial Times, Mail and Sun all urged a Yes vote. Even the Express, under

the editorship of the pro-market Alistair Burnet, presented a balance of viewpoints, although the large number of anti-market advertisements suggested that it was still seen as a paper with many anti-market readers.

The Economist retained its position of over 25 years of support for entry, and provided substantial sympathetic coverage to the pro-market cause, as well as its own series of briefings. The Spectator meanwhile was an important centre of Conservative anti-market activity under its proprietor Harry Creighton and journalists Patrick Cosgrave and George Gale. It endorsed Powell's position that one must vote for the one major party that offers independence, although at the February 1974 election it advised a Conservative vote as Wilson could not be trusted, while George Gale, its former editor, openly declared his vote for Labour. (134) Cosgrave declared that "the Tory Party is in its heart against it". (135) The Spectator ran a regular feature, the Sovereign State, a column for anti-market writers, mainly Conservative. The journal also played an active role in the NRC, providing a Party home for its research team, Creighton and Cosgrave on its executive, Gale as the co-author of the NRC pamphlet with Marten, and Cosgrave as the co-presenter, with Paul Johnson of the New Statesman, of the NRC's political broadcast. The Spectator was an important source of journalistic talent for the anti-market cause, but with its low circulation influenced few people.

The referendum vote provided a two to one majority to stay in. Opinion polls had consistently shown that Conservatives were overwhelmingly pro-market, and that trend was strengthened throughout the campaign. Gallup, in January 1975, found that among Conservatives 52%

were pro-European, 29% anti-European, 9% wouldn't vote and 10% didn't know. (136) ORC reported in March that Conservatives split 61% for, 24% against, 15% don't know. (137) By just before the referendum day, Gallup reported a 65% Yes vote among Conservatives, 12% No and 23% who did not intend to vote. (138) Michael Steed in his analysis in the Economist estimated that 85% of Conservatives who voted in the referendum had voted Yes. (139) Anthony King, in his analysis, shows that "Conservative parts of the country produced larger 'Yes' majorities than Labour parts". (140) What is certain is that the Conservative vote was crucial to the final result.

Conclusion

The 1975 referendum confirmed that whatever the situation in the past, the Conservative Party was almost totally united in favour of British membership of the European Community. The concern of Heath to play Europe cool because of electoral considerations may have been a less accurate assessment than that of the Conservative 'Europeans' who argued that the lack of leadership only played into the hands of the Labour Party, while a firm attempt to persuade the electorate of the virtues of membership would have met with success. While Mrs. Thatcher's position was certainly pro-European, it is not clear that she would have chosen to commit so much of the Party's resources to the campaign, if there had not been a strong consensus within the Party on the need to win a Yes vote. The Cabinet, and later the Shadow Cabinet, appears to have shared the position of the Leader.

Support for Europe became stronger in the parliamentary party, as a new generation of M.P.s entered Parliament throughout whose political history the Party had been pro-European, while the anti-market M.P.s were retiring or dying and were not replaced by a new generation.

Others simply respected the status quo and while lukewarm supporters, or even former opponents, they accepted the case against withdrawal.

The National Union continued to reflect pro-market opinion from the constituencies, and were even critical of the lack of commitment by the leadership. Surveys by the Organisation Department, the CPC discussion groups, motions to Party conferences and the NUEC, feedback from the regional offices, and reports from speakers like Christopher Soames or organisers like Miles Hudson all found far more willingness to campaign than had been expected. Fears of divisiveness expressed by Whitelaw and Fraser proved to be largely groundless.

The Y.C.s and Conservative students found themselves wanting to push ahead much faster than the Party. In particular their campaign for direct elections to the European Parliament met with little sympathy with the leadership. Similarly their support for federalism was seen as an embarrassment which might frighten others, and especially during the referendum they felt their views suppressed.

The Research Department was concerned with the adoption of the Party to membership, particularly with regard to the European Parliament, but this concern was not expressed by the Government. With the creation of the European Co-ordinating Committee, Central Office threw itself wholeheartedly into the campaign and managed to organise an impressive range of meetings and to distribute a massive amount of literature, while at the same time supporting Britain in Europe through the secondment of staff, the monitoring of the media and the distribution of BiE literature.

The informal elements of the Party too were more strongly 'European' than ever before. The Conservative Group for Europe, the Tories in Britain in Europe, the CBI, the NFU, the Tory press and the Economist all campaigned strongly for a Yes vote. The Bow Group and

the Monday Club failed to play a significant role, while the Tory anti-marketeers were badly organised, and lacked a coherent structure. The Anti-Common Market League, the Trident Group, British Business for World Markets, CATOR and the Spectator all reached relatively few people, while the Express was no longer the mass organ of the Conservative anti-marketeers.

The Conservative Party was united to keep Britain in Europe even without strong leadership from the top.

REFERENCESCHAPTER 7

1. David McKie and Chris Cooke, The Guardian Election Guide, October 1974, (London, Quartet, 1974), p.27.
2. Firm Action for a Fair Britain, (CCO, 1974).
3. Putting Britain First, (CCO, 1974).
4. The best discussion of how the Labour Party came to call the referendum is Anthony King, Britain Says Yes, (Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute, 1977).
5. H.C. Debates, Vol. 889, 7th April 1975, c.840.
6. CGE General Purposes Committee, 11th November 1973.
7. Overseas Committee, 28th November 1973.
8. Economist, 2nd February 1974.
9. ibid
10. ibid, 11th August 1973.
11. ibid, 23rd September 1973.
12. Patrick Cosgrave, Margaret Thatcher, (London, Hutchinson, 1978), p.187.
13. Roy Lewis, Enoch Powell: Principle in Politics, (London, Cassell, 1979), p.226.
14. Cosgrave, op cit, p.187.
15. ECC, 5th May 1975.
16. Economist, 12th April 1975.
17. Cosgrave, op cit, p.184.
18. ECC, 17th February 1975.
19. ibid, 24th March 1975.
20. Speech to the CGE Referendum Campaign Launch, 16th April 1975.
See Economist, 19th April 1975.
21. ECC, 28th April 1975, 5th May 1975, 12th May 1975.
22. The Federalist, 1st May 1975.
23. Privately confirmed by a member of Heath's personal staff.

24. David Butler and Uwe Kitzinger, The 1975 Referendum, (London, Macmillan, 1976), p.77.
25. H.C. Debates 895, 9th June 1975, c.231.
26. Economist, 27th October 1973.
27. ECC, 28th November 1973.
28. H.C. Debates, Vol. 891, 7th May 1975, c.1579.
29. Kirk, "A Team for Europe", Spectator, 21st August 1976, reprinted in Peter Kirk 1928-1977, (European Conservative Group, 1977).
30. Economist, 19th October 1974.
31. Kirk, op cit.
32. ibid. See also Kirk, "Britain's Imprint on Europe", Spectator, 4th September 1976, reprinted in ibid.
33. For example, 26th July 1973.
34. Blaker, "Labour's renegotiations: a Conservative view". World Today, (August 1974). Rippon, Our Future in Europe, (CPC, September 1974).
35. Butler and Kavanagh, The British General Election of February 1974, (London, Macmillan, 1974), p.63. Butler and Kitzinger, op cit, p.34.
36. Hurd to Wolff, 28th November 1974.
37. Butler and Kitzinger, op cit, p.65.
38. ibid, p.52.
39. Economist, 12th April 1975.
40. H.C. Debates, Vol. 889, 9th April 1975, c.1309-1316.
41. H.C. Debates, Vol. 889, 8th April 1975.
42. Whitelaw, ECC, 24th March 1975.
43. Butler and Kitzinger, op cit, p.120.
44. Philip Goodhart, Full Hearted Consent, (London, Davis-Poynter, 1976), p.180.
45. See Goodhart's tribute, ibid, p.5. Butler and Kitzinger, op cit, p.100.
46. Times, 11th June 1973.
47. Douglas Schoen, Enoch Powell and the Powellites, (London, Macmillan, 1974), p.128.

48. Times, 23rd November 1974.
49. Schoen, op cit, p.148.
50. ibid, p.150. Butler and Kitzinger, op cit, p.178.
51. H.C. Debates, Vol. 883, 18th December 1974, c.1649.
52. Press Release, Speech by Edward Du Cann, Taunton, 3rd June 1975.
53. Butler and Kitzinger, op cit, p.174.
54. Conference Handbook 1972.
55. Verbatim Conference Report 1972.
56. Spectator, 21st October 1972.
57. Conference Handbook 1973.
58. Verbatim Conference Report 1973.
59. NUEC, 18th May 1974, 24th May 1974, 17th January 1975, 19th September 1975.
60. NUEC, 18th July 1974.
61. NUEC, 16th January 1975.
62. ECC, 3rd February 1975.
63. ECC, 27th January 1975, 10th February 1975.
64. Hudson, Guidelines for Constituencies, (ECC, 17th February 1975).
65. Economist, 12th April 1975.
66. ECC, 10th March 1975.
67. Overseas Committee, 6th March 1975.
68. Butler and Kitzinger, op cit, p.120.
69. Economist, 3rd May 1975.
70. Evening Standard, 15th October 1972.
71. NUEC, 24th May 1973.
72. Young European Democrats National Executive Committee, 30th July 1974.
73. National Union Executive Committee, 1973-1975.
74. Niblock, The Role of the CRD in the Context of the European Parliament, to Douglas, 18th May 1972.

75. Niblock, Preparations for the European Parliament, to Prior, 4th August 1972.
76. Niblock, Thinking European or How to win friends and influence people in the Common Market, 4th February 1972.
Niblock, European Policy and Party Politics, to Douglas, 6th December 1972.
77. ECC, 21st November 1974.
78. Forman, Problems of Public Decision on Britain's Membership, ECC, 21st November 1974.
79. Forman, Activities and Themes for Conservative Pro-European Campaign, 28th November 1974.
80. ECC, 9th December 1974, 13th February 1975.
81. ECC, 2nd December 1974, 6th January 1975.
82. Butler and Kitzinger, op cit, p.76.
83. ECC, 27th January 1975.
84. ECC, 11th March 1975.
85. ECC, passim.
86. Yes for Europe, (CRD, 1975). ECC, 17th March 1975, 7th April 1975, 21st April 1975,
87. ECC, 12th April 1975.
88. E.G. Rippon, Our Future in Europe, (CPC, September 1974);
C. Soames et al, Three Views on Europe, (CPC, December 1973).
89. In Europe, November 1972. Europe: Yes or No, April 1975.
90. Swinton Journal, Autumn 1972, Autumn 1973, Summer 1973, January 1975.
91. Overseas Committee, 26th July 1973, 28th November 1973.
92. Elles to Carrington, 14th October 1973.
93. Overseas Committee, 28th November 1973.
94. D. Baker, P. Ratzer, B. Brooke-Patridge, Europe: Power or Responsibility, (Bow Group, October 1972).
95. P. Lilley, P. Hodgson, N. Waterson, An Alternative Manifesto, (Bow Group, October 1973).
96. A. Schlaim, "Europe and Mr. Shore", Crossbow, January 1974.
N. Brittan et al, Europe: The First Year, (Bow Group, January 1974).

97. I. Taylor vs. J. Lewis, "Sovereignty: Win or Lose?", Crossbow, December 1974. J. Gripps et al, No Referendum, (Bow Group, February 1975). P. Goodhart, The People's Veto, (Bow Group, February 1975).
98. Economist, 17th May 1975.
99. A. Fitzgerald, Monday World, Spring 1973. For a full discussion, see B. Copping, Monday Club, Crisis and After, (London Current Affairs Information Service, May 1975).
100. D. Levy, "Britain Among the Nations", Monday World, Winter 1972. Club Newsletter, 15th November 1972, January 1973, February 1973, May 1973, January 1974.
101. Monday Club, Right Reason, January 1974.
102. Club Newsletter, May 1974.
103. J. Amery, Towards A Solution, (Monday Club, n.d.)
B. Costello, Referenda, P.R., (Monday Club, n.d.).
104. Overseas Committee, 2nd July 1973.
105. CGE Council, 25th June 1973.
106. Overseas Committee, 20th June 1973.
107. CGE General Purposes Committee, 21st May 1974. See also CGE General Purposes Committee, 28th January 1974, 9th April 1974, 21st May 1974, 19th June 1974, 3rd December 1974. European Movement Executive Committee, 9th April 1974, 3rd July 1974.
108. Economist, 11th May 1973.
109. CGE Council, 25th September 1973.
110. Overseas Committee, 16th July 1973.
111. CGE General Purposes Committee, 8th November 1973.
112. ibid, 28th January 1974.
113. ibid, 21st May 1974.
114. CGE Council, 19th November 1974.
115. ibid, 3rd December 1974.
116. CGE Annual General Meeting, 30th June 1975.
117. ECC, 27th January 1975 and passim.
118. Hurd to European Policy Committee, 26th July 1974.
119. Butler and Kitzinger, op cit, p.173.

120. ibid, p.77.
121. ECC, 14th April 1975, 5th May 1975.
122. ECC, 17th May 1975.
123. Anti-Common Market League Committee, 20th September 1973.
124. Butler and Kitzinger, op cit, p.137.
125. CATOR, The Conservative Case Against the EEC, Press Release, 8th May 1975.
126. Anti-Common Market League Committee, 16th April 1975, 16th July 1975.
127. Yes to Europe, (CRD, 1975), p.71.
128. Economist, 7th December 1974. Spectator, 22nd March 1975.
129. Economist, 12th May 1975.
130. NFU Press Release, 20th March 1975.
131. Telegraph, 22nd May 1975.
132. Telegraph, 30th March 1975.
133. Times, 31st May 1975.
134. Spectator, 16th June 1973, 2nd February 1974.
135. Spectator, 4th January 1975.
136. Telegraph, 24th January 1975.
137. Economist, 5th March 1975.
138. Telegraph, 5th June 1975.
139. Economist, 14th June 1975.
140. King, op cit, p.131.

CHAPTER 8: THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER WITHIN THE CONSERVATIVE
PARTY AND THE EUROPEAN ISSUE.

The thesis of this dissertation is that the study of Conservative Party and the issue of European integration supports the pluralist view of the distribution of power within the Conservative Party, contrary to most studies of this issue. This chapter will explain why power is dispersed within the party, despite the arguments presented by McKenzie, Beer et al discussed in the introduction and Chapter One, and survey the evidence presented in Chapters 2 - 7 in support of this thesis.

The Conservative Party has long been recognised as a party oriented to electoral success. Gamble claimed that "electoral perspectives are the ideology of the leadership".⁽¹⁾ The Party has always prided itself on its pragmatism and refusal to be tied to any ideology.⁽²⁾ This view of the role of party is close to the 'catch-all'⁽³⁾ or rational-efficient model.⁽⁴⁾ "The rational-efficient party has exclusively electoral functions and is pragmatically occupied with winning elections rather than with defining policy. The party democracy type is more policy-oriented, ideological and concerned with defining policy in an internally democratic manner involving rank and file membership participation".⁽⁵⁾ In contrast to the party democracy model, with its emphasis on participation within the party as the determinant of party policy, the rational-efficient model sees the concentration of power and authority in the hands of the leader. The leader must be given a high degree of autonomy to respond to political events in the most successful way.

However, the assessment of the pragmatic, catch-all nature of

the Conservative Party has ignored the considerable constraints that this places upon the Leader. The constraints are primarily of two forms: the first is the need to maintain an effective party organisation, which can campaign during an election, bring out the supporters on the election day, provide a source of attractive candidates and act as grass-roots supporters spreading the Party's message through personal contact; and the second is the need to successfully appeal to a diverse and differentiated electorate and to create a majority from a coalition of minorities for electoral purposes. Both these necessities create considerable constraints on the autonomy of the leader.

The Conservative Party is a voluntary organisation, to which people are free to belong or leave and even when they are members, they may move between degrees of activity. A successful party not only requires a large membership but also a considerable number of activists. Clark and Wilson have identified three types of incentives as necessary for the maintenance of an organisation: material or monetary; solidarity, deriving from a sense of community or belonging; and purposive, a concern with the achievement of organisational goals. (6) Discussion of incentives for activists in American parties has concentration on the first incentive, material incentives as exemplified in the urban machines such as that of Chicago's Mayor Daley; and on the third incentive, purposive or ideological, of those who participate with a concern for issues. This approach was described in a classic study by James Q. Wilson of the 'amateurs' with ideological incentives, and the 'professionals', with monetary or career incentives. (7)

The Conservative Party has a shortage of material incentives. The Party can offer few jobs, with very few political appointments

when in government, a small number of jobs in the Party headquarters but often with low pay and a lack of job security, and several hundred jobs as local agents, with unattractive hours and not particularly good salaries. There may be some M.P.s who sought a parliamentary seat for the material benefits such as company directorships. Businessmen, lawyers and estate agents may find that the contacts made at the local Conservative Association may be beneficial to their work, but more contacts may be made at the Chamber of Commerce or the Rotary Club. The limited material benefits that exist are insufficient to maintain a major party organisation.

Studies of Conservative activists suggest that ideology or issues are not a primary explanation of their activity. Rose discovered in his study of conference resolutions that they did not reflect extremist or ideological positions among activists. (8) Bochel's study of ward secretaries of both parties in Manchester found that half the Conservatives mentioned ideological commitment as the cause of their Party work, but this was expressed in very general terms such as patriotism. (9) Constituency parties tend to spend very little time on political discussion or campaigning, but concentrate on fund-raising and social activities. A visit to virtually any Association would confirm the low level of activity. There are, of course, some activists who are ideologically or issue motivated, and they may be growing in number. They may hold a special significance for the Party organisation as opinion-leaders, as speakers and as potential candidates. The existence and role of groups such as the Bow Group, the Monday Club and the Tory Reform Group, suggest that such people do exist, and may play an important role in Party debate out of all proportion to their numbers. They

are essential to the party but they are not the major source of activists and their concern with policies could positively discourage potential members who are less concerned with issues.

The second incentive, the key to understanding Conservative party membership and activity. Bochel found that 41% mentioned the non-political influence of family and friends for their participation in the party. The principal satisfactions of political activity were given as personal and social satisfactions, rather than ideology or issues. 34% mentioned working for a cause; 42% helping people; 17% doing a job for the people; 4% serving the country or community; 24% influence and prestige; 24% organising and campaigning; and 28% social relations and friendship. (Answers total to more than 100% because many activists mentioned more than one satisfaction). ⁽¹⁰⁾ No conclusive evidence exists, but with the weakness of clear material and ideological incentives except for a few, the most plausible primary explanation.

This approach has to explain why people seek these social satisfactions through party activity rather than through one of the host of other clubs and organisations that exist. Part of the explanation may be through family and friends, as suggested in Bochel's study. A more comprehensive explanation may be that the Party represents certain basic values or symbols. These values or symbols are of such a general nature, such as patriotism, stability, authority, property, that they have little ideological content for most members. If this approach is correct, then it becomes essential that party policy be viewed as compatible with these values, and that intra-party discussion should not be so divisive as to remove or reduce the sense of community and shared values. This would explain the particularly

strong emphasis on party unity and the conduct of party debate in a restrained form.

The lack of social satisfactions will be reflected in 'exit' rather than 'voice' at least in terms of activity. (11)

The maintenance of party organisation primarily on solidary incentives, together with some ideological and a few material ones, would explain the degree of attention given within the party on the monitoring of party opinion, not as a determinant of policy, but as a measure of acceptability within the light of party values and the reaction of the ideologically oriented who could, through divisiveness, weaken these solidary incentives. This acts as a major constraint on the party leader.

The other major constraint arises from the need to provide policies which will be electorally successful. The electorate is not viewed as an undifferentiated mass, but as a collection of groups and interests, with overlapping membership, some of which are traditional supporters whose loyalty and turnout must be ensured, some of which are traditional opponents amongst whom some minority support can be expected but at least they should not be encouraged to vote negatively, and a third group, target voters, to which the party is especially keen to appeal, such as young people, housewives or the upwardly mobile middle classes.

Communication with the voters can be conducted directly, through leaflets, publications, press advertising, billboards, and radio and television broadcasts. The impersonal nature of these contacts means that their value is primarily of a reinforcing nature. A second channel of communication is through the party organisation. This may be formalised as through the existence of organisations such as the Women's Organisation, the Young Conservatives, the Conservative

students, the Conservative Trade Unionists and the Small Business Bureau. These organisations play a two-way role, as the spokesmen for the party within that section of the electorate, and as a spokesman for that section to the party. Much of this contact through the party is informal, through those members who are businessmen or farmers expressing their particular grievances. The membership becomes an important source of information on opinions and concerns amongst the various sections of the electorate.

The informal party is another major channel of communication with the electorate. The 'ginger groups' play an organisational role in producing a home within the party for the purposive member, but they also play an electoral role in demonstrating that the party is open to the opinions expressed by the more issue-oriented voter. The Bow Group plays this role "in helping to project an image of the Conservative party as a party of thoughtful, well-educated, and successfully young people". (Rose)⁽¹²⁾ The Monday Club indicates to voters concerned with immigration or law and order that the party is responsive to their concerns, the Tory Reform Group similarly to voters concerned with race relations and 'liberal' on penal issues. These groups provide a voice for these opinions within the party and help to make the party electorally acceptable to voters with those opinions.

The functional interest groups such as the CBI and the NFU are a measure of opinion within that sector of the electorate, and a channel to communicate the party's views to that sector. The party gives considerable attention to these organisations, not to discover what their party ought to do and carry it out, but to gain an understanding of the state of the opinion within that sector as to what would be electorally beneficial or damaging. The organisations

are not always reliable reflections of opinions within their membership, so the party does not rely upon them exclusively.

The press is naturally another major channel between the electorate and the party. The party will try to use the press to put across their messages to the voters, and are concerned that other sources of reference points within the newspapers should differ from the party's message as little as possible. Attention is thus given to leader columns in the Times, Peregrine Worsethorne in the Telegraph or the editorials in the Sun in case they should provide conflicting cues to that of the party. It also sees the press as a reflection of opinion, that the press contact with some sectors of the electorate may reflect their opinions. The Economist is viewed as a significant reflection of business opinion, and the Financial Times is examined for City opinion.

The electorate, en masse, is a difficult body both to reach and to understand. Opinion polls can provide useful information on the state of opinion in general, but provides little information on intensity, saliency and stability of opinion. None of these channels provide reliable means to understanding the electorate, nor means to influence them. All together they provide a strong, if always imperfect, picture of the electorate to which the leader must be sensitive.

With this picture of the party, we can return to the Conservative Party and the European issue and assess the power of the Leader.

Party Symbols

Part of the argument for the power of the leader on the European issue has been based on the view that traditional party symbols and instincts were against Europe, and yet the party was made to betray

its symbols for this new policy. Gamble argued that "The translation of the Conservative Party from the party of Empire to the party of Europe was one of the greatest changes in its short modern history. It required a major reorientation of the electoral perspective of the leadership and of the electoral ideologies of the party for it involved a fundamental change in the conception of the Conservative Nation and in the role of the British State". (13) Lindsay and Harrington believed that "the whole enterprise stood in flat contradiction to all the traditional instincts of the party", and Butt that the application "flew in the face of most of the instincts supporting" the party. (14)

It was certainly the view of the anti-marketeers that three important Conservative symbols, sovereignty, agriculture and the Commonwealth, were to be abandoned in pursuit of Community membership. This was well expressed in their proposed amendment to the motion at the 1961 conference that the Government "declare its clear resolve not to approve any proposals which involved the surrender of British sovereignty, or are inconsistent with pledges to British agriculture and horticulture or with the continuance by the United Kingdom of its traditional role in the Commonwealth and world affairs". (15) Roger Moate asked in the debate, "Surely any Amendment so fundamentally Conservative, so essentially founded in true Tory principles, will be accepted by the Government?". The amendment was overwhelmingly rejected.

These symbols failed to motivate widespread anti-market feeling mainly because the pro-marketeers were able to reduce their saliency. The 'European' response to the sovereignty issue is summed up by the title of a pamphlet by Beamish and St. John Stevas, Sovereignty: substance or shadow?. (16) They argued that outside the Community,

Britain would have the impression of sovereignty but in practice would be dependent on decisions taken elsewhere, and that it would be absurd to say "that we should leave NATO to regain our military sovereignty. By co-operating with allies in defence we do not weaken, but strengthen, ourselves". Suez demonstrated to many that Britain was no longer able to act independently. Home argued that "outside our freedom will be less, not more. It is as sovereign members of the Community that we shall be in a position to safeguard the future of British - all of Britain - in the years to come". (17)

Sovereignty, in terms of the ability of Britain to determine her own future, was presented as being greater within the Community.

The argument that sovereignty would be surrendered to a supranationalist organisation was denied by the 'Europeans'. Heath reported after a meeting with President Pompidou that "We agreed in particular that the identity of national states should be maintained in the framework of the developing Community...that decisions should in practice be taken by unanimous agreement....It provides clear evidence that joining the Community does not entail a loss of national identity or an erosion of essential national sovereignty". (18) The federalist implications of membership were undermined by the Luxembourg Compromise in 1965, reflected in the Tory Gaullism that saw Britain as the leader of a united Europe. The sovereignty symbol was successfully defused by the 'Europeans'.

The agriculture symbol proved less potent than expected because the indications from the spokesmen for the agricultural interest became more ambivalent. In the late 1950's during the negotiations for the Free Trade Area and EFTA, there was the appearance of unanimity against the participation of agriculture in any European agreement. In the early 1960's the position of agriculture was less clear cut,

as some farmers believed that they would benefit from membership, there was recognition of the strength of the agricultural lobby within the Community, and a strong case was presented that agriculture would benefit. None of these things removed the fears about agriculture, especially as the NFU took a position against membership, but neither was the agricultural case against entry conclusive. During the rest of the 1960's, the view that the existing system of agricultural support would have to be replaced due to the expense, and that import levies would be the most appropriate system, became widely excepted in the agricultural industry, reinforced by a series of poor Farm Price Reviews under the Labour Government. In the negotiations in the early 1970's the N.F.U. did not take a position, as it was internally divided, and sought the best terms available, in particular to protect those sections most likely to be damaged like horticulture. By the 1975 referendum the NFU was an enthusiastic supporter of membership. Agriculture was a negative symbol for the European cause at the beginning, remained so but less clearly in the 1961 negotiations, rapidly declined in the late sixties, appeared neutral in 1971 and was a positive symbol in 1975.

The Commonwealth was the third negative symbol of the anti-marketeers. Highly potent in the aftermath of the Empire's contribution to the second world war, Churchill and other Empire men such as Sandys and Leo Amery saw no contradiction between an Empire and a European role. With the Schuman Plan and other experiments with supranationalism, the Empire was a barrier to deeper European entanglements. By the end of the 1950's, the Empire had become the Commonwealth, and had lost some of its emotional appeal. The Commonwealth became more identified with independent black nations and reduced feelings of a family or community among Conservatives.

The emotional appeal was to individual countries such as Australia or New Zealand, but it was recognised that they were insufficient trading partners. Home stated, "I could not see how the Commonwealth could compensate us in the future or lead to an increase in our wealth and strength, simply because all the Commonwealth countries were bent on becoming more independent and were fast industrialising themselves". (20) The Commonwealth declined as an emotional symbol of family, and disappeared as a realistic alternative of an economic association.

The appeal that the Commonwealth still had was not clearly directed towards an anti-European direction, as many identified with the Empire and Commonwealth declared that entry was also in the interests of the Commonwealth countries. Duncan Sandys, Leo Amery, Julian Amery, John Biggs-Davison, Lord Salisbury and Geoffrey Rippon were both Commonwealth and European men. Many of the younger men who identified with the developing Commonwealth were pro-European, such as David Lane at the 1961 Conference, and the Bow Group published Rich Man's Club? arguing the benefits of membership to the developing countries. The Commonwealth was a declining symbol during these years, and was not entirely associated with an anti-market position. The contrast between the number and strength of references to the Commonwealth in the Tory anti-Market publications of 1961-62 and those of 1975 is considerable.

There were several Conservative symbols which were successively associated with Europe: peace, prosperity, anti-Communism and Britain as a power in the world. Rippon told the House of Commons, "Had the Community existed sixty years ago with Britain as a member, who can doubt that the tragedy of two world wars could have been averted?". (21) Central Office polls showed that peace was a

powerful argument for membership amongst the electorate. (22) The case for prosperity through membership was a major theme from the first application, to be achieved through increased trade within the large market that the Community would provide. The need for European unity as a balance to the power of the Soviet Union was first presented by Churchill, and was constantly reiterated, particularly by Home. The emergence of the European Community as a major world power, and the influence that Britain would have through it, was a theme of great appeal to Conservatives, stated by Heath and Rippon in his "new empire" approach.

These Conservative symbols were successfully associated with Europe, and the potential negative symbols were either weaker or more ambiguous. The symbols and values which bind many Conservatives to the party, as activists, members or voters, were not the obstacle to the European case that they have been presented. Now we can turn directly to the role played by the various elements of the party.

The Leader

The significant role played by the Leader within the Conservative Party is recognised, but together with its limits. The security of tenure was not as secure as frequently believed, with all the changes in the leadership in this period at least partly due to party pressure, and in the cases of Home and Heath largely so. The main significance is that tenure does not by itself lead to the ability to make decisions independently of the party.

The power of appointments remains a limited instrument of power. Despite major differences between Churchill and Eden, of which their attitudes to Europe were but an example, Churchill was unable to remove him from his Cabinet, give him a responsibility outside of

foreign policy, or prevent him from succeeding as Leader. Eden was able to remove Macmillan as Foreign Secretary and replace him by the more pliant Selwyn Lloyd, but Macmillan had to be given the major responsibility of Chancellor, which involved a concern with trade relations with Europe. Macmillan felt unable to carry out a major Cabinet reshuffle until July 1960, after $3\frac{1}{2}$ years as Prime Minister. This strengthened the 'Europeans' but the scepticism of Butler, Maudling and Hailsham remained a major force and many of the new appointments were made in order to bring in a new generation, which was also more 'European'. Macmillan's second major reshuffle, in July 1962, "the Night of the Long Knives", involved the dismissal of an older generation, including not only sceptics but also pro-marketeers such as Lord Kilmuir, Sir David Eccles and Selwyn Lloyd. Heath's appointments to the 1970 Government have been criticised for their exclusion of anti-marketeers, but apart from Neil Marten there is little evidence of a deliberate exclusion policy. Powell and du Cann were excluded for reasons only marginally related to Europe. The dismissal of six spokesmen from the Shadow Cabinet by Margaret Thatcher in 1975 did nothing to prevent unanimous support for a "yes" campaign by the new Shadow Cabinet. Europe may have been a factor in the selection of Cabinet or Shadow Cabinet appointments, but it was negligible compared to the need to find capable and responsible people and to satisfy the various elements within the party.

Central Office appointments were not determined by attitudes to Europe. The Chairmen of the Party Organisation were appointed for their organisational abilities rather than their policy positions. Iain Macleod played a significant role in convincing the Cabinet and most of the party that, despite the by-election defeats, Europe was a positive electoral asset, but his appointment was due to his

oratorical skills. Du Cann remained Chairman after Heath's election until September 1967 when the personality clash had become too great. The Chairman of the Research Department was R.A. Butler from 1945-1964, a period in which the Foreign Desk staff became more and more committed to the necessity of British participation in European co-operation. Sir Michael (now Lord) Fraser was a major figure throughout this whole period, and once he had become convinced both of the national benefit and electoral advantage of Community membership, he was a firm advocate of a strong Conservative pro-European position.

The formal policy-making power of the Leader was restricted by the need to obtain party acceptance. While Churchill was personally identified with a united Europe, he was careful not to suggest that this was party policy and tried, if unsuccessfully, to distinguish between his role as a spokesman for the European Movement and as Conservative Leader. While Macmillan became convinced that Britain's best interests would lie inside the Community in early 1960, he felt constrained to act until the spring of 1961 when the Cabinet discussed the possibility of an application. Opposition within the Party was an important factor in the delay and, while he recognised growing support for such a move, he still feared a split. His error was in underestimating the substantial support that already existed in the party. It is this factor, rather than Macmillan's leadership skills (valuable though they were), which explains the ease with which the application was accepted.

The election of Heath as Leader was a sign of the desire for a more radical, adventurous and change-oriented party profile, and Europe was a reflection of that attitude. The reaffirmation of Conservative support for entry had already occurred in the early part

of 1965 even before Heath's election, reflected in speeches by Home whilst still Leader. Heath was no 'Eurofanatic' and his confederalist, quasi-Gaullist views were widely shared, while he was frequently criticised by the more committed 'Europeans' such as Peter Kirk, for example, for his lack of emphasis on Europe in the period running up to the 1970 election. 'European' policies emerged from the working groups in opposition without any central direction, policies on VAT, agriculture, trade union reform and social security. When Heath did believe in a policy outside the party consensus, the Anglo-French nuclear deterrent, despite his efforts to promote the idea, he was completely unsuccessful in making it party policy. The problem with Heath over Europe was not that he tried to promote the policy against the wishes of the party, but that his single-mindedness appeared to make him neglect other interests of the party and made him insensitive to his opponents or even the difficulties of his supporters. In the area of tactics, Heath was forced to climb down on two questions to which he was strongly committed, an early parliamentary vote in 1971 and the three line whip.

None of the Leaders therefore imposed a European policy against the wishes of most of the party. That policy was as much a reflection of widespread attitudes as of the personal position of the Leader.

Cabinet/Shadow Cabinet

All the Conservative Cabinets and Shadow Cabinets during this period believed in Western unity as essential to counteract Communism, and European unity was perceived as a valuable contribution to that aim. Differences existed over the exact relationship of Britain to that movement. During the debates on the Schuman proposals, Churchill

acted as a chairman of the discussion rather than a leader imposing his will. The eventual approach, of participation in the discussions but without a final commitment, was a compromise. On the European Army Eden as Foreign Affairs Spokesman was decisive in British rejection of participation, with Churchill sympathetic to the concept if not the specific proposals. The failure of the more 'European' members of the Cabinet to promote a more active policy under Churchill and Eden was due to their belief that European developments were moving in a direction unacceptable to Britain, towards more supranationalism, a customs union and agricultural free trade. The active pursuit of the Free Trade Area and the European Free Trade Area reflected a Cabinet consensus on the need to avoid a divided Europe.

The scepticism of some members of the Cabinet, Butler, Maudling and Hailsham, was a significant factor in the delay in making an application for membership. Their scepticism was weakened as Butler realised that agriculture was not in unanimous opposition, Maudling that the Economic Community was not as protectionist as he feared, and Hailsham that the EEC still operated largely through national governments. The decision to apply by the Cabinet on 27th July 1961 was taken unanimously with no resignations. The support of the great majority of the Cabinet, and the easing of their concerns, was a more significant factor than pressure applied by Macmillan in explaining the weakness of opposition within the Cabinet.

There was complete support for British entry in Heath's Shadow Cabinet, including Powell. It agreed that there should be a three line whip in support of the Labour application in 1967. With the second veto there was discussion of alternatives in December 1967, but they accepted the recommendation from the Research Department that

none of them was acceptable. Led by Home, the Shadow Cabinet would not endorse Heath's policy of Anglo-French nuclear entente. In government, the Cabinet unanimously recommended the terms, with only the resignation of junior ministers, Teddy Taylor and Jasper More, and all of them were members of the Conservative Group for Europe (except Hailsham for constitutional reasons). On the tactics of a later vote and a free vote, the Chief Whip Pym was supported by most of the Cabinet against Heath and Rippon.

Despite a less enthusiastic 'European' as Leader, Mrs. Thatcher's Shadow Cabinet was unanimously in favour of campaigning for a 'Yes' vote in the 1975 referendum, and most of them played an active role. While the exact relationship between the Leader and his senior colleagues is difficult to establish, it is clear that major decisions on Europe were not taken without considerable discussion, and that the Leader was not able to establish a policy without the support of most of his colleagues and at least the acquiescence of the rest.

Parliamentary Party

There was always throughout the period of this study a substantial body of 'Europeans' within the parliamentary party. In the immediate post-war period Bob Boothby was the most well-known but by no means the most representative of around 60 M.P.s active in the Hague Congress, the European Movement, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and Westminster. In the 1950s they brought attention to European developments and the need for a positive British response, and by 1961 they had established a broad base in the parliamentary party. During the years of opposition under Heath they actively participated in the various committees on Europe,

were critical of Heath and formed themselves into an unofficial group under Eldon Griffiths. Through the Conservative Group for Europe, and led by Sir Tufton Beamish and Norman St. John Stevas, they played an active role during the 1971 legislation in organising supporters, reinforcing the less committed and influencing the undecided. During the referendum they campaigned hard for a favourable vote. There was nearly always a group of around 50 M.P.s promoting the European cause, not in response to the leadership but ahead of it, evidenced in the Early Day Motion calling for participation in the Spaak proposals in 1956, their expression of concern in the late 1960s and their pressure for a more positive lead in 1974. These M.P.s, not always the same ones, of course, were in the 'vanguard' of the party on Europe.

By contrast the anti-'Europeans' were never a substantial body. On the Schuman Plan only a couple of M.P.s spoke against participation in the talks and only 6 abstained in the vote. They were able to obtain many signatures for pro-Europe motions but there was no clear conflict between that and Europe. Almost half of those identified as Empire stalwarts by Finer et al also signed a pro-European motion, and only 9 M.P.s signed the most explicitly anti-European motions. (23)

In the July 1961 vote on the application, only 1 Tory M.P. voted against with 25 abstentions. 40 M.P.s were thought to be against membership with only 12 last ditchers. Despite the frustrations of the second veto in 1967, they were unable to strengthen their numbers. By the Third Reading of the European Communities Bill they were able to get only 16 M.P.s in the No lobby, plus 2 abstentions. In the referendum campaign only 8 M.P.s campaigned for a No vote.

The factors leading to such a relatively weak opposition (in numbers though not in strength of conviction) are many. One group

of factors, said to arise from the power of the Leader as discussed in Chapter One, played only a limited role in the prevention of more backbench dissent. The threat of dissolution was never used, and the whip was never withdrawn or threatened from any M.P. Career aspirations may have been a factor in limiting dissent, especially under Heath who was considered to only appoint 'Yes-men', but Norton suggested that Heath actually encouraged dissent by this attitude, because "having dissented (or expressed their intention to dissent) on an important issue, (they) perceived that their chances of promotion were very slight indeed". (24) There is no evidence to suggest that any M.P. was excluded from office because of his attitude to Europe except for Neil Marten in 1970. Du Cann and Powell's exclusion can be explained by other factors. Patronage was not withheld from the anti-market rebels. Harry Legge-Bourke, Nabarro, Walker-Smith and Turton were all knighted, and Turton became Lord Tranmire. The appeal to group identity can be potent, but it was most effective when expressed by fellow backbenchers rather than by the whips, as in the work of the CGE in 1971. Group identity also depends on the actions of the Leader, who must demonstrate a reciprocal concern. Heath's failure to appear open to backbenchers weakened group identity and enabled the creation of a group identity amongst the anti-marketeers. The successful use of group loyalty to achieve cohesion requires restraint by the Leader. The threat of deselection only appeared in the period of the European Communities Bill and was initiated by the associations themselves and not by the Leader.

Other factors limiting dissent were outside the control of the Leader. The first was the lack of a leader of stature. Hinchingsbrooke and Legge-Bourke failed to provide it in the 1950s

and Turton and Walker-Smith in the 1960s. Powell could have been this figure after 1969, but he refused to be a group leader as a restriction on his own independence; he was treated with suspicion for his anti-Commonwealth views, and he was associated with other issues, particularly race, which some anti-market M.P.s wished to avoid. Du Cann could have played this role if his opposition had not been so rarely articulated and so frequently expressed by an abstention. By the referendum, Meil Marten was the only anti-market M.P. with any claim to leadership. No major figure within the party ever emerged to lead the Tory anti-marketeers.

A second factor was their identification as extremely right-wing. Gerald Nabarro, Anthony Fell and Ronald Bell presented a negative image for most M.P.s. This right-wing image was strengthened by the emergence of Powell as anti-market, so that a position against Europe was associated with a number of other issue positions. The best time to have presented a broader profile was in 1961 when there were elements from the 'left' in Peter Walker, the 'right' in Anthony Fell and the 'centre' in Robin Turton opposed to entry, but they proved to be incapable of working together.

A third factor was the populist, chauvinist and reactionary flavour of some of the anti-marketeers. Expressions of hostility to foreigners caused embarrassment among many M.P.s, as did appeals to a white Anglo-Saxon empire. The populist anti-parliamentary tone, expressed by some anti-marketeers, offended and the anti-market call for a referendum was rejected by the great majority of Tory M.P.s

An additional factor was the division of opinion within the anti-market ranks. This can be seen between those who looked to the old Empire and those who looked to the new Commonwealth, as in Hinchingsbrooke against Walker. The latter became largely alienated

from the cause. Another source of division was over the best alternative to Europe, whether it was to be a reformed Empire Preference or an Atlantic Free Trade Area. A European free trade area was attractive to many economic liberals like Powell and Biffen who rejected an economic association based on the old Empire. It was amongst these anti-marketeers that support for a North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA) was greatest, but the idea was disliked by many of the Commonwealth men, coupled with a degree of anti-Americanism.

Finally the arguments went against them. The Commonwealth developed in a way which reduced identity with it and the possibility of its emergence as a replacement for the Community as an economic association. Sovereignty was too abstract a concept to have great appeal, and the reality of sovereignty appeared illusory as the effect of outside events on Britain were clearly demonstrated. Agriculture proved not to be such an obstacle as first thought, and indeed by 1975 the agricultural community were staunch champions of membership.

Amongst the many factors to explain the limited nature of dissent, some of them identified with the power of the Leader played no significant role, while other factors beyond leadership control were significant.

There exist many opportunities for backbenchers to express their views on party policy, but these were exercised by only a few to express anti-market views. Meetings of the 1922 Committee expressed broad support for a more European policy in 1950, in 1962 and in 1971. None of the backbench committees revolted against the policy, and indeed some members of them wanted a more vigorous approach, with the Parliamentary Advisory Committee in 1962, and the Committee on

Europe (Policy Research) of 1966-68. These activities provide an opportunity in relative privacy to express opposition to the party's European policy. They were not extensively used by M.P.s.

It is not suggested here that M.P.s make party policy. M.P.s however do play a significant role in the determination of policy. First they can place and keep an issue on the party's agenda as a message must be frequently repeated before it reaches consciousness in an environment where there are so many messages. The 'European' M.P.s played this role during the 1950s ahead of the leadership. Secondly, they can create a favourable environment for a policy amongst the less committed M.P.s. The 'European' M.P.s helped to create a favourable climate amongst backbenchers that enabled support for a free trade area, then EFTA, and finally the EEC. It was a 'softening-up' process, which created an opportunity for Macmillan to pursue an application. Thirdly, personal contacts are the most effective means of obtaining party cohesion, and the existence of supportive backbenchers is of great value, as demonstrated by the CGE in 1971. Finally, the backbenchers are an imperfect reflection of attitudes throughout the party. Their values, attitudes and assessments are strongly related to their contacts with the rest of the party, and thus can provide a useful guide to the acceptability or otherwise of policies throughout the party. Backbenchers are a significant restraint on the power of the Leader.

National Union

The National Union accepts that it is not a policy-making body, but its concern with organisational maintenance and electoral success means that it must be concerned with the effect of policy upon activists, members and voters. For the Leader, the National Union is

a major source of demonstration of party support for his policies. While their functions are explicitly different, they cannot ignore the activities of each other.

The Annual Party Conference is often dismissed as a controlled event designed to ensure an image of unity, but there is considerable evidence to show that the leadership is highly sensitive to Conference, not so much with the actual votes on the motions but with the resolutions submitted, the tone of the debates and the reactions of the audiences. The resolutions submitted are carefully analysed for evidence of grass root feeling, as in the Research Department report to Party Chairman Lord Hailsham on the 1957 Conference. The motions selected for debate are a reflection of the assessment of the National Union Executive Committee as to what the leadership would like to see passed, but also with regard to the fact that dull debates attract little publicity. The normal practice has been not to call amendments, but several anti-European amendments were called. The bland nature of many of the motions cannot hide the existence of disagreements, sometimes conducted clearly for and against the motion, and sometimes in the interpretations placed upon a motion, so that the spirit of the motion is debated rather than its exact phraseology. For example, the 1960 motion called for bridge-building in Europe but the speeches of the proposers were such that it became a debate on EEC membership. The usual procedure is to call speakers alternatively on both sides of the motion, so there is plenty of opportunity for those opposed to party policy to express themselves.

The concern to ensure a successful outcome was well expressed in the preparations for the 1962 conference, when a pamphlet on Europe by Macmillan was published before the conference, much literature was distributed before and during the conferences, and a

letter by Winston Churchill sent to all constituency associations. These immense efforts do not suggest that the leadership feels totally secure that the Conference will simply endorse their position.

All the long series of pro-European motions presented to Conservative Conferences were passed overwhelmingly, in 1949, 1954, 1957, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1969, 1970 and 1972. Anti-European amendments were defeated in 1957, 1961 and 1962 and a pro-European one passed in 1965. The 1961 amendment reiterated conditions already accepted by the Government, and so could have been supported without imposing additional constraints but because its spirit was identified as anti-'European' it was overwhelmingly rejected. The tone of the debates suggested that the pro-European speakers were more enthusiastic than the leadership, as in the proposers of the 1960 motion and the Y.C. contributions to the 1969 debate. The audience response is difficult to assess without being present, but personal experience of the conferences between 1971 to 1975, press reports and interventions during the speeches all suggest strongly pro-European audiences.

The party leadership seek other ways of assessing party opinion. The Central Council resolutions to the National Union Executive Committee, reports by Area Agents, attendance at party conferences and meetings, and the CPC contact reports were all used to assess party opinion on Europe. The inability to exert complete control over party conferences is reflected in the concern expressed that there would be few 'European' resolutions to the 1971 Central Council and that the 1971 Scottish and Trade Union Conferences would reject membership. In fact all these conferences voted by substantial majorities for membership. The resolutions submitted to the NUEC

were intermittent on Europe, but almost always favourable. Area Agents were frequently requested to give an assessment of party opinion within their area, suggesting broad but 'soft' support in contrast to minority but 'harder' opposition. CPC Conferences and Swinton College seminars were reported as overwhelmingly pro-European. The most extensive exercise to measure constituency party opinion is through the CPC contact programme. These reports, in 1959, 1965, 1967, 1971 and 1975 all found strong support for membership, and reflected better than other methods the opinions of the more politically conscious members in the constituencies.

The local selection of candidates provides an opportunity for the expression of political positions by the adoption of candidates with the appropriate views. In practice, as all studies have suggested, political views are a minor consideration in the selection of candidates at local level. (The selection of Nicholas Winterton at Macclesfield in 1971 partially for his anti-market views is an exception, and one that disproves the rule that dissent leads to automatic exclusion). Another opportunity would be the deselection, or threat of deselection, of the M.P. The only time this was threatened over the European issue was in 1971, and was a reflection of personal differences between the member and the Association. All anti-market M.P.s were successfully readopted before the 1974 election. The usual situation was that the Association would make its position clear to the M.P., but respect the Burkean notion that the M.P. should make the final decision.

The Young Conservatives are viewed as significant within the party because they contribute a younger image for the party, provide many workers during campaigns, are the source of future parliamentary and local government candidates, provide a partial reflection of

youth opinion, and are the party's main channel to young people. The Y.C.s have their own well organised structure of national, area and local conferences and committees, produce their own publications, organise their own campaigns and are well represented on party committees and at Conferences. When they are able to present a coherent political position, they can be a formidable force on the voluntary side of the party. On Europe they were such a force.

Y.C. Annual Conferences overwhelmingly approved of membership from 1961 onwards. Many of their Swinton Seminars and area conferences revolved around Europe. Y.C. National Officers were active on European issues, in the European Youth Campaign and Youth for Europe, in international youth organisations such as the NEI youth and COCDYC, and as speakers at the party Conference. The Y.C. National Advisory Committee frequently passed motions on Europe including calls for direct elections to the European Parliament in 1972 and for a United States of Europe in 1973, and sent them as resolutions to the Party Conference. They provided enthusiastic support at the Party Conference, with 'Yes' badges in 1962, Eurodollies in 1971 and frequent heckling of anti-market speakers. They were active campaigners on Europe from the 1952 European Youth Campaign to the 1975 referendum. With their own organisational structure and decision-making process, and the latitude given to the youth, the Y.C.s are able to adopt policies not totally in line with party policy. On Europe it was always as more 'European' than the party.

The position of the Conservative Students (formerly F.U.C.U.A. and now F.C.S.) is very similar, with their own conferences, officers and activities. They, too, were active on Europe. FCS conferences in 1948, 1961, 1963, 1965 and 1971 voted overwhelmingly for entry and later for direct elections, a European Defence Community, a European

Democrat Party and federalism. The leaders were active in the European Youth Campaign, European Democrat Students, Students for a United Europe, Youth for Europe, the Federalist magazine and, together with the Y.C.s, Young European Democrats. They, too, spoke for the European case at the Party Conference and conducted their own campaigns.

The Women's N.A.C. was active mainly through the European Union of Women, whose British section Chairman was automatically a Vice-Chairman of the Women's NAC. The women tend to be less politically conscious than the youth but when they did debate Europe, in 1956, 1958, 1965, 1969 and 1971, they voted for pro-European resolutions. Europe was a constant theme of their seminars and conferences.

The Conservative Trade Unionists (formerly TUNAC, now CTU) mainly concern themselves with industrial issues. Fears were expressed inside the party that they might prove a source of opposition to membership but they voted overwhelmingly for membership at their 1962, 1971 and 1975 conferences.

The role of the National Union in policy-making is to provide an accurate assessment of party opinion on policies so that their impact upon the party organisation and the electorate can be assessed. It has no role as an initiator of policy, but the leadership does give considerable attention to party opinion. Much of the concern expressed on Europe from the constituencies was based on a lack of information to provide to supporters to ensure their future vote and the fear that valued activists might be lost over the issue. Most party members do not expect a major say in policy-making but the leadership does not take their support for granted.

Central Office

Europe was a major theme of the work of Central Office in 1961-62, 1970-72 and 1975, and a continuous minor theme during the rest of the period. The Research Department was almost consistently more sympathetic to British participation in European developments than official party policy, from the appointment of Ursula Branston to the foreign affairs desk in 1949. In a series of briefs through the 1950s, the CRD supported association with the ECSC, the EDC, the Spaak discussions, the FTA, EFTA and, by June 1960, membership of the EEC. Michael Fraser led the CRD to argue that entry would have major political and electoral advantages. Even after the 1963 veto, it urged the need to keep Europe as a Conservative theme, and with the second veto in 1967 emphasised the importance to present membership as a long term objective. The Department was eager to conduct a public campaign as early as possible in 1971 and 1975. On policy they emphasised the long term benefits for Britain of participation in European unity. In its briefs on short term policy, the CRD noted the electoral benefits of successful entry and steadied nerves in difficult periods as in the 1962 by-election defeats and the poor opinion polls in 1971. In terms of information to M.P.s, candidates and officials, it produced more material on Europe than on any other single issue, with a massive number of pamphlets and publications. The Department was a constant promoter of the European cause, frequently ahead of the Leader.

The Conservative Political Centre was another active promoter of Europe, starting with the discussion brief on European unity in 1949. The CPC published numerous pamphlets, stimulated discussion through contact briefs and organised many conferences and seminars. Swinton College organised many weekend seminars and published articles in the

Swinton Journal on Europe. The CPC staff were active 'Europeans', including Richard Bailey, editor of the CPC newsletter in the 1950s, Ben Paterson, Deputy Director 1965-1974, and especially Russell Lewis, Director.

The Publicity Department produced and distributed successively the largest quantity of leaflets on an issue ever, firstly in the 1962 campaign, then more in 1971 and finally in 1975 more than in the general election. The Organisation Department was concerned with the maintenance of a strong electoral organisation, but also organised a number of seminars on Europe and provided an assessment of party and public opinion through the Area Offices.

The Overseas Committee, concerned with foreign affairs and party contacts with the rest of the world, has grown into the International Office, with the status of a full Central Office department. The Committee was a stronghold of the Commonwealth influence but became more European oriented as the result of the activities of the youth and women's sections. By the early 1970s it had become a force for a more positive European approach and was critical of the lack of leadership by Heath.

The picture that emerges is not of the CCO as simply the obedient servant of the Leader. The policy-oriented parts (the CRD and the CPC) were more positive towards Europe than the Leader and were one element in creating and maintaining leadership support for British membership.

The claim of the Leader's use of the CCO to impose his policy is not supported by this study. The power of appointments was considered earlier in this chapter. There was little evidence that candidates were denied a place on the Candidates List for their anti-market views, although a couple of anti-market candidates were

removed because of their National Front or Ulster para-military connections. As discussed in Chapter 1, political considerations are rarely a major factor in the selection of candidates. The third claim was that CCO actively worked against rebel M.P.s. CCO did not withdraw the usual services to M.P.s, the organisation of speaking tours and the distribution of press releases. The Party Chairman rejected complaints that the party did not distribute anti-market literature because it was against party policy. Association opposition to anti-market M.P.s were initiated locally. The meeting between the Banbury Chairman and the Party Chairman on 14th July 1971, to which anti-marketeers have referred, was in response to the Association's request. Central Office did welcome declarations of support for the party's policy by the Associations of anti-market M.P.s but did not support moves for deselection.

The explanation for the lack of Central Office activity against rebels was the desire to minimise the damage to party unity, so that the party organisation would be well maintained to fight an election. Brendan Sewill, CRD Director, warned Gordon Pears that "You as a member of the CRD must have nothing to do with activities against - or even attempting to influence - other members of the Conservative Party. The Research Department must serve the Party as a whole and never get involved in arguments between different sections of the Party - even when these involve official Party policy". (25) Kitzinger noted, with reference to Michael Fraser the chief party manager, that "The party organisation had to think beyond any particular issue, however important, and beyond any one party leader, however successful. It had to steer a path between strong action against the anti-market Conservative M.P.s and tolerance of anti-market arguments being propagated at the expense of party funds; between bringing pressure

to bear on M.P.s through their local Associations, and not damaging relationships between Conservatives at the constituency level". (26) Central Office concern with organisational maintenance ultimately outweighed the desire to achieve maximum success on the European issue.

Central Office is neither so firmly controlled by the Leader nor its power over the voluntary party so great as has been suggested. It is the shared objective of electoral success which binds the Leader, Central Office and the constituency associations together, and prevents greater conflict, not the hierarchical nature of the Party.

The Informal Party

The ginger groups can play a useful function for the party. They can float ideas and policies, to which the Leader is sympathetic but not committed, and party and public response can be evaluated. Secondly, they can organise support for the Leader's policies. Thirdly, they can stimulate political education amongst party members so that members are better informed about party policy. Fourthly, they provide a source of politically experienced candidates and speakers. Fifthly, they maintain contact with opinion-formers, through their meetings, conferences and publications. Finally, they help the party to appeal to certain sectors of the electorate. The danger for the Leader is that the groups may develop into factions which challenge the policies of the Leader rather than support them and create an image of disunity. The European debate encouraged both the positive and negative developments.

The Bow Group, as an early supporter of British membership of the EEC, was able to test reaction to that idea and demonstrate that there

was considerable support within the party. The Conservative Group for Europe organised support for membership both among backbenchers and in the constituencies. The groups' conferences and publications helped to educate party members on Europe. Members of the CGE and the Bow Group were frequent speakers in conference debates and constituency meetings on Europe. Opinion-formers not directly related to the party helped to strengthen the European case, for example, Crossbow published articles by the CBI and Commonwealth spokesmen in favour of British membership. The Monday Club helped to sustain right-wing support for the EEC and prevent the organisation of an explicitly Powellite anti-market group. Although not controlled by the Leader, the groups acted primarily in a supportive role.

However, the functions that they perform by their nature require them to be autonomous from the party, so that their ideas and actions can be clearly distinguished from those of the party. The groups may float ideas beyond or against those of the Leader. The Bow Group and the CGE published pamphlets and articles and invited speakers in favour of direct elections to the European Parliament and a federal Europe, when it was known that Heath was firmly opposed to both. The Anti-Common Market League, the Conservative Anti-Common Market Information Service and Conservatives Against the Treaty of Rome organised against party policy. Improved political education can lead to greater questioning of party policy, as with the efforts to raise the question of the Conservative mandate for membership in 1961 and 1971, and also by the 'Europeans' in their campaign for a more active policy in 1974. The candidates and speakers from the groups are likely to be more issue-oriented than those not involved with the groups. Outside opinion-formers can influence the group

towards more radical policies, as occurred with the growth of federalist ideas amongst Conservatives associated with the European Movement. The desire to integrate sectors of the electorate may lead to activity within the party by people whose loyalty is primarily to the issues and not the party, and thus reduce the sense of social solidarity.

The ginger groups have both an integrative and disintegrative potential, as demonstrated on the EEC issue. Is Seyd correct when he claims that the EEC is the main explanation for the factional upsurge within the Conservative party? (27) The evidence would suggest that he exaggerates its role, because support for the EEC was so broad based within the party. Support for the EEC united both the 'progressive' left and the economic right within the Bow Group. The Monday Club was divided on Europe and it could be claimed that the issue helped to prevent a strong explicitly Powellite group within the party. While the Tory Reform Group and its predecessors have been firmly pro-European this issue has not served to distinguish them from other elements of the party. The European Movement and the Conservative Group for Europe included both left and right-wing Conservatives, with Peter Kirk and Duncan Sandys, Norman St. John Stevas and Julian Amery. There is a stronger case that the anti-market organisations encouraged the creation of a right-wing faction, but Norton has shown that "although a number of identifiable Members tended to dissent persistently on a number of issues, they were often supported by different colleagues on different occasions" and gives the EEC as an example. (28) As this study has shown, neither the authoritarian right nor the neo-liberal right were united on the EEC and it remains an issue which divides the right rather than sustains it. The departure of Powell, with his views on race, the

EEC and the integration of Ulster, from the party may actually have helped the various elements of the right to co-operate together.

This study found little direct relationship between the CBI and the NFU, and the Conservative Party. The party's interest in these organisations arises from the degree to which they reflect business and agricultural opinion and their reaction to party policies. The Research Department carefully monitored their opinions on Europe, but their role was reactive rather than initiatory. They were concerned with the details of the negotiations, but the direction of policy was determined by the party, whether in or out of government.

Conservative support for the Free Trade Area, EFTA and the EEC was established when the Federation of British Industry lacked a clear view on these issues. Agricultural policy in favour of import levies rather than Exchequer support was adopted against the wishes of the NFU. While the party is interested in the views of these organisations, it recognises that they may not accurately reflect the views of industry and agriculture. Research Department surveys found support for the European policy was stronger in industry and agriculture than presented by these organisations. The adoption later of enthusiastic support for the EEC by both the CBI and the NFU would suggest that the CRD's assessment was correct.

From the point of the CBI and the NFU, contacts with the Conservative Party are indirect. They are usually with Conservatives as Government Ministers, backbenchers from constituencies with special interests, through their local or regional organisations, through their members who belong to the party and finally through personal contacts. Their direct influence on the party is very limited.

The Conservative-inclined press is important to the Leader as a channel of communication to explain his policies to party activists,

members and voters. Nearly all of them came out in favour of the EEC before Macmillan, and remained supporters. The press was closely monitored by the Research Department, especially the Times as a reflection of opinion-formers, the Telegraph of party activists and the Financial Times and Economist of business opinion. All of them were critical of the leadership on some questions, with the Telegraph critical of the conditions for Commonwealth temperate foodstuffs in 1962 and the Economist of the lack of European leadership by Heath in 1974.

The exceptions were the Express and, after 1970, the Spectator. With an extensive readership among Conservative activists and voters, the opposition of the Express was of considerable concern. The paper first raised the issue of a mandate for membership, which was not resolved until the 1975 referendum, and was viewed by Tory anti-marketeers as their main means of communication with the Conservative grass-roots. The party feared that Europe might prevent the paper's endorsement in a general election, although that never happened. The CRD and the Area Agents reported the impact of the Express's campaign in 1962, and Heath requested a response to one of their pamphlets. The campaign demonstrated that the Leader cannot rely on the support of a paper even as partisan as the Express.

Europe was seen by anti-marketeers as an example of how the Leader can totally ignore public opinion, which they saw as strongly hostile to EEC membership. In an electorally-oriented party like the Conservatives, no Leader can afford to ignore public opinion, but public opinion is rarely clear, consistent and stable. Public opinion polls require careful interpretation. The polls in 1948 and 1950 showed high support for European unity, but also a lack of understanding and a low saliency. Polls in the 1950s showed support for greater

co-operation with Europe together with a suspicion of institutional involvement and low saliency. Evidence of high salient support for entry amongst the target groups of the young middle class helped to convince the CRD, Iain Macleod and the Cabinet of the electoral benefits of an application. Through the great volatility of public opinion, between 1962 and 1973, support reached a high point of 62% and a low point of 22%, James Douglas, the poll expert of the CRD, and the Opinion Research Centre, the party's poll-taker, emphasised that a strong campaign would swing opinion in favour of membership, as confirmed in 1971 and 1975. Public opinion was not ignored but carefully measured and interpreted, so that 'public opinion', in the sense of opinion after the careful consideration of the issue, was not seen as hostile.

Conclusion

This thesis has demonstrated that, contrary to most of the literature on Britain and Europe, the role of the Conservative Party in the issue of European integration supports a pluralistic interpretation of the distribution of power within the party rather than a monolithic one. The explanation for this dispersal of power arises from the electoral orientation of the party, which leads to the necessity of organisational maintenance and the existence of channels of communication between the party leadership and various sections of the electorate. This again is contrary to the view that the catch-all nature of the party gives the Leader strong powers. The dependence on solidary incentives to maintain the party organisation requires a leadership sensitive to the symbols and style that creates the sense of community within the party. The need to reach numerous sections of society creates a dependence by the Leader

on the various means of communication with those sections, such as the national advisory committees or the sympathetic press. A pluralistic party is required to successfully appeal to the various groups within the electorate. Supporting evidence has been found in the study of the Conservative Party and European integration between 1945 and 1975.

No study of one specific issues could conclusively determine which of the two competing models of the Conservative party is correct. The European issue was chosen as it appeared to provide evidence for the monolithic view. This study has been able to refute that claim. Further studies of the Conservative party and other issues would help to test the validity of the competing models. It may be argued that a foreign policy issue such as Europe is not representative of political issues, but normally it has been argued that foreign policy provides more autonomy for the leadership than domestic policy, and therefore further domestic issue studies might be expected to support the thesis presented here. An additional useful avenue of research would be a study of the motivations of those who join the Conservative party and those who enter or leave party activity. This study hopes that it will encourage further examination of the nature of the Conservative party.

Following Sir Karl Popper's view that it is not scientifically possible to prove the truth but it is possible to falsify, the conclusion of this study of the Conservative Party and European integration 1945-1975 is that the monolithic model of the Conservative party has been falsified with regard to the European issue, and that the pluralist model deserves more serious attention from students of the Conservative Party.

CHAPTER 8

REFERENCES

1. A. Gamble, The Conservative Nation, (London, Routledge, Kegan & Paul, 1974), p.8.
2. P. Norton & A. Aughey, Conservatives and Conservatism, (London, Temple Smith, 1981).
I. Gilmour, Inside Right, (London, Hutchinson, 1977).
3. O. Kischeimer, "The Transformation of the Western European Party System" in J. La Palombara & M. Weiner (eds), Political Parties and Political Development, (Princeton New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1966).
4. W. Wright, "Comparative Party Models: Rational-Efficient and Party Democracy" in W. Wright, A Comparative Study of Party Organisation, (Columbus Ohio, Charles Merrill, 1971).
5. ibid, p.7.
6. P. Clark and J.Q. Wilson, "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organisations", Administrative Science Quarterly, 6 (1961), pp.134-137.
7. J.Q. Wilson, The Amateur Democrat, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1962).
8. R. Rose, The Problem of Party Government, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1976), pp.195-209.
9. J. Bochel, Activists in the Conservative and Labour Parties: a Study of Ward Secretaries in Manchester, (M.A. Thesis, Manchester University, 1965), p.164.
10. ibid, p.187.
11. A. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty, (Cambridge Mass, Harvard University Press, 1970).
12. R. Rose, "The Bow Group's Role in British Politics", Western Political Quarterly, 14, (1961), p.878.
13. Gamble, op cit, p.183.
14. T. Lindsay and M. Harrington, The Conservative Party 1918-1979, (London, Macmillan, 1979), 2nd edition, p.214.
R. Butt, "The Common Market and Conservative Party Politics 1961-62", Government and Opposition, 2, (1967), p.372.
15. Conference Verbatim Report 1961.
16. T. Beamish & N. St. John Stevas, Sovereignty: Substance or Shadow, (CPC, 1971).
17. Speech to the European Movement, Edinburgh, 11th March 1971.

18. H.C. Debates, Vol. 736, 7th November 1966, c.654.
19. H.C. Debates, Vol. 818, 24th May 1971, c.32.
20. Home, Our European Destiny, (CGE, 1971), p.4.
21. Rippon, Britain and Europe, (CGE, 1971), p.6.
22. ORC Polls for CCO, 5-9th August 1970, 30th June-4th July 1971.
23. S.E. Finer, H. Berrington & D. Bartholomew, Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons 1955-59, (London, Pergamon, 1961), p.189, p.186.
24. P. Norton, Conservative Dissidents, (London, Temple Smith, 1978), p.235.
25. Sewill to Pears, n.d.
26. U. Kitzinger, Diplomacy and Persuasion, (London, Thames & Hudson, 1973), p.164.
27. P. Seyd, "Factionalism in the 70's" in Z. Layton-Henry, Conservative Party Politics, (London, Macmillan, 1979), p.235.
28. Norton, op cit, p.248.

BIBLIOGRAPHY(a) Interviews

Formal interviews and informal discussions were held with a number of individuals involved in the European issue within the Conservative party. Most of them requested that these meetings should be kept confidential. Twenty-one individuals assisted from the following institutions:

House of Commons.

National Union.

Young Conservatives.

Federation of Conservative Students.

Conservative Research Department.

Conservative Political Centre.

Anti-Common Market League.

Conservative Anti-Common Market Information Service.

Conservative Group for Europe.

(b) Private Archives(i). Conservative Party

Central Council

Resolutions 1950-1975

Chairman

EEC Correspondence 1970-1971, June 1973-June 1974.

Committee on Europe

Minutes 10th November 1970-22nd June 1971.

Committee on Europe (Policy Research)

Minutes 25th May 1966-April 1968.

Committee on Links with Europe

Minutes November 1962-March 1963.

European Co-ordinating Committee

Minutes 1974-1975.

Federation of Conservative Students

Conference Resolutions 1967-1975.

Fisheries Policy Study Group

Minutes 29th January 1969-28th November 1969.

Foreign Affairs Committee

Briefs passim.

Joint Tactical Committee

Minutes 1970-1971.

National Union Executive Committee
Minutes 1945-1975.

Opinion Research Centre
Reports to Central Office on Europe

29th March-2nd April 1967.

5th-9th August 1970.

30th June-4th July 1971.

Organisation Department
Anti-Market Activity 1961-1963.
European Seminar Report, 25th May 1971-11th June 1971.
Local Referenda 1970-1971.
Pro-Market Activity 1961-1963.
Public Opinion Assessment
August 1962
September 1962.

Overseas Bureau
Minutes 1949-1973.

Parliamentary Advisory Committee on the Common Market
Minutes September 1960-30th July 1964.

Parliamentary Agriculture Committee
Minutes 1971-1972.

Parliamentary Finance Committee
Briefs 1956.

Research Department

Desk Officer Files
Guy Hadley, 1st September 1960-30th July 1964.
Douglas Hurd, 20th December 1966-23rd January 1968.
Peter Minoprio, September 1961-August 1962.
Gordon Pears, 26th April 1966-11th November 1967.
Briefs passim.

Women's Advisory Committee
Conference Resolutions 1961-1975.

Young Conservatives
Conference Resolutions 1961-1975.

(ii). Other Archives

Anti-Common Market League
Minutes 1961-1975
Newsletter 1964-1975.

Conservative Anti-Common Market Information Service,
1971-1972.

Newsletter

Miscellany.

Conservative Group for Europe 1970-1975

Executive Committee

General Council

General Purposes Committee

Miscellany.

European Forum:

Council Minutes 30th June 1969-22nd July 1970.

European Movement:

Annual Reports 1966-1969.

Young European Democrats: National Executive Committee
Minutes 1974-1975.

(c) Pamphlets

(i). Central Office

Address by the Price Minister to Central Council (July
1971)

Conference Handbook 1945-1975.

Conference Verbatim Report 1945-1975.

E. Heath, The Conservative Goal, (March 1966).

Leaders of Industry and the Common Market, (November 1962).

H. Macmillan, The Common Market, (2nd August 1961).

H. Macmillan, Britain, the Commonwealth and Europe,
(October 1962).

Miscellaneous Leaflets.

(ii). Conservative Research Department

Campaign Guide 1970, 1974.

Common Market Topics, 7th November 1962-2nd January 1963.

European Campaign Guide, 1975.

Notes on Current Politics 1950-1975.

Pocket Politics 1961-1962.

Weekend Talking Points 1961-1963.

(iii). Conservative Political Centre

T. Beamish & N. St. John Stevas, Sovereignty: Substance or Shadow? (February 1972).

R. Boothby, About Western Union, (January 1949).

U. Branston, Britain and European Unity, (August 1953).

J. Bruce-Gardyne et al, Britain in Europe, (August 1962).

Cambridge University Monday Club, A Europe of Nations, (October 1965).

D. Clarke, Conservatism 1945-1950, (1950).

J. Critchley, The Future of NATO, (October 1968).

N. Davies, Conservatives and Peace, (n.d. 1950?)

J. Driscoll, Our Trade With Europe, (February 1957).

D. Elles, The Housewife and the Common Market, (April 1971).

Expanding Commonwealth Group, The Expanding Commonwealth, (October 1956).

Expanding Commonwealth Group, The Expanding Opportunity: the Commonwealth, (September 1958).

G. Gardiner, A Europe for the Regions, (August 1971).

J. Godber, Our Farming Future, (January 1970).

E. Griffiths, The New Competitors, (March 1965).

E. Griffiths & M. Niblock, Towards Nuclear Entente, (March 1970).

Lord Hailsham, The Acceptable Face of Western Civilisation, (October 1973).

S. Hamilton, Foundations of Alignment, (January 1975).

A. Hartley, The Spectre of Security, (July 1972).

A. Douglas Home, Britain's Place in the World, (August 1969).

A. Douglas Home, Great Britain in the 1970's, (October 1971).

A. Douglas Home, The Modern Commonwealth, (January 1971).

R. Hornby, The Changing Commonwealth, (April 1965).

M. Macioti, Europe and Technology, (February 1968).

H. Macmillan, Economic Recovery, (n.d. 1947?).

A. Meyer, European Technological Community, (December 1966).

A. Mitton, A Tax For Our Time, (September 1966).

One Nation, One Europe, (April 1965).

Research Department, Europe: Words to Remember, (July 1971).

G. Rippon, Britain's World Role, (n.d. 1965?).

G. Rippon, Our Future in Europe, (September 1974).

C. Selly, Farming and the Nine, (April 1973).

S. Sherbourne, VAT: Fair for All, (October 1972).

C. Soames et al, Three Views on Europe, (December 1973).

Society of Conservative Lawyers, Europe and the Law, (February 1968).

P.H. Spaak, Face to Face with Europe, (May 1967).

J. Stanley, American Troops in Europe, (April 1972).

CPC Discussion Briefs:

Commonwealth and Common Market (January 1962).

National Sovereignty in Common Market (March 1962).

British Agriculture & Horticulture and Common Market (March 1962).

Social Security in the Common Market (August 1962).

Towards a Free Trade Area (August-September 1962).

European Political Unity (November 1962).

Food and the Farmer (October 1965).

What Place in Europe? (May 1967).

What Will Joining Mean? (June 1967)

What Role in the World? (August 1967).

Agriculture and Food (February 1970).

A Reading List for Europe (February 1970).

The Common Market (October 1971).

A Policy for Energy (August-September 1972).

Fitting Into Europe (October 1972).

Europe - Yes or No? (March 1975).

(iv). Bow Group

L. Beaton et al, No Tame or Minor Role, (September 1963).

- L. Brittan et al, A Smaller Stage, (December 1965).
- L. Brittan et al, Our Future in Europe, (August 1970).
- N. Brittan et al, Europe: the First Year, (January 1974).
- J. Cripps, No Referendum, (February 1975).
- P. Goodhart, The People's Veto, (February 1975).
- R. Lewis, Challenge from Europe, (n.d. 1956?).
- P. Lilley et al, An Alternative Manifesto, (October 1973).
- A. Meyer, Middle East Crisis - the European Lesson, (June 1967).
- P. Ratzer, D. Baker & B. Brooke-Partridge, Europe - Power and Responsibility, (October 1972).
- L. Reed, Ocean-Space: Europe's New Frontier, (May 1969).

(v). Monday Club

- J. Amery, Towards a Solution, (n.d. 1975?).
- J. Biggs-Davison, Europe: Faith Not Despair, (n.d. 1967?).
- B. Costello, Referenda, P.R., (n.d. 1975?).
- Executive Committee, Right Reason, (January 1974).
- S. Hastings, Conservatism Tomorrow, (October 1966).
- A. Meyer & V. Montagu, Europe: Should Britain Join? (n.d. 1967?).
- V. Montagu, The Conservative Dilemma, (March 1970).
- T. Stacey, A Defeatist America, (April 1970).

(vi). Other Pamphlets

- N. Beacock et al, Towards a European Identity, (P.E.S.T., n.d. 1973?).
- T. Boardman, Super Market, (Conservative Group for Europe, September 1971).
- C.A.T.O., Pride, Prejudice and Persuasion, (no publishers, n.d.).
- B. Copping, The Story of the Monday Club, (Current Affairs Information Service, 1972).

B. Copping, The Monday Club: Crisis and After,
(Current Affairs Information Service, 1975).

H. Corbet, Britain not Europe: Commonwealth Before
Common Market, (Anti-Common Market League, May 1962).

Daily Telegraph, Britain and the Common Market,
(Telegraph, November 1969).

E. Holloway, The Case for an Atlantic Free Trade Area,
(Aims of Industry, 1967).

A. Douglas Home, Our European Destiny, (Conservative
Group for Europe, July 1971).

H. Johnson, Our Entry: Implications for the World
Economy, (Open Seas Forum, n.d. 1971).

T. Kerpel et al, The Europe We Build, (Greater London
Young Conservatives, January 1973).

P. Kirk, Peter Kirk 1928-1977, (European Conservative
Group, 1977).

N. Marten, The Common Market: No Middle Way, (Common
Market Safeguards Campaign, 1974).

J. Meade, The Economic Arguments, (Open Seas Forum,
n.d. 1971?).

V. O'Donovan, The Common Market and the Irish Crisis,
(P.E.S.T., n.d. 1974?).

V. O'Donovan, Company Law and the EEC, (P.E.S.T., n.d.
1974?).

P. Oppenheimer, What Economic Case?, (Open Seas Forum,
n.d. 1971?).

G. Rippon, Britain and Europe, (Conservative Group for
Europe, March 1971).

R. Turton, Why I Voted Against Entry into the Common
Market, (Commonwealth Industries Association, 1972).

D. Walker-Smith & P. Walker, A Call to the Commonwealth,
(Private, 1962).

(d) Newspapers

Daily Express, passim

Daily Telegraph, 1945-1975

Evening Standard, 13th October 1972.

Guardian, passim.

News of the World, 5th September 1948.

Observer, 18th June 1961, 13th October 1963.

Sunday Telegraph, 21st February 1965.

Sunday Times, 2nd July 1961, 15th October 1967, 11th July 1971.

The Times, 1945-1975.

(e) Periodicals

Britain and Overseas, passim

Crossbow, 1957-1975

Economist, 1945-1975.

Federalist, May 1973-31st May 1975.

Listener, 21st October 1971.

Monday World, Winter 1969-Spring 1973.

Objective, January 1952-July 1957.

Spectator, 1945-1975.

Swinton Journal, 1951-1975.

Tory European, Winter 1972-Autumn 1973.

(f) Unpublished Manuscripts

J. Bochel, Activists in the Conservative and Labour Parties: a Study of Ward Secretaries in Manchester, (M.A. Thesis, Manchester University, 1965).

N. Forman, The European Movement in Britain 1945-1954, (Doctoral Dissertation, Sussex University, 1973).

A. Gamble and P. Seyd, Conservative Ideology and Electoral Strategy in Britain since 1964, (Paper delivered to the European Consortium on Political Research, Brussels, 1979).

Z. Layton-Henry, Party Youth Organisations in Britain, (Doctoral Dissertation, Birmingham University, 1973).

(g) Books

- S. Aster, Anthony Eden, (London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1976).
- A. Aughey, Conservative Party Attitudes to the Common Market, (Hull Papers in Politics, 1978).
- A. Aughey, Constituency Attitudes and Policy Formulation, (Hull Papers in Politics, 1981).
- J. Barber, Who Makes British Foreign Policy?, (Milton Keynes, Open University Press, 1976).
- S. Beer, Modern British Politics, (London, Faber, 1969, Second Edition).
- E. Beddington-Behrens, Look Back, Look Forward, (London, Macmillan, 1963).
- R. Behrens, The Conservative Party from Heath to Thatcher, (Farnborough, Saxon House, 1980).
- R. Behrens, The Conservative Party in Opposition 1974-1977, (Coventry, Lanchester Polytechnic, 1977).
- M. Beloff, New Dimensions in Foreign Policy, (London, Allen & Unwin, 1961).
- N. Beloff, The General Says No, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1963).
- H. Berkeley, The Odyssey of Enoch, (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1975).
- J. Biggs-Davison, The Uncertain Ally, (London, Johnson, 1957).
- J. Biggs-Davison, The Walls of Europe: Commonwealth or Common Market, (London, Johnson, 1962).
- S. Black, Industry and Government in Britain, (Farnborough, Saxon House, 1973).
- R. Blake & J. Patten, The Conservative Opportunity, (London, Macmillan, 1976).
- V. Bogdanor, The People and the Party System, (London, Cambridge University Press, 1981).
- R. Boothby, My Yesterday, Your Tomorrow, (London, Hutchinson, 1962).
- R. Boothby, Recollections of a Rebel, (London, Hutchinson, 1978).
- R. Boyson, Goodbye to Nationalisation, (London, Constitutional Book Club, 1971).
- J. Bruce-Gardyne, Whatever Happened to the Quiet Revolution?, (London, Knight, 1974).

- J. Bruce-Gardyne & N. Lawson, The Power Game, London, Macmillan, 1976).
- D. Butler, The British General Election of 1955, (London, Macmillan, 1955).
- D. Butler & D. Kavanagh, The British General Election of February 1974, (London, Macmillan, 1974).
- D. Butler & D. Kavanagh, The British General Election of October 1974, (London, Macmillan, 1975).
- D. Butler & A. King, The British General Election of 1966, (London, Macmillan, 1967).
- D. Butler & U. Kitzinger, The British General Election of 1964, (London, Macmillan, 1965).
- D. Butler & U. Kitzinger, The 1975 Referendum, (London, Macmillan, 1976).
- D. Butler & M. Pinto-Duchinsky, The British General Election of 1970, (London, Macmillan, 1971).
- D. Butler & R. Rose, The British General Election of 1959, (London, Macmillan, 1959).
- R. Butler, The Art of the Possible, (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1971).
- R. Butler (editor), The Conservatives, (London, Allen & Unwin, 1977).
- R. Butt, The Power of Parliament, (London, Constable, 1969, Second Edition).
- M. Camps, Britain and the European Community, (London, Oxford University Press, 1964).
- M. Camps, European Unification in the Sixties, (London, Oxford University Press, 1967).
- D. Carlton, Anthony Eden: A Biography, (London, Allen & Unwin, 1981).
- G. Catlin, The Atlantic Commonwealth, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1969).
- R. Churchill, The Fight for the Tory Leadership, (London, Heinemann, 1964).
- R. Churchill (editor), Europe Unite: Speeches of Winston Churchill 1947-1948, (London, Cassell, 1950).
- W. Churchill, The Sinews of Peace, (London, Cassell, 1948).
- C. Clark, British Trade in the Common Market, (London, Stevens, 1962).

- P. Cosgrave, Margaret Thatcher: A Leader and Her Party, (London, Hutchinson, 1978).
- M. Cowling (editor), Conservative Essays, (London, Cassell, 1978).
- F.W. Craig, British General Election Manifestos 1900-1974, (Chichester, Political Reference Publications, 1975).
- J. Dickie, The Uncommon Commoner, (London, Pall Mall Press, 1964).
- H. Drucker, Multi-Party Britain, (London, Macmillan, 1979).
- A. Eden, Full Circle, (London, Cassell, 1960).
- P. Einzig, The Case Against Joining the Common Market, (London, Macmillan, 1971).
- European Movement, The Case for Going In, (London, Harrap, 1972).
- European Movement, The European Movement and the Council of Europe, (London, Hutchinson, n.d. 1949?).
- D. Evans, While Britain Slept, (London, Gollancz, 1975).
- D. Evans (editor), Destiny or Disillusion?, (London, Gollancz, 1971).
- W. Farrar (editor), The Daily Telegraph Guide to the Common Market, (London, Collins, 1972).
- S.E. Finer, H. Berrington & D. Bartholomew, Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons 1955-1959, (London, Pergamon, 1961).
- N. Fisher, Iain Macleod, (London, Purnell, 1973).
- N. Fisher, The Tory Leaders, (London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1977).
- A. Gamble, The Conservative Nation, (London, Routledge, Kegan & Paul, 1974).
- S.C. Ghosh, Decision-Making and Power in the British Conservative Party, (Calcutta, Oceania Publishing House, 1972).
- I. Gilmour, Inside Right, (London, Hutchinson, 1977).
- P. Goodhart, Full Hearted Consent, (London, Davis Pynter, 1976).
- P. Goodhart, In the Shadow of the Sword, (London, Michael Joseph, 1964).
- P. Goodhart, The 1922, (London, Macmillan, 1973).
- P. Goodhart, Referendum, (London, Tom Shacey, 1971).
- W. Grant & D. Marsh, The CBI, (London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1977).
- Guardian, Guardian Conservative Conference Report, (Guardian, 1969).

E. Haas, Consensus Formation in the Council of Europe, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1960).

Lord Hailsham, The Conservative Case, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1959).

Lord Hailsham, The Door Wherein I Went, (London, Collins, 1978).

N. Harris, Competition and the Corporate Society, (London, Methuen, 1972).

E. Heath, A British Approach to European Foreign Policy, (Leeds, Leeds University Press, 1976).

E. Heath, Old World, New Horizons, (London, Oxford University Press, 1970).

A. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty, (Cambridge Mass, Harvard University Press, 1970).

R. Holt & J. Turner, The Battle of Baron's Court, (London, Macmillan, 1968).

J. Hoffman, The Conservatives in Opposition, (London, MacGibbon & Kee, 1964).

Lord Home, The Way The Wind Blows, (London, Collins, 1976).

D. Hurd, An End to Promises, (London, Collins, 1979).

G. Hutchinson, Edward Heath, (London, Longman, 1970).

G. Hutchinson, The Last Edwardian at Number 10, (London, Longman, 1980).

M. Ivens & C. Bradley, Which Way?, (London, Michael Joseph, 1970).

R. Jackson, Rebels and Whips, (London, Macmillan, 1968).

D. Johnson, Ted Heath: Latter Day Charlemagne, (London, Johnson, 1971).

R. Jowell & G. Hoinville, Britain into Europe, (London, Croom Helm, 1976).

R. Jowell & J. Spence, The Grudging Europeans, (London, Social and Community Planning Research, 1975).

Lord Kilmuir, Political Adventure, (London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1964).

A. King, Britain Says Yes, (Washington, American Enterprise Institute, 1977).

A. King, The British Prime Minister, (London, Macmillan, 1969).

A. King & A. Sloman, Westminster and Beyond, (London, Macmillan, 1973).

- U. Kitzinger, Diplomacy and Persuasion, (London, Thames & Hudson, 1973).
- M. Kolinsky, Divided Loyalties, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1976).
- M. Laing, Edward Heath: Prime Minister, (London, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1972).
- J. La Palombara & M. Weiner, Political Parties and Political Development, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966).
- Z. Layton-Henry, Reorganisation in the Conservative Party: An Analysis of the Chelmer Report, (University of Warwick Working Paper, 1975).
- Z. Layton-Henry, Conservative Party Politics, (London, Macmillan, 1980).
- R. Lewis, Between Brussels and Rome, (London, Institute of Economic Affairs, 1971).
- R. Lewis, Principle in Politics, (London, Cassell, 1979).
- R. Lieber, British Politics and European Unity, (Berekeley, University of California Press, 1970).
- K. Lindsay, European Assemblies, (London, Stevens, 1960).
- T.E. Lindsay & M. Harrington, The Conservative Party 1918-1979, (London, Macmillan, 1979, Second Edition).
- R. McKenzie, British Political Parties, (London, Heinemann, 1967, Second Edition).
- D. McKie & D. Cooke, The Guardian Election Guide October 1974, (London, Quartet, 1974).
- H. Macmillan, At the End of the Day, (London, Macmillan, 1973).
- H. Macmillan, Tide of Fortune, (London, Macmillan, 1969).
- L.S. Mahotiere, The Common Market, (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1961).
- R. Maudling, Memoirs, (London, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1978).
- Maxwell Stamp Associates, The Free Trade Option: Opportunity for Britain, (London, Maxwell Stamp Associates, 1967).
- J. Meade, The U.K., Commonwealth and Common Market: A Reappraisal, (London, Institute of Economic Affairs, 1962, Second Edition).
- Lord Moran, Winston Churchill: the struggle for survival, (London, Constable, 1966).
- H.G. Nicholas, The British General Election of 1950, (London, Macmillan, 1950).

- P. Norton, Conservative Dissidents, (London, Temple Smith, 1978).
- P. Norton, Dissidence in the House of Commons 1945-1975, (London, Macmillan, 1975).
- P. Norton & A. Aughey, Conservatives and Conservatism, (London, Temple Smith, 1981).
- N. Nugent & R. King, The British Right, (London, Croom Helm, 1977).
- H. Pelling, Winston Churchill, (London, Pan, 1977).
- H. Penniman, Britain At the Polls: the Parliamentary Elections of 1974, (Washington D.C., American Enterprise Institute, 1975).
- R. Pfalzgraff, Jr., Britain Faces Europe, (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969).
- J.E. Powell, The Common Market: The Case Against, (Kingswood, Elliott Rightway Books, 1971).
- J.E. Powell, A Nation or No Nation?, (London, Batsford, 1978).
- J.E. Powell, Still to Decide, (London, Batsford, 1972).
- R. Punnett, Front Bench Opposition, (London, Heinemann, 1978).
- T. Raison, Why Conservative?, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1964).
- J. Ramsden, The Making of Conservative Party Policy, (London, Longman, 1980).
- A. Ranney, Pathways to Parliament, (London, Macmillan, 1965).
- L. Reed, Britain in a Shrinking World, (London, Oldbourne, 1967).
- R. Rhodes James, Ambitions and Realities: British Politics 1964-1970, (London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1972).
- R. Rose, Politics in England Today, (London, Faber, 1974).
- R. Rose, The Problem of Party Government, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1976).
- A. Roth, Can Parliament Decide?, (London, Macdonald, 1971).
- A. Roth, Heath and the Heathmen, (London, Routledge, Kegan & Paul, 1972).
- M. Rush, The Selection of Parliamentary Candidates, (London, Nelson, 1969).
- A. Sampson, Macmillan, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1968).
- A. Schlaim, Britain and the Origins of European Unity 1940-51, (Reading, Graduate School of Contemporary European Studies, Reading University, 1978).

- D. Schoen, Enoch Powell and the Powellites, (London, Macmillan, 1977).
- P. Self & H. Storing, The State and the Farmer, (London, Allen & Unwin, 1962).
- D. Spanier, Europe, Our Europe, (London, Secker & Warburg, 1972).
- A.J.P. Taylor, Beaverbrooke, (London, Hamilton, 1972).
- P. Uri, From Commonwealth to Common Market, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1969).
- T.E. Utley, Enoch Powell: The Man and His Thinking, (London, Kimber, 1968).
- K. Waltz, Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics, (London, Longman, 1968).
- A. Watson, Europe At Risk, (London, Harrap, 1972).
- Western European Union, W.E.U.: Ten Years of Seven-Power Europe, (Paris, W.E.U., 1964).
- D. Wilson, Power and Party Bureaucracy in Britain, (Farnborough, Saxon House, 1975).
- J.Q. Wilson, The Amateur Democrat, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1962).
- Lord Windlesham, Communication and Political Power, (London, Cape, 1966).
- J. Wood, Powell and the 1970 Election, (Kingswood, Elliot Right Way Books, 1970).
- W. Wright, A Comparative Study of Party Organization, (Columbus Ohio, Charles Merrill, 1971).
- G.K. Young, Masters of Indecision, (London, Methuen, 1962).
- K. Young, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, (London, Dent, 1970).
- A. Zurcher, The Struggle to Unite Europe 1940-1958, (New York, New York University Press, 1975).

(h) Articles

- D. Baker, "The European Right", New Europe, 2, 1, (Autumn 1973), pp.16-23.
- M. Barnett, "Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons", Parliamentary Affairs, 22, (1968), pp.38-61.
- A. Beichman, "The Conservative Research Department", Journal of British Studies, 13, (1974), pp.92-113.

- H. Berrington, "The Conservative Party: Revolts and Pressures 1955-1961", Political Quarterly, 32, (1961), pp.363-373.
- J. Biffen, "Party Conference and Party Policy", Political Quarterly, 32, (1961), pp.257-266.
- J. Biffen, "Tory Nationalism", Solon, 1, 1, (1969), pp.19-24.
- P. Blaker, "Labour's renegotiations: a Conservative View", World Today, 30, 8, (August 1974), pp.316-326.
- R. Butt, "The Common Market and Conservative Party Politics 1961-1962", Government and Opposition, 2, 3, (April 1967), pp.372-386.
- M. Charlton, "How and Why Britain Lost the Leadership of Europe", Encounter, (August 1981, September 1981, October 1981).
- P. Clark & J.Q. Wilson, "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organisation", Administrative Science Quarterly, 6, (1961), pp.134-137.
- D. Clarke, "The Organisation of Political Parties", Political Quarterly, 21, (1950), pp.79-93.
- D. Close, "The Growth of Backbench Organisation in the Conservative Party", Parliamentary Affairs, 27, 4, (1974), pp.371-383.
- J. Critchley, "How to get on in the Tory Party", Political Quarterly, 49, 4, (1978), pp.467-473.
- J. Critchley, "The Tory Intellectuals", Political Quarterly, 32, (1961), pp.267-
- A. Dickson, "M.P's Readoption Conflicts", Political Studies, 23, (1975), pp.62-70.
- L. Epstein, "British M.P.s and their Local Parties: the Suez Case", American Political Science Review, 54, (1960), pp.374-390.
- L. Fairlie, "Candidate Selection Role Conceptions of Conservative & Labour Party Secretaries/Agents", Political Studies, 24, (1976), pp.281-295.
- R. Frasure, "Backbench Opinion Revisited ", Political Studies, 20, (1972), pp.325-238.
- R. Frasure & A. Kornberg, "Constituency Agents and British Party Politics", British Journal of Political Science, 5, (1975), pp.459-476.
- W. Grant, "Business Interests and the British Conservative Party", Government and Opposition, 15, 1, (1980), pp.143-161.
- E. Heath, "Realism in Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs, 48, 1, (1969), pp.39-50.

- A. King, "How the Conservatives evolve policies", New Society, (20th July 1972), pp.122-124.
- A. Kornberg & R. Frasure, "Policy Differences in British Parliamentary Parties", American Political Science Review, 65, (1971), pp.694-703.
- Z. Layton-Henry, "Constituency Autonomy in the Conservative Party", Parliamentary Affairs, 29, (1976), pp.396-403.
- Z. Layton-Henry, "Democracy and Reform in the Conservative Party", Journal of Contemporary History, 13, (1978), pp.653-670.
- Z. Layton-Henry, "The Young Conservatives 1945-1970", Journal of Contemporary History, 8, (1973), pp.143-156.
- J. Lynskey, "Backbench Tactics and Parliamentary Party Structure", Parliamentary Affairs, 27, (1973), pp.28-37.
- M. Pinto-Duchinsky, "Central Office and 'Power' in the Conservative Party", Political Studies, 20, (1972), pp.1-16.
- M. Pinto-Duchinsky, "Stratification and Policy in the British Conservative Party", American Behavioural Scientist, 17, 2, (1973), pp.285-292.
- A. Potter, "The English Conservative Constituency Association", Western Political Quarterly, 9, (1956), pp.363-375.
- R. Rose, "The Bow Group's Role in British Politics", Western Political Quarterly, 14, (1961), pp.865-878.
- R. Rose, "The Professionals of Politics", New Society, (8th August 1963).
- J. Schwartz, "Explaining a New Role in Policy-Making: The British House of Commons in the 1970's", American Political Science Review, 74, 1, (1980), pp.23-37.
- J. Schwartz & G. Lambert, "Career Objectives, Group Feelings and Legislative Party Cohesion: British Conservatives 1959-1968", Journal of Politics, 33, (1971), pp.399-421.
- P. Seyd, "Democracy within the Conservative Party", Government and Opposition, 10, (1975), pp.219-237.
- P. Seyd, "Factionalism within the Conservative Party: The Monday Club", Government and Opposition, 7, (1973), pp.464-487.
- I. Trethowan, "The Tory Strategists", New Society, 3, (21st May 1964), pp.13-15.
- D. Wilson & M. Pinto-Duchinsky, "Conservative City Machines", British Journal of Political Science, 5, (1976), pp.239-244.