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The Dilemmas of South African Liberalism:

White Liberals, Racial Ideology and the Politics
of Social Control in the period of South African
Industrialisation, 1887 to 1943.

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Abstract

This thesis is an analysis of liberal ideology and its role in South African industrialisation during the period 1886-1948. It looks at the growth of a specifically South African "liberal tradition" out of nineteenth century Cape colonial origins and focuses on the development of liberal welfare and reform orientated organisations and agencies. Using the private papers and correspondence of the individuals involved in establishing this reform tradition, the thesis argues that South African liberals were only partially successful in the years before 1948 in emulating their western counterparts in institutionalising themselves as political mediators between the state apparatus and the burgeoning black working class. Lacking a sound political base in the narrow electoral franchise, liberals were forced increasingly onto the defensive as the old paternalist basis of Cape liberalism became eroded. Though for the period between Union and the second world war able use was made of local level politics, the increase in democratic radicalism by the mid 1940s forced liberals towards reformulating their ideology into one of administrative reform from above on the basis of a model of ethnic pluralism. This theory has remained the basis of South African liberal ideology substantially up to the present.

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Preface

This study of South African liberalism is based on the extensive archival sources left behind by both prominent liberals in South African politics and the organisations that they formed. During the period 1975-77, I conducted research into some of these collections, many of which had hardly been used before as a basis for historical study. The archives of the South African Institute of Race Relations deposited at the University of the Witwatersrand in "B" boxes were especially voluminous as were the Rheinnalt-Jones and Margaret Ballinger collections. Further material came from the recently discovered Howard Pim papers, the Hofmeyr papers, the D.L. Smit papers and such better known collections as those of Walter Stanford, A.B. Xuma and George Heaton Nicholls.

Historical research being such an on-going process, this study can in many ways be only a preliminary entry into a very large area where more detailed case studies will fill out our knowledge of the workings of contemporary South African political processes. In the writing of this thesis, I would like especially to thank my supervisor Professor John Rex and various individuals for helpful advice and discussion, including Stanley Trapido, Shula Marks, Martin Legassick, Richard Mendelson, Alan Jeeves, Tim Couzens, Brian Willan and Chris Saunders. Many librarians have been of invaluable assistance and I would especially thank Marcelle Jacobson and Mrs. Anna Cunningham of the Church of the Province Archives, Wits University, and Mike Berning and Sandy Ford at Rhodes University Library.

Paul Rich
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Abbreviations

ABM	Files of the American Board Mission
ArTCM	Archive of the Transvaal Chamber of Mines
ArSAIRR	Archive of the South African Institute of Race Relations
CMT	Chief Magistrate, Transkei
HAD	House of Assembly Debates
J	Files of the Department of Justice, Union Archives, Pretoria
MSS Brit Emp.	British Empire Manuscripts held at Rhodes House, Oxford
CANA	Files of the Cape Native Affairs Department, Cape Archives, Cape Town
NA	Files of the Union Native Affairs Department, Union Archives, Pretoria
RM	Resident Magistrate
SANAC	South African Native Affairs Commission, Report, 1903-05
SNA	Files of the Secretary of Native Affairs, Transvaal Archives Depot, Pretoria
TCL	Transvaal Consolidated Lands Company
TT	Transkeian Territories
UG	Union Government

Introduction

In this study we propose to discuss the impact of liberal political theory on the development of South African industrialisation. Concentrating especially on the period between 1883, the date of the politically significant Native Laws and Customs Commission in the Cape Colony, and 1948, the year of the election victory of Dr. D.F. Malan's National Party over Smuts's United Party, we will be looking at the shape and content of the liberal reform movement in South African history.

Liberalism as such, it must first be acknowledged, has not usually been seen as having all that great an impact on either political consciousness or legislation in a society like South Africa. The conventional view of historians both of the right and the left has mainly been to emphasise the continual eclipse of those political figures and movements who sought even mildly liberal-democratic reform. Instead, the central focus of attention has been on the growth of rival collective nationalisms — especially Afrikaner and African nationalism — and the development of a labour repressive economy that has markedly diverged from the liberal-democratic models of Western Europe and North America. South African industrialisation, indeed, has frequently been seen in terms of what the Simonses, in their study of class and colour in South African politics between 1850 and 1950, have described as "the impact of an advanced industrialism on an obsolete, degenerate colonial order".¹

Certainly, a general overview of South African history over the last century or so seems to confirm this general impression of the strong colonial and authoritarian legacy of the nineteenth century squeezing out any pressures for political and economic liberalisation. Attention has therefore turned to the entrenchment of what the historical sociologist Barrington Moore, in an important comparative study of the different paths to modernisation, has termed a "revolution from above".² Certainly, judged even by its own standards of a free market economy and the progressive destruction of state controlled regulations over industrial enterprise, the classical liberal model of *laissez faire* economic development stood little or no chance of

entrenching itself in the political and economic order that grew up in South Africa after the discoveries of diamonds at Kimberley and gold on the Witwatersrand in the 1870s and 1880s. By the time that South Africa came to industrialise, the first main wave of industrial transformation, represented by the British industrial revolution after 1850 and the wave of American expansion westwards in the nineteenth century, had already reached maturity. In effect, the real heyday of liberalism as a political creed and method of economic organisation centred around a capitalist free market economy had passed and the beginnings of industrialisation in South Africa, together with such countries as Japan and Germany, saw the beginnings of a new era of growing state control. Accordingly, what emerges as central to the study of the industrial transformation of South African society is the continuous and unhampered growth of central state power as the key means to foster and protect an industrial capitalism that rested only to a marginal degree on the disciplines of a competitive market economy as in the British or American case. This, therefore, leaves little scope for the classic form of political liberalisation in South Africa on the Western model.

A marginal phenomenon?

Given this basic setting, it is not surprising that the basic historiographical interpretation of South African liberalism has rested on the view that it has been continually superceded and defeated by forces and organisations both more powerful and tightly organised than itself. Reflecting the far wider world wide trend of a general retreat of liberal political ideas in the twentieth century before rival state dominated philosophies of nationalism, fascism and communism, liberal analysts in particular have viewed liberalism in the South African context as a hopeless case of well intentioned individuals and organisations being swamped by the entrenched forces of Afrikaner nationalism, allied in many cases to the die hard English-speaking segregationists in areas like Natal.³ This did not necessarily mean that the basic principles of political liberalism could not potentially be applied at some stage in South African economic and industrial development, for the forces that had led to widespread industrialisation and urbanisation were seen by these liberal analysts as also creating a

common social framework that transcended the boundaries of race and ethnic identity. But it was the central domination of the social framework by a polity characterised by a strongly ethnically separatist philosophy that continued to prevent this from being realised.

However, this liberal view of South Africa's politically stalled industrialisation has come under growing attack in recent years by a newer school of revisionist historians who have by no means been so certain of liberalism's basic marginality in South African history. Criticising, in particular, the second volume of The Oxford History of South Africa, which first appeared in 1970,⁴ the revisionists have argued that the liberal argument essentially rests on a false assumption, namely that it is possible to make a direct disjunction between a common social framework characterised, as The Oxford History maintained, by the "interaction" between "peoples of diverse origins, languages, technologies, ideologies and social systems, meeting on South African soil"⁵ and a polity which is dominated by a racially exclusive ideology. This presupposes that there is a necessary contradiction between the rationality of a "common society" and a state apparatus that continues to deny this in the interests of maintaining a "dogmatic" racial ideology.

In essence, this debate between the revisionists and liberals grew out of a debate in the early 1970s on the nature of possible political change in South Africa's contemporary social structure and on whether there was a possible force, in economic growth per se leading to some form of future political transformation. This debate, which has been extensively analysed in such volumes as those of Leftwich, Harrison Wright and Schlemmer and Webster⁶ we do not propose to go into now in extensive depth beyond reviewing its implications for the reinterpretation of South African history. For, if the revisionist critique is to be accepted, it may be necessary to revise many of the conventional assumptions about liberalism's place in the historical process. In particular, if the revisionist argument that there is no inherent contradiction between economic development and the dominant racial ideology is correct, it may mean that liberalism may well have actively caused in many ways the dominant political order in South Africa today, instead of remaining in continued opposition to it.

The revisionist critique is important in South African historiography for bringing to bear new categories of analysis centred around concepts of social class and modes of production. This marxian framework shifts attention away from the previous liberal emphasis upon political ideas and ideologies for their own sake and instead seeks to incorporate them into a social framework governed by capital accumulation, class conflict and struggles for ideological legitimacy. The previous liberal argument that there was a unilinear process endemic to South African industrialisation whereby the progressive expansion of capitalism ensured a long run increase in general economic well-being can now by no means be automatically accepted. The revisionists have widened the framework of analysis in order to locate South Africa in the structures of global political economy and here it is not necessarily obvious that unhampered development follows tout cours. Unlike the first phase of industrialisation in Western Europe and North America, which was aided by the advantages of the surplus derived from imperial expansion overseas or America's expansion westwards, the South African phase of industrial expansion had to rely on the direct exploitation of peoples directly within her territorial confines or immediately contiguous to her. Thus, for the revisionists, the global relationships forged by the western powers of metropolitan development leading to peripheral underdevelopment, has taken place in the South African instance internally within her own borders. As a direct consequence of this, the racial ideologies of segregation and later apartheid did not develop, as some of the liberal conventional wisdom would have it, as a long term legacy of South African frontier history but a direct consequence of capitalist industrialisation and the peripheralisation of the African pre-capitalist reserve economies into labour reservoirs for the white dominated capitalist core.⁷

Thus, as revisionist analysis has deepened in the 1970s, attention has increasingly turned towards seeing liberalism in South Africa as by no means such a marginal and peripheral a phenomenon as has so often been argued. In particular, the revisionists reflected the growing use of the concept of "social control" in the somewhat alienated years of the 1970s as their marxist methodology emphasised the problems of class differentiation and struggle for political power. In this newer

view, liberalism became less a simple tradition of political opposition based around such basic principles as the rights of man, freedom of speech, press and of assembly and the rule of law, but rather an ideology that had played a considerable role in the evolution of structures of social control in order to perpetuate a class society and capitalist relations of production.

This was not a completely original view for attacks had been made on liberals and liberal ideology in the course of political struggle in South Africa in the 1940s and 1950s. The Trotskyite Non European Unity Movement, especially, had been deeply critical of what they perceived to be the control exerted by white liberals in South Africa over black politics and its leading ideologist, I.B. Tabata had mounted an attack in his book The Awakening of a People in 1950 on the whole tradition of South African liberalism from the time of its development in the Cape Colony in the early nineteenth century. This liberalism, he argued, was specifically linked to English capitalism in its thrust to overcome "Dutch feudalism":

the representatives of British imperialism appeared to the Africans in a progressive light and in so far as the liberals brought them education they appeared as their friends and the champions of their rights. Here again the Africans confused the objective demands of the capitalist system with a supposed will-to-good on the part of the liberals. They translated the clash between two economic systems as evidence of an inherent difference in attitude towards the Africans, as an intrinsic difference in moral principles between Dutch and English. They failed to realise that the good things they associated with the liberals had nothing whatever to do with moral principle or the humanitarian will-to-good. Actually the liberals themselves were obeying the dictates of the objective forces of capitalism. 8

A similar view to this by Nosipho Majeke in a work entitled The Role of the Missionaries in Conquest published by the Society of Young Africa in 1953 also emphasises the mystifying function of liberalism in South African history. Here, even the educational function of the missions and the philanthropic aims of the early Cape liberals like the Rev. John Philip are attacked as part of a deliberate colonial policy of "divide and rule". Emphasising the connections of the Evangelicals and Anti

Slavery Movement in Britain to the rising industrial bourgeoisie, Majeke argued that the missionaries in South Africa were part of the historical expansion of capitalism onto a world scale:

This is the womb of the so-called humanitarian movements of the early 19th Century. It is against this background of vast economic forces that the influx of missionaries to the colonies acquires meaning. The missionaries came from a capitalist christian civilisation that unblushingly found religious sanctions for inequality, as it does to this day, and whose ministers solemnly blessed its wars of aggression. Men like Wilberforce had visions of extending this civilisation to the ends of the earth. They saw themselves as the chosen race. 9

Furthermore, "the achievement of the missionaries was the first achievement of liberalism"¹⁰ such that the foundations of liberal ideology in South Africa became irreparably joined to the intrusion of British mercantile imperialism and the control structures it created.

This earlier tradition of analysis of South African liberalism as an instrument of bourgeois social control has, however, been elaborated in the more recent revisionist work of Stanley Trapido and Martin Legassick. Trapido's area of focus has been confined to the Cape Colony between Responsible Government in 1853 and Union in 1910 where he has looked at the structures underpinning the hegemony of liberal ideology at both the colonial and the local level. In particular, he shows how the maintenance of the "great tradition" of Cape liberalism depended upon the underlying backing of English mercantile capital while the local tradition of liberalism related substantially to the establishment of marketing and trading links with the Eastern Cape peasantry.¹¹ Using more recent categories of analysis from Immanuel Wallerstein's general theory of the capitalist world economy, we can say that Cape liberalism reflected the emergence of the transitional category of African peasants between the pre-colonial tribal mode of production and the proletarianisation that ensued with the rise of mining capital after the diamond and gold discoveries at Kimberley and the Witwatersrand in the 1870s and 1880s. During this period a process of peripheralisation occurred as the Cape was

integrated into the world trade relationships forged by the expansion of the woollen industry,¹³ and it was through the generation of a relatively well-off class of African peasants and small capitalist farmers¹⁴ that the Cape liberal tradition flourished. Certainly, African voters came to play an important role in a number of Eastern Cape constituencies despite the successive raising of the franchise qualifications in 1887 and 1894, while at the colonial level the tradition emphasised freedom of speech and the press and the rule of law through the growth of a significant liberal establishment centred around the missions, the press, the judiciary, the parliamentary opposition and mercantile interests.

It was this establishment that was eclipsed at Union in 1910 as mining capital reached a hegemonic position in the united South African political system. From this time onwards, the great tradition of Cape liberalism was finished, though the small tradition continued to survive at the local level and the South African polity embarked on a course of territorial segregation. But what was liberalism's relationship to this new political phase? On this question a controversial thesis has been advanced by Martin Legassick in his work on South African liberalism in order to extend the area of analysis of Dr. Trapido. Liberalism, argues Dr. Legassick, did not remain a static force at the time of Union, linked only to a dying tradition in the Cape. Though this argument has been frequently maintained by a number of liberals themselves, it overlooks an important process of ideological reformulation that was already beginning before Union and which continued after 1910 and up through the inter-war years to the 1948 election. During this period, liberal ideas and institutions were alive and active and were being gradually accommodated to the hegemony of mining capital under the umbrella ideology of territorial segregation:

The separate hegemonic classes within nineteenth century South Africa were linked only through the market, and only dominated with any effect at this level by the metropolitan-orientated bourgeoisie of the Cape ports. The rapid emergence of the mining industry, generating capitalist forces and relations of production which impinged on every aspect of the Southern African economic system, created a new situation. The domination of the capitalist mode accelerated class differentiation

and forms of uneven development. The rise of a hegemonic fraction of capital based on production led to the creation of the South African state in which this fraction dominated the power bloc. Neither classical liberalism nor the hierarchical racial ideologies of non capitalist social formations in the Boer Republics could serve to rationalise or reproduce bourgeois social relations in the new context. 15

In consequence a new ideology of "segregationism" emerged which located bourgeois social control on a geographical basis of separated African and White land areas. As this segregation became entrenched by successive legislation in the years after Union, liberals, argues Legassick, did not for the most part step outside its bounds, but rather reacted to it in a defensive fashion, looking "in nostalgia for the comfortable assumptions of Cape liberalism rather than in a forward-looking search for reform. Most of their activities can be simply interpreted in terms of social control, and many of the reforms they advocated were intended to resolve the contradictions of segregation rather than to challenge its premises".¹⁶ On this methodological basis, it is possible to conclude that the opinion leaders of South African liberalism of the inter-war years such as Howard Pim, Edgar Brookes, J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones, W.M. Macmillan and C.T. Loram were for the most part concerned with elaborating social and welfare policies through bodies like the Joint Councils and the South African Institute of Race Relations which could be reconciled with territorial segregation and to smooth over lacunae that had been left by a generally weak state administrative apparatus. Furthermore, on the basis of a hitherto unpublished paper, Legassick argues that once the state did start to develop a strongly interventionist capacity in the years after 1948, as Dr. Verwoerd began to systematise the apartheid doctrine, liberalism in South Africa lost its essential moral basis and political purpose. The final demise of the Liberal Party in 1968 was not so much a result of simple political repression, the basic interpretation offered by liberals themselves, but a culmination of an inner withering through the loss of liberalism's basic effectiveness as an "agency of social control".¹⁷ In its place there has emerged, Legassick concludes, the vulgar materialism of the O'Dowd, Horwitz and Hutt kind which has placed its central reliance upon economic growth to promote political change. This teleological belief articulates the post-war optimism

in economic progress as it has been articulated by Walt Rostow's "stages of growth" theory into the South African context and concludes that at some date, O'Dowd has even named 1980 as the critical year, South Africa will begin to emerge onto some form of liberal-democratic state, albeit incorporating the features of a "plural society" due to the entrenchment of strongly diverse ethnic and cultural diversities.¹⁸

Legassick's thesis is highly partisan and coloured by a desire, as he expresses it, to promote the interests of a "genuinely South African marxism within the democratic-African nationalist movement".¹⁹ How far should his analysis be taken as an accurate depiction of the true nature and intentions of South African liberalism as it has evolved from its nineteenth century Cape origins? One central objection is that the analysis has been typecast in terminology that defies exact definition. While the relationship of liberalism to structures of social control is an important one, there is the problem of what exactly does "social control" mean? At the same time, while Legassick has been concerned, in studies on liberals such as Alfred Hoernle, C.T. Lorman and the missionaries of the American Board Mission, to analyse the ideas of varying South African "liberals",²⁰ there is the important and basic question of "who or what is liberal?" By working within a shifting perspective of both "social control" and "liberalism" there is the accordant danger of ideological reductionism and making whoever one likes liberal and an "agent of social control". Indeed, in so far as anyone supports non revolutionary political change and some form of private enterprise economy, then he can be seen as liberal who acts to advance social control. The crudity of this approach is underlined by Legassick's concern to read back ex post facto the actual effects of liberal ideas of reform in the South African context and to then conclude that liberals both acted as "agents of social control" as well as precursors of the apartheid state as it emerged after 1948.²¹

There is an important need, therefore, for a more exact definition of terms before assessing this critique of South African liberals and in this work we propose to look both at the uses of the social control concept in historical analysis and the definitions offered of liberal ideology. On this basis, we conclude that while

Legassick's re-assessment makes an important contribution to our understanding of liberalism in South Africa, far sharper discrimination is needed between different types of liberalisms, only the most conservative of which acted as conscious agents of social control. A wider periodisation of liberalism's impact on South African history would suggest, furthermore, that the more thoroughly radical of liberals, acting in terms of its rationalist and Enlightenment origins in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, have acted as vital contributors to the tradition of resistance to political oppression. It is this wider periodisation that we seek to undertake in the latter part of this study as we move beyond the liberalism of the inter-war years to assess its impact on the liberalism post 1948.

The problem of social control:

A crucial lacuna in Legassick's whole argument is an adequate definition of "social control". This is important when it is realised that historians have radically disagreed on the value of the term. Gareth Stedman Jones, for example, has argued that the functionalist origins of the concept in America, with such pioneer sociologists as Edward A. Ross and Robert Ezra Park, makes it useless for the understanding of radical cleavages in history brought about by the rise of popular movements. In particular, the term as such divorces class relations from power relations such that there is a danger of reducing the explanation for the failure of subordinate groups to manifest any collective consciousness of exploitation to narrowly psychologist terms. Stedman Jones has instanced as an example of this kind of social control explanation in historiography the concentration camp analogy employed by Stanley Elkins in his classic work on American negro slavery — an essentially closed method of analysis that allows for little or no area of popular resistance to the structures of oppression which later historians have found on the Southern slave plantations.²²

This interpretation of the social control concept has not by any means won universal approval from historians and a more recent counter attack has begun to mount. One recent volume on social control in nineteenth century Britain, for example, has

argued that Stedman Jones has misunderstood the essentially trans-ideological nature of the term social control. Though the term has been used by functionalists and conservative sociologists in both Britain and America, argues the volume's editor A. P. Donajrodzki, nevertheless even radical scholars can be attracted to it on the basic grounds that all societies and social systems seek to devise various control mechanisms by which to perpetuate themselves. In this respect, the concept can be potentially attractive for it can illuminate some dark areas of history by showing up the processes of interaction between ruling classes and popular masses and the ways by which ruling groups seek to maintain their dominance by the imposition of cultural controls. "Cultural forms of the different component parts of social systems" he concludes, "are formed in a process of interaction".²³

This conception of social control can certainly be said to give the term some sort of renewed lease of life, though it could be argued that many of the great works of popular historiography such as E. P. Thompson's study of the English working class or Eugene Genovese's study of negro resistance on the slave plantations were just as well documented without the direct employment of the term. But if the meaning of "social control" in the final analysis amounts to a dynamic and not a static conception of social relationships, and the interaction between different class and power groups over time, then the term may well lead to an enrichment of historiography. However, can this be said to be the case so far in South African history? Here the term has come into frequent use in recent years and in some cases, such as Brian Willan's recent analysis of De Beer's manipulation of Sol Plaatje's Brotherhood Movement at Kimberley during the first world war,²⁴ some meaning has been given to it in terms of changing class relationships.

But in much of the more dogmatic "revisionist" literature, "social control" has tended to be stated in much more rigidly sociological terms. The term has been too easily taken as representing an unquestionable truth which stands through its mere assertion and here "social control" seems to stand merely for some branch of an all-pervasive machiavellian capitalism. The full historical nature of "social control" as a product of changing class and social relationships thus tends to be played down in

favour of a much more static conception whereby a capitalist ruling class has a permanently fixed and unchanging strategy of continually warding off class struggle and growing class consciousness through various strategies of "cooptation" and the buying off of a fickle African petty bourgeoisie. In this scenario the white liberals in South Africa have been the particular villains of the piece and, as Martin Legassick has repeatedly argued in a succession of papers, it has been through the agency of the liberals that the full mechanisms of "social control" by the class of ruling South African bourgeoisie has been maintained: beyond repeating the continued links between the white liberals and both capitalism and "segregationism" in South African history, for example, Legassick's most extreme argument is employed when he asserts that by its very nature of appealing to the less desirable alternative of bloodshed and revolution then it exerts its influence "as a force of social control".²⁵ Liberalism stands effectively condemned then by its very definition.

But these are essentially anti-historical arguments and fail to locate liberalism effectively in South African historical development as a product of a particular concatenation of events. The subsuming of liberalism into an a priori model of social control overlooks its historical peculiarities as an offshoot of a much wider movement of western bourgeois liberalism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This movement had an autonomous set of political ideas that were linked to the rise of an assertive middle class and the ex post facto labelling of liberalism as an instrument of social control thus leads to the underplaying of the subjective belief held in the principles of liberal political ideology for their own sake. The spreading of liberal ideals of humanitarianism, social reform and non violent political change was not a process of sheer political mystification as the more disillusioned and cynical generation of current social analysts have tended to maintain. These ideals were believed in for their own sake and they formed the principle bases of the whole language of political debate. In one long term sense, the protracted nature of liberalism's demise in a context like South Africa, where the political leadership of the African National Congress only reluctantly began to move towards a full scale campaign of violent revolution in the years after its banning in 1960,²⁶ indicates the degree to which these ideals were held

amongst different ethnic and class groupings. While undoubtedly much was done to manipulate as far as possible the structures through which these ideals were inculcated — and much of this emerges in later chapters of this essay — it simply is not adequate enough to assume that this was merely part of a process of imposing a grid of "false consciousness" upon the colonised subjected masses of the black South African population. Such a view manifests a failure to read the whole tone and ethos of a different historical era to the present where, in the period of growing third world radicalism in the 1960s and 1970s, much of the values of the former Western liberal model have gone into eclipse. As recently as a generation ago, many of the principle ideas of the western liberal tradition were still very much salient ones, and it was only with the ostensible thaw in the cold war in the late 1960s that a far more assertive marxism emerged in the West to present such a major challenge to the dominant mode of intellectual thinking.

Thus what is needed in the analysis of South African liberalism is a basic empathy that stretches beyond seeing it as simply a functional instrument of capitalist domination. For this liberalism was also part of a much wider international movement that occurred in the nineteenth century and was expressed in England in the mid century Victorian liberal self confidence. In varying degrees this was the cultural and political core of the liberal political model (though additional inputs came from both German and American experiences) and around this revolved the increasingly less certain liberal colonial satellites. For South African liberals the Victorian model was the yardstick by which to judge much of their own actions and achievements, and the colonial dependency implicit within this continued to remain dominant long after the actual achievement of Union in 1910. The degree to which liberals became attuned to developing a more distinct South African model of control based upon "segregationism" and the manipulation of the structures of control located on the pre-capitalist reserve economies is, therefore, far more problematical than many revisionist analysts have been prepared to admit. The holistic nature of this model belies much of the liberals anti-theoretical empiricism, for South African liberalism continued to adopt the classic Victorian approach of avoiding central political questions in a society and political context that really demanded it. Indeed,

this was one of the central political weaknesses of South African liberalism — its failure to adopt a more coherent and politically orientated ideology of struggle — and is an area that the revisionists have so far completely avoided. In one sense it is possible to beg the question with much of the analysis of Legassick on South African liberalism: if it was so effective as an agency of social control and in mystifying latent class differentiation why did it decline in the way that it did? Why did it cease to be the central instrument in dampening political conflict by such an astute and machiavellian ruling class? The very overstatement of the revisionists' case leads to a weakening of the argument through sheer overkill.

The emergence of apartheid as the dominant political ideology in South African state politics in the 1950s and 1960s lead us, accordingly, to a conclusion substantially at variance with much of the revisionists' conventional wisdom. It was the weakness and the inadequacy of liberal control structures and precisely their failure to act as effective agents of social control that led to the progressive state nationalisation of former ad hoc efforts practised unsystematically at the local level. White paternalist liberalism in fact failed to control the rise of democratic political consciousness amongst the mass of black workers and peasants in South African towns and villages and it was the continued indebtedness of white liberals to its English Victorian guideline that progressively weakened their overall political impact. Successive attempts were made, as we document in successive chapters, to modernise and upgrade this liberalism to cope with the changing exactitudes of an urbanising and industrialising society. But the efforts overall were piecemeal in the classic liberal tradition, and it was the generally unsystematic nature of the whole liberal effort in comparison to the far more cohesive and tightly controlled apartheid ideology under the umbrella of Afrikaner nationalist militancy which led to the latter's success.

It was thus the paternal dimension of South African liberalism which had important ideological implications for later phases of political development. In England, social control structures had tended to develop on a generally unsystematic basis and without very strong state coordination. The effective dampening of class conflict by the middle years of the nineteenth century as England embarked on a period

of economic growth allowed a key breathing space whereby a decentralised model of political order could be developed that left considerable leeway to private initiative and middle class philanthropy.²⁷ Instead, therefore, of making a unilinear passage from a paternal system rooted in a pre-industrial agrarian order to one of centralised state controlled industrialism, England made a blurred compromise whereby much of the tenets of the earlier paternalism were preserved into the urban, secular, industrial age.²⁸ At the same time, unlike their German liberal counterparts, Victorian liberals and their intellectual defenders displayed a singular lack of interest in "intellectuality" and for theories of social totality and wholeness.²⁹ Until at least the emergence of the German educated philosopher Alfred Hoernle in the 1930s, this tradition was to reign supreme in South African liberalism too. For the most part, white liberals in the colonial periphery continued to act under the guiding light of the Victorian decentralised model, despite the very different configuration of class and political cleavages that confronted them.

Social control and South African liberalism:

The origins of liberalism in South Africa therefore were very much bound up with the same forces that established the nineteenth century liberal culture in England. While a theory of liberal pluralism has been traced to the period before British intervention at the Cape in 1806,³⁰ a distinct tradition of liberal thinking only occurred with the expansion of British colonisation and the intrusion of missions like the London Missionary Society. This was a classical liberalism influenced by the Eighteenth Century Enlightenment and Scottish missionaries like the Rev. John Philip revealed a familiarity with the works of Adam Smith, Samuel Johnson, Isaac Newton and Dean Swift. This liberalism sought initially at least to override racial differences and promote the extension of a free-market economy to the empire, and it was in many respects the ideological accompaniment of English mercantile capitalism and "free trade imperialism".

In the same way as its nineteenth century English counterpart, this South

African liberalism was empirical, and resistant to any ideas of social totality or a coherent theory of the state. For the most part it relied upon subtle political pressure and the belief that ideas could be progressively transformed through education and "western civilisation". Philip's Researches in South Africa was very much in this tradition and it can be seen as a pioneering form of the social survey and narrative report that was frequently to be employed by liberal commentators over the following century and a half. The immediate objective of the Researches, in fact, was to publicise the plight of the Hottentots in the Cape which Philip sought to free from ordinances binding them to unfree labour. As a result of this pressure the Government passed Ordinance 50 in 1829 removing the Cape Coloureds from their status of indentured servants and establishing formal legal equality.

This action has been seen as the foundation of the Cape constitutional tradition in the nineteenth century and it became one of the key anchor points for the historical identification of the liberal tradition in South Africa. Its achievement, though, has often been emphasised at the expense of the pragmatic political circumstances that surrounded it. The Fiftieth Ordinance was an instrument of missionary propaganda for what Philip and the L.M.S. were seeking was really British governmental and public support for the expansion of their activities in Southern Africa. As Philip indicated in his Researches, this aim was not dictated by any coherent political ambition, but as with the Anti-Slavery Clapham Sect in Britain, through moral pressure:

We ask for nothing unreasonable, nothing illegal, nothing new. We have nothing to say to politics. The question under discussion is a mere question of civil rights. We have advanced no suggestions about the new character of justice. We are the advocates of no particular form of civil government in the colony. We have offered no particular directions about the machinery of government desirable in such a country. We have recommended no checks but such as are necessary to prevent one class of British subjects from oppressing and destroying another. In what we propose we suspend no weight upon the wheels of government. We ask nothing for the poor natives more than this, that they should have the protection the law affords the colonists. 31

At the same time it was clear that this *laissez faire* approach, which eschewed

as far as possible direct political involvement beyond the subtleties of informal pressure group politics, was part of a wider design to establish the legitimacy for the missions' own sphere of influence in the Cape Colony. The missions at this time were not viewed especially favourably by the white settler interest in the colony, which had grown up over the previous 150 years, and missionaries were frequently termed "Hottentot predicants". The Governor, Lord Charles Somerset, had already tried to have Philip removed, so Philip's tactic was mainly concerned to establish the basic equality for the Cape Coloureds in order to release resources for a wider proselytising mission:

... if we can procure for the people their civil rights, we may gradually withdraw the funds now employed in supporting our missionary institutions and employ them in diffusing the gospel on a more extensive scale. Excepting a few missionaries at the principle drostyds or towns who may be employed among the coloured population of every class on the sabbath, and in preaching in the farm houses in the neighbourhood on week evenings, the natives may then be left to the provision made for the religious instruction of the colonists. 32

Such a re-allocation of missionary resources was a rational response, Philip argued, given the changed nature of Cape politics from the time in 1799 when the L.M.S. first moved into the Cape under the rule of the Dutch East India Company. Then the position of the missions had been a very defensive one given the very limited missionary activity over the period since the colony's original foundation in 1652. Apart from the short-lived attempt by the Moravian Brethren to establish a mission amongst the Khoisan in 1737, lasting some five years, the L.M.S. itself represented the first real missionary movement in the colony.³³ By the end of the eighteenth century, however, the weak social structures of the Khoi and the San had given way before the settler intrusions and a high degree of acculturation had resulted in a class based society that in many respects transcended racial divisions. Without the strong imperial links forged by the intrusion of British mercantile imperialism, it was by no means clear how Dutch-Coloured relations would have evolved since they were fairly evenly matched and, shorn of the imperial tie, might well have resulted in the white

settlers developing in a similar direction to the prazeros of Mozambique who amalgamated into the indigenous society through racial and cultural assimilation.³⁴

But the intrusion of British mercantile capital put paid to such a trend and the ensuing struggle and resistance of the Khoi Rebellion of 1799 to 1801 was an indication of the cleavages that had developed between white landowners and their Khoi labour tenants. The Rebellion came at the end of a period of growing economic exploitation of the Khoi as commercial links with the Cape boomed after the British entry in 1795 and revealed the limits of collaborative ties between the enculturated Khoi and their colonial masters. While it is probably true to say that the Rebellion did not mark an actual "independence movement" among the Khoi, since most of the drive towards independent state formation had been taken up by movements out of the colony by groups like the Griqua, nevertheless there were strong anti-colonisation features to it.³⁵ Desertions with guns and horses to the Xhosa in the 1790s, especially after the war of 1793, indicated the seriousness of the resistance involved and shaped the responses by the missions in the period following the restoration of order in 1801. For Philip, the essential lesson to be learnt from the Rebellion was the need for the imposition of missionary-controlled order on the border as a means to avert the need for the continued resort to armed force. "Missionary stations are the most efficient agents which can be employed to promote the internal strengths of our colonies", he wrote, "and the cheapest and best military posts that a wise government can employ to defend its frontier against the predatory incursions of savage tribes".³⁶ The point about this missionary control was that it could become, Philip argued, the essential educative and cultural disseminator of a liberal, free market economy in South Africa. This was the key mechanism through which order might be maintained instead of force of arms. For on the basis of a free labour market and the ownership of private property it would be possible to instil into the Khoi an economic motivation which would stimulate the internal trade in the colony:

It is obvious that, while the Hottentots remain in their present degraded and wretched state, their condition must have a depressing influence on the industry and morals of all the ranks of the inhabitants;

but by elevating them above the present level, the whole colony will be elevated along with them. 37

The point about the free market system as a basis of order was that it was being introduced into a society which lacked any large scale peasantry as in the English case before the industrial revolution. Philip thus argued that interventionist measures were necessary to establish a free market economy in the Cape, implying in particular, a limited degree of "moral engineering" in order to ensure the legitimacy of a social order that rested upon class differentiation and the ownership of private property. The value of such a strategy lay in its de-emphasizing any strong role by the state and any radical political transformation. There was, indeed, a strongly conservative emphasis in Philip's argument for he was careful to point out "no sudden alteration in the landed property of the country is to be apprehended from this source". Freedom of property ownership did not imply anything beyond the fact that:

Under the most favourable circumstances the great body of the Hottentots cannot be in any other condition than that of labourers for centuries to come. Individuals among the Hottentots, under a more genial system, may, in thirty or forty years, rise to possess little farms, and they may be able to leave the property acquired by their industry to their children: but no one acquainted with the state of property in Europe can for a moment imagine, that any fears of this nature should paralyse the hand of the government, so as to make it withhold from the Hottentots their natural rights. 38

Thus, with the legacy of class differentiation produced by the industrial revolution in England, Philip's liberalism was lacking in much of the utopian optimism of much of the classical liberal political economy of the eighteenth century and was coloured by the additional input of late eighteenth and early nineteenth century evangelicalism stressing the need for the restructuring of social values to underpin the free market economy. Much of this was directed towards imposing a series of cultural controls over the nascent urban working class who were unlikely ever to become free property holders as the market model implied that they could. No doubt, Philip's previous experience preaching in the workhouses of London and as a minister at Aberdeen between 1805 and 1819 shaped his views on this question for he was already familiar with working class agitation and the use of the strike weapon. 39

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It was, therefore, the idea that the individual could rise by his own efforts to a propertied status which was essential since this was the competitive means through which class combination could be prevented:

It would be sufficiently ridiculous for any one to propose to the British Parliament that it should pass an act disqualifying the weavers of Manchester or Glasgow from holding land, lest they should dispossess the present landed proprietors and the nobility, and engross to themselves the wealth and honours of the country. In free countries you may see individuals rising from humble conditions to possess property; and you may find among our nobility individuals whose great grandfathers were mechanics: but such instances are extremely rare; and it will be allowed that England owes much of its industry and its glory as a country to the laws which secure the poor against the oppressions of the rich, and which leave the immunities and honours of the state open to fair and honourable competition. 40

This was the basis for the conservative liberalism of the Cape Colony in the nineteenth century. Philip's articulation of the liberal thinking behind it could be said to form the basis for a strategy whereby a free Coloured and African peasantry was brought into existence to act as a barrier in frontier conflicts with African tribes as well as boosting the internal trade of the colony as it became progressively incorporated into British free trade imperialism. The point about it, though, was that it was strongly goaded by nineteenth century humanitarian and philanthropic impulses and it was centred around the belief in continued economic progress, "upliftment" and the continued expansion of the essential values of "Western civilisation". These motives cannot be ignored when one assesses the first expansionist phase of liberalism in the nineteenth century and it is impossible to assume such a unilinear and direct connection between nineteenth century liberalism as social control and its twentieth century successors in South Africa rooted around segregation and apartheid. For the latter ideology, as we shown in chapter nine of this study, arose if anything through the general collapse of these liberal values in the twentieth century.

This point is further underlined when Philip's liberalism is set within the wider context of missionary values as a whole in the early nineteenth century Cape. The view of individual missionaries as the simple purveyors of a "missionary imperialism"⁴¹

is a very simplistic one and the closer analysis of different figures indicates that more than one ideological tradition can be unravelled in the complex interaction of mission-state relationships. Missionaries were not in control of the government at the Cape and the liberalism they articulated contained no coherent theory of political power for it was concerned with the selective and pragmatic use of moral influence in order to shape political decision-making. While the implicit end in view was some form of capitalist free market economy goaded by the disciplines of the work ethic, there were differing ideas on the way this should be achieved and these assumed considerable importance in the years after the promulgation of Ordinance 50 as Britain tried to establish a modern legal administrative polity, but lacked the resources fully to implement it. For a missionary such as Philip, as Superintendent of the L.M.S., the central issue up to 1828 was the need to restructure social relations in the Cape in order to incorporate the Khoi into a free legal system governed by liberal ideas of civil liberty as opposed to the previously patriarchal system ruled by an archaic Roman-Dutch law. As the frontier in the Eastern Cape began to close in the 1830s, however, new considerations arose of what was to be the position of the missions vis a vis the African chiefdoms to the north and east of the Cape Colony. Philip's optimistic liberalism of the Researches had been mainly coloured by the expansion of mercantile commerce in the wake of the intrusion of the 1820 Settlers: in both the Coloured mission stations of Bethelsdorp and Theopolis, for instance, Philip had established trading stores of Cape Town merchants and the "improvement" of the 1820s in the living standards there had been due to the economic fillip provided by outlets such as transport riding for the surrounding white settlers.⁴² But these conditions could not be automatically applied in all the contacts with the African communities and in the 1830s and 1840s it became clear, in some instances, that missionary expansionism ran directly contrary to the interests of white settler agriculture.

Philip's free-market liberalism did not really account for group conflicts between missions, tribal chiefdoms and white settlers and a more radical tradition of direct championing of the Coloured or African cause has tended, until recently, to have been overlooked in South African historiography. Philip's original appointment to the Cape in 1819 was in direct response to internal divisions in the L.M.S. at the time of a Cape

Town synod in 1817 and threats to close the missions in the Cape from the government. These divisions accrued from the emergence of a group of mechanic missionaries such as James Read who had worked their way up from artisan status to mission status and had actually been ordained in South Africa. Read reflected a much closer recognition in some missionary quarters of the difficulties confronting missionary expansionism in South Africa after a long period of working on the ground at the Bethelsdorp station from the time of its establishment in 1802 to his appointment as Superintendent of the L.M.S. in succession to Johannes Vanderkemp on the latter's death. Through his marriage with a Khoisan woman and his championing of social equality, Read aggregated a lot of hostility to himself and many of the charges of the "backwardness" of the Bethelsdorp station and the "laziness" of its inhabitants accrued through political hostility to Read's radicalism. In his reply to these attacks, especially from the L.M.S. missionary Georg Thom who was eventually to get him suspended in 1817, Read revealed an awareness of the limitations to the simple free market model of economic expansionism. Bethelsdorp, he pointed out, was unsuitable to the intensive agriculture that was essential if it was to be economically successful, while many of the able bodied men had to go on military service. Similarly, Read kept a record of the number of cattle held by the mission and was able to reply to the accusations that the number had fallen from an initial six thousand to a mere two thousand through Khoisan "idleness" by pointing out the incidence of disease in calves, cattle theft by neighbouring Africans and the preying of wild animals. In this respect, Read can be seen as an early forerunner of the many later observers of agricultural conditions amongst the Coloureds and Africans and the structural limitations on their internal regeneration in response to market opportunities.⁴³

The importance of this radicalism, too, was that it extended into the area of mission-African relations in the years after 1830 when Read became minister at the Kat River Settlement. Having already some familiarity with the Griqua and Tswana missions in Transorangia, he began to recognise, unlike Philip, the tenacity of African tribal culture and to seek to defend it against what he now perceived to be the far greater danger from expanding white land settlement. Much of this expansion in the

Eastern Cape by the 1840s was due to the growth in the woollen trade and many of the original defenders of the Kat Settlement, such as Robert Godlonton of the Grahamstown Journal, became an arch critic as it was seen to stand in the way of the further spread of white-owned farms.⁴⁴

Attacks on Read mounted as he was seen as a supporter of Maqoma and an intriguer in the 1834 War of the Axe, and he can in some ways be identified as an important forerunner of later white champions of African peasant agriculture in South Africa like William Macmillan and the Ballingers, and an early proponent of the idea of "Christian trusteeship" over independent African tribal cultures which were to be guided towards some form of progressive development and Christian enlightenment.⁴⁵

Read's significance for nineteenth century Cape liberalism, though, was lost with the destruction of the Kat River Settlement in 1851, a year before his death, when progressive white land encroachment drove some 250 Khoi into an alliance with the surrounding Khosa against the whites. As a consequence, most interpretations have rested on the close association between liberals and the expansion of the Cape civil administrative machine and this has led in turn to the Majeke and contemporary revisionist thesis of seeing both the missions and Cape liberals as the ideological weapon of British imperial expansion. As we have sought to show this social control theory of the origins of South African liberalism overlooks its complexities and is only partly true. The liberal ideology imported into South Africa was capable of being interpreted in a number of different ways and by the beginnings of industrialisation in the 1880s, which is the start of this study, it had already imprinted a legacy which was to lead to a number of substantially different interpretations of industrial change.

The weaknesses of South African liberalism:

The fundamental problem was, however, that the strongly empiricist tradition which coloured the thinking of South African liberals for so much of the period under study led them to overlook the essential question of how and in what way political power is both acquired and maintained in order to shape society according to these

principles. In a sense, the economic optimism of John Philip's free-market model avoided the key political questions being raised and the more sceptical thinking of James Read became overtaken in the headlong rush of nineteenth century mercantile imperialism and Victorian ideas of continuous progress. South African liberal economic optimism that tended to overlook basic problems of political power was not such a recent phenomenon, as Legassick has maintained, and cannot be seen as simply a reflection of the loss of its function as an "agent of social control" in the post 1948 years when the Nationalists entrenched apartheid. A fascination with the economic at the expense of the political was endemic to classical liberalism and became exaggerated in the colonial environment of South Africa. As Sheldon Wolin pointed out in a penetrating study of the political limitations of liberal theory:

In its mature form liberalism expressed the same misgivings as conservatism about taking political theory seriously ... What determined the liberals' attitude was not merely a belief that the complexity of social relationships posed insurmountable difficulties to rational or purposive action, but the feeling that political activity had lost its charm and excitement. 46

The transfer of this empiricist English disdain for the centrality of politics and a coherent theory of political power to the South African context owed a substantial amount to the ties of colonialism and cultural dependency. It indicates that there is more than a grain of truth in the famous thesis of Louis Hartz that:

The processes of colonization make no room for any doctrine beyond that of any immediate necessity. What has been their history, including the traditions that would have nourished their future, becomes only their pre-history — something irrelevant both to their present and to their development. They are, in truth, fragments which have lost the stimulus towards change which animates the unfolding or ripening of that greater whole they have quit ... They can be, at best, only a 'partial' embodiment of the European ideological complex. 47

While clearly the cultural and ideological ties between South African liberalism and the mother country continued far beyond the early nineteenth century — and indeed act as a source of reinforcement right up to the present — Hartz's grasp of

the colonization process allows us to see that when it came to the question of building up a centralised nation state in the period before and after Union in 1910, liberals were hopelessly ill-equipped to understand the long term consequences of political centralisation in a country industrialising on the capitalist periphery. The entrenchment of Victorian optimism and its more systematic elaboration in the form of social darwinism led to a unilinear belief in economic modernisation tending towards the West European and North American democratic model. This continuous belief in economic change producing political "development" led to an intellectual myopia when it came to considering non liberal forms of industrialisation. The model of development rooted in a paternalist class alliance between agrarian and industrial interests on the model of the Transvaal before Union was thus always seen by liberals as an anachronism that was doomed eventually to give way before the irresistible pressures of free market forces.⁴⁸

The scope of this work:

The main objectives of this work, therefore, are to look at certain key themes in the evolution of South African liberalism over the long period of 1886 to 1948. While it is clearly impossible to attempt an in-depth narrative history over such a space of time, the central emphasis will be on the relationship between changing liberal ideas and the economic and political context. Liberalism began by being heavily indebted both culturally and politically to the metropolitan core of Britain and in the nineteenth century the main liberal protagonists — apart from a small influential African acculturated elite — were white merchants, professionals and politicians. By the end of the period, liberalism had come to influence increasingly the thinking of a growing African petty bourgeoisie centred around the African National Congress and, in the Cape, the All African Convention. Liberalism had, therefore, to be redefined to fit the South African context, especially as the pressures from a labour repressive path of industrialisation, centred around gold and diamond mining, indicated the divergence from the nineteenth century Victorian liberal ideal.

In the first chapter, therefore, we look at the decline in the classical Cape liberalism rooted in the mid-nineteenth century alliance between a fairly prosperous

Eastern Cape peasantry and a white mercantile class integrated into mid-Victorian free trade imperialism. As diamond and gold mining made headway with their increasing labour requirements, we look at the new structures of control centred around Rhodes's experiment in individual African tenure in the 1894 Glen Grey Act. This change in Cape liberalism is also discussed in the second chapter when the African responses to white assimilation are viewed in the context of Ethiopian church separatism. The loss of control over many African followers by the white missions led to moves for extension of controls over African higher education, especially higher education, and in the second part of the chapter we look at the establishment of Fort Hare as an example of the reconsolidated Cape liberalism of the early twentieth century.

These developments in the Cape towards growing links with the state indicate that, within the confines of Cape liberalism, there occurred many of the features of the social control debate that took place by the time of South African Union in 1910. However, the additional input from a growing white working class and petty bourgeoisie on the Witwatersrand added a new racist dimension which we analyse in chapter three when the debate on segregation is discussed. The new segregationist ideology crystallised many of the previous social control features debated in a less systematic manner in the Cape and marked the demise of Cape liberalism as a determining political influence at the centre of South African politics. As a consequence, liberals after 1910 were progressively forced back onto the defensive by resorting to local level control via Native Affairs Reform Societies, such as the Transvaal Native Affairs Society in Johannesburg and the Native Affairs Reform Society in Durban founded by Maurice Evans. The latter we discuss in chapter four in terms of the evolution of a "philanthropic segregationism" evolved by conservative liberals like Evans to fit liberalism into a changing political situation. This idea received support, too, from the Aborigines Protection Society in England under the influence of its secretary John Harris and we look at the A.P.S.'s attempt to guide the thinking of the African National Congress in its opposition to the 1913 Natives Land Act. The collapse of these efforts by 1917, after the downfall of the A.N.C.'s first president, John Dube, led to a temporary demise of this liberal segregationism such that the end of the first world war

saw a revival of liberal hopes for shaping reformist government legislation at the centre.

In chapter five we continue by focussing the debate on social control in the critical period of 1918-1923 and the eventual dashing of liberal hopes to coopt an urban African petty bourgeoisie in the urban areas via the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923. The rise of a white segregationist lobby in South African towns under the banner of Stallardism, as laid down in the crucial 1922 Report of the Transvaal Local Government Commission, forced liberals after 1923 back onto the local level through the new Joint Council movement, the Bantu Men's Social Centre and the press in the form of the Chamber of Mines financed Umteteli wa Bantu. These liberal responses are discussed in chapter six, leading eventually to the establishment in 1929 of the South African Institute of Race Relations.

This liberalism of the inter-war years is further analysed in chapters seven and eight, where both the attempts to establish a class of African master farmers on the land was debated in liberal organisations such as the Joint Councils, and aided by missionaries such as the Reverend James Henderson of Lovedale and Father Bernard Huss of the Mariannhill Mission in Natal. Moves towards establishing African peasant cooperatives were begun under Huss's initiative in the Transkei in the 1920s and were further attempted by William Ballinger and the Friends of Africa in the early 1930s. However, the 1936 legislation of the Hertzog and Smuts government represented another landmark in white liberal fortunes as, despite the removal of African voters in the Cape from the common franchise, new platforms of representation were established via the Natives Representative Council and the white Natives Representatives in Parliament. Institutions like the Institute of Race Relations, under Rheinnalt-Jones's directorship, moved closer towards collaborating with the government's "trusteeship" policy and the attempts by the Friends of Africa to move South African liberalism in a social democratic direction became progressively eclipsed after 1937 as liberals such as Rheinnalt-Jones, Edgar Brookes and Margaret Ballinger were elected to parliament to represent African interests.

However, the renewed development of African trade unionism in the late 1930s, through Max Gordon's Council for Non European Trade Unions and the onset of the second world war, ushered in a new phase which led to a growing ideological crisis in liberalism by the early 1940s. This is discussed in chapter nine, in terms especially of the rise of a renewed philanthropic segregationism via the cultural idealism of the academic study in anthropology and the International Institute for African Languages and Cultures. The most prominent liberal to be influenced by these new ideological directions was Alfred Hoernle, the President of the S.A.I.R.R., and the author of the 1939 Phelps Stokes Lectures. This renewed lurch to segregationism in the early 1940s before Hoernle's death in 1944 had important long term consequences for liberal ideology in South Africa as it marked the turning towards what later became known as the concept of plural democracy based on ethnic separation. As a means of trying to meet the basic principles of the government's segregation programme, liberalism denuded itself of the principles of the Westminster model of government via a parliament and a universal franchise and this became confined to a small minority of democratic liberals in the 1940s centred around white trade unionists like Solly Sachs and the victor over Rheinnalt-Jones in the 1942 Natives Representative election in the Transvaal and Orange Free State, Hymie Basner. This democratic liberalism is looked at in chapter ten, and its progressive isolation explained in terms of the rise of African nationalist consciousness via the A.N.C. Youth League and the campaign to boycott Natives Representation. Deprived of a political base, the democratic liberals of the middle 1940s were increasingly outmanoeuvred by the conservative liberals centred around the Institute of Race Relations. Attempts, too, to reform the N.R.C. after the adjournment of the Council in 1946 at the time of the African mine strike, led to increased contacts between the Institute liberals, now led by Edgar Brookes, and the U.P. government of Smuts and Hofmeyr. These developments we discuss in the final chapter, as the last attempts by the white liberals to consolidate their power base before the 1948 election are viewed in terms of various attempts to meet the A.N.C.'s boycott campaign. The long-term failure to establish such a base led, in the aftermath of the 1948 election defeat of the U.P., to increasing efforts by the liberals to establish a party of their

own as it became increasingly clear that there was no other political avenue to pursue. The final establishment of the Liberal Party after the second U.P. defeat in 1953 was more an act of political despair than a confident attempt to enter into South African white party politics, as the previous political roots in both African political organisations and, to some extent, within the central echelons of government, became progressively narrowed. As the government's apartheid programme began to develop in the 1950s and external attacks by world opinion mounted, liberalism became squeezed out as the political framework became reshaped to accommodate both a rising white nationalist interest that transcended much of the previous Afrikaner-English speaking ethnic hostility, as well as reflecting a growing internal capital accumulation that marked the rise of a class of national capitalists free from the complete dependency to overseas control. In such a context a "revolution from above" that resembled many of the features of the Prussian path of industrialisation in the nineteenth century made the liberal-democratic model of industrialisation increasingly less plausible, and the final demise of the Liberal Party in 1968 after the Prohibition of Improper Interference Act made multi-racial political parties illegal represented more the culmination of previous political trends than some new attack on a liberal tradition that had been so badly eroded by state action and white settler hostility.

References

1. H. J. and R. E. Simons, Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1969, p. 608.
2. Barrington Moore, The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Boston, Beacon Press, 1961; see also Eugene Genovese, "The Fate of Paternalism in Modern Bourgeois Society: The Case of Japan", appendix to Roll, Jordan Roll, New York, Pantheon Books, 1974, pp. 661-665. Moore's distinction between the models of liberal democratic modernisation and "revolution from above" or the "fascist" path has been extensively criticised. "... Professor Moore's market versus labour repressive agriculture distinction fails to survive close scrutiny" writes Theda Skocpol. "Every property system, indeed every market, requires political backing. The significant question to ask is not whether such support is present or absent, but rather who controls the political mechanisms and how they are organized", "A Critical Review of Barrington Moore's Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy", Politics and Society, Vol. 4, No. 1, Fall 1973, p. 16. Thus the essential issue revolves around who is able to control the polity in the path to modernisation and Moore's explanation for the liberal democratic path fails to get behind that offered by the liberals themselves in terms of the inexorable logic of the market process itself, free from state control. As we see in this essay, this problem has confronted much liberal analysis in the South African instance.
3. See, for instance, C. W. De Kiewiet, A History of South Africa, Social and Economic, London, 1941; J. S. Marais, The Fall of Kruger's Republic, Oxford 1961; E. A. Walker, A History of South Africa, 3 ed, London, 1957; T. R. H. Davenport, South Africa: A Modern History, Macmillan South Africa (Pty) Publishers, Johannesburg, 1977; David Welsh, The Roots of Segregation, Cape Town, 1971.
4. Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson, (eds), The Oxford History of South Africa, (2 Vols), Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1966 and 1970.
5. Ibid., p. v; for critiques of the Oxford History see Shula Marks, "Liberalism, Social Realities and South African History", Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, X (November 1972), pp. 243-49; Anthony Atmore and Shula Marks, "A Liberal Dilemma: A Critique of the Oxford History of South Africa", Race, XIV, 2 (1972), pp. 107-36; Martin Legassick, "The Dynamics of Modernization in South Africa", Journal of African History, XIII, (1972), pp. 145-50; for a rather poor summary of the liberal marxist debate see Harrison M. Wright, The Burden of the Present: Liberal Radical Controversy over South African History, Cape Town, David Philip, 1977.

6. Adrian Leftwich (ed), Economic Growth and Political Change in South Africa, London, Allison and Busby, 1974; Harrison M. Wright, The Burden of the Present, Cape Town, David Philip, 1977; Lawrence Schlemmer and Eddie Webster (eds), Change, Reform and Economic Growth in South Africa, Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1977; see also David Yudelman, "Industrialisation, race relations, and change in South Africa: an ideological and academic debate", African Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 294, (January 1975), pp.82-96.
7. See, for example, Harold Wolpe, "Capitalism and Cheap Labour Power in South Africa: from segregation to apartheid", Economy and Society, 1 (1972), pp.425-456.
8. I.B. Tabata, The Awakening of a People (1 ed 1950), rep. Spokesman Books, 1974, p.25.
9. Nosipho Majeke (Dora Taylor), The Role of the Missionaries in Conquest, Johannesburg, Society of Young Africa, 1953.
10. Ibid., p.10; see also Bernard Makhosezwe Magubane, The Political Economy of Race and Class in South Africa, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1979, p.59. For a defence of the missions see Monica Wilson, Missionaries: Conquerors or Servants of God?, King Williams Town, South African Missionary Museum, 1976. Stanley Trapido, "Liberalism in the Cape in the 19th and 20th Centuries", London, I.C.S., CSP, Vol. 4 (London 1973).
11. For the growth of decay of the peasantry in the Eastern Cape see Colin Bundy, "The Emergence and Decline of a South African Peasantry", African Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 285, October 1972, pp.369-388; "The Transkei Peasantry, c 1890-1914: 'Passing through a Period of Stress'", in Robin Palmer and Neil Parsons (eds), The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa, London, Heinemann, pp.201-254; The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry, London, Heinemann, 1979.
12. A concept developed by David Hemson, Martin Legassick and Jo Morris, "Is there a peasantry in South Africa?", unpublished seminar paper, University of Warwick, 1979; see also Bundy, The Rise and Fall, p.12.
13. For the notion of "peripheralisation" see Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World Economy, Cambridge, C.U.P., 1979; "The Three Stages of African Involvement in the World Economy" in P.C.W. Gutkind and I. Wallerstein (eds), The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa, Beverley Hills/London, Sage Publications, 1976; see also Bundy, The Rise and Fall, pp.59-60. For a stimulating study on the growth of the Cape woollen industry see Tony Kirk, "Progress and Decline in the Kat River Settlement, 1829-1854", Journal of African History, XIV, 3 (1973).

14. The concept of "peasant" and "capitalist farmer" must be considered wide ranging and flexible ones. As Bundy has recently pointed out in the South African context, at least three categories of small, medium and large peasants can be perceived, criss-crossed by further divisions between peasants on communally-owned land and on land leased by squatter-peasants from absentee landlords ("kaffir farmers") and between "more traditional" and "less traditional" in social and cultural patterns (and often rather crudely designated "School" and "Red" people). However, this amorphous group of "peasants" can be distinguished from "capitalist farmers" since the latter have the "ability to accumulate, to hire non-family labour and to break with the material and ideological confines of peasant society". Similarly, it is distinguished from the "rural proletariat" since the "peasant retains access to the means of subsistence, and sufficient control over the surplus to feed and clothe his family through agricultural exertions" which the latter can only do through selling his labour power. Bundy, The Rise and Fall, pp.11-12.
15. Martin Legassick, "Race, Industrialisation and Social Change in South Africa: The Case of R.F.A. Hoernle", African Affairs, 75, April 1976, p.228. See also the three unpublished articles, "The Making of South African 'Native Policy', 1903-1923: The Origins of Segregation", London, I.C.S., mimeo, 1972; "British Hegemony and the Origins of Segregation, 1900-1914", London, I.C.S., mimeo, 1974; "Liberalism, Social Control and Liberation in South Africa", unpublished seminar paper, University of Warwick, 1977.
16. Legassick, "Race, Industrialisation and Social Change", p.237.
17. Legassick, "Liberalism, Social Control and Liberation", pp.15-16.
18. M.C. O'Dowd, "The Stages of Economic Growth and the Future of South Africa" in Adrian Leftwich (ed), South African Economic Growth and Political Change, London, Allison and Busby, 1974; paper with the same title in Lawrence Schlemmer and Eddie Webster (eds), Change, Reform and Economic Growth in South Africa, Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1978; for the elaboration of the pluralism concept in South Africa see also Wolfgang H. Thomas, Plural Democracy: Political Change and Strategies for Evolution in South Africa, Johannesburg, S.A.I.R.R., 1977.
19. Legassick, "Liberalism, Social Control and Liberation", p. See also "South Africa: Capital Accumulation and Violence", Economy and Society, III, (1974), pp.287-8.
20. Martin Legassick, "Frederick Bridgman, James Dexter Taylor and Ray Phillips, American Missionaries: The Urban Mission and Social Control", unpublished m.s., n.d.

21. Martin Legassick, "Legislation, Ideology and Economy in Post 1948 South Africa", Journal of Southern African Studies, I, (October 1974), pp.5-35.
22. See in particular, Gareth Stedman Jones, "From Historical Sociology to Theoretical History", The British Journal of Sociology, XXVII, 3 (September 1976); "Working Class Culture and Working Class Politics in London, 1870-1900: Notes on the Remaking of a Working Class", Journal of Social History, Vol. 7, No. 4, June 1974, pp.460-208.
23. A.P. Donajgrodzki (ed), "introduction" in Social Control in Nineteenth Century Britain, London, Croom Helm, 1977, p.15.
24. Brian Willan, "Sol Plaatje, De Beers and an Old Tram Shed: Class Relations and Social Control in a South African Town, 1918-1919", J.S.A.S., Vol. 4, No. 2, April 1978, pp.195-215.
25. Legassick, "Liberalism, Liberation", p.15.
26. For an analysis of this development see Sheridan Johns, "Obstacles to Guerrilla Warfare: A South African Case Study", J.M.A.S., II, 2 (June 1973), pp.267-303.
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37. ibid., (Vol. 1), p.367); see also pp.381-403.
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39. See the short article on Philip by Julius Lewin, "The Nineteenth Century Reformer Dr. John Philip", Politics and Law in South Africa, London, Merlin Press, 1963.
40. Researches in South Africa, (Vol. 1), pp.379-80.
41. See, for example, Kate Crehan, "Ideology and Practice, A Missionary Case: The London Missionary Society and the Cape Frontier 1799-1850", CSP, Southern African Research in Progress, 4, University of York, 1979, pp.1-19.
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44. Tony Kirk, "Progress and Decline in the Kat River Settlement, 1829-1854".
45. See, for example, the preliminary reassessment of James Read by Chris Saunders, "James Read: Towards a Reassessment", London, I. CS, CSP, Vol.7, 1977, pp.19-25.
46. Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Vision, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1961, p.299
47. L. Hartz, The Founding of New Societies, Latin America, South Africa, Canada and Australia, London, 1964, paraphrased by Geoffrey Bolton, Britain's Legacy Overseas, O.U.P., 1973, p.31.
48. See, for instance, Stanley Trapido, "Landlord and Tenant in a Colonial Economy: The Transvaal, 1880-1910", Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, October 1978, pp.26-58.

Chapter One

The decline of Cape liberalism

Many of the essential dilemmas confronted by liberals in South Africa in the period of industrialisation were already present by the time the Cape Colony obtained its Constitution of 1853. This Constitution fulfilled many of the earlier aspirations of John Philip and the L.M.S. missionaries as it entrenched a franchise that included Coloured men on the basis of a £25 property qualification or a salary of £50 and extended the Whig ideal of representative government by establishing a parliament of two separate houses.¹ But, at the same time, the Constitution came during a period of increasing stabilisation in Cape policy towards the African tribes on its borders and presaged the growth in a central administrative apparatus guided by the tenets of Civil law.

This longer term trend in state building afforded by Cape Responsible Government has frequently tended to be under-emphasised in both liberal and radical South African historiography as attention has focused on the abstract categories of "Cape liberalism" and the "segregationism" of Natal and the Boer Republics. Some have argued that the key area of interest is the rivalry between the liberally-inclined towns and the frontier "platteland" with the eventual domination of the latter ensuring the entrenchment of segregation by the time of Union. "In the towns the interaction was different from that on both reserves and farms", Francis Wilson has argued, and he continues:

Not only were the relationships between the diverse groups more impersonal, but also the process of urbanisation came too late to influence the norms by which the politically dominant, white, group judged and to which it sought to mould social interaction as the country became institutionalized. 2

Similarly, David Welsh has argued that, despite the fact that "urbanization undermined the master/servant relationship between white and non-white that had been

established in the pre-industrial era", nevertheless "industry was forced to defer to traditional white attitudes and, with the consolidation of segregation from the 1920s onwards, the traditional pattern was re-established, though, it is suggested, on a more insecure foundation".³

This liberal view tends to by-pass the ideological and political impact of Cape liberalism on later South African developments after Union. The essential rationality of the liberal free-market economy has thus tended to be seen by the liberals as superseded by the entrenchment of a frontier racial ideology from the Northern Republics, as well as Natal under the system of segregation instituted by Theophilus Shepstone.

The weaknesses of this frontier thesis, which goes back to some of the pioneering historiography of liberals such as Eric Walker, I.D. MacCrone, C.W. de Kiewiet and W.M. Macmillan between the wars,⁴ has long been the subject of attack by the revisionists. Using marxist categories centred around concepts of differing modes of production determining class relationships, the revisionist school has argued that Cape liberalism after 1853 can only be seen as the product of a certain historical moment when English mercantile capital articulated with the pre-capitalist Eastern Cape peasantry in an era of free trade following Peel's abolition of the Corn Laws in 1846. Thus, as Stanley Trapido has argued, the 1853 Constitution reflected a search for political consolidation in the wake of a decline in direct imperial control and the Cape could be more easily incorporated into the free-trade imperialism of the mid-nineteenth century through ruling itself rather than being a greater administrative and military burden on the British tax-payer through direct rule as in Imperial India.⁵ It was only when the rise of social imperialism in the 1880s and 1890s began to transform imperial attitudes into a racist and jingoist expansionism that attitudes towards Cape liberalism began to change; and the emergence of mining capital in the 1890s centred around Kimberley and the Witwatersrand began to shift the locus of imperial interest north towards the Transvaal. Cape liberalism by the end of the century became increasingly a political anachronism as its free-trade based economic and political individualism stood in the way of a wider state formation that could reflect the bureau-

cratic and monopoly status of mining. From at least the time of Rhode's 1894 Glen Grey Act onwards, it came under attack as wider structures of social control were sought over the nascent African proletariat and as the subsistence base of the reserve economies became the buttress for the extraction of a higher rate of economic surplus from African labour power.⁶

This revisionist emphasis upon the historical specificity of Cape liberalism and critique of the rather flabby frontier thesis of the liberal school clearly has a number of methodological advantages, especially when it is realised how mid-Victorian Cape liberalism rested on a very narrow class base.⁷ But, on the other hand, the emphasis upon the hiatus in South African economic development brought about by mining leads to a clouding over of the longer-term importance of Cape liberalism in the evolution of twentieth century social control. Even ~~L~~^Sgassick, for instance, has seen nineteenth century Cape liberalism as very much in terms of a classical free market economy⁸ and the longer-term continuities in terms of both the ideological conception of social control and the evolution of structures to underpin it has been rather ignored. This tendency in recent historical writing has been unfortunate for while, as we show in chapters three and four, many of the developments in segregationist ideology occurred before and after Union as mining capital was asserting its hegemonic position, it is also important to realise that many crucial features of this debate had already taken place in the nineteenth century Cape. Indeed, the significance of Cape liberalism for later South African political developments becomes obvious when the focus of attention shifts to the administrative level for the Cape had had, by the time of Union in 1910, a century to develop its structure of law and administration while the Transvaal administrative structure for a long time remained weak and underdeveloped. The Cape court-centred administration became, as Albie Sachs has argued, "one of the main integrative forces in South African social history" along with a market economy, the English language and the belief in a single deity.⁹

The Cape debate on social control is thus an important key to the understanding of the development of similar discussions at a later date. In particular, it is necessary to grasp the important ideological developments that occurred in the thinking of

politicians, administrators and independent observers on the relationship between the extension of Cape magisterial administration over Africans, and their consequential incorporation into a common legal system, and the systematic use and manipulation of tribal institutions and native law in order to buttress colonial control. Many of these developments can be seen to accrue from the dominance of a capitalist mode of production in the Cape Colony where, as Dr. Marks has recently suggested, "the forces of colonialism" were far stronger than in Natal under Shepstone and where "the disintegration of pre-colonial structures more thorough going" than in the Natal case where large tribal units aided the establishment of a segregationist system.¹⁰ This materialist explanation certainly helps us to perceive the structural underpinning behind the "assimilationist ideology" of the Cape which was fostered by the dominant mercantile class in alliance with the African peasantry, but at the same time it can lead us into ignoring the processes of struggle endemic to Cape politics and the continuous challenge to colonial hegemony which grew progressively more concerted and organised as the century came to a close.

In many respects the Cape administrative structure imposed upon the mass of the African population was a haphazard compromise of formal legal machinery under the Civil Commissioner and Resident Magistrate and ad hoc reliance on African tribal structures and customary law. Despite the formal attachment to "assimilation" as part of the nineteenth century notion of a "civilising mission", British rule at the Cape was forced continuously to fall back upon tribal and "traditional" rule through sheer administrative weakness. The Cape civil service and the public servants administering African affairs in no way developed the same kind of ethos and self confidence as its counterpart in India and remained continually hampered by a shortage of suitably qualified personnel. Many of its best administrators came from mission families where sons had been able to grow up amongst African communities and learn their languages and customs. But as the area of administrative responsibilities widened as more and more African communities became annexed in the 1870s and 1880s culminating in the annexation of Pondoland in 1894, the shortage of suitable administrative staff grew worse. Many administrators were frankly unsuitable and frequently

adventurers and opportunists were recruited of the ilk of William Charles Scully who, on becoming appointed a Resident Magistrate, had fingers that "were more at home with the trigger and the pick than with the pen" and who "did not know a single rule of English grammar".¹¹

Thus, the Cape assimilationism in its peak years of the 1850s and 1860s during the period of the governorship of Sir George Grey (1854-61) can detract from a longer term crisis in Cape administrative ideology as the burdens of incorporating increasing numbers of non-westernised African groupings became immense. The heyday of Cape assimilation rested in substantial degree on the fortuitous circumstances of having a large group of Mfengu whose tribal structures were far weaker than those in the Transkei outside direct Cape control. In addition, with the cattle killing episode in the Transkei in 1857, many tribal identities became weakened for a period thus enhancing administrative optimism in the progressive extension of western values and the direct imposition of colonial control through assimilation. As Richard Hunt Davies has pointed out, this belief also coincided with the classical liberal model of individualism for "as national cohesion disintegrated ... Nguni attitudes towards missionary attitudes gradually shifted from a group to a personal reaction, which in turn produced a decline in opposition to mission work".¹² However, this period of optimism, when such directly assimilative institutions as the Zonnebloem College was opened in Cape Town in 1858 to educate chiefs' sons on the English public school model,¹³ belied a longer term trend which threatened the stability of Cape colonial hegemony.

The Mfengu were by no means a typical African community in the Eastern Cape since they had been resettled around King Williams Town in the aftermath of the 1834-5 War and had long been subject to missionary influence via such institutions as Healdtown and Lovedale. Their rate of entry into urban locations before the close of the century was also significantly less than the other African groups — in 1894 only 3.4% of the Mfengu were urbanised compared to 6.2% of other Africans, while many of these urbanised Mfengu were permanent town dwellers who had a far lesser rate of mobility back to the rural locations than the other African groups.¹⁴ The administrative structure over the Mfengu was aided by two important features: a high rate

of rural residence by a group engaged in commercialised agriculture and an important buffer group of non tribal kholwa resident in the towns who formed a nascent petty bourgeoisie. As some studies have shown, this petty bourgeois class had been inculcated with the values of Victorian liberalism and British imperialism and the African leaders like Elijah Makiwane, Walter Rubusana and John Tengo Jabavu who formed the Native Educational Association in 1872 in many ways helped to stabilise administrative control through acting as vital political and ideological intermediaries between the administrators and the African peasants, though their longer term contribution to the development of African nationalism in the Eastern Cape should not be ignored.¹⁵

While, therefore, some assimilation into the Cape administrative machine continued throughout the nineteenth century and this became aided by the development of such African newspaper organs as the Xhosa language Isigidimi in 1871 and later Imvo Zabantsundu edited by John Tengo Jabavu in 1884, at the same time growing African cultural resistance began to occur as the progressive annexation of the Transkei and Griqualand East took place in 1879, Gcalekaland and Thembuland in 1884 and finally Pondoland in 1894. The earlier model of Cape assimilationism became progressively difficult to apply in conditions where the patron-client relationships forged by colonial administrators with local headmen amongst the Mfengu could not be so easily adapted to tribal chiefdoms. With the Transkei Annexation Act of 1877, a pronounced shift occurred in the Cape administrative ethos as the governor was given power to legislate by proclamation and no Cape statute was to operate unless it was specifically extended. For the first time official recognition was given to African customary law "as a system of law",¹⁶ and it began to become clear increasing use was likely to be made of tribal institutions in Cape administration as the Native Affairs Department was too weak to continue the earlier phase of assimilation.

But should the Cape develop a system of segregationist rule on a model similar to that of Shepstone in Natal? This question began to colour political debate in the Cape by the late 1870s and the Report of the Native Laws and Customs Commission in 1883 indicated that Cape liberal thinking was moving in favour of selective

incorporation and manipulation of African tribal institutions and customary laws in its administration, though in a far less restricted and inflexible manner than Natal. In this respect, the 1883 Commission is an important precursor of many of the later debates on social control at the time of the Inter Colonial Native Affairs Commission of 1903-05 chaired by Sir Godfrey Lagden and which has so often been seen as laying down the key foundations of territorial segregation after Union in 1910.

The 1883 Native Laws and Customs Commission:

The Native Laws and Customs Commission that was appointed in 1881 came in the wake of a pronounced challenge to existing Cape native policy in the Basuto Gun War in 1880. While the Transkei Annexation Act of 1887 had sought to institutionalise some African customary and tribal law, in the Basuto case the Cape Government of Sir Godron Sprigg resolved on a policy of direct rule in order to enforce the Peace Preservation Act there of 1878 and the handing in of arms. This direct intervention into Basuto politics also presupposed the raising of the hut tax and white settlement in the south of the country in the district of Chief Moorosi and thus brought the various quarrelling factions of Chiefs Letsie, Lerotholi, Masopha and Joel into a united resistance against the Cape. In the ensuing guerrilla campaign, furthermore, outbreaks of revolt extended outside Basutoland into East Griqualand and the Transkei. With the British government failing to provide assistance to the Cape, the attempt to disarm the Basuto was consequently abandoned by 1881 and the incoming administration of Sir Thomas Scanlen decided to resort to the subtler tactics of divide and rule and exploit the jealousies between the different Basuto chiefs which had grown up in the power vacuum left by Moshoeshoe's death in 1870. John X. Merriman, particularly, hoped at this stage to "split the chiefs up" so as to "throw our friends over and work with the people as against the chiefs".¹⁷ But this policy presumed that the Cape administration was sufficiently powerful to step in and take over many of the administrative functions that were conducted by the chiefs themselves — a task that was clearly impossible as the Cape Government discovered when it appointed General "Chinese" Gordon to look after native affairs. Gordon sought to remove many of the administrative officials from both the Transkei and Basutoland, where the Peace

Preservation Act was repealed, and formal responsibility for the territory was abandoned to Britain who eventually took over the territory in 1884. The central issue was that the Cape simply did not have an effective enough administrative machinery to embark on colonisation of its own and it was faced, in an issue like that of Basutoland, of either seeking to over-run the territory by force of arms or else withdrawing completely and shifting the responsibility onto someone else.

It was this somewhat crude paradox in Cape administrative policy that became the basis of political debate in the Cape and one of the most important contributions came from the Cape Governor's Agent in Basutoland, J.M. Orpen, who fell out with General Gordon on the decision to hand back control of the territory to Britain and rest administrative control on the Chiefs. In a pamphlet entitled Some Principles of Native Government Illustrated in 1880, Orpen sought to direct the principles of Cape liberalism to the question of administration over Africans and especially in so far as it affected the Sotho in Basutoland whose interests he sought to champion. This meant in particular taking in effect a middle position between the two extremes that had become manifest in Cape policy of either seeking to rule through the chiefs — the line taken by General Gordon the following year — or else destroying the chiefs' power and working with "the people" — as suggested by Merriman. The point was, for Orpen, that Cape government had to be orderly without at the same time being arbitrary, and it was no use destroying the power of the chiefs to replace it with an administrative system based on the same principles:

To substitute white arbitrary power for black arbitrary power makes no difference in the danger, for it is the thing itself not the person that is the danger. And if often results in making a black power more arbitrary and less controllable. It then adds crushing weight from above to an existing tyranny. Arbitrary power must be delegated downwards and never yet could be controlled from above. 18

Orpen thus articulated a conservative middle course that frequently became the basis for much later liberal criticism of government segregationist policy in the twentieth century and can even be seen to form the core of criticism like that of the Ballingers' of British colonial policy in Basutoland and the other Southern African

Protectorates in the 1930s.¹⁹ This course was to accept for the meantime the existing administrative and legal functions of the chiefs, but to argue for a progressive policy of civilising liberalism that would in time lead to power being delegated downwards onto a popular basis. Analogies were frequently made with the English historical precedent and Orpen argued that there were many similar features to English common law in African tribal life. Moshoeshoe, he argued, did not have an unchecked arbitrary power for in the high courts there were important "ama pakati" or middle men exercising judicial functions while at the popular level judicial decisions could occur through acclamation such that the law had its own moral force:

The exercise of the intellect and moral mind of the people in discussing equality and public affairs was their greatest and most effective engagement. They knew well how to appeal to the higher feelings and reason.

This was, therefore, an important attempt to reshape Cape liberalism, in the period before the rise of social imperialism and jingoist racism, towards accepting that its rationality and civilising attributes over African tribes were only relative and not absolute phenomena. African societies had "the same radical civilisation that we have" though it had "less concrete form" and was "less stable". It was essential therefore to embark on only a very limited social engineering policy and "instead of forcing a foreign growth on uncongenial soil, and instead of uprooting the growth of such a civilisation we have found as the natural African product, we should develop and engraft it as part of our system, only pruning where necessary".²⁰ This was a reformulation of the earlier ambitious civilising mission of the Cape missionaries which had been based on the unit of the individual and looked in many respects forward towards twentieth century conceptions of a more collectivist-orientated assimilationism that, as we can see by the time of the Native Economic Commission in 1932, represented a view of a multi-racial society centred around a growing access to the vote and progressive detribalisation and economic upliftment based on a free peasantry in the reserves.²¹

Orpen's assimilationism indicated several important themes which became the basis for the last phase of nineteenth century Cape liberalism: the imposition of fewer laws and the recognition of African customary law as a common law, the establishment of native councils and the creation of municipal and district councils for the articulation of African opinion. Such a legal system together with the councils could become an important means to check the power of the chiefs, especially if they were linked to a growing African peasantry with individual land titles that were registered. By such means could African society develop itself and it would be unnecessary to extend unnecessarily the Cape administrative structure which Orpen saw as "a great cold machine, worked by a distant government".²² This somewhat romantic view of African society was significant in that it occurred before the rise of mining capital and the bureaucracy that serviced it and reflected the great Victorian ideal of not extending government administration as far as possible. It is likely that Orpen's views had some influence on the thinking of the Native Laws and Customs Commission which has been seen as being sizeably impressed by the precedent of Theophilus Shepstone in Natal.²³ Orpen's thinking crystallised much of the undercurrent of feeling of many of the Cape native administrators who were against too radical a change in policy towards African customs and law (since it was likely to result in an upsurge in fresh resistance) while at the same time emphasising that the creation of an African "common law" meant that they could not be institutionalised in too "hard and fast" a manner.²⁴ It was undoubtedly the conceptualisation of an organic and evolutionary African customary law by opinion leaders like Orpen which led the Commission into recommending the selective acceptance of African customary law by means of a penal code modelled on the precedent of Macauley's code in India some fifty years previously. While missionary opinion was appeased by the Commission making circumcision by threats of force and without parental consent a punishable offence together with threats of witchcraft, at the same time African communal responsibility was recognised in cases like the spoor of lost cattle being traced to native kraals or communities. "The effect of it is, and will be", the Commission concluded, "to make every native living in his tribal state a detective,

and thus an inexpensive substitute for a police force will be contained throughout the Territories."²⁵ At the same time, the Commission clearly diverged somewhat from the more autocratic conception of Shepstone's segregationist system in Natal which rested, as he said in evidence to the Commission, on the idea of African laws and customs being "based upon the theory of absolute power residing somewhere".²⁶ Instead of relying solely upon tribal structures in the native administration of the Cape and the Transkei, the Commission looked towards a more pragmatic harmonisation of both tribal rule by the chiefs with that of the administrators of the Native Affairs Department. It proposed the idea of a Council for the Transkeian Territories consisting of three chief magistrates and fifteen African members appointed for two years "in accordance with the method of co-optation which has recently and with so much approval been introduced into India for encouraging the people to take an intelligent interest in the management of native affairs".²⁷ Though the President of the Commission, Sir James Barry, opposed this through fear of the "tribal solidarity it would foster",²⁸ suggesting instead a continuation of a divide and rule policy by having three separate councils, the Commission report can be seen to contain the germ of the later United Transkeian Territories General Council or Bunga which was finally established through the merger of the Transkeian Territories General Council with the Pondoland General Council in 1931.²⁹ The Commission contained, indeed, many of the aspirations of Cape liberalism in that it looked towards the continuation of government support for the missions and a policy of improving the general calibre of the civil servants employed in the Native Affairs Department by raising their pay and conditions of service. But, equally, it recognised that the Native Affairs officials could not take over the many legitimating functions held by the chiefs in the African tribal structure for it was useless to imagine that they could "take that place in the kaffir imagination which has from time immemorial been filled by their chiefs".³⁰

The overall effect of the Commission's recommendations was limited, however, by the fact that it came on the brink of the mining revolution on the Witwatersrand in 1886. Its recommendation regarding an African penal code led to the passing of the Penal Code Bill in 1886 which in turn aided the build-up over the following decades

of an important body of case law which would confirm the importance of the Transkeian system's flexibility at the time of the systematisation of native administration in the 1927 Native Administration Act.³¹ But its proposal for a native council was initially turned down by the Cape Parliament in 1885 and the proposal for the progressive incorporation of non-tribal elements in native administration met a rebuff when the 1887 Parliamentary Voters Registration Act restricted the number of African voters on the common franchise. The pace of economic change, indeed, was overtaking many of the ideas that lay behind the Commission's thinking and by the 1890s it began to become clear that the paternalist ideas of many of the Commission's members — native administrators and Cape liberals like the Reverend James Stewart, John Ayliff, Richard Solomon, Walter Stanford, Thomas Upington and W. Bisset Berry — were being superseded by the rise of mining capital at Kimberley and the Witwatersrand. The emergence of Cecil Rhodes as prime minister of the Cape in 1890 personified these changes and with the passing of the Glen Grey Act in 1894 there began to emerge a clear tension between the paternalist idea of social control rooted in the classical Cape liberal alliance of missionary, resident magistrate and local headmen or tribal chief and a newer form of more bureaucratised social control rooted in a stronger centralised state which was prepared to override local opinion in favour of a more standardised administrative structure. The "great cold machine, worked by a distant government" began to materialise as it became clear by the 1890s that the technological superiority of western arms over African tribes in cases like the Matabeleland Rebellion in 1893 was such that there need no longer be quite the same fear of resistance as had haunted many administrators' minds as recently as the Basutoland Gun War of 1880-81. As Cecil Rhodes stated, injecting a new brand of imperialist optimism into Cape politics, machine guns would make it a "perfectly easy thing to deal with the Pondos, and other native tribes".³² In these newer circumstances, where social control in the Cape was being increasingly orientated towards ensuring an adequate supply of African labour for the Kimberley diamond mines as well as for the Witwatersrand, the older ideal of classical Cape liberalism began to give way towards a more segregationist conception and in this some, though by no means all, of the mainstream Cape liberals in positions of influence participated.

The Glen Grey Act:

The passing of Cecil Rhodes's Glen Grey Act in 1894 in many respects crystallised the growing contradiction between the paternalism of classical Cape liberalism and the newer centralised form of social control rooted in territorial segregation. The Act was conceived in an ideological context of growing class conflict which, in South Africa as much as in Britain, was transforming the language of political debate from an individualistic plane underpinned by paternal deference to one of growing collective class solidarity with the ruling propertied bourgeoisie looking increasingly to state action to back up their interests.³³ In the debate on the Bill before its passing, Rhodes appealed to the precedent of the "labour troubles" in England and the strike of the Pullman Car Company in Chicago engineered by the Black Brotherhood of Sleeping Car porters. The point of the Glen Grey Bill, explained Rhodes, was to avoid such strike action:

This is what is going on in older countries on account of the masses as against the classes getting what they term their rights, or, to put it in plain English, those who have not trying to take from those who have. If they cannot get it by what might be termed Irish legislation, they mean to get it by physical force.

And it was precisely to prevent such a possibility that Rhodes conceived the Glen Grey Bill in order to preserve a social order based on racial and not class divisions:

... if the whites maintain their position as the supreme race, the day may come when we shall all be thankful that we have the natives with us in their proper position. We shall be thankful that we have escaped those difficulties which are going on amongst the old nations of the world. 34

The Act, therefore, can be seen as a crucial step in the development of a strategy of social control based upon territorial segregation. "What I would like in regard to a native area", Rhodes remarked, "is that there should be no white man in its midst. I hold that the natives should be apart from white men, and not mixed up with them."³⁵ In particular, the Act sought to maintain the subsistence base of

African agriculture in the areas where it was proclaimed by perpetuating an African "producer class" of freehold peasants who could in turn be buttressed politically by the establishment of local representative councils. The number of such peasants was to be governed by the number of the lots that were registered and the general principle was to be "one man, one lot", though in practice that was to prove almost impossible to enforce. So far, the Act met with general support from the class of African peasants and small property owners in the Eastern Cape who were looking for legislative measures to entrench their rights of land ownership together with some means of local representation: the writer and clergyman John Knox Bokwe, who had been educated at Lovedale, wrote a pamphlet in the same year as the Act calling for the establishment of local village councils in order to extend African peasant agriculture and create a "public spirit in the village" free from the control of the "traditional" class of headmen who still farmed on a communal basis.³⁶ But at the same time the Glen Grey Act sought to introduce a general labour tax of 10sh per annum as a means to force out more Africans to work on the mines and it was in this respect that the Act led to a heightening of political consciousness amongst the African political and educational elite. Calling the labour tax provision, "at best a qualified slavery", Imvo articulated widespread African opposition which threatened to develop to the point of "passive resistance" and a collective refusal to pay the tax.³⁷

This threat of resistance by African taxpayers brought into the open a growing crisis in Cape administration as it became clear that the more paternalistic structure of control based on an alliance between local magistrates and chiefs and headmen was threatened with complete collapse. Mayor Henry Elliott, the Chief Magistrate of the Transkeian Territories, acted as the spokesman of the magistrates in the face of Rhodes's attempts at bureaucratic centralisation and, in an attempt to maintain the legitimacy of the old order, sought to get the labour tax reduced from 10sh to 5sh a year. This was essential, the magistrate W. T. Brownlee recalled, for it was "useless for us to tell the people that we were merely the mouthpieces of the Government and that it was the order of the Government that the new law was being introduced. The stereotyped reply was 'You are the only government that we see. We cannot see the

Government that you say is in Cape Town. We look to you to kill the law.' "

But Rhodes manifested little sign of understanding this system of face to face relationships based upon a sense of mutual trust within a paternalistic order of deference and, in meetings he held with African leaders and people at Nqamakwe (for the Mfengu) and Idutywa (for the Transkei) he threatened the use of force and the introduction of compulsory labour.³⁸

In such a situation, the magistrates were progressively forced to manipulate what was left of the old alliance with the chiefs and headmen in order to swing it round behind Rhodes's policy. With the request for the tax to be reduced turned down, the magistrates were forced to tell the African chiefs to "obey the law" and this was eventually successful because of the complex relationships between different African 'ethnic' and kinship groups. While the Mfengu in the "Fingoland" reserve were most solidly in favour of passive resistance and had cried at the meeting with Rhodes "Hamba! Hamba! Hamba! asiji ku vola! (Go on! Go on! we won't pay it!)", the success of their campaign depended upon wider support from the Gcaleka, Ndlambe and Mfengu groups in the Idutywa reserve. Here the Mfengu were willing to cooperate readily enough but they needed the support of Chief Zenzile of the Ndlambe and Chief Sigidi of the Gcaleka. Zenzile only offered support if he was backed up by the Lovedale educated Sigidi but, in the event, the latter refused after meeting the magistrate Brownlee. Without this collective solidarity, the threat of passive resistance was ineffective and the issue of writs for tax evasion in Tsomo in the course of 1895 soon led to its fizzling out.³⁹

Thus, the effect of the Glen Grey Act was substantially to nullify the older paternalistic system and to bring the Cape magistrates increasingly into a segregationist system of control. With the rapid increase in labour migrancy in the latter part of the 1890s — 2000 African boys of 16 and 17 left Tsomo alone in 1895,⁴⁰ — the magisterial system became used to buttress a class alliance with local African headmen via the more institutionalised form of political cooptation in the Glen Grey councils. Within a year of the threatened passive resistance over the labour tax, many headmen turned towards the councils as they saw the political advantages in being

nominated to bodies which controlled such matters as land allocation and grazing rights. But as class differentiation in the African reserves became more salient as progressive ecological deterioration and disease such as the rinderpest epidemic of 1897 drove out more African peasants as labour migrants,⁴¹ the headmen risked alienating themselves from the groundswell of popular opinion in the locations. Thus magistrates by the turn of the century began to look towards instituting the councils on a firmer basis by paying the headmen a salary in order, as the Commissioner for Lady Frere argued in support of a £5 a year salary, "to make them independent of local influence".⁴² This cooptation of headmen became essential, furthermore, as the councils became used to drive out allotment holders who broke the provisions of the Glen Grey Act or encroached on common land.⁴³

The effect of the Glen Grey Act, therefore, was to reverse many of the earlier assumptions of nineteenth century Cape liberalism and to backtrack on the assimilating ethos of earlier generations of magistrates. If the 1883 Native Laws and Customs Commission had marked a tentative step in the direction of recognising African customary law, the general administrative practice in the years after 1894 marked the real decline of Cape liberalism and the progressive acceptance of many of the tenets of segregation. The small African intelligentsia and kholwa, who had been earlier accepted as part of the Cape civilising mission,⁴⁴ became increasingly marginalised as it became clear that magistrates were working with the more "traditional" headmen on the Glen Grey councils. A vigilance Association formed in the Transkei in 1901 by the African intelligentsia led by Enoch Mamba remained unrecognised by the Cape Government⁴⁵ and the net effect of the Glen Grey Act was in many cases to reinforce the control of "Red" or "traditional" headmen on the councils and their respective kinship lineages. In the Fingqutu location of Lady Frere, for instance, a number of "registered owners of allotments" drew up a petition to protest against the activities of the acting headman Mqikela who:

has been unusually very busy holding meetings and misleading the people by telling them that if they have their building lots surveyed they would have no grazing rights in the commonage and the Government would at once take possession of it and let it to the

farmers and the natives would be required to graze their cattle within the limits of the lots surveyed as building sites for them and they would be further compelled by Government to push up strong substantial dwelling houses which they would not be able to pay for. 46

The petitioners clearly preferred to work through a leading kholwa Meschach Pelem, who drew up the petition, rather than the headmen and it was also clear that many of the forty signatures attached to it came from men forced out into migrancy since many were established to be "at work", "gone a long time" or were "dead".⁴⁷ The case illustrated the growth in class divisions between migrants and headmen and the use made by the Cape government of the Glen Grey Councils in order to buttress traditional lineages as the basis of local control.

At the same time, the Cape government also recognised the value of not implementing the Glen Grey Act in a number of instances. With the risk of fostering growing divisions in the locations, many magistrates argued for only selective implementation of the Act in cases where it would reinforce existing structures of control. While Idutywa, Nqamakwe and Tsomo were included along with Glen Grey in 1894 and Kentani brought in in 1899, Xalanga was rejected as a suitable district in 1902 on account of "objections to the land tenure system".⁴⁸ The Chief Magistrate of Tembuland, Transkei and Pondoland argued that it was "far better to wait until it is asked for, when it could be granted as a concession, than to force it upon them unwillingly"⁴⁹ and it began to become clear that many magistrates had lost the enthusiasm of the original act's ostensible intentions as it failed to lead to significant improvements in African peasant agriculture. Indeed, with growing failure to pay quit rent under the Act and the refusal of African peasants to build houses close together on the allotments provided, many magistrates began to bypass the original "one man, one lot" provisions of the Act and to allow the ownership of more than one allotment.⁵⁰ Furthermore, the rules of seniority were often bent in order to allow allotments to be filled by aspiring African property owners: Julius Hlangwana was able to buy a plot in Macabeni location in Glen Grey, for instance, even though he was only twenty two years old and unmarried since he was the son of an existing allotment holder in the

location. The main objective in granting him the plot seemed to be that he was likely to pay hut tax.⁵¹

This gradual emasculation of many of the tenets of the classical Cape liberal tradition as a result of the Glen Grey Act began to be reflected in the thinking of some of the leading political figures in the Cape before the onset of Union in 1910. The Act was seen as a crucial means to thwart the political aspirations of the African petty bourgeoisie via the common franchise, especially after the 1898 election which saw for the first time the real emergence of what Trapido has termed a group of "semi professional politicians" and African election agents who broke through the barriers of race, language and culture.⁵² Richard Rose-Innes, for instance, was angered by the support of Imvo Zabantsundu for Onze Jan Hofmeyr's Bond and began to favour a separate franchise to exclude African voters influencing white elections. In 1903, therefore, he argued in favour of the Glen Grey Act as a means for entrenching territorial segregation for the principles of the Act "necessarily involve the creation of purely Native Reserves or areas from which Europeans are excluded by purchase or otherwise". This principle "must be maintained against every species of opposition" for the "policy to aim at for the future" was "the segregation of the races within certain limits and under safeguards". This segregation, in addition, had the advantage of establishing the reserves as "'reservoirs of labour' and homes for these people into which the Native will be free to come and go".⁵³

Thus, by the turn of the century, the conservative liberal tradition began to foresee much of the future debate on social control in South Africa in the years after Union. The Glen Grey Act cannot be judged simply in terms of its objective of extending individual land tenure,⁵⁴ for the workings of the Act contributed substantially to the undermining of the Eastern Cape African peasantry which had grown up under the hegemony of mercantile capital in the mid-nineteenth century. By 1922, the Location Surveys Commission established that the Act had nothing like the effect of establishing a secure class of individual property owners for 40% of the Glen Grey allotments had passed into hands different from their original owners,⁵⁵ while in 1925 it emerged that only 7 of the 27 Transkeian districts had been surveyed with a total of 50,000 land

titles.⁵⁶ Increasingly, the objectives of the Act became compromised by the desire of the white government to work in alliance with the tribal chiefs; in an area like Pondoland, for example, chief Victor Poto adamantly resisted the extension of individual tenure on Glen Grey lines.⁵⁷

At the same time, however, it is not an accurate conclusion that the Glen Grey system simply led to a segregationist tendency within Cape liberalism. Despite the fact that the Cape became progressively subordinated to the hegemony of mining capital as 55,000 Africans from the Transkei worked on the Witwatersrand by 1909, a number of Cape liberals still held out for the older paternalistic style of control. This was less in the form of the Cape liberal F.S. Malan, as Peter Kallaway has argued, for it seems unlikely that he had much influence on the evolution of native policy back towards a more paternalistic form when he was running in addition the departments of Mines and Industries, Lands, Agriculture and Education.⁵⁸ It seems rather that the authentic voice for the older style of Cape liberalism after Union came through bodies like the Transkeian Territories General Council, and the Ciskeian General Council. It was probably with these bodies in mind that Walter Stanford, as a former Chief Magistrate of the Transkei, voiced his concern at the decline in the personal, face to face system of rule to which he attributed the reason for the outbreak of resistance at Matatiele in 1914 to the dipping regulations against East Coast Fever. Stanford perceived that labour migrancy was eroding one of the basic pillars, the African family unit, behind the old paternalistic system of Cape rule. Furthermore, both African women and headmen had taken part in the refusal to dip cattle and Stanford urged a reassertion of magisterial control:

In the Transkeian Territories we have a Native population of approximately a million souls. The large majority are still living under tribal conditions. With these, and to some extent even with the others, the personal influence and guidance of the Chief Magistrate and Magistrate are essential factors in their contentment. They regard these officers not merely as the judicial authority before whom their cases must be heard or the collectors of revenue to whom taxes must be paid; they are the representatives of that far away undefined power known to

them as the government, and the magistrates are their channel of communication, and should be their friends and protectors. Yet more and more these Territories are being administered as if they were European districts occupied by a highly civilised European race. The magistrate's power for good is constantly undermined. Officers of various departments abound, each responsible to some other officer stationed at Pretoria or elsewhere unknown to the people. 59 (emphasis added)

But when Stanford's report came up for discussion at a conference of Native Administrators on 9th December 1914 only his proposals for amending the dipping regulations received any attention.⁶⁰ The Minister of Native Affairs, F.S. Malan, was unwilling to consider any increase in magisterial power and Stanford's voice was to a considerable degree a lone one crying in the wilderness. However, the logic of state policy becomes more explicable when it is realised that the growth in African political consciousness by this time made the notion of African conceptions of government as a "far away undefined power" a somewhat archaic one. Even if it was true at various stages in the nineteenth century the Cape paternalistic system had rested upon magistrates successfully legitimating themselves as the local wielders of political authority, by the start of the first world war a substantial expansion in scale of African political thinking had occurred. Much of this had been created by the same forces that had led to the erosion of the Cape paternalistic system from above — the extension of labour migrancy, population mobility and the bureaucratisation of native administration. At the same time, it was also transformed by the emergence of newer forces within African societies themselves and the establishment of pan-tribal political ideology. Even by the 1890s proletarianisation was beginning to make headway on the Witwatersrand and, despite the attempts by the mining magnates to resist this process as far as possible by seeking the enforced perpetuation of tribal consciousness through the compound system,⁶¹ a process of detribalisation began to occur. Much of the expression of this newer consciousness occurred through the development of breakaway African independent churches free from missionary control, for political radicalism in the form of socialist thinking did not begin to intrude into African thinking until the emergence of the International Socialist League on the

Witwatersrand during the first world war.⁶² This independent church ideology of Ethiopianism became a crucial factor in altering the awareness of many African migrants in the 1890s and 1900s and did much to dissolve the individualist and paternalist liberalism of the Cape into the racial segregationism of the years before and after Union. It is thus towards these developments that we turn in the following chapter.

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- voice of turn of the century liberalism in the Cape", Bundy, op. cit., p.139. Certainly, the effect of the 1898 election appears to have caused Rose-Innes to advocate a separate African voters roll. SANAC, Vol. 11, minutes, p.633, though how far this was generally favoured by Cape liberals is uncertain.
54. See, in particular, Monica Wilson, "The Growth of Peasant Communities" in OHSA, p.60; Hunt Davies, op. cit., p.137.
 55. UG 42-1922, p.5; Keegan, op. cit., p.33.
 56. Raymond Leslie Buell, The Native Problems in Africa, London, Frank Cass, 1965, p.90.
 57. Howard Pim, A Transkei Enquiry, Lovedale, 1934, p.32.
 58. Peter Kallaway, "F.S. Malan, The Cape Liberal Tradition and South African Politics", Journal of African History, XV, 1, 1974.
 59. Walter Stanford Papers, BC 293 F(11) 7 Report by Stanford as Special Commissioner to S.N.A. 8 December 1914, p.7.
 60. ibid., Notes of Proceedings of Conference on Dipping Matters 9 December 1914.
 61. For a study of the workings of the compound system and the attempts by means of total institutionalisation to resist the development of proletarian consciousness see Charles Van Onselen, Chibaro, London, Pluto Press, 1976. Van Onselen's account is centred around the Rhodesian mines for the South African compound system see Sean Moroney, "Industrial Conflict in a Labour Repressive Economy: Black Labour on the Transvaal Gold Mines, 1901-1912", B.A. (Hons) Thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 1976.
 62. For these developments see chapter four, p.134.

Chapter Two

Ethiopianism and the extension of educational control

The developments in late nineteenth century Cape liberalism towards a more collectivist political ideology were not a simple response to the rise of mining capital. As the last chapter indicated, mining capital clearly was one important factor in eroding the Victorian individualism that lay behind the classical form of Cape liberalism, but it has also to be seen within a complex of other factors that were occurring at this time. The revisionist view of South African liberalism has tended to see the purveyors of Cape liberalism as somewhat passively responding to external events by the 1890s as they searched for some form of political accommodation with the movements from Kimberley and the Witwatersrand. Legassick has argued, for instance, that the centre for the newer South African liberalism only developed on the Witwatersrand after the first world war as missionaries and 'friends of the native' extended their efforts at political cooptation towards the African petty bourgeoisie through bodies like the Joint Councils. In this context, the more traditional Cape liberals became increasingly anachronistic and looked back nostalgically to an idealised nineteenth century liberalism that increasingly failed to relate to the segregationist context of South Africa between the wars.¹

This view of Cape liberalism, however, fails to account fully for the developments and initiatives pursued by Cape liberals themselves by the end of the nineteenth century as they, as much as the magnates and formulators of segregation in the north, realised the need for an increasing systematisation and professionalisation in policy towards an African political and educational elite that was growing in size and influence. Indeed, while the Glen Grey Act of 1894 signalled the growing integration of the Cape economy into the octopus-like tentacles of the mines and its labour requirements, the 1890s were equally important for movements within the Cape Colony

itself for a strengthening of missionary control and the widening of African educational facilities in order to buttress white political hegemony.

This movement among Cape liberals stemmed from developments in African independent churches and the rise of the phenomenon that became known as Ethiopianism. As a number of African religious leaders seceded with their followers from the white missionary controlled churches and established their own schools and methods of religious and educational instruction, a pronounced African challenge emerged to one of the main props of the Cape liberal establishment. It was the missionary response to this by the start of the twentieth century in the form of moves to extend African higher education and plan for the creation of an African university college that marked one of the first major instances in cultural control over African political leadership. At the same time, with the actual establishment of the University of Fort Hare in 1915, some five years after Union and two years after the 1913 Natives Land Act, the real significance of Cape liberal efforts at both collaborating with and shaping the ideas of opinion formers on native policy in the other states of South Africa was established. As this chapter, therefore, seeks to show, Cape liberalism in the years before and after Union in 1910 was not a dying phenomenon but very much active in shaping the form and nature of social control in the years after Union and actually resisting the continued extension of state centralisation. It was through, indeed, the perpetuation of private philanthropic and missionary efforts in the sphere of African higher education that state control in the form of Bantu education was resisted as long as it was and liberal influence exerted on the formulation of native policy through a "liberal establishment".² Fort Hare undoubtedly formed a strong pillar in this continued liberal resistance to state centralisation of African higher education and its final demise with the state take-over in 1959, following the University College of Fort Hare Act, represented a major inroad into the ability of liberals in South Africa to resist the continued aggregation of state power. In this respect, the origins and development of Fort Hare as an African university college, which we examine in the second part of this chapter after looking at the African challenge in the form of Ethiopianism, marked the active continuation of a liberal tradition in the Cape which

did not simply fall into demise at the time of Union in 1910, as Stanley Trapido has tended to argue,³ nor been reformulated on the Witwatersrand in the inter-war years to rationalise the interests of mining capital and mediate the contradictions of the government's segregation policy, as has been argued by Legassick.⁴ Fort Hare, rather, became the locus for a liberalism that was concerned to preserve non statist and informal modes of social control in an industrialising society and it was thus not surprising that it aggregated to itself from the 1930s onwards continuous Afrikaner nationalist political hostility. As it was born to meet the pan-tribal and Africanist consciousness expressed through Ethiopianism, so it came to be seen as a chief obstacle to the implementation of a policy of retribalisation based upon the ethnic separatism of Dr. Verwoerd and Dr. Eiselen's dream of apartheid.

The Ethiopian challenge:

In its more classical form, the Cape liberalism of the nineteenth century sought the gradual inclusion of educated African leaders into the "European civilisation" of the southern tip of Africa. This was to be substantially on an individual basis for, despite the hopes of the ambitious first generation of Cape missionaries represented by John Philip for the progressive transformation of African cultural values towards those of the dominant colonial culture, it became clear by Responsible Government in 1853 and the retreat of British expansionism that missionary optimism would have to be modified. The influence of the missions on African societies was very much an indirect one and, as J.B. Peires has recently shown in respect of the Xhosa, Christianity was implanted as an African religion brought by the convert Ntsikana as opposed to the breakaway nationalism of Nxele.⁵ While, therefore, missionary proselytisation continued in the Eastern Cape, it depended very much on the vital cultural mediation of African converts themselves in the form of men like Tiyo Soga, the son of one of Ntsikana's converts. The magistrate William Charles Scully, reflecting on a meeting with Tiyo Soga in 1869, exemplified the classical Cape liberal view towards this group of acculturated intermediaries when he stated that Soga "had acquired culture both deep and wide, and then returned to try and civilise his people ... He was not alone a deeply cultivated

scholar, but a Christian gentleman in the fullest sense of the term."⁶ The acculturated African, in other words, was accepted on equal terms as the individual and bourgeois "Christian gentleman" in its full Victorian sense while at the same time being seen as having special additional and separate responsibilities of "returning to his people" and disseminating the values of the colonial culture.

This somewhat piecemeal form of cultural transformation did bring results in the form of a growing African intelligentsia; and in the years after the foundation of Lovedale in 1841 growing numbers of African children received elementary instruction — 11,000, for example, by 1856 and 63,000 by 1883 — and hopes began to turn towards some form of higher educational institution for African leaders. In 1872, the Reverend James Stewart of Lovedale looked forward to "something little short of an African university where a number of excellent things from agriculture to theology might be taught".⁷ Attempts at a systematic cultural transformation of African chiefs' sons in the isolated environment of Zonnebloem College in Cape Town, set up during the governorship of Sir George Grey in 1858, met with only mixed success and in the aftermath of the annexation of the Transkei in 1877 following the Cape Xhosa war of that year and the rebellion of 1881, the Eastern Cape missions began to move towards a growing recognition of the distinctiveness of African customs and law. Even before the appointment of the Native Laws and Customs Commission the Christian Express considered that it was "surprising that (the Africans) have submitted as patiently as they have done to laws and customs, ways and modes of life and forms of administration so foreign to them". For while "they have reaped certain benefits no doubt", they did so:

at the cost of the undermining of a large proportion of the foundations of their social life, and habits as a people. And the result has been that they are landed in what may be called the Transition State, in which many of them are neither completely civilised nor completely savage, neither educated nor ignorant, neither extremely heathen nor Christian. 8

This re-evaluation of civilising missionary assumptions received a boost with the 1883 Native Laws and Customs Commission, but was even further reinforced by the

development of African religious secessionism in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. Beginning with the Thembu Church of Nehemiah Tile in the Eastern Cape following the War of 1877-78 and the influx of Trekboers of 1881-83,⁹ this movement reflected the increasing dispossession of the African peasantry as reserves became overcrowded and uneven development created a class of migrants and squatters, on the one hand, and a landed small farmer class on the other.¹⁰ As labour migrancy in the Transkei advanced dramatically in the 1890s from some 27,511 in 1893 to 45,000 by 1899, African independent churches sprang up to cater for a growing pan-tribal and Africanist consciousness that sought to be free from white missionary control. In addition, through the African Methodist Episcopal Church that was incorporated in South Africa in 1896, links were established with American blacks and the radical A.M.E. Bishop Henry M. Turner (known by the Africans as "Bishop Dunzi") visited South Africa in 1898 to ordain some sixty ministers into the church and raise its membership from some 2,800 in 1896 to 10,800 two years later.¹¹

The significance of this secessionism was that it amounted to virtually an "educational rebellion" by many former mission-educated Christian converts who, having accepted schooling from the colonial power, now wanted to bring it under their own control.¹² One of the leaders of the A.M.E. in the Herschel district, for instance, was Isaiah Sishuba, a headman who had been educated at Lovedale and Zonnebloem College in Cape Town,¹³ while in Pondoland Chief Sigcau appointed an A.M.E. minister Mtintso as "Royal Chaplain to the Great Place".¹⁴ The success of this challenge to missionary hegemony was compromised from the start, however, by a series of economic and political weaknesses. Many of the adherents of the churches were poverty stricken having joined during a period of growing economic distress in the African reserves and there were few funds to establish any systematic educational and cultural programme. In addition, despite the growing pan-tribalism of the churches in the wake of the Thembu Church, many of the members of churches like the Ethiopian Church, established in 1892 out of the Thembu Church, and the A.M.E. were still motivated by ethnic and kinship considerations such that the followers of a particular local secessionist leader were frequently defined by kinship attachments and

rivalry with another headman.¹⁵ Thus, it was not surprising that the leaders of the independent churches looked elsewhere for assistance and the A.M.E. in this instance had the attraction of the connection with America where there were substantial educational facilities for blacks. African hopes grew by the late 1890s for an increasing number of students to be sent over to America for further education while in South Africa itself the visit of Henry Turner in 1898 led to the establishment by the A.M.E. of the Bethel Institute in Cape Town, under the principalship of the Reverend James Dwane, which was looked upon as a possible nascent African university in South Africa.¹⁶

This upsurge in A.M.E. optimism, centred around the connections with negroes in America, undoubtedly acted as a powerful influence on the thinking of white missionaries and administrators by the turn of the century. By 1905 it was claimed that some 100 African students from South Africa were enrolled in American universities¹⁷ and missionary leaders started to warn of possible political implications accruing from education for Africans overseas. "The American connection should be watched", wrote the Reverend James Stewart in 1901. "We don't want nor need American negroes in this country, and there is a party of these Negroes, evidently desirous of gaining a foothold in this country and exploiting as far as they are able for the benefit of the Negro in the South."¹⁸ Stewart's warning underlined the fears held by a number of white missionaries that the A.M.E. represented a new and potentially more attractive source of missionary proselytisation. The Church did have considerable financial resources and the American negro missionary the Reverend Henry Attaway who helped found the A.M.E.'s Bethel Institute also organised a land syndicate that purchased a 10,000 acre farm at Croen River, 44 miles from Cape Town.¹⁹ It thus seemed that the A.M.E. in time might become a leading missionary church in South Africa and so challenge the mission monopoly of the white-controlled churches.

These white missionary fears in the Cape were further underlined by an important secession from the Church of Scotland's mission at Lovedale by the Reverend P.J. Mzimba in 1898, leading to two damaging law suits in the Supreme Court in order

to recover property taken by Mzimba's followers.²⁰ This was seen by many leading Cape liberals as a direct challenge to the authority of one of the most important missions in the Colony and acted as a considerable reinforcement to the racialisation in much liberal thinking by the turn of the century. Richard Rose-Innes, for instance, as attorney for Stewart in the case, wrote to him advising that he "give no quarter and exercise every right and power we possess against them, and not yield a single inch".²¹ Coming on top of the election the previous year when Imvo transferred its support to the Bond, it is possible to see why Rose-Innes was in favour of territorial segregation by 1903.²² Furthermore, support was also promised from the Cape Prime Minister W. P. Schreiner who stated that no matter what final judgment was given in court on the Mzimba case "I will never give title to any but the Free Church of Scotland as long as I am Prime Minister. Dr. Stewart has nothing to fear."²³

In such circumstances, the years after 1900 saw white missionary interests in the Cape being increasingly protected by the actions of the government in a growing mission-state alliance that had been somewhat weakened since the reduction of direct government financial support for the missions in 1863 and increased concentration of resources on white education.²⁴ Despite the fact that the period of A.M.E. radicalism in South Africa following Turner's visit in 1898 was short-lived and that by 1900 a more moderate political course was being adopted, the Cape Government began to implement a tight policy of surveillance over the church as part of a wider aim to exercise control over the activities of independent churches. In this respect it probably led the way in South Africa for other states had been far less discriminatory, either bending over backwards to meet A.M.E. leaders like Turner, as Paul Kruger had done on the 1898 visit, or else forbidding the entry of their leaders altogether, which was the practice of the British administrators in both the Transvaal and the Orange Free State after the Anglo-Boer War. When, therefore, the A.M.E. sought the recognition of the church in the Cape and the right of its ordained ministers to initiate marriage ceremonies, it despatched the Reverend I. N. Fitzpatrick, a leading moderate in the church, to gain an interview with the Prime Minister, William Schreiner. The Cape Government, however, instituted delaying tactics. By 1900, it was beginning to become clear

that by "playing a waiting game" it would be possible to neutralise the influence of independent churches like the A.M.E. by exploiting their internal divisions and lack of strong leadership.²⁵ From Resident Magistrates there came a number of reports of the failure of the independent churches at the local level to "inspire great confidence in the native mind" and predictions that "the movement will drag and not be a success"²⁶ and it seemed likely that by instituting a strict code of conduct in order to gain recognition, the leaders of the churches could be used as vital intermediaries in the implementation of social control. In the case of the A.M.E. the government requested that the church should be domiciled in South Africa "and have, on the spot, some fully competent authority, such authority being vouched for by the chief U.S. Government official of the state he came from".²⁷ Such an approach indicated a recognition by the Cape government of the value of using external vetting by the American state governments which, in the aftermath of the war with Spain in 1898, had an increasingly racist and segregationist attitude and were supportive of British imperial expansion in Southern Africa.²⁸ The policy bore fruit, too, for the A.M.E. duly complied by sending Bishop L. J. Coppin to the Cape in 1901 to secure governmental recognition and define the objectives of the church specifically to an apolitical "religious" sphere. A.M.E. Church organisation was thoroughly investigated by Coppin and the ministers ordained by Turner in 1898 were only selectively re-appointed from year to year.²⁹

As a consequence of these moves by the Cape government, control over African independent churches was put on a firmer footing in the years after the Anglo-Boer War when the question of a native policy for the whole of South Africa began to be discussed. Though the A.M.E. at the colonial level in the Cape was recognised in 1903, many of the radical elements in the church were progressively neutralised with the assistance of the A.M.E. church leadership. Even though, for instance, Isaiah Sishuba proclaimed that the objective of his church in Herschel was only "to christianise our people, to teach them to obey their magistrates, inspectors as well as their bodily masters to work and to be loyal to all the laws of the country", his activities were restricted by the government who backed the objections of the Wesleyan mission in the reserve to his building another church in the location of headman Joel Mehlomakulu.³⁰ Similarly,

the increased willingness of Bishop Coppin's successor as head of the A.M.E. in South Africa, Bishop Charles Smith, to get rid of "undesirable elements" in the church led to the secession of the former radical faction led by James Dwane who complained of the refusal of the A.M.E. church in America to back up their former promises of assistance with any funds.³¹ By the time of the Report of the South African Native Affairs Commission, chaired by Sir Godfrey Lagden, in 1905 recommended selective recognition of African independent churches in South Africa,³² the Cape policy of social control had made significant headway and by 1907 restrictions on the entry of A.M.E. ministers into the Transvaal were relaxed and white settler fears of a united African insurrection led by American educated black churchmen began to decline. Though the myth of Ethiopianism continued to live on in white popular consciousness — it was widely disseminated, for instance, through John Buchan's novel Præster John³³ — it began to become plain to the various state governments of South Africa before Union that African independent church activity was capable of being controlled through various selective measures of partial recognition and continuous surveillance. As Louis Botha, the prime minister of the Transvaal after Responsible Government in 1907, minuted in 1908, cooperation between the governments of South Africa was necessary "to arrest the growth of any racial or separatist movement among natives", nevertheless, "as far as the Transvaal is concerned, there is not sufficient information before the Government to show that the attitude and propaganda of the present Ethiopian organisations are such as to justify the assumption of special legislative powers for the purpose of suppressing their proceedings".³⁴ This attitude characterised the policy of successive South African governments after Union as well as social control through selective recognition and the establishment of guidelines for church conduct characterised the findings of the Report of the Native Churches Commission in 1925.³⁵

On the other hand, the refusal of central government to take a strongly interventionist or repressionist line on independent churches meant that a large sphere of social control functions was left to private initiative, especially that of the white missions and their allies (frequently relatives) in native administration. In this

respect, much of the alarm felt in some missionary circles in the early years of the twentieth century at the growth of African independent churches and potential for Ethiopianism to radicalise mission-educated African religious and political leaders spilt over into a debate on extending controls over African educational facilities. The Ethiopian phenomenon, indeed, became an important base for white missionaries to justify the extension of their own sphere of influence by establishing an African university college under their own control in order to prevent the exodus of educated African leaders overseas, especially to the United States. The longer term consequences of Ethiopianism were thus to exacerbate the hitherto somewhat tardy moves to institutionalise African higher education and to lead finally to the establishment of the University College of Fort Hare in 1915.

The missionary response: Fort Hare and African higher education:

As we have seen, one of the consequences of Ethiopianism by the end of the nineteenth century was to contribute to the growing racialisation in Cape liberal thinking. Even some of the most prominent Cape paternalists like Walter Stanford came to be influenced by this trend as Ethiopianism seemed to represent a significant threat to the stability of Cape native administration in the Eastern Cape and the Transkei. "Hitherto the influential chiefs and headmen in the Transkeian Territories have not associated themselves with the teachings of the Ethiopians", Stanford wrote in 1902. But:

In some of the districts it would appear that they are losing rather than gaining ground. Great ease should, I consider, be exercised in regard to applications from these people for permission to occupy land for church and school purposes, and in allowing any recognition of the validity of their claims to ecclesiastical orders. The introduction of the American negro as a missionary and the readiness of our Natives to send their sons to America for education and training are features likely to lead to political difficulties in the future. There will, however, be compensations. The cry of Africa for the black Africans if once established as the aspiration of the Natives, will more than ought else bring fraternally together the two dominant races in this country. 36

This attitude by a leading Cape native administrator was echoed too in missionary circles, especially The Christian Express which was printed at Lovedale. Still smarting from the Mzimba issue the paper in 1900 declared that the Ethiopian churches "tend to lower Christian life, and to produce a Christian heathenism, which is some ways is worse than the heathenism of 'reds' who do not pretend to be better than they are".³⁷ Such a view was not necessarily shared by all the leading figures in the Cape at the time for Merriman considered that the "intolerant articles" in the Express "must be to the natives a revelation of the insufficiency of the Christian profession to secure either tolerance or liberality in religious matters",³⁸ but this attitude was a reflection of the Bond's defeat of Rhodes's Progressives in the 1898 election and the exclusion from direct political influence of Stewart and Lovedale. However, by the end of the Anglo-Boer War and the beginnings of the debate on native policy for a future united South Africa the warnings of Stewart and the Express began to be heeded. In 1903, for instance, Stewart pointed out in a paper On Native Education — South Africa that it would not be possible to rely on the continued funding of missionary education of Africans from overseas sources and, as things were, there was a major reliance on funds raised by Africans themselves. Pointing out that the annual cost of Lovedale was some £10,000 per annum, Stewart argued that one quarter came from the mission committee in Scotland, one fifth from the education department of the Cape Colony and the rest from African sources. Indeed, the fees for board and education paid by the Africans had risen from nothing in the 1870s to nearly £5,000 a year or some £58,000 over the whole period.³⁹ This meant that, as the African demand for education continued to grow, further reliance would be placed on African sources for funds. It was in this respect, therefore, that Ethiopianism represented such a major challenge to white missionary hegemony for, unless it was controlled, it had the potential for jeopardising the flow of funds from the African peasantry in the Eastern Cape and diverting it to alternative channels. Thus, the key question was to get back control over the African independent church leadership before it became sufficiently radicalised to threaten the white missions. "The education question . . . runs into the Ethiopian question", Stewart said in his

evidence to the South African Native Affairs Commission:

... and I am afraid the Ethiopian question runs into another question wider still. It is to prevent and check all this, to satisfy the native people and take away the excuses they have to go abroad for education that I would provide facilities and opportunities for their getting better education in this country ... We cannot now avoid this advance in education. If it is not given they will secure it themselves by -and-by. One of the efforts of the Ethiopian Church was to found a New South African College, and possibly this Bethel Institution is a shadow of that idea. They wanted a large sum of money and got only a small portion of it. If they had got all the money they wanted, and if they had not fallen out with Dwane, this new effort would have been existing today as the New South African College. 40

Stewart's arguments undoubtedly influenced the thinking of the Commission for interest by the British administration in the Transvaal under Milner had been growing in the whole African education question and the colony's Adviser on Education, E.B. Sargant, had been associated with the Commission as educational adviser.⁴¹ While visiting Lovedale himself in June of 1904, Sargant had been able to see for himself the significance of Lovedale as an educational institution, with assets valued at some £40,000, and its importance in the ideas of the educated African elite in the Eastern Cape. Even indeed the secessionist Mzimba manifested a high regard for it considering that higher education was the most important aspect of education for Africans and that this should be provided at Lovedale in a united South Africa.⁴² Consequently, Sargant strongly recommended Lovedale as the centre for a future African college in his report to Milner since its symbolic significance in African eyes as a living educational institution lent itself readily enough as a catalyst for educational unification in a united South Africa:

As the Bantu tribes receive different treatment at the hands of the various states and Christian churches in South Africa, there is, at present, great need for some adjustment of the views of these States and Churches with regard to the native. I do not believe that this can be done by conferences and commissions alone. What is wanted is the living energy of a single institution, in which the different opinions and modes of action of all governments and denominations can be brought together, costed and allowed to grow into a settled policy. 43

Further the strategic position of Lovedale in an area where many secessionist churches had grown up made it an important institution for neutralising the influence of their leaders; for "even if they have lost their affection for their old school (a thing which is by no means certain), it still bulks largely in their eyes".⁴⁴

In the years after 1905, therefore, the importance of Lovedale and the missionary tradition that motivated it, was impressed on the thinking of leaders from the northern states and the Witwatersrand. To educational specialists like Sargant, the commitment of Lovedale to an industrial training ideology on lines similar to the Tuskegee and Hamilton Institutes in the United States gave it a potential for significant development into a higher educational institution for a semi-skilled African petty bourgeoisie. Stewart, too, had long been defending the record of missions in the Cape against continuous attacks that mission education for Africans was too bookish and was threatening the jobs of white artisans and in 1903 he complained of the inadequacy of grants from the Cape Government for the development of industrial training in the missions in order to train Africans in fields like carpentry, waggon making, printing, book-binding, post office and telegraph work.⁴⁵ The whole ethos of Stewart's approach to African education reflected the racialisation in thinking regarding both African and negro education that was prevalent in both South Africa and the American South by the early years of the twentieth century:

The mind of the African is empty, and he has a great idea of what he calls "getting knowledge", hence his anxiety about instruction merely apart from mental discipline and habit. To this must be added little liking for manual labour, though that dislike is not peculiar to his colour in certain latitudes. He is not, however, so unwilling to work as is generally stated. But there is the erroneous idea that manual work is servile toil, and mental work is supposed to elevate a man to a higher class. This is the odd native idea of social rank. 46

At the same time, the more immediate reasons for this segregationist view of education, with Africans being directed as far as possible into manual as opposed to intellectual fields of instruction, related to Stewart's perception of the potential

threat to missionary hegemony from the growing educated African elite centred around the separatist churches. To enforce a racial separation in education with Africans being confined to industrial training was a means to reinstate internal social control inside the missions and thus neutralise the threat from mission-educated African leaders. A visit to Tuskegee in 1904 confirmed Stewart's beliefs in the value of the industrial training model developed by Booker T. Washington since, as in the case of Elijah Makiwane and the Native Educational Association founded in the Cape in the 1870s, it strengthened the values of conservative Cape liberalism in the African educational and political elite.⁴⁷ Instead, therefore, of seeking immediate political goals under the ideology of Ethiopian church separatism, Stewart saw the Tuskegee model instilling the Victorian values of hard work, educational progress and long term economic advancement:

As Mackay of Uganda used to say, the African would need the Anglo-Saxon alongside of him for the next 50 or 100 years. The pity is that it is just this help that the Native seems bent on throwing off at present. Although I have spent a lifetime in helping them, I am not blind to these defects or faults. Their imitative power is considerable, their spontaneousness not very great, and their administrative power a very great deal less than they take it to be. This seems the general rule, whatever rare exceptions may be found.

Did you not find that they exhibited administrative abilities in America? Booker Washington's father is believed to have been a white man, and the bulk of his staff are not what we would call Natives. There are some very able men there, from architects to agriculturalists, and I was greatly struck by their loyalty to their work and to their leader personally. They have been also largely helped from the North. Mr. Washington spends often about a third of the year in the North. Mr. Carnegie gave him 600,000 dollars or £120,000 in one subscription towards his endowment fund. I spent several days going through the place, and found that where we had not a single steam engine at Lovedale, they had thirteen steam engines at Tuskegee, the largest being 60 horse power ... The work is very thorough and the teaching good, because the staff is large and everything is well organised. But there is no comparison between the two countries. The negro in Alabama has grown up under two totally different conditions, and has the English language, and he enters his work at Tuskegee under quite different conditions from what the Native from the kraal enters the institutions here, whatever the institution may be ...

... At Lovedale we attach quite as much importance to work as they do at Tuskegee, only this may be said: we have to give so much instruction now according to the present curriculum and Department regulations that we have no time for education, which is a different process altogether. 48

Stewart's statement was an admittance both of the importance of the more organised and professional system of negro education in America, aided as it was by large financial donations from industrialists like Carnegie, and the inadequacy of the old Cape mission style of education still prevailing at Lovedale which allowed for "instruction" but not for "education". Stewart's frank admiration for the technical success of Tuskegee indicated that Cape missions needed to buttress their educational facilities with greater equipment and more finance if they were going to succeed in maintaining their ideological hegemony over the African educated elite which by this time was equally being impressed by the American negro example.⁴⁹ It was thus both the recognition by Stewart of the inadequacy of the existing pattern of control inside the Cape missions and the realisation by Sargant, Milner and the Transvaal administration of the growing need for a more national system of African higher education in a united South Africa that led the South African Native Affairs Commission in 1905 to recommend the establishment of an African college of higher education.⁵⁰

The dominant pressure, however, to establish the college over the following decade 1905-1915 came from within the Cape itself, as the previous mission-state alliance forged at the turn of the century in response to the rise of Ethiopianism was strengthened. Undoubtedly, a strong fillip to this was provided in 1905 by a further development in the breach between Lovedale and the secessionist church of P. J. Mzimba. In England the House of Lords made a controversial judgment at the end of 1904 awarding the Free Church of Scotland (the "WeeFrees") control over the property of the United Free Church of Scotland, which was the mission controlling Lovedale. As a result of this decision, Mzimba's church, which claimed in 1902 some 6,500 members and a further 20,000 adherents compared to the United Free Church's 16,044 members in South Africa and a further 8,182 adherents,⁵¹ laid claim to the property and assets of

the Lovedale mission. The effect of this was for a period to drive Dr. Stewart further in the direction of Sargant and the Transvaal administration as he sought external political influence to resist Mzimba's move,⁵² while the Cape government itself strengthened its resolve both to back Lovedale under Stewart and to support the idea of making the mission the nucleus of an African college of higher education as a means to strengthen resistance to Mzimba's claim. Stewart, the Cape Prime Minister Jameson minuted in 1905, had "won the unresolved confidence of the Government" while Mzimba's movement was viewed with apprehension, the Government feeling that "should he secure a voice in the management of Lovedale and the subsidiary establishment of Blythswood, not only would the usefulness of these Institutions be gravely impaired, but having in regard the separatist views now so rife in the minds of a section of the Native people, the change might have a far reaching and harmful political tendency".⁵³

The Cape government, therefore, was strongly in favour of moves to initiate a campaign to mobilise support amongst sections of the African intelligentsia in both the Eastern Cape and elsewhere behind the African college scheme, since this was also a means to clamp down on any further spreading of Church separatism under Mzimba's control.⁵⁴ The proposal was originally mooted in September of 1905 by the Education Board of the Cape⁵⁵ and, following the gathering of African chiefs and leaders at Lovedale in December to support the scheme, the campaign was further pushed by Sargant in the period of political vacuum left at Lovedale by Stewart's death the same month. With the possibility of resistance to the scheme growing from other Cape missions who feared a loss of students to the new college, Sargant saw the mobilisation of African opinion as a crucial buttress to the scheme's political effectiveness. "I regard the natives as our first 'battle' ", he wrote to Hobart Houghton in February of 1906, "but we must order our remaining forces so as to be in touch with the van. The advance should be made no^r pari passu but in co-ordination. At present the Cape Colony Government is well to the front, the natives close in support, the churches next and the Institutions in the rear."⁵⁶ Sargant's fears regarding the "Institutions" were mainly directed at the Reverend R.H. Dyke, Principal of the Morija Institution in

Lesotho, who had suggested Queenstown as an alternative to Lovedale as the centre for the college, but the holding of a meeting of the major chiefs in Lesotho to back the Lovedale option the same month was a successful case of using African political opinion to block such missionary resistance.⁵⁷

This growing alliance between the original Lovedale supporters of the African college proposal and the African educational and political elite was further cemented when the Reverend James Henderson became the successor to Stewart as Principal of Lovedale in 1906. With the support of the now United Free Church of Scotland, Henderson was able to claim land adjacent to the Lovedale mission at Fort Hare as the site of the college and contacts were forged with the surrounding white commercial interests when an executive committee was formed to oversee the development under the treasurership of J.W. Weir, a prominent King Williamstown businessman. Weir, as a representative in the Eastern Cape of what Stanley Trapido has termed "the little tradition" of Cape liberalism based on the class alliance at the local level between white commercial capital and the African peasantry, especially the Mfengu,⁵⁸ was in a strong position to raise African interest in the scheme. Weir sought to convince the leaders of the African intelligentsia in the Eastern Cape led by figures like Walter Rubusana, John Tengo Jabavu and Elijah Makiwane that the importance of an institution of higher education in South Africa was that they would not have to send their sons abroad for further education beyond the mission level. John Tengo Jabavu, for instance, had to send his son Davidson Don Tengo to England for further education even as late as 1914 since the Fort Hare scheme was not yet established, and for Weir this was undoubtedly an important basis for forging an alliance that could override any remaining missionary opposition to the Fort Hare proposal since it could lay claim to obvious "practical" advantages.⁵⁹

Over the following two years a series of meetings in the African reserves and locations to mobilise support had the effect of consolidating the traditional Cape liberal class alliance at the local level at a time when, at the colonial level in the Cape, liberalism was under attack. This can be seen as having important long term consequences since it meant that Fort Hare became the nucleus in the Eastern Cape for the

survival of Cape liberalism long after the establishment of Union and for its becoming one of the key bases behind the South African "liberal establishment". Much of the African support that was mobilised, for example, over-rode previous divisions that had grown up as a result of the implementation of the Glen Grey Act in the Eastern Cape after 1894. When a meeting was called at Idutywa on the 26th April 1906 to gain local support for the scheme, Enoch Mamba — the founder of the Vigilance Association in the Transkei that had protested against the exclusion of educated and "school" people from the Glen Grey Councils — was co-opted onto the local committee to supervise African support for Fort Hare along with Chief Dinizulu Sigidi, whose father had been instrumental in preventing the outbreak of "passive resistance" to the labour tax clause in the Glen Grey Act.⁶⁰ At the same time, Weir sought, along with his coterie of African supporters led by John Tengo Jabavu and Imvo, to keep open contacts with the Cape Government to ensure the scheme's success⁶¹ and to use the Transkeian Territories General Council as one of the main bases for African fund raising. Such a wide alliance, involving the Cape government, Eastern Cape mercantile interests, the Scottish mission at Lovedale, the African peasantry in the Ciskei led by Jabavu and the Transkeian General Council was certainly an ambitious idea, though in 1906 it still seemed feasible when a leading Cape politician like Merriman could propose a scheme of £50,000 for the college on a half and half basis — the Africans providing £25,000 and the Government and missions the rest.⁶² However, in the period up to Union in 1910, it became clear that fissures were developing as the Cape Government came under increasing segregationist pressure. The Superintendent of Education in the Cape, Dr. Muir, remained an inveterate opponent of the whole scheme and, despite Weir's initial success in raising funds, (which in 1907 amounted to some £4 to 5,000 of a promised £38,500 including £10,000 from the Transkeian General Council)⁶³ it began to become clear that support from the Cape Government was waning. In August 1907, the executive board under Weir supervising the scheme decided, after its campaign to involve African interest, to desist from further activity pending further national political decisions⁶⁴ while in 1908 it decided on no further approaches to the Cape Government for financial support due

to the economic depression which might, as Henderson gloomily wrote to Sargent, "prejudice the application for a larger measure of assistance later on".⁶⁵ In such circumstances, the position of the college began to look desperate as African interest in it declined and the credibility of white missionary and governmental financial support for it fell into doubt. "Our efforts have been in great measure rendered futile for lack of organization recognised by Government" stated an unnamed petition from African fund-raisers about this time:

... the belief being widespread among our people that the Government is unsympathetic towards the scheme, and that efforts to raise money for it would be looked upon with disfavour by the authorities. Our aim is to raise £25,000 from among ourselves and we have reason to hope that, if we succeed in this a similar sum will be forthcoming from European sources. ⁶⁶

With such uncertainty, the organisers of the fund raising decided on a more coordinated effort to raise support outside the Cape from mining and philanthropic sources in the Transvaal. Some tentative support had been forthcoming from these quarters in 1905, but the initial optimism in a completely Cape organised scheme backed up by the Government in Cape Town put off further contacts until 1908. Now, however, in a period when unification of the South African states was becoming the main point on the political agenda, the Fort Hare organisers sent one of their number, Neil MacVicar, on a tour of Cape Town, Bloemfontein, Johannesburg and Pretoria. MacVicar reported extensive interest from mining, philanthropic and educational sources in the Transvaal as men like Howard Pim, a leading Quaker philanthropist in the Transvaal, Lionel Phillips, the mining magnate, and G.M. Hofmeyr, chairman of the School Board, expressed support for the scheme. Further support came from the Transvaal Native Affairs Society and the Transvaal Missionary Society while the Secretary of the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association suggested providing bursaries for the college. Support from the Transvaal Government at this time, however, was only tentative with General Botha being "too busy" to see MacVicar and Smuts offering support only with the unification of South Africa out of the way first.⁶⁷

Thus, from 1908 onwards the original Cape organisers of the Fort Hare scheme began to look increasingly towards the Witwatersrand and mining interests as possible

future supporters of it and this tendency increased as Union was finally accomplished in 1910.⁶⁸

As economic depression and agricultural decline continued in the African reserves, it began to become clear that African financial support would remain limited: apart from the £8,000 contributed from the Transkeian General Council, for instance, contributions from Africans remained tiny and only £300 of a promised £1,750 had been collected by 1910.⁶⁹ Some efforts were made by the executive board of the African college to sustain African interest by seeking the appointment of an agricultural instructor since the farm manager at Lovedale could not conduct all the necessary classes in agriculture. Such an appointment, James Henderson felt, would be crucial for the future of the college scheme since it would "give it a definite practical turn upon which its usefulness in the future so much depends".⁷⁰ The Transkeian General Council duly complied by contributing towards the cost of an agriculturalist attached to Lovedale but connected to the College Department of the future "Inter State Native College".⁷¹ This development was important in a number of respects: it reflected the process of growing class differentiation in the reserves as growing numbers of African peasants were forced out as labour migrants while a smaller class of wealthier African peasant farmers sought to expand the scale and nature of their holdings and modernise their farming techniques.⁷² Furthermore, it reflected, too, the increasing perception in dominant white political and economic circles of the African reserves as labour reservoirs, with the economic base of African subsistence agriculture acting as a structural underpinning to the employment by the mining industry of extra cheap African labour power:⁷³ much of the debate on this revolved around the development of the concept of territorial segregation in the Rand before Union which we discuss in the next chapter.

The educational function of the African college began, therefore, to change in the eyes of its organisers by the time of Union and some of the more ambitious liberal aims expressed by James Weir in 1905-1907 became tempered by a growing realisation that increasing compromises would need to be made if the College was ever to get off the ground. Much of the original government contribution of £25,000 was clearly not going to be forthcoming and in 1912 the assets of the college amounted to a mere

£10,613, of which £8,000 came from the Transkeian General Council and a further £1,000 from De Beers. Only £6,050 of this represented liquid assets in the bank and only £600 was promised from the Union Minister of Education, F.S. Malan, when the college board decided to open the college in 1915.⁷⁴ With such a dilution of aims, it was clear that the college would only start off by being little more than a mere agricultural extension to the existing college at Lovedale, especially as the basis of the site donated by the United Free Church of Scotland consisted of farm land that could be used for the fostering of agricultural education and scientific farming. At the same time, the ethos of the college had clearly changed from before Union as the executive board supervising the college scheme became transformed into the Governing Council of Fort Hare under the chairmanship of James Henderson. The original alliance with African political leadership in the Eastern Cape centred around John Tengo Jabavu's Imvo Zabantsundu became weakened as African thinking became increasingly politicised in the wake of the 1913 Natives Land Act (which Jabavu originally supported) and resentment arose at what was seen as the perpetuation of an old fashioned missionary paternalism in the Governing Council's conduct of the college's affairs. "The College is the only institution of its kind the Natives have", Jabavu wrote despondently to Alexander Kerr, the new Principal of Fort Hare:

both from the fact that it is undenominational and that they have been given a say in its management. For long we have noticed things in the management of the missionary institutions which we could not understand or been able (sic) to account for. But having no say in them we have resolved to bear and forbear. And now in respect of this college we have insisted on having a say in its conduct, and the bitterness of the discussions is due, I presume, to the impact of old missionary methods in the management of their institutions and ourselves who have discussed these matters outside their Boards and formed our own conclusions. 75

Such bad feeling within the African educational elite in the Eastern Cape was only partially alleviated by the appointment in 1915 of Jabavu's son Davidson Don Tengo as lecturer at Fort Hare, for the paternalism endemic to the institution continued to breed continuing African hostility and charges of racial discrimination.⁷⁶ But the

structure of Fort Hare itself reflected substantially its changing function as a key means for the dissemination of improved agricultural methods as a means of maintaining the subsistence basis of the African reserves while larger numbers of African migrants went out to work in the white controlled cities and farms. James Henderson, indeed, acted as one of the key spokesmen in the Eastern Cape for this brand of conservative liberalism, rooting many of his ideas on developing African peasant agriculture with his previous acquaintance with crofting in the Scottish Highlands.⁷⁷ His elaboration of this theme at the Johannesburg Y.M. C.A. in 1918 after arrangements with Howard Pim and the Society of Friends indicated the continuing trend in missionary thinking in the Eastern Cape centred around Lovedale and Fort Hare and their desire to strengthen ties with northern philanthropic interests on the Witwatersrand.⁷⁸ It was thus not altogether surprising that, in the wake of the post war African strike wave, that students at Lovedale went on strike in 1920, initiating a tradition of African resistance to white missionary and liberal control that has continued up to the present.⁷⁹

The pattern of Cape liberalism after Union:

Despite, however, the emasculation of many of the original aims behind the African university college at Fort Hare as Ethiopianism itself declined as a key factor shaping African political consciousness after Union, the existence of the college reflected an important continuation of the Cape liberal tradition. Fort Hare became a vital input into the widening of South African liberalism in the inter-war years and it served as an important example of missionary-state collaboration in the evolution of newer structures of social control. The institution itself became the centre for important liberal conferences such as the one in 1930 attended by Edgar Brookes and Alfred Xuma⁸⁰ and it became in turn an object of growing Afrikaner nationalist political hostility. Describing Fort Hare as "the mecca of the native", Die Basuin in 1930 presaged much of the later organic and cultural idealist concepts of African society and education in Afrikaner nationalist circles in the 1940s and 1950s by describing it as

managed and guided by a nation with an exotic culture, an anti Afrikaans culture that slowly but surely detribalizes the educated Native and makes him feel a stranger among members of his race. What a pity that the Native is crammed with everything that is alien in order to despise his race consciousness and race character! What a pity that a genuine Bantu atmosphere is not created there, an atmosphere in which the Native can develop on his own merits and can perpetuate a national pride! . . . Why tolerate the wrong to the Native any longer, a wrong that the more alienates the Native from the Afrikaner nation? 81

Before however the Report of the Native Educational Commission in 1953 leading eventually to state expropriation of Fort Hare, the college acted as a basis to liberal resistance to continuing state centralisation of social control in the sphere of education. Under the umbrella of an ideology of social meliorism and gradual assimilationism, the liberal educational establishment at Fort Hare fought for the progressive development of African educational facilities and sought to resist as far as possible the implementation of a rigid system of territorial segregation by the industrialising South African state. Contrary, indeed, to the revisionist thesis of the complete collaboration of the South African liberal establishment with the prevailing policy of segregation before 1948, we must conclude that Fort Hare was an important brake on it and that, as the next chapter discusses, even the original formulation of territorial segregation on the Witwatersrand before Union was tempered by the ability of more flexible segregationists to appeal to the decentralised forms of social control in the reserves. The capacity of missionary institutions to modernise themselves with growing South African industrialisation represented an important check on the more headstrong social engineers on the Rand advancing the case for increasing state centralisation of social control, especially in the sphere of education. As a consequence, white liberals continued to find in the Fort Hare model of African higher education involving both white commercial interests and the African petty bourgeoisie an important mechanism for extending their political influence at the local level. Even though, for instance, liberal influences became increasingly nullified at the centre of South African politics after the 1922 Rand Strike and the 1923 Natives Urban Areas Act,⁸² compensations could often be found back in local politics. In Natal,

particularly, the Ohlange Institute of John Dube was seen as another institution of African higher education which could be developed on Fort Hare lines, with the funds this time coming from the Rhodes Trust.⁸³ Similarly, in the case of Adams College in Natal, a cooptation of local African leaders began under the Principalship of Edgar Brookes after 1934, when the controlling American Board of Missions agreed to include African members on the board of governors.⁸⁴ The successful establishment of Fort Hare in 1915 represented an important means, in fact, for the reconsolidation of white liberalism and it served as a key institutional base for the fostering of a South African liberal establishment in the inter-war years and into the late 1940s before the advent of the Afrikaner nationalist reaction.

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11. Josephus Roosevelt Coan, "The Expansion of Missions of the African Methodist Episcopal Church in South Africa, 1896-1908", Ph.D. Thesis, The Hartford Seminary Foundation, 1961, p.110; B.G.M. Sundkler, Bantu Prophets in South Africa, Oxford University Press, 1971, p.41. For a rather inadequate life of Turner, see M.M. Ponto, The Life and Times of Henry M. Turner, Georgia, 1917.
12. T. Ranger, "African Attitudes to the control of education in East Africa", Past and Present, No. 32, 1965, pp.62-67; Margaret Read, "The Ngoni and Western Education" in Victor Turner (ed), Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960, Cambridge, C.U.P., 1971, pp.436-392.

13. CA NA 297/1/A851/1902 file on Sishuba's claim for church site in the location of Headman Mehlomakulu.
14. CA NA 497/341/1902 RM Lusikisiki to The Chief Mag. Pondoland, August 17, 1902; H. Sprigg, R.M. Bizana to The Chief Mag. T.T., 10 September 1902; 497/1/370/A96 W.E. Stanford, Chief Mag. T.T. to SNA 22 October 1902.
15. Though, as in the case of the alleged split between Sishuba's followers in Herschel and those of Headman Mehlomakulu there was often the outside manipulation by missionary interest, in this case the Wesleyans represented by Reverend James Letcher. CA NA 297/1/A851/1902 J. Letcher to Headman Mehlomakulu June 3 1902. While the Resident Magistrate strongly backed up this claim by the "old recognised Churches" who "deserve consideration from the start". 497/A96/02 R.A. Herschel to SNA 4 October 1902. The Wesleyans played a strong role in the Cape in emphasising the cultural differences between "Red" and "School" people. See R. Hunt Davies, "School vs Blanket and Settler: Elijah Makiwane and the leadership of the Cape School Community", African Affairs, 78, No. 310, January 1979, pp.12-31.
16. Coan, op. cit., p.212.
17. South African Native Affairs Commission, 1903-5, minutes of evidence, ev. Bishop L. J. Coppin; Coan estimates that 14 African students were enrolled at American colleges under A.M.E. auspices. These colleges were the A.M.E.'s own university Wilberforce in Ohio, Hand University, Morris Brown College and Mahary Medical School. Coan, op. cit., p.147.
18. CA NA 496/A6/803/1901 J. Stewart to Col. Hutchinson, 10 September 1901.
19. Coan, op. cit., p.410.
20. Sundkler, op. cit., pp.42-43; Brock, op. cit., pp.383-4; James Wells, The Life of James Stewart, London, 1908, p.295. Mzimba's church expanded rapidly beyond the Cape and Brock has seen the church as "in embryo, a national political movement with tremendous potential", p.388.
21. Stewart Papers 30 B(ii) 3 R.W. Rose-Innes to Stewart, 16 February 1899.
22. See chapter one, p.52.
23. R.W. Rose-Innes to Stewart, 17 February 1899, enc. letter from S.S. Hutton to Innes dated 14 February 1899.
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25. CA NA 497/A96/929/01 Memorandum by W.G. Cummings, Actg. SNA 29 November 1901; pamphlet by A.M.E. Church n.d. quoting letter from Noel Janitsch, Under C.S., to Bishop L.J. Coppin 16 March 1901 entitled Causes of Recognition. See also Sundkler, op. cit., pp.42, 46.
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29. This development in social control over separatist churches like the A.M.E. with the active collaboration of its leaders like Coppin and later Charles Smith refutes the contention that all black Americans became synonymous "with Ethiopianism and violence" and that "even conservative black missionaries from the United States (were viewed) as threats to white rule", Thomas J. Nuer, Briton, Boer and Yankee: The United States and Southern Africa, 1870-1914, Kent State University Press, 1978, p.123.
30. CA NA 297/A851/1902 I.G. Sishuba to The Deputy and Admin. Officer, Herschel, May 1 1902; W.G. Cummings Schedule A851 20 August 1902 refused the application. 497/4/950/02 L.J. Coppin to SNA Sept 18 1904 commented on the case that "no acts of subordination to the government by any of our missionaries will go unpunished and the A.M.E. Church will not under any circumstances sanction such". Herschel district was marked by a periodic bout of droughts and class differentiation was well advanced by the turn of the century and it is probable that Sishuba's secessionists represented the increasingly poorer class of peasants, see Bundy, The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry, pp.154-57.
31. CA NA 497/301/A96 Bishop Chas S. Smith to SNA July 11 1905; Bishop Chas S. Smith to Stanford July 22 1905; for Dwane see SANAC, minutes Vol IV, p.521.
32. South African Native Affairs Commission, Report, 1903-1905, p.64, para. 321.
33. Prester John was originally published by Thomas Nelson in a cheap edition that secured a wide circulation. See John Buchan by his wife and friends, London, 1947, p.136.
34. SNA 82/464/08 Louis Botha, minute no. 266, 27 April 1908.
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- important impact on liberal thinking in South Africa between the wars. Loram favoured recognition by 1925 on the same basis as the Cape had in the early years of the century, namely that the churches were too divisive to represent any united political movement, C.T. Lorman, "The Separatist Church Movement", International Review of Missions, July 1926.
36. CA NA 497/1/370/A96 W.E. Stanford, Chief Mag., T.T., to SNA 23 October 1902; see also 497/341/02 H. Sprigg R.M. Bizana to The Chief Mag. T.T., 10 Sept 1902.
 37. The Christian Express, January 1 1900.
 38. CA NA 497/A96/98 J.X. Merriman, minute dated 14 December 1898.
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 40. SANAC, minutes Vo. II, p.905, para. 44945.
 41. D.E. Burchell, "African Higher Education and the establishment of the South African Native College, Fort Hare", South African Historical Journal, Vol. 8, November 1976, p.72.
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 43. ibid., p.4.
 44. ibid., p.5.
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53. Stewart Papers, D65/48 27 (c) L.S. Jameson, minute signed 30 November 1905.
54. D 65 27 A (iii) W.E. Stanford to Stewart 10 October 1905.
55. Alex. Kerr Pap. Neil MacVicar to Hunter 17 September 1905.
56. ibid., 13179 Sargant to Houghton February 3 1906.
57. ibid., Sargant to Houghton February 3 and 27 1906.
58. Trapido, op. cit.
59. Alexander Kerr Pap. 13165 Stewart to Sargant 14 March 1905 describes Weir as "a successful businessman, the son of a missionary and one who knows the native thoroughly". Weir was to help in getting the Africans to contribute at least £20,000 towards the college since this "would interest the natives and probably attract them to the work more and more as the years went on, with the belief that the college was so far the result of their own efforts". By September of 1905 Weir was hoping to involve John Tengo Jabavu and the African petty bourgeoisie in Kingwilliams Town in establishing a committee "consisting of prominent natives in all the S.A. states", Stewart Pap. D65/48 27 A (iii) Neil MacVicar to Stewart 24 September 1905 while Weir himself considered the scheme had good chances of success with the backing of Lord Selborne ibid., Weir to Stewart 11 November 1905. Weir's efforts, too, were assisted by Walter Stanford as he travelled round South Africa in 1905 with the South African Native Affairs Commission, A. Kerr Pap. 13215 W. Stanford to Weir 18 September 1906.
60. A. Kerr Pap. 13572, reports of meeting held at Idutywa 24 April 1906. See also chapter one, p. . Most of the districts in the Cape accepted the college scheme except for Victoria East, the centre of Mzimba's separatist movement, 13559 K.A. Hobart Houghton, Report on African Efforts to further the Inter-State Native College Scheme. Mzimba had the support of almost all the headmen in the district, NA 754/243, C.C. Victoria East to SNA 11 March 1907.
61. D65/48 27A (iii) Weir to Stewart 11 November 1905.
62. J. Rose-Innes Corr. 453 J.X. Merriman to J. Rose-Innes 11 April 1906.
63. A. Kerr Pap. 13549 J. Weir to Marshall Campbell 11 September 1907. Muir opposed the scheme since he was against any common action by the four colonies in South Africa, 13179 Sargant to Houghton February 3 1906.

64. ibid., 13218 Hobart Houghton to Col. Stanford August 14 1907.
65. ibid., 13189 J. Henderson to E.P. Sargant 27 July 1908; 13193 Henderson to Col. Crewe 17 June 1908; Imvo Zabantsundu June 30 1908. At the same time, though, it was also recognised that continued political links with leading Cape liberals in the government were essential 13221 J. Henderson to J.G. Weir 16 June 1908.
66. ibid., 13485 Unsigned petition to Senator Sir Frederick Moor and others, n.d.
67. ibid., 13203 Neil MacVicar to J. Henderson 3 April 1908.
68. In 1909 the Cape Government made a grant towards the establishment of a college department at Lovedale as part of the general progress towards the establishment of a separate African college of higher education. However, following a deputation to the Minister of Education, F.S. Malan, in September 1910, the executive board looked to the Union Government. A. Kerr Pap., 13571, J. Henderson, Memorandum on the Proposed Native College for South Africa, 23 December 1910.
69. A. Kerr Pap., Inter-State Native College, Deputation to the Hon. the Minister for Education, 29 September 1910.
70. ibid., 13227 J. Henderson to A.H.B. Stanford 16 March 1910; 13328 to The Sec., Transkeian Gen. Council 9 April 1910. In his memorandum in December 1910 Henderson laid out the implicitly segregationist ethos of the future college's educational system:

Since the proposed College must pay special regard to measures for the economic development of the resources secured to the Native peoples within their own territories and locations, through industrial training, and effectively adapt itself to that phase of progressive civilization through which their communities are at present passing, providing an education in keeping with their existing educational, moral and social environment, it appears hopeless to attempt it within the bounds of any system at present in use for the European colleges." (p.6)
71. ibid., 13227 J. Henderson to The Chief Mag., Umtata, 16 March 1911; 13230 J. Henderson to The Sec., Transkeian General Council 5 April 1911. One third of the Lovedale students wished to study the agricultural course at Lovedale, which was only being taken by 17 students due to the scarcity of funds. Students even came to offer themselves for apprenticeships in agriculture "for the first time in the history of the institution".
72. Bundy, op. cit.

73. For the development of these perceptions see the next chapter.
74. Burchell, op. cit., p.83. The contribution from De Beers was organised via the wealthy Cape philanthropist Frederick Philipson-Stow, who promised £5,000 himself before his death, A. Kerr 13545 F. Philipson-Stow to Houghton 16 August 1907.
75. A. Kerr Pap. John Tengo Jabavu to A. Kerr 20 November 1915. By 1921 Jabavu actively supported Kerr after his initial successes in raising further funds for the college, Imvo November 15 1921.
76. This missionary paternalism was still seen as endemic to Fort Hare on Alexander Kerr's retirement in 1948, E. Lynn Gragg, Fort Hare and other memories, unpub. mss., U.C.T., 1973, p.27; see also Baruch Hirson, Year of Fire: Year of Ash, London, Zed Publications, 1979, p.22.
77. See chapter seven.
78. Howard Pim Papers J. Henderson to Pim 1 March 1919; Address at Johannesburg Y.M.C.A., 19 April 1919; J. Henderson to Pim 21 August and 1 September 1919. Henderson was hoping to develop at Lovedale a separate Native Training Institute by the end of the first world war which would in effect complement the work at Fort Hare. Henderson Papers MS 14651 Henderson to Pim 6 August 1918.
79. Hirson, op. cit.; The Christian Express June 1 1920.
80. See chapter six, p.210.
81. Die Basuin September 1930. This was the general missionary journal of the Dutch Reformed Church in South Africa and was edited by the Rev. J.G. Stydom. See also Edgar Brookes, A South African Pilgrimage, Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1977, pp.45-46.
82. See chapter five.
83. MSS Brit Emp. S22 G191 File on the Ohlange Institute. See esp. Howard Pim to J. Harris 31 January 1922; A. Kerr Pap. R.T. Bokwe to Kerr 6 March 1925.
84. Brookes, op. cit., p.62.

Chapter Three

The debate on segregation

The previous two chapters have sought to show the internal dynamics behind the transformation in liberalism at the Cape at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. External factors played a part in this process — the rise of social imperialism after Britain's entry into Egypt in 1882, the development of social darwinism and jingoism onto a mass basis, the movement in church separatism and the American negro connection — but, as we have shown in the case of both the Glen Grey Act and the extension of African higher education, a large part of the initiative in this transformation came from within the Cape itself. By the time of Union, the Cape evolved a defensive and conservative liberalism that survived into the inter-war period as part of a wider South African liberalism on a national scale.

Why this tenacity in Cape liberalism and why its ideological importance when so much of South African historiography has tended to play down its influence in comparison to movements in favour of territorial segregation? The answer in many respects related to the complex and sophisticated relationship forged between the Cape, rooted in a fairly long tradition of administrative consolidation since the 1870s and 1880s¹ and the Transvaal, where by the time of the start of the British administration under Lord Milner at the close of the Anglo-Boer War in 1902 there was still only a shaky and ill-coordinated pattern of government and "native policy". Though British imperial interests in South Africa between 1902 and 1910 were centred around the Transvaal and the Witwatersrand, this chapter will argue that the debate on the nature and form the future governmental structure in South Africa should take was heavily influenced by the Cape precedent. In turn, much of the character and ideological make-up of governmental legitimation in the period after Union was still dictated by the previous Cape legacy and it was not by any means fortuitous that when Afrikaner nationalism began to emerge onto a mass basis in the late 1930s the ideology accompanying

it should be a specifically anti-liberal and organic theory that sought to depart from the whole ethos of post-Union government.²

This longer-run importance of Cape liberalism in shaping governmental policy in South Africa after Union has tended to be ignored by historians who have dwelt either on the immediate political defeats suffered by Cape liberals at the time, particularly in the failure to extend the common franchise northwards³ or else on the contribution of the Natal system of segregation evolved in the nineteenth under Theophilus Shepstone.⁴ When the contribution of liberalism as a political ideology has come to be considered in post-Union South Africa, it has been assessed either in terms of a narrow party political model, making liberalism an extremely ephemeral phenomenon that only achieved its fullest expression during the period of the Liberal Party between 1953 and 1968,⁵ or else, as in the more recent revisionist critique of Legassick, a broadly defined "liberalism" that superseded the nineteenth century Cape liberal tradition and which rationalised the segregationist ideology of the emerging South African state.⁶

The South African liberalism that began to emerge after 1910 was, in fact, a less precise phenomenon than this. It was an eclectic ideology that was interpreted in differing ways to suit differing class and group interests and, pace the revisionist argument equating liberalism as an important contributory strand behind segregationism, it was frequently more the case of the state selectively making use of liberal political expertise than the other way round. For what is striking about the South African debate over the nature and form "native policy" should take is its imbalanced and disjointed nature. On the one hand, there was a state coming into existence as a British dominion on the periphery of the world capitalist system as it then functioned before the second world war; a state that was heavily dominated by the interests of gold and diamond mining and its links with international finance capital.⁷ On the other hand, a state that was centred on the Transvaal where African chiefdoms had only been finally subjugated as recently as 1898, a year before the Anglo-Boer War, and where administrative expertise was signally lacking and governmental structures had to be built up more or less from the ground.⁸ On the one hand, a state where most of the wealth

and managerial expertise was centred around the Transvaal, but on the other hand, where most of the best in educational traditions, native administration, and a nascent white intelligentsia was centred around the Cape.

To resolve these imbalances was not easy. Even the small number of Oxford men that Milner brought out to reshape the administration in the Transvaal after the war became known pejoratively as the "Milner kindergarten", and it was unlikely that Britain could on any long-term basis restructure South African administration completely as she would have liked in order to incorporate it as a fully mature dominion in the emerging Commonwealth of English-speaking nations. Even in the period before Responsible Government in Transvaal in 1906, the main aim of Milnerism in the Transvaal had been more a cautious attempt at restoring the old system of government of the Boer Republics, but under different political direction, than the massive attempt at social engineering it has often been taken to be.⁹ However the victory of Het Volk under Botha and Smuts put paid even to this and the creation of Union in 1910 was more the result of a successful exercise in careful political manipulation by Britain to create a new alliance of English mining capital and Boer collaborationists than the fulfilment of a Liberal "Magnanimous gesture".¹⁰ It is thus an historical fallacy to conceive of Milnerism as the intrusion of some new form of liberalism into South African politics and then, by means of argument by association, to link this to the emergence of territorial segregation by the time of the 1913 Natives Land Act.¹¹ In its ideological formulation, Milnerism under the influence of its mentor owed more to Bismarckian state centralisation and to socialist theory than it did to the main thrust of nineteenth century Victorian liberalism. "Where the Liberal saw politics as essentially a second-order, arbitral function", Eric Stokes has written, "Milner shared the Germanic conviction in the creative role of political power".¹² This worshipping of state power in turn cut it off even from the developments in liberal hegelianism in late nineteenth century England where thinkers like T.H. Green and Bosanquet saw the positive use of governmental power more to fulfil ethical ends and idealist notions of "the good" than they did to fulfil the ambitions of inter-state politics extended onto an imperial plane.¹³ But furthermore, the application of Milnerism in practice in

South Africa led, via the Boer War and Campbell-Bannerman's accusations of "methods of barbarism" in regard to Boer concentration camps, to the revival of liberalism in England in a specifically anti-Milnerite political direction. The victory of the Liberal Party over the Conservatives in the 1906 election represented an important resurgence of liberal thinking in England that began slowly to challenge many of the racial assumptions that had accompanied social imperialism since the 1880s. Even in its heyday, this social imperialism and the social darwinism that accompanied was probably not as widespread as it has often been taken to be,¹⁴ but certainly in the years after 1906 there began a movement amongst the English liberal intelligentsia to challenge the cruder forms of the Kiplingesque white man's burden and to advance a theme that, by the end of the first world war, would come to be known as internationalism. Originally, this liberalism looked more to Asia and to China than to Africa as a source of political change, but the longer-term challenge to the racial assumptions of imperialism were already present by, say, 1911 with the publication of L.T. Hobhouse's Liberalism:

Nothing has been more encouraging to the Liberalism of Western Europe in recent years than the signs of political awakening in the East. Until yesterday it seemed as though it would in the end be impossible to resist the ultimate "destiny" of the white races to be masters of the rest of the world. The result would have been that, however far democracy might develop within any Western State, it would always be confronted with a contrary principle in the relation of that state to dependencies, and this contradiction, as may easily be seen by the attentive student of our own domestic political constitutions, is a standing menace to domestic freedom. 15

This emergence of a newer and more democratically inclined liberalism in England in the years after 1906, frequently in alliance with the nascent Labour Party, must lead to a questioning of the ostensibly "liberal" context in which segregation was formulated before and after Union in South Africa in 1910.

The context of imperial debate:

Indeed, the ideological context in which the discussion on territorial segregation

was conducted within the white political elite in the Transvaal at the time of Union was less specifically a "liberal" one, but rather a product of the earlier defeat of Milnerism and an attempt to consolidate British imperial hegemony on a more decentralised basis. Even in its most classic form, the doctrines of Milner and his acolytes manifested a realisation that British imperial interests needed to be shaped by a strategic caution and a limitation on territorial aggrandisement.¹⁶ The share of Milner in escalating hostilities against the Transvaal Republic leading to the Anglo-Boer War in 1899 has tended to detract attention away from this more conservative political aim in stabilising British imperial influence in a fashion reminiscent almost of Metternich;¹⁷ and to base explanations for the eventual establishment of South African Union more in terms of party political accommodation in the wake of successive electoral defeats by Oranje Unie in The Orange River Colony, Het Volk in the Transvaal and the Bond in the Cape.¹⁸ While clearly these elections were significant in altering the perception by British imperial decision-makers and their allies in South Africa of the more fragile nature of British imperial hegemony, at the same time they only brought to the fore trends that had been going on in British imperial policy making since the end of the nineteenth century.

By the 1890s it was becoming increasingly obvious that British "splendid isolation" could not continue for ever with growing competition from Germany, Japan and the United States. With the growing armaments race with imperial Germany, the British political elite looked increasingly towards the consolidation of empire as a means to meet the growing German naval "threat". In India, the Viceroyalty of Lord Curzon between the years 1898 and 1905 marked the intrusion of this new imperial strategic thinking and the ethos of British rule began to shift from the mid-Victorian conception of direct rule and mission civilisatrice towards a pattern of government that became known by the 1920s as "indirect rule" and which worked, as Eric Stokes has pointed out, "indirectly and unobtrusively through indigenous institutions and ruling classes".¹⁹ This idea of defusing power onto a wider basis had been formative in the upbringing of Milner who had served under Lord Cromer in Egypt after the British colonisation of the country in 1882 and it had been largely conducted in spatial terms and the diffusion of

power on to Local bodies. It was now recognised that British imperial hegemony was becoming increasingly incompatible with a utilitarian free market economy, which had formed the basis behind mid-Victorian direct rule, since this meant the steady erosion of precisely these indigenous institutions and traditional ruling classes on which consolidation depended. With a growing monetisation of colonial economies and the creation of an important commercial sector, there was an increasing likelihood of political influence shifting towards a nascent nationalist petty bourgeoisie acting as commercial middlemen between peasant agriculture in the rural areas and the colonial economy in the towns and cities.

The locus of this imperial debate by the end of the nineteenth century was undoubtedly India, the jewel of the Empire, since here the growing class contradictions as a result of British rule became starkest and where a sophisticated administrative service was able to conceptualise and seek to act on the issues in a far more comprehensive manner than areas like the Cape Colony. Thinking, in particular, centred around the Punjab where the traditional prop of British rule, the class of large landowners known as Zamindars, was having its hold on land eroded by the emergence of an urban commercial petty bourgeoisie of moneylenders. Consequently the 1900 Punjab Alienation of Land Act sought to prevent this by prohibiting the Zamindars' right to sell or mortgage land except with the prior consent of the district officer. The Act, described by one historian as "the greatest single piece of social engineering ever attempted in India"²⁰ was undoubtedly important in signalling the end of the utilitarian conception of a free market in land and heralding a newer era of state intervention and manipulation of the land system in order to sustain British imperial hegemony. The basis of British imperialism became rooted now in the creation of communal village settlements as opposed to individual land holdings, hence excluding the Hindu commercial class. The 1900 Act was, however, directly instrumental in fomenting rioting in the Punjab in 1907 and growing nationalist agitation led by the urban petty bourgeoisie.²¹

For South Africa, these events in India did not go completely unnoticed since in some ways they resembled the loss of faith in the Cape in the Glen Grey system

of individual tenure by the start of the twentieth century and the bolstering of rural headmen. In the Transvaal they were of some influence on the thinking of one of the foremost segregationist writers in the period before Union, Howard Pim, who later became one of the leading liberal spokesmen in the 1920s. Pim's brother, Alan, who was later to write an influential report on the Protectorates in Southern Africa,²² was an administrator in the Punjab in the early years of the century and gave Pim a glowing account in 1905 of the workings of the 1900 Punjab Alienation of Land Act. "New rights of transfer should not be given to backward peoples", Alan Pim wrote, reflecting the wide prevalence of social darwinist thought, "it is better to wait until such practice grows up in the course of years and then to recognise and control them in the light of experience".²³ Furthermore, it was the duty of the state, Alan Pim argued, of manipulating the cultural traditions of the colonised to bolster up this early form of indirect rule:

... it is only when we have built up on the customs of the country, adapting it from time to time to changing conditions, that we have been fairly successful.

This, however, meant a policy of direct intervention for a period through local administrators in order to ensure the success of such social engineering:

In starting an agrarian system it is necessary to concentrate for a time all power in the hands of selected officers, i.e. those who ... should also define and record the rights of the state and of individuals (as against the state and amongst themselves). No other courts should have jurisdiction. 24

These ideas developed in the Indian context almost certainly had some influence on Howard Pim's thinking on the development of "native policy" in South Africa. The Indian precedent provided an effective model of administration that, in 1905, was still seen to be capable of being worked out and was, moreover, "British" in its nature. It was very likely, therefore, to have helped shift Pim's thinking from a more extreme position rooted in "residential segregation" to one of "possessory segregation" by the time of the South African Native Affairs Commission Report in 1905. Pim, as a chartered accountant, reflected to some extent the thinking of the emerging

white professional bourgeoisie in Johannesburg after the war and he derived a considerable proportion of his work from the gold mining industry (though he opposed the idea of recruiting Chinese labour and was ultimately to lose his contracts with H. Eckstein and the Chamber of Mines). In 1903, in a paper to the Transvaal Philosophical Society, Pim argued for racial separation and the recruitment of white labour as opposed to either importation of Asiatic labour or reliance on Africans, for he saw reliance upon black labour as similar to the use of slave labour in the South in that both brought about "degradation" of poor whites who were rendered economically superfluous. Pim's thinking at this stage was somewhat static for the chief objective of policy, as he then saw it, was to bring about a position of "stable equilibrium, a condition economically sound, to maintain which all natural laws will assist".²⁵

By 1905, however, Pim's thinking developed in the direction of ensuring a growing supply of black labour and a policy that, as in the Punjab instance, rooted African communities on the land and established labour reserves for the mines and farms. As a result of a request by Lagden for a paper to be given at the meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, which held its annual conference in Johannesburg in 1905, Pim went on a visit to Basutoland in order to observe at first hand the tribal system so favoured as a basis of administration by Sir Godfrey Lagden and his fellow member of SANAC, Sir Herbert Sloley. Pim's tour was assisted by Sloley as the Resident Commissioner in Maseru and it very probably confirmed the Punjab arguments of his brother Alan. Certainly in his 1905 paper Some Aspects of the Native Problem, Pim favoured the establishment of tribal councils on the Basutoland pattern and the fostering of redistributive economies based on the power of chiefs and local headmen.²⁶ This, furthermore, led to his opposition to the extension of the Glen Grey system of individual tenure which he saw as failing anyway with plot-owners encroaching on commonage and the district councils being generally ineffective.²⁷ He therefore concluded that administration should be rooted more in the Transkeian system of magisterial rule under the Native Affairs Department for:

It is clear that we should go cautiously elsewhere and not assume that in individual tenure any panacea for the difficulties of the

Native land question has been discovered. Perhaps South Africa may derive benefit from the ... general rules which have emerged from a large experience of Indian land tenure and land administration (note this system is a valuable one but not one of individual application).

Pim then spelt out the principles espoused by his brother Alan based on the idea of enlightened direct rule of the local district officer in order to reconstruct local systems of land tenure.²⁸ This administrative strategy, however, he linked to a further idea born out of the then current campaign against Ethiopianism in the Transvaal. Pim saw industrial training strategies modelled on the Tuskegee pattern as being essential for the fostering of rural African land settlement and preventing the emigration of African leaders to colleges in the United States. It was also in the development of African agriculture in the reserves that a subsistence base for African wages could be found and competition with the still shaky white agriculture be avoided:

... the white man pays in wages, that is in cash, to the Location Native the equivalent of the time that the same Natives under other conditions spends in growing his crops. But if the Native does not grow these crops somebody else must, either inside or outside South Africa. The white man has not yet shown that in South Africa his cultivation of the single crops which the Native requires can compete with Native cultivation. Consequently if these crops are grown in South Africa so far from the white man gaining from the change, he will probably lose. If they are grown outside South Africa the funds used to purchase them leave the country, which has therefore so much less capital available for its extension and development. But this is not all. In a Reserve ... the Native lives under natural conditions which he understands and has created for himself. 29

Such was the basis for Pim's espousal of a strategy of "segregation" for, while he argued that there was "little reason to extend (the reserves) as they became over-populated" since "there can be nothing unhealthy or wrong in requiring the Native himself to cope with the increase in his own number or the increasing stress of outside competition",³⁰ at the same time the American experience of segregation suggested an historical tendency for "the two races" to "steadily drift apart".³¹

These arguments of Pim were significant in the debate after 1906 on closer union in South Africa. Pim gave a further paper at the Fortnightly Club³² where the Closer Union campaign was launched by the Kindergarten member Richard Feetham and the concept of segregation was linked by Lionel Curtis in a paper entitled The Place of Subject Peoples in the Empire to the reformulation of the British imperial ideal away from the enlightened despotism of direct rule — as espoused, for instance, by Sir James Fitzjames Stephen in the 1870s and 1880s — towards the diffusion of power and consolidation of empire on a federal basis. This ideal, which was later championed by the Round Table in the years after Union by both Curtis and Philip Kerr, later Lord Lothian, and the Rhodes Trust, was reflected in Curtis's argument that "South African should be taught not to think of falling back on British troops for the suppression of native disorders even as the last resort" for "by this means it is possible to engender in the minds of every South African a sense of responsibility even greater than that which is followed by the Indian bureaucracy (sic)".³³ This however led to the question of internal social control mechanisms in South Africa and here Curtis — probably with the 1907 Punjab Rebellion in mind — perceived the advantages of the possessory segregation concept as a means of severing relations between reserve Africans and the emergent African petty bourgeoisie in the towns which was likely, as in the Indian case, to foment an incipient nationalism. "We are still faced with the other difficulty", Curtis observed, "that, as with the commercial community in India, the interests of the white population of South Africa are too closely entangled with those of the native population. This however is a difficulty which may be increased or diminished by the policy adopted."³⁴ (emphasis added)

Curtis accordingly ruled out the Cape "policy of washing (sic) the Eithiopian (sic)" which "tends in exactly the opposite direction" since it encourages him to seek to incorporate himself with the white communities". In contradiction to this was the policy suggested by Pim which, though Curtis had initially been "at issue" with it, was now seen as workable based on the areas like Basutoland, Bechuanaland, Swaziland and the Transkei and Zululand which were "more or less perfectly reserved for their (i.e. Africans') exclusive occupation". This strategy was seen by Curtis as much more

effective as a control mechanism than raising the rents on African squatting as had been the dominant tendency in policy in the Transvaal after the Anglo-Boer War. This had had the effect of "crowd(ing) the native off the land" and "encumber(ing) (the Africans) with debts to the white and Indian populations", creating a situation, observed Curtis, similar to one "which would exist if the commercial Europeans in India controlled the natives". In contrast, the "conditions of Basutoland and Bechuanaland are incomparably more wholesome".³⁵

The policy, therefore, suggested by Curtis was one of possessory segregation in a united South Africa mixed with a strong element of benevolent paternalism born of the Indian precedent. "I am picturing a state of affairs", he wrote:

in which the native is free to move about South Africa but has been led to fix his home in native territory and to find himself in the position of an uitlander when he goes outside it. These territories could then be administered by the South African government by means of a highly organised Civil Service, very much as India is administered by the Imperial Gov't. 36

This policy of segregation espoused by Curtis in 1907 can be seen to have been of some ideological significance coming as it did in the wake of the Selborne memorandum of December 1906. This memorandum, which was substantially written by Curtis, sought to guide opinion in South Africa in the direction of federation while at the same time seeking uniformity in "native policy" between the different South African states. "Two or more native policies, inconsistent with each other", the memorandum stated, "cannot end otherwise than in confusion and miscarriage".³⁷ Curtis, therefore, very probably saw possessory segregation as being the unifying ideological means by which such uniformity might be achieved in a federated South Africa.

On the other hand, before 1908 the discussion on closer union and segregation was for the most part confined to narrow political and intellectual circles: while the Fortnightly Club, for instance, had as members a considerable number of individuals who were later to play significant roles in the evolution of "native policy" after Union — Colonel Stallard, for instance, Archdeacon Michael Furse, later Bishop of Pretoria at the

time of the 1920 Natives Affairs Act, Herbert Creswell and F. Petty of the Chamber of Mines — it still reproduced the somewhat narrow elitism of the Milner kindergarten. As such, it still had to sell the idea of possessory segregation to wider sections of white political opinion: in particular the white petty bourgeoisie on the Rand and the white working class who were in the throes of a "Black Peril" scare. The remainder of this chapter will thus focus on the widening of the debate on segregation after the attainment of Responsible Government in the Transvaal and the moves between 1907 and 1910 to establish a wider South African Union.

The widening of the debate:

By 1908, in the aftermath of Responsible Government, a number of interests in the Transvaal began to favour the idea of possessory segregation. The Transvaal Landowners Association favoured it as a means to ward off more radical demands for government controls on African squatting; similarly the representatives of Milnerism, in the wake of Het Volk's victory with the assistance of white labour, saw possessory segregation as a means of reinforcing internal structures of social control over the African population in South Africa as Britain delegated power to a federated South African state. This, however, still left the white petty bourgeoisie and working class who had been mobilised on a racist basis following the importation of Chinese labour. In April 1903, for instance, the White League, an organisation described by the Simonses as consisting of "shopkeepers and racists"³⁸ and based on a campaign stretching back to before the Anglo-Boer War to exclude Indians from citizenship in the Transvaal, organised a meeting in the Wanderer's Hall of 5000 to condemn the importation of Chinese labour.³⁹ Prominent among the League's members was Councillor J.W. Quinn, a Johannesburg bakery and cafe owner, who later became mayor of the city, and active in seeking to exclude by legislative means economic competition from either African or Asian shop-owners.

The white petty bourgeoisie on the Witwatersrand was at this time an insecure group since its trade, in the era before industrial diversification in the 1920s, was heavily dependent on a single industry, the mines. As its fortunes fluctuated with

that of mining capital, its ideological outlook was overwhelmingly shaped by what it perceived as the all-powerful political dominance of the mine-owner. The petty bourgeoisie was thus very given to conspiratorial theories of politics and another of its prominent spokesmen, Fred Bell, an insurance salesman, wrote a book in 1900 entitled The South African Conspiracy that accused the mining capitalists of "backstair influence with the corrupt Government of Pretoria from the time of the discovery of the Witwatersrand fields".⁴⁰ Bell called in 1904 for the granting of immediate Responsible Government in the Transvaal to prevent both the domination of Transvaal politics by the perceived party of mining capital, the Progressives, or, for Bell, the equally unacceptable alternative of "Labour and the Dutch Party together ... with capital in a hopeless minority".⁴¹

This political uncertainty of the white petty bourgeoisie reflected a basic political dilemma it confronted after the Anglo-Boer War in that while it did not wish to be dependent upon a single class interest, white labour or mining capital, it was itself really too weak to control the state alone. Thus, Bell's call for South Africa to be ruled after Responsible Government "by the good sense of the great majority, which will comprise men of all parties who desire the welfare of the land in which they live and will die, but ... which they are not exploiting for the purpose of living away from"⁴² was a simple statement of a racist settler nationalism in which the petty bourgeoisie would have a dominating political say.

Such a nationalism, however, depended to a considerable degree on continued white immigration into South Africa so that the white petty bourgeoisie was very much a prey to contemporarily fashionable arguments of racial determinism and eugenics that stressed the need for increasing the stock of the Anglo-Saxon race. These racial theories were dominant at the time in the American South in the era of Jim Crow and had been given a boost by the victory of the United States in the war against Spain in 1898.⁴³ Thus it is interesting to note that they were picked up by Bell in an indirect form when a platform was provided for him to attack the possessory segregation view by the formation of the Transvaal Native Affairs Society in 1908.

The Transvaal Society was not the first of its kind in South Africa for it came in the wake of the Native Affairs Reform Society in Durban. An additional feature in the Transvaal case was that it was formed at the same time as the Closer Union movement initiated discussion on South African federation. Thus, while J.W. Quinn was the society's first chairman, the objectives of promoting "the study and discussion of the South African native question, with a view to enunciating and advocating a liberal, consistent and practical Native policy through South Africa" together with "native opinion being consulted in matters affecting their own government" indicated that the objectives were similar to those of the Fortnightly Club. Indeed, many Club members were on the Society's first committee: Howard Pim, W. Perry and Michael Furse while Sir George Farrar and Walter Webber of the Chamber of Mines soon joined. From the very beginning, therefore, the Society met opposition from sections of the white petty bourgeoisie. The Transvaal Leader noted that few "born South Africans" were on the committee and hoped that "an embryonic Exeter Hall" was not being fostered⁴⁴ while Fred Bell accused the committee of being "negrophilists".⁴⁵ Politically, these arguments came at an opportune time for the white petty bourgeoisie. The 1906 election in the Transvaal had demonstrated that some businessmen on the Rand were prepared to side with Het Volk for reasons of economic nationalism and a fear of reproducing a similar situation to Kimberley where economic diversification was thwarted by the monopoly domination of De Beers.⁴⁶ In addition, by 1908, in the aftermath of the strike by white mine workers the previous year, there was a renewed upsurge in white working class consciousness and a campaign for industrial segregation on lines similar to the unsuccessful experiment in 1903 by the white Labour leader, Herbert Creswell, to replace unskilled African workers with poor whites.

These latter interests on the Rand became expressed in the debates of the Transvaal Native Affairs Society which, though it only had 109 members by the end of 1908,⁴⁹ focused and crystallised the differing class and economic interests behind the debate on South African "native policy" in a manner far beyond its actual numerical size. The differences in fact became expressed at an early stage in the Society's proceedings: The "repressionists" led by Bell and Quinn gained an early

victory over the "accommodationists" when it was decided that Africans could not be admitted as members to the Society,⁴⁸ while the committee accepted Quinn's invitation to meet in a building he owned.⁴⁹ Furthermore, in March of 1908 another repressionist member, Geo Max King, attacked the Society's constitutional provision that those who favoured a "purely repressive policy towards the natives would not, of course, be in sympathy with the Society"⁵⁰ for "creating a feeling of moral resentment in the minds of the majority which will intensify their prejudices, excite their passions and tend to defeat the object for which we hope the Society has been formed".⁵¹ King's proposal, however, for the Society to adopt an extreme segregationist policy ensuring "a line of demarcation between the white and black communities, socially, industrially and politically" did not gain majority support.

The convening of the National Convention in October 1908 for the purpose of unifying the component states of South Africa injected a new dimension into the political debate on the Rand. The repressionists had consistently seen the franchise as a key political issue and linked the incorporation of a small class of African petty bourgeois voters with the eventual collapse of white hegemony in South Africa. Following the elections in the Cape in 1904, for instance, the repressionists' voice on the Rand, the Transvaal Leader, voiced its anxiety about the franchise in terms of the crude racism then current in the American South on the negro's inherent inferiority. The elections, it wrote, led to the "disgraceful scenes" where "statesmen of the dominant race" went "begging and manoeuvring for the votes of the black men, who see in the process none of the 'brotherhood of man', but only the weakness of those whose weakness they should not be allowed to see". The African franchise, therefore, was to be opposed on the grounds that there was no "mental or moral equality between the black races and the white".⁵²

This biological racism formed the basis of the repressionists' arguments against extending the African franchise from the end of 1908, and strengthened the hand of those in favour of the racial partitioning of Southern Africa and complete residential segregation. H.J. Crocker, for example, suggested such geographical partitioning in the course of 1908 with the "occupation and final settlement of the Europeans in the

temperate zone, and the negro in the temperate zone of the African continent".⁵³ However, it is clear that most of the repressionists did not go so far as to advocate such extreme racial partitioning and the complete denial of African labour power. For Fred Bell the biological argument became a means to rationalise a segregationist scheme which differed from the possessory segregationists in the sphere allowed to protected white labour and white petty bourgeois trading interests. In a paper read to the Transvaal Native Affairs Society in December 1908, Bell developed the biological racist argument on the basis of the writings of Robert Bennet Bean, a Professor of Anatomy at the University of Virginia, who argued that negro brains were "inferior" to Caucasian ones.⁵⁴ However Bell retained some of the nineteenth century imperial arguments regarding the white "civilising mission" for while it was essential to "regard the native as a lower race" it was also necessary to "recognise our responsibilities and obligations towards him to the fullest extent ... recognising that each race should, and must, follow its natural lines of development".⁵⁵

The differences revolved essentially around the mechanism of social control to be employed over the African population, for, with the possibility of the franchise being extended in a South African Union, there was the chance of a future South African state resting social control through an incorporated African petty bourgeoisie possessing both landed and political rights. This, indeed was the substance of the case presented by the Earl of Selborne in an address at the University of Cape in February 1909. While conceding the same general principle as Bell and the Transvaal racists that "so far as we can foreseen, the Bantu will never catch up the European either in intellect or in strength of character".⁵⁶ Selborne nevertheless pleaded for an extension of the Cape franchise to other parts of South Africa on the basis of a "civilisation" test. This position was substantially that of mid-Victorian liberalism in the Cape, which by the twentieth century was most prominently espoused by Theo Schreiner⁵⁷ and interpreted the nineteenth century "civilising mission" in terms of incorporating the African petty bourgeois elite via the franchise. Opposing the idea that "the native should be left to work out his salvation unaided", Selborne argued:

If the black man had never seen or heard the white man, he might possibly in the course of ages have evolved a satisfactory civilisation on lines of his own; but, having been brought into contact with the white man, he must surely go astray unless the white man gives him all the help he can in his evolution. The question is not whether the black man is going to evolve or whether he is going to be educated. It is out of the power of the white man to settle that question, for the Bantu race will slowly evolve, and the more progressive of its members will acquire education, whatever he thinks or does. The real question is whether the white man is going sympathetically to influence that evolution, and, out of his more abundant experience, to direct that education? In self defence for the sake of his children, and in fulfilment of his own moral responsibility, he cannot shirk the task. 58

Selborne was urging the need for a social control strategy that took account of Ethiopianism and was picking up some of the ideas that had been expressed by James Stewart and others in the Cape at the time of the South African Native Affairs Commission for increased control over African higher education in order to neutralise the impact of Ethiopian ideology. The operative word here was control for a voluntarist policy that left "the Bantu" to "imitate the civilisation and religion of the Europeans, after his own fashion" would lead to a situation where the whites effectively abandoned their imperial civilising mission so that they would have "forfeited the right to be surprised at the appearance of a foolish and seditious press, or at the spread of the spirit of what is called 'Ethiopianism'". 59

For the white petty bourgeoisie the crucial issues were not the provision of "higher education" for African political and religious leaders. The main area of contention was what degree of political incorporation should be adopted for these leaders once educated? Here the question of the franchise was seen to lead inextricably to the question of growing economic power, in direct competition with the white petty bourgeoisie, in the urban areas. For, while Selborne effectively advocated a policy of territorial segregation with respect to rural Africans, calling for the maintenance of the Protectorates and Reserves as "safety valves" in a manner similar to Howard Pim, in the case of "civilised Africans" things were seen to be

different. With the latter group, the "civilising mission" of the white man necessitated the removal, as far as possible, of the tribal structures which were likely to endure for a good while longer in the rural reserves. "... so long as individual natives are subjected to the effects of tribal rule and kept from the path of escape from it", Selborne argued, "they are hindered in their efforts towards attaining a higher state of civilisation".⁶⁰ It was therefore essential that "no legal impediment should be put in the way of the individual civilised native to prevent him from becoming an owner of land".⁶¹ Without such an alternative mechanism of control, in the nineteenth century manner of the individual holding of property, then the danger of "assimilation" arose through the "uncivilised" African threatening European cultural standards:

If the Bantu imitates the European, does the European never assimilate anything from the Bantu? The more the Bantu is civilised, the fewer objectionable and unnatural traits there will be for the European to assimilate. ⁶²

Bell attacked this idea in a paper on The Black Vote read at the Native Affairs Society in April 1909 maintaining that Selborne's proposal for outlets for individual African land-holding contradicted the basic principle "that each race should develop along its own separate and natural lines".⁶³ But his criticism at this stage did not extend beyond asserting merely a possessory segregationist principle that white and black land-holding should be in specifically designated areas.⁶⁴

It was in the course of 1909 that the debate on segregation took a new turn as Bell came under the influence of American eugenicist arguments. In April 1909 he had casually referred to writings by A. H. Keane and Meredith Townsend in support of the determinist contention inherent in the racist argument that negroes were inferior to whites. This had lacked the "scientific" appeal of Selborne's evolutionist argument which appealed back to nineteenth century social darwinism. As a result of correspondence between Bell and Keane, the ideas of the eugenicists in America began to seep into South Africa, especially Robert W. Schufeldt's The Negro, A Menace to American Civilisation which was written in 1907.⁶⁵ As an anthropologist,

Professor Keane took up the Nordic cult of Anglo-Saxon racial superiority and used it against the "philanthropists and sham sentimentalists" who proclaimed racial equality and racial miscegenation. This furthermore, was essential for the preservation of the Anglo-Saxon stock who were threatened by miscegenation on the Latin American pattern and the possibility, in Robert Schufeldt's words, of being "robbed by heroic injections into their veins of all the savagery and criminality there is in the negro".⁶⁶ Keane and Schufeldt's influence on Bell became clear by October of 1909 when, in a paper entitled The South African Native Problem, he backed his previous arguments for racial separation with the warning that current policies in South Africa threatened both the "industrial extinction of the whites" and "the possibility of the dominance of the black race over the white". Foreseeing a future "struggle by force of arms for supremacy" between the races, Bell developed the theme that the reserves should be developed economically to ensure a greater carrying capacity for the African population and as outlets for the emergent African petty bourgeoisie. This, he argued, should be ensured by a mixture of tribal rule and Glen Grey individual tenure, the latter being adopted in areas like Zululand to buttress the power of minor chiefs and headmen in the absence of the paramountcy after the Bambata Rebellion. The essence of the policy was similar to the formulation of SANAC, Pim and Curtis in its recognition of future contingencies:

... if the white and black people in South Africa are to follow their natural development, separately and apart, provision in the way of land will have to be made for the native by the white man, to allow for the future expansion of the black race. ⁶⁷

This policy could not be carried out "without effort and sacrifice, nor without inconvenience to classes" and it would be necessary to carry out a scheme of population removals:

... I would make the individual black man in white areas as much a "fish out of water" as the white man would be in black territories. The native should have no locus standi in white territories and the inconvenience of his position would act, automatically, as a stimulus to separation. The white man must be protected from the black man,

and the black from the white. In opposition blacks and whites are each antagonists, industrially, socially and politically. But separately and apart each may follow his own line of progress without detriment to the other. 68

This was the racial nationalism of the white petty bourgeoisie, defined though very much in an English cultural idiom. But its formulation almost exactly paralleled the apartheid conception of the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie in the 1940s which merely took the essence of the scheme and subordinated it to Afrikaner nationalism.⁶⁹ In addition, the scheme propounded by Bell involved the shunting of the African petty bourgeoisie into the reserves in the same way as their successors were provided platforms in the "Homelands" in the period after the Bantu Authorities Act and Promotion of Bantu Self Government Act in the 1950s:

... this breaking up of tribal rule, and our enticing the native away from his natural state and environment, that has so enormously increased our difficulties. This it is that has made the problem so perplexing. It is the so-called "Civilised" and "educated" native who gives us most concern. By what I believe to be our wrong methods we have created an unnatural product, and at the same time, it must be admitted, a class for which we are the more directly responsible. Such natives cannot with justice be forced back to the environment from which we have drawn them, nor can they be allowed to become part of either our social systems or our body politic. But they must be discouraged from remaining amongst the white men, and encouraged to return to their own kind. And under the scheme I suggest a fruitful field would be afforded for the talent of such natives in the settlement under communal tenure where they would have opportunity of aiding and teaching their own people. 70

Politically the ideas of Bell and the repressionists gained some headway after 1909 as the white petty bourgeoisie began to mobilise. Herbert Creswell called at a meeting in July 1909 "for all friends of the white man to bestir themselves"⁷¹ and by the time of the General Election in September 1910 the White League on the Rand, together with the newly-formed South African Labour Party, rallied behind calls for industrial as well as political and social segregation. Some of this appeal was based on a renewed black peril scare with the focus of attack being the Unionists led by Jameson who was associated with the Cape liberal hope to extend the African franchise.

"Beware!", said a White League election leaflet, "Sixty One votes in the Union Parliament for Dr. Jameson's desire, and you have the nigger vote all over South Africa".⁷²

By this time, the Transvaal Native Affairs Society had become effectively defunct as the white petty bourgeoisie's political objectives were pursued through other channels like the S.A.L.P., while the advocates of Closer Union centred around Richard Feetham's The State that managed to bring out two issues before Union. But in March 1910 Bell had significantly been elected to succeed Howard Pim as the Society's President as the latter's political credibility had declined in the wake of successively fruitless bids to be elected Mayor of Johannesburg and a member of the Transvaal Legislative Assembly. Pim's response to the repressionist campaign on the Rand for industrial segregation had been to asset a politically colourless positivism that was much in keeping with the contemporary tendency in British colonial circles to assert the need for "ethnology as an important factor in any scientific system of tropical administration".⁷³ Thus, in his presidential address to the Society in 1909, Pim had spoken of the need for a "rational policy" founded on the principles of society, and a more "piecemeal" approach that distinguished between facts and values:

If we find that our influences in effecting permanent scientific change in the Bantu races that work will be of value, for it will enable us upon clear and reasonable grounds to remodel our own social system to meet the altered conditions. If, on the other hand, we find that the changes are merely periodic, that they effect the individual but not the race, that what we call the civilised native has less vitality, for instance, than his uncivilised brother, or is being a less desirable member of the population, then also the work will bear fruit for we shall know the direction in which our energies have been misplaced. 74

This positivistic scientism was of significance though in that it reflected a considerable shift in liberal thinking from Lord Selborne's evolutionist arguments. The historical optimism of Selborne based on notions of a civilising mission to incorporate Africans as individuals into western "civilisation", now became replaced by a static social engineering policy that looked at races. In its formulation, this thinking of

Pim's probably owed a lot to the shift in the political balance between "accommodationist" and "repressive" segregationists inside the Native Affairs Society as the white petty bourgeoisie and working class mobilised politically to fight the 1910 election. Faced with political defeat by a white racism that had been strengthened by the input from eugenics, Pim's scientism set a precedent for future white South African liberalism: it was wise for liberals as far as possible to avoid direct political confrontations with the numerically stronger white electorate and instead to seek to defuse situations as far as possible by concentrating on ostensibly neutral "facts" backed up by empirical evidence. The lessons of the first experiment on the Rand in the organised discussion of "native affairs" through the Transvaal Native Affairs Society were not lost on the nascent white intelligentsia, led by figures like Pim, and in later developments after the first world war via the Joint Councils and eventually the Institute of Race Relations, white South African liberals saw a thoroughly empirical presentation of their case as a crucial means to avoid damaging political in-fractions.

At the same time, as the ideas of repressionists like Bell began to become translated into legislation by the time of the 1913 Natives Land Act,⁷⁵ a number of South African liberals turned back towards the Local level as a means to avoid, as they saw, increasing state centralisation of native policy under a northern and racist direction. While it was recognised that liberals might have little chance to influence the direction of policy at the centre, at the level of informal social control at the local level they still had a significant chance to modify or redirect what might often be seen as hastily conceived or ill-thought out legislation. Writing in a memorandum in 1914 on the Natives Land Act, for example, Pim argued that "the value of the Act must altogether depend upon the wisdom with which it will be administered, and both races have doubts on this point. This practical question (in the form of the Beaumont Commission established by the Act) is now before the country, and obviously it can only be worked out in detail and on the spot wherever native and white lands are intermingled".⁷⁶ In this case, the liberals at the centre in South African politics had the opportunity of appealing to the variety of local differences in the handling of native administration in the four provinces of the Union, together with the Proctorates and Rhodesia, and this

diversity could be used to resist as far as possible an immediate synthesis of policy. It was out of the discussion on the merits of the differing local precedents that South African liberalism began to emerge by the inter-war years and its eclectic nature was emphasised by the crystallisation of debate around essentially two major schools of thought. On the one hand, there was the precedent of the Cape and its assimilationist ideal of the mid-nineteenth century. On the other hand, there was the precedent of Natal and tribal states like Lesotho based on the ideal of maintaining separate African ethnic identity as part of a theory of cultural idealism. These two strands of thinking interacted within South African liberalism in the post-Union period — though both sought significantly to resist as far as possible state centralisation and total unification of native policy in South Africa. It is the development of these two strands of liberal thinking in South Africa after Union towards which we turn in the following chapter.

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Chapter Four

The ethnic challenge to assimilationism

The establishment of Union in 1910 and the passing of the 1913 Natives Land Act were, as we have seen, significant political defeats for the tradition of liberal assimilationism rooted on the Cape precedent. At the level of national politics, white liberals had to come to terms with territorial segregation and the entrenched legislative demarcation on racial lines of the rights to land ownership. In the Transvaal, the centre of gold mining and now of the new Union government, it became clear that the pattern of class alliance that had characterised nineteenth century Cape politics — a white mercantile bourgeoisie in trading and political relations with an African peasantry — would not be carried northwards. Instead the interests of the mines and the white working class and petty bourgeoisie on the Witwatersrand were best served by a segregationist ideology that reduced the African reserves to labour reservoirs, restricted the competition from the African peasantry in favour of white settler agriculture and hindered as far as possible the permanent urbanisation of an African working class in the cities by a process of rustication and influx control.¹

Liberals as such had little role in the immediate mechanics of this process as Union was established for, as the last chapter showed, the main political thrust behind this had come from the successors of the Milner administration in the Transvaal in alliance with their former Boer opponents centred around Botha and Smuts's Het Volk. Out of this new alliance there emerged the South African Party government of Louis Botha in 1910 with the remnant of the old Cape liberals led by Leander Starr Jameson in the Unionist Party opposition (but backed, though, by a section of mining capital led by Patrick Duncan and Richard Feetham). The objectives of this party line-up were less the fulfilment of a new "liberal" ideology based upon segregationism but the consolidation of the "incomplete dominion" of the South African state and there

was as yet no dominant over-arching blueprint of native policy as came to be characteristic of "segregation" or "trusteeship" in the 1930s and "apartheid" by the late 1940s.

In this respect the role and significance of liberalism in South African politics returned, once the process of political unification had been initially completed in 1910, to the local and provincial level where issues of "native policy" were discussed and debated through a number of Native Affairs Reform Societies interspersed by periodic meetings of the new South African Association for the Advancement of Science, modelled on its British predecessor that had met in Johannesburg in 1905. These reform societies were often under the influence of the more racist sections of the white petty bourgeoisie, as we have seen in the case of the Transvaal Native Affairs Society before Union. For in so far as white settler attention did fix on the "native question" in the period before the first world war it was heavily influenced by myths of "black peril" which, as Charles Van Onselen has shown in the case of Johannesburg, reflected the close domestic encounters in white households with a growing black servant class and the periodic bouts of structural unemployment within the white working class as the gold mines went through rounds of boom and depression in the 1890s and 1900s.² Thus, even in bodies most likely to advance the liberal cause in a settler society, assimilationism was very much a minority view. In the case of the Natal Native Affairs Reform League which was established to deal with black peril agitation in Durban and other Natal towns, it was clear that the dominant objective was to assist in the "control" of the small emergent African political and intellectual elite³ and one of its more liberally inclined members, the American missionary Frederick Bridgman, gloomily confessed that it would take "dynamite" to shift the government on the basic tenets of its native policy.⁴

In such inauspicious circumstances, it became plain to a number of liberals and "native experts" that a gradual modification of assimilationism was needed in order to exert liberal influence over the workings of native policy at the local and provincial level. This was especially crucial once Union was achieved for the establishment of a national Department of Native Affairs failed to extend the Cape-based N.A.D. on any significant scale since most local appointments were made

through the less sympathetic Department of Justice.⁵ The consequences, therefore, of British indirect rule policy which had been behind the establishment of Union began to seep through into liberal thinking and a number of writers and spokesmen began to look for alternative channels of influence via the selective use and manipulation of African ethnic institutions.

The beginnings of an ethnic formulation:

One of the key turning points on the discussion on native administration in South Africa in the first decade of the twentieth century was undoubtedly the Bambata Rebellion in Natal of 1906-7. Hitherto, the idea of employing African tribal institutions as part of an administrative policy of ethnic divide and rule had been hampered by the awareness of strongly different regional traditions in the Cape and Natal. While the former had developed a flexible system since the 1883 Native Laws and Customs Commission based on selective use of native law,⁶ the Shepstone system of segregation in Natal was seen as too rigid for any large scale application to the African reserves in a future united South Africa.⁷ In this context, the Report of the Native Affairs Commission in Natal in 1907 in response to the Bambata Rebellion the previous year represented an important landmark in the discussion on incorporating African ethnic and cultural institutions into the system of administrative control in South Africa. The Report, chaired by H. C. Campbell, was noteworthy for having the "expert" Maurice Evans among its members and its ideas on African "tribalism" were important in the development of Evans's ideas through the discussions in the Native Affairs Reform Society in Durban, which he helped to found, and in his books Black and White in South East Africa (1911) and Black and White in the Southern States (1913).⁸

In particular, the Commission sought, through the application of "the principles of political science", to modernise and update the system of tribally-based segregation bequeathed it by Sir Theophilus Shepstone. While recognising the value of the personal face to face relationships engrained in Shepstone's nineteenth century system of paternalism, the Commission also realised that the advance of bureaucratisation in an

industrialising economy had to be faced. The "over administration" of Africans was regretted, in a manner reminiscent of J.M. Orpen in the Cape, but at the same time it was realised that a more systematic administrative structure was necessary.⁹ Thus, the Commission went on to suggest removing native administration from parliamentary control and empowering a separate body with the powers and responsibilities to modernise continuously a basically patriarchal system of government. The analogy here was with a municipality which had special powers granted it by the central government,¹⁰ though there was the added specification that the separate system of native administration was headed by the Governor as Supreme Chief who "should be free from the review or interference of any court or person".¹¹ Within this system of administration, it was envisaged that the Native Commissioners would work through gatherings of the chiefs and their followers who would continue to act for a considerable time into the future as vital legitimating agents:

To control the growing lawlessness of young men and women, Chiefs and kraal heads should be entrusted with more authority in the direction of securing social order and the maintenance of discipline amongst their people. The loosening of the family tie fills husbands and fathers with alarm, and the fabric of their social system is disappearing before the inroads of misapplied and misabused personal liberty.

At the same time, however, the Commission manifested a continued belief in the late Victorian conception of social darwinism for:

Social evolution in relation to these people is a question that demands much more encouragement by Government than it has received in the past, because, apart from its manifest advantage to the individual, it is a political engine of the highest importance in reducing the power of the chief, and consequently achieving the disintegration of the tribal system. As they become fitted by character, education and intelligence, they should be encouraged to dissociate themselves from tribalism by every agency and means that can be devised for their welfare, so that the system will gradually disappear, more by internal force than external law. ¹²
(emphasis added)

This social darwinism essentially rationalised a strongly state-dominated system of social control over the Africans for the whole point about this Victorian view of "evolution" was that it should be allowed to run its "natural course" free from the external intervention of either "philanthropy" on the one hand or "selfishness" (extreme repressive segregation) on the other.¹³ Such state paternalism potentially threatened any local liberal influence over the workings of policy and it was the suggestion by the Commission of the establishment of a "Council for Native Affairs" including four official and three non official members which seemed to some liberals in Natal the one avenue they might have for the exercise of influence over the direction.¹⁴ Maurice Evans took up this idea in his Black and White in South East Africa and suggested that it should be allowed to review legislation before it was debated in parliament and that two of its six members should be allowed to address the House when it was sitting. Furthermore, one of the Council's tasks would be to earmark the land set aside as African reserves.¹⁵

The significance of this Natal contribution to political debate on native policy was that it made South African liberals far more aware in the years after Union of the issue of maintaining a coherent form of political order as African societies underwent profound social and economic change. The Cape conception of liberalism was more *laissez faire* in its approach to this question, maintaining that the continued inculcation of the values of Christian religious teaching would in itself be a means to ensure a guided "progress" in African society. The Report of the Commission of the Assaults on White Women reflected this view in 1913 under the chairmanship of the Reverend James Henderson. While arguing for firmer social segregation in urban areas in order to prevent a renewed occurrence of black peril agitations, the Commission manifested a continued faith in the value of missionary education free from central state control. "The evidence of the effect of Christian teaching and education on the character of natives is very strong", the Report concluded. "These unquestionably exercise an enormous influence for good. Administrative action can go but a short way in that direction."¹⁶

In contrast, the input from Natal after Union stressed the need to maintain in addition political structures of social control so as to avoid social breakdown on lines similar to that before the Bambata Rebellion in 1906. "The substitution of the impersonal force of law and regulation for the highly personal rule of past days", Maurice Evans wrote, "was largely responsible for the rebellion".¹⁷ The question remained, though, of what kind of political structure to evolve in order to cope with seemingly intractable "problems" for which a governmental system modelled on West European lines was not designed. Evans approached this issue in a manner that typified much liberal thinking in South Africa in the years ahead and which eventually came to be characterised as the model of political pluralism. Attending in 1912 at Tuskegee an International Conference on the Negro, Evans was, like James Stewart before him, able to see the workings of industrial training in the South at first hand and its capacity for systematic and continuous modernisation in accordance with the needs of an industrialising economy.¹⁸ Thus, Evans's book Black and White in the Southern States moved some way beyond the more personalised system of native government envisaged for South Africa on the old Shepstonian lines of Nineteenth Century Natal and began to develop a more comprehensive system of territorial segregation based on African ethnic as opposed to tribal differentiation. The American negro parallel indicated to Evans that the selective incorporation of African franchise holders on the Cape model was potentially disastrous since it risked the same cleavages as had happened after the American Civil War during radical reconstruction.¹⁹ The point about Southern segregation and the industrial training provided by Tuskegee was that it was able to act as a buttress to negro peasant agriculture, thus resisting the tendency of blacks to emigrate to the northern cities. Writing in a period just before the massive negro exodus north during the industrialisation before and after the first world war, Evans concluded that "the city is a veritable sewer and death trap for the negro" for "his home life should be in the country, and it is as peasant farmers that the majority will find the sphere for which they are best fitted. I think the same may be said of the Bantu people of South Africa."²⁰ The point was, therefore, to devise a system of

government rooted in racial separation, but under "white guidance" and here Evans began to move towards an early pluralistic model:

At present we are like voyagers without chart or compass on an unknown sea. As questions affecting the native people arise we deal with them on the spur of the moment, governed by the exigencies of a system of representative party government which we have imported ready made from overseas, and in which the huge native people is unrepresented. We follow no plan, we have no principle to guide us. We have adopted as final a system of government gradually evolved by homogenous peoples of Western Europe so suit their needs, and fatuously hope this will meet the totally different conditions of South Africa...

The urgent need was, therefore, to establish "machinery, within and subject to the parliamentary system, which shall provide for the steady, continuous study of the ever changing relations of the races".²¹ It was by this means that the emergent problems of "race relations" in South Africa could be continuously tackled since it was to this sphere, as opposed to the older civilising mission of the Cape, that Evans perceived the future role of South African liberals and "friends of the native". An idea, it seems, that began to make an impact on liberals in South Africa by the first world war, for in 1915 Michael Furse, the Anglican Bishop of Pretoria and one of the members of the Fortnightly Club before Union, argued at the Anglican Synod in Cape Town for a "more uniform and sympathetic native policy" which should be "above party politics" and handled by three "able bodied experts" who could also be linked to native councils that were extended on Glen Grey lines to the rest of the Union.²²

These views effectively amounted to a philanthropic form of segregation²³ and they began to characterise liberal thinking increasingly in the years after Union as it appeared that the Cape assimilationist ideal was going into decline. Cape liberalism seemed to represent a political model that failed to accord with the centralising tendencies of the South African state and the perceived need of liberals to establish new platforms through which to impress their views. Furthermore, there was the additional factor that many of the philosophical assumptions behind this liberal assimilationism were beginning to come under attack in some humanitarian circles by

the early years of the twentieth century. In its classical form, as we saw in the introduction, assimilationism in the nineteenth century was linked to liberal individualism and utilitarian ethical philosophy. This rationalism and belief in both continual economic and moral social progress began to be doubted in its effects on colonial economies even before the first world war and the more general European crise de conscience. Humanitarians pointed to the effects of colonialism on African society in the Congo under Belgian rule and early ethnologists began to study African customs and social structures more systematically and to argue for their right to self preservation. In South Africa, one of the foremost writers of the latter kind was Benjamin Kidd who, in books like The Essential Kaffir and Kaffir Socialism, argued that African tribal society was marked by a strong communistic-type communalism and a rejection of the Western materialistic norms of enlightened self-interest and that this should be both recognised and preserved.²⁴

This was an early version of what later became a cultural idealism heavily influenced, by the 1930s, by German ethnology through the International Institute for African Languages and Culture.²⁵ In its early phases in South Africa it was only a minority view even in the circle of liberals and "native experts", for it challenged the assumptions not only of the Cape assimilationists, but even the pseudo-scientific eugenicists on the Witwatersrand and the industrial-training school of segregationists led by such figures as James Henderson, Maurice Evans and the missions at Lovedale and Fort Hare. For the most part the cultural idealists rejected the use of western science altogether in the question of developing African societies and, in rejecting western materialistic values, there was a strong tendency to romanticise the cultural traits of "traditional" African societies as heroic examples of the primitive. "So long as we rely on scientific theories built on a material basis", wrote one early cultural idealist Trevor Fletcher in 1908, "we are but tinkering with symptoms and ignoring the cause".²⁶ The point was not necessarily that no "development" would take place in African society as a result of white colonisation, but rather that it should occur outside the context of "material means" and "mechanical theories". Presaging, therefore, much of the later discussion in anthropological circles in the 1930s of

"culture contact", Fletcher wrote:

Much will ultimately depend upon the good will between the two races, and so long as we rely solely on force we shall but create ill-will and rebellion. It is through society and contact with the whites that the greatest good will come, and the whole question calls for patience and self restraint on our part. 27

This was a radical reconceptualisation of western humanitarianism, though its effect in philanthropic and missionary circles in Britain at least was fairly marked by the 1920s, as figures like Arthur Shearley Cripps and J. H. Oldham campaigned for the preservation of African cultures, and in effect brought a large section of British humanitarian and liberal opinion behind the policy of indirect rule.²⁸ In South Africa, the redirection of ideas had an impact on liberal thinking as well, though in the event not in quite such a pronounced manner as had seemed likely at first. For the ethnic formulations of writers like Maurice Evans, Dudley Kidd and Trevor Fletcher in their varying degrees, all assumed a certain African political passivity. In its purest form of cultural idealism it assumed almost a static tribal state, while even the industrial training views of Evans shaped by the precedent of Tuskegee implied a political collaborationism of the kind Booker T. Washington had espoused after his 1895 Atlanta Address.²⁹ But by the first world war in both America and in African colonies black political militancy was beginning to grow — in the former through W.E.B. Du Bois's N.A.A.C.P.³⁰ and in the South African case through the South African Native National Congress, formed in 1912. A year later, with the passing of the 1913 Natives Land Act, the Congress began to mobilise African political opposition that both challenged the ethnic formulations of the philanthropic segregationists and forced a reappraisal of it by South African liberals.

The African challenge to ethnicity:

In its most direct form, the philanthropic segregationism of the humanitarians after 1910 amounted to a systematic attempt to exert white control over African political organisation. The older assimilationism of the nineteenth century had implied a

continuous process of African economic and political growth on the classis bourgeois lines of an ever widening franchise and in Britain this had continued to be held in bodies like the Native Races Committee, a humanitarian descendant of the Clapham Sect and the campaign against slavery. In its two reports on South Africa in 1899 and 1909, the Native Races Committee continued to praise Cape assimilationism and the Glen Grey system of individual African land tenure which it saw as likely "to educate the natives for self government, and encourage their sense of civic responsibility".³¹ The main thrust of social control, therefore, should, the Committee argued, be exerted in an indirect form via education under the control of the missions and far more of a common purpose was required in order for Africans "to take some predetermined place in the body politic or even in the industrial ranks of the community". Arguing the case for greater systematisation of African education, the Committee saw this was essential since "everywhere guidance and control are required rather than repression. In all the provision for education there is need for adaptation to the life and future requirements of the native."³² Developing a theme that was substantially that of the defensive liberalism of the Cape by the early years of the twentieth century, the Committee maintained some belief in the continued "upliftment" of African society through industrial training and warned that "the future of the colonies must be seriously imperilled if there is much further delay in substituting a real scheme of progress for the present destruction of native tribal institutions".³³

This expression — if somewhat guarded — of the more classical form of the British humanitarian tradition began, however, to be substantially modified in the years after South African Union by the rise of a more segregationist theme via the ranks of the Aborigines Protection Society. While the Native Races Committee had acted as a mouthpiece for Cape liberalism before 1910, its position in that year in British philanthropic circles began to be checked by a revitalised A.P.S. which merged with its rival, the Anti Slavery Society, and appointed J.H. Harris as Organising Secretary. Harris boosted the political influence of the A.P.S. and enhanced its stand on the basis of segregationist philanthropy which it had been increasingly taking since the 1890s as he injected a reformist zeal for safeguarding the autonomy of African societies born of

his previous experiences as Secretary of the Congo Reform Association.³⁴ The objective now became one of resisting as far as possible the continued erosion of African tribal structures which Harris saw as essential if African societies were to resist the economic and cultural onslaught of white land settlement; and the A.P.S. focused its attention not on segregation per se but on ensuring some form of "just" segregation via large allotments of land reserved for African use in the working out of colonial governments' land settlement policies. These arguments, for instance, were used extensively in Rhodesia, which Harris visited in 1914, at the time of the sittings of the Native Reserves Commission.³⁵

However, in South Africa, such a view of "just" segregation was by no means unanimously held by the leadership of the Native National Congress as it decided to embark on a mission to England to protest to the British government against the passing of the Natives Land Act.³⁶ Certainly some tribal chiefs in Natal and parts of the Transvaal were by no means in automatic objection to territorial segregation, provided it became a means through which they could extend the areas under their control³⁷ and some of the educated political elite too were prepared to consider it as some form of "political solution" by which they could extend their sphere of influence. Sol Plaatje, for instance, wrote that General Hertzog had promised, while still Minister of Native Affairs in 1912, to create "a vast dependency of the Union in which the energies and aspirations of black professional men would find their outlet, with no danger of competition with Europeans; where a new educational and representative system could be evolved for Natives to live their own lives, and work out their salvation in a separate sphere".³⁸ But the actual passing of the Land Act in 1913 dashed these hopes for there was no provision left for any "mixed" areas where white and African farms could exist side by side and any opportunities for separate African administrative ambitions were nullified by a rigid racial demarcation of land that left African reserves as some 9% of the total South African land area and a provision for further "scheduled areas" which would be specified by a commission at a later date.³⁹

The effect of the Act, therefore, was to dent considerably the hopes of the more segregationist of the S.A.N.N.C.'s leadership, especially as the basis of

political influence exerted at the local level became considerably eroded during the course of a campaign in the latter part of 1913 and early 1914 to raise funds for the deputation to England. John Dube, for instance, as the first President of the Congress had initially seen it as little more than a political alliance of different African ethnic "nations" in Southern Africa and his own political power base had been substantially confined to his native Natal where his control of the Natal Congress came through an alliance of Christian Kholwa and chiefs and hereditary headmen or abenumzane.⁴⁰ Thus, he was not necessarily opposed to the idea of ethnic compartmentalisation of African societies since if this could lead to the eventual restoration of the Zulu Paramountcy of King Solomon, removed after the Bambata Rebellion, then his own political influence might well increase, in Natal at any rate.⁴¹ For Dube, ethnicity in 1912 denoted still a means of mobilising political opposition to government policy and with fears of "black peril" and independent church leaders mobilising a Black pan-tribal revolt in South Africa (which were perpetuated by the Natalian George Heaton Nicholls's novel Bayete, written some time after 1913),⁴² it was not surprising that the Natal Native Affairs Department continued to resist the restoration of the Zulu Paramountcy in the years after Union.⁴³

These ethnic considerations became eclipsed by the time of the 1914 deputation as it began to emerge that ethnic compartmentalisation might well be used to divide up African political consciousness at the grass roots level. The fund raising campaign had been quite successful as African chiefs and their followers gave generously: Saul Msane, for instance, collected £100 9s in one afternoon in Bethel in the Eastern Transvaal,⁴⁴ while Selby Msimang collected funds from East Griqualand and the Transkei.⁴⁵ As a consequence, the tone of the Congress's opposition to government policy began to change as younger and less constrained leaders like Selby Msimang came to the fore. "Our agitation is for the restitution of our legal rights", Msimang wrote⁴⁶ and it became clear that no matter how slim the chances were for successfully persuading the British government to step in and prevent the Union government implementing the Land Act, the Congress leadership would have to bow to popular pressure and use the funds collected to send a deputation to London. "We are between the other thing (sic)

and the deep sea — between two fires", said Dube at the Congress's conference in Kimberley in May of 1914 when the deputation was chosen. "On the one hand we have thousands of people who gave us their money on the express condition that we send a deputation to England, and to obey the government is to break faith with them."⁴⁷

In such circumstances, some white politicians began to view the Congress's activity with alarm and John X. Merriman, as always an acute observer of political trends, wrote to Botha the Prime Minister that he should both try and dissuade Dube from allowing the deputation to go overseas and to consider some policy of divide and rule. "These poor fools", he argued, "will do themselves nothing but harm, but indirectly they may give us a great deal of trouble both here and over the water. I do not think that it would be difficult to anyone like yourself to detach the Zulu from the Bechuana. At least, Dube's demeanour gives one that impression."⁴⁸ (emphasis added) Coming from a former Cape Prime Minister, Merriman's comment indicated the current trend of thinking in some Cape quarters, though the advice was lost on Botha who, probably reflecting the widespread hostility still in some sections of the N.A.D. to retribalisation, urged Walter Rubusana at his meeting with the deputation that "it was surely the duty of educated and enlightened leaders like him to disabuse the minds of the people of false ideas and to persuade them that no good purpose could be served by such talk".⁴⁹ There was still hope, in Botha's mind at least, that the educated elite could be used as the key instruments of social control over the Africans at a mass level.

But the decision to embark on the tour of England introduced a new dimension as the Congress leaders came up against the A.P.S. and its secretary, John Harris. By deciding to resort to a direct appeal to the British government, the Congress had unwittingly challenged the Society's own perceived prerogative of acting as mediator in such issues, while its stand in opposition to the Land Act contradicted Harris's own support for segregation as a philanthropic measure.⁵⁰ Thus, in the months before August 1914, when the outbreak of the first world war prevented any further stay in

England, Harris sought to defuse as far as possible the Deputation's political effectiveness and to force it into agreeing to a document that would signify the British government's approval of the Union government's policy of segregation. Though this was only partially successful, since the Deputation did get a chance to give their full views at a meeting with the Colonial Secretary, Harris's action signified an increasing determination on his and the A. P. S.'s part to actively intervene in and control Congress policy. His hand in this respect was strengthened when it came to the question of finding further funds for the Deputation members to return to South Africa in August 1914 and Dube, Saul Msane and Thomas Mapikela became indebted to Harris when he secured a loan for them via the Wesleyan Missionary Society, the London Missionary Society and the A. P. S.⁵¹ With these financial strings, Harris sought to continue influencing Congress policy back in South Africa and in 1916 a meeting of the Congress in Pietermaritzburg, passed a resolution that stated that the "Bantu people will gladly welcome the policy of territorial segregation of the races if carried out on fair and equitable lines".⁵² The wording betrayed the influence of Harris and philanthropic segregationism.

However, both the ineffectiveness of the 1914 deputation which had left the Congress in serious debt, and the rise of a more radical Congress faction centred around the newspaper Abantu Batho in Johannesburg, led to a showdown over Dube's links with the A. P. S. in 1917. With the publication of the Native Administration Bill, the hand of the militants was strengthened, especially as links had been established by this time with the syndicalist International Socialist League on the Rand, and at a meeting organised by the I. S. L. in the Johannesburg Trades Hall the Transvaal African Congress President S. M. Makgatho, together with Saul Msane and Horatio Mbelle, threatened strike action to resist the Bill.⁵³ Thus Dube's control over Congress became seriously threatened and his fate was sealed at a conference of the Congress in June of 1917 when a letter was read out of John Harris's supporting the 1916 Pietermaritzburg resolution. There was an "outburst of indignation" among the delegates, according to Sol Plaatje⁵⁴ and Dube, along with the Secretary of Congress, Victor Selope Thema, was forced to resign.⁵⁵ As a consequence the more radical faction

led by Makgatho came to dominate Congress and in the period immediately following the end of the first world war the Congress moved towards more radical resistance to government policy, culminating in a campaign of passive resistance against the pass laws in 1919.⁵⁶ The A.P.S. line of segregation and attempting to intervene in African politics had not paid off.

The beginnings of liberal consolidation in South Africa:

The weakness of external intervention into African politics by the A.P.S. from as far away as London led to a reappraisal of the liberal position in South Africa itself in the years after 1917 and it was as a result of this that the liberals were eventually strengthened organisationally vis a vis African political movements by the establishment of the Joint Council movement after 1921. At the same time the growth of radical African hostility towards working in collaboration with any white liberal organisation at all as a result of the Harris affair indicated that a far more flexible ideology would be needed than the somewhat domatic line of philanthropic segregationism. As African strike action grew after 1918 and political ideology started to move in the direction of an early Africanist radicalism⁵⁷ this began to be recognised by some South African liberals themselves. Maurice Evans for instance by 1919 began to advocate not only a Council of Native Affairs and a system of local government in South Africa on Glen Grey lines, but even parliamentary representation as a means to appease growing African political demands.⁵⁸ There began to occur indeed a swing back to the Cape model of local government and limited parliamentary representation with the additional Natal feature of a specialised Council or Commission on Native Affairs to provide "experts" a platform to "study" the "native question" in greater detail. Following a strike of African sanitary workers in Johannesburg in 1918, for instance, a Government Commission of Enquiry chaired by the Cape Magistrate John Moffat urged that the parliamentary franchise was essential if the political radicalism of organisations like the I.S.L., which it blamed for causing the strike, was not to spread amongst the African political elite. "So long as natives are denied the rights of citizenship as parliamentary voters", it concluded, "there can be no real contentment in the country".⁵⁹ This was linked,

too, to proposals to remove gradually the job colour bar secured under the 1911 Mines and Works Act and secure a class of semi-skilled African workers on the Rand as an agent of internal social control on the mines.⁶⁰ Furthermore, the Commission's proposal for a Council of Native Affairs was taken up by the Witwatersrand Church Council under the Reverend F.B. Bridgman which, as we discuss in the following chapter, had been deeply involved at the local level in reform of municipal administration.⁶¹ Organising a deputation to the Minister of Native Affairs, F.S. Malan, at the end of 1918 the Church Council urged an Industrial Board of three or four persons "acquainted with the natives" who could "advise in the event of another industrial conflict arising".⁶²

South African liberals, in fact, began to recognise that a more broadly-based liberalism was needed to cope with an increasingly complex political scene where there were a number of different openings and opportunities. A simple accommodation to territorial segregation, as had tended to occur in the years before and after the 1913 Natives Land Act with some philanthropic segregationists under the influence of external bodies like the A.P.S., was too narrow a conception and risked cutting off liberals completely from urban African political movements centred around a burgeoning working class. It was clear by the first world war that a rural conception of segregation failed to relate to the growing trend of permanent African urbanisation and chiefs and headmen were declining figures of social control in an urbanising society. This became clear, for example, after the Chamber of Mines refused to meet the S.A.N.N.C. in March 1919 to discuss African wages on the mines and decided instead on working through the chiefs. At a meeting with the Native Recruiting Corporation the following month, a deputation of chiefs confessed to being powerless to control the African workforce and Chief Isang Pilane expressed his surprise that there was not more "commotion" in Johannesburg.⁶³ In such circumstances, it began to become clear that more administrative machinery was required to control African workers, negotiate their wage rates and exercise social control by means of "studying" their problems and grievances, which could no longer be interpreted in a tribal or simple ethnic fashion. Some leaders in the mining industry, like H.M. Taberer and the head of the Native Recruiting Corporation

S.N. Pritchard (who had administered the Native Labour Contingent in France) were even in advance of government or liberal thinking on this issue and argued that the government should take a greater role in handling African wage rates while the Native Affairs Department should seek to restore "native confidence" in itself.⁶⁴

Furthermore, with the suspension of the Native Administration Bill in 1917 and the reporting of the five regional select committees on land demarcation in South Africa in 1918,⁶⁵ it was by no means certain by the end of the first world war what exactly would be the direction of territorial segregation. In 1913, the conception of segregation had been more simply defined as the Natives Land Act had been passed to appease white farming interests in the removal of African squatters and "kaffir farmers" from the Orange Free State and parts of the Transvaal.⁶⁶ But as the question arose of implementing a more comprehensive conception of territorial segregation, the Beaumont Commission and later the local land committees found extensive opposition from white farmers who were threatened with a loss of land values as they were put adjacent to African owned areas.⁶⁷ In such circumstances, there seemed to be increasing scope for white liberals and "native experts" to exert influence at the local level in order to modify some of the consequences of segregation and to champion the interests of African farmers in their search for larger grants of land.

In the years after the Armistice of 1918, therefore, there was a considerable revival of liberal hopes at the level of both national and local politics. With the death of Edward Dower, the Secretary of Native Affairs in late 1918, Merriman looked forward to a Cape liberal like Moffat "or one of his type" succeeding to the post⁶⁸ while government native policy as a whole seemed increasingly amenable to liberal political influence. Despite calls, for instance, by the Chief Magistrate of Johannesburg, T.G. Macfie for a coordinated campaign to remove all Africans without passes from the Rand in the wake of the 1919 Passive Resistance Campaign,⁶⁹ an Inter-departmental Committee chaired by the former Cape magistrate G.A. Godley recommended in 1920 only selective action and, indeed, urged that passes should be changed into "registration certificates".⁷⁰ Keeping in accord with the thinking of the Moffat

Commission of 1918, the Committee sought the permanent urbanisation of a section of the African workforce in towns like Johannesburg and argued that the most satisfactory way to exert control over African residential patterns would be in the form of "attractive and property controlled native townships or locations for the more permanent section of the native population, supplemented by efficiently conducted hostels and rest houses for natives temporarily sojourning in these areas".⁷¹ A Bill on these lines had indeed been drafted in 1918 by the Native Affairs Department and it appeared that liberal welfare and missionary work in the urban areas would be put on a firmer basis by legislative backing for permanent African urban townships where there would be provision for freehold property ownership.⁷²

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the Smuts government in 1920 passed a Native Affairs Act that extended the Glen Grey system of local councils and provided, after repeated requests by figures like Maurice Evans and the Bishop of Pretoria,⁷³ for a Native Affairs Commission as a platform for expert "study" of native affairs. Echoing many of the Cape assimilationist assumptions on the break-up of African tribal and communal structures, Smuts argued, while introducing the measure in parliament, that "the most complicated factor" in the whole native affairs issue, was "the break-up of the old tribal life and the engagement more and more of the native in the industrial life of South Africa". The "economic life of the country" had been "deepening the antagonism" and there was accordingly a need "to arrest this feeling of estrangement" and "to re-establish good relations and to recover the lost faith of the natives of South Africa".⁷⁴ This conciliatory tone won the praises of The Christian Express while The Star saw Smuts's speech as "one of the most important utterances ... since Rhodes introduced his Glen Grey Act in 1894".⁷⁵

Thus, by 1920, with the Native Affairs Act moving some way towards appeasing liberal demands, it seemed likely that a significant change in direction away from the more rigid territorial segregation of 1913 would occur, and that liberal political influence could be exerted at the centre of South African politics in a way which had not been seen since before Union. But a chain of events initiated by the African mine strike the

same year and escalating through the 1922 Rand Revolt and the 1923 Urban Areas Act dashed the more ambitious of these hopes. Within three years of the 1920 Native Affairs Act, liberals and their allies now organised through the Joint Councils, were back again in the position of seeking only piecemeal modification of policy and working at the local level.

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2. Charles Van Onselen, "The Witches of Suburbia: Domestic Service on the Witwatersrand, 1890-1914", History Workshop paper, University of the Witwatersrand, February 1978.
3. See Natal Blue Book on Native Affairs, 1904, p.70.
4. ABM F.B.B. to H.Q. 27 May 1905.
5. Ifor L. Evans, Native Policy in Southern Africa, Cambridge, 1934, p.17.
6. See chapter one.
7. See, for instance, Sir Godfrey Y. Lagden, "Administration" in The South African Native Races Committee, The South African Natives, London, 1909, esp. in comments on 1891 Natal Code of Native Law, pp.103-6; E.R. Garthorne, The Application of Native Law in the Transvaal, Pretoria, 1924.
8. Both published in London.
9. Colony of Natal, Report of the Native Affairs Commission, 1906-7, paras. 29-32.
10. ibid., para. 40.
11. ibid., para. 42.
12. ibid., para. 50. The Commission also favoured utilising such agencies as mission reserves, exemptions from native law, communal settlements in locations controlled by village councils and the encouragement of Africans to become permanent residents there free from tribal control and the establishment of municipal locations as a means to break down tribalism as well as "the use of the office of Native Commissioner for supplanting the authority of the Chief, and, as a moral agency, for the elevation of the people. By these and other means the fetters of tribalism will be loosened, and the system perish by natural decay.", para. 51.
13. ibid., para. 31

14. ibid., para. 52(II).
15. p.314
16. Report of Commission on Assaults on White Women, para. 189.
17. Evans, Black and White in South East Africa, p.189; cf. Native Affairs Commission Report, para. 30.
18. See C. Van Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, New York, Oxford University Press, 1966.
19. Black and White in the Southern States, London, 1913, p.111 ff. Other Natal segregationists like George Heaton Nicholls drew similar comparisons with the American experience of Reconstruction.
20. ibid., pp.235, 281.
21. ibid., p.235.
22. The Star, January 23 1915.
23. This term comes from John David Shingler, "Education and Political Order in South Africa, 1902-1961", Ph.D. Thesis, Yale University, 1973, p.191.
24. Kidd's influence on decision makers like Lagden, however, was probably to reinforce the general trend towards preserving tribal structures. See Lagden Diaries A951/A6 6 October 1902.
25. See chapter nine.
26. Trevor Fletcher, "The Native Problem - A Transcendental View", The African Monthly, Vol. 14, No. 24, November 1908; see also "The Native Problem", The State, Vol. 3, No. 5, May 1910 where Fletcher takes issue with some of the aspects of F.W. Bell's views on segregation: "If we isolate the kafir artificially from all contact with the whites and imagine he will thus undergo a mechanical development peculiar to himself, we shall only ensure his continued deterioration ... It is not so much by legislation as to a wider negotiation of our moral responsibilities to the lower races that we must look for a solution to the native problem." (p.778) Bell's eugenicism, of course, led him to believe that such "contact" would have precisely the opposite effect as black breeding would "undermine" the white race.
27. "The Native Problem - A Transcendental View", p.568.

28. See, for instance, Arthur Shearley Cripps, "An Africa for the Africans", International Review of Missions, Vol. 18, 1921, pp.97-107; An Africa for Africans, London, 1927. J.H. Oldham, "The Educational Work of Missionary Societies", Africa, Vol. VII, No. 1, 1934, pp.47-57; Cripps's views were based on a somewhat romantic view of history, which he read at Oxford, and a concern to restore land to "the Commonweal of England", Robin Palmer, Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia, London, Heinemann, 1977, pp.112-3. See also Penelope Hetherington, British Paternalism and Africa, 1920-1940, London, Frank Cass, 1978. The 1920s were a period of theosophy and a search for spiritual enlightenment in the wake of the scientific holocaust of the first world war.
29. For a discussion of Washington's views see August Meier, Negro Thought in America, Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1973.
30. Formed in 1909.
31. The South African Natives, p.69; the Committee initially received assistance from James Stewart, the Rev. J.S. Moffat and John Tudehope, Stewart Pap. D65/48 23A (XVI) Circular Arnold Fox, Jt. Hon. Sec., 11 Dec. 1900, Fox to Stewart, 24 November 1900.
32. ibid., p.231.
33. ibid., p.232.
34. Rachel Whitehead, "John Harris and the Chartered Company", Southern African Research in Progress, Centre for Southern African Studies, University of York, Vol. 2, 1977.
35. ibid.; Palmer, op. cit., pp.112-3.
36. For the Congress deputation see Peter Walshe, The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa, London, C. Hurst and Co., 1970, pp.50-52.
37. See, for instance, Report of the Native Land Commission, UG 22-'16, minutes of ev. Chief Karl Kekana; Chief Johannes Mamogale; Petition of Chief August Mokhatle and fourteen others, Rustenburg 1 May 1914, p.335: Chief Mokhatle told the Commission "We would be satisfied with the law if it allowed us to buy land. We would like to buy land anywhere we could get it."
38. Sol. T. Plaatje, Native Life in South Africa, 3rd ed., n.d., p.372; Richard Msimang, a lawyer and brother to Selby Msimang, also favoured "just segregation" see his pamphlet Land Act: Appeal to the People of England, n.d.

39. For a discussion of the 1913 Act and its differences to the 1912 Bill of Hertzog's see my article "African Farming and the 1913 Natives Land Act: Towards a Reassessment", Collected Seminar Papers, Southern African Research in Progress, Centre for Southern African Studies, University of York, 1978. See also Plaatje, op. cit.; Francis Wilson, "Farming, 1866-19066" in OHSA, Vol. 2, p.127.
40. Shula Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1970, pp.311-337; "The Ambiguities of Dependence: John L. Dube of Natal", JSAS, 1, 2 (April 1975), pp.162-80.
41. H.E. Colenso Pap. Box 43 J. Dube to H. Colenso 27 Nov. 1913.
42. London 1923. The novel depicts a black uprising in South Africa led by an American educated independent churchman Nelson, who is similar in some ways to the villain Laputa in John Buchan's novel Prester John.
43. Shula Marks, "Natal, The Zulu Royal Family and the Ideology of Segregation", JSAS, Vol. 4, No. 2 (April 1978), p.178.
44. Tsala ea Batho November 15 and December 13 1913; Msane collected £360 in the Eastern Transvaal, Plaatje, Native Life, p.180.
45. Selby Msimang, Unpublished Autobiography, SOAS, n.d., p.46.
46. MSS Brit Emp. S22 G203 H.S. Msimang to The Sec. A.P.S. 4 December 1913.
47. Tsala ea Batho May 14 1914.
48. P.M. 1/1/1914 Merriman to Botha 11 May 1914.
49. Cape Times, 16 May 1914.
50. Brian Willan, "The Anti Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society and the South African Natives Land Act of 1913", Journal of African History; Walshe, op. cit., p.50.
51. ibid.; MSS Brit Emp S22 G203 H.I. White to Buxton 16 May 1914; J.H. Harris to Sir Harry Johnstone 6 August 1914; F.H. Hawkins to J.H. Harris 11 August 1914; J.H. Harris to Arnold Wynne 20 August 1914; John H. Harris to J. Dube 16 October 1914.
52. Walshe, op. cit., p.55; Willian, op. cit.,

53. H. J. and R. E. Simons, Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1969, p.193; E. Roux, S.P. Bunting, Cape Town, 1942, p.32. For the growth of the I.W.A. on the Rand see Frederick Johnstone, "The IWA on the Rand: Socialist Organising among Black Workers on the Rand, 1917-1918", History Workshop Paper, University of the Witwatersrand, 1978.
54. Cobden Unwin Papers (APS file) National Liberal Club, Sol Plaatje to Mrs. Unwin 10 July 1917. I am grateful to Brian Willan for this information.
55. R.V. Selope Thema, Autobiography; H.S. Msimang, Autobiography, p.79; MSS Brit Emp. S22 G203 R.V. Selope Thema to Travers Buxton 20 March 1917.
56. Walshe, op. cit., pp.81-83; Edward Roux, Time Longer Than Rope, University of Wisconsin Press, 1964, pp.117-121.
57. Walshe, op. cit., pp.90-93.
58. The Star, April 14 1919.
59. Quoted in Simons, op. cit., p.209.
60. ibid., p.238. In July of 1920 the Chamber, in the wake of the February African mine strike, recognised the Transvaal Native Mine Clerks Association.
61. See p.144 and *passim*.
62. F.S. Malan Papers Vol. 18 Interview of Deputation from the Transvaal Free Church Council with the Honourable the Minister of Native Affairs at the New Law Courts, Johannesburg, Thursday 12 December 1918, p.2.
63. NA 768/18/F473 Notes of Meeting between Director of Native Labour and Native Chiefs, 2 April 1919; The Star April 4 1919.
64. NA 768/18/473 Director of Native Labour to SNA 27 March 1919; H.M. Taberer, Memorandum on Native Unemployment, 1919; The Star November 3 1919.
65. For the development of land policy after 1913 see C.M. Tatz, Shadow and Substance in South Africa, Pietermaritzburg, 1962.
66. See my article "The Agrarian Counter Revolution in the Transvaal and the Origins of Segregation, 1902-1913", in P.L. Bonner (ed), Working Papers on Southern African Studies, Johannesburg, 1977; T. Keegan, "The Restructuring of Agrarian Class Relations in a Colonial Economy: The Orange River Colony, 1902-1910", JSAS, Vol. 5, No. 2, April 1979, pp.234-254.

67. See, for example, UG 22-'16, Vol. 11, ev. G.A. Temlett; F. Wilson Cower, Fort Cox, pp.151-53; H.C.M. Tainton, Kei River, p.154; John James Kelly, Queenstown, p.131.
68. James Rose-Innes Corr., Merriman to Rose-Innes 31 December 1918. Merriman saw this as a key means to prevent the resurgence of black peril agitation.
69. J 278/6122/19 T.G. Macfie to The Sec. for Justice 31 March 1919; The Secretary of Native Affairs however only supported such a clearance if it avoided "irritation to or molestation of respectable law abiding natives who form the large majority of the native population", SNA to T.G. Macfie April 9 1919.
70. Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on the Native Pass Laws, 1920 UG 41-'22, para. 38, p.10. The Committee urged the passing of a Native Registration and Protection Act.
71. ibid., para. 46, p.11.
72. See chapter five, pp.159-60.
73. Michael Furse, Stand Therefore, London, S.P.C.K., 1953, pp.94-101; W.K. Hancock, Smuts: The Fields of Force, 1919-1950, Cambridge University Press, pp.118-119.
74. Cape Times May 27 1920; Tatz, op. cit., pp.34-36.
75. The Christian Express June 1 1920; The Star May 27 1920.

Chapter Five

Stallardism and the rise of urban segregation

Despite the hopes of some liberals in South Africa after the first world war that they would be able to extend their political influence, the rising clamour of white commercial and propertied interests in favour of extending urban segregation nullified this. Instead, there occurred, through the passing of the 1923 Natives (Urban Areas) Act, the entrenchment of a rigidly segregationist doctrine that has remained the cardinal principle behind South African urban areas legislation to the present day, namely that Africans should only be in ostensibly "white" towns and cities in so far as they minister to white economic needs. This doctrine, associated with the report of the Transvaal Local Government Commission of 1921 chaired by Colonel Stallard,¹ represented a severe limitation on the political and economic potential of liberal welfare and philanthropic work in urban areas, since it nipped in the bud any expectations they may have had for stabilising a propertied African middle class as a means of extending their mediating role with the growing mass of urban Africans. As a consequence, when liberal political influence did begin to extend itself in the 1920s amongst the growing African educational and political elite through the Joint Councils and later the Institute of Race Relations, it was qualified by a growing realisation on the Africans' part that its potential as a mediator and a lobbyist for the interests of urban Africans was severely limited. Similarly, as chapters six to nine of this study point out, the organisers of the Joint Councils and the Institute became increasingly aware as the years passed by that any influence they might have with the government of the day would be sizeably determined by the degree to which they were prepared to work within the basic tenets of territorial segregation and base their appeal on the enhancement of African interests in the reserves as opposed to the urban areas.

So the modelling of urban segregation around the Stallard doctrine in the years after 1923 represented a crucial hiatus in liberal fortunes, though it is interesting to note how little this was really perceived or truly understood at the time. In effect,

the growing turn of events in the post first world war period was either misread by the liberals or else simply accommodated to in a somewhat bland and short-sighted manner. By turning back towards local welfare work and the factual analysis of government policy, the liberals sought to ignore the underlying trend of urban segregation and assume that in some way the automatic logic of growing urbanisation, and its concomitant economic and social changes, would in themselves represent a powerful motor towards a different pattern of "race relations". This, for example, tended to be the assumption of the pioneering school of urban anthropologists in the 1930s led by Ellen Hellman and Eileen Krige, rooted as it was in the theories of "culture contact" associated with the International African Institute and its journal Africa.² Similarly, the work of the Joint Councils and welfare workers on the Witwatersrand tended to be heavily influenced by the North American pattern of urbanisation, as the writings of the American missionary Ray Phillips in such books as The Bantu are Coming and The Bantu in the City indicate.³

Thus, throughout the inter-war period and until at least the time of the sittings of the Fagan Commission of 1946-48, liberals in South Africa tended to avoid posing any central questions about the essential trajectory of urban segregation and to assume that it must at some stage become modified to fit what was seen as the more "normal" model of North America or Western Europe. This dependence on external models has tended furthermore, to characterise most liberal historical readings of South African urbanisation, until at least quite recently, and in the Oxford History of South Africa there is the implicit assumption in a number of chapters that urban policy is still dominated by an economically irrational ideology derived from the frontier past.⁴ This tradition of historiography, in turn, has been read back into the past, to explain the failure of liberalism to influence more widely the workings of government segregationist policy. In the writings of Rodney Davenport, for instance, there is a strong emphasis upon the strong domination of policy by such doctrinaire figures as Stallard and George Heaton Nicholls while liberals are left helpless, but righteous, in the political wings, continually outmanoeuvred by a rigged political system that always favours the most racial of political ideologies.⁵

There is something deeply unsatisfactory about such explanations. The logic and trend of government segregation policy cannot be explained in terms only of the machinations of individual men, divorced from the structural constraints and class pressures of urban politics. Similarly, the increasing "severity" of urban areas legislation over the period from 1923 to 1945 and beyond cannot be judged in terms of a eurocentric archetype derived from a different historical and social situation.⁶ The logic of urban segregation, indeed, needs to be located in terms of the complexity of class relationships, and their resulting ideological rationalisations, that were forged in the expanding urban milieux. By such means, it is possible to get behind the seeming "passivity" of the liberals in South African urban politics and to explain their failure through a combination of cultural and class limitations. In this way, therefore, we seek in this chapter to explain the long-term failure of liberals to influence policy at the political centre over the crucial years 1918-1923.

The limitations of the new urban liberalism:

One of the main problems that confronted the first generation of post-Union liberals was the speed and pace with which urbanisation overtook them. Between 1904 and 1921 urbanisation increased in the ratio of 100:155, of which the ratio for whites was 100:151 and Africans 100:185. The number of urban Africans rose by 87,622 between 1911 and 1921, while in the nine principal towns of the Union, the African population was estimated to have risen by an average of 61%.⁷ Many of the social "problems" that accompanied this urbanisation began to change too as more and more African women followed their menfolk to establish permanent families in the towns: in Cape Town, for example, African women increased by 110% between 1911 and 1921, 184% in Durban and 211% in Johannesburg.⁸ The consequences of this change, wrote the American missionary Frederick Bridgman in 1924 shortly before his death were "revolutionary" since it meant that Africans had "almost at a bound made the leap from communistic tribalism to individualism. They have come within the pale of industrialism."⁹

But how could the existing liberal conceptions, derived as they so often were from missionary work in a predominantly rural environment in areas like the Eastern Cape, be reformulated to fit the changing urban situation? This was a question that continually dogged liberal opinion formers in the years after Union and was never indeed really resolved before the Nationalist victory of 1948. The missionaries and welfare workers in South Africa's expanding towns and cities carried with them many of the optimistic assumptions of the nineteenth century civilising mission and did not fully realise the break-up that was occurring in Victorian liberalism. Frequently, missionaries had little experience of the changing nature of urban politics in late Victorian and Edwardian England, as an increasingly jingoistic lower middle class began to make itself felt on the political scene,¹⁰ and still based their activities on an unhampered extension of missionary activity in Southern Africa in the twentieth century. In the General Missionary Conferences in South Africa between 1904 and 1912, for instance, there was a growing move to rationalise and coordinate missionary work in order to meet the perceived "threat" from Ethiopianism, but the underlying assumption remained that a mere extension of the previous pattern of proselytising activity would in itself lead to the goal of complete Christianisation of the African population. Thus, in 1912 a conference survey noted that on the basis of the present rate of missionary expansion, whereby some 43 missionary societies manned 813 mission stations that covered 7 million Africans in South Africa, "another half century may see the complete Christianisation of the heathen population of South Africa south of the Limpopo River".¹¹

This general missionary myopia regarding the specific features of urbanisation was compounded, furthermore, by a further cultural legacy that limited the perceptions of those missionaries who were more acquainted with urban conditions. In South Africa the American Board Mission was probably one of the most urban-orientated of missions, given the strong influences back in the United States of the Social Gospel movement since the latter part of the nineteenth century.¹² This movement, however, which particularly influenced such missionaries as Frederick Bridgman and Ray Phillips,

was rooted in a collectivist and organic view of industrial societies that, like liberal hegelianism in England, failed to provide any specific class analysis of the urban social system.¹³ Thus, like the equivalent development of urban sociology in the United States around the Chicago School of Robert Ezra Park and Louis Wirth,¹⁴ there was an implicit assumption that modern urban social control could be constructed out of a synthesising of nineteenth century liberal optimism with twentieth century collectivism as part of a "search for order" out of the chaos of *laissez faire* economics.¹⁵ Within this process of a renewed harmony of economic and social interests on group rather than individualistic terms, it was assumed that the moral influences from missionaries and philanthropists would play a guiding lead. In this way a renewed pattern of "cooperation" between different racial and class interests could be ensured through the essential mediating role of urban missionaries, who could prevent the recurrence of Black peril agitations as had occurred on the Witwatersrand as late as 1912. This, for example, was the guiding assumption behind Bridgman's work in Durban between 1897 and 1912, before he moved up to the Rand, and it was a cardinal article of faith that schemes of social settlement which entrenched the status of lay preachers and created "healthful surroundings physical and moral . . . with evening school and bible class privileges" could ensure "a little Christian community which will be as gospel salt in this corrupt city".¹⁶

But this view of the mediating role of the urban missionary was flawed by a basic failure to account for the rise of a new propertied white lower middle class in the years after Union. Rooted as it so frequently was in North American and English parallels, the missionary view in South Africa was taken unawares by a more militant white petty bourgeoisie which was far less constrained by the consensual apparatus of Victorian liberal ideology. If the rise of petty bourgeois jingoism in England in the 1890s, culminating in the collective frenzy of Mafeking night, was a conservative and defensive move to consolidate the English liberal order around an essentially patriotic appeal,¹⁷ its equivalent form in South Africa knew no such limitations. With liberalism on the Witwatersrand being little more than a thin veneer, the South African white petty bourgeoisie resembled more the German

Mittelstand in its desire to create its own forms of political and ideological self expression. This had been true, for instance, of the issues of territorial and industrial segregation before Union, as we saw in chapter three, where the white petty bourgeoisie of the Transvaal before Union had been unwilling to accept automatically the dictates of the mining magnates and land companies grouped around the Transvaal Native Affairs Society.¹⁸ It became true, too, of the period after the 1913 Natives Land Act when the petty bourgeoisie, fortified by the patriotism engendered by the first world war, sought to consolidate itself as a respectable suburban middle class protected by a rigid pattern of urban segregation and health and sanitary reform.

For Bridgman and other welfare workers and missionaries on the Rand, these were only partially understood social trends, and the belief in the essential mediating role of urban missions continued to be a guiding principle, even in the middle of the 1912 Black Peril agitation. "... the lines of cleavage are being sharply drawn;", Bridgman noted in April of that year:

on both sides the forces are being organised. Evidently conflict must wax hotter before permanent improvement in racial relations can be expected. In the meantime it looks as though the missionary would have to act the part of buffer and get many hard knocks from his friends, white and black.

Though at the same time, the renewed appearance of the White League on the Witwatersrand did not seem to disturb him, for it did not seem to oppose any "reasonable demands".¹⁹ Thus, Bridgman's essentially nineteenth century optimism became only tempered by a realisation of the need for timing and political astuteness in working on central government in the wake of racial or industrial conflict that hit South Africa between 1912-14 as the Black Peril agitation was followed by white and African mine strikes. As the Economic Commission of 1914 pressed for outlets for semi-skilled African workers on the mines,²⁰ and the management of the mine recruiting bodies of W.N.L.A. and the N.R.C. favoured the creation of "open compounds" where Africans could live in locations with their families,²¹ the possibilities seemed to open up for the

liberals and their missionary and welfare worker allies to extend their mediating and "buffer" influences through a coopted African petty bourgeoisie. So a campaign began to mount in the years after 1915 for municipal reform and these ideas began to be pressed despite the fact that the likely white lower middle class response was only half understood.

The campaign for municipal reform:

Indeed, as liberal opinion formers, missionaries and welfare workers began to mobilise a campaign for the reform of municipal locations in the years after 1915, it was dimly perceived that the actual "reform" of these both strengthened the power of the central state as well as entrenching the structures in the urban areas of territorial and spatial segregation. The elaboration by the reformers of previous patterns of municipal reform such as that of Durban through the Native Locations Act of 1904 and the Native Beer Act of 1909 or the Native Reserve Locations Act of 1905 in Cape Town, gave municipalities the power to extend the racial division of property ownership. The liberals in other words either failed to perceive, or else actively connived in, a reformulation of the Victorian pattern of municipal reform on to racial lines. In England, the motivation behind much of this reform had been a class conscious attempt by the new middle class in the nineteenth century to impose a "sanitation syndrome" on the thinking of local government. As a consequence, disease and epidemics were seen to be endemic to, and caused by, the poor housing and living conditions of the working classes, who were in consequence to be treated as a separate category of public reform. In South Africa this Victorian class based conception of sanitation became progressively reformulated, in the aftermath of such outbreaks of bubonic plague as in Cape Town in 1902 and in Johannesburg in 1904, onto racial lines and the separate category of public housing for the working class became a racially separate category of urban locations.²² Thus, following Donald Olsen's analysis of Victorian London, we can see this in terms of a "tension between two coexistent but incompatible Victorian ideals: individual privacy and public

accountability" which followed class lines:

The middle classes desired privacy for themselves, but wished the lives of the lower orders to be lived in the full blaze of publicity. Street improvements and slum clearance schemes were designed to bring the poor into the open, where they could be observed, reprov'd and instructed by their superiors. 23

In South Africa, such a distinction became racially defined with the central cause of slums and urban squalor being perceived in terms of "the native problem" and the growth of an urbanised African population. The "solution" to this "problem", furthermore, was to be seen as pulling whites who lived in multi-racial slums out into privatised, middle class residential situations on the lines of the growing suburban model.²⁴ On the other hand, Africans, together with Coloureds and Asians, were to be kept under constant "public" (i.e. white) attention in the form of municipally-controlled urban locations.

In Johannesburg, these influences can be seen as critically shaping the campaign for reform after 1915. The Johannesburg Council had made a preliminary effort at establishing African locations in 1904 when, following an outbreak of bubonic plague, it established a location at Klipspruit near a sewage farm.²⁵ But multi-racial urban slums continued to grow in the years up to the first world war. In March of 1915, matters came to a head when a judgment in the Supreme Court meant that it became illegal for landlords to let rooms to Africans within the confines of the Johannesburg municipality. The effect of this judgment was to leave thousands of Africans under threat of eviction. "It seems", wrote The Star, "that a very stiff task faces the municipality" and the need to establish locations became pressing:

What seems to be necessary is either the establishment of locations conveniently situated and provided with decent housing at rentals as low as possible, or that areas which are already largely "black" should be defined as native areas and brought under a special set of bye-laws. 26

Pressure for such locations came especially from the temperance reformers on the Rand who linked the abolition of "illicit liquor" with the provision of adequate housing which would remove the pressures on African households to make up rents of often £3-£4 per month for a slum tenement through liquor dealing.²⁷ These reformers often came from a non-conformist background like Pim who was a Quaker. "Some of us who have not been able to get other work", Pim wrote to Lord Selbourne in June 1915, "are trying to obtain more control of the illicit liquor traffic, and to improve the scandalous conditions under which natives are bound in this town".²⁸

The pressure the temperance reformers placed on white opinion in the years after 1915 was for a radical reform in the whole "system" of African housing. Despite the appeal to a "public conscience", much of the influence on their thinking seems to have stemmed from the previous "Black Peril" agitation of 1912-1914 which had so shocked missionaries and liberals at the time.²⁹ In a report to the executive committee of the Citizens Alliance for Liquor Reform, for instance, Raymond Schumacher, F.B. Bridgman and R. Raine argued that African housing areas were too small and, like municipal locations, "should not be allowed to be extended on the present lines".³⁰ Policy in fact should be much more far reaching:

The present type of room or house is generally speaking unsatisfactory and the amount of space, both inside and outside the building, is insufficient. Provision should be made in the future for properly laid out native townships under the most sanitary conditions. 31

The basis of this recommendation lay in the growth of overcrowded slum conditions in many working class areas of Johannesburg where black and white lived cheek by jowl in appalling conditions of poverty and degradation. In the Vrededorp and Siemert Road district, for instance, a group of ricksha "boys" were reported as having "a little colony" close to houses occupied by whites; while in Jeppestown and districts of Doornfontein reformers pointed to the "problem" of "yards" at the

back of ostensibly respectable residential property where slum conditions persisted.

At the back of one such cottage built of wood and iron there was:

a yard containing between 30 and 40 of the worst kind of slum rooms and every one of the rooms is occupied.

Considerable ingenuity has been shown in the squeezing in of the greatest number of these, and not a foot of the walled-in yard space has been wasted. The plan with all these places is to use the yard wall for the outer wall of the living room, so that only three sides need be added. Walking round the cottage you come straight upon four or five rooms that have not been thus treated. They have been built separately, quite near the back of the house, but the occupants may consider themselves the aristocrats of this yard, for they have windows in their rooms and some light. 32

In one of the "rooms" in this yard, measuring 7 feet by 7 feet, two people lived at a monthly rent of £1 5s a month: the husband of the African couple occupying it earned £3 a month. This yard was "one of the worst" in Jeppe for

Round the yard, in the corner, you may notice here and there a hole that once contained a bottle, until the police came along and found the hiding place.

For the white slum owner in the cottage, however, the yard was a profitable venture for she received 30 lots of rent ranging from £1 5s to £1 10s. In all some one hundred "coloureds" lived in the yard.³³ Since, however, it was estimated that 80% of Africans in Johannesburg earned less than £3 a month, short of a planned township, there was nowhere else to live. The reformers tended studiously to avoid the question of wages as such, for to them the "problem" was posed in terms of "bad" housing leading to illicit liquor dealing and a consequential increase in crime, especially on an organised basis like the "amaleita".³⁴ But seen in these terms, the reformers' arguments carried considerable weight. The Rooth Committee on the working of the Transvaal Liquor laws found that between 1903 and 1917 there were 168,521 convictions for contravention of the liquor laws in Pretoria and on the

Witwatersrand: this included 8,214 whites for the sale of liquor and 22,160 for drunkenness while there were a further 123,237 convictions of Africans. Without further locations the number of slums was likely to grow: in 1915 it was estimated that of the African population in Johannesburg, some 2,500 adult males lived at Klipspruit and in the Wemmer and Jubilee compounds set up under municipal control, while a further estimated 8,800 lived in "yards".³⁵

The proposed locations were to be at rents which an average African family, at the existing wage levels, could afford to pay. The "solution", therefore, proposed by the reformers was to build the locations on land at a low market price outside the city confines and ensure an effective system of transport into the city. Howard Pim, for instance, proposed a site about 3 to 4 miles from the business district for "given good transport, employers would be willing to allow their native servants to live away from their stores". The Star agreed and proposed a tram system and "worker trains" which would ensure that the whole enterprise of establishing locations on the city perimeter would be worthwhile. In the language of mining recruitment it argued:

... a serious economic wastage could be cured by a proper housing scheme the natives in all probability finding no difficulty at all in paying such sums for their municipal accommodation as would cover interest and redemption on the capital sum invested by the town. 36

By the end of 1915 this pressure from the reformers was felt in the municipal elections when seven candidates fielded by the reformist Rand Social Services League were elected to the Johannesburg council. The tone of the candidates' appeal indicated the racial basis of the reformist programme:

Have you ever visited the pestilential yards where the dregs of the white, coloured and native population are herded together in indescribable filth and squalor? If so you will appreciate the pressing need for native townships and better housing conditions. 37

One candidate in the election, J.A. Smit, who was Chairman of the Parks and Estates Committee, was more explicit:

Destruction of slums and municipal housing:

This matter is bound up with the question of natives residing in town. The indiscriminate manner in which natives at present reside and live within the town cannot be other than a menace to the lives and health of the population. The council's power to deal with the matter is somewhat circumscribed. 38

With descriptions such as these, the campaign continued through the 1917 municipal elections when five reform candidates were elected on a growing white franchise on the Rand that for the first time included white women.³⁹ Only by 1920 did the reform campaign appear to die down, as the issues increasingly came to be defined on a national level and legislation began to be drawn up.⁴⁰

The basis behind the municipal reform campaign stemmed, in part, from the revival of an economic potential for slum clearance schemes. The actual social engineering process involved in expropriating and compensating slum owners who rack-rented properties to Africans, Coloureds and "poor whites" was a costly business, as the Johannesburg city council had discovered in 1903 following an outbreak of bubonic plague. The Transvaal Government - then under British colonial control - was influenced by similar schemes in Britain under the Housing of the Working Classes Act of 1890 and had compensated the slum owners of the "insanitary area" by considerably excessive amounts: in all some £1,145,046 was paid for land which was only worth £393,000 in 1912 when it came to be assessed by the Transvaal Leasehold Townships Commission.⁴¹ Thus the establishment of the Klipspruit Location in 1904 left memories of excessive compensation and charges of corruption, compounded by the fact that the city council itself became dogged by declining rateable values of property in the years after 1906. Compared to 1906-7 when the income from rates was £421,066, in 1907-8 income fell to £340,376 and did not begin to pick up again until 1911.⁴² Furthermore, Union in 1910 added confusion in that it remained unclear what exactly the responsibilities of the council were in relation to those of the central government and many interests on the city council continued to deny their responsibility for urban reform and charged it to the Union government in Pretoria.⁴³

In 1917, however, the relationship between the city council and the central government became more closely defined when the Union government refused to allow the extension of the Durban system of municipal beer brewing as a means of raising money for the upkeep of African locations until the council first provided better municipal locations in the first place.⁴⁴ While the Durban system led to repeated opposition from the Witwatersrand Church Council, who saw it as likely to erode the basis behind the migrant labour system since African male wage earners would be spending their income on municipal beer and not put it into "more productive channels" or allow it "to be sent home to the families of the natives",⁴⁵ the potential for further municipal locations aided the reformers' attacks on those sections of the white petty bourgeoisie who were seen to profit from the perpetuation of multi-racial slums. One reform candidate in the 1917 election, John Taylor of Norwood, for example, singled out the slum landowner, the illicit liquor seller and the "kaffir eating house owner" as those "vested interests" who "ministered to the vices of the native".⁴⁶ Similarly, the Secretary of the Transvaal Municipal Employees Federation wrote in The Municipal Magazine in the Transvaal that "it should be possible for the Council to make it a punishable offence for certain premises in specific locations to be let to others than native or coloured people and in other specific parts of the town to be 'let' to other than whites. In this way the living together, cheek by jowl, of whites and blacks could be prevented and slums, such as now exist, would be done away with."⁴⁷ The influenza epidemic of 1918 at the end of the first world war undoubtedly contributed to these segregationist sentiments as it did, for instance, in the case of Cape Town and the decision to remove the inhabitants of Ndabeni to the new location at Langa.⁴⁸ In Johannesburg, the council's housing and health committee instigated a Public Health and Social Welfare Survey and concluded that "the abolition of slum property is one of the first steps on the road to civic health" and recommended the establishment of cottages at low rents on lines similar to the Bloemfontein Town Council.⁴⁹

This manipulation of the sanitation syndrome ensured that by 1918 the Johannesburg city council proposals should closely coincide with those developed by the municipal reformers. As early as May 1917 the Council adopted recommendations for a site to be selected for an African location and tenders were given out for the erection of houses at Newlands, with a tramway connection being established to Brixton. Some of Howard Pim's and the reformers' ideas on moving the African location away from Klipspruit and closer to the centre of the city were taken up, at the same time as transport connections were established in order to ensure an adequate model of urban segregation. At first only £44,350 was allocated for the buildings and roads with provisions for 1,200 Africans in 75 two-room houses.⁵⁰ However in 1918 the Parks and Estates Committee submitted two further estimates for African rehousing in locations (£125,000) and £250,000 for "poor whites": though the proposal was watered down by the finance committee to a mere £65,000 for the African housing scheme and none at all for Africans. "... it is well to remember", commented The Star after initial opposition to the scheme, "that these are times of stringency and that to perpetuate what may be termed the "Town Hall Standard" of sumptuousness is, or should be, inappropriate to prevailing conditions. Health before the splendours of landscape gardening should be the watchword."⁵¹ Emulation of the British pattern of municipal reform seemed, indeed, to be on the way out.

This increasingly segregationist tendency at the local level was compounded by the growing mobilisation of political opposition by the municipalities at the national level to proposals for state control over municipal administration and the entrenchment of many of the ideas of the liberal municipal reformers. A 1918 draft Bill prepared by the Native Affairs Department to provide for the "establishment and the better management and control of locations and other places of residence for natives in urban areas and generally for the administration of native affairs in urban areas"⁵² incorporated many of these liberal ideas as it sought, in a manner similar to the state-orientated British Housing of the Working Classes Act of 1890, to provide for state powers to compel recalcitrant local authorities to comply with general provisions for sanitary reform.

Furthermore, the segregationist provisions under this Bill were generally weak in so far as it followed the Cape model by giving sections of the African petty bourgeoisie in urban areas the right to be exempted from living in municipal locations or hostels, while restrictions on African trading were removed outside urban locations.⁵³ The Bill too was generally favoured by white liberals. James Henderson saw it as a measure which would extend the opportunities open to the semi-skilled trainees from Lovedale who were often prevented in towns in the Orange Free State and elsewhere from conducting trading activities, though he hoped for further provisions whereby Africans could make their own "representations" so as "to secure that their interests are properly considered by the central authority" for "local authorities are apt to take a narrow view even of their own interests in having a strong supply of Native Labour at hand, not to say of the opportunities of utilising the abundance of Native labour for industrial developments in the interests of both races".⁵⁴

But lobbying from local authorities in the period after 1918 ensured that the reformist provisions contained in the 1918 Bill were considerably modified by the time of the 1923 Natives (Urban Areas) Act. Pressure on local authorities from white ratepayers began to build up when the cost of schemes such as Johannesburg's location at Newlands began to rise beyond the original estimates. The original £44,350 set aside in June 1918 for the erection of the location proved inadequate by 1922, despite the fact that the cost of the buildings was kept to a basic minimum through constructing two-roomed huts with roofs of galvanised iron together with a small verandah and latrine. The cost led to a deficit in the council's expenditure and in 1922 alone this amounted to some £7,251, while the cost of providing trams to and from the location between 1919 and 1922 added a further £3,419.⁵⁵ It was thus not surprising that local authority representatives echoed the complaints of their ratepayers to the 1922 Select Committee on Native Affairs, especially as some Labour councillors like Morris Kentridge objected to the location being in the vicinity of white working class suburbs and thus jeopardising white property values.⁵⁶ "Personally I should not like to encourage a native to build his own house", said Councillor H. Kroomer to the Select Committee on the suggestion that Africans be allowed to take up 33 year leases,

"we only want the natives in the locations as long as they work in Johannesburg. We have no desire that they should go and stay there permanently ... we want to expel from our locations a number of loafers who are really doing no work at all. These people are at present living in the slums, and we do not want to be burdened by these people. Some place must be provided for them."⁵⁷

The tone of these remarks indicated an alternative formulation to that of co-optation of the African petty bourgeoisie and strong state control suggested by the municipal reform campaign and the 1918 draft bill. The entrenchment of an urban African petty bourgeoisie would mark a split in the otherwise united racial unity of white property owners and thus represent the possibility of South African cities developing into a distinctly multi-racial direction such as New York where the negro population rose by 66% between 1910 and 1920 and 115% between 1920 and 1930, and 87,417 negroes moved into Harlem and 118,972 whites left for the suburbs of the Bronx, Brooklyn and Queens.⁵⁸ This ghettoization in New York, especially in Harlem, was a consequence of the inability of white property owners to maintain a united front of racial segregation in resistance to the negro urban influx. For many white landlords and land speculators the entrance of the negroes proved very profitable, while for the rest the choice was either maintaining white tenants at very reduced rents or acceding to the general trend and letting to negroes; thus ensuring that Harlem quickly became a "negro" area.⁵⁹ This was precisely what many of the municipal reformers in South Africa feared: hence the attacks on the slum landlords on the Rand who let to Africans as well as low income whites. In contrast to the New York situation, however, the municipal reformers were able, via a direct access to the white controlled state, to enforce state intervention in order to prevent the logic of market forces and property values dictating this American style trend in the urban areas. In the years after 1918 the channels of communication between local authorities and the state increased such that by the time of the 1922 Select Committee on the Urban Areas Bill, government policy was forced to accede to the demands of the municipalities.

One of the reasons for this enhancement in the municipalities' political effective-

ness was that, compared to the weak and diversified nature of the liberals, they reflected the coherent class interest of the white petty bourgeoisie. Under such leaders as Colonel Stallard in the S.A.P., the white petty bourgeoisie had been able to take advantage of the splits in the South African Labour Party over the issue of entering the first world war, and to widen its appeal on the basis of a jingoistic patriotism.⁶⁰

As a high tory patriot with populist leanings, Stallard used some of the arguments of the philanthropic segregationists in order to emphasise the differences between African and White cultures in South Africa and to rationalise complete urban segregation. Arguing for a white labour policy, for instance, Stallard told the Dominions Royal Commission in 1914 that "the native in South Africa is essentially a socialist" while "we are more individualistic" and there was a danger of the African system being "broken down" through migrant labour. Accordingly, there was a need for the creation of "native territories ... of considerable size, where they (the Africans) will be able to lead their own life under their own social conditions, according to their own ideas".⁶¹

These arguments he was able to project with great effectiveness through the Report of the Transvaal Local Government Commission of which he was chairman, in 1921 and to outweigh the competing liberal influences organised around the Native Affairs Commission, established under the Native Affairs Act. At a conference between the Commission and the N.A.C. in August 1921, it was clear that the Stallard position was likely to prevail as the two groups agreed that "the existence of a redundant black population in municipal areas is a source of the gravest peril, and responsible in a great measure for the unsatisfactory condition prevailing".⁶² In the aftermath of the 1919 Passive Resistance Campaign and the 1920 African mine strike, the Stallard Commission had the backing of the municipalities and white property interests in their attack on African residence in urban areas, and though liberals on the N.A.C. like Alex Roberts, a former teacher at Lovedale, hoped for modifications in the pass laws on lines suggested by the Godley Committee's Report of 1920,⁶³ it seemed ever more likely that state policy would bend to municipal and Stallardist pressure.

This was evidenced in a new Urban Areas Bill published by the N.A.D. in

February of 1922 which, while still containing some of the ideas on co-optation of an African petty bourgeoisie by providing for the creation of "native villages" where municipal authorities could "advance moneys to approved natives for the construction of dwellings for them" and the right of Africans to acquire "for residential purposes the ownership or lease of lots",⁶⁴ at the same time moved clearly in the municipalities' favour by providing them with greater powers to expel Africans "habitually unemployed", "not possessed of the means of livelihood" or "leading an idle, dissolute or disorderly life".⁶⁵ Though some of the African leaders on the Johannesburg Joint Council like Selby Msimang looked still to the cooptive provisions of the Bill and the "great possibilities" it held out to would-be African property holders,⁶⁶ even these limited rights came under growing Stallardist attack in the months after its publication.

One of the members of the Stallard Commission, M.G. Nicholson — who was town clerk of Pretoria — voiced his opposition to the Bill's provision for Africans to own property freehold on the grounds that it conflicted with the Stallard Commission report that "natives ... should only be permitted within municipal areas in so far and for so long as their presence is demanded by the wants of the white population". In the case of the draft Bill, Nicholson pointed out the dangers of creating a permanently urbanised class of Africans who would be likely to compete with the white petty bourgeoisie in trade and business activities:

One can easily imagine such a native village being established on the outskirts of a town and ostensibly at the commencement for workers in that town only, but in the course of time the inhabitants far outnumbering those of the town itself and demanding an outlet for their activity, thereby competing with the town's inhabitants in every sort of business, trade and occupation.

What was needed, Nicholson went on, was for a "definite policy" regarding Africans in urban areas. While willing to accept the need for villages — with their rural connotation — Nicholson suggested a scheme that had been previously outlined by the Stubbs Committee in 1918. Such villages were to be "for the exclusive residence of natives so long as they are in the employment of European

masters or have definite work to do for the good of their own community" and were at the same time "separate from the European areas, but with ready means of transportation" where "dwellings there could be erected either by the municipality or by employers of labour or by the natives themselves".⁶⁷ This was a scheme that reflected the growth of more modern means of transportation, but at the same time sought to use it to maintain the cheap labour basis of the reserves in the form of urban locations contiguous to "white" urban areas. The reformists' willingness to entrench a freeholder class who could also develop distinct trading interests, threatened the whole wage labour basis of this model of urban locations and also raised the spectre of a large black township that would destroy the whole ideal of urban areas being specifically "white".

Nicholson's arguments indicated the white lower middle class opposition to those parts of the bill which accepted the idea of permanent African urbanisation. In January of 1923, one month before the bill began to be debated in the House of Assembly, a conference in Johannesburg between the Executive Committee of the Transvaal Municipal Association and members of the Assembly for Reef and Pretoria constituencies indicated the extent of this disapproval among the municipalities. "So far as the Transvaal is concerned", the conference recorded, "it (the Bill) introduces novel and far reaching principles, the result of which may be very different from what the framers of the Bill ever intended".⁶⁸ In the debate on the Bill itself, there were similar expressions of opposition. While Smuts argued that the Bill provided for urban segregation on the principles of the 1913 Land Act and the fact that they "could not mix up natives indiscriminately in one location. They had to give the educated and progressive native a better position in the location than the native who was just rising from barbarism",⁶⁹ Creswell went on to warn of the prospect of "great black cities around our industrial centres". The "policy of drift", he argued, that was contained in the Bill was one "which was tending to wither the roots of our white civilisation in South Africa".⁷⁰

This opposition reached fruition during the committee stages of the Bill when the Select Committee under Richard Feetham moved a number of amendments

to reduce African rights of residence in urban areas. In particular, clause 1 (b) was amended such that the rights of "natives ... to acquire for residential purposes the ownership or lease of lots" was changed to mere leasehold.⁷¹ "It would have been no use", Feetham wrote to Pim, "trying to satisfy native sentiment in favour of ownership ... at the cost of exacting antagonism of municipal authorities and making the bill unworkable".⁷² The effect of the change, however, on African opinion was profound. Selby Msimang saw the Bill as a "most shameful compromise" which "deliberately seeks to arrest Bantu progress and to perpetuate a dangerous policy of keeping the Natives dispossessed of landed property".⁷³ Msimang, in fact, was in favour of organising a stoppage of work in Johannesburg and the sending of a deputation to Pretoria to protest against the failure of the Act to allow Africans freehold property in urban areas; the idea was dropped, though, since he was unable to obtain support from his fellow African members of the Johannesburg Joint Council.⁷⁴ The inclination of the co-opted elements of the African petty bourgeoisie was to continue to work through segregationist structures, and to hope that some pressure for change could be exerted through the Joint Councils.

In June 1923, therefore, when the Joint Council in Johannesburg discussed the Urban Areas Act, the pressure for some sort of "liberalisation" of the freehold tenure measures focused on the leasehold regulations that were to be published under the Act. Howard Pim, as chairman of the Council, urged that leases should be standardised and stated that he had pressed this point in discussions with both Alex Roberts and General Smuts. The African members of the Council proceeded to recognise the effective withdrawal of the ownership clauses from the Act but hoped that leasehold standardisation would be such as "to make them as good as freehold".⁷⁵ This standardisation was, the Joint Council was able to report at the end of the year, effected so that to all intents and purposes the distinction between leasehold and freehold had been nullified.⁷⁶

The move back to the reserves:

However, the political efficacy of urban segregation in the years after 1923 ensured that, even while opposing the more rigid applications of the job colour bar and the exclusion of Africans even from semi-skilled positions — liberals in South Africa after 1924 were forced even more to confront the issue of the rural reserves as the basis of social control. "All thinking natives must admit", Selby Msimang wrote, "that we cannot any longer adopt the line of campaign in 1914 because segregation is no longer a theory but a fact. We must therefore find a means of adapting ourselves to it and get our people to make fresh resolutions about accepting the inevitable in a spirit that will make segregation a blessing in disguise."⁷⁷ Over the following decade the process of adaptation to government policy on these lines by the African political and educational elite was ably assisted by white liberal organisations and the process of incorporating the fundamentals of the Stallardism within liberal ideology ensured that a review of urban segregation would be put off.

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21. Dominion Royal Commission, minutes, p.52. Temperance reformers, however, favoured the Kimberley Closed Compound system in order to prevent the sale of alcohol. J.M. Orpen, Natives, Drink, Labour, East London, 1913.
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24. ibid.; David Thomas, Suburbia, Paladin Books, 1973, p.30.
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26. The Star, March 19 1915; The case revolved around the issue of whether it was lawful for an owner of property to let rooms to Africans in a labour district when they were not actually employed by him. The defendant in the case was found guilty of so doing at 17 Becker St., Johannesburg, under Proclamation 18 of 1903 which was a direct outcome of Proclamation 37 of 1901 which was issued by the British administration in the Transvaal for the purpose of regulating African workers' entry into the Transvaal and the control of them at public diggings. The

Proclamation, furthermore, was seen by the court as directly continuing a further law of the Transvaal Republic, the Volksraad Beluit of September 1871. Under the law so proscribed, an African worker in Johannesburg, having obtained employment, had to either live on the premises of his employer, or if on a mine in a mining compound or else in a location. In the case in question, the accused was found guilty of "harbouring" an African who worked on the Ferreira Gold Mine. Rex v Fleischman, South African Law Reports, Transvaal Provincial Division, March 15, 19, 1915, pp.47-53.

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30. The Star, May 27, 29 and June 15 1915; the second report of the Alliance argued for both compounds and locations under municipal control since this was "the only way an adequate system can be maintained". In July a further report appeared from a Joint Committee including representatives from the Transvaal Missionary Association, the Diocesan Board of Missions, the Witwatersrand Church Council and the Social Services League which pointed out that the illicit liquor "problem" was a result of inadequate housing and argued for accommodation both for single men, married black workers, and single African women, the latter issue coming to occupy a considerable portion of white philanthropic activities on the Rand. See Debbie Gaitskell, "Christian Compounds for Girls: Church Hostels for African Women in Johannesburg, 1907-1970", paper presented to History Workshop, University of the Witwatersrand, February 1978.
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32. E.M. Ramsey, "The Slum Peril", The Star, November 8 1915.
33. ibid.; one report of the sub-committee of the Citizens Alliance for Liquor Reform quoted one of its members saying "there are houses, once dwellings of better class white folk, now let out in tenements to the dregs of a mixed

population. I shall never forget going upstairs in a house in ----- Street and finding a black man, white woman, a sheep and a goat all living together in the top room", The Star, May 27 1915.

34. Charles van Onselen, "South Africa's Lumpenproletarian Army; 'Umkosi Wa Ntaba' - 'The Regiment of the Hills', 1890-1920", Past and Present, No. 8, August 1978, pp.91-121.
35. SC2-1918, p.35
36. The Star, September 22 1915.
37. The Star, November 9 1915.
38. ibid.; see also November 1 and 5.
39. The Star, November 6 1917.
40. The Star, March 9 1920.
41. Maud, op. cit., p.134.
42. ibid., pp.72-3.
43. ibid., p.78.
44. ibid., p.136; Swanson, "Urban Origins"; "'The Durban System'".
45. The Star, January 31 1917; the Council pointed out that in Durban, Africans spent £2,400 a month on "kaffir beer" and that the age limit for drinking had been reduced from 21 to 15. In addition there were ten times the black population on the Witwatersrand. This raised a black peril spectre for "thousands of our house boys who now never touch the drink will frequent these places and secure a taste that will not stop at what is provided in them. The overwhelming number of black peril cases have been clearly traced to drink. To legalise the sale of drink, and to invite house boys to indulge, is to run great risks of increasing the danger."
46. The Star, November 1 1917; Taylor proposed four locations and accommodation on vacant mining ground to the East and West of the town. This would, furthermore, he argued, be without further demands on white ratepayers since many African families could be placed on freehold ground: an argument, though, that probably did not endear him to white traders. The Star, however, agreed with this line and argued that "the talk of segregation in so far as it affects the industrial side of our life is the hollowest sham ever foisted upon an unrelenting public", ibid.

47. The Municipal Magazine, November 1918.
48. Chris. C. Saunders, "From Ndaneni to Langa, 1919-35", in Christopher Saunders (ed), Studies in the history of Cape Town, University of Cape Town, 1979: the flu caused 40,000 deaths by mid-1919 and resulted in the Union Government asking the Cape Town municipality to take it over. Instead, however, of the Council accepting the burden of £20,000 for improvements, lengthy negotiations followed for the building of a new "model location" to replace Ndaneni: see also Maud, op. cit., p.136, and Howard Phillips, "Black October: Cape Town and the Spanish influenza epidemic of 1918", in C. Saunders, op. cit..
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57. SC 3-'23, p.11.
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61. Dominions Royal Commission, minutes, p.120.

62. TP 1-'22, appendix VII, p.95; Rodney Davenport has argued that the N.A.C. sought the restriction on Africans entering urban areas "on sociological rather than dogmatic grounds" in comparison to the Stallard Commission, Beginnings, p.14. It is difficult to see the exact theoretical basis of this argument and to perceive the reason for the Stallard Commission's arguments being any less "sociological" than the N.A.C.'s. In their long term thrust, though, the Stallard Commission's segregationism represented a different class interest to that of the N.A.C. as we have sought to show in this chapter.
63. Pim Papers, Alex Roberts to H. Pim, 24 August 1921.
64. "Bill to provide for improved conditions of residence for natives in or near urban areas for the better administration of native affairs in such areas", Union Gazette Extraordinary, 1 February 1922, Clause 7(i)(c), p. iv.
65. ibid. Clause 13(i)(a), p.vi.
66. Umteteli wa Bantu, 3 February 1923.
67. The Municipal Gazette, October 1922.
68. The Municipal Gazette, January 1923, p.7.
69. HAD Vol. VIII 3rd Sess., Parlt., reported in Cape Times, February 6 1923, p.67.
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Chapter Six

The Joint Councils and the extension of co-optation

The failure of white liberals to take up a sustained interest in the issue of urbanisation in the 1920s did not preclude a widening of the avenues of social advancement to sections of the African petty bourgeoisie and the development of an effective strategy of social control through political co-optation. In so far as the industrial militancy shown in the aftermath of the first world war had failed to prevent the emergence of a policy of urban segregation, African political leadership had by 1924 become isolated from the groundswell of African popular opinion. Deprived of a popular base, which - if it got involved in any mass activity at all by the mid-1920s - tended to drift towards the I. C. U. of Clements Kadalie,¹ some key African spokesmen became the effective articulators of a white liberal ideology. Most prominent of these were Victor Selope Thema, who wrote regularly for the Chamber of Mines newspaper Umteteli wa Bantu and later became editor of The Bantu World in the 1930s, and Selby Msimang, one of the founder members of the A. N. C. in 1912 and who, after a period spent establishing branches of the I. C. U. in the Orange Free State in the early 1920s and imprisonment in Port Elizabeth,² became another regular columnist for Umteteli and a prominent African member of the Johannesburg Joint Council. In addition, a considerable number of other African political leaders got drawn in to political channels controlled by the white liberals, though a prominent minority, led by the former editorial group of the Garveyist paper Abantu Batho and including such figures as D. S. Letanka and T. D. Mveli Skota, refused any such collaboration.³

The basis for the white liberals' success rested to a considerable degree on the transformed nature of the class conflict in the South African social formation in the wake of the 1920 and 1922 mine strikes. Some measure of political acquiescence by the defeated African political intelligentsia would probably have accrued in any

case by the middle-1920s since the A. N. C. suffered a sharp decline in support following its dismal failure in the 1919 pass campaign. The A. N. C. leadership's fright during the course of that campaign, as we saw in Chapter Five, especially as its inability to keep control over it, ensured that some form of collaboration with reform-orientated institutions was more or less inevitable. The strong influences of mission education which was supplemented in some cases by attendance at Lovedale under the Reverend James Henderson⁴ aided this general predisposition to seek "solutions through the proper channels" so that it was not especially difficult to win over some individuals even without any formal organisation such as the Joint Council. Saul Msane, for instance, had come out in support of the Chamber of Mines during the 1918 African sanitary workers strike and issued a pamphlet in SeSotho calling on the workers to go back.⁵ But, this partial and eclectic form of co-optation remained diffuse until it was crystallised through more formal systems of organisation and it was precisely this need which the Joint Council movement in the 1920s was founded to serve. The actual size of the African petty bourgeoisie by the early 1920s indicated that merely local welfare organisations would be inadequate to cope with the growing mobility of African political, religious and cultural leaders: there were an estimated 9,756 African teachers, ministers, chiefs and headmen in 1921 and a further 1,634 interpreters and clerks⁶ and the national scope of their work - aided by the growing nationalist ideology of the A. N. C. itself - meant that a concomitant national co-optive network had to be created if the competing ideological influences from both Garveyism and marxism from the emergent South African Communist Party, were to be neutralised.

Furthermore, South African welfare organisations in the period before 1918-20 still tended overwhelmingly to reflect the missionary tradition of Christian proselytisation and saving heathen souls with only a minimal emphasis upon active material assistance to the emerging working class in South Africa's towns and cities. While there was some selective welfare work on the Rand such as that of the Community of the Resurrection, which organised a hostel for African women on the Rand as early as 1908 in Doornfontein district,⁷ for the most part church activity in the period before the first world war tended to steer clear of any comprehensive programme of economic

and social reform. Deprived, therefore, of any wider systematic ideology of reform which recognised that political co-optation of African political leadership depended to some extent upon reform in the living conditions in the communities from which they sprang, white welfare organisations left themselves open to the continuous charge of pursuing "rescue work" that merely shut the gate after the horse has bolted.

This inadequacy in missionary work tended to become exposed and debated during the course of the municipal reform campaign which was discussed in the last chapter. Frederick Bridgman, especially, acted as a significant catalyst for a new approach that imbibed some of the ideas previously developed in America among reform groups during the Progressive era. Reflecting, in particular, the growing urban orientation of this radicalism when America was still dominated by the agrarian myth of an individualistic yeomanry, Bridgman urged social reform in South Africa in language reminiscent of such contemporaries as Jane Addams. Johannesburg, he recognised soon after coming to the Rand was, in 1913, "the very pivot upon which the future of the native in South Africa swings".⁸ But it was "useless" to expand missionary work on the Rand "unless the missionary can in some way or other find the means with which to multiply himself"⁹ and this involved confronting the diversity of different "problems" that existed there. This meant moving the Christian mission effort in the direction of seeking out those, such as the slum-dwellers in Doornfontein or the domestic servants in the white suburbs, who had been hitherto untouched by the missions based on the mines. Indeed, faced with diminishing returns from missionary attempts at proselytisation on the mines where a significant number of ethnically-based black independent churches (frequently Zionist as the earlier Ethiopian phase declined) challenged conventional missionary hegemony, Bridgman looked increasingly towards the suburbs for new Christian converts.¹⁰ Here, he recognised that the more conventional mechanisms of social control through the compound or location system did not so easily apply, and that a strong welfare component was necessary, possibly on lines similar to the American YMCA.¹¹ This idea developed during the course of the first world war such that Bridgman found

himself in opposition to most of the conventional assumptions behind missionary work up to that time. "How far", he asked in report for 1917, "are our churches meeting the criterion of the judgment by extending the helping hand to the hungry, the thirsty, the strange, the naked, the sick and the imprisoned?" What was the church to do, he asked, to offset the "snares" of the "gleaming allurements of novel city life" for the young African men with "superabundant animal energy" who were separated from the traditional restraints of "home" and "tribe"?¹² Thus, in the manner of Jane Addams's emphasis upon the role of recreational pursuits in growing urban settlements,¹³ Bridgman emphasised the need for the church to "provide healthful, uplifting recreation" through such activities as Sunday dances for the "raw native", together with sports such as football, cricket and tennis and concerts. "Africa is moving", he concluded, "while the church apparently clings to the ancient heresy of destiny working between the sacred and secular, a survival of the medieval fallacy of saving souls while ignoring the body in which the soul lives".¹⁴

By the end of the first world war, Bridgman had moved the missionary ideal in urban centres like the Witwatersrand from the more conventional and piecemeal approach based on "rescue work" to a more integrated perspective that recognised the need for an educational and cultural programme to wean away the rising class of militant African leaders on the Rand from radical political ideologies. The realisation for this, in great part, can be seen as probably stemming from the secession by a group of Natal Africans in Doornfontein from the American Board Mission who had been radicalised by the impact of the 1913 Natives Land Act and the debate on socialism on the Rand through such organisations as the International Workers of Africa.¹⁵ Bridgman noted in particular from this issue that it was the "more educated, sophisticated" of the Natal Africans who led the secession while "the unsophisticated 'mine boys' have been loyal to us almost to the last man".¹⁶ This observation was further compounded by the 1919 passive resistance campaign against passes instigated by the A. N. C. when Bridgman anxiously recorded that "the temper of the native radicals is fast becoming more and more violent and the number of radicals is increasing rapidly". With the outbreak of strikes and demonstrations by

the African mass in Johannesburg "the feeling towards the ruling class", Bridgman wrote, "is more hostile and more widely bitter than before". Furthermore:

Everything pertaining to the white man, everything foreign, is now being derided and held up to scorn and hatred by the native radicals. Christianity is being decreed as an importation, an instrument for keeping the blacks in subjection by appealing to religion. Within the past few weeks a movement is afoot to launch a boycott of matters religious. No church, no membership card, no marriage certificate, which has anything to do with a white missionary is to be recognised or countenanced in any way. So far as I can see we are living in days in Johannesburg at least analogous to the days preceding the Boxer uprising in China. If matters keep on with the present trend and at the present rate, there are bound to come terrible days in South Africa. 17

The short-lived nature of the pass campaign, however, and some renewed attempts at welfare work in the post-war period, tempered Bridgman's pessimism with some long-run hopes for a more co-ordinated approach by religious and welfare bodies on the Rand. Already, in 1918, he had been joined by a fellow ABM missionary Ray Phillips who soon proved ambitious to make use of newer mechanisms by which to win over at least part of the radical African intelligentsia: in the following years Phillips's use of film shows over a wide area of the Witwatersrand at both mine compounds as well as missionary and welfare societies evidenced a possible new path by which to modernise the channels of influence by white liberals.¹⁸ In addition, the Community of the Resurrection's work in helping to "save" single African women on the Rand became supplemented by a Helping Hand Club for Native Girls organised by Bridgman and his wife in 1919 in Hans Street, Fairview and which sought to "rescue" female African domestic servants who "as a class" were "bold, impudent and of loose character".¹⁹ By this time, Bridgman was aware that individual missionary work alone was insufficient in scope to cover the activities and interests of the African intelligentsia who were "leading a life so largely estranged from church interests" and who showed "suspicion and aloofness" towards missionary endeavours.²⁰ The establishment by Ray Phillips and his wife of playgrounds that formed key links between schools and the church was one possible path, indicating that "the natives will respond

in large numbers to social endeavour when applied in an intelligent, tactful, brotherly way". But the missionaries could not cover the whole sphere of human activities on the Witwatersrand and could only demonstrate the value of such selective effort. What was needed, Bridgman concluded, were efforts "to stimulate others to enter the social service field".²¹

The activities of the Bridgmans, Ray Phillips and the American Board Mission on the Rand before 1920, therefore, formed a crucial backdrop to the pressure for a more co-ordinated approach via the Joint Councils.²² Further bodies were in the process of expansion as the new University of the Witwatersrand got off the ground in 1919. J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones, who at this time was editor of the journal The South African Quarterly and an official of the Witwatersrand Council of Education²³ got drawn into inter-racial activities through the founding of the Eclectic Club to replace the defunct Johannesburg Native Welfare Society. This stimulated Ray Phillips, who was already influenced by the Native Affairs Reform Association in Durban, to found a literary and debating society, though its title The Gamma Sigma Club after the Greek dictum "know thyself" suggested a parallel with similarly-named bodies in the United States.²⁴ Contact in bodies such as these with "keen-witted native leaders at their wits' end in Johannesburg, ready to try anything"²⁵ convinced many white liberals of the value of political discussion groups where figures such as R.V. Selope Thema, Selby Msimang, Horatio Mbelle and Benjamin Phooko could involve themselves in discussions with white missionaries, educationalists, welfare workers and advocates. Though the discussions were described as "often heated"²⁶ the ideological complexion of the debate indicated that the grounds-well for "interracial cooperation" was laid through the dissemination of a liberal positivism that emphasised the role of individual rights and liberties at the expense of nationalist and group identities. The advocate O.D. Schreiner, for instance, as a typical example of a newer generation of white liberals who grew out of the emerging legal requirements of the post-war mining and industrial boom, acted as a powerful influence on Selby Msimang's thinking:

Mr. Justice O.D. Schreiner gave us a lecture (at the Eclectic

Club) I have never been able to forget. This was the time when we were all developing real hatred for a white person. In other words, Black Nationalism. We were already accusing ministers of religion of hypocrisy of holding the bible in one hand while on the other they helped to confiscate the land. Mr. Schreiner disillusioned me completely. I learnt of one that might not visit the wrongs of one person to the whole race of natives to which he belongs. 27

This pattern was not followed completely throughout the African political class at this time, for a radical group of nationalists continued to campaign on Garveyist lines through the A. N. C. paper Abantu Batho, and Victor Selope Thema, until at least February 1920, was in the vanguard of this group. During his stay in Britain before his return to South Africa in 1919, Selope Thema reported that he had "come in contact with men and women of all nationalities and colours who are pledged to free the world from the clutches of the economic vultures of capitalism".²⁸ Presaging, therefore, a very different model of "inter-racial contact" to what the white liberals in South Africa had in mind, Selope Thema pointed out, on the basis of a post-war railway strike in Britain, that "the popular cry of the working classes is 'direct action' " and that "the waters of international revolution are rising and the flood of proletarianism (sic) is threatening to sweep away capitalism and militarism and establish the real permanent peace of the world".²⁹

But in the wake of the 1920 mine strike by African workers a series of developments ensued designed to neutralise the faction centred around Abantu Batho and strengthen structures of co-optation. The African press as a whole had tended to be treated with a certain amount of disdain by the white liberals and only a year previously the Reverend James Henderson, in a talk at the Johannesburg YMCA, had criticised the failure of the black press in South Africa to attain the same degree of freedom and knowledge as overseas.³⁰ The precedent of the mine strike made the establishment of a white controlled paper directed at the African intelligentsia even more pressing and the same year the Native Recruiting Corporation established Umteteli wa Bantu in order "to voice sound native opinion in the country".³¹ The key figures instrumental in this were H.M. Taberer of the N.R.C. and Ray Phillips, who earned the long lasting dislike of the African radicals for his attempts to control

African thought.³² The effect of Umteteli's establishment was to hasten the demise of the shaky Abantu Batho which continued to be printed on the outmoded and worn printing presses that had first been used when the paper was first established in 1912 with assistance from the Swazi Queen Regent. The printing workers on the paper were enticed away by higher wages on Umteteli and, though the paper struggled on through the 1920s to finally die during the depression, it had lost the original influence it had enjoyed in shaping African political thinking on the Rand and elsewhere in South Africa.³³

The establishment of Umteteli in 1920 was further complemented by moves to create the Bantu Men's Social Centre as a means of fulfilling Bridgman's ideal of establishing recreational facilities for the growing African population on the Rand. The scope of the Centre was for the most part confined to the African petty bourgeoisie with the overall control over policy retained by a sub-committee that included a number of prominent white liberals. Howard Pim, for instance, was Secretary, while Ray Phillips was Organising Secretary; other committee members included Walter Webber of the Chamber of Mines and Frederick Bridgman. The African role on the committee was confined to electing seven of the total of fifteen members and of the seven three had to be white. This relatively peripheral influence on the actual decision making in the Centre produced an initial wave of African hostility and Bridgman described the attitudes of some African leaders as "suspicious, jealous and offish".³⁴ Furthermore, the Centre was clearly dictated by the interests of the chief donors: the Chamber of Mines gave £3,000 for the establishment of the Centre which was estimated to total some £15,000 in all, while the Chamber of Commerce in Johannesburg also gave a donation.³⁵ However, Bridgman's aim of making the Centre into a place where African men could find "wholesome companionship, entertaining amusements and healthful recreation"³⁶ began to achieve some fruit despite attempts at obstruction in 1920 by the "reactionary element" who attempted to "discredit" the whole idea.³⁷ With the "more reasonable element" in African political leadership coming out in support of the scheme,³⁸ the Centre began to establish itself from the end of 1920 and to play a significant role in the evolution of a western-educated urban black elite

during the 1920s. While the exact influence that the BMSC's products played in African politics on the Witwatersrand and elsewhere in the inter-war period remains an area for more detailed historical analysis, it is possible to conclude that the Centre acted as one of the more crucial institutional underpinnings behind the move towards educational, cultural and political co-optation of the African petty bourgeoisie in the aftermath of the industrial struggles of 1918-20. By 1927, the Centre was reported as having a total membership of 365, though the actual numbers of Africans coming in contact with it was far larger because of the high rate of resignations and new memberships. In addition to such sporting facilities as volley ball, tennis, cricket and boxing, the Centre provided a series of educational classes for junior clerical work such as book-keeping, typewriting, English, arithmetic and elementary science.³⁹ The Gamma Sigma debating club was also continued in the Centre and this may well have been an important educational-forming experience for a future president of the A.N.C. as Dr. A.B. Xuma who came into contact, through the Club, with such prominent white liberals as C.T. Loram, J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones and James Dexter Taylor.⁴⁰

The exact role of the Bantu Men's Social Centre in white liberal activities in the 1920s can be seen to change, however, as the objectives for "healthful recreation" in the urban context by Frederick Bridgman began to be transformed into a wider objective of territorial segregation as the decade advanced. This transition had, in some respects, been accomplished even before Bridgman's death in 1926 for in bringing other bodies into the welfare arena after 1920, other individuals began to play an important role in evolving liberal ideology. Apart from such figures as J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones and O.D. Schreiner, undoubtedly Charles T. Loram from Natal was crucial in shifting the emphasis away from reform per se in the urban context towards defining welfare activities in the context of a policy of confining as far as possible the educational, social and political aspirations of the African petty bourgeoisie to the reserves. The Report of the Native Churches Commission in 1925 was a landmark in this respect for, with Loram as one of its members, the spectre of Ethiopianism was finally exorcised from official thinking at least in South Africa. African Church separatism was now seen as a process that was likely to continue and

should, the Commission argued, be given government recognition. Furthermore, the fissiparous tendencies within this separatism no longer represented the potential for a united Ethiopian ideology of "Africa for the Africans" as such writers as George Heaton Nicholls imagined, but rather the continuation of tribal ties into the industrial setting. "A feature in the separatist movement which is disconcerting to the parent churches", Loram wrote on the Commission's findings, "... is the friendly and even cordial relationship which exists between the seceding Natives and those who remain loyal to the parent Church. It shows clearly how racial or at least tribal considerations rank higher in the Native mind than church divisions, and how likely it is that the separatist movement will spread".⁴¹

If Loram can be seen as taking over, in many respects, the role of one of chief ideologist of white liberalism in the 1920s from such figures as Bridgman and Howard Pim, this carried Bridgman's argument for co-optation of the African intelligentsia in 1904 a stage further. Initially, as we saw in Chapter Two, Bridgman had argued for a cautious policy towards Ethiopian church separatism in order to neutralise the possibility of a united Black movement rising in self defence against white-inspired "Black Peril" campaigns.⁴² Now, however, in the aftermath of the 1920-1922 strike wave and the decline in the political significance of independent church movements, the focus of attention for the South African state had clearly shifted to the educated African intelligentsia in the towns. Loram, as a member of the Native Affairs Commission at the time of his sitting on the Native Churches Commission, was in a good position to understand governmental thinking on this,⁴³ while his previous work for the Phelps-Stokes Commission on education in Africa gave him a good insight into contemporary colonial ideas on updating education in the African setting to fulfil the objectives of rural development. It was, indeed, as a consequence of the tour by the Phelps-Stokes Commission of South Africa in 1921 that the Joint Council movement was finally got off the ground and in the years ahead a more integrated approach to white welfare and philanthropic work in South Africa came to emphasise its coordination with the government's segregation policy and the defusing of African political aspirations through the control of tribal and local councils.

The Phelps-Stokes Commission and the formation of the Joint Councils:

The internal trend in South Africa towards co-optation of African political leadership remained fragmentary by the start of 1921. The establishment of Umteteli, the founding of the Eclectic and Gamma Sigma Clubs and the development of the Bantu Men's Social Centre all remained partial solutions, each hindered by a good deal of African suspicion and political hostility. It was probably true that no white liberal in South Africa had sufficient personal charisma to rally African political leadership behind the idea of "inter-racial co-operation" and the possibility of demonstrating concrete examples of its success remained tenuous. There was the precedent of similar attempts in the American South, but apart from the small number of Africans who had been to America for education, this remained a very distant ideal to most Africans in South Africa at this time. Furthermore, despite the continuing general popularity of the Tuskegee ideal of Booker T. Washington and his successor after 1915, Robert R. Moton, it was no longer the case by 1920 that all African opinion formers in South Africa accepted Washingtonism without question. Breaking to some extent with the previous adulation of Tuskegee by leaders like John Dube and Pixley Seme, S.M. Molema wrote in his book The Bantu Past and Present in 1920 of the ideas of W.E.B. Dubois. Taking up the ideal in Smuts's 1917 Savoy Speech of "independent self-governing institutions", Molema reflected the thinking of a section of the African intelligentsia in South Africa after the first world war in demanding that the process be taken to its logical conclusion and that "separation must be equal".⁴⁴ In addition, Molema articulated the more widely-felt despair in Europe in the values of Victorian liberalism after spending a period at the University of Edinburgh (together with the future A.N.C. president James Moroka) studying medicine. "British liberalism is offering nothing to the Bantu of South Africa", Molema wrote, "except such morbid creations and fancies as 'the Native problem'".⁴⁵

In this context, it was probably essential for some new external influence to show itself in South Africa for any wider movement towards "inter-racial cooperation" to be a success. This influence was duly provided by the Phelps-Stokes Commission

in the course of 1921 as the Director of The Phelps-Stokes Fund, the Welshman Thomas Jesse Jones, and the Commission's African member, Dr. J.E.K. Aggrey from the British colony of the Gold Coast (Ghana), toured South Africa collecting information on African education. The tour was significant for the marrying of ideas on educational segregation developed by C.T. Loram, who helped to arrange the tour, in his book The Education of the South African Native published in 1917 with those of Jesse Jones who was Director of the Research Department at the Hampton Institute in Virginia and lecturer in Sociology there. For Loram, education for Africans should be directed towards the objective of resisting cultural assimilation with whites and - on the basis of his experience in such areas as reforming the curriculum at Amanzimtoti⁴⁶ - should be geared towards industrial training in the reserves. For Jesse Jones, too, education for American negroes should be based on the principles of industrial training similar to those of Tuskegee which, in the Southern case, could be demonstrated to be economically successful by the use of comparative statistical analysis.⁴⁷ Both, therefore, defended an educational ideology based upon assumptions of racial differentiation and both essentially saw the value of education for blacks in the context of rural social control, despite the considerable growth in the United States during the first world war of extensive negro urbanisation.

The especial significance of the Phelps-Stokes Commission, however, was its linking of the ideas on industrial training developed in such centres as Tuskegee and Hampton in America and Lovedale in South Africa with missionary and administrative concern in African colonies with problems of rural education.⁴⁸ This linkage was reflected by the inclusion of Aggrey on the Commission, for here was a shining propaganda example of the relevance, as far as the Phelps-Stokes Commission was concerned, of the Tuskegee ideology to colonial conditions. Aggrey had graduated from Livingstone College in North Carolina in 1904 and had long been acquainted with Jesse Jones. After becoming Vice Principal in 1919 of the newly-established college at Achimota in the Gold Coast by the progressive British administration of Sir Gordon Guggisberg, Aggrey was a key political figure to use in

demonstrating the possibilities of the Tuskegee. Furthermore, Aggrey's anglophilia served as an important means to dispel any doubts, as reflected for instance by writers like S.M. Molema, in the values of British liberalism, which could now be shown to be shown to be the essential basis behind the objectives of African self-help and self-reliance. In the course of the South African tour, Aggrey went out of his way to influence the thinking of the African intelligentsia and participated in no less than 120 meetings with African students and religious and political leaders. Appealing to "British justice" which was "being felt now more than ever before because of the war and because of the restlessness", Aggrey was able to exploit politically the divisions that had emerged by 1921 in Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association through corruption and the disaster of the Black Star Shipping Line.⁴⁹ This proved especially effective in such student centres as Lovedale and Aggrey was able to appeal to his African origins in his objective of weakening Garveyite sympathies in a manner that white missionaries, such as Father Huss of Marriannhill engaged in a similar task, were unable to do.⁵⁰ "What we need is some great messiah of the Anglo-Saxon race to rise up and give fair play and reciprocity", Aggrey declared at one meeting. "I have dedicated my life to see that we work for cooperation. I pray that before long South Africa will be the best place on earth for white and black; so that Great Britain will lead the whole world".⁵¹ At the same time, reflecting the gradualist basis of this approach, Aggrey argued that "We Africans must, like infants, learn to stand before we can walk and walk before we can run".⁵²

Aggrey's appeal clearly lay in his ability to demonstrate to sections of the African intelligentsia the political advantages of working through institutions that afforded direct contact with white liberals and governmental, academic and commission representatives. There was an air of glamour about his own career that probably appealed to even radical African political leaders and the possibilities of being able to influence government and "white" thinking. R.V. Selope Thema, for instance, was especially impressed by Aggrey's description of the inter-racial bodies in the American South which demonstrated the possibility, so Aggrey argued, of altering ingrained political attitudes.⁵³ Furthermore, Aggrey's stress on Africans having

the right to join the proposed Joint Councils as opposed to the previous system of selective invitation to the old Native Welfare Associations gave the Joint Council idea a seemingly radical potential for many African leaders, the political possibilities by 1921 had already become somewhat narrowed as the decline in popular upsurges left the scope of "agitator" politics considerably diminished. The success of political agitation, as Michael Twaddle has pointed out, depends upon a continual threshold of political credibility⁵⁴ - this had been the case in the wake of rising prices, the decline of the reserve economies and the dissemination of radical ideologies in the course of the first world war. On the other hand, short of the creation of a fully fledged political movement, "agitation" per se does not offer the basis for a political career for such aspirant politicians who engage in it, and there is the consequential risk of becoming a specialist in a narrowly defined political field. Thus political co-optation occurs when institutions open up the opportunity for upward career mobility, introducing what Morris-Jones describes as "nodal points or moments of crucial choice in the course of a career" when the less adaptable politicians tend to get eliminated.⁵⁵ In this respect, the establishment of the Johannesburg Joint Council did offer some such avenues of mobility, though on a considerably reduced scale to what many African leaders had hoped. Professor D.D.T. Jabavu had hoped for African membership on the Native Affairs Commission in 1920 and there had been hopes for the local councils established under the Native Affairs Act considerably revamping the powers of the Glen Grey councils and extending them to the rest of the Union. In the initial stages of optimism in 1921, the Joint Councils were probably seen by many African leaders to complement this process of "representation", though in later years they became the last bastions in a general process of declining political influence by the time of the legislation of 1936. In terms of information and factual discussion, the Joint Councils clearly provided invaluable assistance to many African leaders whose education had often ill-equipped them to scrutinise complex government legislation. It was precisely in this sense of growing political adaptability that Selby Msimang later recorded that the Joint Council provided much needed help on such measures as the 1923 Natives (Urban Areas) Bill. "For the first few months", Msimang recalled, "the whole thing was

in the form of a test. Africans felt that they could not put all their confidence in the whites, they had got to show in some way their sincerity". With the introduction of the Urban Areas Bill the white members of the Joint Council were provided with an opportunity of demonstrating their interest in providing concrete assistance and "they took the trouble to explain the provisions of the Bill and went through it clause by clause".⁵⁶ As a consequence, when the Native Affairs Commission visited Bloemfontein to discuss the Bill, Msimang said that "the notes we had made through our discussions in the Joint Council assisted us greatly. I was able to put across the various ideas that came across in our discussions in the Joint Council".⁵⁷ But the other side of this process was a strong decline in political radicalism for, even though Msimang wanted to organise a large demonstration "of all the people from Randfontein to Springs" to protest against the Urban Areas Bill and march to Pretoria, he was unable to carry his fellow African members of the Joint Council on it.⁵⁸ By this time, the Joint Council had been able to institutionalise itself sufficiently to ensure that its African members eschewed for the most part popularly-based politics.

The political co-optation centred in the Joint Council in Johannesburg, however, was not all-embracing. After an initial attendance by the Native Mine Clerks Association and the Native National Congress, who were each able to elect representatives onto the committee of thirty members, external pressures soon enforced their withdrawal. In the case of the Mine Clerks, the Chamber of Mines sought its separation from Joint Council activities through fear of its possible radicalisation. As in the case of Kimberley, where De Beers established its own structures of internal co-optation with the local African petty bourgeoisie through its support for the Brotherhood Movement and the Lyndhurst Road Native Institute,⁵⁹ the Chamber on the Witwatersrand feared outside participation in its own system of rewards and favours that buttressed social control. In the aftermath of the 1920 African mine strike, this attitude was probably well reflected in one memorandum of the Native Recruiting Corporation which argued that:

The native has an inbred respect for his superiors and will quickly recognise and appreciate the justice granted to the

more skilled of his class and will look to these men to guide him rather than the highly educated native who is fast becoming more and more under the influence of undesirable Whites who will only use the natives as a means to attain their own mischievous ends. 60

This distinction between the "more skilled" Africans on the mines and the "highly educated native" probably guided the Chamber's policy. In the case of the former group, the selective avenues which the Chamber proposed to open up on the mines after the 1920 African mine strike could effectively act as a dampener on any latent political radicalism. In the case of the latter group, the issue was seen as essentially a non-mining one and in the province of such institutions as the Bantu Men's Social Centre, the Joint Councils and literary and debating societies. The proneness of this group to radical political ideologies, as represented by the Abantu Batho faction in the Native National Congress, made it an object of continual Chamber mistrust and it was partly for this reason that the N.R.C. had been instrumental in establishing Umteteli in 1920. Thus, it was not surprising that when the Native Mine Clerks under their leader Allison Champion sought to introduce a discussion on African wages at the second meeting of the Joint Council in June 1921 that the Chamber sought to bring the association to an end. The following year the Chamber withdrew recognition from the Association in the light of the 1922 Rand strike by white mine workers and the Association had, as a consequence, to withdraw from the Council in October 1922.⁶¹

This withdrawal by the most prominent association of clerical and white collar workers on the Witwatersrand, whom Charles van Onselen has designated "collaborators" in the mining industry,⁶² left the Joint Council's African component very much dominated by the more conservative sections of the African petty bourgeoisie who had to some extent no real alternative avenues of political advancement once they had been deprived of a mass following. It was not surprising therefore that the Mine Clerks withdrawal was followed by the formal disassociation by the radical A.N.C. leadership centred around Abantu Batho. Always distrustful of the Council, the radical group led by D.S. Letanka, C.S. Mabaso, L.J. Mvabaza and T.D. Mveli

Skota attacked what they alleged was Joint Council interference in A. N. C. politics and forced Victor Selope Thema to give up his post as Provincial Secretary of the A. N. C. in the Transvaal.⁶³ Aided by the development of Kadalie's I. C. U. on the Witwatersrand, the A. N. C. refused throughout the early 1920s any collaboration with the Joint Council and boycotted such campaigns as that opposing the introduction of night passes for African women in 1925. The isolation that produced for the African followers of the Joint Council was evidenced in 1924 when Selby Msimang got the Council to establish a special sub-committee to organise publicity for the Council which he said was only vaguely known about by the Africans living on the Rand.⁶⁴ Umteteli as a Chamber of Mines-backed paper continued to give the Joint Council unstinting support throughout the 1902s claiming that "the chief hope of the Native people lies in such inter-racial cooperation as that which has been begun by the Johannesburg Joint Council". Its protestation, however, that it was "certain that the movement will spread" and that "the government will sooner or later be compelled to give it recognition"⁶⁵ began to look increasingly implausible as the 1920s progressed.

The Joint Council, however, did act as an important channel by which some African organisations on the Rand were able to obtain white liberal support on specific issues. A good example of this was the "night passes" issue when the Council was significantly pressured by Mrs. Charlotte Maxeke and the Bantu Women's League. By the 1920s, Mrs. Maxeke had ended her association with the A. M. E. School in the Northern Transvaal which she had established with the assistance of Chief Dalindyebo⁶⁶ and had moved to Johannesburg where she had become involved in church work, and as chaplain to four women's prisons.⁶⁷ As a prominent African member of the Joint Council she had significantly opposed Champion's attempt to get the wages issue discussed in June 1921 and was clearly anxious to maintain the support of such prominent white liberals on the Council as Ray Phillips and Howard Pim. These connections proved useful in 1925, when

the Pact Government proposed to introduce night passes for African women. Ray Phillips took the lead in the lobbying of the government on the matter, carefully pointing out in a letter to General Hertzog on January 18th that "we would deplore any action on the part of the Natives which would lead to any increase of anti-white feeling on their part".⁶⁸ The response from Hertzog indicated the government's willingness to accede to the Joint Council's request for the holding in abeyance of the issue, provided that the Joint Council itself agreed to act as an informal policeman for the government by placing before it "any effective and acceptable alternative scheme of solution of the problem".⁶⁹ Ray Phillips then sought to mobilise a campaign to change the government's policy and reported on February 9th that "energetic efforts" had been made to secure the cooperation of the African National Congress in the calling of a Joint Conference on the issue.⁷⁰ In the event, the A.N.C. refused any such collaboration and, though individual members of the A.N.C. attended the conference which was held on the two separate days of February 14th and March 7th, no formal support from the A.N.C. was obtained by the Joint Council on the issue. Instead, the Joint Council had to be content with the support of the essentially conservative Africans organisations on the Rand such as the Native Ministers Association, the Native Mine Clerks Association, the Native Teachers Association and the Bantu Women's League. Even so, the meetings failed to reach agreement on the issue of whether African women should be made to secure parental or magisterial assent before travelling to an urban area, with both Selby Msimang and Allison Champion opposed to the whole idea.⁷¹ Though the Joint Council won the admiration of some leaders of African opinion such as Sol Plaatje for "its definite stand and active protest" over women's night passes,⁷² the ambiguity of the Joint Council's strategy and its failure to obtain A.N.C. support indicated its only partial political support from the African petty bourgeoisie.

Indeed, by the middle 1920s the Joint Council's somewhat unreliable support from the African political and educational elite reflected in many ways the contradictions engendered by the Government's segregation policy. As the 1923

Natives (Urban Areas) Act had indicated, the main place of abode for Africans was in the rural areas and the restrictions on African property holding in urban areas indicated the problem an urban petty bourgeois class faced in getting itself established.⁷³ Even the two most prominent African members of the Joint Council in Johannesburg, Selby Msimang and Victor Selope Thema, were unable to overcome these hindrances for both had only flimsy economic roots in the city in the 1920s.⁷⁴ Though they both wrote regular articles for Umteteli, attempts at forming businesses were haphazard and when Msimang eventually gave up the Secretaryship of the Joint Council and formed a general agency business with Selope Thema to collect rents for the property owners in Alexandria and Sophiatown, the effort proved unsuccessful. After working as a clerk to pay off debts of some £80, Msimang found a much more promising offer in the management of three farms owned by a land syndicate at Driefontein, near Ladysmith, in his native Natal.⁷⁵ The problems confronting Msimang and Selope Thema in establishing urban businesses almost personify the position of the African petty bourgeoisie at this time and indicated why so many members of the African political elite were willing, in the final analysis, to accommodate themselves to governmental policy, and take advantage of territorial segregation to acquire rural landholdings. "It seems to me", Msimang wrote, "that if we allow things to drift as they do we shall not only delay the final settlement of the Native areas for another ten or twenty years but we may afford an opportunity to those whose ambition it is to oust us out of the land altogether and to convert the existing recommended areas into white settlements or cotton growing farms for poor whites under state or company patronage".⁷⁶ There was a tendency, therefore, for African members to fall in with the general trend of segregationist thinking in the Joint Councils in the 1920s, belying the idea that they acted as significant forces on liberal opinion in the direction of assimilation.⁷⁷ W.M. Macmillan in 1923, for instance, suggested that African leaders accept the proposal for land allocations in the bushveld areas, since there was the potential for growing cotton there⁷⁸ and later the same year Msimang echoed this by arguing

that "we should try to make a good job out of a bad one in the hope that if the recommended land be not enough after they have been occupied we shall have the excuse of asking for more land. Let us take that which is given to us and then ask for more".⁷⁹

Faced, therefore, with this general structural weakness in the urban African petty bourgeoisie, the Joint Council was forced to turn increasingly to rural areas for African political support. This policy was shaped too to a considerable degree by the increasingly segregationist turn of "liberal" thinking in the wake of the 1923 Urban Areas Act, the victory of the Pact in 1924 and the publication of the four bills in 1926. As an editorial in The South African Outlook in February 1924 summarised the position:

So far as we can see the safe course is along the line of dual, or parallel development, where that is still practicable at the stage we have already reached. Save and except on the Rand, the large concentrations of Natives are still in the reserves and locations. But only a voluntary segregation is now possible, and to attain that, it must be made attractive. If white employers would make up their minds to employ whites, and set for their employees a high standard of efficiency, the hope would dawn for a white South Africa. 80

Within this context, the pressure was exerted on the Joint Councils until the end of the 1920s to focus on rural African leadership. This was aided after 1926 by the growing influence of C.T. Loram on Joint Council policy as the Native Affairs Commission declined in its ability to influence government thinking. Loram, together with Rheinnalt-Jones had been one of the driving forces behind the establishment of the Joint Council in Johannesburg in 1921, though his views were in a markedly more segregationist direction than many of his liberal colleagues. As chairman of a Commission of Enquiry into the Training of Natives in Medicine and Public Health, Loram championed the idea of welfare work and the training of African doctors being primarily focused in rural areas. Thus, it was not surprising

that, when A.B. Xuma returned in 1927 from America as a qualified medical practitioner, Loram, together with H.M. Taberer, advised the wife of the late F.B. Bridgman not to appoint Xuma as superintendent of the newly-opened Bridgman Memorial Hospital for Africans on the grounds that he would be better employed among "his own people" in the reserves.⁸¹ Xuma did join the Johannesburg Joint Council the following year, 1928, but it is clear that his interest together with a number of other African political leaders based in urban areas, to collaborate with white liberal bodies did not substantially develop until after the formation of the South African Institute of Race Relations in 1929.⁸² By this time, the general direction of liberal ideology in South Africa had been to move to an "apolitical" basis with welfare work by the Joint Councils and other welfare bodies serving as the social and economic underpinning of co-optation of the African petty bourgeoisie, while separate political accommodation occurred with the state on segregation to remove African voters in the Cape from the common roll. This strategy was to develop in the years after the publication of the four native bills in 1926.

The Joint Councils and the "fight" to defend the Cape franchise

The publication of Hertzog's four native bills in 1926, with the implicit threat behind them of the eventual destruction of the common franchise in the Cape, led to a debate in liberal circles on the exact "political" role the Joint Councils should take. It was clear that the imprint on the Joint Councils since their inception had been that of Loram, who had developed an approach modelled on the precedent of inter-racial bodies in the American South. The Tuskegee ideal of avoiding "political" involvement as far as possible and concentrating on relatively peripheral issues and welfare work was enhanced in Loram's mind by the relatively delicate position held by the Joint Councils in South African politics. With funds from the Carnegie Corporation in the United States, the Councils needed to keep a "respectable" image if they were to continue to be supported by their American benefactors, whilst at the same time avoid rousing political hostility

inside South Africa due to their overseas connections.⁸³ Furthermore, from at least 1923 onwards, Loram became increasingly influenced by what he saw as the more significant political potential of the Dutch Reformed Churches, which he considered could do the job of political lobbying far more effectively than the English-speaking liberal bodies. This conception was originally stimulated by a conference in 1923 held under the auspices of the Federal Council of the Dutch Reformed Churches in Johannesburg, where a number of papers, including one by Edgar Brookes, had been given on the need to develop welfare politics within an overall policy of territorial segregation. The conference impressed Loram as "the largest and most important unofficial conference on Native Affairs ever held in South Africa"⁸⁴ and it was undoubtedly the legacy of this which led Loram, after the victory of the Pact in the 1924 election, to advocate a low profile strategy to the Joint Councils, leaving the Dutch Reformed Churches in the vanguard of actual political pressuring on a government that now had a distinctly Afrikaner complexion.

By 1926, therefore, Loram came out distinctly in opposition to any schemes for a tightening up of the national organisation of the Joint Councils and the creation for a federal controlling body since this would be likely to lead to pressures for more direct political involvement. As he wrote to Rheinnalt-Jones:

American experience would keep the Joint Councils aloof from national issues. If the JC is bound to a votes for Blacks policy for example it will find it harder to get the Blacks in Pretoria a swimming bath. Without achieving practical local reform the JCs will fade away. Keep your big political organization separate tho the personnel may be the same in both cases ... You will see that I have departed from my view of a National Joint Council. I see that the JCs to be effective must be local and non political. Let the Dutch Reformed call the political meetings ...

In addition, he added a sting in the tail by threatening Jones's own position if he did not conform to this idea: "don't you get associated with the political issues", he wrote, "otherwise we shall not be able to use you as you deserved to

be".⁸⁵ Thus, hiding behind the ostensibly "delicate" position of the Joint Councils,⁸⁶ Loram from 1926 onwards sought to steer the Joint Councils as far away as possible from any direct political involvement, especially on such issues as the Cape African franchise, which he himself only came out and openly championed after he had reached the safe vantage point of Yale in 1930.⁸⁷ But this effective emasculation of much of the original liberal thinking which had been carried into the Joint Councils by a number of their supporters at their inception led to growing threats of a political wrangle.

While Loram was able to maintain a certain body of support behind his apolitical conception from the Joint Councils in the Transvaal, where the Cape franchise issue especially had less immediate political impact, it was clear that a number of Cape members came increasingly to object to what they perceived as the abandonment of the principles of the Cape liberal tradition. Loram himself made some attempts to offset this influence in the Cape by himself forming "Bantu Study Circles" at the University of Cape Town,⁸⁸ but this failed to stop a Cape liberal like Saul Solomon from arguing in 1926 that "analysis proves that the substitute for the Cape franchise is a sham and a farce" and putting pressure on the Joint Council to openly state in its memorandum In Defence of the Cape Franchise the essential Cape liberal ideal of "equal rights for everybody irrespective of race or colour".⁸⁹ Such a clear difference proved significant in the case of the Johannesburg Joint Council for a number of members were by no means so vocal in their opposition to the Government's segregation policy. In the case of Howard Pim, for instance, it was clear that the victory of the Pact in 1924 had led to a desire to press the welfare and philanthropic claims of the Joint Council within the confines of the segregationist framework laid down by General Hertzog's Smithfield Speech on native policy in December 1925. While arguing that he had "no hard and fast segregation in his mind", Pim nevertheless wrote that "the only section of the native population in the Union which is asked to give up anything is the Cape Native voters. For the other provinces

the Prime Minister's proposals if carried out will be a definite gain".⁹⁰ There was a clear difference between the liberal members from the Cape and the Transvaalers who were more concerned to use the Pact's segregationist scheme for whatever political advantages could be derived from it.

The debate in the Joint Council, however, led to temporary victory of the Cape liberals and this was to determine increasingly the course of policy until the defeat of the South African Party in 1929. The memorandum published by the Joint Council on the Smithfield proposals and the four bills of 1926 came out in favour of preserving the Cape franchise on the grounds that "the steadying influence of the Cape vote will be lost" such that "European interests will more and more dominate Parliament":

It will be fatal if European interests and Native interests are separately represented. Every member of Parliament should have the interests of all South Africa as his province, and these can only be protected by representatives elected on a franchise that knows neither colour or race. 91

For the moment considerations of unity within the liberal campaign had led to Loram's apolitical strategy being defeated for a number of Transvaal members, including Howard Pim, were prepared to concede to the Cape liberals. "If we start shedding members on account of differences", Pim wrote to Rheinnalt-Jones, "... we shall break up altogether, and this I think would be a setback".⁹²

The logic of the course taken by the Joint Council, however, dictated that some form of political lobbying would become increasingly necessary if every member of the South African parliament was to "have the interests of all South Africa as his province". The 1927 pamphlet General Hertzog's Solution of the Native Question⁹³ still followed the Loram course of presenting only a factual analysis of the four bills, declining any overt political analysis. But with the conference the same year of the Federal Council of the Dutch Reformed Churches refusing to come out in opposition to the Pact's segregation policy,⁹⁴ it was becoming progressively clearer that Loram's hope of relying on the Dutch Reformed

Churches to bring effective political pressure on the government was failing to work.⁹⁵ At the same time, a number of Joint Council liberals, including both Alex Roberts from the Native Affairs Commission as well as Pim, were beginning to oppose what they perceived as the illiberal and corporatist ideology being espoused by Loram as he sought to gather funds from American sources for an inter-racial boost to supplement the work of the Joint Councils.⁹⁶ In 1928, Loram initiated contacts with the Carnegie Foundation as well as the Phelps-Stokes Fund in America for funds to establish an Institute of Race Relations. These sources were closely linked to the corporatist and managerial ideological thinking behind American Progressivism which stretched back to before the first world war but had hitherto only indirectly affected liberal thinking in South Africa via the welfare and philanthropic ideas of Frederick Bridgman and the American Board Mission. Now, however, it became clearer that Loram's initial insistence upon distinguishing welfare work in the Joint Councils from direct political involvement was becoming expanded into a far wider pragmatist and managerialist⁹⁷ ideology of liberal philanthropy that threatened completely to eclipse the older liberal paternalism of Roberts, Solomon and Pim. This positivism of Loram - which he shared with a number of "friends of the natives" such as Brookes and Rheinnalt-Jones - was not simply a colonial fascination with "scientific" methods in the metropolis, but also related in considerable degree to the work he did for American educational foundations. Thoroughly acquainted with methods of Negro education in the United States, Loram by 1928 was the South African representative of the Phelps-Stokes Fund as well as acting as unofficial adviser to the Carnegie Corporation on its programmes for black education in both Africa and the United States.⁹⁸ It was as a result of these connections that the Phelps-Stokes Fund had provided a grant of £500 per annum for three years and £200 for the salary of Rheinnalt-Jones as the "Executive Secretary of the Joint European and Native Councils in South Africa"; while the Carnegie Corporation in 1928 authorised £750 per annum for five years to the "Associated Joint Councils".⁹⁹ This American money was

welcome for Joint Council activity had before then been frequently financed by money from the pockets of individual members,¹⁰⁰ but on the other hand it threatened any political work the Joint Councils might do. Pim, therefore, argued for an Organiser and a Board of Trustees to handle the funds which, while observing the conditions laid down by "our American friends", as he termed them, would also avoid the other threat which Loram's ideas seemed to imply of actual government control. The proposal was motivated in part by Pim's suspicions regarding Loram's background in the Native Affairs Commission and his governmental connections and a determination to keep Joint Council work autonomous to state interference at a time when government policy seemed to be veering increasingly towards an "illiberal" direction. "We are glad you recognise", he remarked sarcastically in a letter to Loram, "the difficulty of distinguishing between what is "political" and what is "social betterment in native affairs". Under the conditions existing in the Union it seems to us impossible to draw any definite line, and to attempt to draw one would nullify the efforts of the Organiser".¹⁰¹

Pim's growing political involvement by 1928 was also backed, at a convenient distance by Rheinnalt-Jones. In Jones's case, freedom of manoeuvre was more difficult since his salary at this time depended on Phelps-Stokes sources; but on the other hand, Jones too began to recognise after 1927 that the Joint Councils' success depended to a considerable degree on a political involvement. In part, this was a recognition by Jones that the Loram strategy had cut off the Joint Councils from an important section of African political thinking. In 1926 Jones went on a visit to the Eastern Cape, the Transkei and Natal where he was able to see conditions for himself at a time when the I.C.U. was picking up support in the rural areas. In Durban he attended an I.C.U. meeting chaired by the former Joint Council member Allison Champion,¹⁰² whose application to join the Joint Council in Durban had been refused, and was made aware of the growing potential of African trade unionism at a time when the reserve economy was entering a catastrophic decline during the long drought in the 1920s. Such influences began to tell on his thinking which by

1927 was moving in the direction of accepting greater numbers of permanently urbanised Africans, with social control being exercised through legally recognised trade unions. At the European-Bantu Conference in 1927, Rheinnalt-Jones argued against the Hertzog land proposals in a similar vein to W.M. Macmillan.¹⁰³ Labour conditions on the land, he argued, were "favourable to neither the European nor the Native farm labourer; both suffer from the fact that their conditions are survivals of patriarchal and slave-owning days".¹⁰⁴ While accepting the reality of the African reserves and segregation as "a temporary expedient" (though "as a permanent principle" it "was bound to fail"),¹⁰⁵ he argued for common "National Land Policy" as opposed to a racially-defined "Native Land Policy" as was esconced in the Hertzog Bills. The logic of this lay in the determination of a policy that accepted the proletarianisation of farm labour, both black and white, and the elimination of what was perceived as pre-capitalist restrictions on the mobility of labour. "Experience in Europe and elsewhere", Jones's memorandum continued, "shows that only a small proportion of any agrarian population is fitted to be independent on the land" so that "our rural population will have to consist mostly of farm labourers - working under direction. This will be true of both Europeans and Natives". The strategy that was needed was two-pronged in nature, which, while seeking to maintain industrial segregation at one level in so far as Africans were kept on the land, at the same time accepted the growing requirement for African labour in industry:

The acutness of the racial problem in South Africa today is due to the fact that rural conditions are driving White and Black into fierce competition for the same jobs in urban areas. There are only two ways of dealing with a situation of this kind. The first and most essential is to ease off the flow of Black and White migrants into the towns by creating better conditions on the land. The other is by enabling Industry to absorb the available labour in the towns. ¹⁰⁶

The industrial aspect of this question, Rheinnalt-Jones approached some two years later, in 1929, in the wake of the fissures in the I.C.U. and the growth

in control over the union through the importation of William Ballinger in 1928 to act as consultant to Clements Kadalie. As author of the Joint Council memorandum The Native in Industry, Rheinnalt-Jones argued against industrial segregation and the colour bar. Taking as his standpoint, the position of neo-classical economics and the laws of supply and demand in a capitalist economy, Jones argued for "the abrogation in course of time of laws which prevent the adoption of the urbanised native into Industry, under the ordinary laws applying to Europeans. Natural economic laws know no colour bar, whether protective or repressive. The only protection we ask for the Native in Industry is protection against measures which would not be taken were he a white man". Favouring the formation of African trade unions, he saw this as a newer form of social control, necessary in a situation where "it needs no prophet to foretell that they will organise more and more in the near future, and it is important that they should early learn to organise on trade union lines and to act constitutionally and lawfully".¹⁰⁷ This toleration of black trade unions came in the wake of the I.C.U. split and was indicative of the change in approach amongst white liberals as the I.C.U. began the move away from industrial militancy in the middle 1920s - including attempts at organisation among farm workers and peasants¹⁰⁸ - which it described as "the worst features of a racist organisation" to Joint Council controlled moderation where "it ... endeavoured to function as a general workers union, following legitimate trade union methods".¹⁰⁹

This development in Joint Council ideology as articulated by Rheinnalt-Jones shaped the outlook of the Council towards political involvement on the Cape franchise issue. Older forms of social control, based on the rural reserves and philanthropic efforts at giving a "helping hand" in urban areas, became increasingly outmoded as African urbanisation and the growing labour requirements of industry necessitated newer forms of collaboration with Africans in the urban locations. In this context, the Cape franchise took on a new meaning. For the liberals in the Joint Council, the issues of principle involved in the defence of the campaign

related in substantial measure to their concern to maintain and modernise structures of social control in urban areas through the increasing co-optation of an urban African political class rooted in the franchise. With the failure by and large to sustain this in the early 1920s, though important ground work had been laid in the form of welfare work and the Bantu Men's Social Centre, the Cape franchise issue became all the more pressing. In addition it presented an important opportunity to extend influence among African political organisation which, in the Cape, was too weak to present an effective opposition to the Pact government's franchise proposals. By 1928 it was clear that despite attempts such as those by Sol Plaatje to mobilise African voters together with Coloureds and Indians in the Cape Flats to "squash the attitude of the most overbearing Europeans by working up a strong man who would stand up between the Natives and repressive legislation",¹¹⁰ little or no grass roots supports backed the Cape voters in the fight to defend the franchise. In such a context, the Joint Council was in a strong position to take the initiative in shaping the campaign to oppose the franchise proposals.

The Non Racial Franchise Association

The Joint Council in Johannesburg resolved on political action on the Cape franchise early in 1928, following the Select Committee on the Native Bills the previous year. Support for this had come from other Joint Councils, such as Pretoria, which allowed the Johannesburg Council to act on their behalf.¹¹¹ At the same time, the actual organisational dimension of a Franchise Defence Organisation, as it was preliminarily called, was delegated by the Johannesburg executive to Howard Pim, as the Chairman, and Rheinnalt-Jones as Secretary.¹¹² The basic principle was accepted to be a common franchise, though the executive was "prepared (to) accept high personal native qualifications".¹¹³ The reasoning for this political involvement was explained by Rheinnalt-Jones to Archbishop Owen in Kenya in February of the same year. "There is one thing we have to work for

in Africa", he wrote, "and that is STATUS - legal, political and economic status for all the members of the state. Without status all efforts at upliftment will take many more generations to be effective". In addition, while willing to accept a Council system "as a means of cultivating public opinion among the Africans and of providing a sounding board for this opinion" the Joint Council was at the same time "nervous", explained Rheinnalt-Jones, "of proposals to invest them with legislative powers independent of the legislature of the country" for "this would prove an easy way of ridding the country as a whole of the responsibility for development of the Africans".¹¹⁴

The problem that confronted the Joint Council at this stage was the question of mobilising support from white liberals in the Cape. Rheinnalt-Jones complained to Morris Alexander that he had tried on frequent occasions to persuade the Joint Council in Cape Town to act as a parliamentary committee to lobby for support directly in the House of Assembly, but to no avail.¹¹⁵ Apart from Alexander himself, few members of the South African Party in the Cape seemed willing to take up the issue, especially as many of the old Unionist bloc inside the party seemed more interested up to 1927 of fighting the government on the Flag controversy.¹¹⁶ In addition, with the unlikelihood of the government proceeding with actual legislation on the franchise until after an election, many S.A.P. members in the Cape urged the Joint Council members to desist from immediate action. Henry Burton, for instance, wrote to Pim in April of 1928 arguing that "it would not do for us to take a line - in our ignorance of the final plan and the views of the natives themselves upon it - only to find that these views do not agree with our own. We had much better await the modified scheme, so that we know what to fight about and also what the natives say about it".¹¹⁷ These were tactical arguments based upon the interests of the South African Party in white party politics and the Joint Council was hampered in its attempts to gather "liberal" support in the run up to an election which was to play upon racial fears. C.P. Crewe, another former Unionist in the S.A.P. even went so far as to argue against any formal

political organisation in the Cape before the June election in 1929, on the grounds that "our people are pretty well all agreed to stand by the present Cape franchise for Natives" while in the S.A.P. "it would be difficult in most parts of the Cape to get the best men on to a committee or organisation to deal alone with Native franchise matters".¹¹⁸

Despite this resistance to formal organisation in the Cape, by February of 1929 matters came to a head with the National European-Bantu Conference organised by the Joint Councils in Cape Town between February 6 and 9. Here the arguments which had been rehearsed by Rheinnalt-Jones in the memorandum The Native in Industry were spelled out with greater political effect on the thinking amongst white liberals in the Cape by the Conference chairman, Howard Pim (Rheinnalt-Jones was convenor of the Conference). Pim's forthrightness probably accrued from the fact that he had been in Cape Town the year previously in order to canvass support on the franchise issue and was aware of just how few members of the parliamentary opposition were willing to make a stand.¹¹⁹ But aside from the immediate political considerations, Pim's opening speech established the whole tone of the conference and guided it towards a growing recognition, which was later to be reflected in the report in 1932 of the Native Economic Commission, that the subsistence base of the reserves was declining and permanent African proletarianisation made a reconsideration of the level of African wages essential. While African wage earners had to buy in "European markets", the prices they paid were "based upon European wages and these in turn upon European costs of living". These prices, therefore, were not based upon what Pim saw as African "costs of living" and the actual level of wages paid were "arbitrary and do not rest upon any definable foundation". There was thus a need for "having a definite scheme of correlation of Native and European revenue and expenditure, and for the co-operation of both these races to bring this about".¹²⁰ Pim accepted, however, the idea of a continued increase in African proletarianisation and "the most persistent efforts are called for to remove all barriers to Native

advancement and to encourage Natives in every possible way to increase their knowledge and improve their position", necessitating the removal of the Colour Bar Act, as well as increased exemption under the pass laws.¹²¹

Pim's arguments were reflected in the resolutions of the conference which sought the amendment of the Industrial Conciliation Act to include "pass-bearing Natives" and the organisation of African workers into trade unions.¹²² In addition the Cape franchise issue was discussed and a resolution passed defending it, despite Loram's objections.¹²³ The debate on this acted as a catalyst for developments in formal organisation for the franchise's defence, with Pim in particular expressing open objections to Loram's attitude. "If Loram has nothing good to say of the Franchise Bill", Pim wrote to Rheinnalt-Jones, "why did he take up the attitude he did in the conference and object to any resolution being taken of the principle. Frankly I do not trust him and in this I am not alone. He is the Government servant every time with the merits and defects of his class".¹²⁴ Pim, therefore, instigated moves to start an organisation in the Cape, especially as a committee had already been formed by Rheinnalt-Jones, before he returned to Johannesburg after the Conference, of a number of prominent Cape liberals such as the Archbishop of Cape Town, Sir James Rose-Innes, Henry Burton, Jagger and Morris Alexander.¹²⁵ The assumption behind this was that such a group would contribute to a widening debate on the franchise issue which Pim saw as occurring as a result of the election campaign and which was not tied to the strings of the S.A.P.¹²⁶

The organisation that was formed, however, quickly got caught up in the maelstrom of party politics in the run up to the June election. Following the issue of a manifesto which condemned the Franchise Bill for having the effect "as surely as night follows days ... to drive all the Bantu, civilised or uncivilised, educated or uneducated, into one group by giving them a common grievance",¹²⁷ early in April an association was formed with a committee that includes Rose-Innes,

J.W. Jagger and Professor Fremantle. Some 55 to 60 names were included in the Association membership and the general tone was to some extent dictated by the dominating personality of James Rose-Innes who had retired from the bench in 1927 and had desisted from the idea of entering active party politics.¹²⁸ On the 25th April, the society was firmly established as the Non-Racial Franchise Association, despite objections from two senators, F.S. Malan and Street, who sought more general objectives.¹²⁹ With £140 collected from the foundation meeting, the ostensibly "non party" basis of the association soon became confused by the decision taken in early May to canvass all the election candidates in the Cape Province on their attitudes to the franchise issue, with the further tactic of "warning" the Native Voters Association of individual replies that were "unsatisfactory".¹³⁰ As Henry Burton wrote to Pim, there were clearly doubts about the value of this for the S.A.P.'s election fortunes but "our object is of an importance so overwhelming that we dare not be guided simply by Party considerations".¹³¹

By this time General Smuts had already been careful to dissociate the S.A.P. from the Non Racial Franchise Association's activities. The initial manifesto of Rose-Innes issued at the end of March he depicted as championing equal franchise rights which was not the policy of the S.A.P.¹³² The response of the Association, as represented by its dominating spirit, Rose-Innes, was the re-affirmation of its non-party status;¹³³ but the value of this was soon nullified by the actual defeat of the S.A.P. in the June election with concomitant tendencies amongst some S.A.P. Assembly members to blame this on the N.R.F. Association activities.¹³⁴

The effect of the election was to send the Non Racial Franchise Association into decline and, though it continued in truncatory form in the early 1930s, the main driving force in Cape Town after 1930 appears to have been from Julius Lewin and a small Fabian Society.¹³⁵ By this time, though, the Institute of Race Relations had been formed and white liberal opinion tended to be increasingly

controlled, as it had before 1929, from the Witwatersrand. "I do not know", Rheinnalt-Jones wrote to Lewin "whether the country is ready for another organisation on the political side"¹³⁶ and to this extent independent liberal organisation outside the S.A.I.R.R. tended to fade.

But with the Institute formed in 1929, there tended to fade as well the political hopes of liberals such as Howard Pim, who had been so closely associated with the attempt at formal political organisation in the Cape. Instead of widening discussion on the franchise issue, as Pim had hoped, the election had the effect of strengthening the S.A.P.'s role in the fight to defend the franchise, thus reinforcing tendencies towards an "apolitical" standpoint in white liberal organisations. While the Pact could not alone command a two-thirds majority in the combined Senate and House of Assembly to remove the African voters from the common roll, the standpoint of the S.A.P. became increasingly critical. "Our future, therefore", Pim wrote to John Harris, "depends upon the party tie to an extent that we never expected and it can be expected to hold for some time, but not indefinitely unless we succeed in changing northern opinion".¹³⁷ It was this increased dependence on the S.A.P., however, which renewed the division in white liberal thinking between "political" activity, which Loram had at first been content to leave to the Dutch Reformed Churches and was now the role of the S.A.P., and welfare activities and "consultation" with African elite opinion, which after 1929 became increasingly centred around the Institute of Race Relations. In this new definition, Loram played a final decisive role, before finally leaving South Africa for good to take up a professorship at Yale.

The South African Institute of Race Relations

The intervention of the Joint Councils on the franchise issue, and the formation of the Non Racial Franchise Association, in the election year of 1929, provided the context in which the Institute of Race Relations was formed. The exact form it was to take remained unclear until that year for as late as January

of 1928 Loram was still interested in the idea, now that the Carnegie Corporation had promised £3,750 over a five year period, of reviving the old idea of a federation of Joint Councils.¹³⁸ But this idea was proposed for discussion along with other issues, including the proposed legislation on the franchise; and Pim's objections to Loram's attempts to divide "political" from welfare issues in the course of 1928 can be seen as an important motive for Loram to propose by the end of the year a "more Catholic" committee for inter-racial co-operation than was possible under the aegis of the Joint Councils".¹³⁹ As Rheinnalt-Jones wrote to Jesse Jones of the Phelps-Stokes Fund, "Loram feels so nervous regarding the political side of the present situation that he fears lest the Joint Council should become too political. For myself I feel that a great deal will depend upon the organiser who must use considerable judgment in these difficult times. I have told Loram that I am ready to throw myself into the work even at considerable financial risk".¹⁴⁰

Rheinnalt-Jones's effective willingness to fall in with Loram's scheme for liberal organisation in South Africa was a decisive factor on the shaping of the Institute in 1929. On 9th May, a committee established by Rheinnalt-Jones with the consent of the Carnegie and Phelps-Stokes Funds met at Ray Phillips's house in Johannesburg where Loram was elected Chairman, Pim as Treasurer and Rheinnalt-Jones as Secretary. This committee became the effective foundation of the Institute and Rheinnalt-Jones, who was in favour with the American bodies (especially Jesse Jones since his 1927 memorandum on Land¹⁴¹) was appointed "Adviser" to the Institute from the 1st January 1930. The guiding ideology of the committee was that of Loram and the American foundations' policy of desisting from political involvement. The establishment of the foundation committee on 9th May, for instance, had extracts from a report of the Carnegie Corporation for 1924 distributed to the participating members which defined Corporation policy on political involvement. "The deliberate and conscious

propagation of opinion is a perfectly legitimate function for the individual", the report stated, "but it is becoming greatly recognised that it is not the wisest use to which trust funds can be put".¹⁴² With the money involved (though Rheinnalt-Jones stated his commitment to the idea even if it meant financial risk to himself), there was little the South African liberals could do: even Pim was forced into proposing Loram as Chairman of the foundation committee because of his foundation connections, feeling that he was "entitled to the position".¹⁴³ The only crumb of comfort that could be gained was the knowledge that the Institute was formed separately and autonomously to the Joint Councils, whose work Loram had promised not to interfere with; but the effective centre for liberal activity after 1930 clearly rested on the Institute, whose "Adviser" tried increasingly to intervene in Joint Council work to make it conform to Institute policy.¹⁴⁴

Despite the overtly "apolitical" ideological basis of the Institute, Rheinnalt-Jones did seek from the beginning various low-keyed contacts with representatives of state institutions and politicians in the Senate and House of Assembly. He was aided in this by Loram's decision in 1931, following a refusal by the Natal Administration to allow him to serve on the Native Economic Commission and an order by the Government to return to Natal as Superintendent of Education, to take up an offer of a Professorship at Yale.¹⁴⁵ With Loram's controlling influence thus removed, some freedom of manoeuvre was allowed to Jones. Until 1936 with the appointment of Douglas Smit (a member of the Institute) as Secretary of Native Affairs, contacts with the state tended to be limited, despite attempts to make the Institute a channel for communication between the Native Affairs Department and wider public opinion.¹⁴⁶ Thus for the first few years, various feelers were put out to establish selective personal contacts and an avoidance of organised publicity, which Rheinnalt-Jones felt would damage the image of the Institute (which was widely distrusted in government circles) and jeopardise a strategy based on the idea that "when the time came for the special campaign we could rely upon groups of men both inside and outside Joint Councils who would respond to the appeal for help".¹⁴⁷

Much more overt political activity by the Institute, however, was initiated with respect to African politics. By 1930, African support in the Joint Councils was tailing off to a marked degree, while there were reports that standards in the Bantu Men's Social Centre were slipping.¹⁴⁸ Furthermore, there were significant indications of resistance by African members of the Joint Council to imparting information on African living conditions. In 1930, for instance, an attempt was made by the Johannesburg Joint Council to secure what Pim described as "social information" on the means of African workers. The attempt, however, soon ran to ground. "Preliminary meetings were held when a number (of Africans) expressed their willingness to help", Pim wrote to Rheinnalt-Jones, who was in London at the time, "but as soon as results were asked for they faded. All questions of this kind emanate from the Europeans. Natives are suspicious of the occasion for which their statements are required and I fancy that the enquiries are not too well received".¹⁴⁹ Pim was inclined to ascribe this distrust to the general image of the Joint Councils, blaming in particular the traditional African bete noire Ray Phillips. "The natives say", he continued, "that he is now only a messenger boy of the Chamber of Mines";¹⁵⁰ an idea based presumably on the fact that Phillips had been granted a £2,000 donation by the Chamber to spend as he saw fit, in the wake of his successful work for them on film shows during the 1922 strike. The "suspicions", by the Africans continued, however,¹⁵¹ aided by the growth of newspaper articles by an anonymous writer "Enquirer" in the Umteteli to the effect that the Joint Councils were seeking to control all African political organisation. As "Enquirer" (widely believed, in fact, to be Harold Mbelle, Sol Plaatje's brother in law) wrote in July 1933:

The Joint Council movement ... is one intended to be established as the only agency or medium through which the Natives could air their grievances or make their representations to the Government or local authorities concerned. In working towards this objective (though

as has been seen, it was turned down by the government in 1932 - P.R.) this movement has, directly or indirectly destroyed or rendered ineffective all purely African organisations, and has arrogated to itself the right to control and direct all matters Bantu. 152

The persistence of "Enquirer's" charges against the Joint Councils in the early 1930s underlined the renewal of distrust in collaboration with white liberal bodies by significant sections of African political leadership. Certainly, there were still prominent African figures still arguing for a renewal of contacts, though in a somewhat less subservient form. Xuma, for instance, argued in a paper read at the Conference of European and Bantu Christian Associations at Fort Hare in 1930 that "The European must more work with and less for the African. The Africans, on the other hand, must not only co-operate with the European in European-controlled activities but must more and more organise themselves and do things themselves. They must not always wait for someone to do things for them".¹⁵³ But, on the other hand, it was also clear that "Enquirer's" diatribes underpinned a widely felt resistance to "co-operation" of any kind. Rheinnalt-Jones privately confessed that "Enquirer's" accusation that the Joint Councils had destroyed African leadership contained "just enough truth to make it a dangerous statement"¹⁵⁴ and in 1933 the Institute commissioned Edgar Brookes to tour the Union to sound out whether "Enquirer" had any significant African support (Brookes reported that he had very little).¹⁵⁵

The significance of "Enquirer's" attacks, in fact, lay beyond the immediate issue of the control of African political leadership. In an important sense, "Enquirer" gave vent to the grievances of a section of the African petty bourgeoisie that felt itself to be increasingly squeezed out of economic activities by the end of the 1920s and the onset of the depression. Numbers of Africans owned small shops on the Witwatersrand, which were estimated to number some 500 in 1934, with 40 in Nancefield alone.¹⁵⁶ Likewise, individual Africans managed to take advantage of certain sectors for which was no significant ethnic domination such as the haulage of bricks: Johannes Tumahole, for instance, built up a brick cartage

business from Sophiatown to Parrrtown in the years after the Anglo-Boer War, for which he was paid up to 15sh a load and on which he was able, as T.M. Mapikela had been in Bloemfontein, to start a building business of his own.¹⁵⁷ But the mobilisation of capital by African businessmen was extremely limited, especially as ethnic domination of various service sectors, such as laundering, had successfully squeezed out African competition by this time.¹⁵⁸

For mission-educated kholwa in the African petty bourgeoisie running shops, carting bricks or laundering was not the most obvious way in which to employ their talents. The long tradition of African journalism which stretched back to the mission papers such as Isigidimi and Imvo in the nineteenth century suggested another obvious way through the ownership of newspapers and the Congress paper Abantu Batho survived as late as 1931 as an example of successful independent African newspaper ownership, though in the final years it was propped up by the Congress President Josiah Gumede. But with Gumede's defeat in 1930 the paper collapsed and was succeeded for a brief period by a paper of Gumede's conservative successor in Congress, Pixley Seme, entitled The African Leader. The Leader was edited by a former writer for Abantu Batho and opponent of Ray Phillips, T.D. Mveli Skota and the paper maintained a clear Africanist philosophy, reflecting a desire for independent African business activity by its owners. But soon after its formation early in 1932 it met a challenge from white commercial capital in the form of The Bantu World, which ensured its eventual demise. In this instance, "Enquirer's" accusations of Joint Council and Institute intervention into African politics proved well-founded, for in the crucial area of African opinion formation, especially at the level of the educated elite, the white liberals played a decisive role in the early 1930s.

The actual initiative for the founding of the Bantu Press (Pty) Ltd. did not actually come from the Institute directly, but a Bethel farmer stuck on hard times, B.G. Paver. Conceiving the idea of a central organisation to take over

African newspapers and co-ordinate their advertising, Paver approached Rheinnalt-Jones who responded favourably.¹⁵⁹ It seems, in fact, that Jones formulated the idea of a central syndicate which actually controlled the advertisement contracts in the various African papers, which were in due course to be incorporated into the one central organisation. Disclaiming any personal financial involvement in the scheme, Jones stated his support for the idea on the grounds that "the level of native newspapers would be raised considerably", especially as the number of literate African readers had risen significantly, thus making it "imperative that it (the African readership) should be supplied with better reading matter".¹⁶⁰ In actual practice the Institute of Race Relations was tied in to the project to the extent that, as William Ballinger, an opponent of the whole scheme, claimed, a wealthy Pretoria businessman Charles Maggs supported The Bantu World while at the same time championing the efforts of Edgar Brookes in raising funds for the Institute.¹⁶¹ It was Maggs's company, together with the Chamber of Mines' Umteteli, which was reported by Ballinger to have approached the Printing Machinery Company, which printed The African Leader, in order to get that newspaper into its possession "lock, stock and barrel" and "put it into cold storage".¹⁶² It was not surprising, in this context, that Brookes sought, after the death of The Leader, actual affiliation of The Bantu Press (Pty) Ltd. to the Institute of Race Relations in order that "we could keep some measure of regular influence over the Bantu Press".¹⁶³ An idea, though, that does not seem to have been taken up, especially as Brookes soon left direct Institute of Race Relations work to take up an appointment as Principal of Adams College in Natal.

The Joint Councils and the I. C. U.

In comparison to the limited success of the Institute in establishing a certain degree of ideological control over the black press, the role of the liberals in the Joint Councils in exacerbating splits in the I. C. U. was of far more long term significance. As we have seen, the I. C. U. in the early part of the 1920s

remained a focal point of African opposition to efforts at political co-optation. While the A.N.C. remained weak and divided, Kadalie's efforts at extending the I.C.U. amongst unorganised black workers remained a thorn in the government's flesh. The "hostility clause" in the 1927 Native Administration Act was a result of a series of resolutions passed by white farmers associations that called for action to be taken against African workers who joined the Union and it was clear that pressures began to grow by that year for an active state response to the Union to curb its activities. In the case of the liberals in the Joint Councils, the I.C.U. was seen as for the most part marginal to their activities following the failure to gain their support for such issues as Women's night passes in 1925 and until 1926 no initiatives were taken to wean over any sections of the I.C.U. leadership, despite indications that some of the more moderate leaders were increasingly hostile to links with the Communist Party.¹⁶⁴

In such circumstances, it is interesting that the first real initiative for the Joint Councils to establish some form of political alliance with the moderate I.C.U. leaders came from outside the mainstream of the white liberal intelligentsia. Up until the middle 1920s, white liberal activities had been almost exclusively male dominated. White women had for the most part confined their activities to welfare work, typified, for instance, by the wives of Ray Phillips and Frederick Bridgman, while additional support had come from women involved in church work and the looking after of hostels for African women. In the period after the first world war, however, the expansion of university education began to break down some of the more traditional mores in white society and the first of the women graduates began to make their mark on South African political life: Mabel Palmer in the middle 1920s (who probably formed the basis of William Plomer's character Mabel van der Horst in his novel Turbott Wolfe), then Margaret Hodgson (later Ballinger), Ellen Hellman, Eileen Krige and others in the 1930s. The exact ideological influences exerted on South African liberalism from this incipient

conservative feminist source remains a matter for detailed investigation, but in the case of Mabel Palmer wider overseas contacts as a result of a stay in England led to the emergence of a female triumvirate of herself, the novelist Winfred Holtby and the South African writer Ethelreda Lewis that exerted a decisive impact on white liberal opinion in the direction of co-opting I.C.U. leadership. Of the three, Ethelreda Lewis was the most vocal in her unflagging efforts to try and rouse support from South African business and political figures in a campaign, as she saw it, to save the Africans in the I.C.U. from Communism. As a minor novelist who wrote stories such as those about "Trader Horn", she was probably in a far better position to reflect populist sympathies amongst the lower middle class in both Britain and South Africa in a period when, following the "Zinoviev Letter" of 1924, communism was a considerable bogey term. At the same time, following the failure of efforts in 1926 and 1927 to rally support for her cause in South Africa since, as she put it to the Bishop of Zululand, "no one of all the professional or businessmen in Johannesburg has come forward with definite help. They have no wish to jeopardise a practice or a business by being associated with natives",¹⁶⁵ it became clear that the only source to turn to was overseas assistance. In effect, the probes of Ethelreda Lewis and her coterie were sufficient to expose all the political limitations of the Joint Council/Bantu Men's Social Centre structure that had been erected in the early 1920s through the efforts of Loram, Bridgman, Phillips and Rheinallt-Jones. Selective help had been offered from these quarters only in the form of lectures from such people as Edgar Brookes and F.S. Livy Noble of the Pretoria Joint Council and from the anthropologist J.D. Krige. This form of activity was politically innocuous since, as Krige wrote to Ethelreda Lewis, "it would not stigmatise us as being implicated in a movement which we do not wholly sympathise with".¹⁶⁶ But any more direct involvement that included reshaping the administration and control of the Union in order, as Ethelreda Lewis saw it, to neutralise the Communist influence, was at this stage beyond the capacity of the white liberal

hierarchy in the Joint Councils. But it was precisely this limited extent of Joint Council activities, covering mostly only the small African petty bourgeoisie, which Ethelreda Lewis objected to. "They fail to see", she wrote, "that where help and a faithful presence is most vitally needed is not in the nursery but in the street with those of no reputation, natives who are constantly being walked over by the well-organised Communists here". What was thus needed was not a continuation of the old missionary approach which had already been criticised for all its limitations by Frederick Bridgman before the first world war, but which still survived in the general ethos impressed after Bridgman's death on the Bantu Men's Social Centre by his successor Ray Phillips. On the contrary, Ethelreda Lewis argued, there should be a "mission" which was "unsectarian" in order to neutralise the "anti-Christian doctrines" inculcated by the Communists:

And that is the only way they may eventually get clear of bad doctrine - by the constant presence and friendship of men who are not out to steal their legitimate trade union ambitions from them (which is what they fear from the Joint Council type of organiser), but to establish those ambitions more safely than would any self-seeking communist.

And, in a manner that echoed the earlier ideas of Frederick Bridgman:

Especially could they be approached by young men good at football and cricket and boxing, who are willing to coach the native and not to laugh at his little vanities. 167

Despite this paternalism, Ethelreda Lewis's approach was still seen by Clements Kadalie as offering up a better opportunity for integrating the I.C.U. into the mainstream of the South African labour movement than working with the Joint Councils.¹⁶⁸ In particular, the overseas connections that had been forged by the Lewis, Holtby, Palmer triumvirate opened up possibilities for help from the British labour movement. Following the expulsion of the Communists from the I.C.U. in December 1926, which led Ethelreda Lewis to boast to the Prime Minister, General Hertzog, that Kadalie was "leader of a law abiding labour organisation of natives" who was "likely to be of far more use in South

Africa than if he were a docile nonentity amongst a small group of natives who are content to be influenced by the Joint Council, great as their pioneer work has been", ¹⁶⁹ the plans for a more elaborate structure of co-optation began to get into gear when Kadalie visited Europe in May 1927. The success of Kadalie's appearance at the International Labour Conference in Geneva and the contacts forged in Britain, via Winfred Holtby, with the Labour Party, Trade Union Congress and the Co-Operative Movement led to the beginnings of a re-evaluation in the South African administrative hierarchy of the nature and role of African trade unions. The Department of Labour in particular seems to have been favourable to the idea of bringing African workers inside the Wage Act and even recognising African labour organisations under the 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act, though at a conference with the Native Affairs Department and Native Affairs Commission, no definite conclusion was arrived at on this. ¹⁷⁰ But at least it seemed, in the political climate of 1927-28, that certain moves in the direction of shifting social control away from purely racial criteria towards one of class and the entrenchment of a unionised black work force were a distinct possibility. In these circumstances, the fruition of the first stage of Ethelreda Lewis's plan came about when, following the acceptance by Walter Citrine of the British Trades Union Congress of the credentials of the trade unionist William Ballinger, an adviser was sent out to assist in the reorganisation of the I.C.U. in June 1928.

Right from an early stage, however, it became clear that the hopes placed behind Ballinger's appointment in South Africa were misconceived for his appearance in South Africa ultimately only represented the extension of existing Joint Council activities into the spheres of African trade union organisation. The reasons for this are multiple. The divisions, corruption and jealousies inside the I.C.U. which had grown rapidly into a nation-wide movement of some 57,760 members by January 1927 hampered Ballinger's work right from the beginning. It was also clear, as was later to emerge during the period of African trade union

expansion in the second world war, that the British model of union organisation was completely misconceived in an environment of semi-peripheral capitalist industrialisation such as South Africa.¹⁷¹ No nation-wide social democratic political movement existed across racial lines to champion the interests of African and White workers on the ostensibly colour-blind liberal democratic model of North America and Western Europe. The entrenchment of racial prejudice in white workers' political consciousness together with the institutionalisation of the colour bar militated against any effective co-operation with the white trade union movement. Thus the options open to Ballinger were extremely limited. Even if he had wanted to, the option of seeking a more militant line was hampered by the prospects both of his expulsion from South Africa and the isolation of the I.C.U. from any radical influences stemming from the Communist Party. The most that could be hoped for would be some of radical political - cum - industrial black organisation that would be able to pick up earlier traditions of resistance to white rule such as Ethiopianism and Garveyism. But in such an instance, Kadalie would have been wiser politically to have taken up the already well-trodden American trail and seek assistance from a Black American trade union organiser: the cultural and political background of Ballinger were completely alien to the idea that Kadalie seems to have had in mind by the time he arrived to assist in the task of reorganising the union.

In such circumstances, it was not surprising that Ballinger's entry into South Africa served to extend Joint Council control over African political activities. With the I.C.U. itself becoming increasingly racked by internal divisions, a chance existed for white liberals to involve themselves in spheres of labour organisation and African trade unionism. In the following years, therefore, a debate began on the methods by which capitalist economic values could be instilled into the African working class. An industrial committee was formed by the Joint Council in Johannesburg in 1930 under Ballinger's influence in order to gather statistical data on African living patterns on the Witwatersrand. Though African participation in this newer "developmental" approach was initially

limited through earlier hostility to the links forged by such leading figures as Ray Phillips with the Chamber of Mines,¹⁷² this development heralded an increasing interest in research into the conditions of urban Africans in the 1930s by such liberals as Ellen Hellman and Eileen Krige. Though one of the dominant emphases of such work in the 1930s was on juvenile delinquency and the need to reproduce family-based structures of social control in the urban areas as well as maintaining links as far as possible with the kinship links in the reserves,¹⁷³ nevertheless the fresh approach engendered by Ballinger in the late 1920s served to keep liberal interest in working-class organisations alive throughout a decade that was signally barren of a nation-wide black trade union organisation. Such an interest served to influence liberal thinking by the time of the second world war when the renewed expansion of black trade unions led to a resurfacing of the debate on the exact role liberals should play in relation to the activities of African political and industrial organisations.

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41. C.T. Loram, "The Separatist Church Movement", International Review of Missions, July 1926, p.480.

42. See Chapter Two, pp.87-88
43. Richard D. Heyman, "C.T. Loram: A South African Liberal in Race Relations", The International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1975, p.41; Martin Legassick, "C.T. Loram and South African 'native policy', 1920-1929", unpublished ms., University of Warwick, n.d.
44. S.M. Molema, The Bantu Past and Present, Edinburgh, 1920, p.366; the significance of Molema's book can be seen to lie in its raising doubts in Smuts's whole notion of a white mission civilist race in Africa based on his essentially cultural idealism. At the same time, by questioning the values of "British liberalism" it also doubted the assimilationist ideals of so many African political leaders up to that time, who sought a meliorist and modernisationist programme based on the British model. See John David Shingler, "Education and Political Order in South Africa, 1902-1961", Ph.D. Thesis, Yale University, 1973, pp.22-29; see also D.D.T. Jabavu, The Black Problem, Lovedale, 1920, p.1
45. ibid., p.351
46. Legassick, "C.T. Loram", p.11.
47. For an analysis of this educational programme see Kenneth King, Pan-Africanism and Education, Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1971, p.97; Shingler, op. cit., pp.200-202.
48. ibid., pp.27-28; see also C.T. Loram, "The Phelps-Stokes Education Commission in South Africa", International Review of Missions, Vol. X, No. 4, October 1921, pp.496-508.
49. William M. Macartney, Dr. Aggrey - Ambassador for Africa, London, 1949, p.74; Edwin W. Smith, Aggrey of Africa, SCM Press, 1929, p.121; 1921 was the year that followed the great Convention of the Universal Negro Improvement Association in Madison Square Garden in New York and was

the period when Garvey was making strenuous efforts to spread the movement overseas by touring Central America, Cuba and Jamaica. The second Convention in 1921 was not as successful as the first, though Garvey was not actually arrested until January 1922 on charges of defrauding the mails, John Henrik Clarke, Marcus Garvey and the Vision of Africa, New York, Vintage Books, pp.99-101.

50. Francis Schimleck, Against the Stream: Life of B. Huss, Principal of St. Francis College, Mariannhill, Mariannhill, 1949, pp.61-62.
51. The Christian Express June 1 1921; Aggrey described Lovedale as "the Hampton of Africa", Smith, op. cit., p.168.
52. Quoted Smith, op. cit., p.175; see also Edgar Brookes, A South African Pilgrimage, Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1977, p.29.
53. Selope Thema, Autobiography, p.101.
54. Michael Twaddle, "The Politician as Agitator in Eastern Uganda" in W.H. Morris-Jones (ed), The Making of Politicians: Studies from Africa and Asia, London, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1976, pp.78-92.
55. W.H. Morris-Jones, "Introduction" in ibid., pp.12-16; for a similar distinction between the "agitator" in times of crisis and the "conciliator" in intervening periods see Harold Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How, New York, Meridian Books, 1958, p.177. A similar argument regarding African support for the Joint Councils is presented by Baruch Hirson, "Tuskegee, the Joint Councils, and the All African Convention", London, I.C.S., mimeo, 1979, pp.6-7.
56. Selby Msimang, Autobiography, p.110.
57. ibid.
58. ibid., pp.113-114; Umteteli wa Bantu 13 September 1924.

59. Brian Willan, "Sol Plaatje, De Beers and an Old Tram Shed: Class Relations and Social Control in a South African Town", Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2, April 1978, pp.195-215.
60. ARTCM 1920/54 "C.W.L.", Memorandum for members of board of management, 1 March 1920.
61. Howard Pim Papers, Box 2 Native Affairs 1905-1934, P.A. Gazana to The Gen. Manager, The N.R.C. 21 October 1921 encl. in P.A. Gazana to H. Pim, 21 October 1921.
62. C. van Onselen, "The Role of Collaborators in the Rhodesian Mining Industry, 1900-1935", African Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 289, October 1973, pp.401-418.
63. Selope Thema, Autobiography, p.103.
64. Minutes of a Meeting of the Executive of the Johannesburg Joint Council of Europeans and Natives, 8 August 1924.
65. Umteteli wa Bantu, 5 June 1926.
66. Alfred Xuma, Charlotte Maxeke - "What an Educated African Girl can do", Johannesburg, 1930, p.16.
67. ibid., p.17. The question of the wages of mine clerks was a sensitive one politically as Margaret Maxeke's husband had worked out a minimum expenditure for the "ordinary Native" in Nancefield of less than £7 a month. As a consequence the Joint Council sought to approach the Native Recruiting Corporation to get it to enforce on individual mines an individual wage level which the N.R.C. had advised mine managers to introduce from 1st November 1920. These levels raised the minimum pay from £7 10s to £9 for Chief Native Clerks and from £7 10s to £10 a month for indunas. Joint Council of Europeans and Natives, Report of Wages Committee, n.d.
68. Hertzog Papers, A32 Box 35, Ray Phillips to Hertzog 18 January 1925. J.W. Horton has argued that Rheinnalt-Jones was the main figure behind the

deputation to Hertzog, though he has presented no evidence to support this. J.W. Horton, "South Africa's Joint Councils: Black-White Cooperation between the two world wars", South African Historical Journal, No. 4, November 1972, p.33. The Government's introduction of women's night passes was short-lived, however, since the following year the courts threw them out. The measure was brought back again via the 1930 Amendment to the 1923 Urban Areas Act.

69. ibid., Sec. to General Hertzog to H. Pim 22 January in reply to letter from Pim to Hertzog of same date.
70. Minutes of a Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Johannesburg Joint Council held in Mr. Pim's Office, February 9 1925.
71. Minutes of a Meeting of the Joint Council held in the Exploration Buildings on March 16th 1925 incl. report on two conferences of February 14th and March 7th.
72. Imvo February 17th 1925; in the event the government introduced night passes from June 1st 1925, Hertzog Papers, minute dated June 2 1925.
73. For a study of this process in Bulawayo see Stephen Thornton, "The Struggle for Profit and Participation by an emerging African Petty Bourgeoisie in Bulawayo: 1895-1933", London, I.C.S., mimeo, 1978.
74. Interview with S. Msimang.
75. Selby Msimang, Autobiography, pp.41-43.
76. Umteteli wa Bantu, 3 November 1923
77. Shingler, op. cit., p.17
78. Minutes of a Meeting of the Joint Council held at the University, Johannesburg, Friday August 17 1923.
79. Umteteli wa Bantu 17 November 1923

80. The South African Outlook, February 1 1924
81. The Star December 1 1924; A.B. Xuma, unpublished Autobiography, in Xuma Papers, p.28.
82. ABX 3004 17 A.B. Xuma to H. Pim April 17 1930 asking for information on the S.A.I.R.R.
83. Legassick, "C.T. Loram".
84. C.T. Loram, introduction to European and Bantu: Papers and Addresses given at the Conference on Native Affairs, held under the auspices of the Federal Council of the Dutch Reformed Church, 27th and 29th September 1923, Johannesburg, 1923, p.5.
85. ArSAIRR, C.T. Loram to J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones 22 September 1926; Rheinnalt-Jones drew up a draft constitution for a Federation of Joint Councils in 1923, MSS Brit. Emp. S22 G194 J.D.R-J to J.H. Harris 25 January 1923.
86. ArSAIRR C.T. Loram to H. Pim February 3 1928.
87. Legassick, "C.T. Loram"; Heyman, op. cit., pp.46-47.
88. ArSAIRR C.T. Loram to J.D. R-J May 15 1927.
89. Howard Pim Papers Saul Solomon to J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones November 8 1926.
90. Hertzog Papers A32 Box 83 Howard Pim, "Notes on General Hertzog's Smithfield Proposals", 1 January 1926, pp.3-4; Howard Pim, "General Hertzog's Smithfield Proposals", The South African Quarterly, Vol. III, January 1925-February 1926, pp.3-6.
91. Johannesburg Joint Council of Europeans and Natives, In Defence of the Cape Franchise, n.d., p.11 (1926?).
92. Howard Pim Papers, H. Pim to Rheinnalt-Jones 11 November 1926.
93. Johannesburg, 1927

94. ibid., p.14
95. Loram, therefore, continued to argue against debating the franchise issue on the grounds that it threatened to produce a split. Report of the National European Bantu Conference at Cape Town, February 6-9 1929, Lovedale, 1929, pp.33-34.
96. Legassick, "C.T. Loram"; Horton, op. cit., p.35.
97. Heyman, op. cit., pp.42-43; for a study in the role of managerialism and its influence on ideology in South Africa see Belinda Bozzoli, "Managerialism and the mode of production in South Africa", South African Labour Bulletin, Vol. 3, No. 8, October 1977, pp.6-49. The historical role of managers in South African industrialisation requires extensive analysis: but it might be tentatively argued that the role of managers by the 1920s, in the aftermath of the 1918-1922 period of labour unrest, had been transformed from one of obtaining labour under conditions favourable to capital to a role of conflict resolution, mediating between labour and capital in a situation of growing class conflict. The American precedent, therefore, in managerialism from the Progressive era acted as an important model and Loram's tendency to copy the American example was probably only typical of a far wider tendency amongst the professional middle class in South Africa at the time.
98. Heyman, op. cit., p.43
99. Edgar Brookes, RJ, p.6.
100. Horton, op. cit., p.30
101. ArSAIRR H. Pim to C.T. Loram 14 February 1928.
102. Umteteli wa Bantu 9 October 1928
103. W.M. MacMillan, Complex South Africa, London, 1930; see also Chapter Eight.
104. J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones, "The Land Question", paper presented at European-Bantu

Conference, January 30–February 2 1927, p.6.

105. ibid., p.9
106. ibid., p.8
107. Johannesburg Joint Council, Memorandum No. 3: The Native in Industry, Johannesburg, 1929, p.7.
108. ibid., p.14; see also Rheinnalt-Jones's article "The Worker in Industry" in Coming of Age, Cape Town, 1930; for the growth in rural support for the I.C.U. see P.L. Wickens, The Industrial and Commercial Workers Union of South Africa, Cape Town, Oxford University Press, 1978, pp.117–122.
109. The Native in Industry, p.15
110. Umteteli wa Bantu 18 February 1928: "Take, for instance, the Cape Native at present. He has more to lose by the legislation now pending in Parliament than anyone else; yet it is difficult to instill any life into him."
111. ArSAIRR F. Livie Noble to J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones May 12 1927.
112. ArSAIRR Minutes of a Meeting of the Joint Council held in the Bantu Men's Social Centre, 11 April 1928.
113. ArSAIRR B72(b) J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones (telegram) to H. Pim 20 March 1928.
114. ArSAIRR B3(e) J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones to Archbishop Owen 20 February 1928.
115. ArSAIRR B3(e) J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones to M. Alexander 5 March 1928; the previous year Rheinnalt-Jones urged at a native welfare society meeting in Cape Town the formation of a federal body "to gether together Native and European opinion in South Africa on native matters", MSS Brit. Emp. S22 G194 J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones to J.H. Harris 25 June 1927.
116. Howard Pim Papers J.W. Jagger to H. Pim 27 October 1927.
117. Howard Pim Papers H. Burton to H. Pim April 29 1928.
118. ArSAIRR B72(b) C.P. Crewe to H. Pim February 21 1929.

119. ibid., H. Pim to J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones 10 March 1928.
120. National European Bantu Conference, Cape Town, 6-9 February 1929, Open Address by the Chairman, Howard Pim, Lovedale, 1929, p.3.
121. ibid., p.15
122. National European-Bantu Conference, Report, p.21.
123. ibid., "The Conference deprecates any alteration of the law which would result in depriving the Natives of the Cape Province of the franchise in its present form" (p.51).
124. ArSAIRR B79(a) H. Pim to J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones 18 February 1929.
125. ibid., J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones to Mabel Palmer 1 April 1929.
126. MSS Brit. Emp. S22 G194 H. Pim to J.H. Harris 12 February and 20 March 1929.
127. Imvo April 2 1929; ArSAIRR B79(l) H. Burton to J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones March 13 1929.
128. B.K. Long Papers MS 6720 James Rose-Innes to B.K. Long 1 January 1927.
129. ArSAIRR B72(f) J. Rose-Innes to H. Pim 19 April 1929.
130. ibid., H. Burton to J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones May 10 1929; H. Burton to H. Pim May 10 1929.
131. ibid.
132. Cape Times 1 May 1929
133. Cape Times 23 May 1929
134. ArSAIRR B72(f) H. Burton to H. Pim July 3 1929.
135. ArSAIRR J. Lewin to J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones July 1 1931; Interview with Julius Lewin, 12 July 1979. The Fabian Society failed to pull in many students, but probably contributed to the continuing radicalism in the Cape

Town Joint Council in the 1930s. Lewin himself left for England in 1934.

136. ibid., J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones to J. Lewin 14 August 1931.
137. MSS Brit. Emp. S22 G194 H. Pim to J.H. Harris 30 June 1929.
138. ArSAIRR C.T. Loram to J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones 11 January 1928.
139. ibid., C.T. Loram to J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones 11 January 1928.
140. ibid., J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones to T. Jesse Jones 5 December 1928.
141. ibid., T. Jesse Jones to J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones 5 December 1928.
142. ArSAIRR B97(3) Memorandum marked "private and confidential" for special committee on Carnegie and Phelps-Stokes Funds formed to meet in Howard Pim's Office, Exploration Buildings, Johannesburg, May 9 1929; Brookes, RJ, p.7; Horton, op. cit., p.36.
143. James Rose Innes Corr. 755 H. Pim to Rose-Innes 18 June 1929.
144. Howard Pim Papers "Notes by R-J given by Stella Jones", September 25 1930. Horton, op. cit., p.37.
145. C.T. Loram, Circular Letter to My Friends, June 30 1931.
146. ArSAIRR B3(e) Herbst to J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones 8 December 1932.
147. ArSAIRR B2(e) J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones to T. Jesse Jones April 12 1933.
148. Abantu Batho 5 March 1931
149. ArSAIRR H. Pim to J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones 3 October 1930.
150. ibid.
151. Joint Council Files b.125 f.17 J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones to Dunlop 16 April 1931.
152. Umteteli wa Bantu 1 July 1933
153. A.B. Xuma, Bridges to cooperation between White and Black, Fort Hare, 1930, p.18.

154. Howard Pim Papers "Notes of Rheinnalt-Jones copied by Stella Jones", September 25 1930.
155. Minutes of Meeting of the Executive Council of the South African Institute of Race Relations, December 20 1933.
156. The Bantu World February 3 1934
157. The Bantu World December 25 1948
158. Van Onselen, op. cit., p.7
159. T.J. Couzens, "A Short History of 'The World' (and other black newspapers)", unpublished seminar paper, University of the Witwatersrand, 1976, pp.6-7.
160. ArSAIRR File 4 Minutes of a Meeting of the Executive Council March 4 1932, adjourned to March 15.
161. Couzens, op. cit.
162. ibid.
163. ArSAIRR General, Native Press Co. 1934, E. Brookes to J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones, 2 June 1934.
164. Wickens, op. cit., p.102
165. W.G. Ballinger Papers A410/C2 E. Lewis to The Lord Bishop of Zululand May 20 1927.
166. ibid., J.D. Krige to E. Lewis 30 November 1926; Krige considered that "the lines upon which the political growth of the native should proceed very important, and am almost instinctively sceptical of ideas on this subject which emanate from overseas" (J.D. Krige to E. Lewis 18 November 1926). It was this colonial parochialism which Ethelreda Lewis and her cohorts had to break.
167. ibid., E. Lewis to The Lord Bishop of Zululand May 20 1927; ArSAIRR Misc. E. Lewis to E.F. Keppel August 8 1927.

168. Wickens, op. cit., p.105
169. W.G.B. Papers E. Lewis to The Right Hon. The Prime Minister
January 3 1928.
170. Wickens, op. cit., pp.137-139
171. See Chapter One. For a study on the role of South Africa's development
into a semi-peripheral industrial power see Philip Ehrensaft, "Polarized
Accumulation and the Theory of Economic Dependence: The Implications
of South African Semi-Industrial Capitalism" in Peter C.W. Gutkind and
Immanuel Wallerstein (eds), The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa,
London, Sage Publications, 1976, pp.58-59.
172. W.B. Ball Pap. BC 347 DI I. 3. I. I. W.G.B. to W. Holtby 15 January
1930; ArSAIRR H. Pim to J.D. R-J 3 October 1930; Joint Council
Pap. J.D. R-J to R. Dunlop 16 April 1931.
173. See, for instance, Ellen Hellman, "The Importance of Beer Brewing in an
Urban Slum Yard", Bantu Studies, Vol. VIII, No. , 1934; J.D. Rheinnalt-
Jones, "Social and Economic Conditions of the Urban Native" in I. Schapera (ed),
Western Civilisation and the Natives of South Africa, London, 1934; Eileen
J. Krige, "Some Social and Economic Facts revealed in Native Family Budgets",
Race Relations, Vol. I, No. 7, 1934; "Changing Conditions in Marital
Relations and Parental Duties among Urbanized Natives", Africa, Vol. IX,
No. I, 1936; Hilda Kuper and Selma Kaplan, "Voluntary Associations in an
Urban Township", African Studies, Vol. III, No. 4, 1944; Ellen Hellman,
"Urban Areas" in E. Hellman (ed), Handbook on Race Relations in South Africa,
London, O.U.P., 1949; Rooiyard - A Sociological Survey of an Urban
Native Slum Yard, Manchester University Press, 1969 (i ed 1948): in the
latter analysis, E. Hellman pointed out that of a survey of 100 families in the
slumyard all but 26 had direct connections with relatives in the reserves,
either through children reared by these relatives or through the removal of

the family to "its rural home" (sic) by the migrant labour system. This led to the conclusion that "the rearing of children under tribal conditions forms an effective check to the detribalisation either of them or their parents" (pp.111-112).

Chapter Seven

Liberals and the drive to entrench territorial segregation

The political context in which liberal bodies developed in South Africa in the years after the first world war indicates that a reassessment is needed of the role and function of liberal ideology inside the South African body politic. On the surface, the creation of the Joint Councils, the Bantu Men's Social Centre, the Institute of Race Relations and other similar bodies acted as an important catalyst for debate on the nature of racial prejudice. Acting as channels through which ideas that were being discussed on the international plane could be disseminated in South Africa, the liberal bodies of the inter-war years acted as key educational and cultural institutions through which an educated African elite could be socialised into contemporary political life. As the example of the I.C.U. and the importation of William Ballinger shows, this process was not always an easy one and often overlay African aspirations to political autonomy and the free development of their own institutions. But in addition, there is the important further question of how far the political involvement of the liberal bodies compromised their own ideology.

Some analysts have taken the liberals' own claims towards racial assimilation in the inter-war years at face value and seen the ideological content of South African liberalism in somewhat of a political vacuum. John Shingler, for example, in a recent doctoral study of education and its relationship to political order in South Africa, has argued, from an analysis of various liberal writings of the period, that the content of South African liberalism by the 1920s verged towards assimilationism:

Wherever earlier to be a liberal, a negrophilist and a humanitarian meant to be a segregationist, by the 1920s the reverse was true. 1

This view tends to accord with the dominant theme of South African liberal historiography which, as was shown in Chapter Three, rests on the view that the Union in 1910 was a political hiatus from which the influence of the Cape liberal tradition

successively declined. Liberals, therefore, remained for the most part excluded from power, except for a few important individuals such as Hofmeyr, the subject of Alan Paton's dramatic biography,² and remained effectively in a state of near internal exile, cooped up in their isolated universities, Joint Councils or Institute of Race Relations, though occasionally receiving important moral support from some liberal churchmen.³ This isolationist view of South African liberalism, seeing the purveyors of the liberal message as in touch with the ideas being developed outside South Africa but incapable of disseminating these ideas into the formation of actual policies, has been challenged by the revisionist school of South African historiography. Using for the most part a marxist paradigm, the revisionists have sought to locate the liberal bodies of the inter-war years in the context of a class struggle, indicating that the objective function of the liberals, as opposed to any subjective intentions, was to both sustain the South African social formation and reproduce capitalist relations of production. In this context, as Martin Legassick has argued in an unpublished seminar paper, the actual differences between the ideas on "native policy" by the liberals and "friends of the native" and that of the government itself were only marginal. Focusing, in particular, on the transformation in liberalism as a whole by the end of the second world war from an individualist-based laissez faire model of society to that of a collectivist and interventionist one, Legassick has argued that the traditional view of an unbroken "liberal tradition" surviving in isolation in South Africa after Union becomes somewhat static and unhistorical. While certain general ideas in individual liberty, human rights, freedom of speech could be said to remain the basis of South African liberalism, at the same time an important reformulation of liberal ideology took place to reflect the social and class changes engendered by South African industrialisation. The liberals of the 1920s such as Rheinnalt-Jones, Hoernle and W.M. Macmillan represented a newer generation of liberal ideologists based no longer in the Cape, though some had had their origins there, but in the Transvaal and on the Witwatersrand.⁴ Here liberals proceeded to formulate an ideology that closely coincided with the segregation policies of both the Smuts government up to 1924 and the Pact government thereafter. In 1923, especially, a "liberal consensus" could be said to have emerged with the calling

of a European Bantu Conference by the Dutch Reformed Church, where prominent white liberals such as W.M. MacMillan and Edgar Brookes mixed with representatives from welfare societies and the Protestant churches in addition to those of the D.R.C.⁵

This high-water mark of "liberal" influences on official thinking - which was reinforced by the appointment of Roberts and Loram to the Native Affairs Commission - was, to a considerable extent, minimised in the years after 1924, though liberals continued to score individual victories, such as that of the night passes case of 1925. For the most part, white liberal organisations felt themselves to be under growing threats of isolation as the 1920s progressed and this was aided after 1929 by the beginnings of a reformulation of "native policy" by Afrikaner nationalist ideologists such as W.W.M. Eiselen in his pamphlet Die Naturelle Vraagstuk.⁶ This period of comparative isolation, however, did not indicate a static liberalism for the development of liberal discussion, especially on such issues as the reserves in the 1920s and the position of urban Africans in the 1930s, indicates that the position of liberals in the overall South African social formation was one of both periodic isolation and inclusion. The argument of this chapter and the ones following is based upon a partial synthesis of the isolationist thesis of Shingler and liberal historiography, on the one hand, and the revisionist critique of Legassick on the other. Liberalism was of use as an ideology of social control, but only on selective occasions. The key occasions were in periods of ideological uncertainty in the governing apparatus such as in the early 1920s covering the last years of the Smuts government and the first two years or so of the Pact; as well as the period after 1933-34 when Hertzog and Smuts joined together to form the United Party government and eventually pass the Native Bills of 1936. In the latter instance liberal commitment to the Cape African franchise was outweighed by considerations of direct inclusion into the state apparatus via the Natives Representatives and the Natives Representatives Council.

The periodic isolation and inclusion of South African liberal ideology makes any assessment of its formulation considerably more problematic than a simple analysis

of its objectives will imply. The weakness with the analyses of both Shingler and Legassick is that they have taken liberal statements at face value, though coming to somewhat different conclusions. Behind such statements there was a machiavellian pragmatism which is revealed in the private correspondence of such figures as C.T. Loram, Edgar Brookes and J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones who were all politically ambitious men intent on manipulating the systems of communication and influence with the government to their advantage. How far were these individuals and the institutions they represented the expression of a distinct class interest? While it is possible to observe that most South African liberals had a "petty bourgeois" background, some of the cruder marxist analyses imply that white liberalism was simply a covert mask for capitalist interests and that the content of liberal ideology was effectively the same as that of segregation and later apartheid.⁷ The thrust of this argument is similar to that of the Frankfurt theorists in Germany after the rise of Hitler when Herbert Marcuse, especially, charged liberalism with being a direct ideological source of fascism.⁸ But this probably overlooks to a very high degree the fundamental political weakness of the South African liberals and implies to them an effectiveness in ideological influence they simply did not have: it was only in journals like Trek and later The Democrat that anything like a "mass" impact of liberal ideology could be said to be felt in South Africa, and even then on a relatively limited scale. The true picture, indeed, was considerably different. The very isolation of the liberals for most of the period under review necessitated their taking up a pragmatist and realist approach in order to exploit whatever political opportunities were available - but the very necessity of doing this involved a considerable compromise of principle such that the objective consequence of liberal toenadering was that they became the instruments of social control. It was a dilemma which was never fully resolved before 1948 and only began to be debated in the early 1950s with the emergence of a more radical liberalism articulated by a younger generation who became instrumental in the formation of the Liberal Party. This we examine in the last chapter; for the moment, however, we turn to the development of liberal ideological discussion in the 1920s once the victory of the Pact in 1924 ensured the state's determination to proceed with a policy of territorial segregation.

Segregation and the reformulation of liberal ideology

Even before the arrival of the Pact, liberal thinkers in South Africa had been continually aware of resting their "solutions" to "the native problem" on the basis of the development of the reserves. This had been the basis, to a considerable extent, of the ideas of Maurice Evans in his Black and White in South East Africa in 1911, when the industrial training of Tuskegee was recommended as the basis of African education in South Africa in order to ensure the continuation of the African's attachment to the soil: "Back to the land is the inarticulate cry of the Abantu, and no relief of the situation is likely to be brought about by those who will accept entirely new conditions of life which would connote abandonment of all they value".⁹ This was the basis of a cultural idealism which progressively infiltrated liberal thought in the colonial context in the first few decades of the twentieth century and which later spilled over into more scientific analyses in anthropology by the 1930s. Beyond shaping an educational debate on the nature and control of African education in South Africa, the formulation of rural industrial training also determined the politico-economic basis of South African liberal ideology in the inter-war period. The concept of agricultural and rural training in the reserves implied the fostering of a class of master African farmers who would form strong social and economic attachments to mission stations and educational institutions like Lovedale and Fort Hare in the Eastern Cape. In a sense, there was the notion of a class alliance implied in this with Christian liberals such as James Henderson and Edgar Brookes, secular intellectuals such as C.T. Loram and W.M. MacMillan and philanthropists such as Howard Pim uniting in the collective mission of fomenting an African petty bourgeois class rooted in the rural areas and having the limited political check of the Cape African franchise, which most liberals still hoped in the 1920s would still be extended to the provinces. Such an alliance played a vital role in protecting liberal interests by steering African political consciousness away from the dangerous urban radicalism represented by Abantu Batho on the Rand, and the small numbers of African radicals being recruited into the Communist Party night schools after 1921, while at the same time meeting the repressionist counterattack

from the white working class and the S.A.L.P. who sought complete industrial segregation as a means of removing the competition from semi-skilled Africans in the urban areas.

There was an implicit paternalism in this vision which was only gradually modified as the 1920s progressed and the African political class became more vocal. One of its earliest advocates was the Scot, the Reverend James Henderson, Principal of Lovedale, who, as a highlander born in Caithness, was eager to apply the Scottish crofting model to the African reserves. The advantage of such a model was its implicit paternalism which ruled out the possibility of independent class action through the growth of trade unions:

... tenant farming, it may be said, is uneconomic because it imposes on the ground the burden of carrying two sets of people apart from the servants, but in Scotland, I take it, the ground requires to carry two sets of citizens. In Scotland, we had the autocratic class, the descendants of the old feudal lords, and these were born by the land, and it was up to them (and they did it) to carry on the public work. They were the members of Parliament, the Lieutenants of the County, the Officers of the Court. They bore the great burden of public service. The farmers bore the burden of local public service, meaning by local that confined to parishes, perhaps to Counties. It would seem that for the wider class of public services we (in South Africa - P.R.) are largely dependent on men who have achieved success in business and are in a position to retire from it. We are not maintaining a class in the same way, who, in the prime of life, are free to carry on the broader public service.

With White farmers thus playing this role of "public servants" carrying on the wider functions of political and legal office, Henderson went on to suggest that more local issues could be taken up, as in the Scottish model, by smaller businessmen and farmers, who in the South African instance, could be African:

... it seems to me as clear as daylight that by and by we shall be faced with great labour unions opposing the Masters Unions, and that we are paving the way for that by making no differentiation between the most capable Native. We are throwing back the most capable Native amongst the least capable, and the result will be combination amongst them, and strikes and labour troubles. 10

This suggestion for providing aspirant African rural entrepreneurs with outlets in the reserves took a form similar to that outlined by the 1925 Morris-Carter Commission in Rhodesia of Native Purchase Areas which were attached to the African reserves and were areas where African farmers could buy land freehold.¹¹ In the South African instance, however, the 1913 Land Act of Sauer had eliminated the proposal in Hertzog's draft bill for a series of "neutral" areas where both white and black farmers could buy land and had instead introduced a rigid definition of territorial segregation that defined land as either White or African owned.¹² But Henderson's ideas carried considerable influence among a number of opinion formers on land policy at this time and the idea of "neutral" areas was a crucial element in the debate on segregation. For C. T. Loram, for instance, Henderson was seen as one of the most crucial influences on his book The Education of the South African Native which also appeared in 1917.¹³ Here Loram suggested that communal African land tenure would eventually break up and "individualism must ultimately prevail":

The influence of the white man's example and the work of the missionaries both lead in that direction. It is unreasonable to expect a trained and educated Christian Native to subject himself willingly to the capricious rule of the heathen and barbarian hereditary chief, nor is it possible to expect any great interest in education unless such education will bring natural as well as spiritual advantage. 14

On the other hand, Loram was careful to point out that this recognition of the need for increased outlet for the educated African kholwa and rural petty bourgeoisie did not negate the basic need to keep the mass of the African population on the land though "for this to be carried into effect with the limited amount of land available, better methods of agriculture must be taught in the schools. Along with the primitive methods of agriculture the primitive methods of tribalism must die"¹⁵ (emphasis added). Loram pointed out that such developments in the rural context should be made to fit in with the increasing pressures towards industrial segregation in the urban context where there were little or no opportunities for the development

of African industrial skills. "The educated native", wrote Loram, "is beginning to see that his work is to be largely a preserve for the white youth, and that he must take up some manual occupation if he wishes to make a good living. At present such forms of manual labour as carpentry, blacksmithing and bootmaking are the most popular; but when the natives realise, as they soon must, that these callings can only take a limited few, they will turn to farming, which is the field that offers the greatest scope for them, and which is the hereditary occupation of their race".¹⁶ Arguments such as these were a distinct shift from the position Pim had taken at the 1914 Dominions Royal Commission, when he championed the increase in industrial training in an urban context for Africans and Loram's case underpinned the pressures towards Stallardism that were to gather momentum in the period after the first world war.

Henderson's and Loram's arguments for economic outlets for a rural African petty bourgeoisie were championed by some of the leaders of African opinion. D.D.T. Jabavu, for instance, supported the idea of "neutral" areas in evidence to the 1917 Select Committee and it appeared, from the development of African farming in the Eastern Cape, that certain areas of mixed white and African farming would win support from the Union government.¹⁷ This was certainly the opinion of the Local Natives Land Committee under the chairmanship of W. C. Scully, which was set up after the report of the Beaumont Commission, to investigate conditions in the Cape Province.¹⁸ Before the Committee reported on the 24th January 1918, Scully issued a communication which defended the individual ownership of land by Africans in the Eastern Cape and pointed out that "in districts wherein European and native farmers are most intermingled, representations of both races expressed themselves as strongly opposed to the principle of segregation and stated most emphatically that they desired no interference with the existing conditions". Furthermore, Scully went on, "whilst regarding territorial segregation as advisable within the greater portion of the Cape Province, I am strongly of opinion that any law which would have the effect of forcing large numbers of civilised native landowners back into locations would be unfair and in every respect inexpedient".¹⁹ But Scully's

ideas met opposition when it came to trying to put them into effect. White farmers, despite Scully's claims, were increasingly segregationist in outlook in the Cape after the first world war and eventually succeeded, at the sixth annual congress of the Cape Provincial Agricultural Association in November 1919, in passing a motion that opposed the sale of land to Africans in "European" areas.²⁰ When, therefore, the Scully committee proposed at Victoria East to schedule a narrow line of farms owned by whites that projected into African-owned territory, opposition from white farmers proved, in Henderson's words, "irresistible" and, after communications between Scully and General Botha, the Prime Minister, the proposal was dropped.²¹ The failure in Victoria East did not prevent Scully keeping to his original ideas in the final report of the committee when land in the Cape was proposed as being divided into three different classifications. Classes "A" and "C" were proposed as white and African respectively while Class "B" was proposed as a mixed area, including King Williams Town, East London, Komgha, Peddie, Stutterheim, Victoria East, Fort Beaufort, Stockenstrom, Cathcart, Queenstown, Wodehouse, Elliot, Maclear, Matatiele, Mount Currie and Umzimkulu.²² Within these districts was some 104,000 morgen owned by African farmers and the committee warned of the consequences of rigid territorial segregation which would lead to the eviction of large numbers of African farmers and the further overcrowding of the reserves as well as the town locations. Such evictions, the committee suggested, would "subject a multitude of people accustomed to a healthy country life, to moral and physical conditions which it is no exaggeration to describe as hideous, and under which the death rate is often a disgrace to civilisation".²³

The Committee, therefore, reflected to a considerable degree the thinking on African reserves and the need to create outlets for the rural African petty bourgeoisie among liberals of the time. In particular, the Committee warned against the creation of large African farms which it felt often led African farmers to get into debt and suggested instead expropriation and sub-division into smaller blocks which might be designated as locations under the Glen Grey Act. Such sub-division would help relieve the pressure on land and reinforce the trend towards settling Africans on the

land and maintaining social control through individual land-holding. "The evidence is overwhelming", the Committee concluded, "to the effect that the land-owning Native in spite of his occasional improvidence - is a useful member of society. The ownership of land tends to endow him with a sense of responsibility: he and his tenants are usually regarded by unprejudiced Europeans as an insurance against stock-thieving in the vicinity".²⁴ In order to make a large number of small individual holdings viable, though, the Committee went on to suggest some form of cooperation which would ensure the fencing of arable lands, the purchase of agricultural implements, the more systematic use of grazing areas and the breeding of stock. Such cooperation could, in addition, be assisted by "Native General Councils" which "should be encouraged to interest themselves in these matters", while "the same financial aid should be given by the Government as is at present given towards general education in the Native Territories".²⁵

The emphasis upon cooperation in the rural context was a theme that was increasingly championed by liberals in the 1920s as efforts at encouraging more efficient African farming took effect at both the informal level of encouragement through private institutions such as Lovedale and Fort Hare and the formal level of instruction through agricultural demonstrators appointed by the Native Affairs Department and the establishment by the government of the training schools for African demonstrators such as Fort Cox and Tsolo. It provided the immediate context for the elaboration of territorial segregation after the election of the Pact in 1924.

Agricultural demonstration and the growth of African farmers associations

For Henderson, rural co-operation among Africans was a problem that would "apparently have to be re-created under European guidance".²⁶ It was a question that influenced policy at both Lovedale and Fort Hare in the period after the Armistice in 1918. The general aim was a Native Training Institute in South Africa which could broaden the selective focus on industrial training that already went on in places like Lovedale, which had only just completed the installation of electric plant in 1918 to power its workshops.²⁷ At Fort Hare

in the same year the Agricultural Department was inaugurated with the son of Swiss missionaries, P. Germond, appointed as both Lecturer in Agriculture and Farm Manager. In this Germond was assisted by an American Negro missionary from Qanda, near Middledrift, Reverend East, who was paid as a part-time agricultural demonstrator by the Department of Native Affairs to take over the task of organising students' vegetable gardens at Fort Hare.²⁸ This early instance of cooperation between informal efforts at Fort Hare and formal interest by the Union government reflected the growth in ideas of separate, community-based African education that had a strong rural orientation. In East and Central Africa such ideas reached fruition in the Jeanes schools organised by Thomas Jesse Jones, that were modelled on the system of itinerant teachers in the American South who travelled to backward Negro schools to instruct negro pupils in industrial and agricultural education.²⁹ A similar pattern in South Africa began to emerge even before the Report of the Phelps-Stokes Commission in 1921 and the American Negro connection - (which contrasted strikingly with the attitudes to "Ethiopian" influences and the A.M.E. Church that were to be repeated as late as 1923 in Heaton Nicholls's novel Bayete) evidenced also a concern to import techniques and methods from the South.³⁰ In this respect, the official recognition of the value of the American model was not an isolated incident in Southern Africa at this time for in 1926 the government of Southern Rhodesia appointed an American missionary, E.D. Alvord, as "Agriculturalist for the Instruction of Natives", with a staff of 4 Whites and 87 Africans, though work on "development" of reserves was severely hampered by lack of adequate staff and funds and opposition by Native Commissioners to Alvord's American background.³¹

East's influence among many small African farmers in the Eastern Cape appears, however, to have been significant at this time. As a child, East had worked on the cotton fields in the South, where his grandfather had been a slave and "dedicated to improving the agricultural practices of his congregation, he made his pastoral rounds in an open cape-cart which carried a plough, a harrow

and other basic implements. He needed no invitation from workers in the fields to unhitch his team of two draught horses, transfer them to the plough and demonstrate better methods and skills to the conservative African peasants".³² This advice and demonstration came at a time of growing rural unrest in the Eastern Cape, with radical influences from the I.C.U. as it sought to organise farm workers³³ together with the millenarian tendencies of the Wellington Movement in the Transkei which awaited the liberation from white colonialism through the arrival of American Negroes in aeroplanes.³⁴ For such leaders as D.D.T. Jabavu, who had been teaching at Fort Hare since 1915 and who had visited Tuskegee and championed its ideas, East's presence acted as "a source of inspiration to many African husbandmen",³⁵ especially in the way that he emphasised that acreages of 4 to 6 acres were too small for effective farming and the need for dams, sanitary arrangements in the locations and the importation of foreign bulls and stallions to improve the quality of African stock.³⁶ In addition it is very likely that Jabavu saw the political value of East's agricultural demonstrations in that they acted as important ideological counter-weight to the I.C.U.'s radicalism. Warning in 1920 that "socialism of the worst calibre is claiming our people",³⁷ Jabavu increasingly sought a power-base of his own in the Native Farmers Associations that were formed in the Eastern Cape after the War and which closely identified with the agricultural methods and Tuskegee-based ideology promulgated by East.

Most of the African Farmers Associations were formed in the Keiskamma River basin where they were in easy access to the agricultural demonstrations of Fort Hare, combined with the fact that some of the small farms in the area were felt to have a considerable potential economically in the agricultural development following the War. The first such association was formed in Middeldrift in 1918 and had East as its Vice-Chairman, Jabavu as Secretary, Chief Shadrach Zibi as Vice-Chairman (he was later to re-settle with some of his followers in the Rustenburg district of the Transvaal) and Stan Ford Sojica, a self-made farmer, as Treasurer.³⁸

Some 60 African farmers attended the second meeting and over 100 the third, held at Qanda, where a talk was given by Reverend C. Kunene of his experiences of "scientific agriculture" at Tuskegee.³⁹ The Association met with some support from the government: the Secretary of Native Affairs agreed by the end of 1918 to arrange for agricultural bulletins to be translated into Xhosa, while in July 1919 the then Secretary, M.C. Vos, addressed the Association at Burnshill, and stressed the need for better agricultural methods, especially adequate fencing which "would release thousands of boys for school and other purposes whose time is now wholly and deplorably consumed in herding stock", local afforestation "so as to obviate the present primitive method to which (African) women folk are compelled to resort in order to gain firewood" and the creation of adequate markets for African produce and local village industries.⁴⁰ By the end of 1919, the Native Affairs Department agreed to discuss proposals for cooperation and the establishment of local councils on Glen Grey lines which empowered locations, on a majority vote of tax-payers, to tax themselves for agricultural schemes such as dipping tanks, commonage fencing and waterfurrows.⁴¹ This attitude does not appear to have been maintained for very long for the assistant Secretary of Native Affairs, E.R. Garthorne, reflected the government's decline in support for Glen Grey principles when he wrote to the Association that the government had had "no indications of any general desire on the part of Native communities in Ciskeian districts for the establishment of councils or committees such as are contemplated by the association".⁴² Government policy reflected the growing trend to enforce territorial segregation and it thus appears that the Farmers Association was only accepted in so far as it reinforced ideas of separate African communal occupation and not necessarily individual tenure per se. This policy, in fact, emerged in the course of discussion by the Smuts government in the early 1920s and, on the 5th December 1921, Smuts stated at a meeting called to discuss a Native Affairs Department memorandum on the "native land question" that while

he "felt that . . . it would be unwise to adopt any measure which was equivalent to segregation out of hand" (a policy he had outlined in the debate on the 1920 Native Affairs Bill) nevertheless he "was impressed with the importance of providing for community occupation, which seemed to be better adapted than individual tenure to the needs of the native at his present stage of development".⁴³

From the end of 1921, therefore, state policy towards fostering African farmers associations and encouraging individual tenure began to change as communal tenure became increasingly emphasised. The Native Affairs Department declined to appoint an additional agricultural demonstrator⁴⁴ while, three years later, it declined to assist Chief Zibi in his scheme to move his Hlubi followers from the overcrowded Rhenosterboom location to Rustenburg on the grounds that it was "doubtful as to the ability of the tribe to carry the financial burden they wish to undertake":⁴⁵ though in the event some £4,000 was raised and 1,200 morgen of land purchased.⁴⁶ Until the start of a series of disastrous droughts after 1924, this policy did not have too debilitating an effect on the growth of the Associations which were able to accumulate considerable sums of money on the basis of individual members' prosperity. Stephen F. Sonjica of Qanda, for instance, had become prosperous on the basis of savings earned as a policeman in King Williams Town and with £80 invested in farming he had gradually accumulated sufficient funds after five years to be able to buy a farm for £1,000.⁴⁷ Success stories such as these were held up as within the realms of possibility for any of the Associations' members and enthusiasm tended to grow for their objectives. By March of 1920 285 members were reported by a meeting of the Association at Victoria East⁴⁸ and numbers of non-kholwa "lady heathens and peasant women"⁴⁹ began to take an interest, walking up to 16 miles on foot to attend the meeting of the Association at Ncwazi in June 1921.⁵⁰ On the basis of this increased interest, Jabavu announced a scheme to establish a "Native Endearmont Company" which could purchase agricultural equipment and £73 was collected for this by June 1922⁵¹ while in the same year a threshing machine was

purchased by a syndicate of the Association.⁵² But at the same time there were indications that the Associations were increasingly distrusting government policy as they sought to encourage African agriculture on lines similar to those of white settlers. Imvo complained of the policy of subsidising European farmers associations on a pound for pound principle "some of which have hardly a dozen members present at their so-called meetings" while "nothing is granted to the Middledrift or Kentani or Butterworth Associations which are attended by anything from fifty to a hundred at an average gathering".⁵³

The election of the Pact government in 1924 had the effect of accentuating these political tendencies as both the government's drive towards territorial segregation and the progressive ecological deterioration of the reserves hampered even further the Tuskegee ideal of establishing a class of African master farmers centred around the detribalised kholwa. In the same year as the election drought hit the reserves and continued throughout the 1920s to hinder the efforts of the farmers associations to accumulate sufficient resources from whatever agricultural surpluses were available. "Were it not that natives practically live on dead meat", Paul Germond wrote despondently to Alexander Kerr, "there would be starvation. In some locations dead cattle are numbered in hundreds".⁵⁴ This natural disaster was not assisted by the Government's passing in 1925 of the segregationist Native Land and Taxation Act which continued to exclude African farmers from state assistance in the form of the government land bank, available to only white farmers, whilst at the same time consolidating the various provincial taxes on Africans into one standard poll tax of 20sh per annum on all adult males together with a local tax of 10sh per annum on all huts and dwellings in the reserves. This tax was a penal one for African land holders, especially in the Cape, where previously Africans holding land on individual tenure had paid quit rent instead of the 10sh hut tax and caused a considerable amount of resentment. In particular, the centralised nature of the tax, which was designed to provide finances for African services such as education, was seen as a direct attack on the entrenched position of African

land holders in the Cape under the 1910 Act of Union. These fears were confirmed even further the following year when the government published its long awaited four native bills, which proposed, amongst other things, to remove African voters in the Cape from the common roll and place them on a separate franchise in return for seven white representatives in the House of Assembly with the power to vote on African issues only.

In such circumstances, the African political elite, especially in the Cape, was drawn increasingly into the orbit of the white liberal institutions centred around the Joint Councils as the Afrikaner nationalist complexion of the Pact and its resistance to proposals for increasing state spending on reserve development nullified much of the discussions in the early 1920s at the time of the Native Affairs Act. This does not mean that the change of government in 1924 necessarily represented a political hiatus since many of the ideas of Hertzogian segregation were implicitly rooted in the earlier discussion under the Smuts administration of 1919 to 1924. But what did become clear as the 1920s progressed was that South African native policy was falling further behind British colonial policies of indirect rule in other parts of Africa as the government, under pressure from settler farming and mining interests, proved increasingly reluctant to provide the resources for African tribal institutions to develop or for increased spending on African education. While the £340,000 spent on African education in 1921-22 nearly doubled to over £600,000 by 1931-2, the Native Taxation and Development Act acted as a rigid form of taxation that provided a fund incapable of sustained development⁵⁵ and by the time of the 1932 Report of the Native Economic Commission it became increasingly recognised that the state would have to provide a growing capital contribution to provide the resources and infrastructure for the reserves to function effectively under a modernising African political elite. But until such thinking became clarified by this Report, acting as it did under the legacy of growing African militancy in rural areas as a consequence of I.C.U. influences, the official policy at governmental remained obfuscated. Thus, the only alternative centre for develop-

mentalist ideas in the reserves (apart, of course, from the more revolutionary proposals of the Communists) were the white liberals in the Joint Councils. By the latter part of the 1920s, thinking in these quarters began to move towards a coherent strategy of educational mobilisation, taking off from the earlier and piecemeal Tuskegee approaches of the early 1920s, geared towards the systematic inculcation of western economic values and the cash nexus into the African peasantry in the reserves. Such thinking received a considerable fillip after the arrival of William Ballinger in 1928 and the split in the I.C.U. leading to its effective demise as a separate and autonomous African institution capable of resisting white liberal control of African political activities. But it reflected too a conscious liberal attack on government policy as successive efforts to work in collaboration with the Pact proved unsuccessful. This was especially the case with such liberals as Edgar Brookes and W.M. Macmillan who, by the end of the decade, found themselves effectively rebutted in their efforts to instil into government segregationist thinking a recognition of the need for a strategy of educational and economic development. It was, in fact, only as a consequence of the more circumambient route of the Native Economic Commission that these ideas had a significant impact on government thinking by the middle 1930s, in the more optimistic climate of the United Party government of Hertzog and Smuts. But by then, the South African economy had come out of the more depressed state it was in during most of the 1920s. For the meantime white liberals were forced to look to their own individual efforts as the attempts by Brookes and Macmillan proved so inauspicious.

Attempts at re-thinking segregation: Edgar Brookes and W.M. Macmillan

The previous sections of this chapter have indicated that many of the crucial elements in the ideological reformulation of segregation had already occurred before the triumph of the Pact in 1924. Pressures towards industrial segregation made themselves felt under the South African Party government of Smuts, which passed early in 1924 an Industrial Conciliation Act that confined collective

bargaining machinery to only whites and coloureds. After 1924, the Pact Government elaborated this policy by passing the Wage Act in 1925 and the "Colour Bar" Act of 1926, the former protecting unskilled white workers and the latter the skilled and semi-skilled. Linked to this was the espousal of a programme of "segregation" which, while initially formulated by Hertzog in terms of strict white-black territorial demarcation,⁵⁶ came increasingly after 1924 to be seen in terms of the "liberal" model of providing a third "neutral" area for a black rural petty bourgeoisie. One of the initial influences for this change in Hertzog's thinking, or at least a return to the position of his 1912 Land Bill was that of Edgar Brookes who was at the time teaching at the Transvaal University College in Pretoria. Despite coming from a Natal English background, Brookes developed strongly pro-Nationalist sympathies and in an influential monograph accepted as a Ph.D. thesis, The History of Native Policy in South Africa from 1830 to the Present Day, argued on the basis of a positivist view of history developed from the then influential Introduction to Political Science by J.R. Seeley that territorial segregation was the fulfilment of South African historical processes.⁵⁷ The Nationalist sympathies revealed in the book led to English publishers refusing to publish it, unless certain passages were excised, so Brookes accordingly sent a copy to Hertzog in February of 1924 for his opinion on possible publication.⁵⁸ This request came at a delicate time politically: Hertzog had no clear "policy" on the "native question" and even admitted as much after the Pact Victory in 1924, while at the same time there was an ideological vacuum within the Nationalist Party. Basing most of his political appeal on the industrial segregation and Republican issues, Hertzog had not yet begun to come under systematic pressure from within his own party to define Afrikaner Nationalism on a more strongly ethnic basis. The Broederbond, founded in 1918, had gone under ground in 1922 and, though its ideological leadership in the mid-1920s shifted from Johannesburg to Potchefstroom under the chairmanship of Professor J. C. van Rooy who was a strong advocate of "Kuyperianism" and the exclusiveness of ethnic identities,⁵⁹ this did not have any

immediate political consequences. Indeed, it was only after 1927 that the Bond began to undertake a programme of mass propaganda, aided after 1929 by the foundation of the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings.⁶⁰ Thus Brookes's appeal for assistance on publication of his manuscript came at a time when Hertzog needed more systematic ideological backing for his policies. To this extent, the semi-historicist justification for segregation contained in Brookes's History was timely, together with the fact that Hertzog found the work a valuable apologia pro vita sua in so far as it justified his stance in 1912 on the break with the Botha cabinet and his later claim to be the "true" author of the 1913 Land Act. "If they had followed the draft bill of 1912 with its provisions for reserved areas - suggested by you as neutral areas", Hertzog wrote to Brookes on March 23 "your indictment of the Act of 1913 would never have been necessary."⁶¹

In the event Hertzog gave his support to Brookes's efforts at publication and the History was eventually published by Die Nasionale Pers in Cape Town. It was clear, too, that Hertzog's thinking moved in the direction suggested by Brookes and the policy that was then dominant in the Native Affairs Commission and the thinking of the Smuts government. "I wish to assure you of my almost unqualified approval of your solution of this most difficult problem of native policy", Hertzog continued to Brookes:

In fact, ever since 1912 I have been a constant advocate of this policy of differentiation - political, territorial and economical. Unfortunately, for lack of a more appropriate term at the time, and under the circumstances, I spoke of it as a policy of segregation, and thereby opened the field for a variety of misconceptions, not the least of these being what you call residential segregation the folly of which I have all along felt no less deeply than you do. 62

For the following three years, therefore, Brookes campaigned for Hertzog and the Nationalists and sought to exercise political influence on their segregation programme.⁶³ Such ideas revealed, though, some continuity with the thinking of liberals under the S.A.P. government of Smuts. Interpreting Hertzog's scheme

to the Rand Daily Mail, for instance, Brookes argued that it "had been very largely misunderstood" for it was "not a scheme for the immediate division of the country into sets of areas in one of which only white and in the other only black people will be permitted to live". Furthermore, "as regards land, (the scheme) simply means the addition of neutral areas to the existing "black" and "white" areas of the Natives Land Act. In these neutral areas natives would be permitted to buy land as freely as Europeans. In effect it means legislation finding greater land facilities for the deserving and progressive native". This re-emphasis on rural development and creating agricultural opportunities for the African petty bourgeoisie also, of course, coincided with Hertzog's policies for industrial segregation:

In existing native areas the plan is to develop native agriculture and native kraal handicrafts with suitable marketing arrangements, in order, by a gradual process, to withdraw natives from mines and factories, making room for the surplus of unemployed whites . . . The whole object of this so-called 'economic segregation' is to reduce to a minimum economic competition between white and black and subsequent race friction and race hatred. 64

The similarity of these ideas with those of the liberals on the Joint Councils and the Phelps-Stokes Commission in the early 1920s was evidenced in June of 1924 when Brookes arranged for Jesse Jones to interview Hertzog as part of the Phelps-Stokes Commission's tour of the Transvaal. Brookes was anxious for the Commission to understand the Nationalist Party's "native policy" which, as he had previously explained in the Rand Daily Mail, he felt to be "misunderstood". This was especially important, Brookes felt, in the light of the Commission's standing in both America and Britain where the Commission was in "close touch" with the recently appointed British Imperial Commission on Natives Affairs in Tropical Africa after its 1921 report on education in Africa that was considered "authoritative and final". In these circumstances, the recently-

elected Pact government could not afford to ignore the Commission, Brookes argued, especially if it was to present a better image in native affairs:

Part of the propaganda used against the National Party in the past - and largely accepted overseas - is that our Native Policy is illiberal, reactionary and unjust. No better opportunity of dispelling this slander could be obtained than by convincing the Phelps-Stokes Commission of the Party's good intentions in the sphere of Native Affairs. 65

This public relations role of Brookes continued throughout 1924 and 1925 when Hertzog effectively made Brookes's History appear as the definitive ideological base for the Nationalist programme on segregation. In response to a request from the Secretary of the Party in the Cape, copies were despatched to a number of opinion leaders in both the Nationalist and Labour Parties while a further 100 copies were available for distribution to local party stalwarts.⁶⁶ The book indeed appears to have had a fairly wide circulation among influential sections of the governing class of the time. The Labour Minister in the Pact, T. Boydell, for example, considered the book "the standard work on the native question in South Africa".⁶⁷

At the level of policy, however, Brookes's ideas seem to have influenced Hertzog only in the first year or so of the Pact Government. In a speech at Smithfield in November 1925, Hertzog outlined the Pact "native" policy and its scheme for removing the African voters from the common roll in the Cape and their replacement by seven representatives in the House of Assembly and a Union Native Council. The assumptions of this policy grew, in considerable measure, out of the previous mechanisms of "consultation" which had been established in the Eastern Cape through the council system under the Glen Grey Act and the two councils in the Transkei, the Transkeian Territories General Council and the Pondoland General Council, which were eventually to be merged in 1931 to form the United Transkeian General Council or Bunga. In addition the Hertzog scheme reflected the growing emphasis in native policy upon communal as opposed

to individual tenure and the enhanced role being played by "tribal" structures. Thus the Union Native Council was perceived as being essentially "advisory" in nature to start with "as the Natives qualify themselves for the task of self-government and as the Council acquires influence and confidence amongst the various Native tribes". On the other hand, Hertzog also recognised - probably as a result of Brookes's influence - that the land provisions of the 1913 Land Act needed to be extended so that "within all Native areas the Native is trained and encouraged to be as much as possible self-reliant, to make those areas as attractive as possible for himself, and also to govern himself as far as possible".⁶⁸ The differences between Hertzog and Brookes, which were to grow as the discussion on legislation developed, revolved essentially around the respective emphases they placed on the role and position of non-tribal and kholwa African farmers in the creation of a rural African petty bourgeoisie. Initiating a debate that was in many ways to be repeated in the 1950s between Dr. Verwoerd and the Tomlinson Commission over the role of Bantu Authorities,⁶⁹ Hertzog emphasised the role of "tribes" in the rural areas within which the kholwa class of African farmers were to fit and the overall importance of communal tenure on the pattern initiated by the Smuts government after 1921. Brookes, on the hand, emphasised the need to create increased opportunities for non-tribal or "detribalised" kholwa with the implicit assumption that there was a need for enhanced individual land tenure.

The differences emerged more clearly in the course of 1926 after the publication of Hertzog's four draft bills. Presenting a memorandum to the government, Brookes sought to modify policy in the direction of providing for increased scope for the kholwa. Thus, separate elections for "tribal" and "detribalised" Africans were suggested for the Union Native Council on the grounds that "their interests and outlook are very different". "As the Act now stands", Brookes continued, "the qualified Cape voter not only loses his Parliamentary franchise, but does not exercise a direct vote even for members of his own council".⁷⁰

The implications of this were serious for the development of channels of communication and "consultation" with the rural kholwa if the scheme was to be at all viable:

The articulate and informed Native criticism on this Bill is that of the detribalised Natives, whom it is important to satisfy so far as possible. They in any case will, through their education, be the leaders of the Council, and it is with them that the Government will have to work, and their good-will and co-operation that will be needed to make the scheme a success. 71

Brookes, therefore, suggested a modification of the Government scheme which allowed for the election of representatives of "detribalised" Africans or for those living in urban locations through chiefs, headmen or local councils established under the 1920 Native Affairs Act. The aim of Brookes's alternative method was the preservation of the independent voting power of the educated African kholwa established in the Cape and for their direct election of representatives to the Union Native Council to ensure a majority in their favour of at least one.⁷²

A similar objective was revealed in Brookes's proposal that the seven representatives in the House of Assembly be Africans or that they be allowed to have full membership rights. While such a scheme "could hardly be granted at once at the present juncture", Brookes impressed on Hertzog the need to co-opt the "detribalised" African petty bourgeoisie by providing them with a political platform on lines already pursued tentatively by the Joint Councils. "In conversation with a group of advanced and rather 'agitator' natives the other day", Brookes continued in his memorandum, "I was spontaneously and unanimously assured that, where the concession granted that they might be represented in the House by men of their own colour, all opposition would be dropped and nothing else asked for".⁷³ Such recognition of the need to co-opt the kholwa was also manifested in Brookes desire to see portions of land in Released Areas, set up under the Natives

Land Act, 1913, Amendment Bill, set aside for "village settlements" for "de-tribalised natives" who wish to leave the towns either voluntarily or as a result of the Government's 'civilised labour policy' ".⁷⁴

Brookes's hopes, however, clashed with other powerful pressures acting on the Hertzog policy which were pushing it in a direction very much at variance with a scheme for co-optation of the "detribalised" kholwa and urban petty bourgeoisie. While, hitherto, Hertzog might have been influenced to a greater or lesser extent by Brookes's ideas - though he probably saw the chief value in Brookes as a party ideologist as opposed to actual policy maker - by the end of 1926 the mobilisation of agricultural and mining interests in favour of the extension of migrant labour inside the Union,⁷⁵ combined with a growing political backlash to the extension of I. C. U. organisation to the rural areas,⁷⁶ led to the emergence of political opposition to some of the features embodied in the Hertzog scheme. Even at the time of the debate on Hertzog's Native Taxation and Development Bill in July 1925, there had been some opposition to what was seen as the reduction in the "control of the kraal head over the young native".⁷⁷ But as the scheme was elaborated at Smithfield in November the same year, political protests became more vocal. Arthur Barlow, for instance, as an ardent exponent of segregation in the Orange Free State declared that "... if (Hertzog) is going to allow the Native to choose their own representatives in the Free State for Parliament, then he will be up against a storm of opposition on the part of all the younger men. I shall certainly oppose him in this direction through thick and thin".⁷⁸ Likewise, in the Transvaal, the Head Committee of the Nationalist Party appointed a sub-committee on "the native question" which rejected any idea of giving Africans representation in Parliament or a vote in the Transvaal for Parliamentary elections.⁷⁹ Opposition such as this may well have been a crucial factor in Hertzog's growing reliance upon the use of external political advisers in the drawing up of legislation and an increasing abandonment of much of the former state apparatus for native affairs which had been bequeathed by the Smuts government. The Native Affairs

Department, under increasing control from the Department of Justice in the early 1920s, appears to have exercised little influence in the drawing up of the bills of 1926.⁸⁰ Loram from the vantage point of the isolated Native Affairs Commission, disclaimed all responsibility for the Land Bill in 1926 and declared that it came, not from the Native Affairs Department but was "the work of H's political friends".⁸¹ Likewise, in the case of the Native Administration Bill which the Government succeeded in passing in the course of 1927, the real authorship seems to have been the Department of Justice which revised an original Native Affairs Department draft with close collaboration between one of the Department's law advisers, E.L. Mathews, and Oswald Pirow who later succeeded Tielman Roos as Minister of Justice.⁸² *With* the growing tendency to subordinate the Native Affairs Department to political machinery under direct control of the government via the Minister of Justice, the Act vested in the Governor-General in Council wide powers to legislate by proclamation and regulation on the model operating in the Transkei, while also, as a result of amendment in Select Committee, extending the Natal model of Shepstone by appointing the Governor-General Supreme Chief over the African population in South Africa. Reflecting this move towards extending state control in native policy and abandoning, for the meanwhile, any policy of political co-optation, the Minister of Justice, Tielman Roos, evidenced willingness to neutralise the urban African petty bourgeoisie:

The Supreme Chief gets the power in the fullest sense of the word that a chief would have if there was one chief for the whole of the natives. I regard it as of the very greatest importance that those powers should be conferred upon the Governor-General, not only in respect of natives who are living under the tribal system, but also over detribalised and exempted natives . . . who in many cases, are the principal agitators in South Africa today. If you have the power to remove them from one place where they do mischief to a place where they do not do mischief, what a useful provision that would be. 83

Roos's Act was directed principally at the attempts at organisation of African workers by the I. C. U. and the Communist Party in the late 1920s, and the "Hostility Law", as it was known, was used against activists like Stanley Silwana, Bransby Ndobe and John Gomas who were accused, under clause 29, of actions intended "to promote ... feeling(s) of hostility between Natives and Europeans". The three, as a result, spent three months in jail after protesting against the shooting of an African by police in Paarl.⁸⁴

The Native Administration Act can be seen, therefore as, in some senses, introducing a hiatus in relations between the government and white liberals on the nature and evolution of "native policy". Hitherto, white liberals had given cautious support for Hertzog's policy and they had been supported by some sections of the African petty bourgeoisie, both rural and urban, who saw in land segregation opportunities for business and land speculation. With the government's increasing move away from individual to communal tenure and the extension of rule through legally defined "tribes" on an indirect rule basis following the Native Administration Act, scope for the African petty bourgeoisie through the government's segregation policy looked increasingly less certain. In addition, following the disastrous series of droughts in the 1920s, the concept of "development" of the African reserve looked jaded. The Government continued its programme of agricultural schools and appointed a Union Director of Native Agriculture in 1929, R.W. Thornton, but it was clear that the overall thrust of policy became increasingly one of relegating the reserves to the status of labour reservoirs for industry and agriculture. In 1926 90 African families were ejected from the East London district and told to go to a government farm at Peddie: they were, however, only to have 140 head of cattle in all and though they had all previously been farmers, only 44 of the 90 families were allowed to have lots, while the rest received only building sites with no gardens.⁸⁵ This overcrowding of the reserves and their continuing denudation as a result of over-grazing was made

plain in a report furnished by the Native Affairs Department from W.M. Macmillan, but never published. Before leaving South Africa to pursue historical research at All Souls College, Oxford, where he published the path-breaking Complex South Africa in 1930, Macmillan published a series of articles At The Roots in The Cape Times. While confronting some of the traditional liberal dilemmas in South Africa through warning against government measures which, while "designed to save white civilisation in South Africa" might still "utterly destroy it by hastening the process of transforming the natives into a landless proletariat",⁸⁶ Macmillan nevertheless destroyed certain assumptions about the conduct of "native policy" with respect to the reserves. Basing much of his analysis on research in the Eastern Cape, especially in Herschel, Macmillan developed what can be seen as an early attempt at an 'underdevelopment' theory. The simple, unilinear model of orthodox liberal thinking regarding native agriculture was, in Macmillan's eyes, inadequate when it came to explaining problems of capital accumulation in the reserve economies. Indeed, following a model of circular causation similar to that later used by Gunnar Myrdal,⁸⁷ Macmillan pointed out the limited scope for business opportunities in contexts of extreme economic scarcity:

In parts of the Territories one hears of the rise of native money-lenders or "capitalists". Of course, evidence of natives of really considerable wealth there is little or none. Where the mass is so very poor and the spirit of mutual communal assistance still so very strong, mere accumulation is beset by the demands of poorer neighbours, and of the brothers of the large tribal "family" to an extent difficult for us in an individualist society to appreciate.

The situation of scarcity led Macmillan to warn further against the common liberal assumption that the educated kholwa and petty bourgeoisie necessarily held the leadership positions in the reserves. Economic change in the reserves in the direction of labour reservoirs did not imply that the traditional class of chiefs and headmen lost all political influence:

As things are, the philosophers in this state would not be kings. In practice, no doubt, and in the long run education will count for leadership. But for the present, evidence suggests that the degree of their civilisation is an unreliable guide to the grades of native society, and the most influential leaders may well be some shrewd old fellows dressed in blankets. These and not the modern and younger men are the leaders of suspicion and discontent rife in some districts like Herschel. The leading malcontents, strongly aided and abetted by many of the women, are often men of the old school, backward - in the local phrase "reactionaries".

A condition, too, that was not helped, Macmillan argued, by the recent legislation that aided traditional authorities and was within a year to be further bolstered by the Native Administration Act.

These arguments suggested a rethinking in "development" theories and a shift away from the Glen Grey ideal in many liberals' minds and a search for more "efficient" methods of agriculture. The Native Development Fund Macmillan showed to be completely inadequate as a means for developing the reserves, for in the Cape, especially, this meant an increase in taxation from 20s or even 12s a head to 30s a head, cutting even further into the potential for peasant credit. Even on existing trends, Macmillan calculated, a district like Herschel was becoming approximately 50% dependent for its income on the cash earnings of migrant labour: out of a population of 40,000, he estimated that the total annual outlay of some £70,000 to £100,000 was met by about £40,000 from produce and anything up to £30,000 in wage earnings. In the context of existing government strategies, Macmillan pointed out, the situation of further underdevelopment (with development for a tiny few) was exacerbated by the policy of industrial segregation:

The Government hope to reduce the general reliance on native labour is utterly futile because the natives must in fact earn wages - or starve. The whole of this description of actual conditions has tended to show how

hopeless it is to-day to expect the Reserves otherwise to support even their present population. Their standard of living could not be lower and their poverty makes the natives a drag on the country and their competition with unskilled whites quite deadly. They can find an outlet, now and for long years to come, only in European areas; and for the public opinion of this country (i.e. White opinion - P.R.) - either ignoring or ignorant of such facts as these - to begin its attempt at a national policy by such a mere negative as the "civilised labour" policy, and by the Colour Bar Bill, is much worse than inept. The position of the Reserves and of the natives as a whole is far too serious to admit of measures closing the better sort of avenues long open to them, barring the progress of their ablest individuals, and therefore pressing the masses of them down to still lower depths of poverty. 88

The assumptions of Macmillan's arrangements were still implicitly segregationist in that he still foresaw a future condition when there would be a situation where self-sufficient African communities would be served by their "ablest individuals" and, like the government, he accepted this as a goal of policy. But the means to obtain this he radically disagreed about and, unlike the liberals of the early 1920s, challenged the assumptions of industrial segregation and the relocation of African wage earners, as far as it was possible, back into rural communities. To this extent, Macmillan's writings, which were to be elaborated more fully in Complex South Africa, marked an important development in liberal thinking at a critical time politically.

For the years 1926-27 also marked the beginning of political cleavages between white liberals and the government which were only alleviated in some degree by the Native Bills of 1936 and the creation of new political platforms of co-optation, whereby white liberals and their African allies were granted a slightly wider framework of political discussion via the creation of Natives Representatives in the Senate and House of Assembly and the Natives Representative Council. In 1927, however, it seemed to most liberals that the existing structures via the Native Affairs Commission were inadequate to influence the government when

the Native Administration Act could be passed with its "hostility clause". Loram and Roberts continued on the Commission for a further two years, but realised that they were increasingly ineffective; even Brookes realised, as well, that his attempts to exercise some form of "liberal moderation" upon Hertzog had been in vain as the government came under growing pressure from agricultural and mining interests to extend labour migrancy and restrict the potential of the reserves. Though still championing the overall ideology of the government in 1927 in a book entitled The Political Future of South Africa,⁹⁰ Brookes began a period of re-assessment during a visit to the United States in the same year. Seeing for the first time the urban dimension of the Tuskegee philosophy, compared to its rural side so emphasised in South Africa, Brookes was made aware of the potentials of an urban black petty bourgeoisie which had grown up in a number of the larger American cities.⁹¹ "I learned in the United States", Brookes recalled, "what more penetrating and thorough research might have shown me in my own country - the salutary lesson that the black man was capable of considerable achievement in a milieu of white civilisation. Simple though this lesson may have been, naive as was the young man who learned it, it had a devastating effect on my theories of separate development".⁹² In actual practice, the effect was not as profound as Brookes later liked to imagine for he merely tended to emphasise the role of the urban, as opposed to the rural, African petty bourgeoisie, moving as such to a position by 1931 where he saw himself "standing ... for the old Cape policy" and aligning with the South African Party of Smuts.⁹³ There was also in this a high degree of personal political ambition for Hertzog had never formally offered Brookes a political post in the Pact and Brookes frequently confessed to political ambitions and sought in 1931 the SAP candidacy for Woodstock in Cape Town, though without success.⁹⁴

The "retraction" of Brookes, and later public confession at the Fort Hare Conference in 1930 of earlier mistakes⁹⁵ marked, nevertheless, a significant swing

in white liberal opinion away from close co-operation with government policy and a move towards African political organisation. This trend was to gain momentum from the growing divisions in the I. C. U. in the late 1920s and the importation of William Ballinger, a trade unionist from Motherwell in Scotland, as an adviser to Clements Kadalie. A significant figure in this was the novelist Winifred Holtby who, with fierce anti-communist views, saw Ballinger as a crucial figure in stemming what she perceived as a tide of increasing communist domination of the I. C. U.: a view shared by a number of leading figures in the ILP and British T. U. C., such as Walter Citrine and Arthur Creech-Jones, who arranged for Ballinger's visit. This intervention, however, proved the thin end of the wedge for liberal involvement in African politics for it came at a time of growing disaffection inside the African National Congress to the leadership of J. T. Gumede. Though formerly one of Alexander Kerr's students from Lovedale, Gumede, as the A. N. C.'s President, along with a Communist Party delegate James La Guma, attended the Congress against Colonial Oppression and Imperialism in Brussels in February 1927 and as a result swung rapidly in a leftward direction. After returning from a visit to the Soviet Union in 1928, Gumede found himself confronted by political opposition of the chiefs and petty bourgeoisie, led by the builder T. M. Mapikela from Bloemfontein, after he defended the Soviet system;⁹⁶ and as a consequence the next two years of his presidency were marked by increasing disaffection until he was finally removed at the A. N. C. Congress in 1930 in Bloemfontein and replaced by the conservative Pixley Seme with chiefs' support. By this time Ballinger's attempts to remodel the I. C. U. on orthodox British trade union lines exacerbated the splits already developing in the Union such that Clements Kadalie, though formerly opposed to Communist participation in the Union and the moving force behind the expulsion of communists in 1927 following the Brussels conference of the League Against Imperialism, himself moved leftwards as he condemned what he saw as Ballinger's attempts to take over control of the

Union with white liberal allies.⁹⁷ As a result, by 1929, the I.C.U. split into a number of factions with a group dominated by Allison Champion, The I.C.U. yase Natal, operating in Natal, The Independent I.C.U. led by Kadalie operating from East London and a third group, The I.C.U. of Africa supporting Ballinger. The split in the African union which at the height of its influence had claimed up to 200,000 members⁹⁸ nevertheless provided white liberals with a growing power base to influence the nature and course of African political organisation. Starting from William Ballinger's control of the I.C.U. of Africa, and with the A.N.C. proving increasingly ineffective under Seme's corrupt leadership, white liberals were in a strong position to develop their theories of rural "development" in the early 1930s on the basis of models of economic co-operation. Until the 1936 legislation provided alternative foci for political activity, this scheme for African co-operatives became the focus of liberal political discussion.

The attempt at establishing co-operatives

William Ballinger's arrival in South Africa in 1928 and subsequent take-over of the I.C.U. of Africa was of considerable significance for white liberals in that he sought to elaborate upon a number of informal attempts at rural co-operation and development outside state control. The schemes for training agricultural demonstrators at Lovedale and Fort Hare continued after the election of the Pact, though in November of 1924 Paul Germond, in charge of the Fort Hare course, confessed to being disappointed with its lack of popularity among African farmers and its inadequate training in practical farm management.⁹⁹ The numbers of African farmers associations continued to grow too in the Eastern Cape such that by 1926 the first conference of the South African Native Farmers Conference could be held at Lovedale with 17 delegations present representing 1,400 members and funds of £1,000. However, the associations in the Eastern Cape only represented for the most part the educated kholwa and richer peasantry

and though, as we have seen, tentative attempts were made in the direction of pooling resources for agricultural machinery and improving agricultural methods, the model of the associations was not one that could be widely applied in the South African reserves. In addition the associations in the Cape became closely involved in political campaigns to defend the Cape franchise after the publication of the four bills in 1926 and many of the associations' members became involved in the Cape Native Voters Convention. As President of the Convention, D.D.T. Jabavu confessed to Sir Walter Stanford in 1926 that "it is now taking us all our time to preserve our rights":¹⁰⁰ a situation which was even further exacerbated after the passage of the Native Administration Act in 1927 and the involvement of the Convention in a series of legal wrangles (following the subpoenaing of an African farmer from King Williams Town in the case of Rex v Ndobu to produce his title deeds) over African land titles which were called in under the Act to be replaced by a series of uniform titles.¹⁰¹

A model for rural development which was to prove much more attractive to Ballinger and which was seen to have wider applicability in the South African reserves by many white liberals, was undoubtedly that of Father Bernard Huss of the Mariannhill Mission in Natal. Huss had developed contacts with white liberals as early as 1922 when C.T. Loram had written to him asking him to "put on your thinking cap and do something for these poor natives who heed a helper and you are that helper".¹⁰² In the tradition of the "helping hand", Huss developed the idea of generating the idea of "self help" on lines similar to the co-operative movement in Britain and the co-operative store founded at Rochdale;¹⁰³ implicit within this was the traditional missionary conception of moral as well as economic rejuvenation of African societies. "Without the development of their mental and moral resources", Huss wrote, "there can be no true, lasting and healthy material development. Only when the Africans have become mentally, morally and socially efficient, will they become economically efficient".¹⁰⁴ Huss's

activities in the 1920s did not go without opposition, however, and Garveyites heckled his meetings and formed branches of the I.C.U. to counteract his influence, as a result of which Huss formed his own Catholic African Union in 1929.¹⁰⁵ Though a critic of the "tribal system", in a memorandum drawn up for the Native Economic Commission in 1931 the Catholic African Union evidenced greater flexibility on the issue of communal tenure than the African farmers associations in the Eastern Cape. "Unrestricted and universal individual land tenure", the C.A.U. argued "would ... lead to the impoverishment of great masses of the native", necessitating a "middle way" through the establishment of "small communities under the jurisdiction of the chiefs or headmen, which have however a great deal of power of self government. The members of these communities may own some small plots by freehold tenure, but the greater part of the land - especially grazing land and forestry would belong collectively to the whole community so that the community may always have the necessary resources for the promotion of the general welfare of the whole community, as well as for the relief of its desitute members". In addition it was pointed out that:

The establishment of such communities would provide employment for a great many Natives who are at present working in towns or are unemployed in the administration of the communities, the better development of the locations and other cultural works. 106

This comparatively favourable attitude to communal tenure was very probably the reason why Huss's ideas were well received by Native Commissioners in the 1920s in areas like the Transkei. Courses on economics and co-operation were taught by Huss at Mariannhill after 1923 and were attended by numbers of Africans from the Transkei and in 1926 Huss was invited by the Chief Magistrate to address the Transkeian Bunga on co-operative credit. As a result of this and other frequent talks in the Transkei - one of which in Idutya lasted six hours - a number of co-operative credit societies were formed. By January of 1928 Huss

found some 20 societies in existence, two of which were reported as having over £1,500 circulating as loans among their members, while one had made £50 profit in its first year and circulated 200 bags of fertilizer among its members.¹⁰⁷

Despite the Depression, it appears that the co-operative ideal continued in the Transkei in the early 1930s, for Howard Pim found in a survey of the Transkei that there were 36 societies in 1932 with total receipts of £25,000, though the movement's development was "less than was hoped for".¹⁰⁸ Nevertheless, the apparent "success story" of Huss's movement kept alive the liberal ideal of rural development of the African reserves and the exclusion of African workers from the labour market. Thus in 1933, Huss could write:

Fortunately the Natives of South African are to some extent independent from the vicissitudes of the political life of the country, in so far as they can find their livelihood in their own Reserves by carrying on their own trades amongst their own countrymen. It should therefore be always their chief aim to become as independent as possible from the world's labour market. 109

Huss's ideas, therefore, can be seen as to some extent perpetuating into the late 1920s and early 1930s the earlier liberal views on paternalist segregation, which had come under attack by W.M. Macmillan, and provided a ready model for the schemes of William Ballinger and Howard Pim. The model of co-operative credit societies suggested the need for more active attempts by liberals to make the reserves economically viable. Following the Co-operatives Credit Act of 1922 where provision was established for limited liability for co-operative societies, the movement gained increasing effectiveness in the 1920s in assisting farmers in South Africa and seemed readily applicable to the "problems" of the reserves. The frequent mistake the liberals made in their analysis of the situation, though, was to assume that the mechanisms for "development" in the African reserves were substantially the same as other societies, such as Britain, in previous historical eras prior to economic "take off". Macmillan had made some initial warnings against this in 1926, but after this he was in England until 1931 and returned to find his

more radical ideas unacceptable in the Johannesburg Joint Council.¹¹⁰ The evolutionist and neo-Darwinian assumptions of earlier liberal thinking, continued, therefore, to prevail when it came to understanding the course of economic change in the reserve economies despite the fact that more radical writers like Edward Roux, who returned from Cambridge in 1928 to lead the Communist-dominated League of African Rights, warned of an "agrarian revolt" as a result of the government's proposals to increase the farm labour supply by tightening the laws on squatting and increasing the number of days of compulsory labour demanded of labour tenants from 90 to 180 a year:¹¹¹ a scheme that was, indeed, to reach fruition in 1932 with the Native Service Contract Act.

The reality was, in fact, substantially different from what liberals imagined. The peasantry in England in the period prior to the Industrial Revolution had not been herded into reserve economies and had been able to make use of the money market in economy as a whole. Indeed, contrary to the prevalent myth of continually associating the English peasantry with indebtedness, recent research has tended to revise the Tawney thesis (an important intellectual influence on Macmillan) of associating credit in the English peasantry with the need to ward off temporary shortages in agrarian economic activity. There have, instead, been indications that credit in the English peasantry was of sufficient volume as to negate any need in the eighteenth century to create a new money market, for one already existed. Furthermore, the widespread nature of this credit indicated that the peasantry was not at the mercy of a small class of money lenders who were in complete control of the money market. As B.A. Holderness has pointed out:

In England, the combination of a considerable surplus above immediate consumption for a broad spectrum of agrarian society, at least in a long period analysis, the habit of using the surplus as credit, and the wide diffusion of lending among country people, was of particular importance in the process of economic development. Savings may not have equalled investment, but the peasant proclivity for hoarding gold under the bed was not very pronounced. The appar-

ently heavy commitment to consumption in the exploitation of these credit facilities may not have been an ideal component in the development of a credit market, but since credit facilities in rural communities formed a more or less integrated system by 1700 the most important consideration was the will to lend, not the destination of particular loans. 112

In South Africa, however, the African peasantry was at the complete mercy of only a small number of money lenders for the supply of external credit in an economy dominated by mining and commercial and industrial capital. Furthermore, when it came to making greater use of internal resources for credit, these limitations on the mobilisation of credit hampered the development of a class of independent kulak farmers. The peasantry in the Eastern Cape had emerged in the nineteenth century into a position of close economic dependence on white trading and commercial interests and the growth of individual African land tenure had, in turn, been managed by a class of powerful white lawyers and middlemen. Richard Rose-Innes, for instance, had managed a number of African property transactions and had been in a powerful position to determine the sources of African credit, shaping the business affairs of both John Tengo Jabavu and his son, Davidson Don Tengo Jabavu. As late as 1925, Richard Rose-Innes handled, together with his son, F.G. Rose-Innes, the property transactions of D.D.T. Jabavu. With the disasters of the drought in the mid-1920s, Jabavu sought the sale of a small-holding he owned at Rabula, some 40 miles from Middledrift. In the event, the sale does not appear to have gone through, for Jabavu still owned the property at the time of his death in 1959.¹¹³ Nevertheless, Rose-Inne's attitude to the proposed sale indicated the degree of control exerted by white lawyers and financial brokers on the African property market. The Bond on the property was £600 on which Rose-Innes was prepared to reduce the interest from 8% to 7% "to ease matters". Rose-Innes, though, was unwilling to accept an African as mortgagor in place of Jabavu unless he fulfilled the conditions of "satisfactory and continuous cultivation of the ground" and "prompt payment of interest for the half year

without bother or trouble". Preferring, in fact, "a German agriculturalist as a buyer, if such a one could be found", he imposed the condition of payment of the £600 bond in cash on the African farmer, James Mbiko, who was actually farming the property at the time and wished to buy it. "What guarantee", asked Rose-Innes of Alexander Kerr, "have I that he (Mbiko) will do better under the new arrangement than under the old one?"¹¹⁴

In addition to this external control over African credit and property transactions, there was also in South Africa the feature of labour migrancy and its effect on the "will to lend" in the reserve economies. The psychological impact has been observed by Sandra Wallman and others in the case of Lesotho,¹¹⁵ but little attention has been paid to the effects on the South African reserves. Clearly similar features manifested themselves in the form of defining attitudes towards agricultural innovation. Selective evidence emerged even by the end of the 1920s to the proponents of co-operative model that the introduction of the cash nexus via labour migrancy hindered rather than aided agricultural innovation. Margaret Hodgson, later Margaret Ballinger, noted in her diary in 1929, for example, that in the Ciskei starvation and severe economic stress did not necessarily encourage migrant labour for "all prefer to starve together", especially as the voluntary system of labour recruitment meant that a migrant had to sign on for work in Johannesburg before he could get any advances for his family. This reluctance to migrate also explained in part the growing overcrowding in the locations as squatters who were supposed to have been removed under the 1923 Act stayed "partly because people themselves won't expel them - naturally they are their relations - partly because there is nowhere for them to go" and thus in turn aiding further landlessness.¹¹⁶ Furthermore, evidence emerged from the survey of the Transkei by Howard Pim that when Africans did migrate, little of the wages that were returned actually went on agricultural innovation: of the sales of 90 stores, for instance, only 8% was on agricultural implements and fencing.¹¹⁷ Finally, and in many ways most crucially, there was the issue

of African class differentiation which white liberals were forced to re-assess. Until Macmillan's warning about the potential for "reactionary" sections of the African peasantry leading organised resistance, it had been a cardinal article of liberal wisdom that the educated class of kholwa were in the vanguard of economic change: this, for instance, had been the basis of Brookes's formulation of rural segregation and Loram's ideas on restructuring African education to enhance a rural African peasantry, schooled in the skills and values of industrial training, Tuskegeeism and the Jeanes Schools. As the 1920s progressed, however, it no longer became so plain that even the African elite was going to maintain itself in the vanguard of a model of progressive change, as migrant labour increasingly restructured the reserves into labour reservoirs. The effect of subordinating African agriculture in the reserves was, to some considerable extent, to de-emphasise the more "traditional" distinctions between "School" and "red", educated and "traditional" which had been one of the cardinal assumptions behind the nineteenth century missionary enterprise and the folk wisdom, too, of a considerable amount of later anthropological research. William Beinart, for instance, has shown for the inter-war period that there were a considerable number of bridging factors introduced by labour migrancy in Pondoland which overlay the "School-Red" gap, though how far this can be extrapolated to other reserves remains problematical.¹¹⁸ The Native Administration Act of 1927 had the effect of revamping the powers of the tribal chiefs and the belief of the liberals, such as Brookes in his memorandum of 1926 to Hertzog, in enhancing as far as possible the influence of the educated School elite as the basis of a class of African master farmers, received a severe jolt through the economic denudation of the later 1920s. By 1929 and the failure of Jabavu's campaign to resist the Rex v Ndobi judgement on African land-ownership, it seemed that a reformulation of liberal ideology towards the African rural elite became essential.

An important influence on this was the experience of the liberals in

fighting the Cape African franchise issue. The combination of depriving the rural African political class of the vote, together with increasing restrictions on the African small-holders' ability to develop as a result of increased taxation through the 1925 Native Taxation and Development Act as well as the initiation in 1929 by the Native Affairs Department of a reserve reclamation scheme all illustrated the increasing loss of independent control by missionary and liberal educational schemes over the African political elite. "Strong government and heavy taxes are identical" wrote Marx in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte:

By its very nature, small holding property forms a suitable basis for an all-powerful and innumerable bureaucracy. It creates a uniform level of relationships and persons over the whole surface of the land. Hence it also permits of uniform action from a supreme centre on all points of this uniform mass. It annihilates the aristocratic intermediate grades between the mass of the people and the state power. On all sides, therefore, it calls forth the direct interference of this state power and the interposition of its immediate organs. 119

It was this threat from the central state in South Africa towards liberal ideological hegemony over the African population in the reserves - a threat which successively increased in the first half of the twentieth century to culminate in the establishment of Bantu Authorities in 1951 and the nationalisation of the missions through the 1953 Bantu Education Act - that led to the shift in liberal thinking away from the more traditional form of paternalism rooted in the old Cape assimilationist ideal. Doubtless the growth of African worker consciousness after the first world war and the growth of the I.C.U. amongst rural African farm workers played a considerable role in this too, but it was the threat from the state to the liberal-controlled "aristocratic intermediate grades" which forced a reformulation of liberal ideology in the direction of the assimilation of the educated African elite into a common society governed by the values of "western civilisation". A large part of this reformulation took place in terms of a debate on education, with

institutions such as Fort Hare being seen as critical in the dissemination of positivistic and scientific values to a nascent African intelligentsia. "Native education is not a thing apart", said Alexander Kerr in 1931, "but one branch of education in general. There is at most nothing that can be said about education that cannot at the same time be said about Native education ... But lately the education of the young has become so much an accepted part of the activity of the organised State that few of us stay to put the question. Yet clearly it is a question that ought to be asked, otherwise the end of the activity is likely to be blurred and its complete achievement frustrated". The answer to the question for Kerr lay in the enhancement of education as a bridge-building exercise in order to ensure that "peace and harmony are to prevail ... between its separate communities":

No such understanding or appreciation is possible unless there is some common ground between the groups, some knowledge of the fundamental elements that underlie all civilisation, whatever be the character of the superstructure that is raised on the foundations. Such knowledge can only come through the processes of education, and the higher the education the more thorough the knowledge. 120

This formulation of liberal education coincided to a considerable degree with the conception of inter-racial "harmony" underpinning the creation of the Institute of Race Relations in 1929. Furthermore, it illustrated both the liberal requirement to respond to the burgeoning role of the state in "native administration" (with the concomitant decline in the old Native Affairs Department to that of the Department of Justice) as well as defining an area where liberal activity and predominance could be maintained. The "assimilationist" ideals underlying liberals ideals on education, therefore, were at the same time capable of being accommodated to whatever "superstructure", in Kerr's words, predominated. In other words, pace Shingler and Legassick, assimilation did not preclude the continuation of a segregationist policy by the state and was only likely to directly clash with it if liberals felt in a sufficiently influential position to do so.

For the 1920s and early 1930s this political influence by the liberals was considerably lacking and the ideals tended to be merely stated. "During the last five years", said Howard Pim to a St. George's Day banquet of the Southern Transvaal Lodge of the Sons of England in April 1929, "I have had many opportunities of gauging the capacity of this (educated) class of native, and my feeling that that are very like ourselves has steadily grown". Consequently they "should receive every inducement we can give them to become civilised":¹²¹ how, though, was this to be achieved? Pim privately confessed to doubts in the commonly accepted "capacity" of the African population in South Africa as a whole to respond to the western market model as the basic stimulus to economic development. "I am wondering", he wrote to Sir James Rose-Innes in January 1930, "if we have begun to understand living alongside a people to whom competition is unknown and markets. Who hold all necessities of life in common ... How can the rules of our economics be applied?"¹²²

The question increasingly confronted liberals by the early 1930s as, with an early version of "limited good" governing their perspective of the "failure" of the reserves to respond to market challenges, liberal ideologists looked to alternative methods of economic regeneration. The subject had led to a debate in the Johannesburg Joint Council where an economic committee had been established to include W.M. Macmillan, William Ballinger, Margaret Hodgson, Selby Msimang and A.B. Xuma¹²³ and the co-operative model on lines similar to those already experimented with by Father Huss clearly tended to be favoured. William Ballinger's influence in this respect was especially crucial for having been drawn into Joint Councils circles at a relatively early stage, he was in a position to influence white liberal thinking with co-operative stores in his native Motherwell before he came to South Africa. Furthermore, by 1930 Ballinger had become disillusioned with the whole idea of trade unionism for Africans. "The I.C.U. is much more adapted in policy and structure", he wrote to Arthur Creech Jones, "for mass production - the next phase of industrial development in Africa -

than are the other unions".¹²⁴ Ballinger's keenness to turn away from the formal organisation of workers towards land schemes was probably one reason for the receptiveness of a number of white liberals to his ideas on co-operatives, marking a distinct shift from 1927 when, in the first edition of the Joint Council pamphlet The Native in Industry, Rheinnalt-Jones had seen the spread of African trade unionism on I.C.U. as inevitable and called for the legal recognition of them. For Ballinger, the very explanation for the "failure" of the I.C.U. lay in its lack of success in procuring land. Rivalry, too, with Kadalie's Independent I.C.U. organisation which claimed in 1929 to have established an "African Native Land Settlement Corporation Ltd." with a nominal capital of £100,000, undoubtedly acted as a fillip to Ballinger's efforts to secure a land deal with his own African supporters.¹²⁵ The same year, therefore, Ballinger's I.C.U. of Africa reported that a "Native Development and Trust Company Ltd." had been registered with the hope that "with the assistance of the African Congress combined with the I.C.U. this will prove a success and will restore the confidence of the masses".¹²⁶ The reality was, though, that the company was registered at the Volksrust farm of A.N.C. founder Pixley Seme who succeeded in 1930 Gumedé as the President of the African National Congress. With a nominal capital of £25,000 the company played a key role in tying Seme to the purse strings of the white liberals, especially as the scheme was seen as the first of a number which would link the creation of a trading class of Africans in the urban areas in South Africa to the regeneration of the peasantry in both the reserves in South Africa and the Protectorates. By the close of the decade liberals increasingly looked further afield for ways of accommodating development in the reserves to government policies on territorial segregation inside the Union.

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The total authoritarian state brings with it the organization and theory of society that corresponds to the monopolistic stage of capitalism" (p.19). Marcuse, however, did not consider that liberalism simply "adapts" to this change since a new social theory based on "heroic folkish realism" intervenes. This additional ideological component is not accounted for in Legassick's more simplistic analysis which sees apartheid ideology as a direct culmination of liberal ideology in the South African social formation. For the volkish component in apartheid ideology see my preliminary discussion in "Is South African Apartheid a case of 'fascist modernisation'?", unpublished paper, University of Warwick, 1979.

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Chapter Eight

Renewed liberal debates

William Ballinger's rethinking of the value of African cooperatives and trading mechanisms linking peasant agriculture in the reserves to the burgeoning black proletariat in the towns came at an important time politically in the fortunes of Southern Africa. The effective collapse of the I. C. U. in 1929 was also the year in which Smuts lost the election to the Nationalists on the "Black Manifesto" which his opponents charged would result in "a black Kaffir state ... extending from the Cape to Egypt in which white South Africa would vanish". The return of the Nationalist government to power without being dependent upon the British-orientated South African Labour Party necessitated the rethinking of South African liberalism, especially as, following the failure of the Non-Racial Franchise Association, the old Cape ideal of preserving the African franchise looked increasingly dead politically.

The issue posed by the Black Manifesto in 1919 was by no means a new one on the South African political scene, for it had been envisaged at the time of Union in 1910 that the Protectorates of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland, together with the Rhodesias, would eventually be incorporated into the Union. This hope had been renewed as recently as 1924 when Hertzog became Prime Minister but British intransigence prevented the incorporation hoped for by the white South African parties, Smuts's S. A. P. and Hertzog's Nationalists alike. The explanation for this opposition has been posed by liberal historiography in terms of an altruistic British concern for maintaining the old Cape ideal and the fostering of a trusteeship policy whereby African interests in British African colonies would be paramount, as had been outlined in the Passfield white paper of 1923. "South Africa's expansion was self interested", Ronald Hyam has written. "Imperial Britain was concerned about trusteeship".¹ This depiction of the seeming clash of interests between Britain and South Africa, however, has been recently re-assessed by Martin Chanock who has argued that

Britain was by no means unself-interested in Southern Africa and was dictated less by a simple moral aversion to South African segregation policy, but by a desire to maintain the British "imperial factor" through connecting the Protectorate territories to the white settler states in Central and East Africa as a means of offsetting the Afrikaner settler power in the Union. Especially after British hopes of neutralising Afrikaner influence inside South Africa through the incorporation of Rhodesia were dashed in the 1922 Referendum, when Rhodesian settlers opted to go their own way, British policy became increasingly concerned with fostering white settler interests under her own tutelage. Thus Hyr an's concentration on British concern to protect African interests in the Protectorates has to be seen in a wider context of British interests in fomenting a wider sphere that crossed the Zambesi and where "settlers were to be co-trustees".² In such a context:

In the High Commission territories, where African lands had been guaranteed in the schedule (to the Act of Union), the British authorities placed their emphasis on securing administrative separation combined with the functioning of some form of African assembly. In Rhodesia, where the immediate problem was to render African land holding secure, the major imperial intervention was to ensure that the reserves policy would not dissolve into theory before the Union took over. Where there were white settlers it was imagined that "native questions" could best be dealt with by experts free from electoral pressure. Where old African institutions had been destroyed, territorial and administrative separation was to be combined with the creation of separate local councils. The Cape policy was dead, and while the British government insisted where it could that its memory be honoured by preserving the traces it did not aim at promoting political integration in any part of Southern Africa. 3

In the years after 1923, therefore, British policy, especially under the Colonial Secretary L. S. Amery, became concerned with neutralising as far as possible the trusteeship provisions of the Devonshire Declaration. Amery was a sympathiser of white settlement in Africa on lines close to that of Lord Delamere's settlers in Kenya, and in the 1920s he began to foster schemes for the economic development of the Protectorates in alliance with South African mining capital, led by Sir Ernest

Oppenheimer. As he observed in 1927 on visiting Southern Africa, the "... future position of the Empire in South Africa is going to depend largely on the Protectorates and Rhodesia, both as regards native development, and on a smaller scale as regards British white developments".⁴

The attractiveness of these development schemes was not lost on liberals inside South Africa. Just as some liberal critics of South African government in Britain itself, such as Leonard Barnes, author of Caliban in Africa and The New Boer War and Lord Olivier, author of Anatomy of South African Misery, looked to British fostering of the Protectorates as a means of influencing South African segregation policy,⁵ so in turn South African liberals began by the late 1920s to look outwards to the Protectorates as a means of both testing new ideas on economic and social development as well as seeking new political alliances to offset their weakness inside the Union itself. Concomitant, therefore, with the reports commissioned by the British government from Sir Alan Pim (brother of Howard Pim) on the Protectorates, which were published between 1933 and 1935,⁶ so South African liberals began to turn their attention to similar areas. Howard Pim's report on the Transkei was published in 1934, recommending a stepping up in land reclamation schemes, cattle culling and economic cooperation⁷ while William Ballinger and Margaret Hodgson (later Ballinger) began work on the Protectorates too in the early 1930s, publishing Indirect Rule in Southern Africa in 1931, Basutoland the same year and Britain in Southern Africa (No. 2): The Bechuanaland Protectorate in 1932.⁸

For the Ballingers, especially, the research on the Protectorates offered a valuable means to reformulate liberal ideology in a more radical and collectivist direction so as to move it away from the paternalist welfare role that had been its central definition in the 1920s through the activities of Loram, Rheinnalt-Jones and Pim around the Joint Councils. This essentially political definition of the role of South African liberalism had alienated Ballinger from Loram by the end of 1929, with Loram opposing the idea of Ballinger being employed in any formal capacity by the newly-formed Institute of Race Relations.⁹ This exclusion of Ballinger from the

Institute forced him to look for alternative avenues of support and the following year he began to forge contacts with a small committee that had been formed in London by the former Secretary of the Pretoria Joint Council and warden of the Bantu Men's Social Centre, Fred Livie Noble, together with Winfred Holtby and F. Pethwick-Lawrence. This committee, which eventually became the London Group on African Affairs, sought "to act as a sort of informal clearing house on matters of African interest" and was especially anxious for information on the Protectorates in order to strengthen its lobbying position on the British government in order to at least delay transfer of the Protectorates to South Africa.¹⁰ The support of this committee enabled William Ballinger to cease for a period his involvement in the I.C.U. of Africa and in 1932 he wrote to his former supporters meeting at Heilbron in the Orange Free State that the research was essential "in order to judge the full effects of the impact between the indentured, semi-tribal and detribalised native conditions".¹¹

In the course of their research work, William and Margaret Ballinger sought to apply British social democratic values to the question of economic and social development in the reserves, providing a different approach to the current orthodoxy of seeking to maintain tribal institutions and "adapt" them to modernised economic conditions. This adaptationist approach, which was especially represented by the Report of the Native Economic Commission (which is examined in detail in the following chapter) owed a considerable amount to the fostering of anthropological research in South African universities under the auspices of such prominent influences on fund-raising as C.T. Loram. Attempts at blocking this trend actually within Joint Council circles proved, in the event, to be ineffective, as W.M. MacMillan discovered on his return to South Africa in 1932. While MacMillan's history department at the University of the Witwatersrand continued to be starved of funds, C.T. Loram's connections with American fund-raising ensured that Rheinnalt-Jones was able to head a new department of Bantu Studies, even in the midst of economic depression.¹² Thus the Ballingers' work was of significance in its marked lack of enthusiasm for the perpetuation of tribal institutions as the basis of a development programme in the Protectorates. Chieftainship, they argued in Indirect Rule in

Southern Africa was a "doomed institution" for:

While the chiefs are desperately clinging to the old forms and justifying themselves on the grounds of defending tribal claims to the land, they are entirely ignorant of the economic and political forces which are crushing out the nation's life ... They see their young men go out to work in the Union without a glimpse or appreciation of the factors involved both for themselves and for others. 13

The British colonial service, furthermore, was guilty of having failed to understand these forces for they had allowed the apparatus of native administration in the Protectorates to become "enmeshed (with) private enterprise to exploit the resources of the country to its own benefit".¹⁴ What was wanted was a programme to ensure cultivation and development, which the new Agricultural Department was likely to initiate. This programme could ensure that while "tribal methods" and the "conservatism of the chiefs" could be gradually abolished at the same time "tribal ownership" could be maintained as the basis for a new scheme of rural co-operation since "it should mean the use of all the resources of the country for all the people".¹⁵ By means of education the chiefs could be taught to "help their people forward rather than to hold back in the interests of their own power", while instead of simple industrial training on the Tuskegee model which had continued to dominate liberal thinking in the 1920s, a programme of general cultural education could be provided in order to instil values of progress and improvement in a burgeoning African educated class, which the Ballingers saw the germ of in the Basutoland Progressive Association.

The arguments in Indirect Rule in Southern Africa represented an interesting and important formulation of rural development policy to that of current liberal orthodoxy. Their basis in Basutoland was important, too, for it had been here that Howard Pim had been impressed with the tribal model of social control in 1904 when he visited the territory before presenting his 1905 paper on segregation to the British Association for the Advancement of Science. However, the Ballingers' pleas for a more politically sophisticated colonial administration in the territory in order to develop it away from its current condition "which Britain has explicitly set her face

against"¹⁶ betrayed a lack of understanding of the forces behind the shaping of British policy in Southern Africa. Having taken the Devonshire Declaration at face value, the Ballingers failed to perceive the willingness of British policy to accommodate itself where feasible to white settler interests, especially as a former member of the Round Table, L. S. Amery, had specifically guided British policy in this direction in the 1920s. Basutoland's real condition as a labour reserve became even more obvious a year after the report was published when, in the drought of 1932-33, some 50% of the country's livestock was destroyed while maize production fell to the point where it had to be imported to feed the population. The early 1930s, indeed, were a turning point in the fortunes of Basutoland agriculture for a down-turn was reached from which the economy never recovered. The population remained virtually static between the censuses of 1936 and 1946 and more and more men were forced into migrant labour in order to maintain a basic economic subsistence.¹⁷

Political events in Southern Africa acted, nevertheless, to keep up the momentum of the Ballingers' cooperatives model for a few more years. In 1932, Hertzog renewed his bid for the incorporation of the Protectorates, backing them up this time with economic threats that included the exclusion of Africans in the Protectorates from the Union's labour market.¹⁸ In addition, in 1933 the Protectorates issue came forcibly into the political limelight following the forceful removal of the Regent of Bechuanaland, Tshekedi Kgama, by the acting High Commissioner, Vice Admiral Edward Evans with a force backed up by Union troops. Though Kgama was soon reinstated, the affair served to highlight the position of the Protectorates, especially as Tshekedi had attempted unsuccessfully to renegotiate the concessions granted to the British South Africa Company in 1929. Through the mediation of the Governor-General in South Africa, the Earl of Athlone, the British government had successfully accomplished a series of new concessions to Sir Ernest Oppenheimer's Anglo-American and De Beers Companies for mineral exploitation in the territory.¹⁹ Though Tshekedi's objections ("we know that when mining takes place in a country it won't be a nation. We know we can uplift ourselves by means of cattle not by

means of mining") had not been able to reverse the British policy, it was still the hope of liberal critics in Britain that the whole affair could be served to show the dangers of actual incorporation of the Protectorates into the Union. For Leonard Barnes, the issue was a valuable card to play in at least delaying the transfer for while "the Prots are bound to go to the Union sooner or later and the South Africa Act contemplates as much", nevertheless liberal critics could continue "to insist that this is not the time, and to go on doing so as often as the question of transfer is raised, until at last we are defeated".²⁰ More forceful opposition came from Margery Perham through a series of articles in The Times in September of 1933, as a result of which a debate was instigated between her and Lionel Curtis, formerly of the Milner Kindergarten and anxious to see the Milnerite vision at least partially accomplished through incorporation.²¹

The controversy served to enhance the role of the Ballingers' research, especially as the more conservative liberals in the Institute of Race Relations equivocated on incorporation. In 1933 Rheinnalt-Jones considered the incorporation of Basutoland as "inevitable", while not being sure about the other two.²² Two years later as the issue began to reach the level of serious political discussion as the British government began to modify itself towards Hertzog and the Afrikaner Nationalists in the wake of Fusion, Jones sought to use it as a means to enhance the prestige of both himself and the Institute. Writing to Livy Noble of the Friends of Africa, he argued for a Commission of Enquiry to be set up on the whole incorporation issue containing representatives from the British and South African Governments together with African representatives and "missionaries". Recommending D.D.T. Jabavu, John Dube and Z.K. Mathews as the African representatives from the Union, Rheinnalt-Jones suggested a number of additional white liberal possibilities including Professor Hoernle, Professor Walker, Edgar Brookes and himself. "At present", he continued, "I am the only link in South Africa between all the missions ... The Institute has been useful in acting as a consultative agency without being either a government department or a missionary institution. But possibly even the Institute and myself might be suspect, being in the Union!"²³ The proposal got as far as being sent to Lord Lugard for serious consideration.²⁴

In contrast to Rheinnalt-Jones and the Institute, Ballinger had in the early 1930s far closer and more direct contacts with liberal opinion in Britain. These were used to discredit, as far as possible, the values and assumptions of the Joint Council movement and the Institute which Ballinger saw as being rooted in an out-dated and paternalistic approach. Those in charge of the Joint Councils, he wrote to Livie Noble in 1933 "either cannot, or do not want to see, that they are not supported, so far as the non-Europeans are concerned, by the rising Native middle class".²⁵ He accused the Institute of being manipulated by the Chamber of Mines, especially in the case of the appointment of Edgar Brookes to the Institute in 1933,²⁶ while in his own case, he could point to a number of contacts in order to establish his own political credibility as the defender of African and Coloured interests. Following his attendance at the Non-European Conference in the Cape in 1930, Ballinger was able to report that Abdurahman and D.D.T. Jabavu sought his candidature for a parliamentary seat, though in the event he was ineligible as a non-South African citizen.²⁷ Then in 1933, he became the supervisory editor of the radical A.N.C. paper The African Defender which was established by a group inside the African National Congress to fight the conservative policies of the President, Pixley Seme. Despite its decline, the I.C.U. of Africa was not completely defunct by this time either. Ballinger claimed that the I.C.U. of Africa was still the "parent I.C.U." of eight separate sections which now existed and argued that he was only unable to rejuvenate the organisations through lack of funds for travelling around South Africa. The Acting General Secretary of the I.C.U. of Africa, Daniel Budulwayo, was reported as visiting a number of branches in order to coordinate membership lists and achieve some form of reorganisation.²⁸

Furthermore, William Ballinger was able to claim the successful development of some African cooperative enterprises, which he saw as the partial answer to the problems of development in the Protectorates. In the first year of operation, the Western Native Township Co-operative, based in Orlando, made a small profit and Ballinger jubilantly reflected that "the tree of Native co-operation is well rooted and is going to throw out many strong and varied branches". Contact had been

established with the Resident Magistrate in Swaziland, T. Ainsworth Dickson, in the hope of being able to develop marketing links between Swazi producers of butter, tobacco and other commodities and the African market on the Rand. "If you could get those in charge of the Colonial Development Fund to spend a few thousands on cooperative activities", Ballinger wrote to Livy Noble, "it would do much to assist the Natives to adapt themselves to the better aspects of our economic system and money economy. As it is today, the most intelligent Natives are suffering from the shocks of a money economy, which is so far removed from their subsistence economy, and the breakdown of our commercial-industrial system which leaves them so bewildered. When they invest, or rather put on fixed deposit £25 of their surplus from cooperative retail sales, I have to warn them about high rates of interest and the meaning of fluid as against frozen capital". As a consequence "the success of the first year's work of the Western Native Township Coop is bringing many anxieties".²⁹

The apparent success of the first year's operation of the Western Native Township Coop led to efforts by Ballinger's friends in England to seek support from the British government for cooperative enterprises in the Protectorates. Winfred Holtby succeeded in gaining contact, via the Reverend A. G. Fraser, Principal of Achimota College in Ghana (where Aggrey had been Vice Principal) with Lord Lothian.³⁰ As Secretary of the Rhodes Trust, former member of the Milner Kindergarten, and prominent appeaser towards Nazi Germany (he was later British Ambassador in Washington) Lothian represented one of the most valuable contacts between liberal opinion on colonial development and official government policy. The Colonial Secretary in the early 1930s was J. H. Thomas, formerly General Secretary of the National Union of Railwaymen; but as a member of Ramsay MacDonald's National Government, influence on policy was increasingly being made by the Baldwinite Conservatives, who in turn came to dominate policy more or less completely following MacDonald's resignation in 1935. Thus the support of Lothian for the cooperatives could be said to be a key to the scheme's success. Ballinger sent to Lothian a summary of what the scheme had achieved so far, arguing

that "for various reasons, African natives grasp far more quickly the principles of co-operative than of individualist economics, and that if a beginning could be made which would in some way link native production within the Protectorates to a market outside, a partial solution at least would have been reached for the present problems of the Territories". Pointing out that the Western Native Township Cooperatives had made a profit of £340 in the year following its opening in April 1932, allowing for a dividend of 5% to be paid, Ballinger argued that "such stores are both needed, and can, under European supervision, be developed".³¹ The Resident Commissioner in Swaziland's enthusiasm for the idea also gave credence to Ballinger's scheme and it was hoped that the Swaziland Protectorate Authorities would assist the marketing of cattle, butter, "Native hand-made cigarettes" and "kaffir corn and mealies", thus possibly supplying the basis for "the transition stage between industrial and tribal economics".³²

Despite finding the Rhodes Trustees cautious, Lord Lothian himself was enthusiastic towards the scheme. "Obviously", he wrote to Howard Pim in December 1933, "it would be of immense advantage if agriculture could be made more productive in the native territories with a steady market within the Union, thus keeping the money in the country and giving the natives an economic interest which might save them from rushing prematurely into politics".³³ Similarly, approaches were made to the cooperative guilds in England for funds to develop the scheme, though only a small sum of money was in the event forthcoming. But the overall objectives behind the fund-raising were not achieved and by 1934 it became clear that Ballinger, together with his small number of liberal supporters in Britain, would have to go it alone. Even before the scheme was started, it was clear that the British Government was not going to be over-enthusiastic for its success. In 1932, J.H. Thomas had refused to support a proposal from Lord Olivier and a group of supporters of the cooperatives idea that Ballinger should be put on the staff of the High Commissioner for South Africa, Sir Herbert Stanley.³⁴ Furthermore, until at least 1933 it was the general view of the Dominions Office, according to Alan Pim, "that absorption is ultimately unavoidable on general economic grounds though

they dislike the idea and this ultimately defeatist view must affect the attitude of the Treasury to financing essential developments".³⁵ Even while the resistance to incorporation was sufficiently strong, after fusion in 1934, the development of South African mining after South Africa came off the gold standard represented another key factor in British policy not wishing to antagonise the basic labour requirements of the mining industry. In this respect, British colonial policy in the early 1930s so far as Southern Africa was concerned had not yet moved towards a developmentalist view that sought to initiate any independent economic projects in the Protectorates that might run counter to the requirements of migrant labour. For the most part British policy was guided by the consideration that, even with the Union becoming "unbritish", the pro-British settlers of East and Central Africa were too small to form an effective counter bloc and that both economic and political ties with the Union were likely to persist for some time to come.³⁶ Though there were critics of South African policies in the British Government in the 1930s, such as the High Commissioner Sir William Clark in 1938,³⁷ for the most part British opposition to South African segregation in the 1930s failed to link itself to the "forward thinking" which had been initiated by Amery in the 1920s and institutionalised through the creation of the Colonial Development Fund in 1929. It was only after 1938 with the re-examination of colonial development grants in which W.M. Macmillan was involved, that a critical re-assessment began to take place; especially with the publication in that year of the first edition of Macmillan's book Africa Emergent.³⁸

The continuation of the debate in South Africa

The rebuff to Ballinger's attempts to obtain official British support for his cooperative schemes left him with only a narrow base in Britain through the London Group on African Affairs. The Group had been seen by Ballinger as an essential pillar behind his activities in South Africa and the Protectorates following his effective exclusion from the Institute of Race Relations.³⁹ In September 1934, during a visit to England of Margaret and William Ballinger, a new committee was formed to continue the support for the Ballingers' work on cooperatives. With the

aim of raising £1,000 a year for five years to cover Ballinger's expenses "in order to co-ordinate knowledge of the various Co-operative or Industrial movements in different parts of the continent", the British committee set itself the task of both backing the Ballingers' work and pressurising the South African government to ratify the forced labour convention. "Since his arrival in South Africa", a draft statement appealing for funds recorded, "Ballinger has done his best to persuade the White Labour Movement that any attempt to repress Native Standards is short-sighted, even from the point of view of European interests. Ultimately it is to the interests of White labour to see the black worker is not exploited. Co-operation adds to Native bargaining power, and should thus help in the long run to raise both Black and White standards of living".⁴⁰ No mention was made of developing specifically African trade unions.

Nevertheless the emphasis upon some form of industrial organisation probably reflected Ballinger's declining faith in Cooperatives as a model of economic development in the aftermath of his failure to obtain widespread British support. The initial optimism behind the Western Native Township Cooperative soon waned in the light of inexperienced management and pilfering. By 1935-36 it was reported that the profit margin had fallen to be between 10 and 15% on a turnover of £3,000.⁴¹ Though three African cooperatives were registered at the office of the Registrar of Cooperatives in that year, it began to appear as that the most successful base for cooperatives trading was a tribal one, with ethnic ties and chiefly control reducing the incidences of corruption. One of the more successful efforts was that of the Bakgatla Co-operative Society Limited under Chief Makapan at Makapanstad near Pretoria whose objectives extended beyond trading to "tribal coordination" and the integration of the four separate groupings of Mosetlha, Mocha, Makau and Pilane.⁴² Another relatively successful example of a cooperative society fostered as a result of Ballinger's efforts was one at Orlando under the Reverend S.S. Tema of the Dutch Reformed Church while at Boksburg the Reverend N. Tantsi of the A.M.E. Church also had a cooperative society.⁴³

These attempts at cooperation, however, did not provide Ballinger with a

very strong political base, especially as efforts to link them to industrial organisation and trade union formation seemed unsuccessful. By 1934, attempts were being made to revive African unions after the collapse of the Communist-dominated South African Federation of Native Trade Unions and the lean years of the depression. On the Witwatersrand, the only two African unions that appear to have survived the early 1930s were the clothing and laundry workers, and the Laundry Workers Union became the nucleus of the Joint Committee that was formed in 1934 to extend union formation to African workers in South Africa's burgeoning industry.⁴⁴ As the numbers of African industrial workers grew in the 1930s, from 66,751 to 134,233 between 1932-36, so in turn did the number of unionised workers, who were estimated to total some 20,000 by 1940. For William Ballinger, it thus seemed a ripe opportunity to return to his union-organising activities of the late 1920s and learn by past mistakes. Hopeful that African unions could be modelled on lines similar to the British Transport and General Workers Union, Ballinger claimed a limited success in 1934, announcing to Livy Noble amongst other things that he had been instrumental in the establishment of a Native Building Workers Union.⁴⁵ But his previous attachment to the I. C. U. of Africa and continued links with the Joint Councils probably led a number of black trade union organisers to treat Ballinger with a good deal of suspicion. This weakness in Ballinger's organising ability was compounded by the arrival of a serious rival on the Witwatersrand in 1935 in the form of Max Gordan, a former industrial chemist and Trotskyite from Cape Town, who soon proved adept at submerging himself in the work of trade union formation. Aided by links with his former friend from the University of Cape Town, Lynn Saffery, who was now Secretary of the Institute of Race Relations, Gordan became Secretary of the Laundry Workers Union and proceeded to develop tactics of working inside the existing legislation governing trade unions, while at the same time appealing to African workers current needs by developing schemes for legal aid, literacy and book-keeping classes.⁴⁶

The comparative success of Gordan and Saffery in the late 1930s before Gordan's internment by the Smuts Government in 1940 has led to the view that

Ballinger was left a marginal figure, "confined", in Baruch Hirson's words, "to the periphery of events".⁴⁷ Certainly, Ballinger failed to develop trade union organisation amongst African workers in the same degree as his political rivals and his exact political role remained unclear. Though his wife, Margaret, claimed at a conference on the question of recognition of African trade unions in 1939 that Ballinger was a "representative of Native Trade Unions",⁴⁸ the locus of his political support was problematical. Only a limited degree of backing had been secured from the All African Convention in 1936 at the time of the election for Natives Representatives in the Senate and, in the event, Ballinger had been beaten in the campaign for the Senatorship of the Transvaal and Orange Free State not only by Rheinnalt-Jones of the Institute of Race Relations, but the former Communist Hymie Basner as well.⁴⁹

On the other hand, it is important to recognise that Ballinger's ties with the Friends of Africa acted as an important check on a monolithic white liberalism, completely under the control of Rheinnalt-Jones and the Institute. In the years after 1936 and the Native Franchise and Native Trust and Land Acts, the bulk of white liberal opinion inside the Union shifted away from any former interest in the Protectorates and the incorporation issue towards seeking to make the segregationist provisions of the Native Trust and Land Acts workable. Having been prepared, from as early as September 1935 to sacrifice the Cape franchise as part of this objective,⁵⁰ Rheinnalt-Jones in particular saw the Land Act as opening up opportunities for development in the reserves. Indeed, on the question of agricultural innovation, Jones wrote on similar lines to the Native Economic Commission arguing that "more has been achieved in this direction than is generally realised - enough to justify confidence that the Bantu can be developed into a reasonably progressive agricultural people working in harmony with the restricted conditions of close agricultural settlement".⁵¹ Given such possibilities, and with a "splendid lot of men" in the Native Affairs Department, it no longer made sense, Jones wrote to Livy Noble, to consider the additional incorporation of the Protectorates, for "... the Union Native administration has enough ... for the next ten years to carry out the promises made to the Natives in regard to the land and

Native development to prevent it giving adequate attention to the Territories and the spending of money which should be spent on them".⁵² The result of this strategy, however, as the next chapter seeks to show, was the co-option of the Institute into the working of the government's trusteeship policy and the complete isolation of white liberal thinking from the groundswell of the emergent African nationalism in the 1940s. Rheinnalt-Jones himself paid the price for this by his loss of the senatorship to Basner in 1942, and the wider implications were felt after the 1946 African mine workers' strike and the collapse of the Native Representatives Council.

For Ballinger and a minority of more radically-inclined liberals, this path of co-optation was seen as a disaster even before the end of the 1930s. "There can be little doubt", Ballinger wrote vitriolically to Xuma in May 1939, "that Jones imagines that he has a right to corner Natives and all they do or intend to do. If he ever wakes up to the fact that many of the Natives in Southern Africa are very conscious that they are Africans he will die of shock".⁵³ There was probably an element of personal sour grapes in this attitude of Ballinger, whose income from the Friends of Africa progressively declined throughout the 1930s while Rheinnalt-Jones was able to obtain a salary from the Institute of some £700 a year. Ballinger, too, tried to carve out a position for himself as a "liaison officer" between White and African Trade Unions and the Department of Labour in a paper read to the Joint Council in Johannesburg in March 1939,⁵⁴ without any apparent success. But Ballinger's opposition to the idea of "segregated cooperatives for Natives under the control of the Institute and Department of Natives Affairs"⁵⁵ and his previous attempts at fostering African cooperatives in the Protectorates acted as an important basis for the development of a radical liberal critique of the strategy adopted by Rheinnalt-Jones and the Institute. Such a critique grew, especially, after South Africa's entry into the second world war, and the rethinking by many liberals of their role in the political system.

Splits in the Institute

William Ballinger's opposition to Rheinnalt-Jones's running of the Institute

of Race Relations was by no means an isolated one. As we have seen, Howard Pim had opposed the apolitical stance defined for the Institute by C.T. Loram even before it was formed. In the early 1930s there had been various groups of radically-inclined liberals who sought a more collectivist and social democratic orientation. In 1933 the Cape Town Joint Council was reported as being "strongly antagonistic" to the Institute, refusing even to affiliate to it,⁵⁶ while around 1935 the Reverend R.G. Milburn proposed in a memorandum that the Joint Councils should be reconstructed into a "liberal association" so that "all political progressives should act together" outside the Institute's control.⁵⁷ Even prominent Cape liberals such as James Rose-Innes, previously involved in the Non Racial Franchise Association, doubted the wisdom of Rheinnalt-Jones's ostensibly "apolitical" definition of the Institute's activities, considering it likely that the Institute would "become all things to all men".⁵⁸

However, after 1935 there were increasing pressures on Rheinnalt-Jones to continue the "apolitical" course mapped out in 1929. Even though the Executive of the Institute in that year resolved to reduce as far as possible its financial dependency upon the Carnegie Corporation and raise money from local sources, which currently stood at £2,000 a year,⁵⁹ increasing ethnic fissures as a result of the growth of Afrikaner nationalism in the early 1930s acted as an important check on any radical tendencies in Institute policy. In 1935 a rival body to the Institute was established in the form of the Rasserverhoudingsbond van Afrikaners whose secretary was M.D.C. de Wet Nel (who had previously received a grant from the Institute for a doctoral dissertation). Declining Rheinnalt-Jones's requests for collaboration between the two bodies, de Wet Nel's Rasserverhoudingsbond acted as an immediate magnet for a number of Afrikaans-speaking universities, such as Stellenbosch, Pretoria and the Orange Free State, who consequently proceeded to withdraw their affiliation to the Institute, which was increasingly being seen as a "liberal" body.⁶⁰ The increasingly statist and "neo fichtean" definition of Afrikaner nationalism in the 1930s, reflected by the publication in 1936 of Dr. Diederichs's Nasionalisme as Lewensbeskouing, reinforced such tendencies, this making it even more important for Rheinnalt-Jones to dissociate

as far as possible the Institute from any political tendency that was critical of the basic assumptions behind the government's trusteeship policy.⁶¹

In addition, the elections to the Senate and House of Assembly in 1937, together with the creation of the Natives Representative Council, served to reinforce the previously fragmented liberal opposition to the Rheinnalt-Jones policy. While Jones himself, together with the conservative Edgar Brookes carried the Transvaal - Orange Free State and Natal senatorial campaigns respectively, newer forces were being organised in opposition to the policy of complete collaboration with government policy. In the Eastern Cape, Margaret Ballinger won the election for the Natives Representative in the House of Assembly, while Donald Moltenu carried the Western Cape. Both candidates won through considerable A.N.C. support, especially that of the new Secretary-General from Cradock, James Calata. But doubts about the effectiveness of Natives representation, especially as regards the huge size of the constituencies which made considerable demands on candidates' energies and organisational resources, began to make themselves felt. "... we were both tired out and sick to death of it long before the end", Margaret Ballinger wrote to Selby Msimang in 1937, "This whole Natives representation is a mad affair and the sooner it is changed the better, is my present feeling".⁶²

These doubts became reinforced when the question of land allocations to Africans began to be assessed in the light of the 1936 Native Land and Trust Act. Before 1936, the main thrust of the liberal critique of current policies of African land-holding had been directed outside the Union towards the reserves. This had been the main implication of the Ballingers' work on cooperatives in the Protectorates, though W.M. MacMillan pointed out the growing overcrowding in the reserves where, in the case of the Transkei, there were 57.41 Africans to the square mile compared to the Union's average of 14.64 and "that Kaffir pastoralism - and we have done little to train them anything better - cannot possibly be made to support even at their low standards of living a population at 50 to 60 or 100 to the square mile".⁶³ But these warnings failed to have the impact of official scientific surveys and were quite

capable of being used to substantiate the official government policy of adaptation contained in the 1932 Report of the Native Economic Commission.⁶⁴

A different emphasis began to emerge with the report of William Fox and Douglas Black on the Ciskei and Transkei in the middle 1930s which was sufficiently tendentious in its conclusions for the Chamber of Mines to suppress it for a number of years.⁶⁵ The report particularly attacked the prevailing myth behind the adaptationist policy that migrant labour and cash wages were an essential means for transforming the "traditional" sector of African agriculture into a more modern condition. This early dualist theory, which had been substantially upheld by both MacMillan, Howard Pim and the Native Economic Commission, had only been partially criticised by the Ballingers' early work in the Protectorates, with the implication in Indirect Rule in Southern Africa that transformation of the reserve economies could be achieved through limited social engineering to remove chiefly control and establish an economy based on cooperative enterprises. For the Fox Report the structures of labour migrancy were such that far more radical changes were necessary if anything like genuine economic transformation was to be accomplished in the reserve economies. Pointing out that the African population density in the Ciskei was 91 to the square mile, the report showed that very little of the cash income from migrant labour went on agricultural improvement: of the sales of 90 stores in the reserve, for instance, only 8% consisted of agricultural implements and fencing equipment:

In part of the Ciskei erosion and denudation of the land have reached such a stage over wide areas that it is questionable whether, even if all the resources of modern science were brought to bear with a total disregard for expenditure, it would be possible for the land to be brought back to a productive stage within a lifetime. 66

This criticism by two nutritional specialists of the viability of the government's trusteeship policy and attempts at land reclamation in the reserves through a betterment areas scheme began to influence liberal thinking by the onset of the second world war. In particular, it began to emerge by the early 1940s that one essential tenet of

political thinking held by many white liberals, namely the creation of a stable African peasant class in the reserves, was becoming increasingly implausible. Not only had the discussion on the recognition of African trade unions in the late 1930s influenced this, but the working of the trusteeship policy in the reserves was clearly being made to coincide with the growing labour requirements for industry and mining as a result of war-time industrialisation. Margaret Ballinger, especially, became aware of the effects of the government's policy of land re-allocation on African social life in the Eastern Cape. Headman Ntentein Kapase of Gogodela, for instance, owned his own plot of ground as well as that of his father and wished to transfer it to his son, as the original Glen Grey Act had provided. Having paid 2/6d stamp duty on his own title and 17/6d for a new title for his father's land, he found in 1940-41 that his land was taken from him under the land allocation provisions. Similarly in the case of Diamond Fuzani of Zingqutu, land was taken by the government after he had been away from the district for eight months, despite his having obtained permission to be absent for a year.⁶⁷ These cases and others like them had led Margaret Ballinger to doubt the whole basis of the segregation policy by 1943: "The general effects of this direction of land policy are causing me much anxiety", she wrote in December of that year

I am certain that this must be disastrous, both to the Africans and to the country as a whole, by preventing for all time the growth of an African peasantry or farming class, and condemning the African in perpetuity to the position of a subsidised rural urban worker, and incidentally South African industry to this extremely unhealthy foundation. 68

This lack of faith in the government's land policies thus orientated a section of the liberals increasingly around the issue of recognition of African trade unions, which were now seen as the essential mechanisms by which fundamental social and economic reforms inside South Africa could be achieved. With war-time emphasising in Britain the enhanced role of the welfare state, together with the publication of the

Atlantic Charter in 1941, many liberals looked to a reassertion of the social democratic values that before the war had been upheld by such fragmented groups as Ballinger's Friends of Africa and the Fabian Society organised by Julius Lewin in Cape Town.⁶⁹

On the issue of African trade union recognition, it had been the hope of a section of liberals inside the Institute that closer contact could be forged with Ballinger's Friends of Africa in order to push the Institute behind a more overt political programme. In 1939 William Ballinger was in fact invited to attend a discussion of the Institute's council on trade unions, but an abusive letter he wrote in reply to Lynn Saffery led to the idea being dropped, at least for a short period. Nevertheless, Ballinger's ideas clearly exerted some influence on such liberals as Donald Molteno and Douglas Malcomess⁷⁰ who reflected the suspicion of many Cape liberals to the narrow, positivist and politically colourless liberalism of the Institute based on the Witwatersrand. The first really vocal opposition in fact came from the former lawyer defending Tshekedi Khama, and Chairman of the Friends of Africa Society, Douglas Buchanan, who had already been partially involved in some of the Protectorate schemes of the Ballingers. Voicing opposition in 1941 to the apolitical stance of the Institute at a council meeting (though at the time in ignorance of the original funding policy laid down by the Carnegie Corporation),⁷¹ Buchanan initiated the start of a campaign which soon gathered momentum as the African National Congress under its president, after 1940, Alfred Xuma, started to demand where the Institute stood on such key political issues as the pass laws, the recognition and registration of African trade unions and the Union native policy of segregation.⁷²

Xuma's request, which was prompted both by the A.N.C. executive, together with the revival of charges by the Pretoria trade union organiser and A.N.C. activist Archie Mbelle that the Institute was controlling African politics⁷³ led to a debate in the Institute on the exact role it should play towards Union native policy. At the executive meeting in July 1942, Margaret Ballinger urged a reconsideration of the

whole policy of the Institute,⁷⁴ though the issue was postponed until the meeting of the Council in January 1943. In the months that followed, there was discussion on the exact role and nature of the Institute. "Race relations" for many of the Institute members centred around the gathering and dissemination of factual information on racial issues in South Africa, with political involvement being confined to the encouragement of African trade union and political organisations only in an indirect manner. This conception, heavily dependent upon American precedents, was accepted by not only the most conservative liberals for Julius Lewin wrote an unpublished memorandum some time in 1942 advocating this form of detached role. "The Institute is in no sense a political party", he argued, "and cannot act like one". Though there were weaknesses in the decision-making structure of the Institute, since the Council only met about once or twice a year - the most that could be done was to "take advantage of the prevailing winds of public opinion":

The work of stimulating public opinion must be carried on. The bodies that can carry it on most effectively are the political parties, and bodies like the Joint Councils and the African organisations themselves. The Institute is always ready to assist such bodies in their campaigns with advice and information, and such assistance is not the best valuable function the Institute can perform. But we do not believe that we can strengthen the Institute by ourselves undertaking work of this nature. 75

The fact that Lewin argued for this course in the Institute reflected the state of liberal thinking in the wake of the debate on the recognition of African trade unions. Following Max Gordan's internment in May 1940, there had been uncertainty as to who was to take over the running of the Joint Committee. While Gordan had advised from the concentration camp where he was detained that Saffery succeed him, this had by no means been universally acceptable to the African members of the Joint Committee.⁷⁶ The growing financial independence of many African unions by the late 1930s (the Commercial and Distributive Workers Union collected £3,200 from its members in the twelve months prior to the war, while the General Workers collected over £5,000) led to increasing opposition to what was perceived

as Institute interference in policy making. This "interference" may well have been crucial to the success of Max Gordan's efforts, for he had been subsidised by grants from the Institute-administered Bantu Welfare Trust, while legal aid had been provided from the Institute's Legal Aid Bureau and general secretarial assistance in the typing and roneoing of memoranda.⁷⁷ On the other hand, Max Gordan discussed all the memoranda drawn up by the Joint Committee with the Institute before they were presented to the Government Wage Board; while both Lynn Saffery and Max Gordan worked together to gather information which was presented to the Wage Board by Rheinnalt-Jones in his capacity as Natives Representative. It was probably this strong influence exerted by the Institute on wage negotiations which angered a number of radical African trade unionists. Gana Makabeni's African Clothing Workers Union rejected all white officials and Dan Koza of the African Commercial and Distributive Workers Union mounted an attack on the continuation of white supervision as in the days of Max Gordan.

The issues involved in the relationship between the Institute and African unions became clarified in 1941 when a coal strike in five Johannesburg coal yards led to the Secretary of Justice circularising the police not to arrest striking Africans until the Departments of Labour and Native Affairs had had time to clarify the issues. While there was no question of the government conceding recognition of African unions under the Industrial Conciliation Act, the effect of the decision was undoubtedly to contribute to a growing optimism in the ranks of the African unions and burgeoning membership figures. As a result, the Council for Non European Trade Unions (CNETU) was formed in November 1941, claiming the support of twenty-five unions, and some 37,000 registered members.⁷⁸ The CNETU marked an important shift in the thinking of a number of liberals involved in labour organisation for it now became clear that African unions were increasingly capable of both standing and organising on their own without Institute help. A report in September 1942 by E. S. Sachs, A. Fischer and Julius Lewin reflected this change. Direct social control via paternalistic liberal involvement in the organisation and running of trade unions was now seen as increasingly outmoded and the main strategy should now be directed towards the

creation of internal social control mechanisms through the consolidation of a small African labour aristocracy via sectional and craft unions:

Certain classes of workers have been able to raise themselves well above the general level of unskilled labour and thereby to attain substantially higher wages, e.g. Transport Drivers. This development should be encouraged both by paying special attention to the sectional interests of these workers . . . and also in certain circumstances by separate organisation for them. 79

In this context, it was less the case, as Baruch Hirson maintains, that Lynn Saffery's efforts by the end of 1941 had "failed" when he left for the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt,⁸⁰ but a realisation that newer structures of control over African trade union formation were now the order of the day. The choice of the Copperbelt was not accidental in this reformulation of liberal ideology, for it was here that experiments were being tried by the early 1940s in both the permanent urbanisation of African workers and social control through the legal recognition of African unions in the wake of the 1935 and 1940 strikes.⁸¹ "The time is past when European organisations can dictate to the Africans", Saffery remarked in 1943. "The function of persons interested in assisting the Africans should be to stand behind the African organisation and to render advice and guidance when it is sought".⁸² This was substantially the position of the CNETU in 1942, and this has a close bearing on the debate in the Institute that year on its relationship to political activity.

In fact, by the time of the Council meeting in January 1943 on the questions posed by Xuma's letter of the previous July, it became clear that the old Ballinger line of hostility to the Institute's apoliticalism was outflanked on both sides of the political spectrum. While the dominant strand of conservative thought represented by Rheinnalt-Jones, Alfred Hoernle, Edgar Brookes and the mainstream white liberals sought the continuation of the Institute's position laid down in 1929, on the other flank the liberal radicals no longer thought of the Institute as a suitable body through

which to conduct political activity. Thus Lynn Saffery, Julius Lewin and others including Solly Sachs stood outside the debate which was now for the most part conducted by the Cape liberals centred around Margaret Ballinger, Douglas Buchanan and, more tentatively, Donald Molteno. Having failed to win wider allies, this latter group were easily isolated and defeated.

The leader of the attempt to politicise the Institute, Douglas Buchanan, lacked the extensive contacts and inside knowledge that the long-serving members had and, given his close connections with both the Friends of Africa and the Cape Committee of the Institute, was seen as threatening the traditional domination from the Transvaal.⁸³ While asking for the Institute to "give a lead" on political issues for African and Coloured organisations, it was clear that the bulk of feeling in the Council meeting in January was for the status quo. Graham Ballenden of the Johannesburg City Council confessed to being "worried lately by the trend of events within the Institute, where there seemed to be attempts to capture the Institute for political purposes"; similarly Professor Reyburn of the University of Cape Town argued that General Smuts's statement in 1942 that "segregation has fallen on evil days" could not have been made at an Institute meeting if the body had been a political one. These arguments were supported by some of the more conservative sections of the African petty bourgeoisie present such as the Reverend E.E. Mahabane and D.D.T. Jabavu who argued that "The Institute is the strongest organisation to help in building up public opinion which will help African organisation. If the Institute became too specific it would fly asunder".⁸⁴

This alliance of opinion carried the day, despite a moderate rearguard action by Donald Molteno who questioned the meaning of the word "political" and urged the Institute to take such action as promoting legislation on education and penal reform. But the Council meeting reaffirmed its support for the line of dispassionate research laid down in 1929, though recognising that "scientific study and research must be allied with the fullest recognition of the human reactions to changing racial situations", and "respectful regard must be paid to the traditions and

usages of the various national, racial and tribal groups which comprise the population".⁸⁵ When it came to the question of replying to Xuma's letter of July 1942 some nine months later, Rheinnalt-Jones studiously avoided the whole question of the Institute's relationship to Union segregation policy, merely stating that the Institute had "in many directions . . . initiated efforts for progressive reforms and development".⁸⁶

The longer-term consequences

Even by the time of the temporary resolution of the debate in the Institute in January 1943, there had been pronounced trends in African political consciousness that weakened the attachments to white liberal organisations. Rheinnalt-Jones's election defeat in 1942 served as a reminder of these trends, though the full impact was only felt after 1946 when the Congress Youth League initiated moves to boycott what were now seen as the collaborative bodies of the Natives Representative Council and location advisory boards. The Institute's attachment to its traditional conception of a dispassionate body devoted to empirical research reflected a political conservatism that was suspicious of more formal political alignments, together with a genuine optimism in some quarters that the current wave of war-time industrialisation was by itself sufficient to initiate important political changes in a liberal-democratic direction. The origins of this view are examined in the following chapter, but it is important to note that by the early 1940s the growth in the Institute membership from some 1,060 in 1939 to some 2,303 by 1944, together with an increase in both funds and publications (more between 1941-42 than over the whole previous period of the Institute's existence) led to a general feeling that the positivist and apolitical stance of the Institute was paying off.⁸⁷

In the longer-term, however, the triumph of the conservative line in the Institute had the effect of reinforcing a general hardening of ideological arteries during a period which has traditionally been seen by liberal historiography as one of comparatively open debate.⁸⁸ While clearly many more ideas were being

discussed compared to the 1930s and also to the increasing repression of the 1950s as Nationalist policy began to be implemented in a comprehensive manner, at the same time it is important to recognise that the cooptive strategy pursued by the dominant sections of the liberal hierarchy in South Africa had the result of excluding a number of important themes from serious political debate. The perception of race relations as defined in the Institute's January 1943 meeting, whereby "respectful regard must be paid to the traditions and usages of the various national, racial and tribal groups which comprise the population" marked the formulation of an early plural model of South African society which was seen as typified by the interaction of autonomous groups defined on "national", "racial", or "tribal" lines. The wider structural basis to explain the formation of such groups, which has marked the extensive critique of pluralism, was signally lacking in the Institute's analysis.⁸⁹ As a consequence, the role of the Institute came to be seen as increasingly integrated into the working of the government's own policy as the 1940s progressed.

In fact, doubts about the Institute's perception of a "plural" model of race relations began to be expressed by no less a person than the Institute's president, Alfred Hoernle, though his critique was never fully formulated before his premature death in 1944. In an unpublished memorandum, "Reflections on the Racial-Caste-Society of the Union", Hoernle borrowed the model of caste that had been popularised in some American studies in the 1930s such as John Dollard's Caste and Class in a Southern Town.⁹⁰ The important point about the caste conception as it was used by Hoernle was that it directly attacked the notion of inter-racial cooperation as it was perceived by the Institute. While a caste society might also be a class society, for Hoernle the important point about South Africa was that "caste unity overrides class unity". The government's policy of trusteeship might secure for the dominated castes a certain level of "progress", while at the same time ensuring "retrogression" in other spheres, particularly the "slow, but steady disintegration of tribal bonds and tradition" but the important point was that "no balance of improvement over retrogression does in fact touch, or weaken, the caste structure", for

indeed, if anything, they only strengthened it. Thus formulating what in many respects can be seen as an early version of Heribert Adam's view of the continuous modernisation of racial control in South Africa,⁹¹ Hoernle went on to question many of the assumptions behind the reformist liberalism of the Institute and the Joint Councils. It could no longer be enough, Hoernle argued, for liberals to merely "make the caste society more tolerable for the underling castes within it" which was mere "ambulance work" that "did not touch the caste society principle itself".

Hoernle, therefore, urged his fellow liberals before his death to address themselves to the question of formulating an alternative liberal theory to that of the prevailing caste society that underpinned trusteeship:

... the opponent's theory has the support of actual practice in the established order. Against this combination, the Liberal's theory has no chance of prevailing, unless he is prepared, not merely to advocate general principles in the abstract, but these principles embodied in some definite social structure into the practice of which men can think themselves in imagination, instead of being put off by an impalpable blank when they ask for the alternative, or alternatives, to the established order. 92

Despite many weaknesses, this analysis of Hoernle is of interest in revealing doubts by one of the foremost liberal ideologists in South Africa of the 1930s and early 1940s on the course taken by mainstream liberalism in refusing to challenge the essential tenets of territorial segregation. It thus refutes the allegation that Hoernle was merely involved in the formulation of territorial segregation,⁹³ while at the same time revealing certain ideological inadequacies in South African liberalism at a critical time in South Africa's economic and political history. The caste concept as it was used by Hoernle lacked any independent means of explanation and, given its cultural roots in Hindu society, could not be applied uncritically to a capitalist society like South Africa. Given the unique typology of caste, it thus was probable that Oliver Cromwell Cox was correct in observing that "it is beyond all social logic ... to conceive of a caste society developing spontaneously within

a capitalist system. We cannot even conceive of social status, as it manifests itself in the caste system, having an identical or similar manifestation in the capitalist system".⁹⁴ Similarly, in the formulation of an alternative liberal theory to the dominant racial ideology in South Africa, Hoernle developed an ahistorical utopian perspective. His formulation of the idea of a liberal utopian world view (in Mannheim's sense) being generated in opposition to the dominant ideology of segregation depended on the hiatus view of liberal history in South Africa which Chapter Two has sought to question. Perceiving that the "liberal experiment at the Cape was destroyed when the Cape, through the Union, was yoked together with the illiberal theory and practice of the three Northern provinces", Hoernle ignored the systematic and complex relationship developed by liberals in the Cape even before Union to the development of segregationist theory. As such, he betrayed a lack of historical understanding of the nature and function liberal ideology has performed within the South African social formation.

This role, in fact, was illustrated by the relationship of the Institute to the apparatus of natives representation in the years after 1936. Hoernle's retreat to a utopian formulation for an alternative liberal ideology was both a reaction to the failure of previous liberal experiences since 1936, but also a crisis in liberal ideology itself by the middle of the second world war. It was a crisis that was never fully resolved by the time of the appointment of the Fagan Commission in 1946 in the crisis period after the war, and the polarisation of political ideology that accrued from the development of the alternative Nationalist formulation of apartheid.

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Chapter Nine

Trusteeship and the crisis in liberal ideology

"I have always felt . . . that the more we look upon the native in South Africa as a scientific problem the less we shall feel that he is a social danger."

Sir Matthew Nathan, 1914¹

The ideological crisis in South African liberalism pinpointed by Hoernle in 1941 had varying cultural and political roots. In formal political terms, it could be said to be a reflection of the pessimism felt by a cultural idealist such as Hoernle in the growing positivism and scientism expressed in the liberalism of the Institute, which closely resembled the emphasis upon factual and empirical analysis by the Department of Native Affairs itself. This positivism as we have seen, was a result in good measure of the reformulation of liberal ideology in the 1920s by such opinion formers as C.T. Loram and J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones, though the roots go farther back to the 1905 meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science in Johannesburg where Howard Pim had read his important paper on segregation. In wider cultural terms, however, Hoernle's disillusion could be said to relate to the very way that the "trusteeship" ideology had been formulated by the South African government, and in which liberals had actively collaborated.

"Trusteeship" was not an especially new doctrine for the nineteenth century imperial phase could be said to have consciously contained within its notion of a "civilising mission" the sense of trust. The term had gained wider currency from the heyday of direct British rule in India and had been widely used by colonial administrators in other parts of the Empire: Lagden, for instance, had used it as the apology for territorial segregation in the Transvaal and in opposition to the Tsewu v Registrar of Deeds case in 1905. By the end of the

first world war the growing sense of imperial self-doubt could be said to be reflected in the changing meaning attached to Trusteeship when the term came to be linked to the League of Nations doctrine of an Imperial mandate to rule territories, such as Palestine or South West Africa, which would become formally free at some more distant date. Now, instead of the "civilising mission" necessitating an imperial presence in a territory for as long as the mind could conceive, the phase of imperial rule became far more truncated and less certain.

This loss of certainty inherent in the Trusteeship notion by the 1920s led to a variety of responses by colonial and native administrators. Just as the administrators at the periphery could, in many respects, be said to be a more accurate barometer of imperial ideas in the nineteenth century than what has been called "the official mind" of imperialism,² so by the second and third decades of the twentieth century many administrators indicated a growing cultural malaise that almost bordered on what Fritz Stern has defined as "cultural despair".³ George Heaton Nicholls, for instance, had developed *authoritarian* views by the early 1920s as a result of his experiences in Northern Rhodesia as a Native Commissioner and as a Natal sugar planter.⁴ Similarly, the former Native Commissioner in the Zoutpansberg and Rustenburg, Ernest Stubbs, indicated a similar cultural pessimism in his segregationist pamphlet Tightening Coils, published in 1925. Retrenchments inside the Native Affairs Department, the loss of contact at the local level between Sub Native Commissioners and local African tribal and kinship groups, the extension of unionism amongst Africans to the rural areas by the middle 1920s, all these were strong influences on Stubbs's growing doubts in the ability of "western civilisation" to automatically perpetuate its own cultural and racial domination. Indeed, taking up the nineteenth century social darwinist assumption of "progress", Stubbs argued that civilisations were equally capable of declining as well as progressing:

The pitiful remnants of the Greek civilisation, squatted upon and defiled by a people still essentially squalid and barbarous

in temper, furnish an example of the fate that may overtake the highest order of human beings. The Aryan Armenians, the Aryan Georgians, the Aryan Tadjies of Central Asia constitute in their several communities an inferior and despised caste. 5

This was the lot of "white civilisation" in South Africa unless policy was so directed to tackling the issue of the "poor whites" who were a "sign and a warning" of the dangers to come and the loss of control by a ruling class threatened by racial intermixture:

The mixture of white and black is abhorrent to the White race: the Natives can never be permitted to become a member of the ruling class, while the ruling class itself is deprived of the accessions of strength and vigour which is necessary to its permanence. The foundation of every political society is its labouring class. If there is no cohesion between the foundation and the structure reared upon it, the whole fabric must topple to the ground. Decay is already apparent in our South African slave economy. 6

The only remedy for Stubbs was the vigorous application of a policy of territorial segregation to ensure that the African communities did not threaten the white "ruling class" by being allowed outlets in their rural economies.⁷ This theme, of course, was not a new one for it was repeated by liberal writers such as Loram and Brookes and found support through the establishment of such training institutions as Fort Hare. On the other hand, the post first world war strike wave and the emergence of the I. C. U. gave a note of added urgency to Stubbs's plea with its emphasis upon "cohesion" between the "foundation" of the "African labouring class" and the "structure reared upon it". But what sort of ideological structure? This was the theme for debate in the 1920s and 1930s, and in which the liberals so actively participated.

At one extreme, there were the racists such as Heaton Nicholls who inherited the fears of the petty bourgeois "Black Peril" scares from before the first world war. The most virulent expression of these feelings were the lynchings of

blacks during the 1922 white strike on the Witwatersrand. On the other extreme, there were isolated calls for an almost complete abandonment of the whole idea of "western civilisation" and the effective intermarriage of black and white. This "Portuguese" alternative received very few advocates in South Africa after the first world war, despite the loss of imperial self-confidence, and was noteworthy probably only for its able expression by William Plomer in his novel Turbott Wolfe in 1925. The son of a Native Affairs official who had been retrenched in the early 1920s and taken up trading in Zululand, Plomer developed an early and precocious literary sarcasm towards the whole idea of "western civilisation" in the aftermath of the first world war. Developing an anti-puritan consciousness that "whether Catholic or Protestant, falsified, misled and distorted human nature",⁸ Plomer set out in Turbott Wolfe to explore the themes of social and sexual intermingling between races in the South African context that remained unparalleled until Nadine Gordimer's similar quest in A World of Strangers in the middle 1950s. Despite active attempts, though, to develop a conscious empathy towards Africans, Plomer's effort was characterised by an aloof aestheticism that was characteristic of contemporary literary movements in Britain centred around Bloomsbury. It was not surprising that the first edition of the novel was published by Leonard and Virginia Woolf's Hogarth Press, and Plomer himself eventually came to stand on the peripheries of Bloomsbury when he finally came to settle in Britain after a career of wandering that took him to Asia and Japan.

But for all its defects, Turbott Wolfe must be considered a remarkable early vision of an alternative society in South Africa free of racial distinctions. The vision, for instance, of the young missionary Friston in the novel reflects, probably, the questioning by a small number of more radical missionaries of the conventional proselytising assumptions behind missionary expansion in Southern Africa:

"Credo", he announced in a voice of awe, prodding the ground with his forefinger, and speaking as distinctly as

an oracle. "I believe that the white man's day is over. Anybody can see plainly that the world is quickly and inevitably becoming a coloured world. I do assert yet that miscegenation should be actively encouraged, but I believe that it is the missionary's work now, and the work of any white man in Africa worth his salt, to prepare the way for the ultimate end. Let us take the native, and instead of yapping to him about Jesus Christ and Noah's Ark, let us tell him about himself, not in relation to Hebrew folk-lore, but in relation to himself and to the white man. I think that's where my work lies." 9

Plomer's novel contains an interesting semi-satirical account of a political organisation - Young Africa - founded by Friston together with a white liberal Mabel van der Horst. The description of the African member of the organisation, Zachary Msomi, the "slightly contemptuous ... kaffir intellectual, his over-developed torso constricted in a black coat",¹⁰ was based quite possibly on John Dube whom Plomer visited at his Ohlange Institute in Natal.¹¹ The article contributed by Msomi to The Morning Chronicle "a leading native newspaper" parodies the pretentious style of the African petty bourgeois intelligentsia in such papers as Ilanga and Imvo:

It is extra-superfinely fortunate for the auspices of the Association and happily portends that its two leading members or founders should occur to be Europeans familiar with prevailing sociological conditions as they are amongst the native peoples. 12

The thrust of the novel, though, is, if anything, one of regret that Africans had ever been "civilised" at all. This regret becomes the basis, and more especially the vehicle, for Plomer to convey wider doubts about the values inherent in western civilisation itself. "I have reached the pitch of understanding with the nerves", says Friston:

I look forward to the great compromise between white and black; between civilisation and barbarism; between

the past and the future; between brains and bodies;
and, as I like to say, between habit and instinct. 13

This attack on Western cartesianism parodies the modern movement in literature and the arts and the "appendix" to the novel contains some alleged "notes" by Friston on "the politico aesthete" who remains an essentially divided figure for "on the right hand he is a politico, on the left aesthete".¹⁴ This division reflected Plomer's own uncertainties and indicates why, following the failure of Voorslag which he edited with Roy Campbell, he decided to leave South Africa for artistically richer pastures.¹⁵ But his one South African novel did have some impact: hardening, if anything, many white attitudes on segregation. One editor of a Durban paper was reported as having "his jaws chattering together with rage" as a result of reading the book¹⁶ and clearly the book did represent an important alternative viewpoint to the supposed ideological consensus in the 1920s among whites on the values that should underpin native policy.

The anthropological input

The legacy of Turbott Wolfe soon became clouded by the emergence of social anthropology in South Africa as a more "scientific" method in which to organise relations between racial groups. It was this fresh input from the middle 1920s onwards which served as an effective counter to the earlier doubts expressed by many Native Administrators and, in turn, anthropological research provided an increasingly important empirical base on which to formulate policy on tribal reorganisation, reserve reclamation and native law and custom.

Before 1920 anthropology in South Africa had been very much on an amateur footing and had been divorced to a considerable degree from the practical implementation of policy. Selective works had been published by missionaries and "native experts" such as Dudley Kidd and Maurice Evans and Henri Junod, author of The Life of a South African Tribe in 1912.¹⁷ But a firm state commitment to research into ethnology was not entered into, despite pleas even from some African leaders, until 1925 when an ethnological section was created inside the Native

Affairs Department. By this time, a firm foundation had been laid for academic research by the establishment of a School of African Studies at the University of Cape Town under the professorship of A.R. Radcliffe-Brown. Invited there by General Smuts, Radcliffe-Brown brought a firm commitment to the development of rigorous anthropological research governed by the values of Durkheimian sociology together with an absence of any real doubts in the values underpinning "western civilisation". Coming from a lower-middle class Birmingham background, Radcliffe-Brown's aspirations were upwardly mobile. It was symbolic that he changed his name to the double-barrelled Radcliffe-Brown in 1926 and his mannerisms affected those of the English aristocracy, suggesting that the basic premises behind western colonial rule in Africa were not in question, at least at this stage in his career.¹⁸ Indeed, the basic problem for Radcliffe-Brown was the development of a scientific and positivist anthropology that could act as a firm guide to the "regulation" of race relations:

The one great problem on which the future welfare of South Africa depends is that of finding some social and political system in which the natives and the whites may live together without conflict; and the successful solution of that problem would certainly seem to require a thorough knowledge of the native civilisation between which and our own we need to establish some sort of harmonious relation. 19

Radcliffe-Brown himself did not stay long in South Africa to carry through this vision of a "conflict free" anthropology since he returned to Australia in 1926. There were others waiting in the wings, however, to jump onto the bandwagon and link the claims of anthropology to a wider view of the nature and role of a liberal intelligentsia. C.T. Loram had called in 1921 for a scientific approach to native policy²⁰ and this had been underlined the same year by the establishment of the Joint Councils under the influence of the research of the Phelps-Stokes Commission on education in Africa. With Loram continuing his work on the Native Affairs Commission, the one other individual to establish the links between liberal institutions centred around the Joint Councils and anthropological research was Rheinallt-Jones.

In 1926, therefore, Rheinnalt-Jones delivered an important presidential address to Section E of the South African Association for the Advancement of Science on "The Need of a Scientific Basis for South African Native Policy" where some of the themes that had been emphasised by Radcliffe-Brown were taken up in a more openly partisan manner. Arguing against an historical approach to native policy, Rheinnalt-Jones emphasised the values of a static, positivist standpoint on which to base research on race relations:

Political experience and historical knowledge have not given us the panacea for our racial difficulties, but have led us instead into a wilderness where the road is lost in the thick undergrowth of racial pride, passion and prejudice. We may well turn aside to look for other paths, even though they may prove less direct. 21

Jones then turned to the arguments propounded by the advocates of complete racial separation, who had taken comfort from the theory of a "primitive mentality" propounded by the French anthropologist Levy-Bruhl. This pseudo-scientific argument had been much favoured by the cultural idealists who had argued that the "Bantu culture" of the Africans was so inherently different to that of the whites in South Africa that it would be morally wrong to impose the values of "Western civilisation" upon it. The evidence for this Rheinnalt-Jones dismissed as thin and drawing on eclectic examples, varying from the well-known case of George Washington Carver's scientific researches at Tuskegee to the precedent of the *Mfengu* in the Eastern Cape, concluded that "the emergence of the Bantu from the power of animism and the tribal organisation that is based upon it" was "inevitable".²² Thus such legislation as the Native Administration Bill (which became law the following year) was undesirable in so far as it perpetuated tribal institutions in South Africa and inhibited the absorption of Africans into "Western civilisation":

If the civilisation of a people or an individual can be measured by the degree of emancipation from the power of animistic beliefs, and of social organisations based upon

these beliefs, and if we accept the conclusion that the Bantu people are capable, at whatever rate of progress, of assimilating our rationalised civilisation, any Native policy which seeks to drive the Native back into Bantu culture, is setting the Native's face in the wrong direction - not towards liberty, but into thralldom. Rather should it aim at surrounding and permeating Native life with all those civilising agencies which enrich our own life - such as educational and religious teaching, economic development, hygienic organisations and governmental control. To give every encouragement to those who show signs of adopting civilised ways would be logical. 23

This argument was not simply a return to the old Cape assimilationist ideal of the middle nineteenth century, though the renewed confidence instilled by the anthropological input clearly meant a strong revival by the middle 1920s of some aspects of the "civilising mission" among white liberals. More importantly, it represented an important introduction into the cultural and ideological atmosphere of South Africa of some of the revised ideas on racial differences in Britain and the United States where the old ideological underpinnings behind Jim Crow segregation were under significant attack by the rising liberal intelligentsia schooled in the idea of the essential similarity of different racial groups. This attack on the old racist belief in the differences of ability and aptitude between races could be traced back to at least before the first world war in America, with the publication in 1911 of Franz Boas's The Mind of Primitive Man, but it was not until the early 1920s that they received a public airing in the South African context.²⁴ Thus, formally at least, Rheinnalt-Jones's vigorous statement in opposition to the cultural idealist assumptions behind segregationist ideology represented an important new departure in liberal thinking in South Africa by the middle 1920s, especially as it could be linked to the growth of such organisations as the Joint Councils.

On the other hand, the response from the government itself over the following five years or so indicated the oblique nature of the anthropological attack. In a sense the "scientific" nature of Rheinnalt-Jones's attack on the "primitive mentality" school was as blunted as the "scientific" pretensions he was

attacking: science, in this context, could be seen to be used to support a case both for and against racial separation.²⁵ There was, furthermore, the problem of translating the more general anthropological attack on cultural separation into a concrete programme that led to a completely different social and political order to that presumed by the cultural idealists: this, as previous chapters have indicated, was completely lacking in liberal thinking in the 1920s as the issues became bogged down in the Cape franchise issue. It was only by the early 1930s with the work of the Ballingers on the Protectorates that an alternative model began to emerge which was not based on more or less the same foundations as that of the government itself; but even then, this alternative formulation took place outside the context of the Institute of Race Relations and the Joint Councils. In reality, therefore, Rheinnalt-Jones's initial attack on native policy in 1926 failed to be translated into an effective alternative policy.

The State's response: "Adaptation" and "Trusteeship"

The reason for this failure lay to a considerable degree in the links formed between the government policy makers and administration officials in the Native Affairs Department with the white liberals, together with an important reformulation of government segregation policy behind the notion of "trusteeship". Despite Rheinnalt-Jones's opposition to the Native Administration Bill in 1926, by that year there had already been established an important Bantu Studies course for Native Affairs administrators at the University of the Witwatersrand. The value of such courses, apart from the academic prestige they brought, had always been such that they were too strong an ideological influence for both Rheinnalt-Jones and C.T. Loram to sacrifice on the altar of political action, despite successive disappointments after 1926. As a part-time lecturer in Bantu Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand from 1927 to 1937, when he became a senator, Rheinnalt-Jones looked upon his academic lecturing as in many ways more

important than his work on the Joint Councils and in 1929, when he suffered from a bout of ill health, was prepared to sacrifice if necessary the Joint Council activities.²⁶ This priority to Bantu Studies was reinforced in the early 1930s when, through Loram's assistance and funds from the United States, the Bantu Studies course under the professorship of the language scholar C.M. Doke was expanded into a Department in its own right without any ties to History.²⁷ By this time Rheinnalt-Jones's control of the Institute of Race Relations and the reigning in of the more radical activities of the Joint Councils were added factors contributing to compromising with government policy. Thus it was not surprising that earlier hopes of land reform in the reserves, which Rheinnalt-Jones had espoused in the middle 1920s, became emasculated under the government's policy of Trusteeship after the publication of the report of the Native Economic Commission. Rheinnalt-Jones himself aided this in part by publishing an abridged edition of the report through the University of the Witwatersrand's journal, Bantu Studies.²⁸

Thus, by the early 1930s a new ideological consensus could be said to have been formed between the more conservative sections of the liberal intelligentsia centred around the Institute and the government policy of Trusteeship. Previous informal liberal attempts at development in the reserves were given up in favour of state control as the Native Economic Commission in 1932 spoke in favour of a "wise, courageous, forward policy of development in the Reserves".²⁹ More particularly, this rapprochement with state policy implied a moving away from the previous emphasis upon "assimilating" Africans into "Western civilisation" towards one of "adaptation" which was the principle ideological emphasis of the Report:

The inevitable effect of the under-development of the Reserves is that the orientation of the most advanced Natives has been towards the European. Instead of finding in their own area a fruitful field for using their energies, and their knowledge to uplift their people, they have been forced out from among them and have become "exiles" elsewhere. To develop the Natives and the Reserves: to make the dead hand of tribalism relax its

grip; to convert tribalism into a progressive force; to set the Native mass in motion on the upward path of civilisation, and to enable them to shoulder the burden of their own advancement - such must be ... the main approach to the solution of the Native problem in its economic aspect. 30

This "adaptationist" ideal was reinforced by the Commission's claims on the government's attempts to develop the reserve economies. The Native Administration Act was shown to have been beneficial in this respect since it allowed the Native Affairs Department control over all the native administrators in the reserves and by the time of the Report's publication, the Director of Native Agriculture, R.W. Thornton, had some 155 African demonstrators working in the field (though it was estimated that at least 400 would be needed over the next decade).³¹ In addition, contrary to Rheinnalt-Jones's and W.M. Macmillan's arguments in the 1920s on the necessity for land reform in the Union, the Commission considered that the key basis for "development" in the reserves lay less in the provision of more land, but in the effective utilisation of existing areas. Its central reading of history in South Africa since the 1913 Natives Land Act was that if there had been an "intensive campaign of Native agricultural education" the African demand for further land would be "less insistent and less urgent".³² Agricultural demonstrators were seen to be the essential means towards breaking down peasant conservatism, ensuring the introduction of better livestock strains, stock limitation, fencing, paddocking and irrigation and a careful programme of land reclamation. Praising the efforts of Father Huss in his efforts to introduce co-operative societies in the Transkei, the Commission recommended state action in this sphere, with the emphasis upon a Native Agricultural Bank since "European private capital" was virtually excluded from the reserves. At the same time, echoing the emphasis upon instilling sound business ethics into the aspirant African trader class in the reserves by Howard Pim, William Ballinger and others, the Commission urged that "very close watch should be kept on the use made of the borrowed money" for "it must be remembered that to the Abantu money economy is a new thing" (sic). It was necessary for

there to be "education on the use of credit" which the Commission considered could be achieved by "imposing very strict limits on the purposes for which money can be borrowed" and by "employing existing Native agencies, such as Councils and Chiefs to supervise this".³³

The Native Economic Commission, therefore, sought both to nationalise many of the more informal efforts at capital mobilisation in the reserves and the creation of a class of traders and rural petty bourgeois, while at the same time, through the ideology of "adaptation", manipulating "tribal" and traditional social mechanisms as the main basis of social control.³⁴ In its essence, the strategy proposed by the Commission resembled in many respects the later state efforts at manipulating tribal institutions through the creation of Bantu authorities in the 1950s and the enhancement of rural petty bourgeoisies in the reserves around such factions as Chief Matanzima in the Transvaal, Lennox Sebe in the Ciskei and Chief Mphephu in Venda.³⁵ This ideological continuity was further underlined by the fact that the Chairman of the Native Economic Commission, John Holloway, who, as Director of the Office of Census and Statistics at the time of the Report's publication had had a significant influence on the Report's findings, was himself an important advocate of a pragmatic form of apartheid after 1948. After being economic adviser to the Treasury between 1934 and 1937, and Secretary for Finance between 1937 and 1950, Holloway was looked upon favourably by the Nationalist government of Dr. Malan in the 1950s and was appointed Ambassador to Washington in 1954. In an article in 1956 Holloway spoke of the apartheid doctrine as being "not a dogma but a policy" and interpreted it very much in terms of the adaptationist formulation of the Native Economic Commission. "The millions of Bantu in Southern Africa", he argued:

can no longer be fed unless the high level of industrial technique introduced by Western civilisation is maintained intact and in sound working order. 36

There were, furthermore, "reforms which have still to be introduced to make the Bantu survive at all in a civilised environment ... A totally improvident race will never become a civilised race". Thus "a long time will have to elapse before the Bantu areas can be fully developed. Just as in the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, so in the South African Bantu reserves capital will have to come from outside to create a basis for civilisation. This also means that for a very long time to come the Bantu will be dependent on the Capital investment which has already been made in the white areas".³⁷

For the liberals in the Institute of Race Relations, acceptance of the framework for Union Native policy outlined by the Native Economic Commission marked an important transformation in their ideological thinking. It is, indeed, with this reorientation of liberal ideology around the adaptationist concept in the early 1930s that the seeds of the later crisis outlined by Hoernle in 1941 can be traced. "Adaptation", with its implied synthesis of the values of "western civilisation" with those of "traditional" African culture, became the basis of much anthropological work in the 1930s centred around the idea of "culture contact" disseminated through such organs as the journal Africa published by the International Institute of African Languages and Cultures. The influences on this debate were in a markedly culturalist idealist direction especially as the editor of the Journal and the Director of the Institute was Professor Diedrich Westermann. As the Professor of African Languages at the University of Berlin, Westermann was steeped in the cultural ethnography of the German school of Anthropology, which was also one of the dominating influences on the development of Afrikaans volkekunde at such centres as the University of Stellenbosch under Professor W.W.M. Eiselen.³⁸

It was through these sources that the culture contact school in the early 1930s underlined the adaptationist concept by emphasising the need to maintain and modernise traditional structures of social control in African societies. Perhaps in keeping with the mood of a European intelligentsia that was itself

disillusioned with the values of liberal individualism in the wake of the depression, the importance of this influence in reinforcing an ideological consensus between liberals and trusteeship policy cannot be ignored. In his book The African Today published in 1934, Westermann welcomed the efforts of the Joint Councils which were "trying by discussions and consultations to alleviate the racial antagonism and to induce co-operation where possible".³⁹ While conceding that "nobody will maintain that the South African Natives have been treated liberally in the distribution of land, in payment for work done, and in being given opportunities for advancement", Westermann nevertheless argued for some form of racial separation:

Though a radical separation is impracticable, both races will agree that social intercourse between the two will probably not be the rule, and that consequently they must aim at living peacefully together side by side . . . By living apart many possibilities of friction and conflict are diminished, and each community can develop its own institutions undisturbed and live its own life. The same conditions have been evolved in North America after long experience and are regarded there as the most satisfactory arrangement by both races. 40

But such racial separation was maintained essentially, Westermann argued, by the preservation of social and familial institutions, especially through educational means:

Every man is born into a social organization, into a family, tribe, people and state. He will always have relations, neighbours and fellow workers. The feeling of solidarity with the village and the clan, with men of the same age-grade and with friends in the same association, will remain alive in the future in large parts of Africa. Efforts are being made today in European countries to revive associations which have fallen into decay, because the values inherent in them have been recognised. In recognising these values there is a conviction that in contrast to an atomizing individualism, nothing is more likely to let altruistic feelings gather new strength than the cultivation of such natural bonds. Such institutions are still alive in Africa, and it would be short-sighted to let them die of neglect. 41

In this ideological climate of a considerably rejuvenated cultural idealism in anthropology in the early 1930s the earlier positivism of the 1920s began to lose influence. In so far as its chief objective, in the form of the fact-gathering and empiricist body the Institute of Race Relations, had already been achieved, it was hard to discern what further objectives were actually open to it. The main figures associated with positivism were of considerably less influence by the 1930s as well. Howard Pim became an honorary figure in the Institute and his last major contribution was his study of the Transkei, which came out shortly after his death in 1934. C.T. Loram moved to the United States and Yale in 1931 where his influence could only be indirect, mainly in fact, in terms of the academic expansion of the Bantu Studies course at the University of the Witwatersrand. Rheinnalt-Jones became engaged in the Institute of Race Relations before becoming a senator in 1937. Thus, it was not surprising that the ideological developments in liberal thought came from newer influences, especially in terms of cultural idealism.

This reformulation of liberal thinking was evidenced particularly by the publication in 1934 of a collection of essays by a group of leading liberals entitled Western Civilisation and the Natives of South Africa. Described as "studies in culture contact", the editor, Isaac Schapera, attempted in the preface to reconcile the adaptationist formulation of the Native Economic Commission to the older assimilationist ideal of the Cape liberals and the anthropology of the 1920s. With the emphasis upon the preservation of African social institutions, however, the pattern of argument revealed the general trend of thought:

As an immediate practical policy there is much to be said in favour of utilizing Native institutions in the administration and economic development of the reserves. The arguments adduced to this effect by the Native Economic Commission are not without validity. But it must always be remembered that there are numerous influences apart from the Administration bearing upon the life of the Native, and that they are all

tending to assimilate his culture to that of the Europeans. As a means of facilitating the transition to assimilation (and, as the records show, this does not mean identification) there is every need for a policy of adaptation. But it cannot be regarded as a final solution of the Native question. Bantu culture will change and develop, drawing most of its impetus from the elements of our own civilisation, no matter what we can do now or how we attempt to control it. 42

This interpretation of adaptation was on lines similar to the indirect rule policy that had become the basis of a lot of British administrative theory in African colonies to the north.⁴³ Schapera hoped that this looser view would thus reduce the adaptationist concept to a more interim policy which basically accepted the long-term inevitability of cultural "assimilation". But this attempt at synthesising the concept of adaptation with that of assimilation was for the most part unsuccessful and Schapera himself did not stay in South Africa to support it, but went instead to Bechuanaland to conduct research on the effects of migrant labour in a more detailed and scholarly manner than the previous efforts of the Ballingers.⁴⁴ The general trend in the 1930s, in fact, was towards a liberal acceptance of the ideological assumptions behind the adaptationist concept.

It is for this reason that the name of Alfred Hoernle is associated most closely with South African liberalism in the 1930s and early 1940s. Between the publication of Edgar Brookes's Phelps-Stokes lectures in 1932 The Colour Problems of South Africa, which represented a separate strand of Christian trusteeship, though favourable to the general anthropological shift away from assimilation,⁴⁵ to Hoernle's Phelps-Stokes lectures in 1939 entitled South African Native Policy and the Liberal Spirit, a pronounced change could be said to have occurred in liberal thinking. Now liberal ideals became founded on a basic acceptance of cultural diversity as a result of the impact of the culturalist idealist school in anthropology. The context of this reformulation is of

importance. As President of the Institute of Race Relations, Hoernle was as aware of the "threat" from the rival Rasseverhoudingsbond van Afrikaners of M. D. C. de Wet Nel in 1936 as Rheinnalt-Jones and it was the arguments of cultural ethnicity propounded by the Bond under the influence of neo-fichtean nationalism from the F.A.K. that influenced his conceptualisation of the adaptationist and assimilationist dichotomy posed by the Holloway Report. In some unpublished notes written after his attendance at a conference of the Rasseverhoudingsbond, Hoernle more or less revealed his acceptance of Holloway's arguments on assimilation. Indeed, he made a basic distinction which Holloway himself came to make after a visit to the United States in 1934 after the Commission's report,⁴⁶ namely that the cultural basis for assimilation in the United States was substantially different to that of South Africa where there were much firmer indigenous cultural and tribal institutions amongst the Africans:

... whilst the American experiment shows that Negro humanity can assimilate Western culture successfully, such assimilation is obviously both more difficult and more time-consuming where Bantu culture still exhibits a considerable degree of cohesion and vitality. Again, the more closely we study Bantu culture, the more we recognise that, even if it does contain elements of which by the standards of Western, and above all Christian, culture, we cannot approve of, it also contains much that by any standards is worth preserving. Thus, not unreasonably we begin to regret the indiscriminate breaking down of Bantu culture and to talk of giving the Bantu a chance to build up on the basis of their own cultural heritage. 47

On the other hand, "culture contact" did have its destructive effects on "Bantu culture" with the assimilationist results, as argued by Schapera. This furthermore raised the problems of how far assimilation of Africans into western culture threatened the cultural identity of Afrikanerdom:

We simply cannot Christianise without to a greater or less degree de-Afrikanderising ... We cannot administer

Native tribes as we do in the Union without Europeanising the people through contact with our Western methods of Government. 48

This dilemma for Hoernle thus left him with the only option of propounding a "middle course" which involved "assimilation in culture whilst practising such differentiation in matters social and racial, as both groups may agree by mutual consent to practise in the interests of racial good-will and co-operation".⁴⁹ This, however, amounted to a political version of the formulation earlier propounded by Schapera and it was unclear, in 1936, what "differentiation" mutually agreed upon in the interests of "racial good-will and co-operation" amounted to beyond the existing influence exerted by the Institute over sections of the conservative African petty bourgeoisie in the period before and after the 1936 land and franchise legislation. There was a vacuum in Hoernle's thinking at this point which was never fully resolved.

But the importance of Hoernle's thought lay in its shifting liberal thinking away from the previous assimilationist tradition derived from the mid-nineteenth century Cape liberal tradition and redefining it in terms of the newer anthropological perspective of adaptation. The political implications of this were spelt out more cogently not by Hoernle but by the apostle of Christian Trusteeship Jan H. Hofmeyr in a lecture at the University of Witwatersrand in August 1936. With the destruction of the Cape African franchise, Hofmeyr was aware that there was a need to shift away from the Old Cape liberalism which "in later years" had "become too largely a thing of sentiment". What was now needed was "a new liberalism" which Hofmeyr defined in terms of the current anthropological approach:

... the acceptance of, in essence, the same broad principles as those for which the old liberalism has stood, together with the application, to the working out of those principles, of sympathetic first hand acquaintance with the Native peoples - or, to put it differently, eager study and thoroughgoing investigation, with a view to giving form and substance to the otherwise possibly dry bones of idealism. 50

Such an approach for Hofmeyr involved the acceptance of "constructive segregation" which involved the development of the reserve economies on principles similar to those spelled out by Holloway while also recognising in the urban areas a "class of detribalized urban native as a permanent factor, of accepting the members of that class as co-workers in the building-up of South Africa's economic life".⁵¹ Such was the course outlined by Hofmeyr with its depoliticising consequences for the white liberals in the Institute compared to the activities even seven years previously in the Non Racial Franchise Association. When tackled on the course of government policy by Alfred Xuma in November of 1936 with the warning that the Trusteeship policy "establishes, with leadership of the State itself, what I choose to call real racialism in South Africa, from which one may expect very serious conflicts and antagonisms between the White and Black races in South Africa, unless better councils . . . prevail",⁵² Hofmeyr could see no alternative course other than one of "accepting the position thus created at least as a foundation on which to build a more adequate structure of race co-operation in the future."⁵³

Growing collaboration

In the years after 1936, therefore, the ideological basis of the political divisions between the Institute and Government policy were minimal, despite the attempts by some historians to interpret the period of the late 1930s and 1940s as one of intense ideological debate.⁵⁴ The failure of the liberals to formulate an alternative ideology to Trusteeship effectively left them at the political mercy of a new class of politicians - later described as "native politicians" - who were created as a result of the 1936 legislation. Foremost among these was the Natal segregationist George Heaton Nicholls whose views had considerably changed since his Black Peril novel Bayete in 1923. As Shula Marks has shown, Heaton Nicholls's views by the late 1920s had been considerably influenced by the gradual reassertion of Zulu tribal authority under the Regency of Solomon ka

Dinuzulu's Inkatha ka Zulu. Seeing the revival of tribal power and the recognition of Solomon as king, which had continued to be opposed by the Native Affairs Department in Natal still mindful of the 1906 Bambata Rebellion, as an essential means to combat growing class consciousness in Natal, Heaton Nicholls manifested an acute insight into the way social control could be manipulated via tribal institutions.⁵⁵ Indeed, this was essential if the adaptationist concept was to work:

... the conflict today has ceased to be the conflict between the tribal assegai and the European and is developing into a class war of a native proletariat. The recreation and maintenance of that old native aristocracy is essential to the growth of the adaptationist ideal. The creation of a Bantu nation having its nucleus in the Native Reserves, with its loyalties gathered round native institutions rooted in the soil of the native areas, requires the establishment of paramount chiefs. No Native race in Africa is prouder of its past, its traditions, its institutions and its Royal House than the Zulus and if native policy could be directed to capturing the latent loyalties of the Zulu race by recognising the Royal House as paramount, it would go far to satisfy native opinion and to re-orient that opinion in the direction of building up a Native society in the reserves. 56

Heaton Nicholls's perception of "an amazing unanimity amongst educated natives in their desire to increase the powers of the chiefs"⁵⁷ related in good measure to the conservative nature of the African petty bourgeoisie in Natal compared to other parts of South Africa and the absence of the assimilationist ideology based on the Cape African franchise. In the early 1930s Heaton Nicholls, who was driven by an intense loathing of universities and intellectual life born of a sense of marked colonial inferiority, sought to establish a power base of his own outside Institute control. On the basis of attachments with John Dube, he attempted to widen the class alliance that had been established in Natal by 1930 between the sugar planters, Native Affairs Department officials (who later formed the Zulu Society in the 1930s) and the African petty bourgeoisie⁵⁸

onto a Union-wide basis. Ostensibly seeking to "escape party politics with whites which will only lead to confusion and ill-feeling", Heaton Nicholls approached Dube in February 1931 to sound out African leadership's opinion on land allocations to the reserves offered in exchange for the removal of the Cape franchise. As a result of a tour of the Union, Dube succeeded in gaining considerable support for a memorandum on "Land Settlement" that sought to create compact African reserves in each province of the Union on lines similar to the Transkei, in addition to establishing a Union Native Council for members elected from provincial councils. For such prominent representatives as Chief Victor Poto of Pondoland and the tobacco grower and stock breeder Qamata of Cala in the Transkei the scheme was found to have considerable approval. Indeed, Dube reported from the Transkei that "all the leaders" there were prepared to accept the "Compromise" since "they say land and development measures are more acceptable to them than the vote ... So you can remain assured that all of the Transkei is with you in this matter ... It was quite clear to me that we need have no fear of Natives opposing this measure. They all say Natives want land more than the vote".⁵⁹

The use of Dube in this scheme of Heaton Nicholls was of importance, since Dube had fallen out in the 1920s with the white liberals over their support for increased white control over the financially insolvent Ohlange Institute. With Dube's failure to secure financial support from philanthropic circles in Britain, especially John Harris and the Aborigines Protection Society, by 1929 the Institute had fallen under increasing control from Natal sugar planting interests. Marshall Campbell, a prominent sugar magnate who later became a senator, was asked by Dube to become one of the trustees of the Institute so that by 1931 it was not surprising to find Dube so beholden to Heaton Nicholls.⁶⁰ The longer-term consequence was the gradual weaning away of sections of the African petty bourgeoisie and tribal chiefs from liberal influence centred around the Joint Councils. Though this was unlikely to appease the Cape members

whom Heaton Nicholls despaired of completely winning over,⁶¹ it seemed very likely by the time of the publication of the Native Bills in 1935 that not all sections of African political leadership would necessarily fall behind D.D.T. Jabavu's Cape-based and Joint Council influenced All African Convention.⁶²

This consideration was reinforced by 1935 when it began to emerge that Heaton Nicholls was one of the chief ideological exponents of the United Party government's version of Trusteeship. In an address in September 1935, Heaton Nicholls precluded any possibility of maintaining the Cape franchise on the basis of a stark manichaeian dichotomy of preserving white rule rooted in trusteeship or accepting the inevitability of class struggle and black majority rule. The South African polity, he declared was faced with the choice of either "trusteeship with Native reserves and institutions" or "common citizenship and the evolution of a class society": with the deciding factor being the Cape franchise. The logic of this argument led to a situation of turbulent unrest similar to that depicted at the end of his novel Bayete:

... and when all this is done as the logical consequence of a common citizenship, we shall have succeeded in creating a landless black proletariat - sullen, discontented and bolshevised - with the limited right to vote indeed, but intimidated in its exercise by precisely that form of pressure which rules the ballot box in the Southern States of America. 63

Furthermore, like Hoernle, it was also clear that Heaton Nicholls disagreed with the American parallel of assimilation. Aware of the existence of a "separate Bantu ethos", Heaton Nicholls argued for the preservation of separate African cultural institutions in order to ward off eventual class conflict:

The Bantu of Africa should not be regarded from the same angle as the Negroes of America, who form a submerged class of a mixed population. On evolutionary principles the American Negro has branched off from the main stream

of his race and is fast becoming a hybrid. Assimilation is everywhere in progress in America, retarded in the higher and changing classes of the community solely by social prejudices. To transplant American class ideas into South Africa is to lead the way to a coloured South Africa, since classes have everywhere, and all through the ages, ended by becoming absorbed into the body of the general community, no matter what legal impediment there may be. Hence the need for a clear recognition of what assimilation entails . . . It matters not whether they are tribalised or detribalised, educated or ignorant, civilised or barbaric, the Natives belong to a distinct and separate "race". Classes are emerging in the race itself and may require separate administrative treatment, but the race remains as a separate entity. The proposed legislation we are considering has, therefore, no application to "class"; it is concerned with the maintenance of the Bantu ethos in the interests of Western civilisation. 64

This was a considerably less sophisticated version of the cultural idealism that had begun to be rejuvenated in the early 1930s in the aftermath of the Native Economic Commission and which began to colour Hoernle's thought by 1936, the following year. In its emphasis upon evolution, "hybrids" and the separate racial "ethos" of "the Bantu" it recalled nineteenth century social darwinism and eugenics.⁶⁵ For the positivist school of anthropology the arguments were easily dismissable. Rheinnalt-Jones wrote, for instance, that the biological basis behind Heaton Nicholls's racial theories were unsupportable and "when he is tackled about it he loses his temper and there is no further argument". Furthermore, in his emphasis upon complete racial separation, given his admittance to Rheinnalt-Jones at meetings of the Native Affairs Commission that it would still be impossible to settle a self-sufficient African peasantry on the land, the arguments favoured the repressionist school.⁶⁶

Despite these ideological objections from the positivists, however, it was by no means clear that Heaton Nicholls's ideas were completely incompatible with some of the arguments of the cultural idealists in the attempt to preserve a separate

African ethnic identity. These considerations were reinforced by the political weakness of the Institute in the wake of the passing of the two bills in 1936. Despite hopes by D.D.T. Jabavu for a last-ditch struggle against the Native Representation Bill in 1935 so as "to give the government a full run for their money by dying hard so that we may go down still fighting",⁶⁷ it became clear in the course of 1935 that the liberals in the Institute had too much at stake to risk a complete confrontation with the government. On the 16th May, Edgar Brookes advised Rheinnalt-Jones against any policy of non co-operation towards the Bills⁶⁸ and on May 26th Jones himself went to consult Smuts on a scheme for a series of conferences with African leaders on the Bills. Though Smuts was in favour of one general native conference, the liberals in the Institute favoured a series of Union wide conferences which could increase their general political influence, and this proposal was agreed upon through the influence of D.L. Smit, the Secretary of Native Affairs.⁶⁹ With the increasing isolation of Jabavu's All African Convention in the coming months, liberals got increasingly involved at the local level with establishing class alliances of their own with sections of the African petty bourgeoisie in supporting the removal of the Cape African franchise. This became clear, for instance, in Natal where Edgar Brookes, who himself sought to renew his political ambitions by standing for the senatorship in Natal under the proposed legislation, championed an alliance with John Dube. Following the opposition of the conference in Natal to the Bills and its championing of the Cape African franchise, Brookes warned Dube of "the grave danger" involved in his "selling the past" and allowing the more radical sections of African political leadership prevail.⁷⁰ In the hope of outmanoeuvring the radicals, who were widely believed to be influenced by the activities of Carl Faye, a Zulu linguist in the Natal Native Affairs Department involved in the establishment of the Zulu Society, Brookes suggested that Dube press at the A.N.C. Congress in Natal on December 15th for the immediate establishment of the Natives Representative Council, while

the other legislation on land, native representation and the Cape franchise could be worked out with the government through the N.R.C. This de facto acceptance of the government's policy clearly depended upon Dube being able to maintain Congress support, though Brookes, working in conjunction with Douglas Shepstone - the grandson of Sir Theophilus Shepstone, a lawyer and later rival to Brookes in the 1937 senatorial election in Natal - and the Chief Native Commissioner in Natal, H.C. Lugg, kept open the option of supporting Z.K. Matthews should Dube have failed.⁷¹ In the event Matthews was not needed and Dube maintained Congress support for the effective acceptance of the government's proposals, providing the Cape franchise was not abolished.⁷² Thus Brookes had led the way into effectively integrating liberal political activity in Natal into the class alliance already forged by Heaton Nicholls between the Natal sugar planters, the Native Affairs Department and the African petty bourgeoisie: a process that was further extended in 1937 when Brookes became senator for Natal on the basis of support from the Zulu Paramount Mshiyeni ka Dinuzulu and the tribally-based Zulu Society that was centred in the offices of the Native Affairs Department.⁷³

Given this political trend, and the eventual support for the Bills by John Dube after he went to Pretoria with the Zulu Regent Mshiyeni,⁷⁴ it was not surprising that Heaton Nicholls began to recognise the potential importance of the Institute in the co-optation process. Writing to Rheinnalt-Jones in November 1935, he urged the Institute to abandon its ivory tower outlook and to "set to work to study what can be done along the material lines of the Bills". Indeed, he believed the Institute "could do much to assist in the coming development, and incidentally bring a better relationship, if you go with the national current; but on no other terms".⁷⁵ This tended, in fact, to be precisely the trend of policy in the Institute as both Brookes and Rheinnalt-Jones became elected as Natives Representatives in 1937 in the wake of the Bills passing into law. Rheinnalt-Jones, for example, began to integrate his work significantly into that of the Native Affairs Commission, then under the control of Heaton Nicholls, seeing his

role as a communicating link between African chiefs, farmers and headmen on the one hand and the Commission on the other. Writing to John Dube in 1937 shortly after his election as Senator, for example, Rheinnalt-Jones boasted of his being successful in getting African chiefs and headmen to speak to the Native Affairs Commission which "welcomed my presence and told the chiefs etc. that I was there to help".⁷⁶ This close collaboration also entailed a curtailed opposition to the Commission's policy on land allocations under the Native Trust and Land Act. Despite repeated claims by Rheinnalt-Jones that the white liberals had done their best to persuade the South African Parliament not to pass the Act,⁷⁷ it became increasingly clear that he saw his role as one of explaining and justifying previously worked out government policy. The tribal basis of the policy, for instance, prohibited him from campaigning for land claims by groups outside recognised "tribal" structures such as the Hlubi clans of Chief Msiti in the Orange Free State. Despite the fact that these people had been a recognised chiefdom until the end of the Anglo-Boer War, there were no land provisions for them under the 1936 Act and Jones doubted, in a letter to one of the group's leaders in Matatiele, whether it was worth applying for land to the Chief Native Commissioner, Northern Areas, who was "finding it quite impossible to do anything for scattered tribal people in the O.F.S., or even for some not so scattered".⁷⁸ Such a response indicated, if anything, Rheinnalt-Jones's desire to shield the apparatus of Native Administration from attack and to smooth over the administrative process of the Trusteeship policy.

It was therefore in the general political context of growing liberal collaboration with the evolution of the government's Trusteeship policy that the reformulation of liberal ideology onto a culturalist idealist basis in the late 1930s occurred. Here, the philosopher Alfred Hoernle, as President of the Institute of Race Relations, was of crucial significance for he had the necessary intellectual and ideological armoury to synthesise the anthropological arguments of the cultural idealists with the philosophical ones of contemporary liberalism: in this he was undoubtedly aided by his wife Winifred who had been trained in the United States

and taught Bantu Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand. Furthermore, in comparison even to Rheinnalt-Jones, who manifested an apparent reluctance to engage Heaton Nicholls in open debate until at least 1941,⁷⁹ Hoernle sought to discuss with an ostensible opponent the underlying similarity in their ideological outlooks. "I have always recognised that the argument for complete segregation is very strong", Hoernle wrote to Nicholls in April 1937, "what I have criticised is the incomplete segregation which is, to me, a mere sham". Heaton Nicholls's idea of "keeping the Bantu race in its own reserves" had an attraction, therefore, to Hoernle who was prepared to support it in its full "literalness", especially if by total segregation there would be ensured the ending of "the disruption of Native social and economic life by the prolonged absences of the men for the purposes of earning wages in white employment" which could not be really described as "segregation".⁸⁰ Such considerations were probably reinforced in Hoernle's mind by the fact that by the late 1930s it was becoming increasingly obvious that African political leadership was reluctant to accept automatically the guidance and paternal authority that had been hitherto the prerogative of the Institute and Joint Councils. As Xuma had warned Hofmeyr in 1936, African political opinion mobilised through both the A.N.C. and All African Convention was becoming increasingly radicalised, forcing the hitherto "moderate" leaders into severing their former uncritical class alliance with the white liberals. This process became clear by 1938 in Johannesburg where the African membership of the Joint Council became strained after the success of the radical faction in the Transvaal centred around the Transvaal African Teachers Association, and the Transvaal African Congress. This group had supported Hymie Basner in the 1937 election against Rheinnalt-Jones and, though they had been beaten through the weighting of the voting in favour of the chiefs, had nevertheless made a considerable impact on the urban intelligentsia.⁸¹ Thus, it was not surprising that on an issue such as the Protectorates, when it was discussed by the Joint Council, a number of African members present wholly

opposed the idea of their transfer to the Union. "Our Natives managed to disappoint us all, more or less", Hoernle wrote to John Harris of the Aborigines Protection Society. "I have known them in much better form . . ." The "general effect" of the discussion, however, was to set Hoernle thinking on the value of tribal structures:

The general effect on me at least - and much against my wife - was to set me wondering (not for the first time) how these detribalised Natives can really speak for the Native peoples as a whole; or how much helpful advice they can really give to the Natives in the Protectorates. Compared with a chief who has a real following among his tribe, these advanced Natives have no following at all; and would be in opposition, if they had to live and work under a chief. This fundamental division between the (more or less) detribalised and the (more or less) still tribalised, when added to solid surviving tribal jealousies and enmities, makes any strong and wise leadership of Natives by Natives impossible. 82

With growing doubts, therefore, in the ability of such liberal organisations as the Institute of Race Relations and the Joint Councils to maintain their ideological and political hegemony over the African political elite, Hoernle undertook his reformulation of liberal ideology in his Phelps-Stokes lectures of 1939, South African Native Policy and the Liberal Spirit. The cultural idealist arguments on the value of social communities as the essential basis of social control became linked, in Hoernle's analysis, with an interpretation of liberalism heavily influenced by the liberal-hegelian school of idealists of late nineteenth century England. The static notion of a "liberal spirit" thus became bound up with the preservation of "culture" in the group-orientated sense of the cultural idealists:

individuals live their lives as members of social groups, and the excellence of their lives is relative, therefore, to the culture (in the widest sense) of their group; the culture to the pattern of which individual lives are moulded, the culture from which they draw the materials, as it were, for a life worth living. The liberal spirit, in this aspect, shows itself as a respect for social groups other than one's own, for

cultures other than one's own, for sentiments and traditions other than one's own, though always coupled with a willingness to share one's own. 83

Out of this cultural relativism, Hoernle formulated a liberalism that bore close similarities to the cultural pluralism of the later post-war school of plural scholars such as J.S. Furnival, Leo Kuper and M.G. Smith and which marked an important step away from the individualist-orientated free market model of nineteenth century Manchester school liberalism.⁸⁴ At the same time, recognising that within this cultural pluralism, Afrikaner Nationalism was a growing political force, Hoernle gloomily reflected on the "heartbreak house" of contemporary South African race relations. Perceiving that the choices were three-fold, in a manner similar to the Native Economic Commission, Hoernle argued for a policy of "separation" as opposed to "parallelism" or "assimilation". But such "separation" meant "the sundering or dissociation so complete as to destroy the very possibility of effective domination" if the "liberal spirit" was to be achieved.⁸⁵ But this did not, Hoernle recognised, represent a very practical political programme and he was forced to concede that there was "no ultimate hope for the liberal spirit".⁸⁶

Towards the politics of hope

Hoernle's thinking in the 1930s reflected to a high degree the tensions implicit within liberal political activity in South Africa at a crucial time. His ultimate admittance in 1939 that there was no "ultimate hope" for liberalism drew the scorn of a number of fellow liberals, most notably the Bishop of Johannesburg, Geoffrey Clayton, who attacked him for "abandoning hope" which he interpreted as lying at the heart of the Christian message.⁸⁷ But while such "hope" continued to lie at the basis of much liberal thinking in the 1940s and 1950s, expressed, for instance, by Alan Paton who published a collection of essays entitled Hope for Africa,⁸⁸ the secular basis of liberal ideology as expressed by Hoernle was clearly in a state of crisis. As we saw in the last chapter, the

divisions in the Institute of Race Relations in 1942-43 only magnified this crisis and it was uncertain, after 1943, exactly in what direction liberal thinking could move if it was not to be merely a pale reflection of the government's Trusteeship policy.⁸⁹ Events during the Second World War and the revised thinking taking place in the colonial powers magnified this sense of crisis so that by 1945 and the victory of the Allied Powers over the fascist Axis, a new set of liberal principles in keeping with Roosevelt's "Four Freedoms" and the Beveridge Plan for a welfare state in Britain seemed imperative. The growing issue of African urbanisation brought on as a result of South Africa's wartime industrialisation enhanced the importance of this, also, so that by the time of the appointment of the Fagan Commission in 1946 to revise government thinking on Native policy it seemed that a more radical liberalism might yet emerge. The colonial basis of South Africa's industrialisation and the imperatives of capital accumulation, however, were in the event to belie this.

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15. Autobiography, pp.171-178. The journal first appeared in June 1926 and only lasted a few months. Plomer and Campbell both left South Africa in September the same year on the ship Canada Meru.
16. Autobiography, p.170: the book was kept under lock and key in the Durban public library along with Rabelais, Boccaccio and The Origin of Species.
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63. G. Heaton Nicholls, The Native Bills - An Address, Pretoria, 1935, p.7.
64. ibid., pp.7-8
65. See Chapter Four; for the close relationship between social darwinism and eugenics see R.J. Halliday, "Social Darwinism: A Definition", Victorian Studies, Volume XIV, No. 4, June 1971, pp.389-405, though the argument is rather over-stated.

66. ArSAIRR B100 (a) J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones to Rennie Smith, December 10 1937. Smith was a member of the Friends of Africa in London and Rheinnalt-Jones was thus probably keen to distance himself as far as possible from Heaton Nicholls on a formal ideological level.
67. ArSAIRR B100 (a) D.D.T. Jabavu to J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones, May 2 1935.
68. ibid., E. Brookes to J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones, 16 May 1935.
69. ibid., R.F.A. Hoernle to J. Smuts, 13 July 1935; Minutes of a meeting of the Executive Committee, SAIRR, in The Library, Natal Technical College, Durban, July 8-10 1935: Smit opposed the holding of one central conference which was liable to be "dominated by agitators".
70. ibid., E. Brookes to J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones, 22 October 1935, referring to correspondence with Dube.
71. ibid.; interview with H.C. Lugg, Durban, 1976. The decision to possibly use Matthews instead of Dube is of interest. Matthews was one of the products of the new positivist anthropology taught in Britain where he had registered at the University of London for a Ph.D. under Malinowski after completing an M.A. at Yale. He was also less keen than D.D.T. Jabavu to emphasise the British connections in South African liberalism following the failure of Jabavu's attempt to get the Rex v Nodobe issue on African land tenure in the Cape referred to the Privy Council. Instead there should be, Matthews wrote, "a marshalling of the forces on our side here in our own country" which would "help us more than striving to maintain the British connection", Ilanga, January 16 1931. At Yale, Matthews came under C.T. Loram's influence.
72. ibid., E. Brookes to J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones, 25 October 1935, enclosing letter from Z.K. Matthews to Brookes, 22 October inst.

73. Interview with H.C. Lugg; As Brookes wrote to Jones before the election: "On the question of tactics, I feel that, if elected, we should not only hold up the right ultimate ideals in a wise and constructive way, but make friends, win confidence, and carry through smaller but definite constructive reforms. I do not feel that we should adopt an 'all or nothing' attitude, and we should not stand for election on such lines", ArSAIRR B111 (b) E. Brookes to J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones, 4 November 1936; see also Zulu Society Papers 11/9 E. Brookes to C. Mpanza, September 24 1941; Mpanza to Brookes, 1 November 1941.
74. KCM 3358 P. Grobler, Minister of Native Affairs, to Heaton Nicholls, 17 December 1935.
75. ArSAIRR B100 (e) G. Heaton Nicholls to J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones, 11 November 1935; see also my paper "The Kroonstad Connection: Rheinnalt-Jones, Urban African Trading and the Politics of Social Control", University of Warwick, 1978.
76. ArSAIRR File Native Land Affairs J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones to J. Dube, August 26 1937; Hertzog Papers A32 Box 33 G. Heaton Nicholls to Hertzog, 14 August 1936.
77. J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones, "circular letter to 'The Chiefs and Other Leaders of the African People of the Transvaal and Orange Free State'", 8 September 1939.
78. ArSAIRR Native Land Affairs J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones to A.J.M. Mtimkulu, April 2 1938.
79. J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones, "Interpretations of Trusteeship", The Forum, Vol. VIII, No. 3, 1941.
80. Heaton Nicholls Pap. KCM 3362 a R.F.A. Hoernle to Heaton Nicholls, 25 April 1937.

81. Interview with Hymie Basner (tapes in SOAS library); see also my paper "The Kroonstad Connection".
82. MSS Brit. Emp. S22 G196 R.F.A. Hoernle to John Harris, 1 July 1938.
83. R.F. Alfred Hoernle, South African Native Policy and the Liberal Spirit, Cape Town, 1939, pp.149-50; see also my article "Liberalism and Ethnicity in South African Politics, 1921-1948", African Studies, 35, 3-4, 1976.
84. Rich, "Liberalism and Ethnicity"; Leo Kuper and M.G. Smith, Pluralism in Africa, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1969.
85. South African Native Policy, p.168.
86. ibid., p.178
87. Smit Papers 25/41 Geoffrey Johannesburg to Hoernle, 25 October 1941; for further details of this debate see Rich, "Liberalism and Ethnicity", p.242.
88. Alan Paton, Hope for South Africa, London, Pall Mall, 1958.
89. For the working of this policy see my "Liberalism and Ethnicity"; Gerald Webb Broomfield, Colour Conflict: Race Relations in Africa, London, 1943, esp. Chaps. IX - XI; J.C. Smuts, The Basis of Trusteeship, S.A.I.R.R., 1942.

Chapter Ten

The growing democratic challenge

The internal malaise of South African liberalism which, by the early 1940s, had surfaced in the form of growing ideological divisions within the Institute and the deep despondency of Hoernle, was compounded over the following years by a renewal of democratic optimism ushered in by the second world war. Hitherto, as we have seen, periodic upsurges of African political consciousness had been followed by periods of stabilisation where liberal political influences often increased. The phase of Ethiopian church separatism in the 1890s and 1900s, for instance, had led to an extension of the avenues for African higher education and the establishment of Fort Hare. Similarly, the post-war strike of 1918-20 had led to further avenues via the Joint Councils, Umteteli wa Bantu and the Bantu Men's Social Centre. The development of the I. C. U. in the 1920s had led, too, to a number of responses that ultimately strengthened certain liberal avenues: The Bantu World, for instance, had been set up partly to neutralise the Africanist Abantu Batho while the creation of Natives Representatives under the 1936 Representation of Natives Act had strengthened the local anti I. C. U. alliance in areas like Natal by the inclusion of a liberal like Edgar Brookes. So, at least until the late 1930s, the liberal position had never been directly challenged by a mass-based democratic movement in South African politics and continued African financial weakness and factional disputes had never seriously threatened the essentially paternalistic role the liberals had continued to play with respect to black political movements.

By the onset of war in 1939, however, it was beginning to become clear that things were starting to change. The well-intentioned, if somewhat misconceived fabianism of the Ballingers and the Friends of Africa Society in the 1930s had begun to check the monolithic liberal segregationism of the Institute of Race Relations under

Rheinnalt-Jones, while the extension of African trade unionism in the late 1930s under the Federation of Non European Trade Unions indicated a potentially new political base for African political organisation outside the ties of patron-client relations that had been endemic to financially starved African movements like the A. N. C. and A. A. C. A new generation of African political leaders was beginning to come to the fore by the 1940s who were also far less likely to accept as automatic the clientelism by which the white liberals had continued to rest their political appeal to Africans. Even before the emergence of the Africanist-inclined Congress Youth League inside the A. N. C. in 1943 under the leadership of Anton Lembede, Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo and others, this resistance to white liberal control was becoming apparent. At the time of another "African deputation" to the Minister of Native Affairs, H. A. Fagan, in 1939, which was led by Rheinnalt-Jones,¹ Alfred Xuma confessed to the seeming inability of Africans to generate their own distinct political ideas:

Many of us have no views of our own; but are making expressions and acting according to instructions from our patrons. There seems to be more co-operation with and more faith in certain people on the part of the African leaders, than with their own compatriots. Because of this situation many policies which are against the interest of our people have been implemented with cooperation and blessings of some of us. 2

Xuma's opposition was prompted in part by his growing opposition to attempts by the Institute of Race Relations to act as a mediator in such things as African student visits overseas. As Rheinnalt-Jones sought to tie in Institute activities in the late 1930s to government trusteeship policy under the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act, so there had been moves to extend controls over the activities of African students who went to study in London. As a self-taught student in the United States, Xuma was in a strong position to attack the suggestion of Rheinnalt-Jones in an Institute memorandum that Africans from South Africa would not be "at ease" in the company of West Africans at Aggrey House in London and would be better off in hostel accommodation at the Student Movement Club where there were fewer African students. Xuma therefore

opposed the idea of establishing a specific committee "dealing with the welfare of non-Europeans from Southern Africa" which "may tend to run the segregated South African hostel like a reformatory or detention home from which men come out educationally and culturally no better than they were when they left South Africa" and would furthermore help to extend the South African government's own ideas on racial segregation in African higher education into an overseas context.³

While the Institute under Hoernle's moderating influence toned down many of Rheinnalt-Jones's proposals to meet Xuma's objections,⁴ the issue pinpointed many of the features of the African hostility to perceived white liberal political and cultural control over African political expression by the start of world war two. One of the main reasons why many African students went abroad for further education was to escape the tight segregation in higher education in South Africa and the failure of attempts to broaden the basis of courses at Fort Hare. As a member of the All African Education in the 1930s Xuma had maintained contact with one of his black American acquaintances, Max Yergan, who had acted as "Secretary for External Relations" for the A.A.C. in New York. Yergan at this time was strongly in favour of establishing independent black educational and research efforts and had been a guiding influence behind A.A.C. efforts to establish at Fort Hare an institute for the training of African social workers and so escape the white monopolisation of social work through such liberal controlled institutions as the Jan Hofmeyr School of Social Work in the Johannesburg Bantu Men's Social Centre. The attempt had not been successful as a consequence of government resistance to the proposals, and after 1937 Yergan's interests in New York became diverted into the International Committee on African Affairs, of which he became director.⁵ But undoubtedly the legacy of Yergan's influence in favour of independent African efforts at educational autonomy — an influence which in itself strongly resembled earlier Negro American influences in South Africa such as that on African separatist churches in the 1890s — left a lasting imprint on Xuma's mind.⁶ It was not surprising that when Xuma became President of the bankrupt A.N.C. in 1940 he would begin to emphasise as far as possible independent black political action that was free from white liberal control and to

challenge the domination of the Institute of Race Relations and Natives Representatives like Rheinnalt-Jones.⁷

One of the basic problems Xuma faced, however, together with the tiny educated leadership at the head of the A.N.C., was the inadequacy of research sources and organisational funds to fund a campaign that could resist the permeating empiricist and neutralising influences stemming from the Institute. As we saw in chapter eight, it was only for a brief period under the secretaryship of Lynn Saffery that the Institute had begun to move from its role of presenter of factual information, as the somewhat curious alliance had been forged with Max Gordon and the Federation of Non European Trade Unions.⁸ By 1942 this phase had ended after Gordon had been interned, Saffery and the radicals in the Institute progressively isolated and Institute policy reaffirmed in a direction that accommodated itself to government trusteeship policy. Thus a tension began to set in as African Unions continued to develop in the early 1940s under the organising influence of leaders like J.B. Marks and Gaur Radebe, the "Secretary for Mines" in the Transvaal African Congress. The founding of the African Mine Workers Union in 1941 had acted as a crucial fillip to hopes for the extension of African unionism for it was seen as a key means to "create", in Gaur Radebe's words, "an organised body capable of taking its proper place in the advance of the African people out of their present state of national oppression",⁹ while the establishment in November the same year of the Council for Non European Trade Unions (CNETU) acted as a key organisational base on which to build African political and industrial movements free from white liberal control. Inside the Institute, this development was but half understood, and only a small number of white liberals such as Julius Lewin and Solly Sachs had pressed for a new approach that avoided direct white control over African unions and instead entrenched a semi-skilled African labour aristocracy.¹⁰ By the end of 1941 it was clear the relations between the A.N.C. leadership and the Institute were further deteriorating as Xuma came under pressure to make the advancement of trade unions and increases in African wages one of the central planks of the A.N.C. platform. "... the Africans are getting more and more apprehensive of what they consider to be compromising their

rights piece meal", he wrote to Alfred Hoernle in August 1941, and while still acknowledging that "we (Africans and white liberals) are all working for one common goal", nevertheless considered that "the Africans' personal views and attitude must be more and more essential in any scheme towards that goal".¹¹

By 1942, even this relatively conciliatory approach by Xuma to the Institute liberals became strained as the development of the A. N. C. anti-pass campaign led Xuma to seek clarification of the Institute's attitude towards the government's segregation policy.¹² Before the resolution of this with the Institute's Council meeting of January 1943, the additional dimension of the senatorial election in the Transvaal injected a further radicalism into the A. N. C.'s leadership's policy. By the time Hoernle asked Xuma and the A. N. C. treasurer P. G. Baloyi (a prominent Alexandria businessman) to nominate Rheinnalt-Jones in opposition to the ex-communist Hymie Basner it was already clear that Basner was going to win the election and that the political position of the A. N. C. leadership depended upon its bowing to mass pressure from the African electorate. The most that could now be looked for from white liberals, wrote Xuma, was the less organised voluntary support of radical white sympathisers of Congress:

... no individual European elected to the Senate is going to save the African people from disaster. They may help but one need not go to Parliament to serve the cause of better race relations. There are many Europeans — unsung heroes — who are doing their bit quietly. The salvation of the African people from himself through his organisation which finally imply his proper representation. ¹³

This break with the old clientelist ties, as Basner won the election following the swing of several prominent chiefs in the Transvaal away from Jones¹⁴ acted as a critical turning point politically. For now the ideological homogeneity of white liberal representation in parliament had been broken, together with the fact that there were alternative radical liberals to whom the Congress leadership could appeal to for support. Indeed, it had been precisely the "breakup of the present team of representatives of the Africans in Parliament" which Hoernle had feared when he had sought Xuma's

nomination for Rheinnalt-Jones.¹⁵ Ever since the first election of the Natives Representatives in 1937 the group, consisting of Senators Brookes, Rheinnalt-Jones, Malcommess and Welsh and MPs Mrs. Ballinger, and Messrs. Hemming and Burman, had agreed to act as a distinct caucus free of links to any of the party groupings in the South African Parliament.¹⁶ The election of Basner for the Transvaal in 1942 now directly challenged this view of Natives Representation, governed as it was by the distinctly conservative liberalism of such leading liberals as Rheinnalt-Jones and Brookes. The basis of Basner's election campaign had been both a strong attack on the ostensible political neutrality of the Institute of Race Relations and the toenadering of Rheinnalt-Jones with government segregation policy. The reason, Basner's election manifesto argued, for the "low level of political and economic thought in South Africa" was due to "European racist politicians" and this could only be rectified by "energetic propaganda and political courage". Of the Native Representatives only Margaret Ballinger and Donald Molteno in the Cape had "brought the economic facts home to Parliament and to the people of South Africa", while Rheinnalt-Jones as a "social worker" from the Institute had essentially masked over the differing interests of "firms and municipalities and the Native people". Thus, appealing to the growing African trade union movement, Basner rested his election campaign on a basically anti-fascist and democratic platform:

The defeat of fascism is even more important to you than to the European section, because Fascism aims at a greater and crueller exploitation of the workers and peasants of other races. Fascism's main characteristic is race oppression. If the government is in earnest about this war it must arm the African soldiers. If the Government is in earnest about this war it must give the Africans some democratic rights to fight for. 17

This challenge to the traditional Institute hegemony in the cooptive structures created in 1936 had a significant impact on the movement of African political consciousness in the coming years; and it can be seen to contribute to a growing democratic liberalism amongst both younger Africans and white liberals influenced by the war-time alliance against the Axis. By the end of 1942, Xuma was driven to admitting that on

the role of the Institute there was "no halfway house" between political involvement or a "research and information bureau": if it was not prepared to come out in favour of the former then it would be better "to give up the attempt to deal with everyday problems and to leave the responsibility for dealing with daily issues of race contacts and conflicts to such united bodies as the Friends of Africa and the Cape Central Committee on Race Contacts which have defined their objectives".¹⁸ The Institute, he charged, had been taken in a considerably different direction by Rheinnalt-Jones than what had been originally intended by such liberals as his former friend Howard Pim, and he turned down the offer of being elected onto the Institute's Council.¹⁹

But, at the same time, it was also clear that the rising nationalism inside Congress prevented too firm an alliance with the smaller and less well organised democratic liberals centred around Ballinger's Friends of Africa and Basner. Xuma himself confessed to knowing less personally about these groups than the Institute,²⁰ and though some selective assistance was made use of by the Congress such as a memorandum on African wages prepared by William Ballinger which was used to buttress the Congress's evidence to the Native Mines Commission in July of 1943,²¹ the emergence of the Congress Youth League in the course of that year began a movement towards avoiding any close contact with any white liberals or democrats of whatever political hue. The CYL began as a movement amongst the African intelligentsia, many of whom had been educated at Fort Hare or Adams College in Natal and had direct acquaintance with the control over higher education for Africans by such liberals as Alexander Kerr and Edgar Brookes. Unlike the groping nationalism of Xuma, Calata and the Congress leadership, the League began by injecting a strongly racial conception of African nationalism that initially was hostile to the class analysis of the Communist Party and the democratic left. However, by appealing back to a distinctly African cultural tradition that stood antiposed to the "white western civilisation" and that was seen to be oppressing the African nation in South Africa, the CYL was able to invoke a sense of African ideological identity. This was lacking in much of Xuma's American-influenced pluralism that assumed that the A.N.C. could mobilise South African blacks in a manner similar to the political

machinery of the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People and it was thus not surprising that in the years after 1943/44 the CYL began to spread slowly outwards from Johannesburg to small areas in Natal, the Orange Free State and the Eastern Cape where there were small groups of African teachers, medical students and professional men.²² Foremost amongst the League's early ideologists before his premature death in 1947 was the UNISA philosophy graduate Anton Lembede and it was he who injected the strong Africanist strain into the League's programme which directly challenged the entire conception of Trusteeship under which liberal activities had been conducted in South Africa since the early 1930s.²³ Trusteeship, in fact, the CYL Manifesto of 1944 proclaimed:

... has meant, as it still seems, the consolidation by the Whiteman of his position at the expense of the African people, so that by the time of the national awakening opens the eyes of the African people to the bluff they live under, White domination should be secure and unassailable. 24

Rejecting therefore the entire apparatus of "trusteeship" established under the 1936 legislation, the League emphasised the necessity of directly challenging the psychological underpinnings of the Trusteeship ideology that contributed to the apparatus of state control over the African population:

While Trustees have been very vocal in their solicitations for the African their deeds have shown clearly that talk of Trusteeship is an eyewash for the Civilised world and an empty platitude to soothe Africans into believing that after all oppression is a pleasant experience under Christian democratic rule. Trusteeship mentality is doing one thing and that very successfully, to drive the African steadily to extermination. Low wages, bad housing, inadequate health facilities, "Native education", mass exploitation, unfixed security on land and halfhearted measures to improve the African's living conditions are all instruments and tools with which the path to African extermination is being paved. 25

There was undoubtedly a considerable amount of ambiguity in the Youth League's position despite their fervent rejection of any collaboration with white liberals in the development of African nationalism. Many of the discussions that led to the original

1944 Manifesto, for example, took place in the Johannesburg Bantu Men's Social Centre²⁶ and it was clear that, despite Lembede's appeal back to the values of "traditional" African society with its alleged "democratic" and "socialistic" features, the Youth League was still very much dependent upon the existing organisation of the African National Congress.²⁷ In terms of actual numbers, the CYL failed to extend beyond a narrow circle of the educated African intelligentsia and by the end of 1947 still only had 278 members based in some four branches.²⁸ But on the other hand, the addition of a strain of Africanist philosophy in Congress added to a sense of intellectual reassertion amongst the African political elite which had hitherto been lacking. Congress meetings in the early 1940s were still poorly organised and attended,²⁹ while the cultural domination from white liberalism had a marked effect on African self-confidence. As late as 1943, for instance, Ilanga lase Natal wrote that African intellectuals still gave the impression of being "intimidated" for:

They speak as though afraid of the echo of their own words. Indeed, in many instances when our men of ability and intellect were exchanging views with Europeans of liberal minds, it was left to the European to express themselves with moving sincerity of some of the problems confronting our people. If utter condemnation of conditions that perpetuate the suffering of the non European was called for the European did the talking while the intellectuals glossed over these things and kept on thinking of half loaves of bread all the time. 30

It was this psychological and cultural dependence upon white liberals — a phenomenon once termed the "Prospero complex" by the French anthropologist Mannoni in a study of French colonialism in Madagascar³¹ — that was to a degree broken by the Youth League in the years after 1944 as an increasing radicalisation began to occur within the Congress leadership. The initial period of political optimism in the early years of the war that was summed up by General Smuts's statement to the Institute of Race Relations in Cape Town in 1942 that "segregation has fallen on evil days", began to fade by the end of 1943 when it began to become clear that the pass laws were not going to be completely removed by the war-time government, African trade unions were not going to receive immediate recognition while African strikes were made illegal in 1942 under War Measure 145. The Atlantic Charter signed in 1941 by President

Roosevelt of the United States and Winston Churchill, prime minister of Great Britain, formed the basis for the A. N. C. document African Claims that was adopted in December of 1943. Rejecting completely the policy of segregation on the grounds that it was "designed to keep the African in a state of perpetual tutelage and militates against his normal development",³² African Claims indicated the growing democratisation of African political consciousness in the 1940s under the impact of ideas like Roosevelt's "Four Freedoms", the Beveridge Report in England and, after 1945, the Labour Government in England under Clement Attlee. While re-stating traditional political objectives such as the extension of the franchise, equal justice before the law, freedom of the press and the right to own and sell property, African Claims also sought a welfare state programme that would lead to the state provision of education for African children, free public health and medical services, industrial welfare legislation and unemployment, sickness and old age benefits.³³

These social democratic objectives continued to characterise the A. N. C.'s political strategy as well, at least until the 1946 African mine strike and the collapse of the Natives Representative Council. Having moved as far as possible outside the paternalistic sphere of the white liberals in the early 1940s, Xuma hoped to model the A. N. C. on lines close to that of the British Labour Party, with a new power base lying in areas like African trade unions. The initial involvement, for example, by African trade unions in the anti-pass campaign had given grounds for optimism for, at an Anti-Pass conference called by the Communist Party in November 1943, the largest delegation was some 43 delegates representing 26 unions, totalling in all 40,160 members.³⁴ Xuma, however, as President of the A. N. C., sought to guide the African unions into specifically non political channels, so that they could focus upon "industrial" and "economic" issues while the Congress itself, like the Labour Party, could deal with "political" questions. "Trade unions are not political organisations", he said at a conference of Non-White Trade Unions in August 1945, "and to act as such is to prejudice their own functions as instruments for collective bargaining of their members".³⁵ Within this conception, a high degree of political lassitude was left to the Congress leadership within an essentially

elitist political philosophy that sought to control the activities of African unions.

This implied political role for the A. N. C. as the mobiliser of Africans in Unions as part of a single national movement, came seriously unstuck when it came to the question of the organisational means by which it was to be achieved. Once again it raised the question of how was Congress to reach its own members without a newspaper under its own control. The Youth League had an advantage here since it had after 1945 its own organ Inkundla ya Bantu in Natal, edited by Jordan Ngubane, who sought to press Xuma on launching a campaign of propaganda through the white press in South Africa and also through overseas newspapers.³⁶ But though he had been favourable to the idea of an independent African paper in the 1930s when African papers had been taken over by white controlled syndicates³⁷ Xuma himself was unwilling to press ahead with a scheme for an independent paper run by Congress itself. "My fear is", he wrote, evincing his elitist political inclinations, "that if such a paper is owned by Congress, it will suffer from mass control. It will be everybody's business and nobody's business. Incompetent people by mass vote will be placed in offices and positions that will do the cause no credit. The last Abantu Batho suffered and died from that."³⁸ It was political caution like this which stultified Congress's organisational efforts and progressively alienated Xuma from the Youth League and the Congress radicals.

The relative failure of Congress to stimulate mass involvement in a political campaign shaped by overseas social democratic models led to a counter movement by the Youth League, together with a small number of Communist allies, to seek an early and precipitate mobilisation by boycotting all the existing institutions of segregated political representation. If Congress was unable to raise the level of political awareness, then a campaign of boycott might itself lead to crystallising of attitudes around the institutions which kept Africans in a state of subjection. This was the reasoning which began to prevail as the movement entered the critical year of 1946 as overseas in India there began the movement of decolonisation, while in New York attacks began on the South African policy of segregation, and the administration of

South West Africa, in the newly founded United Nations.³⁹ With the strike by African miners, and the adjournment of the N.R.C. shortly afterwards, the issues became crystallised. Even the leading moderates like Z.K. Matthews and Paul Mosaka were now resigned to the fact that the "toy telephone" of Natives Representation had completely failed to meet their hopes of a political platform through which they could influence and modify government policy. "... the Council has developed into a meeting with senior officials of the Native Affairs Department", Matthews declared, "who not unnaturally are beginning to regard the Council as part of the set-up of their Department and the members as Government servants like themselves".⁴⁰ In such a situation, the initiative passed to the radicals inside Congress and the Youth League organ Inkundla urged a "ruthless struggle on a national scale" as a means to transform government policy.⁴¹ In October 1946 the A.N.C. met in conference at Bloemfontein and resolved on a policy of boycott.⁴²

The boycott issue:

As these moves towards boycotting natives representation began in the last quarter of 1946, many of the previous pressures at both the local level and within the national leadership against alleged liberal control of African politics came to a head. In an important sense, the use of the boycott weapon came as a direct response to the defeat through extensive state power of the African mine strike,⁴³ and indicated that the strategy had passed to institutions and movements other than those of trade unions. Now political struggle could no longer be centred around the withdrawal of African labour power, which had failed to involve Africans on a wider scale outside the mines beyond simple condemnation of government methods in suppressing the strike. The alternative was to focus upon the boycott of such bodies as the Natives Representatives Council and the Advisory Boards established under the 1923 Urban Areas Act as a means of raising the wider national consciousness that was essential for a nation-wide political campaign. The Youth League therefore pressed hard for the boycott in the period after September 1946, since many of the CYL members such as Oliver Tambo and

Godfrey Pitje had first been involved in political activity as students at Fort Hare in the early 1940s when the boycott weapon had been used to improve the quality of food provided in the canteen.⁴⁴ As the Youth League leader A.P. Mda argued in July 1947:

If the militants within Congress join hands with the present N.R.C. members ... the urban location boards, the rural election committees and progressive organisations throughout the length and breadth of the country, it should be possible to paralyze the whole segregationist machinery in South Africa, and to usher in a new period of struggle for direct representation in Parliament. ⁴⁵

In this sense, the boycott was a nationalist weapon that was being used to try and strengthen African sympathies behind its traditional vehicle of expression, the A.N.C.. As such, it was still a meliorist and reformist means of effecting political change for it was based, as Imvo came to argue, on the idea that "... Africans will have to educate the ruling class about their wants and activities and needs before they can be allowed much latitude of improvement".⁴⁶ But, as with independent church separatism in the 1890s, and later with Carveyism and independent trade union activity centred around the I.C.U., the whole strategy behind the boycott campaign was to wage an independent African initiative free from white liberal control. Boycotts directly attacked the very legitimacy of the white natives representatives to speak on behalf of Africans, whilst it even by-passed the question of inter-racial class solidarity through the expansion of trade unions. Thus it put into question not only the more conservative liberalism of the Institute of Race Relations and the Natives Representatives and showed it up as an outmoded form of paternalism, but also the more radical liberalism that had been espoused by the Friends of Africa, Hymie Basner and Solly Sachs.

The boycott weapon, therefore, challenged not only the patron-client structures which had been traditionally dominated by the mainstream liberals, but even the white radicals, who had hoped for a fostering of trade union organisation as the basis behind a broad-based democratic movement that would entrench an African urban working class as well as mobilise savings in order to generate an African business and trading petty bourgeoisie. The problem was that this group of left-wing inclined

liberal progressives was both tiny and ill-organised, despite the growth in democratic sympathies amongst some sections of the white population during the war as a result of such organisations as the Springbok Legion. Before the emergence of the boycott issue in 1946, the only really significant achievement of this group of democrats had been the election of Basner in 1942, which had if anything split the white liberal camp. For the most part the ideas of the progressive liberals remained very much paper ones, though their importance was to point out the limitations of the existing strategy of the mainstream liberals and to indicate the way towards a realignment of forces into a social democratic alliance. Leo Marquard's book The Black Man's Burden (written under the pseudonym of John Burger) was a land-mark in this respect, coming as it did from a former founder of the liberal student union N.U.S.A.S. and a member of the Institute of Race Relations who had conducted a survey of farm labour in the Orange Free State.⁴⁷ As a member of the Army Education Corps, Marquard was affected by the rising democratic tide during the war and the second edition of his book in 1943 applied a critical marxist methodology to South African political economy in a penetrating insight into the limits of liberalism. The advent of the United Party in 1934 through the merger of Hertzog and Smuts had weakened liberalism's influence, argued Marquard, and the further advent of Afrikaner nationalism left liberalism "fighting a gallant rear-guard action ... all it can do is to try to prevent the forces of reaction from having it all their own way. It is, indeed, apparent that the limits of reformism have been reached, and that any further improvement in the living conditions of the non-European proletariat will have to be achieved along the lines of industrial action rather than by liberal influence in politics".⁴⁸

This social democratic argument contrasted with much of the optimism engendered in many liberal circles through war-time industrialisation and the belief that marginal changes in government policy to allow for a larger urban African work force would in time lead to some more substantial political change in a liberal direction.⁴⁹ However, Marquard's words were only shared by a small number of fellow liberals who pressed for moves on the industrial and trade union front in order to establish a democratic power

base amongst organised African labour power. "It is high time that the liberals in South Africa descended from their lofty pedestal", wrote Solly Sachs angrily in June 1947, "of abstract theory and illusions and came down to earth and faced the problem in a realistic and concrete manner. Liberalism in America and in other countries, even in England a hundred years ago, made progress only by a correct examination of the workers' needs and aspirations and by the closest cooperation with the workers' mass organisation. Liberalism in South Africa is doomed unless and until it learns to understand the workers' problems and finds a concrete base of cooperation with the masses of workers, European and Non-European."⁵⁰

But how would such a reformulation of liberalism be made and who was to make it? Undoubtedly, the war-time experience and radicalisation inside the African National Congress influenced some of the African liberals into rethinking some of the tenets of liberalism: though it was unclear how far they were prepared to move in the social democratic direction. Jordan Ngubane, for example, pointed out in the left-wing journal The Democrat that the "fascist attack" from the Afrikaner nationalists might not immediately threaten the position of the liberals in the same way as it did the "leftist progressives", but any "collapse" of the latter "would immediately expose the Liberals to serious fascist onslaughts". This necessitated a democratic realignment despite the problem that the liberals "are not organised into a systematic political grouping standing for clearly defined principles".⁵¹ This question raised, however, the question of how far the white liberals would be prepared to move outside the constrictions of white party politics in order to both extend their power base and advance their cause amongst the large mass of non-voting Africans. In this respect, the 1946 African mine strike and the adjournment of the N.R.C. acted as a hiatus in many liberals' hopes as it did to the alignment of forces inside the A.N.C.. The growing movement of African nationalism and the pressure for a boycott forced many left-wing white liberals back into the white party political camp as they became increasingly isolated from the African nationalists. Writing to Hofmeyr on the 25th September 1946, for example, Leo Marquard indicated the growing mood of many white liberals to look to Hofmeyr as a possible leader inside the United Party for the

attainment of liberal ideals. Reacting to a series of police raids on the offices of the Communist Party, trade unions, the Springbok Legion and private homes, Marquard wrote that "African-European relations have deteriorated and that we are rapidly forfeiting what African goodwill we still possessed". As one "in contact with a considerable left-liberal opinion" he stated that there were considerable feelings of bewilderment at the government's "shift away from liberalism and an appeasing of reaction". The only hope was for a party led by Hofmeyr which, though it could not necessarily control the government, could still have sufficient votes "to enable it to hold the balance of power in such a way that no government would be able to pass reactionary legislation". Such a party, based on the abolition of the industrial colour bar and "some form of universal franchise" would be able to attract "to the fight for liberalism a very large number of Left Liberals, it would have your own personal following, and it would attract a proportion of industrialists and men of the Van Eck and Van Biljoen type. The effect on local and national politics would, I am convinced, be far greater than most people would anticipate. But it must be done soon if we are to avoid disaster."⁵²

This political strategy outlined by Marquard in 1946 came increasingly to characterise liberal thinking in the run-up to the 1948 election as it was more and more obvious that the African nationalist mobilisation around the boycott issue was going to exclude the white liberals. While Marquard, as a teacher and publisher, was not in the front-line of white liberal dealings with the A.N.C., it began to become clear that even those radicals who had been actively involved in African politics were finding their political power base ever narrowing. Hymie Basner, for instance, had been the focus for democratic hopes after his election defeat of Rheinnalt-Jones in 1942; but by 1947 he, too, was forced increasingly onto the defensive as he sought to rally African support around the idea of a national convention to rewrite the South African constitution.⁵³ In part, this weakness had been brought on as Basner sought to organise his own political bandwagon in opposition to that of the A.N.C. via the African Democratic Party. The campaign for constitutional reform led to the establishment by the A.D.P. of a campaign organised by Basner and

his African supporter on the N.R.C. Paul Mosaka for a £60,000 fighting fund to send propaganda overseas to Britain and America. Such activities directly offset the organisational work of the A.N.C. and Xuma accused Basner of seeking to "fight" the A.N.C. if his plans were not accomplished.⁵⁴ But undoubtedly, for Basner this was the only avenue left in an increasingly polarised situation where Natives Representation was under growing challenge from the boycott. As he argued at a meeting of the Cape Town Joint Council; the task of the Natives Representatives was to "correlate the activities of all those who are exploited and unenfranchised in their efforts to achieve the general franchise and to abolish general exploitation." Such a task involved appealing on a class basis to poor whites as well as Africans for Natives Representatives:

... must educate European public opinion to the realisation that the exploitation of the poor-whites and the underpaid white workers is closely related to the absence of democratic rights, the landlessness and the economic exploitation of the Native people. They must also educate the Native people to realise the necessity of industrial organisation, peasant leagues and political parties to become pressure groups on the Government for change of the present laws and policies ... Otherwise Natives Representation is completely useless, and by confining itself purely to parliamentary advocacy can be very harmful. It can be harmful by lulling the Africans into a false sense of security that their interests are being protected and furthered in Parliament and that there is no need to bestir themselves for their own freedom and well being. 55

This activist view of the function of Natives Representation certainly marked a significant departure from the more limited whig view of political representation that continued to dominate the thinking of the other Natives Representatives such as Edgar Brookes, Margaret Ballinger and Donald Molteno who sought as far as possible to dissociate themselves from Basner's activities.⁵⁶ On the other hand, in organising the rival A.D.P., Basner alienated certain key elements in the African intelligentsia and cut himself off from both the African National Congress and its rival in the Cape, the All African Convention. Basner probably felt that it was essential to establish his own power base, especially as until the emergence of the boycott issue the Congress

leadership had made almost no attempts to organise any mass following by appealing to the broad base of peasants and migrants. In the early 1940s, following his resignation from the Communist Party, Basner had picked up a selective following in some rural areas as he offered his legal advice to groups hard pressed by the implementation of the Government's reserve reclamation programme. In the Northern Transvaal, contacts had been founded with the Zoutpansberg Cultural Association organised by the indefatigable Alpheus Maliba,⁵⁷ while as squatter camps grew up around Johannesburg during the war years the A.D.P. established a following amongst the Sofasonke Party of James Mpanza and the Moroka Vigilance Association. Certainly pressure from such groups was placed on the A.N.C. leadership to cooperate with Basner and the A.D.P. for, as a representative of the Moroka Vigilance Association wrote to Xuma, Basner was "indispensable as far as the African people are concerned and he cannot be replaced".⁵⁸

But the activities of such a body as the A.D.P. were seen to rival that of Congress (despite the latter's organisational lethargy) and, moreover, to challenge the sanctity of African nationalism. One of the main objectives behind the original Youth League Manifesto of 1944 had been to establish an ideological alternative to the A.D.P.,⁵⁹ and as CYL pressure grew on the Congress leadership around Xuma, the chances for cooperation became increasingly slender. The A.N.C. Working Committee rejected a proposal from Basner early in 1947 for a New Party based on the supporters of the A.N.C. and A.D.P. on the grounds that it would confound the "present confusion" over the boycott issue and, in effect, strengthen the hand of the liberals inside the A.N.C. led by figures like Selby Msimang and Allison Champion who modified the original Congress boycott resolution of September 1946 with a proposal to launch a boycott only when a £10,000 fighting fund had first been raised.⁶⁰ This tendency became strengthened by the realisation in the Congress leadership that the hoped for reform of Natives Representation, which we shall discuss in detail in the next chapter, was not going to move much beyond the segregationist foundations of the 1936 legislation while the proposed Industrial Tribunals Bill to recognise selectively African trade unions would in fact lead to a strengthening of state control over them.⁶¹

In such circumstances, the opposition of the A.D.P. and its front organisations like the South African Democratic Socialist Party (established by one of the A.D.P. organisers in Johannesburg, Self Mampuru⁶²) to the policy of boycott was seen as increasingly coinciding with the more "collaborationist" followers inside Congress who both opposed the continuation of the boycott and supported a candidate like Douglas Buchanan in the by election in the Transkei in 1947. For example, The Bantu World, edited by Victor Selope Thema, became increasingly hostile to the Congress policy in 1947 and 1948 and was eventually to be the vehicle for the splinter group organised inside Congress by Selope Thema called the National Minded Bloc.⁶³ But it was this paper which began to give extensive coverage to the anti-boycott speeches of Self Mampuru and Paul Mosaka in opposition to the official policy of the A.N.C. and the Congress Youth League.⁶⁴

These political limitations on Basner's campaign to mobilise African political support behind a radical liberal campaign organised through the A.D.P. exemplified the problems of the more democratic liberals in the late 1940s. Hemmed in by the growing nationalism of the A.N.C., cut off by rivalries with his former Communist colleagues and restricted in his appeal to African support by only a selective regional following, Basner's position by 1948 was virtually untenable and it was significant that he abandoned the campaign for re-election as senator for the Transvaal and Orange Free State to the more ineffectual William Ballinger. The success of the A.D.P. was confined only to its two main African organisers, Self Mampuru and Paul Mosaka, who were both elected to the N.R.C. that year, Paul Mosaka beating his Communist rival Edwin Mofutsanyana by some 52,524 votes to 12,812. The very fact that only three new members were elected to the Council that year (including Mampuru) indicated the strength of the boycott campaign and that there were increasingly limited avenues in which the A.D.P. could develop. Furthermore, by very virtue of the fact that Basner's appeal rested through the channels of Native Representation, there was a tradition of legalism that pervaded his political appeal. In this sense, the A.D.P. was unable to develop such an opportunistic political platform as the Communist Party,

which selectively advocated both boycotting and participating in elections to advisory boards, the N.R.C. and Natives Representation in Parliament. While the A.D.P.'s strategy was based upon a long term realignment in liberal forces within the structures of political representation in South Africa, the C.P.S.A. was able to exploit whatever were the prevailing local sympathies to representative structures. In Johannesburg the local party committee advised a boycott of advisory board elections in support of the Pimville Sub Tenants Association⁶⁵; while in Orlando Communist candidates were put up, unsuccessfully, against the Sofasonke Party of Mpanza⁶⁶; and in Pretoria five candidates stood for ten seats in the advisory board elections.⁶⁷ Similarly in the Cape, C.P. candidates stood for advisory board elections where local figures like Johnson Ngwevela and W. Ndunyana continued to stand on the advisory board long after the party was banned in 1950, while in 1948 Sam Kahn defeated Douglas Buchanan in the election for Natives Representative for the Western Cape.⁶⁸ While Edwin Mofutsanyana defended this expediency on the grounds that "a total boycott can only be achieved when sufficient organisational work has been achieved in this country",⁶⁹ clearly the C.P. did score against the A.D.P. in its ability to appease the radical support for the boycott whilst at the same time using the election to the representative institutions to attack the "collaborationism" of the more conservative liberals. In the Western Cape elections, for instance, Sam Kahn's supporters were able to muster extensive support in a 53% poll when the slogan "Votela Ngoluhlobo" was able to appeal against the somewhat ineffective campaign of Douglas Buchanan. Winning 3,780 votes against Buchanan's 754, Kahn declared that "a vote for a communist is a vote for freedom. That is what the Africans think today."⁷⁰

In such circumstances, Basner by 1948 moved towards a more mainstream liberal position by coming out in favour of a liberal party led by Hofmeyr. Only such a party, he declared in the wake of the Nationalist election victory over the U.P., "based on the needs of the industrialists of South Africa has a chance of finally defeating the feudal agrarian ideology and policy of the Nationalist Party".⁷¹ The statement was indicative of the state of the liberal position as a whole in the South African body politic as independent political action to establish a power base amongst black political

organisation has so clearly failed. Though various further attempts were to be made by isolated liberal groups and individuals through the 1950s and early 1960s to repeat Basner's enterprise and seek some form of African following — most notably Patrick Duncan and the white student group the African Resistance Movement⁷² — it was clear that, by the time of the 1948 election, liberal political initiative would be based upon party political action through the narrowly based white electoral franchise. The attempt at democratising liberalism in a social democratic direction had for the most part been unsuccessful despite the period of war-time optimism, while in the period after the Nationalist election victory of 1948 a number of key liberals who had been hitherto involved in the governmental process itself via Natives Representation became released to become actively involved in leading political action in the direction of a political party. It was in circumstances such as these that the democratic challenge from left liberalism was met in the 1940s. As a consequence, as the next chapter shows, the more conservative liberalism of the Institute of Race Relations became consolidated on a cold war basis that increasingly equated the left-liberalism of Basner, Sachs and The Democrat with a monolithic "communism" stemming from Moscow.

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2. A.B. Xuma Papers ABX 390507 Xuma to Calata 9 May 1939.
3. ABX 390510 Xuma to Hoernle 10 May 1939. For Xuma's career in America as student see Richard D. Ralston, "American Episodes in the Making of an African Leader: The Case of Alfred B. Xuma, (1893-1962)", The International Journal of African Historical Studies, VI, 1 (1973), pp.72-93.
4. ABX 390620 R.F.A. Hoernle to Xuma June 2 1939; Rheinnalt-Jones to Xuma June 20 1939; Rheinnalt-Jones RR4/39 Memorandum on Non Europeans Travelling Overseas, February 28 1939.
5. ABX 370204 M. Yergan to Xuma February 4 1937.
6. Peter Walshe, The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa, London, C. Hurst and Co. 1970, p.339; "Report of Max Yergan to the All African Convention", n.d., Minutes of the All African Convention, December 1937, pp.34-46. Yergan advocated "unity with the liberal forces in the trade union movements, unity with all liberals and progressive minded people" (p.38). Later in the 1960s Yergan became a supporter of apartheid in South Africa.
7. When Xuma became President of the A. N. C. in 1940 there were only £13 in funds, Unpublished autobiography, p.48.
8. See pp. 307-309.
9. ABX 4106091 leaflet by Gau Radebe 9 June 1941.
10. See pp. 308-309.
11. ABX 410828 Xuma to Hoernle August 28 1941; Hoernle to Xuma 29 August 1941.
12. ArSAIRR Policy 1943 A.B. Xuma to J.D. R-J, 1 July 1942.
13. ABX 420912c Xuma to Hoernle, 12 September 1942.
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15. ABX 420914 Hoernle to Xuma 14 September 1942.
16. Margaret Ballinger Papers BC579 B.98.22 Meeting of Natives Representatives Parliamentary Group, Pretoria, December 4-8 1937.
17. To the Electorate of the Transvaal and OFS by H.M. Basner, 1942, p.6.
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21. Evidence given by A.B. Xuma, President General of the African National Congress to the Native Mine Wages Commission, July 13 1943, p.6; based upon evidence given by the Friends of Africa to the Native Mine Wage Commission, Memorandum prepared by W.G. Ballinger, 31 May 1943.
22. For the development of the Congress Youth League see Walshe, op. cit., pp.349-361; Gail M. Gerhart, Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of An Ideology, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978, esp. chapter three; Edward Roux, Time Longer Than Rope, University of Wisconsin Press, 1964, p.403.
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24. A.B. Xuma Papers Box 47 (c) 326329(68) Congress Youth League Manifesto, dated 31 March 1944, p.2.
25. ibid., p.3; see also Janet Robatson, Liberalism in South Africa, 1948-1963, Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1971, pp.36-37.
26. Ilanga lase Natal March 11 1944.
27. Ilanga lase Natal February 24 1945 article by Lembede entitled "Some Basic Principles of African Nationalism".
28. The Bantu World, December 27 1947.

29. See for example a description of an African meeting in Bloemfontein in 1942 by S.M. Molema, ABX 430128a, "Some Thoughts and Reflections on the African National Congress", 28 January 1943.
30. Ilanga lase July 31 1943.
31. O. Mannoni, Prospero and Caliban, trans. P. Powestand, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1964; see also A. Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized, trans. H. Greenfield, New York, Orion Press, 1965, for a similar master-servant paradigm of Colonialism.
32. African Claims, Johannesburg, 1943, p.15.
33. ibid., pp.9-15.
34. ABX 431123c E.T. Mah and Y. Dadoo to Sec. A.N.C. 23 November 1943.
35. ABX 450804 A.B. Xuma, Opening Address of the All in Conference of the Non-White Trade Unions, Bloemfontein, 4 August 1945, p.3; A.N.C. Bulletin, 1 November 1945, p.2.
36. ABX 460318a J. Ngubane to Xuma March 16 1946.
37. ABX 361127c Xuma to Yergan 27 November 1936.
38. ABX 480507b Xuma to I.C.P. Molefe March 1 1948; see also Walshe, op. cit., pp.383-4. The Transvaal A.N.C. resolved at its annual conference in Germiston in 1946 to try to raise £20,000 for a printing company and float £1 shares "for the rich class of the African community" and 5sh "for the masses", ABX 460329c A.W. Bopape to Xuma 29 March 1946. The matter does not appear to have been proceeded with.
39. James Barber, South Africa's Foreign Policy, 1945-1970, London, O.U.P., 1973, pp.24-34.
40. The Bantu World September 21 1946.
41. Inkundla ya Bantu 2nd Fortnight September 1946; ABX 460921, A.B. Xuma leaflet on Emergency Conference of All Africans, 21 September 1946.
42. The Conference decided in the end to adopt a strategy whereby the Councillors on the N.R.C. resigned by degrees and was a middle position between one of complete boycott demanded by Anton Lembede and one of continuing to work through the Council championed by Selby Msimang. Of 510 delegates Msimang's motion got hardly a dozen votes and over 490 voted for the motion backed by Xuma

which he arranged in close consultation with many of the N.R.C. councillors and Moses Kotane, Inkundla ya Bantu, First Fortnight, October 1946.

43. Dan O'Meara, "The 1946 African mine workers strike and the political economy of South Africa", The Journal of Commonwealth and Political Studies, XIII, 2 (July 1975), pp.146-73.
44. Interview with Adv. A.P. Mda and Godfrey Pitje; Baruch Hirson, Year of Fire, Year of Ash, London, Zed Publications, 1979, p.34.
45. The Bantu World July 17 1947.
46. Imvo January 10 1948.
47. Interview with Julius Lewin.
48. John Burger (Leo Marquard), The Black Man's Burden (2 ed), London, 1943, p.244.
49. This belief was especially centred around the liberal journal The Forum in the 1940s which I have discussed more fully in my article, "Liberalism and Ethnicity in South African Politics, 1921-1948", African Studies, December 1976.
50. Trek, June 1947; Sachs had earlier abandoned the mainstream liberal argument on industrialisation by itself promoting political change. In 1942 he suggested at the national executive of the South African Trades and Labour Council the appointment of an advisory committee for the consultation on all matters affecting workers but the idea was rejected by the government in March 1943. "We waited patiently for the realisation of some of the good things promised", Sachs wrote to Smuts, "but we soon became completely disillusioned and realised that the more lavish the promises the less intention was there to fulfil them", The Guardian March 25 1943; see also E.S. Sachs, The Choice Before South Africa, 1952.
51. The Democrat October 20 1945.
52. Leo Marquard Papers, BC 587, L. Marquard to Jan Hofmeyr 25 September 1946 Jan Hofmeyr to Marquard 12 June 1946.
53. The Guardian February 13 1947.
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55. H. Basner, A Nation of 10,000,000 — Challenge to S.A.'s Native Policy, Johannesburg, 1947, p.47.

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57. The Zoutpansberg Cultural Association was a peasant based organisation in the Northern Transvaal that rose to resist the government's implementation of land consolidation under the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act. In the case of the Venda, for main areas of consolidation were proposed — Jelele, Sibasa, Mpafuri and Ramputa — which would lead to considerable overcrowding, with taxpayers receiving 2 morgen of land and non tax payers 1½ morgen. Maliba led protests against the scheme and was arrested in 1941 under the Riotous Assemblies Act and by the time of the 1942 senatorial election even Chief Sibasa gave Maiba's backer Hymie Basner his support against Rheinnalt-Jones. The Guardian, October 30, November 6 and December 18 1941, July 30 1942; D. Molteno Papers B8. 58. Zoutpansberg Cultural Association, leaflet by J.M. Muthibe, Secretary, 7 November 1941; Baruch Hirson, "Rural Revolt in South Africa, 1937-41", London, ICS, CSP, Vol 8, 1978, pp.115-132.
58. Hirson op. cit.; ABX 480402b N.K. Peele to Xuma 2 April 1947.
59. Godfrey Pitje Collection, Institute of Race Relations Library, Johannesburg, A.P. Mda to Pitje 15 September 1948.
60. Minutes of a Special Meeting of the National Executive held at Community Hall, Batho Location, Bloemfontein, 1 and 2 February 1947. Msimang's motion, which resolved that the boycott weapon was "dependent for its success entirely on a powerful and nation-wide campaign, or as a weapon to be resorted to after all constitutional means have been exhausted in the struggle for the full attainment of political rights" was supported by both Champion and James Calata, the Secretary General of Congress.
61. The Bantu World May 17 1947.
62. The Bantu World June 14, July 5 and 12 1947.
63. Walshe op. cit., pp.357, 359. The National Bloc emerged in 1951 when J.B. Marks was elected President of the Transvaal African Congress. The executive of the Congress had equivocated on the boycott resolution as far back as 1947, Imvo June 21 1947.
64. The Bantu World July 5 and 12 1947 and January 24 and April 3 1948.
65. Johannesburg Dist. Committee of the Communist Party, Boycott of Advisory Board Elections, n.d.; The Guardian, February 20 1947; Inkululeko May 1946.
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67. The Guardian September 18 1947.

68. Rosalie Kingwill, "The African National Congress in the Western Cape", B.A. (Hons) Thesis, University of Cape Town, 1977, pp.61-64.
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Chapter Eleven

The failure of reform

The progressive isolation of the left-liberals in the post war period in South Africa was a reflection of growing political polarisation on both the internal and external political plane. Internally, as we have seen, the democratic liberalism of Basner became isolated as it was caught between a growing nationalism inside the African National Congress favourable to the boycotting of Natives Representation and the more conservative liberalism of the other Natives Representatives sheltering behind the Institute of Race Relations. Externally, it became caught up in the growing cold war political climate engendered by the iron curtain spreading down through Europe and struggles between East and West for political influence inside the United Nations. These latter influences began to play an increasing role in defining political ideologies in South African politics as the move towards national independence in both Asia and Africa began to shape increasingly the complexion of Union policy in international affairs.

In essence, the inter-war climate of "trusteeship" underpinned by the League of Nations and the operation of mandates in such areas as Tanganyika and South West Africa was now dead. National independence in countries like India in 1947 meant that it no longer became internationally acceptable for one country to be holding another country in "trust", and this applied as much to South Africa's holding of South West Africa as anywhere else. Even if the Western powers covertly sought continued South African control over a region that was beginning to emerge as a vital source of minerals,¹ it no longer became possible to justify this internationally in terms of the old mandate conception. The growing attacks on South Africa in this respect from both emergent states like India and from the South African A. N. C. left the country isolated politically and unable any longer to appeal to the old colonial allegiances of the pre-war years. "What has been evolving at Dumbarton Oaks, San Francisco

and here in London", wrote the Union High Commissioner in London, Heaton Nicholls, "has been a new world system, which is very imperfectly understood in South Africa":

We have surrendered our old sovereignty. No longer will we be able to determine our own external policies without let or hindrance from outside. ... South African politics are quite out of date in the modern world. The political parties will have to realise that they are part of a greater whole and they cannot do what they like in Trade, Economics or in Politics, and that they are linked up with the rest of Africa in a unity of common interests. It is an interesting thought to realise that it is only the British Commonwealth and the support of the Western colonial powers which prevents the development of a movement initiated by Russia and its satellites to regard South Africa as a kind of Franco Spain, and thus turn the whole force of the United Nations against us. 2

This realisation of South Africa's isolation in terms of her "native policy" thus initiated a reappraisal within her administrative class of the working of segregationist legislation. While not necessarily concerned to move away from the basic assumptions of this policy, the administrators in charge of the old policy of "trusteeship" increasingly recognised the need to reformulate this in more internationally respectable terms. At the same time, the widening of political opposition to the policy after 1946 by the A.N.C. in alliance with the Indian Congress and the Coloured Peoples Organisation and the growing radical influences from both the Congress Youth League and the Communists emphasised the urgency of the situation.

Discussions on reform:

Thus, soon after the adjournment of the Natives Representative Council in August 1946, there began to occur a debate within administrative and political circles on the methods that might be adopted to reconsolidate the original 1936 legislation on a new basis acceptable to the African political elite. The problem was, as the deputy Prime Minister Jan Hofmeyr pointed out to the Prime Minister Smuts, that "the hitherto moderate intellectuals of the Professor (Z.K.) Matthews type are now committed to an extreme line against colour discrimination, and have carried the chiefs with them. We

can't afford to allow them to be swept into the extremist camp, but I don't see what we can do to satisfy them, which would be tolerated by European public opinion".³ Hofmeyr put the dilemmas of political change in order to re-establish the structures of political co-optation over the African political elite with succinct brevity. For how far would it be possible to engineer political change without risking losing further support from the white electorate to D.F. Malan's Nationalists?

In this respect, the question turned on using as far as possible the avenues of consultation established under the 1936 legislation as a means to win back the confidence of the "moderate intellectuals" on the Natives Representative Council and to use the liberals elected as Natives Representatives. As had been evidenced during the excursions of the Native Trust after 1936, the white parliamentary representatives had often proved useful as channels to the African chiefs in the tribal reserves.⁴ Now the question turned on whether the Representatives could be employed in a similar fashion regarding the intelligentsia in both the Congress and the N.R.C. who had been swung behind the boycott motion.

This strategy by the government was in many ways determined by the mutual consultation of both government representatives and white liberals as both sought to exploit as far as possible a situation of relative flux in the immediate post-war period. For the government, the exact method of administrative reform remained unclear given the somewhat shaky state of the Native Affairs Department that had been denuded of personnel for the duration of the war. The guiding influence of the Secretary of Native Affairs, Douglas Smit, ended in 1945 as he was appointed to the Trusteeship Committee of the United Nations — a post in which he remained until 1946 when he returned to the more advisory role as member of the Native Affairs Commission. But during the time away in San Francisco and later London, he had a chance to see, like Heaton Nicholls as High Commissioner in London, the development of newer ideas in Native Administration in the British African colonies and to meet with Lord Hailey, a key exponent of developing African councils as administrative units at the local level.⁵

In addition, for the liberals, changes were occurring in the internal politics of the Institute of Race Relations by the end of the second world war as the long felt presence of Rheinnalt-Jones as director was clearly coming to an end. Having suffered considerable loss of faith with his election defeat in 1942, and intolerant of many of the younger members like Lynn Saffery with whom he had fallen out during the war years, there was growing pressure within the Institute for his removal. The executive committee, therefore, decided in 1945 to begin relieving Rheinnalt-Jones of much administrative work and to place it in the hands of the somewhat more ineffectual Quintin Whyte, whose ideas revolved less around the interventionist approach that had been carved out by Rheinnalt-Jones since the Institute's inception in 1929 than as a research body with leanings towards the field of "industrial relations" and "race relations".⁶ In the period of transition before Whyte took over full control in 1947 when Rheinnalt-Jones accepted an offer to work as an adviser to Anglo American in the opening up of its Orange Free State gold mines,⁷ the Institute was in somewhat of a state of flux and was very much open to the influences of the one liberal whom Rheinnalt-Jones and Loram had cast aside in the early 1930s, Edgar Brookes. As a new member of the Native Affairs Commission as well as Native Representative in the Senate for Natal, Brookes by late 1945 was in a position of some influence to act as a mediator between the Institute, as it was being reshaped under the guiding hand of Quintin Whyte, and government discussions on the reform of native administration. For Brookes this was a golden opportunity not to be missed towards remodelling government native policy to involve the African intelligentsia and political elite at the local level as well as carving out a new role for the liberals around the Institute in the field of local level administration and in industrial relations. In one sense, indeed, the opportunity that was presented took up some of his earlier suggestions made on the Pact Government between 1924 and 1926.

For the important point was that by the end of the second world war it was becoming clear that the old "welfare" approach of inter-war liberalism was no longer adequate and risked becoming increasingly irrelevant in the new political situation. Many of the Joint Councils were going into decline either through apathy or open

African hostility and it was by no means certain that any active policy would be able to revive them. Brookes was in favour of avoiding the personality cult that had surrounded Rheinnalt-Jones and spreading out Institute representation onto various bodies and committees as well as seeking, if possible, to reconcile the old differences with William Ballinger and the "Friends of Africa" so as to focus upon trade unions and industrial relations. At the same time, through avoiding direct research itself except certain small-scale work, the Institute could act as the co-ordinator for many other types of research at the local level:

The work for racial cooperation is vital. We should not have a unintelligent policy of keeping Joint Councils as such alive artificially. Where they have lapsed, local branches of the Institute may be better. I know our difficulties in that these bodies tend either to get apathetic or to be run by the Leftists. We can combat that by encouraging constructive work, especially on actual local situations, and also study. Visits from Headquarters, with their stimulation and guidance, are very necessary. We shall miss R.J. in this, but it may also be a good thing if this work is more spread out. Marquard could be used, so could Maurice Webb. Regional Organisers could be exchanged from time to time. I also want to suggest that one of the ways in which the Carnegie Corporation could help us would be the setting aside of funds for travelling lecturers. 8

Brookes's ideas for a more activist approach to race relations backed up by increasing local level research coincided with his hopes for a more coherent stake by the white liberals in the working of the government's native policy. The boycott resolution of the A.N.C. in 1946 indicated that in many respects the heartland of South African liberalism was for the first time under systematic attack. The consolidation of the Joint Councils and the Bantu Men's Social Centre in the 1920s had tended only to overlay the fundamental liberal structure at the local level centred on the Cape, the African franchise, the Transkeian and Ciskeian General Councils and Fort Hare. These had been able to continue, even after the 1936 legislation ending the Cape common roll, for as a substitute there had been the direct representation of African representatives in Parliament and the election of such liberals as Donald Molteno and Margaret Ballinger. But by the early 1940s, it was becoming

clear that many of the traditional assumptions behind Cape liberalism at the local level were finally beginning to be eroded as the Government's Betterment Areas Scheme took heavy tolls on the Eastern Cape African peasantry. The South African Native Farmers Congress complained that many of the BSC graduates in agriculture from Fort Cox and Fort Hare were becoming frustrated in their ambitions to put their training into practice through the government's failure to employ them as agricultural instructors,⁹ while in many parts of the Eastern Cape areas of African land holding that had been consolidated under the 1894 Glen Grey Act were being contracted in size. Despite attempts by Margaret Ballinger in the early 1940s to defend as far as possible the claims of individual land-holders, the channels of communication through Native Commissioners to central decision making became increasingly blocked and the seeming effectiveness of Native Representation in advancing the interests of African land claims progressively diminished. "The effect and apparent intention of the present land policy of the Department of Native Affairs", Margaret Ballinger wrote despairingly to the Under Secretary of Native Affairs Gordon Mears in 1943, "is that a Native peasantry shall not develop but that rather the African country man shall continue to be, and on an increasing scale, a town worker with a plot of land to subsidise his town earnings". Even this trend, though, became checked by the actual forfeiture of many African claims to rural holdings after migrating to town locations thus ensuring a complete proletarianisation of many former peasant land holders in the Eastern Cape.¹⁰ This nullified the hopes of many of the Eastern Cape African political leaders, like D.D.T. Jabavu, who had originally considered that the instruments of Natives Representation established in 1936 could be used to extract large land settlements from the South African Native Trust.¹¹ As a consequence by 1943 the position of Jabavu inside his own political body the All African Convention was becoming progressively weaker and he looked to his friend and mentor Margaret Ballinger for political assistance to defend himself from an increasingly vocal Trotskyite left wing.¹² A similar phenomenon occurred too with the Reverend James Calata in the Cape African Congress as attacks on the liberally-inclined Secretary General mounted in the years after 1936 from an assorted collection of Communist and Africanist orientated political groupings.

With Calata, however, the main source of political assistance came from Donald Molteno who, until the middle 1940s, provided his client with a considerable support in the form of attending African political meetings and acting as a covert lobbyist in Calata's favour against his more radical political critics.¹³

After the end of the war, however, and particularly following the passing of the boycott motion by the A.N.C. in September 1946, it became clear that this covert support by the Cape Representatives to the liberals inside both the A.N.C. and the All African Convention was ceasing to work. The structures of Native Representation had failed to rectify the overall workings of government segregation policy and it had not even been able to prevent the erosion of the remnants of the African franchise in the Cape which ensured the Representatives of their basic political support. By January of 1946 The Cape African Voters Association indicated that the effect of the government's limitation on African land-holding was the further narrowing of those eligible to the franchise: many applications for the vote under the old £50 property qualification, for instance, were refused because it was difficult for Africans to demonstrate that they were employed by a "known" employer, while in the case of the £75 property qualification it became difficult for many Africans to prove that property they held in the rural areas amounted to this figure unless they had a house built on it "in a European style".¹⁴

This weakening of the economic basis of the old Cape liberalism at the local level by the mid 1940s thus left the Cape liberal representatives in an increasingly marginal political position. Though a part of the caucus of Natives Representatives in Parliament, Margaret Ballinger had not necessarily agreed to all the political views of her more conservative colleagues like Rheinnalt-Jones and Brookes from the Transvaal and Natal. Considering Brookes a "timid conservative", she had in the initial years after 1936 sought to develop her own specific channels of consultation on specific issues and had tended to avoid working in too close a harmony with the other Representatives, as Brookes in particular had at first hoped.¹⁵ This strategy, however, left her politically weak after August 1946 when the boycott issue challenged the whole system of Natives Representation and in particular shattered the belief that the old

structures of paternalist Cape liberalism could continue to be used to sustain the influence of the Cape Representatives. In December of 1946 the Cape African Voters Association followed the A.N.C. in urging a boycott of Natives Representation and the position of some of the white Cape liberals' closest African supporters like R.H. Godlo, chairman of the Advisory Boards Congress, Professor Z.K. Matthews and D.D.T. Jabavu became politically threatened. Jabavu declared that, despite opposing the boycott motion in both the A.A.C. and the Cape African Voters Association, he was "overwhelmed by the youthful majority who were strong in their views and who forced me to refrain from exerting any influence on the discussion by reason of my being chairman".¹⁶ Similarly Godlo pointed out that "without the voice of the Council" the efforts of the Natives Representatives would lose in their effectiveness for they would lose a valuable means through which to disseminate their views to the African public.¹⁷

In comparison, therefore, to the northern liberals who were more closely associated with the Institute of Race Relations, there was little that such Representatives as Donald Molteno and Margaret Ballinger could actively do in the critical period from the beginning of 1947 to the election in 1948. Having so closely based her political strategy on a parliamentary view of Natives Representation in the best whig tradition, Margaret Ballinger was clearly taken very much unawares by events. "We have a strong feeling that the African population are not yet ready for a complete repudiation of the Council", she wrote to Godlo in September of 1946,¹⁸ and it was only in December, on returning from a trip to India, that she sought a meeting of the Natives Representatives in Cape Town to seek some form of co-ordinated strategy vis a vis the boycott issue.¹⁹

This parliamentary lobbying, however, was clearly a far less effective means of trying to influence government policy and though the Cape representatives acted as purveyors, in the course of 1947, for resolutions by the Cape African Congress,²⁰ the more effective method lay in direct contact with government decision makers on a personal basis and the formulation of clear-cut reformist proposals. And in this respect,

Edgar Brookes had the upper hand for he not only had the advantage of being a member of the Native Affairs Commission and close contact with his fellow member Douglas Smit, but also the role of being mediator between the Institute of Race Relations and government policy. Furthermore, for the period immediately after the boycott resolution in 1946, Brookes was not hampered by any strongly radical African political influence in Natal for the Youth League did not begin to expand into the Province until 1947 and Congress politics were still dominated by the amenable presence of Allison Champion, whom Brookes had secured as a supporter behind his senatorship in the late 1930s.²¹ Thus, after securing the support of the four Natal members on the Natives Representative Council — including Champion — behind his policy of opposition to outright boycott in October of 1946,²² Brookes began a campaign of direct influence on Hofmeyr and central government decision making. In comparison to the Cape representatives, Brookes was far more concerned to create new and more direct platforms by which to coopt the disaffected "moderate" elements within African political leadership. Enclosing an article published in The Manchester Guardian in December 1946, Brookes suggested to Hofmeyr that a Commission of Enquiry on the N.R.C. be set up so as to "hold the question in solution", while the N.R.C. at its next meeting could be asked to nominate a sub-committee to confer with this Commission.²³ While Hofmeyr doubted the wisdom of a full scale Commission which he felt would lead "to a crystallization of the issues and a deepening of the cleavage", undoubtedly Brookes's ideas for an administrative reform from the top downwards had some impact in the coming months and indicated the changing nature of the political pressures from the white liberals.²⁴

In essence, Brookes's differing approach to the "solution" of the boycott issue to that of the Cape liberals related not only to differences of temperament but also cultural and historical background. As a Natalian, Brookes was heir to a more systematised pattern of native administration dating back to Shepstone and he had a far greater faith in the virtues of "administration" than the Cape liberals ever did. At the same time, in comparison to the more pragmatic approach of the Cape representatives, Brookes's ideas were shaped in part by the previous discussion in the Institute of Race

Relations and by Hoernle in the early 1940s on blueprints for the reform of "race relations". The problem was, for Brookes, to open up the avenues of native administration and prevent it from hardening into a closed and impermeable system. In a memorandum to the other members of the N.A.C. in September 1946, for instance, he warned of the dangers of allowing the boycott movement to extend itself:

If ... the Government stands on its dignity and gives the more moderate members of the Council no way of saving their faces, they will be bound to repeat their resolutions and adjourn again indefinitely. If we consider what that means, it means a declaration of civil war — a bloodless war but war nevertheless — between Government and accredited leaders of the Native people chosen by a system of election which the Government itself has devised. It means that men who have hitherto stood out as moderates will, by the logic of events, be forced to take their place with the extremists. If we pause to think what a nationally organised non co-operation movement among the natives would mean, especially if among those leading it were such men as Matthews, the Transkeian chiefs and Luthuli, who have won the confidence of large numbers of Europeans and who are regarded as moderates and responsible men, I do not see any end to such a struggle. 25

This meant, therefore, exerting pressure through such lobbies as the Native Affairs Commission and the Natives Representatives' caucus in Parliament for political reform that would widen the political influence of the N.R.C. as well as go some way toward meeting the hopes of African union leaders for the legalisation of African trade unions. In the debate that ensued on this, Brookes was partly supported by many of the Native Affairs Department administrators who, though not necessarily so beholden to liberal influences directly through such bodies as the Institute of Race Relations, were nevertheless aware that that bureaucratic conception of Natives Representation devised in 1936 was no longer operable. Douglas Smit had long privately felt that the N.R.C. was an ill-devised body that failed to meet the demands of the African intelligentsia,²⁶ while the new Secretary of Native Affairs, G. Mears, who had the responsibility of chairing the Council's meetings, confessed to difficulties in coping with its political nature. The Council, he complained to the Native Affairs Commission,

was "a political body and does not fit into the administrative machine at all":

When it was born the analogy was taken of the Transkeian Council, that it had worked well and this would too, but actually it is a different body altogether. The Transkeian Council is an administrative machine but this is a political body which does not fit into the administration at all instead of being an advisory body as an adjunct to the departmental machine. For that reason I find it difficult to handle the situation and the whole thing is an embarrassment to me. 27

Thus, in the course of 1947, following an initial instruction from Smuts the Prime Minister, the administrative apparatus of Native Affairs began to discuss strategies for reform based upon the idea of politicising in some way the existing body of the N.R.C. and widening its area of representation so that it could represent more fully the emergent interests of an African petty bourgeoisie in the urban areas. At the same time, though, the basic constraint on any such reformist programme was that it was still to work within the basic structures of Stallardist urban segregation and merely to widen the linkages by which the urban intelligentsia maintained contact with its counterparts in the reserves. While much of the actual drafting of the proposals for the N.A.D. was done by the Secretary of Native Affairs Mears, it seems that the strongest influences came from his former boss Douglas Smit and the N.A.C. who sought the recategorisation of Africans into "Reserve Natives", "Urban Natives" and "Farm Natives", with the latter having in particular an increased stake in the composition of the N.R.C. via a Union Advisory Boards Congress.²⁸ However, in contrast to the somewhat more radical proposals of Mears for the establishment of an almost completely separate system of devolved local African-dominated administration, Smit urged for only a partial reform that still ensured the continuation of white administrative officials from the N.A.D. "You cannot eliminate the local officials from responsibility", he wrote to Mears in April of 1947 when opposing the S.N.A.'s ideas on local tribal councils conducting their own courts. For "at present they do the bulk of the work and their withdrawal would deprive the Native Councils of the necessary driving power and the close association with our administration that is necessary to ensure success".²⁹ Smit's desire to shield the existing area of

responsibility held by the Native Affairs officials indicated the limitations on the debate on reform, conducted as it was within the confines of an administrative hierarchy anxious to preserve its own sphere of influence. Smit certainly recognised the need to bring in as far as possible the African intelligentsia into public administration and the proposals that were drawn up by the N.A.D. entitled A Progressive Programme for Native Administration went some way towards achieving this by establishing a reconstituted 50 member Natives Representative Council that had powers to impose personal taxes on Africans, to consider the expenditure of the General Councils and to allocate funds to them as well as having an executive committee to confer with the Secretary of Native Affairs. Furthermore, a separate "Native Treasury" was envisaged that would be responsible for revenue obtained by the N.R.C. and the system of local government that was envisaged to cover the whole of the Union and which would be centred around a series of General and Local Councils modelled on the Eastern Cape and Transkeian precedents.³⁰ While being segregationist, the scheme was the most comprehensive plan for a delegation of powers to both a rural and urban African political elite yet evolved and recalled in some ways the promises made by General Hertzog to Sol Plaatje and African political representatives when he was Minister of Native Affairs in 1912. "It should be our policy to associate the Natives with us in their own affairs", Smith, the essential architect of the policy, wrote in some notes for Mears:

Unless we do this they will resent our presence more and more as the time goes on, as has been the case in India. The growing spirit of nationalism among them will be less bitter if we find more scope for members of the intelligentsia in the Public Service rather than in agitation . . . Lord Hailey has rightly drawn attention to the fact that throughout Africa there is a growing middle class among the Natives who are antagonistic to our Government and these people are gradually creating a position that may well prove insoluble in the future unless some effort is made to give them an outlet for their aspirations. 31

The essentially bureaucratic context in which this policy for reform was conducted, however, indicated that the influences from the white liberals led by

Brookes and the Institute of Race Relations were ultimately blunted. The Native Affairs Commission by May of 1947 was relegated to a more peripheral role where it could do little more than urge a greater political tact by the government leaders when it next met the African political leadership,³² while Brookes's pleas at one of its meetings for a complete overhaul of the Industrial Conciliation Act so as to ensure a more wide ranging measure than the proposed Natal Industrial Bill fell on stony ground.³³ Instead, it became clear after the 8th May, when Smuts in a meeting with a contingent from the N.R.C. promised to try to make the Council into a "real working institution, helpful to the good government of this country",³⁴ that the reformist programme was becoming increasingly bound up with the rest of the reconsideration of the Union's native policy that was currently being considered by the Native Laws Commission under the chairmanship of H.A. Fagan. Though the N.A.D. proposals did not directly conflict with the ideas of the Fagan Commission, — the more detailed intricacies of the reform policy such as the establishment of a Union Advisory Boards Congress depended upon the final resolution of the Commission's deliberations. In August of 1947 Fagan therefore urged that definition of the new scope and powers of the Boards be shelved until after the Commission's report and, in effect, until after the next general election.³⁵ It was essentially for this reason that when the N.A.D. programme came up for renewed discussion on 1 September 1947 that Smuts decided that the final evolution of the policy should be delayed until after the election, which he confidently expected to win.³⁶ Administrative slowness thus delayed an early response to the N.R.C.'s boycott decision of September 1946 and in the event the United Party suffered the election defeat by the Nationalists in May 1948 without any coherently evolved native policy.

The African response:

The dilatoriness and uncertainty pervading the government's native policy in the months after September 1946 if anything helped to exacerbate the resolve amongst African political leadership in the A.N.C. to step up the boycott campaign. Xuma

found the initial blueprint of the N.A.D. reform policy in May 1947 "vague and disappointing" since the failure to remove the essentials of colour bar legislation left even a revamped N.R.C. assisting the Africans "to administer their own domination, discrimination and oppression under the cloak of giving Africans responsibility and participation in the administration of their own affairs".³⁷ Meeting in the Johannesburg Trades Hall in June, 600 delegates of the Transvaal African Congress went on to condemn the proposals, especially the Industrial Disputes Bill which C.S. Ramohanoë argued would increase state surveillance over African unions by the N.A.D. which he described as an "Intelligence Service Department surpassing even Marshall Square".³⁸ Furthermore, even the most liberally-inclined African leaders like Jordan Ngubane who had written a pamphlet in 1946 arguing for an increase in the powers of the N.R.C.,³⁹ could not find much to support in the Smuts proposals since the executive powers that would be given the Council would still be subject to a government veto and would thus nullify any attempts to escalate some of the existing land provisions under the Government's trusteeship policy:

As things now stand, the Native Affairs Department needs millions of pounds to rehabilitate African reserves alone. Parliament is not willing to vote the required amounts. The Africans see no reason why Parliament would suddenly change its attitude merely because the demand for the money came from an elected, wholly African body. 40

These arguments reflected in essence many of the pressures being exerted by Africans at the grass-roots against collaborating with the government's attempts to reform the machinery of administering native affairs. In the Eastern Cape and Transkei, for example, widespread opposition began to be expressed against the seeming ineffectiveness of both local African representative bodies such as the Ciskeian General Council and the Transkeian Bunga as well as the representation in Parliament to reverse the working of the Government's Rehabilitation Policy. The promulgation of the scheme for the Ciskei in the form of Douglas Smit's New Era of Reclamation in 1945 had occurred at the same time as a devastating drought which had led to considerable famine amongst the African peasantry,⁴¹ and the complaint was expressed by villagers that the South

African Native Trust had effectively taken over most of the administrative functions formerly conducted at the local level via the Glen Grey Councils. This bureaucratisation particularly removed many of the powers by local headmen who had often been in many cases, as we saw in chapter one, one of the basic pillars behind the reconstituted Cape liberalism in the early years of the century. Now, however, in areas like the Healdtown Reserve, groups of local headmen began to protest in the course of 1947 at the erosion of their powers which, as one petition claimed, was drawing local African dignitaries "into the policy of administration implied in the Native Administration Act of 1927 which gives discretionary powers to officials to act without consulting the people".⁴²

These protests against the workings of the rehabilitation policy also became linked to the boycott campaign and this became instanced in the Transkei with the formation of an "Anti Rehabilitation Government Scheme Committee" which argued in a manifesto of October 1947 that "the present boycott in the Transkei is strengthened by the dissatisfaction caused by the Government in the Transkeian Territories. We fully endorse that if the scheme could be stopped at present pending future consideration, the present state of mental perturbation among Africans resulting in the anti white spirit can be improved and bettered in the Native Reserves".⁴³ The manifesto warned, however, that much of this depended upon how far the Natives Representatives were prepared to fight the scheme in Parliament and it was becoming clear just how ineffective this was now becoming. William Ballinger, in a letter in reply to the manifesto writers, personified the state of the more radical white liberals by simply repeating many of the ideas on African peasant cooperatives in the reserves linked to an urban African working class in the towns that had been debated in the 1930s, with the additional hope that if the African peasant farmers could "get busy" and pass on their ideas to the Natives Representatives a "plan of campaign could be worked out" providing the conclusions were "theoretically sound" for "representatives cannot of themselves compel the authorities to put them into operation".⁴⁴

Ballinger's hopes, however, depended upon the boycott campaign being in

effect stifled and African consciousness at the grass roots being brought behind a more moderate leadership that was still prepared to work through the system of native representation.⁴⁵ Such a hope, however, seemed increasingly implausible in the course of 1947 as particularly in the Transkei support began to be mobilised behind boycotting the by-election for the Native Representative to replace Advocate Hemming who died that year. The executive committee of the Transkeian African Voters Association declared the whole system of Natives Representation "a farce and a mockery" since it meant that Africans were "expected to elect a European to perpetuate the illusion that we are represented . . . Let the people know that we are voiceless",⁴⁶ while a campaign began to be organised by Govan Mbeki and the Transkeian Organised Bodies that gathered considerable momentum despite the shortage of funds.⁴⁷ With the only known candidate standing being the rather old fashioned Cape liberal Douglas Buchanan who was still keen to trust to parliamentary tactics as far as possible,⁴⁸ the campaign was a considerable success. Despite the fact that Buchanan was able to claim that only a small number of African voters — allegedly some 94 out of 200 gathered at a meeting in Umtata in May — actually supported the boycott campaign,⁴⁹ the appeal of the boycotters to the large numbers of franchiseless African peasants and labour migrants undoubtedly acted as a considerable fillip to the general African feeling that Natives Representation in toto lacked a basic political legitimacy. Alfred Xuma urged Mbeki to encourage African voters to press their own candidate or candidates forward in the election to succeed Hemming since there was "calamity awaiting the Transkei about its representation"⁵⁰ and Anton Lembede of the Congress Youth League urged Buchanan to stand down.⁵¹ Indeed, the movement of Congress organisation out into the reserves indicated the strength of the boycott appeal and Buchanan's eventual election in the Transkei in 1947 did nothing to nullify the growing African opposition to being represented in an all white parliament by whites. By the time that General Smuts's proposals for reform of the Natives Representatives Council were finally revealed in September of 1947, it was clear that even some of the foremost Congress moderates like Selby Msimang were forced to concede that they would do little to ease the political deadlock.⁵² Pressure from the grass rootes had in areas

such as the Transkei ensured that by the start of 1948 Natives Representation had become a political symbol of the structures that were seen to be preventing the development of mass African political consciousness and only those white radicals like the Communist Sam Kahn who stood outside the white liberal caucus of Native parliamentary representatives gained the support of the leading local African political organisations. Justifying the support of Kahn in the Western Cape election of 1948 after Donald Molteno's decision to resign from Parliament, C.A.W. Sigila of the Cape African Voters Association indicated the degree to which the old paternal alliance with Cape liberalism had been eroded. "We Africans since 1936", he wrote to Margaret Ballinger, "learnt to have no particular attachment to any political party, except to individuals who promise to consistently and persistently present our case with courage and honesty"⁵³ and it appeared that now, even in the former heartland of the South African liberal tradition, white liberals could no longer expect automatic support by organised African political opinion.

The beginnings of a party base:

In these political circumstances in 1947 and 1948 following the general inadequacy of the Smuts reform proposals, liberals began to look towards a more formal political organisation. The election defeat of the U.P. turned many liberal hopes towards a political party led by Hofmeyr; and this became more and more the obvious direction in which to go as the Nationalists policy of ethnicisation through the apartheid conception both cut the white liberals off from their African political base as well as removing them from the institutions that could effect government policy at the centre. The attempts, for instance, by Brookes and his fellow Institute liberals to influence government decisions became dashed as the death of Hofmeyr at the end of 1948 removed the one figure to whom liberals could look to be included in a liberally-inclined cabinet.⁵⁴ Furthermore, the general direction of the Nationalist apartheid policy began to become clear in the course of 1949 as both Brookes and Smit were put under pressure to resign by the Nationalist Minister of Native Affairs, E.G. Jansen, from the Native Affairs Commission.⁵⁵ Now, the thrust of policy was to continue some

aspects of the previous United Party government's reform programme by extending local and general native councils on a regional basis; but hopes of continuing the idea of extending urban African representation onto a revamped Natives Representative Council vanished as the Nationalists sought separate political outlets via the tribally dominated reserves.⁵⁶ For the new Secretary of Native Affairs, W.W.M. Eiselen, appointed over the head of Mears in September 1949, and his colleague M.D.C. de Wet Nel, chairman of the Native Affairs Commission, this became an extension of the neo-Fichtean conception of Afrikaner nationalism as it became clear in the course of 1949 and 1950 that the Nationalist Government could expect little or no support from the urban African intelligentsia beyond a small number of opportunists like S.N. Bennett Ncwana and the former Treasurer of the A.N.C., the Alexandria business man Richard Baloyi.⁵⁷ By 1950, the entire thrust of government policy had swung round towards by-passing the urban African petty bourgeoisie and the existing institutions of Natives Representation via the N.R.C. and the white parliamentary representatives and establishing instead new structures of control via Bantu Authorities in the reserves under the control of a regenerated tribal political elite.⁵⁸ With the appointment of the apartheid ideologist Dr. Verwoerd in 1950 as Jansen's successor as Minister of Native Affairs this policy received strong political support in the central echelons of the Nationalist controlled state apparatus.

For the liberals, these new political trends necessitated a search for a new political strategy in order to cope with their weakened political base. Even before the U.P. election defeat in 1948 the government discussion on political reform had been seen in some quarters of the Institute of Race Relations as an opportunity to put into practice some of the previous ideological revision of liberalism propounded by Hoernle in the early 1940s. On the basis of a memorandum written by Brookes in January 1948 entitled "Segregation and its Alternatives", the executive committee of the Institute had kept closely in mind the three political possibilities offered by Hoernle of total segregation, parallelism and assimilation.⁵⁹ The proposals of the Smuts government for a widening of the powers of the N.R.C. together with an extension of local government for Africans received the committee's tentative support

for, as it argued "there is a certain incompatibility in the demands of the Natives Representative Council for increased powers for itself and for extension of the present system of African parliamentary representation".⁶⁰ The Institute executive tended to place most faith in the proposals to extend representation to the urban African petty bourgeoisie via a Union Native Advisory Boards Congress for it was in this direction that it saw its own influence in terms of an industrial relations and race relations research mediator. Echoing the previous trend towards a plural conception of democratic theory, the committee concluded that "the application of democracy to a multi-racial society with peoples of different levels of development may involve forms not hitherto found necessary".⁶¹

But what was to be the avenue by which these political ideas could now be put across given the changed complexion of the South African state and the black political opposition to it? By the middle of 1949 Margaret Ballinger began to move round towards the idea of establishing a liberal political party, which was now being actively championed by diverse groups of liberals, including Leo and Hilda Kuper and Kenneth Kirkwood in Durban.⁶² "I am quite convinced", she wrote to C.A.W. Sigila of the Cape African Voters Association, "that it is a fruitless (?) waste of energy for those of us who have applied ourselves to the task of Native representation to continue longer as isolated units. It simply means that for much of the time we are beating the air."⁶³ Similarly, Donald Molteno wrote that with the death of Hofmeyr there was an even greater need for the organisation of liberal leaders since "the need for inspiring leadership is perhaps greater in the case of liberalism than in that of any other political creed".⁶⁴ The actual decision to organise such a party, though, was deferred until after the 1953 election, which many liberals hoped that the U.P. could still win from the Nationalists, despite the creation of six extra Nationalist seats through the incorporation of South West Africa into the Union.⁶⁵

This idea of direct entry into party politics was not necessarily shared by all sections of the liberal establishment in South Africa for in the Institute of Race Relations, particularly, there was still the view that liberals should keep to a bland and empirical

programme.⁶⁶ But the African National Congress came under growing influence from the Communist-Youth League alliance in 1949 as Xuma and Calata were removed from the presidency and secretaryship respectively and replaced by J.M. Moroka and Walter Sisulu, so clearly new avenues had to be found to appeal to the radicalised African political elite. Though some influence remained through Natives Representation as Brookes held on to the senatorship for Natal in 1948 and William Ballinger easily won the Transvaal and Orange Free State the same year,⁶⁷ it was likely in some areas that continued liberal participation in the elections risked alignment with only the tiny faction of the African rural elite who continued to oppose the boycott. In the Transkei, for example, the main support for the nomination of Alexander Kerr as parliamentary representative on his retirement as Principal of Fort Hare came from the Bikitsha faction of Mfengu headmen who were linked in a political alliance with Kaiser Matanzima, chief of the emigrant Tembus. Though this group gained control of the old Transkeian African Voters Association in opposition to the pro-boycott Transkeian Organised Bodies, the partial nature of the support led even such a conservative chief as Victor Poto of the Pondo to advise Kerr to stand down.⁶⁸ In such circumstances, the avenues of political influence to African political leaders via such channels as Natives Representation became increasingly unreliable and needed to be supplemented by a new political organisation based on a party apparatus.⁶⁹

The formation of the Liberal Party after the defeat of the U.P. in the 1953 election should, therefore, be seen within a somewhat wider context than the pluralist party politics model suggested by Janet Robertson in her Liberalism in South Africa, 1948-63.⁷⁰ While clearly the timing of the white liberals' decision to form the party was dictated by the fortunes of the U.P. in opposition to Malan's Nationalists, it is important to understand the structural context in which the party was formed. This was unlike western liberal democratic systems since, by 1950 at the latest, it was already beginning to be recognised that white liberals could not hope to reverse the general political direction that the South African political system was taking. As Edgar Brookes lamented in the Hoernle memorial lecture of the Institute of Race Relations that year,

a new "golden image" of nationalism had come to dominate South African politics "and those of us who will not bow down to this golden image are threatened in our positions and our fields of service. We may never, if the worshippers of the image have their way, never, never, never hold public office in South Africa, never speak for our beloved country in the outside world, never be reckoned as one of the real family in our own country. As far as may be our freedom must be curtailed, our voices stilled, our pens struck from our hands".⁷¹ In such circumstances, the move towards creating a Liberal Party took on more the mantle of defensive political despair, indicating less a continuation of the values of a Cape liberal tradition, as Robertson has argued,⁷² than a simple desire to assert basic political values which no longer influenced political decision making at the centre of power.

For in essence, the early 1950s found the mainstream white liberals trapped in a political limbo. They had fought off the earlier attempts in the 1940s to swing liberalism in South Africa leftwards under the aegis of political bodies like the African Democratic Party; similarly the radicalisation of the A.N.C. and the boycott campaign had nullified their former control of the apparatus of Natives Representation. But with the capture of the state by the Nationalists, and the increasing prevarication of the U.P. in opposition as the more conservative elements in the party surfaced to neutralise the efforts of many of the urban-based liberals to reform the party from within, there was little else that could be done but to go into the political wilderness. And this, indeed, was substantially the legacy of the Liberal Party as it sought to extend its miniscule political influence in the years after 1953. Deeply suspicious of efforts by individuals such as Patrick Duncan to seek to swing its policy behind a campaign of passive resistance,⁷³ it remained wedded to constitutional means of effecting political change to the very end of its life in 1968. Though still anxious to seek some form of role as a "bridge builder" between white and black communities in South Africa, its essential function in South Africa could hardly be described as one of "an agent of social control" for it was too politically marginal to exert any such influence.⁷⁴ Basically, the party was the logical culmination of the earlier erosion of the white liberals' power

base within both African politics and the central echelons of the state and it was driven to assert a coherent political solidarity in the context of growing polarisation of political ideologies in the Cold War and the rise of MacCarthyism. By keeping too vague an alliance with the U.P. the more committed white liberals risked compromising themselves completely with the evolution of the Nationalists' apartheid policy. Equally, by aligning themselves with the "left" in South African politics, they risked increasingly being aligned with members of the Communist Party and their allies who had gone underground after the party's suppression in 1950. Some form of distinct political body therefore was essential to advance the interests of the liberal establishment, even if it by no means received unanimous political support in elections as many white liberals, until the formation of the Progressive Party in 1959, continued to vote for the U.P. The Liberal Party at least had the virtue of acting as one form of political shield for the increasingly defensive political establishment in the 1950s and early 1960s; and it had the advantage, too, of articulating the values of conservative western liberalism that were formulated under American global hegemony in the West after the demise of Britain as a world power.⁷⁵ This it continued to do until the erosion of the rule of law under an increasingly authoritarian garrison state in the post-Sharpeville 1960s made even this limited function politically impossible. But by then, to adopt a phrase of Matthew Arnold, it was clear that the earlier values of a more optimistic age of South African liberalism had grown "cold and sad beneath that breathless, voiceless night".

References

1. For the growth in this Western interest in the post-war years see Ruth First, South West Africa, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1963, which, though dated, is still one of the best general accounts.
2. D.L. Smit Papers, 4/46 G. Heaton Nicholls to D.L. Smit, 18 February 1946.
3. Jean Van der Poel (ed), Selections from the Smuts Papers, Cambridge 1973, Hofmeyr to Smuts 8 September 1946.
4. See chapter nine, p.350.
5. D.L. Smit Papers, 165/45 D.L. Smit to Mears 9 August 1945 encl. Notes of Discussion with Colonial Office Officials, 31 July and 1 August 1945; 169/45 Notes of Interview with Dr. Margaret Read, head of the Colonial Dept. of the Institute of London University, 8 August 1945; 175/45 D.L. Smit to Piet Van der Byl, noting British expenditure of £120,000,000 over next ten years under Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940. "What we want", Smit argued, "is an overall plan so that we may look ahead without fear of interruption half way"; Note Book No. 3, dined with Lord Hailey 24 September 1945.
6. Ar SAIRR BIV Q. Whyte to Bernard Pim 4 July 1945.
7. Rheinnalt-Jones only took up this job after being advised by both Smuts and Hofmeyr to do so. Shepherd Papers, MS 14/713 (w) J.D.R-J to Shepherd March 8 1947.
8. Ar SAIRR BIV E. Brookes to Q. Whyte 17 April 1947.
9. M. Ball. Pap. A410/B2 D.D.T. Jabavu to M. Ballinger 4 March 1942 encl. Memo of S.A. Native Farmers Congress.
10. ibid. M. Ball to G. Mears 13 December 1943; to D.L. Smith 11 December 1943; Notes entitled "Complaints from the Glen Grey District Re Allocation of Lands", November 1943; to B.B. Mdlele 16 December 1943.
11. Select Report of the Natives Representative Council, UG10-'38, motion by D.D.T. Jabavu, November 1938.
12. M. Ball. Pap. D70/80 5(n) D.D.T. Jabavu to M. Ball. and D. Molteno 26 November 1943, asking M. Ballinger to appear at the triennial conference

of the A.A.C. at Bloemfontein on the 16th December; M. Ball. to D.D.T. Jabavu 4 December stating that she did not feel well enough qualified to advise Jabavu on his position: "I am always a little bit nervous of interfering in purely African matters, unless I have some grasp of all the issues involved." As an M.P. Margaret Ballinger appears to have been consistently "hazy" of the nature of African political cleavages.

13. Donald Molteno Papers; Calata to Cape Parliamentary Representatives 2 July 1941; Calata to Molteno 4 October and 16 December 1941, 7 January 1942, 19 June 1946, 14 June 1947.
14. M. Ball. Pap. A410/C2 C.A.W. Sigila to M. Ballinger 26 June 1943.
15. ibid., E. Brookes to D. Buchanan February 10 1943.
16. ibid., D.D.T. Jabavu to M. Ballinger 23 September 1947.
17. ibid., R.H. Godlo to M. Ballinger 16 April 1947.
18. ibid., M. Ballinger to R.H. Godlo 3 September 1946; Memorandum on the Adjournment of the Natives Representative Council August 11 1946 advocating a do nothing policy by the Natives Representatives in the wake of the N.R.C. resolution condemning the government's native policy.
19. ibid., M. Ballinger to C.H. Malcommess December 31 1946.
20. ibid., D. Molteno to Calata 29 April 1947 describing interview with the P.M.
21. Champion Papers A922 Caroline Frost to A. Champion April 20 1936 indicating the first overtures from Brookes even before his election; Champion to Brookes 10 August 1937 indicating message passed from Brookes to Champion via the Durban Bantu Men's Social Centre for a meeting; BC 581 A1 128 E. Brookes to Champion 16 August 1937 promising to keep in touch with Champion on the wage question; Champion to The Editor The Natal Mercury 11 March 1940 indicating his support for Brookes; Champion to Brookes 5 September 1941; Brookes to Champion October 2 and 15 1941; Champion to Brookes 18 November 1941, thanking Brookes for making it possible to attend a conference of Chiefs and leaders at Pietermaritzburg, and 11 June 1942.
22. Jan Hofmeyr Papers Brookes to Hofmeyr 22 October 1946 describing meeting with the Natal members of the N.R.C.
23. ibid., Brookes to Hofmeyr 3 December 1946 encl. article "Racial Tension in South Africa".

24. ibid., Hofmeyr to Brookes 5 December 1946.
25. D.L. Smit Pap. 29/46 E. Brookes to D.L. Smit 2 September 1946 encl. Memo dated 2 September 1946.
26. ibid., GM 69/35/D 13.1/43 D.L. Smit to wife 13 May 1943 lamenting that the N.R.C. was so dominated by "the urban element"; 16 May 1943; Note Book No. 4 entry dated 7 September 1946 noting that Hofmeyr felt that the events in the N.R.C. had occurred as he had foreseen at its inception in 1936.
27. Notes of Discussion by Native Affairs Commission 27 September 1946, p.6 contained in ibid. 31/46.
28. ibid. 5/47 SNA to the Prime Minister 15 February 1947 encl. draft memo A Progressive Programme for Native Administration; D.L. Smit to Mears 8 March 1947; Memo on Native Councils.
29. 13/47 D.L. Smit Further Notes Re Native Representation 2 April 1947.
30. 55/47 A Progressive Programme for Native Administration, revised after correspondence between Mears and H.A. Fagan, 20-22 August 1947.
31. 10/37 Smit to Mears 24 March 1947 encl. Notes on Further Development of Native Councils.
32. 22.1/47 Native Affairs Commission to S.N.A. 2 April 1947.
33. 21/47 Notes of Discussion of N.A.C. re Native Industry Bill, 3 May 1947.
34. 23/47 Notes of Interview between the Prime Minister and members of the N.R.C. 8 May 1947, p.4; Smit indicated the political constraints on the whole reform programme when he privately minuted on 25th March that he did not think that the General and Local Councils would accept the scheme "and the intelligentsia will object that they want much more than is visualised. But within the orbit of the present political outlook I cannot suggest a suitable alternative" 11.1/47 Notes Re Representation.
35. 45/47 H.A. Fagan to Mears 23 August 1947; Mears to Fagan 20 August re to conversation re same.
36. 57/47 Notes of Discussion with the Prime Minister, Union Buildings, Pretoria, 1 September 1947; see also my article, "Liberalism and Ethnicity in South African Politics, 1921-1948", African Studies, 35, 3-4, 1976, p.250.
37. The Bantu World May 17 1947; The Democrat July 1947.

38. The Bantu World June 14 1947; The Guardian May 15 and 29 1947.
39. Jordan Ngubane, Should the N.R.C. be Abolished?, Cape Town, 1946. The N.R.C. was envisaged as becoming merely an administrative institution, responsible for the administration of Reserves and Locations and the appointment of Native Commissioners, while Ngubane sought a drastic overhauling of the 1936 legislation to ensure the extension of the Cape franchise to the other provinces and the increase in the number of Senators representing Africans. "So far", he concluded, "the Council has been a fairly good school of political training; now it must be turned into a training centre for Africans in the art of administration" (pp.27-28). An idea exactly opposite, in many respects, to the scheme of Mears and Smit who sought to politicise the N.R.C. as an outlet for the urban African petty bourgeoisie and to confine administrative matters in detail to local and general councils under the guiding influence of the N.A.D.
40. The Forum June 21 1947.
41. A New Era of Reclamation, Statement of Policy made by Mr. D.L. Smit, Secretary for Native Affairs at a Special Session of the Ciskeian General Council at Kingwilliamstown, the 8th January 1945, Pretoria. The Ciskeian famine the same year was to some extent a propaganda coup for The Guardian newspaper which organised a relief fund which was assisted by Dr. Bokwe. Donald Molteno Pap. BC 579 C4 148 M. Ballinger to Donald Monteno October 25th 1945.
42. M. Ball. Pap. Memorandum drawn up by C.A.W. Sigilia from Healdtown Farmers, 24 May 1947; Imvo June 18 1947.
43. ibid. The Anti Rehabilitation Government Scheme Committee for the Transkeian Territories Manifesto", East London, 14 October 1947.
44. ibid. W.G. Ballinger to Messrs. Hamilton G. Kraai, M.P. Ngloshe and W. Jingo, 22 November 1947.
45. W.G. Ballinger Papers W.G.B. to Malcommess 2 December 1947.
46. The Guardian July 3 1947.
47. A.B. Xuma Pap. Govan Mbeki to Xuma 27 June 1947; Mbeki started the anti boycott campaign initially through the Transkeian African Voters Association in the period following the adjournment of the N.R.C. in 1946 before establishing the rival T.O.B. ABX 400411 G. Mbeki to Xuma 11 September 1946. There were charges though that the A.N.C. leadership did nothing to help the campaign in the Transkei during 1947, Inkululeko December 1947. See also Brian Bunting, Moses Kotane, London, 1975, p.145.

48. M. Ball. Pap. D. Buchanan 1 September and 13 November 1947.
49. D. Molteno Pap. BC 579 C6 96 D. Buchanan, leaflet New Transkei By Election, 15 July 1947.
50. ABX 570604 A.B. Xuma to G. Mbeki 4 June 1947.
51. Brian Bunting, op. cit., p.146.
52. ABX 470917c Selby Msimang to A.B. Xuma 17 September 1947.
53. M. Ball. Pap. C.A.W. Sigila to M. Ball. 31 January 1949.
54. Edgar Brookes, A South African Pilgrimage, Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1977, pp.89-99. "Gone with him were most of our facile political hopes. Parliament was now an altogether different place. We could no longer go to Ministers' offices and hope for a friendly reception", p.98.
55. D.L. Smit Pap. 18-25/49 corr. re removal of Brookes and Smit from N.A.C. A South African Pilgrimage, p.95.
56. E.G. Jansen, Native Policy of the Union of South Africa, Pretoria, 1950, pp.7-9.
57. No Sizwe writes that only "half hearted and tentative overtures" were made to the Africanists in the A.N.C. "to probe the stability of the links between African nationalism and communism", and the Nationalists soon abandoned the idea of co-opting petty bourgeois African leadership, One Azania, One Nation, London, Zed Publications, 1979, pp.64-65.
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59. S.A.I.R.R. Memo R.R. 3/48 CT. 8.1.48 Memo entitled "Segregation and its Alternatives".
60. S.A.I.R.R. R.R. 2/48 CT. 8.1.49 Marked "Private and Confidential" Considerations of Proposals Regarding Natives' Representative Council, p.2.
61. ibid., p.4.
62. W.G. Ball. Pap. BC 347 G2 11 19 Kenneth Kirkwood to M. Ballinger 21 August 1948.

63. M. Ball. Pap. A410/BL M. Ballinger to C.A.W. Sigila 21 June 1949.
64. Donald Molteno, "The Situation after Hofmeyr", Trek, January 1949, p.1.
65. M. Ball. Pap. A. Paton to M. Ballinger 22 September 1952 stating that he felt a Liberal Party would be established after the 1953 election.
66. This was especially the view in the Institute of Race Relations under Quintin Whyte's influence. See Q. Whyte, Apartheid and Other Policies, S.A.I.R.R. 1950. Whyte made a visit to the United States in 1950 and came under the influence of various techniques of race relations involving inter-group contact via holiday camps, social welfare via the National Urban League. Drawing on the American parallel, he concluded that given the limited funds of the Institute and its difficulties in specialization, the main approach should be an eclectic one: "American experience would appear to point to this line of approach — to seek lines of least resistance in whatever field, probing each to the limit where opposition might be severely provoked", Quintin Whyte, Report of Trip to Europe, Britain and the U.S.A., 1950, p.6.
67. The Guardian, September 23 1948.
68. A. Kerr Pap. B.B.B. Bikitsha to A. Kerr 18 April 1948; Victor Poto to A. Kerr 27 April 1948; A. Kerr to V. Poto, 11 May 1948 declining nomination.
69. Margaret Ballinger also confessed to confusion in knowing the exact policies of African leadership, M. Ball. Pap. A410/B2 M. Ball. to J. Hlehani 10 February 1953.
70. Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1971.
71. Edgar H. Brookes, We Come of Age, S.A.I.R.R., 1950, p.20.
72. Robertson, op. cit., p.106.
73. See Tom Lodge, "Patrick Duncan and Radical Liberalism", unpublished seminar paper, University of Cape Town, May 1977.
74. Robertson, op. cit., p.115.
75. For analyses of this American-dominated cold war liberalism see Richard W. Fox, "Reinhold Niebuhr and the Emergence of the Liberal Realist Faith, 1930-1945", Review of Politics, Vol. XXXVIII, 1976, pp.244-265; James A. Nuechterlein, "Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr and the Discontents of Post-War American Liberalism", Review of Politics, Vol. XXXIX, 1977, pp.3-40. By 1953 the changed nature of the global context of western liberalism was coming to be appreciated by Edgar Brookes in his book, South Africa in a Changing World, Cape Town, O.U.P., 1953.

Conclusion

This study has sought to show the divided and uncertain nature of South African liberalism over the critical period of 1883 to 1948. Searching for much of this time for a coherent ideological perspective, liberals in South African politics can only be partially designated "agents of social control" in the reproduction of capitalist social relations. While the more conservative sections of what was increasingly becoming by the turn of the century a "liberal establishment" did seek a political role for themselves in the centralising political processes that were accruing before and after Union in 1910, the eclectic and haphazard nature of this prevented a full and complete inclusion in the governmental process.

Instead, as we saw from the beginning of this study, liberal political interests increasingly contented themselves with piecemeal and local level involvement in the governing structure of the emerging South African state. In one important respect, this tradition accrued from the early nineteenth century origins of South African liberalism with John Philip and the missionary paternalism of the London Missionary Society. Bringing an empirical and loose ideological conception of politics that avoided the question of the nature and degree of centralised power through the state, the liberalism of the Cape frontier addressed itself right from the beginning with only ad hoc questions involving the application of moral pressure on a governmental apparatus that was accepted ab initio. Believing, too, in the centrality of the market economy and the dominance of economics over politics, early South African liberalism eschewed as far as possible direct political involvement and sought to rely on the workings of mechanistic market processes in the resolution of political problems.

This avoidance of a coherent theory of political action led South African liberals for the most part to bypass attempts to politicise liberalism in a more radical direction. While such a tradition can be seen to exist in a minor form in South African history from the time of James Read and the mechanic missionaries in the early nineteenth century, through the ideas of J.M. Orpen in the wake of the Basutoland

Gun War to the attempts to introduce social democratic ideas in the late 1920s and 1930s, via the Ballingers and Friends of Africa, for the most part liberals in South Africa remained contented to use informal institutions to bring pressure to bear on government policy in some form of "liberal" direction.

In the nineteenth century Cape, these institutions were the missions, linked as they were to the evangelical revival and anti slavery lobby in the English metropolitan heartland, together with such associated groups as the press, the economic interests linked to the Eastern Cape African peasantry and spokesmen in the parliament in Cape Town. Buttressed by British imperial hegemony, these arms of the nascent "liberal establishment" needed rarely to stir themselves for protracted political involvement and the colonial "trusteeship" of Africans was ultimately reposed in the parliament at Westminster. Defined predominantly in whig parliamentary terms, this view of liberalism depended heavily on the idea of representation through a single parliament. Its chief political ally in this at the local level was the small African political elite, who had been mission-educated and had enough educational or property qualifications to wield the limited right to the common franchise.

By the 1880s, this alliance began to come under strain as the beginnings of industrialisation based first upon the Kimberley diamond discoveries, and later the growth in gold mining on the Witwatersrand, indicated growing pressures for the segregationist exclusion of the African petty bourgeoisie from the South African polity. As a consequence, despite believing strongly in a Victorian idea of continuous moral and political progress, the white liberal establishment in the Cape put up little or no resistance to both restrictions on the African franchise in 1887 and 1892 and limitations on peasant land holding through the 1894 Glen Grey Act. Furthermore, when it came to the question of Union, Cape liberals for the most part failed to put up any protracted fight to the constitution which confined the common franchise to its native Cape and entrenched the Northern system of racial exclusivism in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. Instead, liberals remained contented to work via local level politics, placing most faith in the operation of local councils established under the otherwise segregationist Glen Grey Act and the consolidation of African higher

education in response to African emigration to overseas college and universities through the University College of Fort Hare that was opened in 1915.

Perhaps the longer political trajectory of liberalism in South Africa might have been slightly different if the Cape had remained independent longer than it did. Michael O'Dowd, for instance, has suggested recently that "the slight degree of class mobility which one had in England, or in Japan, . . . might have occurred in South Africa had industrialisation been built on the foundation of the class system of the old Cape Colony",¹ and there seems no real reason to accept the contention of some revisionist historians like Legassick that "segregationism" was inherently endemic to South African capitalism.² The fact that capitalist industrialisation occurred on an increasingly segregationist basis in South African history, does not necessarily prove that the segregationist model that was evolved was the most rational conjuncture of political and economic restraints open to the capitalists concerned. Such ex post hoc ergo propter hoc reasoning overlooks the autonomous political factors that were critical to the segregationist tendencies in South African politics occurring in the way they did. Crucial to this, as we saw in chapters three and five, was the development of a distinct white petty bourgeois class interest on the Witwatersrand in the years before and after Union which led to the entrenchment of territorial segregation on both the land, via the 1913 Natives Land Act, and in the urban areas, via the 1923 Natives (Urban Areas) Act.

What was the meaning of this segregation? In some respects, it took many features of the previous debate on native policy in the Cape in the late nineteenth century to a more advanced level, beginning a systematisation of native policies at Union level. Much of the flexibility of the earlier Cape policy, however, was progressively removed as the African petty bourgeoisie was increasingly denied further access to tracts of land for purchase or residence and trading rights in the urban areas. Instead, an increasingly "Prussian Path" of internal capital accumulation began to occur whereby white trading and manufacturing interests were weaned away from the earlier Cape model of allying themselves with a relatively prosperous African peasantry, and

instead brought under the umbrella of a segregationist state bent on ensuring the emergence of a class of large capitalist agricultural landlords on the Transvaal and Orange Free State model. This refeudalisation via the Native Administration Act of 1927, the Native Service Contract Act of 1932 and the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 were linked to a policy of destroying the African petty bourgeoisie in the towns, shunting it back to the reserves and seeking to channel African political aspirations through reconstituted tribal authorities that sought to legitimise themselves by paying obeisance to "traditional" African cultural norms and values.

For the liberals, these developments were either a matter of regret or else something to be used as a possible instrument to advance liberal ideas on an ad hoc basis. The development of Fort Hare under Alexander Kerr and the control of Lovedale by the Reverend James Henderson indicated even before the end of the first world war the association between liberals and the creation of a class of African master farmers. These tendencies developed in the inter-war period through the academic study of William MacMillan, the experiment with African cooperative agriculture by missionaries like Bernard Huss and the Friends of Africa, established by the Ballingers, and the favourable attitude shown by the 1932 Native Economic Commission Report on ties between the Native Affairs Department, anthropologists and liberal welfare agencies like the Joint Councils. Thus, despite continued lip service to African entrenched political rights via the common franchise in the Cape, many conservative liberals looked increasingly to working within the government's segregationist policy as a means both to extend their own sphere of influence and influence official policy in a "liberal" direction. This became clear after the failure of the liberal-backed Non Racial Franchise Association in the Cape in the 1929 election and the establishment the same year of the South African Institute of Race Relations with the aid of American money. The influence of such liberal accommodationists as C.T. Loram and J.D. Rheinnalt-Jones now indicated that an ostensibly "non political" strategy for the S.A.I.R.R. was really designed to neutralise the Joint Councils, many of whom had become radicalised politically at the local

level, and work in accord with government "trusteeship" policy as it became evolved in the wake of the Native Economic Commission Report. A last ditch attempt at widening the sphere of liberal interest to incorporate the British Protectorates and link African cooperatives in the reserves with buying organisations in the townships was defeated by the Institute as William Ballinger and the Friends of Africa were isolated in the early 1930s and the 1936 legislation of the Hertzog-Smuts government ensured continued liberal participation as Rheinnalt-Jones, Brookes and Margaret Ballinger were all elected as Natives Representatives under the new segregationist legislation.

The onset of the second world war, however, and the speeding up of South African industrialisation, indicated that this era of continued liberal collaborationism within basically a colonial and paternalistic structure was now passing. Max Gordon's Federation of Non European Trade Unions indicated a renewed African trade union challenge to white liberal hegemony over African politics which had been the foundations for the continued success of the system. As long as the A.N.C. and its small African leadership had remained weak and divided white liberals had continued to exercise crucial domination over African political thinking and this had been reinforced by their control of both African higher education, newspapers like Umteteli wa Bantu and The Bantu World, cultural organisations like the Gamma Sigma Club and the Bantu Men's Social Centre and the Joint Councils. African attempts for a separate sphere of cultural and economic rejuvenation — which had first been expressed in the growth of Ethiopian church separatism in the 1890s — had been continuously defeated and had remained little more than futile hopes held by small groups of Garveyists inside the A.N.C. in the 1920s and early 1930s as the main pillar of African hopes, the I.C.U. became wracked by corruption, internal division amid manipulation by the Joint Councils. Now, however, a new generation was coming to the fore which was much better educated than previously and more able to maintain contact with its potential supporters among the permanently urbanised African townsmen who continued to swell in number despite the increasingly harsh attempts by the state to entrench urban segregation and influx control.

The political expression of these new African tendencies began to become manifold in the early 1940s. In the All African Convention, there emerged growing Trotskyite influences; in the African National Congress there grew up the Africanist-orientated Congress Youth League; while in 1941 the Council for Non European Trade Unions and the African Mine Workers Union were formed. All these tendencies, however, became focused by the end of the war with the 1946 African Mine Strike and the adjournment of the Natives Representative Council. From now on the whole legitimacy of Government Trusteeship policy and its underpinnings of separate natives representation was thrown into question and, despite the lack of funds, organisation and resources, the A. N. C. together with the A. A. C. plunged into a programme of boycotting native representative elections.

For the first time on a Union wide basis, South African liberalism was faced with a concerted challenge to its already somewhat tarnished legitimacy. The white liberals were ill-equipped to respond to the new democratic challenges which had been stimulated by the war and the increasing militancy all over the colonial world of nationalist agitation, and South Africa's leading philosophical advocate Alfred Hoernle in a general sense expressed their nostalgia for a safer and more secure colonial era that was now passing from their grip. The "Heartbreak House" of South Africa resembled in many ways George Bernard Shaw's play of 1919 that looked back on the Victorian sunset and it seemed that liberalism was incapable of coming to grips with the stark political polarities that were coming to characterise the South African scene.³

The result we have outlined in the last two chapters of this study, though the full response would take us far beyond our period and lead us to the developments of the 1950s and 1960s. In essence, once the immediate democratic challenge to the paternal liberalism centred around bodies like the Institute of Race Relations had been beaten off in the middle 1940s, South African liberals set down towards formulating a programme to accord with Hoernle's ideas of ethnic pluralism acting as the basis for a liberal model of political conflict resolution in South Africa's "multi-racial" society.

The power-base via parliamentary representation had, even in its severely truncated form via Natives Representation, seen its final demise in the boycott campaign of 1946-47 and the last vestige of the old Cape liberalism that had secured representatives like Margaret Ballinger and Donald Molteno came to an end. Now the strategy became one of trying to work through the echelons of the government native administration apparatus which, in the last year of the Smuts government, seemed at least willing to discuss revamping some aspects of the Natives Representation system and incorporate the African urban petty bourgeoisie into an enlarged Natives Representative Council. As we saw in chapter eleven, these hopes came to an end with the election victory of the Nationalists in 1948 and the emergence of the apartheid strategy after 1950 of Verwoerd and Eiselen in the Native Affairs Department. The political response from some of the liberals, therefore, was the decision finally to form a separate Liberal Party after the second U.P. election defeat in 1953 and seek at least some political change through the white parliamentary system.

However, even this response was only a partial one. Despite the growing attacks on the South African Constitution in the early 1950s, the Defiance Campaign and the progressive escalation of the apartheid programme whereby African political energies were to be redirected through revamped Bantu Authorities in the reserves, many white liberals continued to look to the old methods of moral pressure and peaceful persuasion on the Nationalist government. The Institute of Race Relations' Director, Quintin Whyte, echoed C.T. Loram's strategy in the early 1920s of trying to work in conjunction with the Dutch Reformed Churches for, as he wrote to Dr. H.W. Shepherd of Lovedale "issues in South Africa are moral issues and having no constitution like the Americans, we have to deal on this moral basis in this field of race relations".⁴ On such issues, too, as the implementation of Betterment Areas schemes in the reserves in the 1950s on bases similar to the original Native Economic Commission Report of 1932, the Institute found itself in close agreement with government policy, disagreeing mainly on the pace and scale of its implementation.⁵ The objective, therefore, seemed to be to try to modify the workings of government policy in order to ensure the progressive

incorporation of African business and political interests in the urban areas, much on the same lines as had been tentatively pursued immediately prior to the 1948 election.

This, in essence, has continued to be the basis of white liberal policy in contemporary South African politics and there has been over the last thirty years almost an unbroken tradition of continuous liberal hopes, echoed in press reports, of a "new deal for urban blacks" whereby an African business and professional bourgeoisie can be eventually created as a political buffer in South Africa's growing racial polarisation.⁶ The plural democratic models espoused by the Progressive Federal Party, and the discussion on a Swiss-style canton system for urban areas whereby separate political autonomy can be ensured for the aspirations of the urbanised African political elite, are more recent features of this otherwise unmodified tradition of liberal optimism.⁷ Whether, of course, such a political model could ever amount to a "solution" to the South African "racial problem" will remain a matter for political punditry; but the absence of a solid African political base lends credence to the belief that ultimately South Africa's white liberals can only remain on the perimeter of South African politics. Short of massive external intervention by the Western powers over the head of the South African government, it appears that the liberal model of ethnic pluralism that makes such massive concessions to the urban African petty bourgeoisie has little chance of immediate success. In the longer term, government escalation of the Homelands policy and the granting of "independence" to such proto states as Transkei and Bophutatswana might introduce a new dimension that has yet to be thoroughly analysed. Here there appears at least the nucleus for a political machine that might buttress some of the more conservative liberals and their strategy for political and economic modernisation of the urban townships. In Kwazulu, especially, the Inkatha machinery of Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, himself a former pupil at Fort Hare, acts as a potential African political extension of some liberal strategy. Over the years, therefore, a progressive Africanisation of South African or Azanian liberalism could well occur and thus introduce a new dimension to the trends we have been discussing in this study. But so far there are no clear signs that such a develop-

ment could ever lead to the internal transformation of the South African political system in a demonstrably liberal-democratic direction on the western style.

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