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Sequential vs. single-round uniform-price auctions
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Mezzetti, Claudio, Pekeč, Aleksandar Saša and Tsetlin, Ilia (2008) Sequential vs. single-round uniform-price auctions. Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.62 (No.2). pp. 591-609. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.002 ISSN 0899-8256.
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.002
Abstract
We study sequential and single-round uniform-price auctions with affiliated values. We derive symmetric equilibrium for the auction in which k1 objects are sold in the first round and k2 in the second round, with and without revelation of the first-round winning bids. We demonstrate that auctioning objects in sequence generates a lowballing effect that reduces the first-round price. Total revenue is greater in a single-round, uniform auction for k=k1+k2 objects than in a sequential uniform auction with no bid announcement. When the first-round winning bids are announced, we also identify a positive informational effect on the second-round price. Total expected revenue in a sequential uniform auction with winning-bids announcement may be greater or smaller than in a single-round uniform auction, depending on the model's parameters.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
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Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | ||||
Journal or Publication Title: | Games and Economic Behavior | ||||
Publisher: | Elsevier | ||||
ISSN: | 0899-8256 | ||||
Official Date: | 2008 | ||||
Dates: |
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Volume: | Vol.62 | ||||
Number: | No.2 | ||||
Page Range: | pp. 591-609 | ||||
DOI: | 10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.002 | ||||
Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||
Publication Status: | Published | ||||
Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access |
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