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**(Re) Interpreting *Intégration* : A Study of
Colonial Reform during the Algerian War
(1954-62)**

by

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A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
French Studies

University of Warwick, Department of French Studies

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Acknowledgements

From around 1956 until the final stages of the Algerian war, French government officials claimed that the conflict had reached 'le dernier quart d'heure'. Not only has this thesis taken almost as long to complete as the duration of the war itself, but I, too, have spent many months deluding friends, colleagues, partners, employers and, most of all, myself that the final quarter of an hour was at hand. It is without false modesty that I state that I have not taken easily to the task which I began in 1992. My supervisor, Dr James Shields, has shown great patience in handling the frequent *états d'âme* which I have inflicted upon him and I am extremely grateful to him for this. He has always been willing to give of his time to discuss the project and has proved a model of efficiency in marking any written submissions which I have given to him, even where he has wrung his hands in despair at my inability to write with sufficient scholarly rigour and focus. I would also like to express my thanks to the British Academy for their initial three years of funding without which this project would not have been possible.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements	p.i
Declaration	p.ii
Abstract	p.iii
Note on Lexicon	p.iv
Abbreviations and Notation	p.v
Note on Archival Material	p.vi
Introduction	p.1
The Colonial Reformer	p.4
Contribution to the Field	p.9
History and Text	p.13
Chapter One:	
Questions to the Reformers	p.19
The Civilising Mission	p.21
<i>Assumptions of European Superiority</i>	<i>p.21</i>
<i>'Savages' into Frenchmen</i>	<i>p.24</i>
<i>The 'Harmony of Interests'</i>	<i>p.27</i>
<i>The One and Indivisible Republic</i>	<i>p.28</i>
Bilan de la présence française	p.29
<i>A Divided Society</i>	<i>p.31</i>
The Impossibility of Reform	p.35
The Inevitable Rejection of Colonialism	p.42
<i>Imagining an Alternative Ending</i>	<i>p.46</i>
The Cost of Reform	p.48
<i>Conclusion</i>	<i>p.52</i>
Chapter Two:	
Introduction to the Reformers	p.53
Key Themes of the Reformers	p.53
<i>Justifying Colonialism</i>	<i>p.53</i>
<i>Beyond Colonialism</i>	<i>p.56</i>
<i>'La France se nomme diversité'</i>	<i>p.58</i>
<i>The 'consent potential'</i>	<i>p.60</i>
Reformers Within the French Army	p.63

<i>The Sections Administratives Spécialisées</i>	p.63
<i>The Cinquième Bureau</i>	p.66
<i>Dissenting Voices</i>	p.69

Chapter Three:

Reading the Past and Anticipating the Task Ahead	p.71
Reformers and the Failings of Colonialism	p.71
<i>The European Superiority Complex</i>	p.71
<i>The Intolerable Conditions</i>	p.74
The Speed of Change	p.77
<i>Lost Opportunities</i>	p.80
Extraneous Factors	p.82
Reformer Indignation	p.86
<i>'La mise en valeur' of Algeria</i>	p.86
<i>Dealing with International Criticism</i>	p.89
<i>Algeria versus the Arab World</i>	p.91
Looking to the Future	p.92
<i>Concluding Remarks</i>	p.97

Chapter Four:

Reading the Muslim Population: 'The Consent Potential'	p.99
Representing the Muslims: A Common Past and a Shared Destiny	p.100
<i>Soustelle and the Direction of History</i>	p.104
Bilans de la Pacification	p.105
The FLN and the Rule of Fear	p.109
May 1958	p.110
Navigating Between the Extremes	p.115
<i>The Lack of Revolutionary Unity</i>	p.116
<i>The 'False Dawn' of the Reformers</i>	p.118

Chapter Five:

Liberal Alternatives to <i>Intégration</i>	p.121
Intégration versus Federalism	p.122
<i>Federalism and the Logic of the Conflict</i>	p.125
Reformers and Liberal Anti-Colonialists	p.128
<i>The 'Intermediary Margin'</i>	p.128
<i>The Dilemma of the Liberal Anti-Colonialist</i>	p.132
<i>Concluding Remarks</i>	p.136

Chapter Six:

A Closer Look at *Intégration*

p.138

Assimilation and Intégration

p.139

Changes to the Algerian Economy

p.141

Industrialisation as the Way Forward

p.142

Imagining an Independent Algeria

p.146

Culture and Identity

p.149

Muslim Women and Islam

p.149

Language and Education

p.153

Political Reform

p.158

Concluding Remarks

p.161

Chapter Seven:

Opposition to Independence

p.163

Algérie: Terre française

p.164

Economic Concerns

p.167

A Return to the 'Harmony of Interests'

p.169

Grandeur

p.171

Algeria: The Global Significance

p.173

The Communist Threat

p.173

The Islamic Threat

p.175

The Pan-Arabic Threat

p.176

Conclusion

p.178

Chapter Eight:

Reformers and their Scapegoats

p.180

The Politicians and the Failure of Intégration

p.181

May 1958 and the Return of de Gaulle

p.186

The Failings of the French Army

p.196

Soustelle's Stance

p.201

The Intellectuals

p.204

Camus: A More Moderate Protest

p.207

Influence of the Intellectuals

p.208

Concluding Remarks

p.209

Chapter Nine:

The Settlers and the People of Metropolitan France

p.210

Reading the Settlers

p.210

De Gaulle's Betrayal of the Settlers

p.215

Domestic Support	p.217
<i>France in Transition</i>	p.217
<i>A Strategy of Denial</i>	p.220
Conclusion	p.226
Endnotes	p.231
Notes to the Introduction	p.231
Notes to Chapter One	p.233
Notes to Chapter Two	p.237
Notes to Chapter Three	p.240
Notes to Chapter Four	p.242
Notes to Chapter Five	p.244
Notes to Chapter Six	p.246
Notes to Chapter Seven	p.247
Notes to Chapter Eight	p.248
Notes to Chapter Nine	p.250
Notes to the Conclusion	p.251
Appendix 1: A Selection of Tracts	p.253
Bibliography	p.265

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Declaration

I declare that no material used in this thesis has been published previously. I declare that this thesis constitutes my own work. No work submitted for a previous degree has been incorporated into this thesis. I confirm that this thesis has not been submitted for a degree at another university.

Abstract

This thesis examines the writing of individuals whose stance during the Algerian war of 1954-62 might broadly be defined as favourable to a process of colonial reform. Focusing above all on the *intégration* programme championed by Jacques Soustelle, the present study will seek to challenge colonial reformers for their over-generous reading of France's colonial past; overturn their claim that they had the consent of the Muslim population for their proposals; critique their reading of the European population as willing to embrace change; criticise them for replicating many of the Eurocentric notions of progress and development associated with the old colonial policy of *assimilation*; and finally, show how in their search for explanations for the failure of reform, they failed to appreciate that the dynamics of the colonial system prevented its reform. Whilst the proposals of reformers were, for the most part, guided by a genuine, if misguided, good will, the thesis will also identify certain areas where the attitudes they displayed, and the measures they proposed, fell short of the liberal principles which they claimed to uphold. In constructing a critique of the colonial reformers' position, the study draws upon the work of anti-colonialists theorists writing at the time of the conflict such as Frantz Fanon and Albert Memmi and upon the assessments of contemporary historians.

Whilst the territory over which this thesis ranges has been partially mapped, it has not been comprehensively so. No previous study has fully analysed the *intégration* programme, particularly with the aim of establishing the ways in which it differed from a policy of *assimilation*, or considered at length the ideas of its chief architect, Jacques Soustelle.

Lexicon

In general, I have used the term 'Muslim' or 'indigenous population' to describe the Arab and Berber populations of Algeria. I use the terms 'settler community', 'pieds-noirs' and 'European population' to describe those inhabitants of Algeria whose families trace back to Europe, even where they were third or fourth generation settlers. In both cases, the terms are used interchangeably, largely for stylistic reasons. Whilst I am aware that, at the time of the conflict, the use of words such as 'indigenous' or '*pied-noir*' may well have carried with them political connotations and reflected a certain *prise de position*, it is with the belief that the passage of time has largely stripped away most of the significance that is attached to these words that I employ them here (in the same way that it is now possible to talk without implying bias of *la guerre d'Algérie*). My use of them is in no way intended to convey an *a priori* judgement.

Abbreviations and Notation

In order to avoid needless repetition of endnotes, I have used a system of abbreviations incorporated in the text to refer to those works most often cited. I have included separate and full endnotes for the first reference to each of these works in the main body of the thesis. Additionally, on those occasions where these works cite another speaker or refer to a declaration or broadcast made previous to the time of writing, a separate endnote is given. The abbreviations are as follows:

- NA: Chevallier, Jacques, *Nous, Algériens* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1958)
- SR: Fanon, Frantz, *L'an V de la révolution algérienne : sociologie d'une révolution* (Paris: Maspero, 1959)
- DT: Fanon, Frantz, *Les damnés de la terre*, 2nd edition (Paris: Maspero, 1970) [First published 1961 with a preface by Jean-Paul Sartre]. All references in this study are to the later edition.
- PN: Fanon, Frantz, *Peau noire, masques blancs*, 2nd edition (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1975) [First published 1952]. All references in this study are to the later edition.
- PC: Memmi, Albert *Portrait du colonisé précédé du portrait du colonisateur* (Paris: Gallimard, 1985). [First published Paris: Corrèa, 1957]. All references in this study are to the later edition.
- AS: Soustelle, Jacques, *Aimée et souffrante Algérie* (Paris: Plon, 1956)
- PT: Soustelle, Jacques, *La page n'est pas tournée* (Paris: Editions de la table ronde, 1965)
- ET: Soustelle, Jacques, *L'Espérance trahie (1958 -1961)* (Mayenne: Editions de l'Alma, 1962)
- DA: Soustelle, Jacques, *Le drame algérien et la décadence française. Réponse à Raymond Aron* (Paris: Plon, 1957)
- AL: Tillion, Germaine, *L'Algérie en 1957* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1957)
- *CA: Camus, Albert, *Chroniques algériennes 1939-1958* (Paris: Gallimard, 1958)
- *FR: Vidal-Naquet, Pierre, *Face à la raison d'Etat. Un historien dans la guerre d'Algérie* (Paris: la Découverte, 1989)

**These are works of collected essays. In order to allow a distinction to be made between the different essays, the abbreviation for the title of the collected work following the first reference is used only in the endnotes rather than incorporated in the text.*

Any references following the first to articles cited from *Le Bled* will be denoted in the endnotes by the abbreviation LB.

Archival Material

First references to any articles drawn from the archives of the *Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre* [S.H.A.T.] will contain the full title details, the date of production where given, the catalogue number and full title of the dossier within which it has been classified unless previous reference has already been made to that dossier in which case only the dossier number will be given. Any references following the first to a particular article from the archives will contain the title of the article and the catalogue number of the dossier from which it is drawn.

All dossiers stored at the S.H.A.T. consulted in this study begin with the number 1H. The acronym is not repeated in the endnotes.

The full title of the dossiers stored in the archives at the S.H.A.T. are included at the start of the bibliography. Individual items cited in the study drawn from these dossiers are also incorporated in the bibliography together with the number of the dossier from which they are drawn. Owing to the nature of the material, most of these articles are listed under the heading of 'Works with no specific author'.

INTRODUCTION

The historical significance of the passing of Empire can scarcely be overestimated. Given the number of personal, commercial and national interests linked with the fate of colonialism and the immense significance of the decolonisation process for the (ongoing) history of both colonising and colonised countries, debate about what colonialism was, and why it ended, is often far from dispassionate. 'Decolonisation', writes Martin Evans, 'revealed the world as fluid, decomposing, recomposing and changing and destroyed the historical certainties that underpinned imperialist perceptions of the world.'¹ Nowhere were these historical certainties exploded with greater force than in Algeria. As Laurent Gervereau, Jean-Pierre Rioux and Benjamin Stora comment in the foreword to their 1992 study, the Algerian conflict is not amongst those episodes in contemporary history 'qu'on peut exposer avec la sérénité de l'âge et la tranquillité du savoir établi'.²

The armed insurrection which finally brought an end to French rule is generally recognised as having begun on 31 October 1954. An extra consignment of French troops was despatched to Algeria to quell what was widely perceived to be a sporadic outburst of local discontent on the part of a few poorly armed bandits. Algeria was legally part of France, its incorporation dating from 1848. Owing to its special status, which distinguished it from its neighbours Tunisia and Morocco, there was a great deal of reluctance within French military and governmental circles to look upon the uprising as a foreign policy or even colonial matter.

Eight years later, the 'bandits' of 1954 had been transformed into the statesmen of 1962 and the conviction that Algeria was forever French had been shattered. The French Army had effected an inglorious withdrawal from Algerian soil, leaving behind it an independent state under the control of the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN).³ In the course of an often brutal combat, huge numbers of men and resources had been mobilised by the French against an enemy which could only muster a tiny fraction of this force, reports of war atrocities had become commonplace, and under the pressure of events in Algeria, France had undergone a political transformation which had seen the collapse of the Fourth Republic and the return of General de Gaulle from a self-imposed political exile.

Between the years 1954 and 1962, the struggle for Algeria was not only waged in her cities, rural outposts and deserts, but also textually, giving rise to a substantial and diverse body of writing comprising books, newspaper and journal articles, tracts, petitions and novels. Commentators, both military and civilian, competed for the sympathies of policy-makers, soldiers and the general public, seeking to convince them that their interventions on the war were just. Much of this writing might be broadly described as politically committed, that is to say, it is characterised by partisan narratives both in favour of, and opposed to, Algerian independence. In the immediate aftermath of the war, Michel Crouzet described the Algerian conflict as 'la bataille de l'écrit'.⁴ Madeleine Rébérioux, writing at a later date, employed a similar metaphor, observing that 'la guerre d'Algérie fut aussi une bataille de mots'.⁵ If such metaphors perhaps exaggerate the importance of the role played by journalists and intellectuals during the war, they remain useful in conveying a sense both of the volume and the mutually oppositional nature of the material written at the time.

The anti-war stance adopted by certain publications and the individuals who wrote for them has been charted by David Schalk. Tracing different 'cycles of engagement', Schalk identifies 1955 as the beginning of a 'pedagogic stage' of protest during which

commentators warned of the grave risks which the nation ran through its continued prosecution of the war. The 'moral stage' followed in 1956 in which the condemnation of the war was expressed more vigorously. Lastly, in 1957, came the 'counterlegal stage' during which individual writers or publications committed or condoned forms of protest deemed illegal by the government.⁶ Focusing on individual opposition to the war, Pierre Vidal-Naquet's classification of protesting intellectuals as *dreyfusard*, *bolchevik* or *tiers-mondiste* also provides a useful aid to navigation through the minefield of contributors active during the conflict. Whilst *dreyfusards* condemned the war (or the means by which it was being waged) on the grounds that France's democratic and republican values were being violated in the process, both *bolcheviks* and *tiers-mondistes* adopted a more radical contestatory stance. The *bolcheviks* saw in the FLN 'une élite révolutionnaire capable de mettre en mouvement les masses algériennes pour les conduire à la victoire du socialisme' whilst the *tiers-mondistes* viewed the inhabitants of the Third World as 'de nouveaux "damnés de la terre" qu'il convenait de rédimer'.⁷

At the same time, as Raoul Girardet has observed, the considerable body of texts favourable to the continuation of the French presence should not be overlooked, even though they have received less scholarly scrutiny and no parallel typology to that produced by Vidal-Naquet has been offered.⁸ Works such as Jacques Soustelle's *Aimée et souffrante Algérie*, Jean-Yves Alquier's *Nous avons pacifié Tazalt* or Christiane Fournier's *Nous avons encore des héros* are good examples of this pro-*Algérie française* writing.⁹

The signing of the Evian Accords in 1962 brought no end to the production of this *littérature engagée*. Divisions amongst commentators, much in evidence in the 'written battle' of the war years, have not been reconciled. The post-war literature became, in the words of Stora, a 'bataille pour l'héritage des mémoires' typified by General Jacques Massu's 1971 work *La vraie bataille d'Alger*, a frank account of his

prominent role in the now infamous 1957 Battle of Algiers.¹⁰ Fiction has also become an important battleground for re-fighting the war and keeping alive old enmities. Philip Dine has shown the way in which fictional narratives have become a favourite medium for 'all those with a case to plead or an axe to grind'.¹¹ The period since 1962 has also given rise to a certain amount of academic writing about the war. Whilst not devoid of a certain *prise de position*, this writing is more self-consciously balanced than the polemical accounts. In this category, mention might be made of *La guerre d'Algérie et les Français* edited by Jean- Pierre Rioux which collates the contributions made during the 1988 conference organised by the Institut d'Histoire du Temps Présent.¹² In the English language, one thinks of Alistair Horne's weighty tome *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962* or John Talbott's *The War Without a Name: France in Algeria, 1954-1962*.¹³

So great is the cumulative effect of all the various types of writing about Algeria that Stora has referred to a 'véritable avalanche de l'écrit à propos de la guerre d'Algérie'.¹⁴ He calculates that between 1960 and 1990, nearly 2000 publications appeared on the war.¹⁵ His own dictionary of the books dealing with the conflict published between 1955 and 1995 is not only a valuable research tool but testimony to the depth of interest generated by this subject.¹⁶ In similar vein, Dine, Rioux, and Patrick Eveno and Jean Planchais have all drawn attention to the burgeoning corpus of material dedicated to the conflict.¹⁷

The Colonial Reformer

From amongst the polemical writing, it is possible to identify a group of writers whose position might broadly be defined as favourable to a process of colonial reform. Colonial reformers, as we wish to term them here, were a heterogeneous grouping made up of politicians such as Jacques Soustelle, intellectuals such as Albert Camus and Germaine Tillion, and even factions within the French Army. Despite the

differences in profession, background, political allegiance and intellectual sophistication which existed between them, the underlying principles which governed the reformers' stance on the war were sufficiently similar for us to group them together in this study under a collective label. Reformers believed in what Dine has termed, 'an improvable colonialism' or what Stora has called 'un colonialisme de progrès' based on the notion that it was incumbent upon the French to 'guider les peuples vers le bonheur'.¹⁸ According to reformers, a revised and, in their eyes, improved version of France's traditional civilising mission, able to turn a dominance-dependence relationship between coloniser and colonised into a partnership of equals, constituted both a liberal and achievable resolution to the Algerian conflict.

Laying claim to a democratic heritage inspired by the 1789 *Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen*, reformers claimed to support tolerance, equality, the right of national self-determination, and peaceful co-existence between peoples of different ethnic, cultural and religious backgrounds. It was in the name of these principles that they attempted to justify the retention of French sovereignty over Algeria. Underpinning their position was the belief that as long as the French were sincere in their reforming intentions, Algeria's Muslim population would (still) aspire to play a full role within the French national community. For this reason, liberal principles and the prolongation of French rule were not, in their eyes, incompatible.

A number of other themes frequently featured in the writing of reformers. Whilst disputing the claims of Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Memmi that French colonialism was, by definition, exploitative, reformers nonetheless held that it had been deficient with regard to the Muslims who were supposed to benefit from it. This situation, they believed, could be remedied. Reformers claimed that the European settlers would be prepared to accept a series of measures designed to bring to an end the privileged status which they had historically enjoyed. These measures were grounded in a particular conception of modernity and progress which held that the industrial

development of Algeria constituted a 'good' and which, on the political front, assumed the universal applicability of the Western model of parliamentary democracy. The implementation of these measures was essential since, reformers argued, Algeria could not survive without French assistance. As a necessary corollary to this position, they asserted that the financial burden of the proposed transformation of Algeria could, should and would be borne by the people of Metropolitan France. Finally, once it had become abundantly clear that Algeria was to become independent, Soustelle in particular, attributed the failure of reform to a number of 'scapegoats', with General de Gaulle the principal target for his ire.

Through a detailed examination of the writing of these colonial reformers, the present study highlights the flaws in the proposals which they expounded. Our analysis will seek to attack reformers for their over-generous reading of France's colonial past; question their conviction that they had the consent of the Muslim population; challenge their reading of the European population as willing to embrace change; critique them for replicating many of the Eurocentric notions of progress and development associated with the old colonial policy of *assimilation*; and finally, show how in their elaboration of 'scapegoat stories', they failed to appreciate that their own proposals were inherently flawed. Whilst some of the proposals of reformers were, for the most part, guided by a genuine, if misguided, good will, the thesis will also identify those occasions where the attitudes they displayed, and the measures they proposed, fell short of the liberal principles which they claimed to uphold. In constructing a critique of the colonial reformers' position, the study draws upon the work of radical anti-colonialists writing at the time of the conflict such as Frantz Fanon and Albert Memmi, and upon the assessments of historians such as Tony Smith who have written with the outcome of the conflict already known.

Our critique is necessarily a retrospective one undertaken at a time when Algerian independence is a political reality and the era of formal colonial control is all but over.

Whilst the French are generally perceived to have played the *mauvais rôle* and the position of the reformers now seems anachronistic, this marks a considerable evolution from the time of the conflict itself.¹⁹ Smith has highlighted the existence of a 'colonial consensus' on the positive benefits of Empire emerging in France towards the latter part of the nineteenth century and continuing throughout the Fourth Republic.²⁰ That France had played a benevolent role in her colonies and that she should remain there were amongst the assumptions which together formed the conventional wisdom framing colonial policy, what David Chuter in another context would describe as a 'meta-strategy'.²¹ The existence of a consensus over Algeria is affirmed by Girardet in his personal testimony included in Rioux and Jean-François Sirinelli's study, *La guerre d'Algérie et les intellectuels français*. He sees the end of 1960, a time when the official position had shifted to favour Algerian independence, as heralding a sea-change in the political climate within which writing on the Algerian war was produced. Until this time, those who wrote in favour of the continuation of the French presence were very much in accordance with the official line: 'L'audace et le courage sont de l'autre bord, il faut bien le reconnaître: ce sont eux les contestataires.'²² Although Charles-Robert Ageron's analysis of opinion polls conducted throughout the war suggests that popular opinion had become, at best, lukewarm about French military efforts to preserve Algeria well before the end of 1960, Girardet's analysis is correct to the extent that France's political and intellectual classes, with some notable exceptions, had been reluctant to concede that Algeria should be granted her independence until this time.²³

Amongst the various plans for colonial reform, the one upon which this study concentrates is *intégration*. The *intégration* programme was launched by Soustelle following his appointment to the post of Governor-General of Algeria in January 1955. It was a programme fully committed to the maintenance of French control over Algeria on a territorial level, since Algeria was legally a French province, whilst at the same time it purported to respect the cultural, linguistic and religious differences

which gave Algeria its own 'personality'. On the political level, *intégration* proposed equal rights and responsibilities for all cultural groups within Algeria which effectively meant that all Muslims would become fully-fledged French citizens. These measures were to be combined with policies aimed at promoting convergence between living standards in France and Algeria, implying a far-reaching transformation of the largely agrarian and low per capita income Algerian economy. *Intégration*, in the words of Bernard Droz and Evelyne Lever, 'reposait sur le double postulat de la totale appartenance de l'Algérie à la France et de l'originalité algérienne, notamment dans les domaines linguistique, culturel et religieux. En quelque sorte, l'égalité des droits dans le respect de la différence.'²⁴

Our reasons for privileging *intégration* over other proposals for colonial reform in this study are, in part, a reflection of the place which it occupied during the war. Although endorsed only fleetingly and without great conviction by governments of the Fourth Republic, *intégration* was, nevertheless, the reform plan which was given most airing during the conflict. It was overtly championed by the politically-active elements of the Army during the turmoil of May 1958 and, although the word itself was never actually pronounced, *intégration* appeared to be de Gaulle's policy until he pointedly distanced himself from it during his speech on Algerian self-determination of 16 September 1959. Furthermore, although all plans for colonial reform were, in our view, destined to fail owing to the mistaken nature of the reformers' assumptions about the motivations and aspirations of the various players in the Algerian conflict, the study will suggest that, from within the logic of the reformers' position, *intégration* was the most intellectually coherent of the reform strategies available to the French and therefore the most worthy of a comprehensive treatment here.

Contribution to the field

In 1957 Albert Memmi produced his seminal critique of colonialism *Portrait du colonisé, précédé du portrait du colonisateur*. Central to this work was his conception of the *colonisateur de bonne volonté*, an individual seeking the reform of colonialism along liberal lines but whose impact upon the colonial situation was negligible since he could neither change the attitudes of his fellow settlers nor those of the colonised.²⁵ Memmi's portrait is an excellent likeness of the colonial reformer. Several key themes of reformers' writing have also been discussed in academic studies. In this context, mention might be made of Rita Maran's work on torture and human rights or Kristin Ross' study of the social and economic changes occurring in France throughout the duration of the Algerian war.²⁶ Many of the themes which we cover here have also preoccupied the producers of fictional writing on the Algerian war, as Dine's study shows.²⁷ However, whilst the territory over which this thesis ranges has been partially mapped, it has not been comprehensively so. Neither the theoretical work of a figure like Memmi nor any subsequent academic study has fully analysed the *intégration* programme, particularly with the aim of establishing the ways in which it differed from a policy of *assimilation*, or considered at length the ideas of its chief architect, Jacques Soustelle.

As a prominent parliamentary figure during the Fourth Republic and, crucially, as Governor-General of Algeria between January 1955 and January 1956, Soustelle was, arguably, the individual who was most closely involved in the elaboration of the *intégration* programme and who wrote about it in the most detail. He is widely credited with having coined the term, although when interviewed in 1988 he claimed that it was provided for him by Mendès-France.²⁸

Soustelle was intimately linked with the events that led to the overthrow of the Fourth Republic as a leading agitator in the Gaullist camp. Upon his return to Algeria at the time of the coup of May 1958, he was arguably the most popular amongst the parade of civilian and military figures who addressed the assembled masses in the capital and throughout the country. Despite being one of the key players in securing de Gaulle's return to power, he went on to become one of the staunchest opponents of the General's Algerian policy as it moved progressively towards the acceptance of Algerian independence. Ultimately, he was forced into exile through his association with the settler terrorist group, the *Organisation Armée Secrète* (OAS). He produced four main works on the Algerian war. The first of these was *Aimée et souffrante Algérie* written about his period of office as Governor-General and published in 1956. This work dealt primarily with the provisions of the *intégration* programme. It was followed in 1957 by *Le drame algérien et la décadence française: Réponse à Raymond Aron*, his response to Aron's treatise in favour of French withdrawal from Algeria. By the time he came to write his 1961 work *l'Espérance trahie*, Algeria was virtually independent. This work and, to a lesser extent his 1965 work, *La page n'est pas tournée*, reviewed the position which he had articulated throughout the conflict and criticised de Gaulle's shifting Algerian policy as a betrayal of the *intégration* programme.²⁹

For a figure who played such a prominent role in the *Algérie française* camp, Soustelle has received surprisingly little detailed critical attention. By virtue of his involvement in the conflict, he figures in every historical account yet his major works are rarely analysed at length. An ethnographer by training, having published an academic study of Aztec civilisation, he is a surprising omission from Rioux and Sirinelli's edited work on intellectual *engagement* during the war although, according to most conventional definitions, he is certainly worthy of a place amongst the ranks of the Intelligentsia.

Overlooked as a subject of academic study, Soustelle has perhaps also fallen victim to a number of over-generalisations regarding the evolution of his thinking during the course of the conflict. For Schalk, Soustelle underwent a marked change of attitude due to the intoxicating effect of living in Algeria:

Like many who came before him, the natural beauty and particular ambience of Algeria went to his head – *l'Algérie montait à la tête* was the phrase often used... Soustelle abandoned his liberalism in 1955 and moved 180 degrees politically, under circumstances that have never fully been elucidated.³⁰

Greeted with suspicion if not outright hostility upon his appointment as Governor-General by the settlers who considered him to be too much of a reformer, Soustelle was feted as their idol when his spell in office came to an end twelve months later. The most frequently cited explanation for this shift in stance is that, appalled at the FLN-led massacre of Europeans at Philippeville in 1955, Soustelle was converted to a much harder line.³¹ Upon appointing Soustelle to a minor ministerial role, de Gaulle was criticised by Jean-Marie Domenach for having ‘donné au fascisme algérien un poste-clé pour le contrôle de l’opinion française’.³² Soustelle remains, however, a deeply ambiguous figure. Whilst at times he seemed to articulate an agenda which borrowed significantly from the *ultras*, he cannot simply be condemned as a champion of illiberalism since he was undoubtedly in favour of reform. In this ambiguity, he was not atypical of reformers in general, if, on occasions, a little more extreme in his views. His continued insistence, even after Philippeville, that the destruction of the FLN and prolongation of *Algérie française* had to be backed by new rights for the Muslims means, however, that the notion of a sudden change in his attitudes towards the rebellion, transforming him from suspected *bradeur* to darling of the *pieds-noirs*, is misleading. If one accepts at face value the view that the settlers were generally hostile to reform, then their *rapprochement* with Soustelle must be attributed as much to a misunderstanding on their part over the extent to which he wished to defend the colonial *status quo* as it was to a change of heart on his.

Alongside Soustelle, this study also considers a number of anonymous figures from within the French military whose writing has not previously been subjected to detailed critical analysis. The documentation produced by the French Army remains, as yet, a largely untapped source of primary data. Most historical studies of the Army's role in the conflict predate the availability of this material, much of it stored in the military archives at Vincennes and only released for public consultation in 1992 to coincide with the thirtieth anniversary of the end of the war. Whilst it is not our intention to present the thoughts of, say, an historically unknown sergeant as representative of the Army as a whole, the study seeks to provide a modest contribution to the elucidation of the material relating to those branches of the Army most closely linked to the reform process. These were the *Cinquième Bureau*, the branch of its operations assigned the specific responsibility for the production and dissemination of propaganda, and the *Sections Administratives Spécialisées*, units set up by Soustelle with the aim of providing a humane face to the French Army's attempt to eradicate the rebellion and entrusted with implementing economic and social change at a grassroots level.

Other figures cast in supporting roles to Soustelle in this study include the ethnographer and his one-time collaborator in Algeria, Germaine Tillion, the hard-liner turned pro-reform mayor of Algiers, Jacques Chevallier, and Albert Camus. As an intellectual 'giant' of the twentieth-century, Camus' political thought has been widely discussed, Tillion and Chevallier much less so. If their contributions are accorded limited treatment here this is firstly due to the fact that they were less prolific on the subject of Algeria than Soustelle and secondly because their proposals for colonial reform were less fully worked out. In the case of Camus, his self-imposed silence on the Algerian question from 1958 onwards and his untimely death in 1960 have deprived us of his opinion on some of the key moments in the conflict.

History and Text

This thesis largely deals with text. Using the accounts of the colonial reformers as our primary source material, this thesis not only judges the consistency of the measures which the reformers proposed against the values which they claimed to defend, but also seeks to explain why their proposals were bound to fail. In order to arrive at such judgements, it draws on other textual accounts of the conflict which offer competing assessments to those offered by the reformers. Included amongst these are a number of studies written by academic historians. Whilst it is not our intention to embark upon a lengthy discussion about the theoretical aspects concerning the nature of historical 'truth' and how such truths might be conveyed textually, some understanding is required of the way in which the rival textual mediations consulted relate to each other and to the war itself.

Much of the primary source material written by activists such as Soustelle has a dual function as both historical artefact in its own right and as report on an unfolding historical process. Although occasionally produced for a reader sharing the same vision as the author, a good deal of this politically committed writing was conceived with the express purpose of persuading an uncommitted reader of the veracity of one particular interpretation of the conflict. The vast majority of the material produced by the French Army was propaganda, designed to serve a persuasive function in a conflict in which it was widely held in French military circles that the key to the conflict lay in winning 'hearts and minds', and in which the text itself could be considered as a weapon.

It is our belief that the academic (historical) accounts of the war differ from these polemical representations of the conflict insofar as they respect certain rules of scholarship (such as the need to provide documentary evidence) and as a consequence of the intellectual honesty and integrity which the professional historian maintains in the construction of the text. As such, these accounts offer a more self-consciously

balanced view. Even in the absence of any single reality about the world or absolute standard against which to judge textual representations of it, this thesis works on the understanding that 'knowledge' about the past is nevertheless possible and some accounts can be considered 'better' representations than others based upon a consultation of documentary evidence. If we are not prepared to go even this far, we end up in a theoretical impasse in which all texts have equal and consequently no value. As Christopher Norris has convincingly argued, when 'truth' and 'history' are reduced to purely discursive concepts, the 'real world' political consequences are particularly dangerous.³³

The only proviso is that the scholarly account and the work of propaganda must both be approached with a constant awareness that the text is a cultural artefact and that the writer has a series of preoccupations, conscious and unconscious, anchored in the values and norms of the society in which the work is produced and dependent upon the imprecisions of language. Firstly, historians are not impartial custodians of truth, nor is their work the ultimate arbiter between competing representations of colonialism to be found in, say, the writing of Soustelle and Fanon. The guidelines of the academic profession cannot prescribe a method of operation so strict that the historian is placed in a methodological straitjacket which totally constrains his/her own voice.

The 'inevitable bias' attached to any piece of historical writing is perhaps heightened in the case of the Algerian war given that relatively little time has elapsed since the end of the conflict. The temporal and spatial separation between the author and the events in question which provide the historian with a certain 'critical distance' are, in this case, often missing. Many of those involved in studying the war in their professional capacity as academics also personally experienced the events of the war and were often politically active for or against independence. To draw upon two particularly striking examples, Pierre Vidal-Naquet and Raoul Girardet have both

written about the war in their capacity as professional historians; indeed, both have produced typologies as a way of classifying forms of *engagement* during the conflict.³⁴ Yet both figures were also activists, working for opposing causes and, in the case of Vidal-Naquet, liable for incorporation within his own categorisation of the conflict.³⁵ This ambiguous status has provoked conflicting responses in the two individuals concerned. Conceiving of the historian as 'témoin de la vérité', Vidal-Naquet does not view his professional training and his political *engagement* as contradictory. The secondary title of his work *Face à la raison d'Etat* is *un historien dans la guerre d'Algérie*. His investigations, he claims, were undertaken with a constant awareness of 'l'éminente dignité de ma profession', causing him to verify all the facts which he brought into the public domain and to retain a necessary 'distance réflexive' between himself and the object of his enquiry.³⁶

For Girardet, by way of contrast, there is an unease at the duality of his role which, as he admits, underpins his contribution to Rioux and Sirinelli's study. In his eyes, the individual activist [témoin] views events from a personal, and necessarily limited, horizon which, however honest his/her representation of the conflict, remains 'marqué par le poids des fidélités, des refus, des amertumes'. Since he views it as incumbent upon the historian to attempt to incorporate the individual perception of the conflict into a wider ensemble, he concludes, 'Il est donc bien incommode d'être à la fois historien et témoin, et je ne prétendrai pas concilier à tout prix les deux rôles.'³⁷ Vidal-Naquet is accepted as being an eminent historian whose work is scrupulously documented. Nevertheless, Girardet's remarks highlight the fact that the historians writing about the conflict often have a personal agenda, one which cannot be completely detached from their professional role.

When seeking to establish the status which is to be accorded to text in this study, we must also be aware that the writing of both the polemicist and the historian is more than simply the revelation of a conscious *prise de position*. A case can be made that

we are bound in a network of discourses, intimately tied up with power and knowledge, which are beyond our capacity to comprehend or to change. The writer cannot, in any sense, be 'outside' society, imbued with a kind of cultural and historical weightlessness which allows access to some higher 'truth'. In other words, what is considered significant is a function of what is considered worthy of measurement at the moment of writing and within the society in which the text is produced. However, as we stated earlier, recognition of the cultural and historical specificity of any text, and indeed, our own culturally and historically determined standpoint as readers, should not be evoked as a reason for setting out the impossibility of any judgement provided we approach the text with a certain vigilance regarding its conditions of production.

This same vigilance should also be extended to the present study since in its treatment of the relationship between the Algerian war and the writing about it, it is clearly not innocent. Even where it wishes to show the existence of conflicting analyses as they have been constituted across a disparate corpus of materials, the present study is involved in the process of selecting and reading texts, deciding which of them offers a more plausible explanation of the conflict and, on the basis of this operation, generating its own 'narrative'. As such, this work is not merely an overview of a debate about the reformability of colonialism but is itself a participant in it, and is subject to many of the same factors governing its production as the sources which it considers. It is for this reason that the term '(re)interpreting' has been included in the title since it suggests the nature of the relationship between the present study, the sources consulted and the Algerian war in itself.

Finally, it is appropriate to mention the position from which this thesis passes judgement on the colonial reformers and, in particular, the charge that they were guilty of Eurocentric attitudes in their plans for the transformation of Algeria. In the same way that Soustelle and the colonial reformers sought to move beyond *assimilation* by

offering the new goal of *intégration*, might it not be argued that the present study merely offers one more version of Western imperialist discourse about the colonial experience of the Algerian people? It is a dilemma neatly encapsulated by Norris:

How can 'we' (on our own terms) 'enlightened' and 'progressive' secular intellectuals presume to speak on behalf of [a] wider community without laying claim to a universal wisdom that suppresses difference and thus writes another chapter in the violent history of Western ethnocentrism?³⁸

The work of Edward Said and, in particular, his 1994 work *Representations of the Intellectual* can be seen to offer a defence of our position.³⁹ Attacking the 'endless talk about Judeo-Christian values, Afrocentric values, Muslim truths, Eastern truths, Western truths, each providing a complete program for excluding all the others', Said laments the fact that the 'result is an almost complete absence of universals'(pp.67-8), defining universality as:

taking a risk in order to go beyond the easy certainties provided us by our background, language, nationality, which so often shield us from the realities of others. It also means looking for and trying to uphold a single standard for human behaviour when it comes to such matters as foreign and social policy. (p. xii)

The extent to which it is possible to talk about universals in any meaningful way without simply articulating our own culturally specific values is, of course, an issue to which Said remains highly sensitised. Indeed, Said himself has done as much as any thinker to show the way in which imperial powers transformed their belief in the universality of their message into a vast Empire of world domination. The rhetoric produced by political leaders, he points out, often suggests that "'our" values (whatever those may happen to be) are in fact universal'(p.68). If this critique of Western hegemonic pretensions would be taken for granted by most contemporary exponents of postcolonial or literary theory, Said, nevertheless, writes of a 'truly vast array of opportunities despite postmodernism'(pp.13-4).⁴⁰ This vast array of opportunities seems to lie precisely in charting a path between the two extremes of seeing everything in terms of the local situations and power structures and the blithe

assumption that the dominant discourse of any given society has any axiomatic universal relevance. It is in accordance with the strategy advanced by Said in *Representations of the Intellectual* with his emphasis on tolerance, justice and racial non-discrimination as universals, whilst at the same time recognising the potential for universality to serve as a cover for cultural exploitation and the imposition of one's own values on other societies, that this thesis seeks to re-examine the question of *intégration*.

CHAPTER ONE

QUESTIONS TO THE REFORMERS

Around four months after taking up his position as Governor-General of Algeria in February 1955, Jacques Soustelle sent a communiqué to Edgar Faure (the head of the ruling coalition of the Fourth Republic at the time) setting out the components of his *intégration* programme:

L'*intégration* suppose:

- a. Que l'Algérie est une province ayant sa physionomie, sa 'personnalité' particulières, notamment sur le plan culturel, linguistique et religieux.
- b. Que l'économie, l'industrie et la monnaie de l'Algérie devront être complètement fusionnées avec celles de la métropole (...)
- c. Sur le plan politique, complète égalité de droits et de devoirs.¹

It was Algeria's Muslim inhabitants who were intended to be the chief beneficiaries of these measures. Since, in the vast majority of cases, they were poorer than the European settlers and the inhabitants of Metropolitan France, *intégration* offered extensive economic assistance; since they enjoyed fewer of the benefits of French citizenship, *intégration* promised new political rights; and since they had a different cultural and religious identity, *intégration* proposed to respect their particular 'personality'.

Although never challenging France's right to rule in Algeria, other advocates of colonial reform wrote about, and campaigned for, similar versions of this 'new deal' for Muslims. Whilst there were political differences and nuances of opinion between writers and activists who broadly favoured colonial reform, Soustelle's project captured the essence of their thinking.

The *intégration* project was, in part, launched in response to the pressing political and military imperatives placed upon the French following the outbreak of the rebellion in 1954. The victor, it was widely believed, would be the side that managed to win the 'hearts and minds' of the Muslim population. At the same time, the proposals for reform submitted by Soustelle were made in the context of an enduring French presence which was already a century and a quarter long. Reformers were aware that they were not acting in an historical vacuum; before they could talk about the future, they had to re-read the past. Inscribed within their strategies were a whole series of assumptions about the specifics of the 125-year-long French presence in Algeria and about colonialism in general. Whilst a comprehensive portrait of reformers' thinking will emerge over the course of this study when we examine their writing in more detail, the purpose of this chapter is to generate a series of accusations or challenges to be put to them as the basis for a more rigorous examination of their belief system.

The chapter begins with a discussion of France's *mission civilisatrice*, a set of ideas often articulated in pro-colonial discourse to provide a moral justification for the work of empire building in which the French had been engaged and in which reformers' ideas were rooted. The second section surveys in brief the results of French colonialism, highlighting the extent of the discrimination which Muslims suffered during the period of French rule. It seeks to show that, even if considered *on its own terms* as a genuine attempt to improve the lives of those upon whom it was visited, France's civilising mission must be deemed to be a failure.

Whilst the 'faux modèle de la République'² that was colonial Algeria did indeed contain political, economic and cultural indicators of a very real disparity between civilising rhetoric and the reality of French occupation, the nature of the 'gap' between them is far from straightforward in the colonial context. The third section provides a brief survey of the ideas of anti-colonial thinkers writing around the time of the Algerian war (Sartre, Memmi, Fanon) and, to a lesser extent, of historians writing

after 1962. These writers accounted for the disparity between rhetoric and reality by asserting that colonialism was, by definition, an immobile system of domination which did not allow for the transformation of the colonised. Drawing upon the same writers, the fourth section considers their argument that the nature of the colonial system was such that the colonised was compelled to rebel against it. The final section looks at the economic arguments for decolonisation as advanced by Raymond Aron, amongst others, who argued that there was little political will within mainland France to fund a process of widespread reform in Algeria.

The Civilising Mission

Assumptions of European Superiority

Attitudes towards imperial expansion in France and Britain, writes Edward Said, were characterised by ‘virtual unanimity that subject races should be ruled, that they are subject races, that one race deserves and has consistently earned the right to be considered the race whose main mission is to expand beyond its own domain’.³ Scholars of French imperialism such as Girardet and Ageron, whilst noting that imperial ‘France’ was not a unitary actor and that there was no absolute homogeneity of thought amongst those who advocated colonialism, have highlighted the extent to which the speeches made by supporters of French colonialism reveal a vocabulary permeated by notions of European supremacy and their duty to rule over the ‘inferior’ peoples to be found in Africa and Asia.⁴

France’s self-appointed *mission civilisatrice* justified the conquest and retention of overseas territories on the grounds that the nation had a duty to export the values of her political system, culture, expertise and patronage to what were perceived to be backward regions of the world. This mission presupposed the superiority of Western, and specifically French, forms of development and social organisation, favouring individual property rights over traditional concepts of communal ownership of land,

and settled communities over nomadic patterns of living. Drawing its rationale from the discourse of the Enlightenment, it took as given the universality of Western notions of science, medicine, education and progress and largely scorned the traditional knowledge and practices of indigenous societies. As Masao Miyoshi puts it: ‘This eighteenth-century universalism is part of the philosophy of progress and evolution that endorsed the nineteenth-century imperialism of the West.’⁵

Employing an ‘inside-outside’ paradigm to describe imperialist thinking, the American geographer James M. Blaut explains that, for colonialists, Europe and North America formed the ‘inside’, perceived as the location of all that was innovative, modern and developmental, whereas other countries were part of the ‘outside’, advancing more slowly and viewed as able only to copy the ideas originating in the ‘inside’.⁶ Blaut outlines opposing characteristics which, according to accepted imperial orthodoxy, separated the advanced ‘inside’ from the primitive ‘outside’:

<u>Inside</u>	<u>Outside</u>
Inventiveness	Imitateness
Rationality, intellect	Irrationality, emotion, instinct
Abstract thought	Concrete thought
Theoretical reasoning	Empirical, practical reasoning
Mind	Body, matter
Discipline	Spontaneity
Adulthood	Childhood
Sanity	Insanity
Science	Sorcery
Progress	Stagnation ⁷

Of course, this belief in European supremacy did not go unchallenged within France and within the territories subjected to French rule. By way of example, one might cite the intellectual resistance to French hegemonic pretensions brought by the *négritude* movement which flourished in the 1930s with Léopold Senghor and Aimé Césaire its

principal exponents. These writers sought to subvert the coloniser's hierarchy of values by attributing positive value to those aspects of colonial society deemed inferior according to Western conceptions of economic development and social behaviour.⁸ This proved to be a double-edged sword because, although critical of colonialism, at the same time it validated the coloniser's racially-inspired binary division of the world. As Wole Soyinka has argued:

Négritude stayed within a pre-set system of Eurocentric intellectual analysis of both man and his society, and tried to re-define the African and his society in those externalised terms.⁹

Blaut's own work can be conceptualised as an attempt to find a way out of this dilemma. His intention is to explain the characteristics that allowed European powers to conquer and rule distant lands (rather than the other way). He maintains that there were no cultural, natural or scientific reasons to account for it, challenging the notion that European civilisation 'has had some unique historical advantage, some special quality of race or culture or environment or spirit of mind, which gives this human community a permanent superiority over all other communities, at all times in history and down to the present'.¹⁰ The belief system which ascribed primacy to European civilisation and which fostered the ideology of colonialism is deconstructed and replaced with Blaut's own version of the nineteenth-century notion of the 'psychic unity of mankind' which ascribed equal potential for inventiveness and innovation to all peoples (p.12).

The year 1492 is an important date for him. Europe, he argues, enjoyed no developmental advantages over African and Asian societies at this time. Any ascendancy which Europe gained post-1492 can be attributed specifically to the flow of wealth into the continent generated by the colonisation of America. This conferred an enormous advantage upon European powers which allowed them to overtake Asia and Africa in terms of material development and, ultimately, to colonise them (pp.152-3). Despite certain inconsistencies in the argument, Blaut's narrative does

provide a theory which presents European dominance over Africa and Asia as itself dependent upon, and explicable in terms of, an earlier colonisation.¹¹ It thereby challenges, albeit retrospectively, the claims of nineteenth century colonialists to a natural right to rule.

Unfortunately, Blaut's somewhat mystical-sounding notions of the 'psychic unity of mankind' did not enjoy much currency at the time of colonial expansion. The technological advantage which the European imperial powers enjoyed over the territories which they would go on to conquer was almost certainly instrumental both in creating, and then in reinforcing, the received wisdom of the Metropolitan centres regarding the non-white inhabitants of the globe. Precisely because European countries had undergone a more extensive process of development than countries in Africa and Asia, giving them an economic and technological ascendancy which allowed them to expand territorially, they felt superior. As Said comments, 'Europe *did* command the world; the imperial map *did* license the cultural vision' (his emphasis).¹² As he illustrates both in *Orientalism* and in *Culture and Imperialism*, this became a self-reinforcing process in which the representation of the non-European 'Other' in everything from anthropological studies, through the works of little known travel writers to some of the canonical texts of Western European literature, served to reinforce dominant cultural stereotypes in the West.¹³

'Savages' into Frenchmen

In order to describe the process by which supporters of imperialism assumed 'progress' and 'civilisation' moved across the world from the European centre to the non-European periphery, Blaut uses the term diffusionism. Summarising the essence of diffusionist thinking, he writes:

Colonialism, including settler colonialism, brings civilization to non-Europe; (it) is in fact the natural way that the non-European world advances out of its stagnation, backwardness and traditionalism.¹⁴

Whereas the belief in the inherent superiority of the European powers provided no more than a Darwinian justification for colonialism in the name of the right of the stronger, the professed interest in the diffusionist aspect of imperialism as ‘purveyor of progress’ allowed colonialism to appear legitimate to those whose ideological persuasions might more logically have led them to oppose it. It permitted them to resolve, in their own minds at least, the contradiction which lay at the very heart of the civilising mission: whilst the French promised to spread democracy, civil liberties and individual rights to the far-flung corners of the globe, it was only through violating these very principles on the back of French military conquest and through the initial subjugation of other peoples to French rule that the civilising mission could begin. Hiding this contradiction entailed a neat juggling trick recognised by Fanon, who, whilst condemning the attitude of the Western bourgeoisie towards the colonised as a dehumanising ‘racisme de mépris’, nonetheless saw that the promise of equality was the way in which colonial ideology ‘se débrouille pour rester logique avec elle-même en invitant les sous-hommes à s’humaniser à travers le type d’humanité occidentale qu’elle incarne’.¹⁵

Girardet has observed that French imperialism was underpinned by a discourse which held that the extension of French sovereignty and all it brought with it could only be beneficial for those to whom it was extended. Whilst a certain pride was taken in imperial conquests, Girardet stresses that raising the French flag over new lands was equally ‘le symbole d’une certaine forme de civilisation, d’une conception de l’homme, de tout un ensemble de valeurs spirituelles’. The French saw themselves as marked out by Providence to play a special civilising role, driven by ‘la conviction que l’établissement de la suzeraineté française ne peut qu’être éminemment bienfaisante pour les peuples sur lesquels elle s’étend’.¹⁶ The final stage in this transformative process was *assimilation*; through French generosity, the colonial subjects would gradually be transformed into Frenchmen and women. French imperialism was thus animated by a rhetoric which Jack Hayward has labelled a kind of ‘cultural self-

confidence' which assumed that France could convert any nation in the world into French citizens.¹⁷

Faith in France's imperial vocation united republicans and the Catholic Church with the result that, as Michel Winock has pointed out, France was 'doublement missionnaire, au nom des Lumières et au nom de la foi chrétienne'.¹⁸ This was remarkable in the sense that Church and Republic were so often the bitterest enemies over the principle of *laïcité*, although more understandable when we consider that the ideal of converting 'savages' was common both to the missionary and the pro-colonial republican. Even Socialists, with Jaurès the most frequently cited example, saw no absolute contradiction between the retention of a colonial Empire and France's claim to promote freedom, democracy and the cause of the oppressed. As Winock puts it:

Aux yeux d'un Jaurès, adversaire de l'impérialisme, la colonisation française n'était pas perverse en soi: elle contribuait à civiliser, elle était une étape du progrès humain, pourvu qu'elle soit convaincue de ce devoir.¹⁹

A further example of the complicity of the Left with France's civilising mission can be seen in the attitude of Claude Bourdet. Although he was to become one of the leading activists in the anti-colonial lobby during the course of the Algerian war, Bourdet admitted to having taken a long time to become aware that the notion of the inherent superiority of French values could be challenged. As he was to comment in an interview conducted in October 1978:

Les hommes de gauche de ma génération ne percevaient pas le problème colonial. J'ai passé toutes les années de la Résistance sans songer une seconde à l'émancipation des peuples colonisés. L'idée qu'ils puissent aspirer à autre chose qu'à être français me paraissait incongrue.²⁰

Bourdet's recognition of the Left's failure to conceive of French colonialism as problematic reveals another component element of the civilising mission - the belief that the French were welcomed by the native population. Bourdet explains the lingering confidence in the magnanimity of the French colonial enterprise by pointing

out that by the time of the Algerian war, the benevolence of French intentions had been written into France's cultural history: 'Pendant cent cinquante ans, les petits Français ont continué à apprendre quel rôle généreux et civilisateur jouait la France.'²¹ It is a point confirmed by Jean-Baptiste Duroselle who observes that for many generations French schoolchildren were not only taught that the Empire contributed to French power and prestige but equally 'that the French were better colonisers than others, that the Blacks and Africans liked and welcomed them'.²²

The 'Harmony of Interests'

In order to give some indication of the context in which the ideology of the civilising mission was elaborated, it should be emphasised that those colonial supporters who professed their faith in France's great humanitarian vocation to spread her values across the world did not reject the additional benefits which colonialism might bring. The writing of pro-colonial Frenchmen from around 1870 onwards in the wake of defeat in the Franco-Prussian war revealed a number of different motivations for the acquisition and maintenance of an overseas Empire. Surveying the decade from 1871-1881 and analysing the writings of a number of theorists of colonialism such as Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, Gabriel Charmes, Paul Gaffarel and l'Abbé Raboisson, Agnes Murphy argues that 'no Imperialist Frenchman of that era viewed colonial policy from a single point of view'.²³ She identifies a number of key themes in the discourse of these figures and concludes from this that we should reject the 'systematic classification of motivation into patriotism, international rivalry, science, commerce, industry, propagation of the Gospel, civilisation of backward peoples'.²⁴ Stuart Persell offers a similar analysis: 'Precisely because no single purpose animated the actions of imperialists, historians must now assume the confluence of several causal factors as the best way to explain a multifaceted historical epoch.'²⁵

That there were a plurality of reasons invoked to justify French overseas expansion is evident from the ideas of Jules Ferry, one of the leading advocates of imperialism in the 1880s. In addition to highlighting France's civilising duties, the 'Ferry doctrine' stressed the economic advantage and the gains in national prestige to be had from the possession of Empire. As Daniel Leconte puts it: 'Elle rassemble dans une doctrine homogène les arguments de marchands, les générosités d'humanistes et les rêves de grandeur des nationalistes.'²⁶ The analysis of Smith and Girardet has shown that the same arguments were echoed by advocates of colonialism, albeit modified by the changing international political climate, up to and beyond the outbreak of the Algerian war.²⁷ In other words, colonialists saw an unproblematic co-existence, or 'harmony of interests', between commercial gain, the acquisition of national prestige and the fulfilment of the civilising burden of educating the 'savage'.²⁸ In French eyes, it was a 'win-win' strategy for all concerned in which France could gain economically and augment her international standing whilst transferring the gifts of French civilisation to the indigenous populations of the conquered lands.

The One and Indivisible Republic

Before leaving this brief overview of the French colonial idea, we should note the particular place of choice which Algeria enjoyed within the French Empire. The ties between France and Algeria were both territorial and human. In 1848, Algeria was legally incorporated as an integral part of the French nation. It also became an important *colonie de peuplement* to a far greater extent than its near neighbours Tunisia and Morocco. Without the presence of a million or so European settlers, it seems unlikely that the French would have gone to such lengths to resist the advent of Algerian independence.

A mixture of French, Spanish, Italian and Maltese descent, settlers were keen to stress their particular status as Algerian Frenchmen.²⁹ As Stora has observed: 'Quelle que

soit leur origine, ils se considèrent comme appartenant à une “France algérienne”, les “Français de France” étant perçus comme des compatriotes différents.’³⁰ Despite this insistence on their particular status as Algerian, the Europeans were fiercely patriotic, always observing the days of national commemoration with more verve than was shown in mainland France, an ambiguous relationship neatly expressed by Camille Brière who writes of the ‘régionalisme particulier’ of the settler community and by Stora who refers to their ‘nationalisme extrême’.³¹ The cultural divide and the geographical distance which separated Algeria’s European population from Metropolitan France created, according to Stora, a psychological need amongst settlers to be accepted as true Frenchmen and women: ‘Pour se faire aimer, se faire comprendre de la mère trop lointaine, les *pieds-noirs* n’auront de cesse de pratiquer une surenchère nationaliste.’³²

The rampant nationalism of the settlers coupled with the legal status of Algeria meant that the principle of the One and Indivisible French Republic was extended to Algeria, with the Mediterranean seen as dividing it from the Hexagon in the same way that the Seine divided Paris. Of course, this claim never stood up to close scrutiny since Algeria was never administered as though it were merely one more French province. Nevertheless, as we shall see, it exerted a powerful influence on the thinking of even some of the most liberal thinkers in France during the 1954-62 conflict.³³

Bilan de la présence française

Despite the outbreak of nationalist violence in 1954, there was no shortage of figures from amongst Algeria's settler community and within mainland France itself prepared to wax lyrical about the marvellous results which the French colonial presence had achieved. The 1955 conference report of *l'Assemblée des Présidents des Chambres de Commerce de France et de l'Union française* offers a particularly striking example of this.³⁴ According to the report, pre-colonial Algeria was a barren land, subject to ‘la

plus complète anarchie' for which the French presence had substituted peace, security and economic prosperity (p.2). Thanks to the efforts of administrators, industrial workers, the business community and farmers, all of whom 'n'avaient pas hésité à répondre à l'appel du Gouvernement pour aller mettre en valeur ces territoires nouveaux', France had brought to Algeria real economic and social progress in which she could have 'une légitime fierté' (p.2). Nor was it to be assumed that only the settler population had reaped the rewards of this transformative endeavour; the indigenous population had also benefited from French expertise: 'Loin d'être accomplie dans un but égoïste, cette œuvre profite en très grande partie aux autochtones qui possèdent la plus grande part des terres cultivables' (p.3). Rather than simply reproduce the 'harmony of interests' thesis by stressing that French economic gain from the colonies was offset by the 'gift' of civilisation, the report claimed that France had been doubly generous: not only had she provided culture and civilisation but she had also developed the Algerian territory 'au prix d'un apport de capitaux pour lesquels il ne peut être question d'une rentabilité normale' (p.3).

The report presented the education of the Muslims as the very paragon of the French civilising role, boldly proclaiming: 'L'éducation de la population a toujours été un des principaux soucis de la France' (p.2). French school teachers had been sent to North Africa and, once there, had instituted the same educational opportunities for all children, regardless of ethnic background, with a view to providing equal opportunities in the work place. This teaching had struck a balance between respect for indigenous Muslim culture and Western rationalism:

Si elle n'a jamais cherché à faire oublier la culture musulmane, si même elle a développé ses moyens d'expression et de pénétration, elle a également fait connaître aux musulmans les disciplines occidentales. (p.2)

Further unadulterated praise for France's civilising genius was to be found in a speech made at Verdun on 17 June 1956 by the (then) President of the Republic, René Coty. Although ostensibly commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the historic battle

fought at Verdun during World War One, Coty was also keen to praise French achievements in Algeria. For Coty, France's benevolent civilising enterprise had been undertaken for the good of all Algeria's citizens, Muslims and Europeans alike. He praised 'l'œuvre magnifique' that for 125 years successive generations had worked tirelessly to construct and which had resulted in 'une si prodigieuse métamorphose'.³⁵ The French, he continued in his speech, were driven by the goal of spreading the revolutionary ideal of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity: 'Nous saurons là-bas autour du drapeau tricolore réaliser toujours plus de liberté, d'égalité et de fraternité', he announced triumphantly.³⁶

A Divided Society

On the basis of such statements alone, a visitor to Algeria in 1955 might have expected to find deserts in bloom, a flourishing economy, and Muslim and European children strolling hand-in-hand to school; in sum, a land of prosperous, happy citizens playing their full role in a democratic, multicultural French Republic. Even the briefest of snapshots of the reality of French colonial practice reveals the veritable *pays de cocagne* constructed in pro-colonial discourse to be a gross distortion of the truth: widespread poverty and unemployment, political under-representation and high rates of illiteracy were the defining characteristics of Algeria's indigenous population at the time of the outbreak of hostilities. The vast difference between the lifestyles enjoyed by the settler population and those of the indigenous population was encapsulated in Fanon's portrait of the colonial city as a site of racially-determined division. Alongside the clean, sanitised, planned space inhabited by the coloniser lay the sprawling, uncontrolled misery of the colonised - two mutually exclusive worlds, separated by the police and Army whose function was to prevent the encroachment of the colonised into the European citadel (DT,8).

Economically, Algeria was a fractured society, a land of enormous contrast between the European settlers and the indigenous population. In 1948, Muslims earned on average an estimated 16,000 old Francs per year whilst the European equivalent was 450,000 Francs.³⁷ In the words of Droz and Lever, Algeria had 'le visage d'un pays moderne et bien équipé' with 'une économie européenne en pleine expansion'. Yet three quarters of the Algerian population, almost without exception Muslim, lived in poverty. For the rapidly expanding Muslim population, 'le volume des ressources oscillait dangereusement entre la stagnation et la récession'.³⁸

The situation in which Algeria's Muslim population found itself in 1954 was, in fact, the culmination of a whole catalogue of discriminatory measures designed to keep them in a subordinate place. In 1840, a decree confiscated land from all those indigenous Algerians who had taken up arms against the French in the initial resistance to French rule. Following this, the Ordinances of 1844 and 1846 allowed the confiscation of non-developed land for which no justifiable titles under French law were held before 1830. In 1870, following a revolt in Kabylia, several million acres of land were confiscated from Muslims by way of punishment. An Act passed in 1863 which had proclaimed tribes to be the rightful owners of land they had enjoyed in perpetuity, was offset by the Warnier Act of 1873. This later Act made communal land available for sale and which, once sold, remained subject to French land codes.

Economic domination was permitted by, and went hand-in-hand with, European monopolisation of political power in Algeria. Under a law passed in 1865, Muslims became French subjects and were permitted access to the French Army and to minor civil functions. French citizenship, however, could only be obtained by abandoning personal status under Muslim civil law on such matters as marriage, divorce and inheritance. Indeed, perhaps the one area where the French fully applied a policy of *assimilation* was in the extension of military service to Muslims who were thus

expected to comply with the most dangerous of duties incumbent upon fully-fledged French citizens whilst receiving few of their rights.

In 1919, in recognition of the efforts of the Muslims who had fought in the French Army during the First World War, legislation was introduced which allowed a limited number of them access to French citizenship, again with the proviso that they abandon their personal status. Since by 1936, only a few thousand naturalisations had taken place, the Blum-Violette project of that year proposed that a number of educated Algerians (around 25,000 from a population of 6 million) could become French citizens without this precondition. Such was the resistance of the European settlers to this initiative that it was not even discussed in the French parliament.

The discrimination continued after the Second World War. The 1947 Statute of Algeria created an elected Algerian Assembly which had the power to modify laws passed in Metropolitan France which were of relevance to Algeria. This Assembly, comprising 120 seats, was elected by two separate colleges, each electing the same number of *députés*. The first college comprised all French citizens which, Horne reports, numbered about 500,000 in 1954, and around 60,000 Muslims who were considered sufficiently 'Europeanised' to belong to this group.³⁹ The second electoral college contained the Muslim voters (excluding the women who had not yet been enfranchised and many thousands of males whose details were not held by the French authorities and consequently were not registered to vote), with the result that the vote of a European effectively counted around ten times more than that of a Muslim. Whilst the 1947 Statute contained a number of relatively liberal propositions including the extension of the right of suffrage to Muslim women, a more equitable administration system, and the teaching of Arabic to all levels, these measures relied upon the Algerian Assembly for their ratification. With half of the seats in this Assembly held by the *pieds-noirs* and a two-thirds majority required to pass any legislation, Algeria's European population had an effective veto over any measure

considered too progressive. Moreover, the French were not averse to election rigging in order to ensure that any Muslims with nationalist leanings were kept away from the Assembly. The most striking example was the 1948 elections which were systematically falsified by the Governor-General, Marcel Naegelen to ensure that Muslims favourable to the French presence and unlikely to question the *status quo* were elected.⁴⁰

The French also attempted to silence those amongst the Muslim community most vocal in their calls for change. Messali Hadj, one of the earliest advocates of independence, was imprisoned or exiled on several occasions for his involvement in various political groupings which had called into question the legitimacy of the French presence. More moderate Muslims, such as Ferhat Abbas, a partisan of *assimilation* until the failure of the Blum-Violette project, saw their claims for an equalisation of rights and status constantly fall on deaf ears. As Hocine Aït-Ahmed, one of the founders of the FLN pointed out, the French commitment to Liberty, Equality and Fraternity smacked of arrant hypocrisy:

D'un côté, il y avait la République française avec tous ses acquis démocratiques dont on nous avait parlé à l'école, la liberté, la fraternité, l'égalité...De l'autre, il y avait en Algérie un Etat colon où nous, les musulmans, n'avions pas les mêmes droits que les Européens.⁴¹

Judging by the figures, one might add that Aït-Ahmed was relatively unusual in having had the opportunity to go to school at all. In 1954, only 12.7% of Muslims of the appropriate age were educated and the illiteracy rate amongst the indigenous population was 90%.⁴²

Behind the electoral chicanery, the quasi-institutionalised political apartheid and the economic domination enjoyed by the settler population lay the very real threat of military repression. Outbreaks of nationalist violence invariably met with an even more violent response on the part of the French Army. Perhaps the most striking example prior to 1954 coincided with the end of the Second World War when

Muslims in the small Algerian town of Sétif marked V.E. day with pro-independence demonstrations culminating in the massacre of around 100 Europeans, with many others wounded. The response of the French Army was bloody and disproportionate. Even the lowest estimates put the death toll exacted by the French forces at around 1,000, whilst Algerian nationalists and their sympathisers placed the total nearer to 45,000.⁴³

The brevity of our survey of French colonialism naturally means that much is omitted. Rival statistics to the ones mobilised above could be cited to offer a more positive image of the French colonial presence. Certainly, the French built some schools and hospitals as the apologists for the continuation of the French presence, *ultras* and reformers alike, were keen to proclaim. Nevertheless, even the basic *rappel des faits* offered here makes a damning case against the French.

The Impossibility of Reform

For leading anti-colonial writers, it was not simply a case of disputing statistics. The miserable state in which Algeria's indigenous population found itself was not to be seen as an aberration, but was more properly to be regarded as the desired and inevitable product of colonialism. The sincerity of the coloniser's intentions was rejected, with any talk of helping the indigenous people a rhetorical side-show not to be taken seriously. To consider the 'gap' between rhetoric and reality as constituting a failure of French colonialism was largely to miss the point since the colonial system did not, by definition, permit the possibility of its closure.

For radical anti-colonialists, the coloniser's unwillingness to accept reform was both psychological and economic. Although not talking specifically about Algeria, Fanon in his work *Peau noire, masques blancs* challenged the notion that the French were concerned with the development of the indigenous peoples over whom they had

established their rule. He argued that the settlers and administrators within the colonial territories did not even pay lip service to this idea; Blacks and North Africans were considered to be fundamentally incapable of adopting the principles of French civilisation, incapable of logical reasoning and receptive only to the use of force. The European superiority complex did not only manifest itself in overt demonstrations of racism but equally in the paternalistic attitudes adopted by the coloniser towards the colonised. Fanon noted by way of example the way in which Europeans always addressed blacks in pidgin French, imprisoning the colonised within the subordinate role: 'Parler, petit-nègre, c'est enfermer le Noir'.⁴⁴ He continued along similar lines in *Les damnés de la terre*: 'L'indigène est déclaré imperméable à l'éthique, absence de valeurs, mais aussi négation des valeurs. Il est, osons l'avouer, l'ennemi des valeurs' (DT,10). Colonial subjects, relegated to the status of animals and described by a 'langage zoologique' (DT,11), could be deprived of the rights which Europeans enjoyed. In short, it was the original belief in the superiority of the colonial power which provided the ground upon which the racism of the colonial situation was based. Since the settlers believed themselves to be superior, they could not be persuaded to treat the colonial subjects as their equals.

In *Peau noire, masques blancs*, he draws upon Césaire's critique of the complicity of European liberalism with the holocaust to show that all involved with colonialism were guilty of endorsing the racism of the system. Whilst in *L'an V de la révolution algérienne*, he highlights the positive role played by some of the democrats in France and certain members of the European community in Algeria, those picked out for praise are not those who sought to reform colonialism but Europeans who had transcended the racial divide to join the forces of the rebellion.⁴⁵ In *Les damnés de la terre* he reverts to his earlier line:

Ce que le colonisé a vu sur son sol, c'est qu'on pouvait impunément l'arrêter, le frapper, l'affamer; et aucun professeur de morale jamais, aucun curé jamais, n'est venu recevoir les coups à sa place ni partager son pain avec lui. (DT, 12)

Les damnés de la terre was prefaced by Sartre whose critique of colonialism, whilst written from a European perspective, was nonetheless equally condemnatory. His 1956 article 'Le colonialisme est un système' follows a fairly orthodox Marxist-Leninist line in its presentation of colonialism as a deliberate attempt to derive economic advantage: 'La France a, du premier jour, dépossédé et refoulé les Algériens, puisqu'elle les a traités comme un bloc inassimilable, toute l'œuvre française en Algérie a été accomplie au profit des colons'.⁴⁶ In short, the misery and the despair of the Muslim population were 'l'effet direct et nécessaire du colonialisme' and would persist for as long as the colonial system was in existence (p.40).

Since colonialism was a totalising, immobile system which depended, for its very existence, on the absence of change, the notion that the settler community might embrace reform was a contradiction in terms. Sartre did not believe that any liberal grouping within that community would be able to take a reforming lead for the simple reason that one could not distinguish one type of coloniser from another: 'Il n'est pas vrai qu'il y ait de bons colons et d'autres qui soient méchants: il y a des colons, c'est tout' (p.27). In his preface to Memmi's *Portrait du colonisé*, he stressed the way in which racism was ingrained in the very logic of colonialism. In order to reduce the cost of labour, the coloniser required the multiplication of the indigenous population. Yet such was the numerical superiority of the indigenous population that they could not be accorded democratic rights since this would immediately lead to the end of the colonial system. By not according these rights, the coloniser was compelled to see the colonised as sub-human: 'Le colonialisme refuse les *droits de l'homme* à des hommes qu'il a soumis par la violence, qu'il maintient de force dans la misère et l'ignorance, donc, comme dirait Marx, en état de sous-humanité'.⁴⁷

Memmi was less militant in his critique of colonialism than either Sartre or Fanon. As a Tunisian of Jewish faith he hovered, by his own admission, between the worlds of

the coloniser and the colonised. A thread of liberal humanism runs through his seminal critique of colonialism, *Portrait du colonisé*. For this reason, Girardet, in his classification of four types of anti-colonialism, considers Memmi's writing to form part of 'la protestation humaniste' as opposed to the 'messianisme révolutionnaire' which he ascribes to Fanon and Sartre.⁴⁸ However, unlike the colonial reformers and even the liberal anti-colonialists about whom we will say more in Chapter Five, Memmi did not believe that colonialism could be redeemed in any way. He exposed the impossibility of a liberal outcome to the colonial situation even where this revelation was marked by a tinge of regret. For this reason, his views are incorporated in this study with those of the militant anti-colonialists.

Memmi, like Sartre and Fanon, condemned what he saw as the lack of sincerity in French promises to transform the indigenous population. Realising the injustice of the colonial system, the behaviour of the 'colonisateur qui s'accepte' was driven by the 'la condamnation fondamentale que tout colonialiste porte au fond de lui-même' (PC,80). The triumphalism demonstrated towards settler achievements in Algeria derived from the coloniser's 'soif de justification' which created a psychological need to valorise his own events whilst simultaneously denigrating everything connected with those whose place he had usurped (PC,77). The enthusiastic support for, and participation in, the parades which marked days of national commemoration corresponded to 'un besoin profond de la vie coloniale' which served both to reassure the coloniser that his privileged place was not under threat and to impress the colonised (PC,83).

Memmi also attempted to explain the way in which reform was antithetical to the functioning of the colonial economy. Colonialism was not, in reality, intended to lead to the progressive emancipation of the colonial subjects:

Les motifs économiques de l'entreprise coloniale sont aujourd'hui mis en lumière par tous les historiens de la colonisation ; personne ne croit plus à la *mission* culturelle et morale, même originelle, du colonisateur. (PC,33)

The entire colonial system was based on the privileges enjoyed by the coloniser at the expense of the colonised: the coloniser enjoyed high living standards because those of the colonised were so low, he could benefit from a cheap and plentiful labour supply by exploiting the colonised, and, through his monopolisation of the legislative process, he was able to enshrine these practices in law (PC,37). For this reason, *assimilation* was never seriously contemplated:

La véritable raison, la raison première de la plupart de ses carences est celle-ci: le colonialiste n'a jamais décidé de transformer la colonie à l'image de la métropole, et le colonisé à son image. *Il ne peut admettre une telle adéquation qui détruirait le principe de ses privilèges.* (PC,91)

Since colonial society was supposed to be static rather than evolving, the coloniser mobilised all methods available to prevent the evolution of the colonised: 'Tout est mis en œuvre, enfin, pour que le colonisé ne puisse franchir le pas' (PC,141). For Memmi, even if colonialism was to be considered on its own terms, the benefits enjoyed by the indigenous people at the cost of their freedom were negligible:

Après plusieurs décennies de colonisation, la foule des enfants dans la rue l'emporte de si loin sur ceux qui sont en classe ! Le nombre des lits d'hôpitaux est si dérisoire devant celui des malades, l'intention des tracés routiers est si claire, si désinvolte à l'égard du colonisé, si étroitement soumise aux besoins du colonisateur ! Pour ce peu, vraiment, la colonisation n'était pas indispensable. (PC,131-2)

Memmi was prepared to concede that there were some colonialists who genuinely desired reform. Yet the possibility that colonial oppression might be successfully resisted from within the settler community was to be discounted. In the strict dichotomy between coloniser and colonised, the very fact of being born into the settler community located the reformer as part of the oppressor group from which there was no escape:

La situation coloniale est de relation de peuple à peuple. Or, [le colonisateur de gauche] fait partie du peuple oppresseur et sera, qu'il le veuille ou non, condamné à partager son destin, comme il en a partagé la fortune. (PC,64)

Such was the nature of the system that the coloniser of good will was condemned to an irrelevant role. 'Les relations coloniales', Memmi asserted, 'ne relèvent pas de la bonne volonté ou du geste individuel' (PC,64). It mattered little that the coloniser may have behaved humanely towards the members of the indigenous population with whom he came into contact. Since the colonial divide operated upon the society as a whole, the coloniser of good will, even if in no way guilty of oppression as an individual had a collective responsibility 'en tant que membre d'un groupe national oppresseur' (PC,65).

Contemporary historians, even those who have nothing of the doctrinaire anti-colonialism which characterises a figure as politically committed as Sartre, and even where their analysis is less condemnatory, have largely upheld the twin themes that colonialism was by design oppressive and that the settlers were unwilling to contemplate reform. Horne's reading of French colonial expansion is essentially one of dispossession and exploitation.⁴⁹ Droz and Lever, contemporary historians who are at times prepared to accept a certain amount of good will amongst some of those involved in the French colonial enterprise, are nevertheless highly critical of the destabilising effects of the French conquest on indigenous Algerian society. They emphasise the way in which competition from France ruined artisan industry in Algeria whilst the native farmers were jointly afflicted by expropriation, tax and the integration of Algeria into a market economy. French colonialism could be characterised as 'une entreprise consciente de destruction de la société musulmane et de ses institutions traditionnelles par l'introduction modulée du droit français.' In their eyes, the policy of *assimilation* was, in fact, 'une politique de soumission'.⁵⁰

Stora places particular emphasis on the period immediately after the First World War during which economic power became increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few settlers. Loans which were obtained to finance land irrigation programmes led to the concentration of land amongst a small sector of the settler population, while the

development of mechanisation led many small farmers into debt, ruining the artisan and causing massive unemployment amongst native Algerians, prompting them to go to France in search of work. This process of concentration of power continued during the 1930s, again working to the detriment of the Muslims with many peasants displaced to less fertile land where the soils were subject to erosion.⁵¹ He also emphasises the extent to which the unanimity of settler views on reform were fashioned by the colonial system. Although a divided community in terms of ethnic origin, political affiliation, and place of residence, their status as French citizens, denied to the Muslims, welded them into a single block.⁵²

Leconte, despite his own *pied-noir* origins, accepts, albeit to a lesser extent, that the settler community spoke with one unyielding voice. Whilst sympathetic to the 'ordinary' settler, Leconte argues that by controlling the commanding heights of colonial society, the *gros colons* succeeded in imposing their perspective upon the rest of the population:

Le gros colonat contrôle le Crédit agricole, la presse, l'administration et la police ; en somme tous les secteurs de la société civile algérienne. Le dispositif colonial est donc en place pour empêcher toute autre expression que la sienne qui, seule, sera la norme.⁵³

Smith highlights the way in which the settlers sought to exclude the indigenous population from the process of industrialisation and modernisation. In the face of a rising birth rate amongst the indigenous population, per capita production amongst rural Muslims underwent a dramatic decline. Yet Europeans were not willing to allow the Muslim sector of the economy to modernise since this would have resulted in unwelcome competition. Where industry did develop in Algeria, the primary concern of the French was to find Europeans to work in these industries. Economic domination functioned in tandem with the monopolisation of political power in order to deny Muslims access to power.⁵⁴

This description of deliberate exploitation does not square with the image which we presented earlier in the chapter of a France convinced of the merits of her civilising mission, even where this was tempered by the mistaken belief that there was a 'harmony of interests' between commercial advantage and the provision of French culture. It is therefore useful to draw a distinction between the settler community and the colonial establishment as whole. Commentators have contrasted the partial willingness of governments in Paris to press ahead with reform with the reluctance of the settler population to see any such reforms put into place. Writing in *Foreign Affairs* in 1960, Joseph Kraft portrayed the settlers as 'an oppressive, authoritarian movement aimed at asserting mastery over both the native population in Algeria and the government in France'.⁵⁵ Smith has noted that the differences in scholarly provision and educational achievement between Muslim children and their European counterparts was not simply a question of neglect but the result of a deliberate policy choice by politicians and administrators representing the European settler population.⁵⁶ Summarising the record of the French colonial presence in Algeria, he comments:

One searches the historical record in vain for a single instance of a generous gesture by the European community to the Muslims. The settlers combated without exception every measure by Paris to improve the lot of the Muslim population.⁵⁷

From the evidence available, those in Paris who were sincere in their belief that France should move towards a more equitable colonial relationship did not appear to be in a position to greatly influence the development of French colonial policy.

The Inevitable Rejection of Colonialism

For the anti-colonialists, the logic of the colonial system operated not only upon the coloniser but also upon the colonised. As Fanon put it: 'La situation coloniale uniformise les rapports, elle dichotomise la société coloniale de façon tranchée' (SR, 113). Memmi adopted a similar tone: 'De même que le colonisateur est tenté de

s'accepter comme colonisateur, le colonisé est obligé, pour vivre, de s'accepter comme colonisé' (PC,110).

Once colonisation had taken place, there was a certain extent to which the indigenous people adhered to colonisation (PC,109). In order to attempt to escape from the colonial situation, the first step taken by the colonised was to attempt to become like the coloniser (PC,137). The initial love of the coloniser was linked in Memmi's mind with the colonised's own self-hate. *Assimilation* entailed a deliberate process of denial of the self and of one's own cultural identity: 'Au nom de ce qu'il souhaite devenir, il [le colonisé] s'acharne à s'appauvrir, à s'arracher de lui-même' (PC,138). The colonised became engaged in a systematic process of self-denial: skin colour, hair colour, art, music, and customs all had to be discarded in order to resemble the coloniser. Eventually, however, the colonised came to hate this process of self-destruction and wilful effacement of his own identity:

Le candidat à l'assimilation en arrive, presque toujours, à se lasser du prix exorbitant qu'il lui faut payer, et dont il n'a jamais fini de s'acquitter. Il découvre aussi avec effroi *tout* le sens de sa tentative. Le moment est dramatique où il comprend qu'il a repris à son compte les accusations et les condamnations du colonisateur ; qu'il s'habitue à regarder les siens avec les yeux de leur procureur. (PC,140)

The implacable logic of colonialism led the colonised to reject *assimilation*. 'La situation coloniale, par sa propre fatalité intérieure, appelle la révolte. Car la situation coloniale ne peut être aménagée ; tel un carcan, elle ne peut qu'être brisée' (PC,144).

Like Memmi, Fanon saw an almost inevitable historical logic behind the revolt of the colonised. In *Peau noire masques blancs* published five years before Memmi's *Portrait du colonisé*, he had argued that the Black acquiesced in his oppression and developed an inferiority complex towards the white coloniser; to be white was seen as a way out of misery, Blacks saw the acquisition of the French language as a sign of evolution and black women wanted to be white (PN,41). In *L'an V de la révolution algérienne*, the period of acceptance had given way to a violent rejection of

colonialism. The work depicts an indigenous population virtually unanimous in its rejection of the colonial situation and all its trappings. For Fanon, everything French or imported from France was tainted and was inevitably rejected by the Algerian people even where what was on offer was, objectively speaking, of benefit to them. The radio, seen as a symbol of modernity, was rejected because it broadcast the views of the colonial oppressor and even Western style medical techniques and European doctors were rejected because they belonged to the oppressor, synonymous in the minds of the Algerian people with teachers, engineers and paratroopers. (SR, 109). However, when it served the interests of the rebellion, attitudes towards modernity shifted dramatically and change was embraced (SR, 113-4).

In *Les damnés de la terre*, Fanon synthesises and refines his earlier positions and seeks to distinguish between the reaction to colonialism of the intellectual elite within the indigenous society and that of the masses. It was the members of the former group who sought to ingratiate themselves with the coloniser by undertaking 'l'acquisition forcée de la culture de l'occupant' whilst at the same time criticising their own culture (DT,166-7). Since their energy had been devoted to gaining entrance to the world of the coloniser, this colonised elite, whilst proclaiming the need for more freedom, did not want to see the system fundamentally overturned and therefore stopped short of recommending revolutionary violence (DT,24). Condemned by Fanon as the lap dogs of colonialism, this elite formed 'une sorte de classe d'esclaves libérés individuellement' or 'esclaves affranchis' and their claims were thus restricted to 'la possibilité d'organiser une authentique classe d'affranchis' (DT, 25).

Fanon placed a much greater and a perhaps over-optimistic faith in the masses who he regarded as the truly revolutionary element within colonial society. When faced with the coloniser's deliberate attempt to destroy the indigenous culture, the masses took refuge in their traditional cultural practices. Whilst the violent reaction of the masses to colonial oppression was initially turned inwards and exacted upon their own

community (DT,18-19), the exploitation, misery, famine resulting from this oppression eventually led them to realise the need for a violent confrontation with colonialism and to reject the coloniser's values (DT, 168).

Propaganda produced by the FLN during the conflict largely sought to present the Muslim population as united in its bid to overthrow colonialism. Thus an article appearing in an FLN newspaper in 1957:

Le FLN est devenu une organisation puissante, plongeant ses racines profondes dans toutes les couches du peuple: paysans et étudiants, ouvriers et commerçants, femmes et jeunes, tous les Algériens sont mobilisés dans la lutte libératrice.

Le FLN est partout dans tout le pays, dans chaque ville, village, mechta, quartier, entreprise, ferme, université, collège.⁵⁸

For Alain, one of the characters in Jean-Louis Hurst's novel *Le déserteur*, the paternalism of certain French Army officers was a peripheral aspect of the war which in no way altered the fundamental injustice of continued French rule over Algeria: 'Il y a de l'autre côté de la Méditerranée un peuple qui souffre, un peuple qu'on prive de liberté, de dignité. Le paternalisme des meilleurs officiers SAS n'y changera rien.'⁵⁹

The inevitable process towards the rejection of the coloniser which Memmi and Fanon highlight can be set alongside the view that the end of colonialism was part of an unstoppable global process to which it was impossible for the French to remain immune. Having been subjected to a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Viet-Minh at Dien-Bien-Phu and with Morocco and Tunisia acquiring their independence, it could be argued that Algeria was almost destined to follow the same route. As an editorial to an FLN publication *Résistance algérienne* put it:

Quand les fruits sont trop mûrs ils tombent d'eux-mêmes des branches. Il en va des colonies comme des fruits. Si le dix-neuvième siècle a été celui de la colonisation à outrance le vingtième est celui de la libération. En Asie comme en Afrique, les peuples soumis au joug étranger se libèrent les uns après les autres. Il faut croire qu'un certain déterminisme historique existe ici-bas.⁶⁰

For the British historian John Strachey, writing in 1959, the endeavours of the French Army to retain Algeria under the umbrella of French rule in any meaningful way were doomed to failure. Colonial powers needed to recognise the realities of the twentieth-century situation. Independence for the colonies was an inevitable process, whether or not the colonial power fought against it or agreed voluntarily to it. By fighting what he described as ‘a series of hopeless and bloody “rearguard action” colonial wars’, the imperial power only succeeded in compromising its own future development as well as that of the soon to be independent colony.⁶¹

Imagining an Alternative Ending

Stora has classified Algerian resistance to French occupation into three stages: firstly, the post-1918 generation who claimed the right of national self-determination; secondly, the generation emerging after the *Front Populaire* who rejected the illusion of *assimilation* and looked to an Arab and Islamic heritage to provide the ideological foundation of their resistance to French rule; finally, the post-1945 generation who believed in the need to undertake armed action in order to throw off colonialism.⁶² For Stora, it was essentially the lack of reforms which pushed the Algerian people towards greater militancy:

Comme il apparaît de plus en plus clairement – au cours de longues années d’échec politique – qu’aucun gouvernement français n’est capable d’entreprendre des réformes, et que s’affirment la mauvaise volonté et l’incapacité française à faire des concessions, les nationalistes militants commencent à gagner du terrain, et s’accroît la tendance aux opérations clandestines pour un renversement brutal de l’ordre existant.⁶³

As Hocine Aït-Ahmed commented in a 1994 interview, the continual refusal of the settler community to accept any reform ‘verrouillait l’espoir chez les gens et rendait la situation explosive’. He continued: ‘Nous estimions aussi qu’il fallait recourir à la lutte armée puisque la voie électorale était totalement bloquée’.⁶⁴ Whilst it was undoubtedly the case that the lack of concessions given to gradual demands for change led to a hardening of resistance, Aït-Ahmed's remarks appear to give some

credence to the idea that a liberal policy pursued earlier might have avoided the bloody struggle for national liberation altogether, leading, if not to a harmonious co-existence between coloniser and colonised, to a velvet divorce. This leads one to ask whether a figure like Ferhat Abbas, who in the words of Stora, became 'un déçu de la "francisation"' could have taken the helm of an independent Algeria retaining most, if not all, of its links with France if only the Europeans had been willing to go along with it.⁶⁵

Smith points to an historical window of opportunity during which, had a genuine attempt to integrate the Algerian economy with that of France been made, it might have been possible to end French colonialism in another way. However, the French never seriously contemplated such measures with the result that, from around the turn of the century onwards, France was socially and economically too weak to absorb Algeria; making Algeria French:

...would have required political and economic policies that were obviously not the order of the day in the first quarter of this century. But only a dogmatist would insist the process was inconceivable. If France, for example, had recruited from Algeria a far larger labour force for industrial work than was the case, and had associated a Muslim elite with the exercise of power locally and nationally, the relationship between these two peoples might have been far different.⁶⁶

Once this opportunity was missed, the retention of French sovereignty and the application of a liberal policy for Algeria were, for Smith, irreconcilable objectives. The settlers who consistently refused reform were more logical in their attempts to preserve French sovereignty than those liberals who naively believed that they could offer reform as a means of deflecting Muslim demands to be rid of the French:

One wonders if those metropolitan liberals who so ceaselessly denounced the 'stubborn blindness' of the settlers on the subject of reform were not themselves more truly blind. Political freedom and economic mobility were pious daydreams for a land where deep cultural antagonism had come to be compounded by economic conflict. The Muslims had all the grievances of a defeated and despoiled race.⁶⁷

Since both Memmi and Fanon saw colonialism as incapable of evolution, there was no reason for them to speculate at length about what might have happened had the French attempted a genuine programme of reform. Memmi's work does, however, suggest an answer to this question. Excluded from any of the usual rights enjoyed by citizens, the colonised's sense of citizenship and of nationality, he argued, developed more slowly under colonialism than in the countries where the inhabitants participated more fully in the life of the nation. He therefore held out the possibility that colonialism had retarded the development of the national consciousness of the colonised:

On répète que la colonisation a précipité la prise de conscience nationale du colonisé. On pourrait aussi bien affirmer qu'elle en a modéré le rythme, en maintenant le colonisé hors des conditions objectives de la nationalité contemporaine. Est-ce une coïncidence si les peuples colonisés sont les derniers à naître à cette conscience d'eux-mêmes ? (PC,116)

Colonialism as it was actually constituted stifled the national identity of the colonised only to later re-create a more violent nationalist opposition dedicated to its overthrow. However, a more benevolent colonialism, even if it had been possible, would not have prevented the eviction of the French but might possibly have speeded it up by creating a national consciousness amongst the indigenous population earlier. Memmi's arguments place colonialism in an untenable situation in which both liberalism and repression give rise to the same outcome.

The Cost of Reform

However benign the intentions of reformers may have been, and even if backed by both the settler and indigenous populations, plans to remake Algeria stood little chance of success without the support of the inhabitants of Metropolitan France. Between 1950 and 1962, France's Gross Domestic Product grew by 4.6% per annum despite the wars in Indochina and Algeria.⁶⁸ Whilst this did not mean that economic growth could pay for the resolution of all of Algeria's problems, it certainly implied

the possibility that there was surplus capital available for investment. However, the availability of state-raised capital for investment in Algeria depended as much upon domestic willingness to make Algeria a spending priority as it did upon ability to pay in an absolute sense. It was the people of France who would have been required to find the necessary financial wherewithal to underwrite both the protracted military campaign and the work of economic reconstruction.

Termed by Girardet, 'un anticolonialisme de repli hexagonal', opposition to French overseas expansion based around the position that the Empire did not pay had always found a limited audience within French political and intellectual circles.⁶⁹ Between 1954-62, this economic anti-colonialism was most closely associated with the journalist Raymond Cartier, the well-known intellectual Raymond Aron, and ultimately General de Gaulle.

Cartier's position was outlined in three articles appearing in *Paris-Match* during August and September 1956.⁷⁰ Although centred on France's sub-Saharan territories, Cartier's 'anticolonialisme utilitaire' had obvious ramifications for Algeria.⁷¹ Essentially, Cartier argued that the colonies cost more money than they brought in, retarding the development of Metropolitan France. Pointing to the relative wealth and stability of other former colonial powers such as Holland, Cartier advocated a policy of Metropolitan preference which made the improvement of domestic conditions the spending priority. Similarly, Aron, in two fairly short pieces on the Algerian war written in 1956 and 1957 and published collectively under the heading *La Tragédie algérienne*, argued that any policy which sought to vastly improve the welfare of the Muslim population would prove too great a financial burden for France to shoulder, particularly in the light of Algeria's rapid population growth.⁷² This work was followed in 1958 by another book *L'Algérie et la République* which, as Pickles has commented, seemed 'primarily intended to show up the fictions and unrealities of M.

Soustelle's plans for *integration*' and demonstrated 'the practical impossibility of economic *integration*'.⁷³

Fanon, too, joined this debate. In order to reduce the appeal of nationalist movements through economic transformation, he argued, measures that had not been taken in Metropolitan France itself would have been required. For Fanon, Cartier's 'amertume désabusée' was a reaction to the state's preoccupation with the colonies whilst so many French people lived in financial straits. Cartier's bitterness illustrated the impossibility of transforming colonialism into a 'programme désintéressé d'aide et de soutien' (DT,142-3).

On 3 October 1958, de Gaulle announced the Constantine Plan which set out a number of goals for the transformation of Algeria. Welcomed by reformers as a sign of de Gaulle's commitment to Algeria, this plan envisaged new industrial developments in Algeria to take advantage of the resources discovered in the Sahara, the construction of new houses for a million people and the creation of 400,000 new jobs. By 11 April 1961, however, de Gaulle was adopting a very different line, declaring: 'L'Algérie nous coûte, c'est le moins qu'on puisse dire, plus cher qu'elle ne nous rapporte'.⁷⁴ This transformation in de Gaulle's declared policy can be explained not only by his determination to extricate France from a war which he saw as economically debilitating but equally by the strong dose of political realism which led him to discount the viability of *l'Algérie française* and by his desire to augment France's standing as a world power.

As the powerful Head of State between 1958-62, de Gaulle was in the privileged position of being able to turn his thoughts into policy. Yet he would have been unable to do so without domestic support. In an analysis which proves particularly damning for the reformers, Ageron's study of French public opinion on the conflict as manifested in numerous surveys carried out between 1954-63 by the *Institut français*

d'opinion publique reveals that, even before de Gaulle's return to power, popular opinion was both sceptical about the chances of preserving Algeria and far from convinced of the merits of *intégration*. By 1958, the situation had evolved to such an extent that 'aucun gouvernement n'aurait pu en 1958 et dans les années suivantes imposer une politique d'intégration: l'opinion française était alors majoritairement ralliée à l'idée d'une Algérie autonome, puis à la fin indépendante'.⁷⁵

De Gaulle's reluctance to prolong the Algerian war was clearly in tune with the mood of the country. Rioux notes that his progressive disengagement from Algeria was carried out 'en collant au sentiment majoritaire de l'opinion publique' whilst Ageron observes that his was 'la politique algérienne souhaitée par la majorité absolue du peuple français'.⁷⁶ This conclusion is confirmed both by the results of the referendum held on 8 January 1961 which provided a resounding popular endorsement of both de Gaulle and his policy of an *Algérie algérienne* (75.26% of the votes cast), and by the 90.7% approval rating for the Evian Accords which brought the conflict to an end.

It was not simply the French public as a whole that lacked the political will to support the continuation of the French presence in Algeria but investors, too. The work of Jacques Marseille is particularly useful in highlighting the relationship between French capitalism and Algeria. Marseille argues that from 1880 to 1930 the protected market offered by the possession of the colonies benefited a large section of the French economy because it retarded the end of the 'family' firm structure of production. Following 1930, the harmonious relationship between French capitalism and the retention of Empire became more shaky, coinciding with changes in the nature of production and the demise of the family firm: 'A partir de cette date, s'entame la procédure de divorce'.⁷⁷ Continued changes in methods of production, the pressure of international competition and the opening-up of the French economy required large-scale restructuring and investment in the domestic economy leading to a massive

flight of capital and lack of investment in Algeria from 1955 onwards. As Marseille concludes:

Cette mutation industrielle nécessitait aux yeux de ceux qui en étaient les acteurs et les comptables la rupture des liens politiques qui forçaient la puissance publique à gaspiller dans l'empire des capitaux considérables sans aucun bénéfice.⁷⁸

Daniel Lefeuvre's analysis of the failure of the 1959 Constantine Plan further reinforces Marseille's assertion that French investors were reluctant to commit to Algeria. Intended to run over a five-year period, by 1961 the Plan had yielded very little in the way of tangible evidence for improvement; only 13% of the projected investment had taken place, light industry had met less than 8% of its targets, and only 14, 000 new jobs had been created.⁷⁹

Conclusion

On the basis of the critique which has been developed in this chapter, it is possible to formulate a number of questions to be put to the reformers, their answers to which will be analysed over the course of this thesis. Firstly, how did they respond to the accusation that the coloniser had no interest in reform? Secondly, even if their own reforming intent is accepted, how did they seek to answer the case that they were no more than colonisers of good will whose impact upon the colonial situation as a whole could be no more than minimal? Thirdly, on what grounds did they believe that the Muslims actually wanted the changes which they proposed? Finally, how could they explain the growing popular disillusionment with the war and the increasing reluctance of French companies and private finance to invest in Algeria other than by admitting that their own position was inherently flawed?

CHAPTER TWO

INTRODUCTION TO THE REFORMERS

Having drawn up a broad critique of colonialism in the opening chapter, the purpose of this chapter is to highlight some of the central tenets of the reformers' vision of the colonial world. By drawing predominantly on the example of Soustelle's *intégration* programme, the first section introduces the principal themes which appear in their writing, noting the values which they held and the way in which these were anchored in the ideology of the civilising mission. Subsequent chapters will then provide much finer detail to the outline sketch offered here.

The second section deals with reformers within the French Army. The French Army in Algeria now has few defenders, and rightly so, for the atrocities which it committed in the name of preserving Western civilisation in Algeria run contrary to a strong humanitarian tradition in Western thought. The chapter will identify where the pockets of pro-reform sentiment within the Army were to be found and highlight the way in which the conditions under which the war was fought led many soldiers to believe that their mission necessitated the promotion of the well-being of Algeria's indigenous population.

Key Themes of the Reformers

Justifying Colonialism

Colonial reformers such as Jacques Soustelle, contemplating the future of the French presence in Algeria after 1954, were both approving and critical of the underlying

ideology of the *mission civilisatrice*: approving, in the sense that they maintained that the French had a duty to help Algeria's indigenous population; critical, insofar as they promised to show more respect for the latter's cultural differences than had previously been contemplated under the (largely unapplied) policy of *assimilation*.

In Soustelle's eyes, colonisation was not *a priori* illegitimate, but was instead to be judged upon its merits. In an attack on his anti-colonial opponents of the day, he argued that colonisation was more rightly interpreted as part of an ongoing historical process, admittedly a destructive one, but one which brought about a transfer of knowledge and culture, and which thereby enabled the colonised to emerge from a primitive state and acquire the trappings of civilisation.

Quant aux pieux progressistes qui se voilent la face et se couvrent la tête de cendres au seul mot de 'colonisation', et selon qui tout ce qui est 'colonial' doit être a priori condamné, je leur demande ce que seraient l'Occident et la France si nos pays n'avaient été colonisés par Rome. Toute l'Histoire est faite de ces mouvements de peuples et de ces transferts culturels sans lesquels nous en serions encore à aiguiser des lames de silex dans les grottes de la Vézère. En ce qui concerne, du reste, l'Afrique du Nord, que sont donc les Arabes qui y vivent, sinon des colonisateurs qui y ont apporté, souvent au prix de terribles destructions, une grande religion, une langue, une civilisation. (ET p.30)

Within this general endorsement of colonialism are to be found three interwoven themes intended to legitimate a continued French presence in Algeria. Firstly, the reference to the history of France sought to provide both a precedent and a justification for overseas expansion. Working on the understanding that his reader would concur that France had become a 'civilised' country, Soustelle attributes French progress from cave-dwellers to modern society to an initial colonisation by the Romans. To deny any benefit to colonisation was therefore to reject the foundations upon which French society was built. If France had benefited from colonisation so, too, could Algeria. This comparison was, of course, an incomplete one for it omitted to mention that the French had resisted their colonisation by the Romans from whence sprung the whole legend of Astérix, popularised in children's books.¹

Secondly, by not acknowledging any particularities to the brand of colonialism practised by the European powers, Soustelle attempted to deny the role of victim to the Arabs in the French-dominated colonial situation of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Roman conquest of France, the Arab colonisation of Algeria and, by implication, the ongoing French occupation of Algeria are not really distinguished. The natural order of things dictated that where the Arabs had once been conquerors bringing language, religion and civilisation, albeit at a price, they were now the conquered, supplanted by the superior French civilisation.

Thirdly, Soustelle's reference to the Arab colonisation of Algeria performed an important function in the legitimisation of the claims of the European settler community to have an inalienable right to live there. Dine has argued that 'whether born in Algeria or not, the European population could never be of the land in the way that its indigenous population all too plainly were'.² In contrast, Soustelle's reasoning blurs the distinction between 'colonisers' and the 'indigenous population'. Since the only difference between the Arab and European colonisation of Algeria was one of timing, the French presence could only be disputed by the imposition of some arbitrary distinction over the amount of time that 'colonisers' had to inhabit a particular territory before becoming 'indigenous'. Arabs could not, according to his logic, denounce the evils of colonialism without denying their own legitimacy as inhabitants of Algeria. This point was made explicitly in *Le drame algérien*:

Dites-vous bien, et que chacun se dise bien, que ces Français d'Algérie ont le droit d'être là-bas, autant que tout autre. Depuis les Puniques jusqu'aux Français, en passant par les Romains, les Vandales, les Arabes et les Turcs, personne n'est entré en Algérie autrement que par la conquête. Si la présence française est illégitime, seuls les Berbères peuvent invoquer un droit qui se perd dans les brumes de la proto-histoire. (DA 23-4)

Soustelle accepted that the principle of the 'One and Indivisible Republic' applied to Algeria, stating that, 'L'Algérie n'est pas une colonie, mais une province' (DA,62); Algeria and France were joined by unbreakable bonds, and history could not be rewritten to make it otherwise:

Qu'on le veuille ou non, il y a une Algérie ; cette Algérie n'est pas, n'en déplaise aux sots qui répètent des slogans, une « colonie ». C'est une création, une symbiose (...) Il ne sert de rien de dire ou de penser qu'il eût mieux valu ne pas débarquer à Sidi-Ferruch: nous n'y pouvons plus rien. Nous sommes liés à l'Algérie pour le meilleur et pour le pire. (DA, 36-7)

As a *pied-noir*, Camus was equally reluctant to embrace the possibility of Algerian independence. In an open letter written in 1955 to an Algerian militant, he called for 'des réformes nécessaires et décisives qui relanceront la communauté franco-arabe d'Algérie sur la route d'avenir'.³ He failed to anticipate the manner in which the combat would ultimately be resolved, seemingly unable to countenance the possibility of an exclusively Muslim Algeria: 'Le "fait français" ne peut être éliminé en Algérie et le rêve d'une disparition subite de la France est puéril'(p.128). Once the fighting ceased, he believed that the Europeans and Muslims of Algeria would still have to share the same country and for this reason asserted that the war could profit no-one: 'Cette guerre sera sans vainqueurs réels et qu'après comme avant elle, il nous faudra encore, et toujours, vivre ensemble sur la même terre' (p.129). By 1958, he at least recognised the possibility that the conflict might end in a French withdrawal but remained equally ill-disposed towards it.

Beyond Colonialism

Whilst reformers did not view colonialism as intrinsically blameworthy and rejected independence, they claimed not to support the colonial *status quo*. In 1965, Soustelle was to describe *intégration* as 'vraiment chargée de progrès humain (...) véritablement décolonisatrice', continuing: 'L'intégration n'était pas le colonialisme mais son contraire' (PT,130). Clearly, he entertained a different understanding of the term 'decolonisation' to the one that might be more conventionally understood, believing that it was possible to somehow go beyond colonialism without necessarily bringing the French presence to an end. J. Reis, writing for the *Revue Socialiste* in 1958, maintained a similar perspective: 'Le dépassement du stade colonial par une colonie n'aboutit point forcément à la sécession', he proclaimed.⁴

Within these promises to move beyond existing colonial practice was an admission that the colonial *status quo* was discriminatory. Reis exhorts his fellow countrymen to avoid previous errors: 'Ne recommençons pas en Algérie ce qui fut la faute d'un siècle un quart'.⁵ Likewise, Albert Bayet, Vice-President of the *Ligue des droits de l'homme* and a figure of impressive democratic credentials, accepted that France's civilising mission had not been entirely benevolent: 'Que nous ayons commis des fautes en Algérie, nul, je crois, ne le conteste.'⁶ He argued that the war could only be justified if seen as a new departure, rather than a retrograde defence of the old colonial order: 'S'il était question de recourir à la force pour maintenir des abus, pour défendre des privilèges, notre protestation serait unanime'.⁷ For Colonel Roger Barberot, the privileged positions enjoyed by Algeria's European population had to be overturned. The purpose of the French Army's combat was to forge a new, liberal Algeria in which both communities had their rightful place rather than to maintain an outdated and discriminatory colonial order:

Si la France est obligée de poursuivre la lutte, elle doit bien préciser qu'elle ne se bat pas pour la domination et le maintien des privilèges mais pour imposer les institutions libérales qui empêcheront une communauté d'opprimer l'autre.⁸

A commitment to reform necessarily required action to address the desperate poverty in which many Muslims found themselves. Reformers believed that the French people had a duty to undertake the financial commitment to transform Algeria. Responding to the argument that the partisans of *intégration* would swiftly recoil when presented with the bill for Algerian reconstruction, Reis countered that there was an overriding moral imperative to help born of humanitarian duty and left-wing fraternity. To accept the financial sacrifice of keeping Algeria was, for Socialists, both a 'vertu' and a 'devoir' even though it was possible that living standards in mainland France would suffer as a result. Rather than reluctantly resign themselves to this eventuality, it was better that Socialists accepted it 'par un sens de la fraternité ou si l'on préfère par une mystique de l'égalité sans laquelle le socialisme démocratique risquerait de se dessécher'.⁹

In *Le drame algérien*, Soustelle accepts that the implementation of a radical long-term plan to transform the Algerian economy would not be pain free for the French taxpayer: 'Que l'Algérie exige de nous un effort énorme d'investissements, je crois avoir été un des premiers à en faire prendre conscience à l'opinion' (DA,30). Comparing Algeria to mainland France as he was prone to do, he caustically observed that the logical extension of Aron's economic anti-colonialism was that the poorest provinces in France should also be accorded their independence:

L'Algérie est une charge, donc il faut la larguer: avec un tel raisonnement, je ne crois pas que la Corse, la Lozère, les Causses, les montagnes des Cévennes aient beaucoup de chances de demeurer dans la communauté française. Si l'on en croyait M. Aron chaque département devrait présenter son bilan de fin d'année, et les provinces qui coûtent au lieu de rapporter subiraient leur juste châtement: l'indépendance. (DA 29-30)

In defence of the reformers, this willingness to commit France to a long-term renovation of Algeria was evidence of their good will. Yet whilst the likes of Reis and Soustelle could make the case that Algeria ought to have been supported, they could not, of course, answer for the rest of France.

'La France se nomme diversité'

Reformers' calls for an end to colonial exploitation did not merely amount to an endorsement of the traditional rhetoric of the civilising mission. Armed with good intentions to make amends for the historical 'failures' of the French colonial presence in Algeria as he understood them to be, Soustelle declared his intention to move beyond the unfulfilled policy of *assimilation*. He recognised that there were obvious ethnic, cultural and linguistic differences between native Algerians and the people of mainland France and considered *intégration* to be a more enlightened version of the previous policy insofar as it recognised and celebrated the separateness of the Muslim personality rather than seeking to suppress it. He quoted approvingly from the Special Commission of the Fourth Congress of the Indigenous Peoples of the Americas in which *intégration* was described as part of an egalitarian ideal, tolerant and respectful

of differences and which in no way implied the domination of one section of the population over another:

L'intégration sociale d'un pays ne semble pas exiger que tous ses habitants deviennent culturellement uniformes. Elle demande simplement qu'ils développent un ajustement mutuel chaque jour meilleur, qui leur permette de reconnaître l'existence d'une nation commune à tous. Elle n'exige pas non plus que les habitants d'un territoire national se transforment en non autochtones.¹⁰

Like Soustelle, Bayet also pledged his support for a pluralistic, multi-cultural conception of Frenchness, offering a comparison between the ethnic diversity of Algeria and the cultural differences amongst the inhabitants of Metropolitan France:

Les provinces qui composent aujourd'hui la France ont été durant un long temps très différentes les unes des autres. Si différentes qu'elles se battaient sans cesse. Il a fallu conquérir la Bretagne, conquérir la Flandre, conquérir l'Alsace, conquérir la Franche-Comté. Et puis un jour, l'unité s'est faite. Certes, Bretons, Flamands, Alsaciens, Francs-Comtois ont gardé leurs originalités, et nous nous en félicitons. Qui dit diversité dit richesse.

Au sein de cette indivision, pourquoi les Algériens n'occuperaient-ils pas une place semblable à celles qu'occupent les Bretons, les Normands, les Flamands, les Provençaux ?¹¹

Bayet's comparison was based on the apparently reasonable and liberal assumption that, in spite of the diversity of its inhabitants, a national community could not only survive but flourish. The individual character of the provinces of Metropolitan France was invoked as evidence that Algeria's different religious, ethnic and cultural mixture did not render it in any way incapable of being integrated. Just like Soustelle's references to the colonisation of Europe by the Ancient Romans, Bayet's comparison does not stand up to closer scrutiny. The differences between Savoie, a geographically adjacent territory incorporated into the French state, and Algeria, separated from France by the Mediterranean are obvious.¹² When one adds to this the differences in religion, ethnicity, forms of social organisation and technological sophistication, Bayet's comparison appears somewhat fanciful. Even where one wishes to support the view that peoples of different ethnicity, religion and language can enjoy peaceful cohabitation within the same nation against theories of ethnic or religious separatism,

the case is not advanced by an over-simplistic comparison which goes to the other extreme by assuming an unproblematic integration.

Furthermore, what Bayet perhaps unwittingly provides here is a mandate for any form of imperialism in which notions of the consent on the part of those to be integrated can effectively be ignored. Although Bayet sought to atone for the original seizure of Algeria by arguing that Metropolitan France was also enlarged through conquest, this in turn ignored both the specific character of nineteenth century imperial expansion driven by a belief in European superiority over the colonised peoples and the ongoing discrimination which the latter suffered at European hands. As Dine puts it:

Colonialism's expropriation of the indigenous population is not in the nature of a single, properly punctual, injustice; it is rather a process, a continual denial of the colonized's natural rights. It is, in consequence, not liable to be forgotten, still less forgiven; it exists or it does not, it cannot be rendered more humane.¹³

The 'consent potential'

On other occasions, reformers were more careful in claiming that Algeria's indigenous population did indeed want to be integrated. Reviewing his *intégration* project in 1961 as Algeria edged ever closer towards independence, Soustelle wrote:

Or, dans mon esprit, il n'était nullement question d'imposer de force l'intégration et le ralliement des Musulmans constituait bien une condition *sine qua non*, dont j'étais sûr d'ailleurs qu'elle serait remplie si les circonstances étaient favorables. (ET,33)

This 'consent potential' as we might term it, was pivotal to the reformers' representations of the colonial situation since it allowed them to reconcile their support for the war with liberal principles. Muslims were perceived as sympathetic to plans to make them French citizens *à part entière* whilst the FLN were thought to be unrepresentative of Muslims' aspirations. Since, for reformers, the continuation of the French presence was welcomed by the vast majority of Muslims, the prosecution of the war against the FLN could be justified on the grounds that it was both democratic and respectful of the right of national self-determination.

This belief that the consent of the Muslim population could still be obtained puts reformers' criticism of colonialism into perspective. When Soustelle wrote *Aimée et Souffrante Algérie* in 1955, he still believed in the recoverability of Algeria. Although admitting that damage had been done to the position of the French, he did not think that the deficiencies of French colonialism prior to the outbreak of the rebellion had sounded the death knell of *Algérie française*. Despite expressing fears over 'les conséquences de tant de refus (comme celui du projet Blum-Violette) et de tant d'atermoiements', he believed that it would be foolish not to make a last attempt to integrate Algeria: 'Cependant ce serait folie que de ne pas faire cette ultime tentative'.¹⁴ His actions throughout the Algerian war can be viewed as a constant attempt to carry out this final effort.

Rather than dwell upon the faults of the past, reformers urged all those connected with the Algerian problem to look to the future. As Smith has observed, for many French people 'to acknowledge past injustices only increased the French desire to do right in the present. And it was by no means obvious that the right course of action meant leaving Algeria to its own devices'.¹⁵ In fact, almost by definition, the belief that past mistakes had been costly but not to the point where Algeria remained irrecoverable was shared by all those who favoured colonial reform. Jacques Chevallier, the pro-reform mayor of Algiers, writing just after the return to power of General de Gaulle, remained convinced that, provided sufficient good will was exhibited by the Europeans, Algeria could still be saved:

Rien ne sera perdu non seulement en Algérie, mais encore en Afrique du Nord si les Algériens trop souvent aveuglés par la conscience de leur seul mérite savent enfin avoir une conscience non moins égale de leurs erreurs, et, en en tirant matière à enseignement positif, en évitent le renouvellement.¹⁶

Camus, like Soustelle, expressed concern that failure to implement reform in the past had been severely detrimental to relations with Muslims. The events of Sétif in 1945, he claimed, should have been sufficient to make the Europeans realise the error of

their ways. Far from stifling any hint of rebellion amongst the Muslim population, as many had believed, Camus argued that Sétif was instead ‘un signal de départ’.¹⁷ He believed manipulation of the electoral process had caused a further haemorrhage of support for the idea of French citizenship amongst the Arab population:

Les élections truquées de 1948 en particulier ont à la fois illustré le mensonge et découragé définitivement le peuple arabe. Jusqu’à cette date les Arabes voulaient tous être français. A partir de cette date, une grande partie d’entre eux n’a plus voulu l’être.¹⁸

Whilst this might be a selective reading of Algeria’s history, ignoring the nationalist or proto-nationalist movements which had existed prior to 1948, Camus’ main point was that the nationalist demands had been stoked by lack of generosity and fairness on the part of the French. Nevertheless, as we saw earlier, Camus did not see any real alternative to reform and still believed that Europeans and Muslims could find some way in which to cohabit peacefully. Moreover, he stressed that the European settler population should not be permanently blamed for previous failings and thought it a time for reconciliation:

Il est dangereux de lui demander de s’avouer seule coupable et de la vouer à une pénitence perpétuelle. Je crois en Algérie à une politique de réparation, non à une politique d’expiation. C’est en fonction de l’avenir qu’il faut poser les problèmes, sans remâcher interminablement les fautes du passé.¹⁹

Comments like these have led Smith to attack Camus for never really grasping the nettle of settler responsibility for colonial injustices and for consistently referring to his European counterparts ‘as though they should be Good Samaritans’.²⁰ Calls to essentially wipe the slate clean, or at least that part of it which the colonial reformers saw as negative about the French presence, although not bereft of good intentions, neatly side-stepped the issue of just how blameworthy the French were for the situation in Algeria.

Reformers within the French Army

The Sections Administratives Spécialisées (SAS)

In order to implement his plans for remaking Algeria and to facilitate the full integration of the territory into mainland France, a task which would have been difficult enough under peacetime conditions let alone against the backdrop of the FLN's armed struggle, Soustelle required the help of the French Army. For this reason, he created the SAS, special detachments based on the *Bureaux Arabes* of France's colonial past which were sent into the heart of the Algerian outback to deal with any of the problems which the local inhabitants faced.²¹ The prime directives of the SAS officers were not to crush the FLN by force of arms but to discredit it in the eyes of the Muslim masses, promote the benefits of French rule and prepare the ground for a long-term integration. Their mission was predicated upon a belief that there would be a continued French presence in Algeria for many years to come, supported by increased investment. Herein lay the recognition that the Muslim community had legitimate grievances with regard to the social and economic conditions under which it was forced to live. Although the name suggests that the SAS were primarily intended to play an administrative role, a soldier attached to this corps often found himself fulfilling a multitude of tasks such as engineer, doctor, civil servant and planner. As Colonel Barberot comments:

Voilà qu'on avait commencé à lui faire comprendre qu'il fallait s'occuper de la population, manipuler le mercurochrome, les antibiotiques et les sulfamides, contrôler et recenser la population, lui donner du travail, parler bulldozers et ponts et chaussées, routes, crédits, apprendre à la population à s'administrer, entrer dans la politique locale, etc., et qu'on lui demandait d'être la bonne à tout faire de la nation.²²

In these multiple roles, the soldiers of the SAS had to be flexible enough to adapt to the particularities of the circumstances in which they found themselves. Writing in *Le Monde* in 1957, Philippe Herreman speculated that of the 600 SAS units operational at that time, no two carried out exactly the same mission.²³

It should be noted that strictly military considerations were not totally absent from the duties of the SAS officers. Muslim villagers were actively encouraged to take sides against the FLN with the goal of forming local militias which would then be able to contribute to the ongoing pacification effort. In brief, the mission of the SAS, as John Ambler has noted, was both socio-political and military whereby 'arming local villagers, winning the confidence of the local population, and increasing economic prosperity in the pacified zone (...) prepared the population in progressively larger areas in turn to accept French authority'.²⁴

Perhaps the theme most commonly associated with the French Army's role in the Algerian war is that of war atrocities. In the light of the now largely uncontested reports, widely circulated in newspaper articles, periodicals and first-hand testimonial accounts, the conventional wisdom now holds that the Army played an inglorious and entirely repressive role. The paratrooper is singled out for special vilification; as Patrick Rotman comments, in the eyes of the world, 'le para d'Algérie fut un salaud, un tortionnaire, un casseur de fells'.²⁵

The SAS have, to a certain extent, escaped some of this criticism and their activities have not been as uniformly denounced as other sectors of the Army. For Ambler, those selected for leadership of an SAS detachment 'understood the requirements of lasting pacification' and 'were usually aware that random and uncontrolled brutality was self-defeating'.²⁶ For Frank Giles, the SAS offered 'a practical expression of the *présence française* which was at once humane and effective'.²⁷ Horne has referred to the SAS as 'a selflessly devoted and courageous band of men' and argues that their role in improving living standards amongst Algeria's Muslims made them particular targets for the FLN.²⁸ Schalk, in his comparative study of the Algerian War and American involvement in Vietnam, argues that soldiers became more aware of the wider social implications of the conflict and started to see themselves as reformers: 'In

both wars, through “pacification” programmes, this new breed of more educated soldiers came to believe that they had the power to enact social reform.²⁹

There is, nonetheless, enormous potential to romanticise about the SAS officer. According to Pierre Sergent, the activities of the SAS officer can be compared to the humanitarian missions carried out by relief agencies around the world:

Que les médecins sans frontières, les membres des organisations humanitaires d’aujourd’hui lisent ce témoignage. Ils découvriront que les ‘soldats colonialistes’ dont ils ont appris à condamner l’action n’avaient pas d’autres motivations que le mieux-être des populations qui leur étaient confiées.³⁰

Sergent’s role as former head of *OAS-Métro* and his present-day connections with the *Front National* do not mark him out as a reliable commentator. Supporters of the *Front National*, with their scarcely concealed racism and strident anti-immigrant rhetoric, most vehement when directed against immigrants of North African origin, are not the most qualified to pronounce upon the generosity of France’s intentions towards Algeria’s Muslim population and the benevolence of her civilising mission. Even if Sergent’s status is ignored, his comparison remains wide of the mark. The actions of the SAS in Algeria bore no more than a passing resemblance to the work undertaken by organisations involved in the process of humanitarian aid. Unlike the French in Algeria, *Médecins sans frontières* and other aid agencies are non-governmental, have no overt political agenda and their dispensation of aid is largely unconditional.

In addition, such eulogies of the SAS only tell part of the story for they ignore the fact that the dictates of the war and the shortage of skilled Arabic and Berber-speaking specialists in France often meant that officers were sent to the Algerian outback lacking in competence and having received very little training. Perhaps for this reason, there were those in the SAS detachments who often ignored the humanitarian concerns upon which their mission was supposedly based and who carried out the kind of atrocities more often associated with the paratrooper regiments.

The Cinquième Bureau

During the war, the activities of the SAS were widely reported by the Army's *Cinquième Bureau*, the main source of military propaganda. The spin doctors of their day, soldiers attached to the *Cinquième Bureau* were assigned the specific task of interpreting events so as to promote the benefits of a continued French presence.³¹ By virtue of the predominantly socio-administrative role that was assigned to them, it was the SAS who were often shown in tracts or posters as the human face of the French military presence.

The *Cinquième Bureau* produced pamphlets, tracts, radio broadcasts and films for the consumption of the Muslim population. These were simplistic in nature and drew strongly on the themes of the civilising mission: the French brought civilisation, progress and well-being whereas the FLN offered only misery, ruin and destruction.³² Given the proliferation of French Army atrocities, it is tempting to view *Cinquième Bureau* material as no more than a gloss, a desperate grope for a sanitised rhetoric amidst the brutality of the conflict. That military propaganda deliberately exaggerated the Army's commitment to reform is certainly true but does not constitute the whole story. It only partly explains the fact that, by 1957, the Army had adopted *intégration* as its own policy for Algeria and, in so doing, had gone further and had been less ambiguous in the elaboration of its goals than the government in Paris.³³ Similarly, it only partially accounts for the fact that during the turbulent month of May 1958, amidst the coup of sorts unleashed in Algiers by the settler community, French soldiers had busied themselves in the Casbah 'coaxing the Muslims to turn out and stirring them up with heady assurances of equality and reform'.³⁴

Rather than view French military propaganda as either blatant falsification or, at the other extreme, as indicative of a sincere and deep-felt commitment to reform within the Army, it is more appropriate to view the espousal of *intégration* by many, if not the totality, of influential figures within the Army as a marriage of reason, a pragmatic

choice as much as it was a sincere one. As Kelly has observed: 'Dynamic social improvements for the Muslims were often favoured, not just for their own sake, but as a rational instrument for winning the conflict.'³⁵ Girardet confirms this point noting that *intégration* was for the French Army a 'politique empirique (...) étroitement liée aux impératifs et aux modalités de la lutte qu'elle a pour mission de mener'.³⁶

The reason for this is to be found in the nature of the conflict. Against the assembled might of the French Army, the FLN would have been swiftly crushed in a face-to-face battle fought along traditional lines. The nationalists, perhaps encouraged by the successful application of guerrilla warfare tactics against the French by the Vietminh in Indochina, avoided wherever possible direct military confrontation and made control of the civilian population its primary goal. As J. Cayol, writing in *Le Bled* puts it:

Il s'agit de conquérir non plus le terrain, mais les esprits. Les populations indochinoises ont connu ce nouvel aspect de la lutte qui consistait à faire prêcher un véritable catéchisme rouge par le Vietminh communiste. Dans l'affaire algérienne, nous retrouvons ces mêmes méthodes employées cette fois par le FLN.³⁷

Also like the Vietminh before it, the FLN had a clear goal with which the Muslim population of Algeria could identify: independence. For Cayol, the promise held out by the nationalists of an independent Algerian nation could be considered as 'une idée suffisamment dynamique et simple pour abuser toute une population'.³⁸ To avoid a repetition of the failure in Indochina, French theorists of counter-subversive warfare (*la guerre révolutionnaire*), argued that the Army in Algeria needed to offer a political project equally unambiguous and attractive. As Paul-Marie de la Gorce has observed, 'Le besoin d'un "but de guerre", clair et définitif, parut indispensable au corps des officiers.'³⁹ Girardet confirms this point, noting that the Army required 'une autre foi à la foi qui animait les rebelles', a vision of the future capable of combating 'la puissante mystique que proposait et que véhiculait avec elle la rébellion'.⁴⁰ Reform was thought to hold the key to victory, hence the Army's adoption of *intégration*.

Algeria's Muslim population was not the only target audience for French military propaganda. Without an understanding of the aims and objectives for which he was fighting, the French soldier, in most cases a conscript or reservist, could not effectively attempt to win 'hearts and minds' for France. The aim of the publications of the *Cinquième Bureau* was to turn every soldier into a political activist, capable of demonstrating through both word and deed the merits of French rule: 'Il s'agit de faire du soldat un combattant actif, d'obtenir son adhésion aux missions qui lui sont fixées', observed Captain Souyris, one of the more prominent military writers of the day.⁴¹ As a military manual produced in 1957 for troops on active duty in the Sahara stated:

Chaque militaire, quel que soit son grade, doit savoir que dans cette lutte, il joue ici le rôle essentiel, car c'est par lui et à travers lui, que la France sera connue, comprise, aimée, voulue. Il est le *premier instrument de la pacification*. Mais pour jouer ce rôle, il doit être un *partisan*, convaincu de la cause française et de l'importance décisive que lui, soldat, peut avoir pour le triomphe de cette cause.⁴² (original emphasis)

The main organ of military propaganda destined for French troops was *Le Bled*, a free newspaper delivered throughout Algeria which sought both to entertain and educate the soldier, combining puzzles and trivial news from 'back home' with more serious discussion on the conflict and reports on the evolution of government policy. Proof of the importance attached to this propaganda can be found in Colonel Lacheroy's claim that *Le Bled* was an important tool of psychological action.⁴³ *Le Bled* had a circulation of 350,000 which was almost as great as *Le Figaro*, nearly twice as many as *Le Monde* and more than any weekly in Metropolitan France. One of its editions was also produced in Arabic for those Muslims who served in the French army. Almost all of the early issues carried the slogan 'De Dunkerque à Tamanrasset' alongside the title, demonstrating commitment to the continuation of a French presence on Algerian soil. Its pages were filled with numerous accounts of harmonious co-operation between French soldiers and Muslims and of the benefits of the French presence. Messages of encouragement to the troops from sympathetic political figures such as Guy Mollet,

Robert Lacoste, Jacques Soustelle and Max Lejeune were a staple component of many issues.⁴⁴

The key elements of the reform strategies articulated by civilian commentators such as Soustelle were mirrored in the pages of this newspaper as they were in brochures, communiqués and pamphlets produced for the French soldier by the *Cinquième Bureau* and which were intended to legitimate the French military undertaking and stress the benevolence of the Army's intentions. According to a 1957 manual, by choosing to give their allegiance to France, the Algerian people would receive:

La paix, la prospérité, la satisfaction de toutes les légitimes aspirations des deux communautés, le maintien de ses libertés et de ses croyances, un avenir digne d'elle.⁴⁵

Equally typical is a pamphlet entitled *Maintenant vous connaissez l'Algérie* produced for French conscripts who were about to be demobilised which set out the nature of the Army's task in the following manner:

Il s'agit simultanément:

De relever le niveau de vie des population musulmanes encore trop souvent misérables

D'équiper, d'industrialiser ce territoire pour créer de l'emploi à une population sans cesse croissante.

Et aussi

De poursuivre la lutte contre l'ignorance et l'analphabétisme

De former encore plus de cadres et de techniciens.⁴⁶

Dissenting Voices

The Army was not a homogeneous body and cannot be seen as essentially 'knowable' by subsuming the currents of thought to be found amongst its soldiers into a single, linear narrative adopted by the *Cinquième Bureau* in which the contradictions and differing positions are swept away. To our argument that the support for reform can be considered as a 'marriage of reason' on the Army's part, certain caveats must be attached. Firstly, whilst almost every military publication from 1954 onwards contained an article on the nature of counter-subversive warfare, not all amongst the upper echelons of the military, particularly those who had not served in Indochina,

were won over to the *guerre révolutionnaire* doctrine, especially in the early stages of the conflict.⁴⁷ Secondly, Ambler's research has shown the Army in Algeria to be an ideologically divided body even amongst those who accepted the basic tenets of *guerre révolutionnaire* theory. He identifies three distinct currents of thought. The first group, broadly sharing the ideals of *intégration*, was closest to the official line. The pro-*intégration* camp was flanked on one side by officers motivated by 'an intégriste style of Catholicism which rejected liberal democracy and drew an authoritarian political philosophy directly from a dogmatic view of Catholic theology' and whose views were most closely represented by the publication, *Verbe*. It was flanked on the other side by a group of officers, who, vehement in their opposition to Communism, whose agents they imagined the FLN to be, were no less opposed to what they saw as the decadence of Western capitalism. The clear fascist tendencies of this grouping were perhaps most closely associated with Colonel Antoine Argoud.⁴⁸ Reservations must also be expressed about the extent to which the sentiments expressed in *Cinquième Bureau* propaganda were even read, let alone shared, by French conscripts and reservists. Whilst some supported the Army's aims, many more were indifferent and many opposed them on ideological grounds.⁴⁹

In summary, the pro-reform sentiments emanating from the *Cinquième Bureau* cannot be dismissed as totally divorced from the opinions of the soldiers in the field. *Cinquième Bureau* support for reform was part propaganda, part elaboration of best practice consistent with the theme of *intégration* that should have been followed by soldiers. The sentiments expressed therein were those of a reforming current which had to co-exist with several other schools of thought within the French Army. It is with this reforming current that our interest lies in this study.

CHAPTER THREE

READING THE COLONIAL PAST AND ANTICIPATING THE TASK AHEAD

Reformers' assessments of what was to be done in Algeria were, in part, informed by their interpretation of what had 'gone wrong'. Since they continued to believe in a future French presence, the task of explaining away the miserable living conditions of most Muslims generated by 130 years of French colonialism required a great deal of verbal and intellectual subterfuge. The purpose of this chapter is to track the different readings adopted by reformers of France's colonial past and to explore their understanding of the size of the task that faced them. Accordingly, it analyses the way in which reformers responded to the charge levelled by anti-colonial thinkers that colonialism was as an immobile system of exploitation, incapable of reform. Their responses are grouped into a number of categories ranging from genuine regret at the treatment which many Muslims had received at the hands of the French through to a spirit of self-congratulation in the face of France's colonial 'achievements'. The final section of the chapter will present the over-optimistic assessment produced by reformers of the ease with which the problems in Algeria could be solved.

Reformers and the Failings of Colonialism

The European superiority complex

Amongst the faults of French colonialism seen as contributory factors in the outbreak of the rebellion, reformers cited the disdain of the settler for the Muslim. Settler attitudes, they claimed, were unacceptable. In a series of articles on the state of

poverty in Kabylia, appearing in *Alger républicain* in 1939, Camus argued that the Europeans had much to learn from the inhabitants of Kabylia who he sought to portray as a reflective people capable of giving 'des leçons de sagesse aux conquérants inquiets que nous sommes'. He proclaimed them to be a noble people, 'plus sage' than their mediocre French conquerors who were driven by 'cette fièvre et ce besoin de pouvoir'.¹ Such statements have led Schalk to comment that the Camus of 1939 was 'extremely ambivalent and perhaps a little guilty about colonization'.² In 1958, Camus condemned the collective failure of the European settler population to appreciate the worth of the indigenous people, critiquing the 'attitude souvent méprisante ou désinvolte de beaucoup de Français'. Settler arrogance created amongst the Muslim population the 'complexe d'humiliation qui est au centre du drame actuel'.³

Like Camus, Soustelle denounced the 'complexe de supériorité culturelle et raciale' which had historically characterised some of the attitudes of the Europeans towards the Muslims (AS,67). These attitudes, he claimed, were all the more intolerable when adopted by ill-educated Europeans: 'Ces attitudes, toujours condamnables, deviennent intolérables lorsqu'elles sont le fait d'individus ignorants et grossiers s'adressant à des gens plus "évolués" qu'eux-mêmes' (AS,68). He had expressed similar sentiments in a communiqué sent out in 1955 to civil servants in Algeria in which he had stressed that, whilst the 'danger du mépris' was less than it had been in the past, Europeans still did not treat Muslims with the respect which he felt they deserved.⁴

For Jacques Mercier, writing in the military review *Contacts* in 1958, the settler population was reaping what it had sown. By refusing to treat the Muslims with dignity, settlers had created the conditions for the nationalist revolt:

Plus leurs oreilles étaient rebattues de l'affirmation 'l'Algérie, c'est la France', plus leur cœur s'humiliait, plus leur esprit se révoltait contre la distance ou la familiarité blessante que les Français de souche avaient été accoutumés d'adopter à leur égard. Le mouvement de révolte qui a pris naissance en Algérie s'explique en partie par une soif de considération.⁵

A very similar analysis was produced in a 1958 *Cinquième Bureau* study into the methods by which settlers and Muslims might be brought closer together. The report stated that amongst the European population there was ‘une certaine forme de racisme se trahissant par un complexe de supériorité qui entraîne lui-même la constitution d’une société “fermée”, hostile au musulman’.⁶ One of the causes of the rebellion, the report argued, was ‘l’attitude de la population européenne qui, vivant derrière un écran n’avait avec les autochtones que des relations de supérieur à subordonné, d’employeur à employé’.⁷

An article appearing in early 1958 in one of the more modest divisional bulletins of the French Army cited the case of a young, educated Muslim woman who recalled how she had joined the rebellion because she had never been treated with equal status by the Europeans for whom she was always a ‘mauresque’ or ‘fatma’. For the authors of this bulletin, such a fault had to be rectified: ‘Sans vouloir excuser l’égarement de cette jeune fille, il serait criminel de négliger ce reproche’.⁸

If the expression of such sentiments showed reformers to be partially sensitive to the existence of the European superiority complex, they were not completely so. Dine has drawn attention to the difference between Camus’ political activity in favour of the indigenous population and his literary production, arguing that Camus’ representation of the Arab in his fictional works replicated those attitudes of European superiority which elsewhere he sought to denounce.⁹ The charge of (unconscious) hypocrisy might, with equal justification, be levelled at Soustelle. In this and subsequent chapters, we will see how Eurocentric attitudes permeated his reforming intentions. At this stage, we are simply concerned to show that both Soustelle and Camus recognised that settler attitudes towards the Muslims had been unacceptable and that these had contributed to the deterioration of the colonial situation, even where they were not always mindful of their own role in perpetuating it.

The Intolerable Conditions

Another frequent reproach brought against colonialism by reformers was the way in which it had led to an uneven distribution of wealth and opportunity. In the conclusion to the *Chroniques algériennes*, Camus pointed to the economic inequities yielded by the colonial system as an issue which needed to be addressed, citing the unfair distribution of land and wealth, worsened by the rapid birth-rate amongst the Muslim population.¹⁰ It was, by this stage, a familiar theme of his writing about Algeria. His 1939 articles set out his opposition to the colonial system which had kept Algeria's Muslim population in a position of permanent poverty. He denounced the idea that the Muslims had fewer needs than their European counterparts, stressing that there was 'rien de plus méprisable que ces arguments'.¹¹ That Muslims managed to eke out an existence hardly implied that they were happy with their lot. The conditions under which the Kabylarian peasants worked were appalling, 'un régime d'esclavage' as he termed it (p.51). He also criticised the settler belief that the Kabylians were lazy and for this reason deserved to be poorly paid. Such an argument derived from 'une logique abjecte' according to which workers, lacking money to buy food, had no strength to work which, in turn, resulted in lower pay (p.55). He also attacked the French for their failure to provide adequate schooling opportunities for the Kabylians. Money had been unwisely spent on a small number of well-equipped schools, ill-adapted to the needs of the indigenous population for whom there was a desperate shortage of school places. These showpiece schools had been built 'pour les touristes et les commissions d'enquête' sacrificing 'au préjugé du prestige les besoins élémentaires du peuple indigène' (p.63). Moreover, if the aim was really to turn Algerians into fully-fledged French citizens, it was a mistake, Camus believed, to separate the schooling of the Muslim children from that of the Europeans (p.64).

The dual assertions that Algeria's indigenous population wished to escape from poverty and that the French had been derelict in their duties towards them was echoed by other reformers. Soustelle also recognised that the standard of living amongst

Algeria's indigenous population was unacceptable on the economic, political and social front: 'Moi tout le premier j'ai dit, et je le répète, que les conditions de vie qui règnent dans ce pays au point de vue social, économique et politique sont insuffisantes, qu'il faut unir nos efforts pour les améliorer' (AS, 67). Reforms had to be implemented 'sans retard, sans excuse, sans hypocrisie' (AS,154). Like Camus, Soustelle attacked those advocates of the colonial *status quo* who sought to justify the poverty of the indigenous population on the grounds that Muslims, because they were less civilised, were happy to accept lower standards of living. For Soustelle, such beliefs were ill-founded and needed to be dispelled: 'Il serait absurde d'imaginer que le Musulman algérien de la ville ne tient pas autant qu'un autre à un minimum de confort et de commodité' (AS, 63).

As the rebellion gathered momentum, other reformers mirrored Soustelle's concern at the deficiencies of French rule. Bayet attacked the French for their broken promises to the indigenous population over reform, for the fact that a large percentage of the Algerian population had been denied the opportunity to go to school, and for the absolute poverty in which too many Algerians lived.¹² The 1958 *Cinquième Bureau* study into settler-Muslim *rapprochement* also recognised 'la condition inférieure qui a été faite au musulman en lui refusant pendant trop longtemps l'accès à l'instruction, à la propriété, à la fonction publique.'¹³ Again, the authors held that such a policy could not be justified on the grounds that Muslims were happy with their lot since they had 'une aspiration très naturelle à des conditions de vie plus larges et à la modernisation'(p.2). However, in the authors' eyes, this aspiration was juxtaposed with 'un respect aveugle de coutumes périmées'(p.2). This dismissive attitude implied a hierarchy with European culture at the pinnacle and the values and culture of indigenous society at the bottom. Even though critical of the settlers, the report nonetheless left intact the basic assumptions of the civilising mission.

By recognising some of the failings of the French, the *Cinquième Bureau* report was able to link the outbreak of the rebellion to the fact that the material aspirations of the Muslims remained unfulfilled. The authors argued that the rebellion 'trouve ses sources et ses arguments dans le mécontentement, pour une bonne part justifié, de la population musulmane'(p.1). This echoed a point made by Soustelle in *Aimée et souffrante Algérie* with reference to a visit he had made to Kabylia during 1955. Support for the rebellion, he argued, had been garnered on the back of poverty and unemployment: 'Les forces de désagrégation (...) trouvent leur origine dans le mécontentement, on pourrait même dire le désespoir, d'une population livrée au chômage et à la misère' (AS,42-3). In Soustelle's eyes, the insurrection was not the product of an unstoppable nationalist urge but derived from a specific economic problem which, with the application of specific resources, could be solved.

That the causes of the rebellion were primarily economic and social is an argument which has received the endorsement of Droz and Lever who write of the 'dramatique disparité des conditions sociales dans laquelle le nationalisme algérien a trouvé sa légitimité et l'insurrection son principal atout'.¹⁴ What Soustelle, and to a lesser extent Droz and Lever, fail to appreciate, however, was that the rebellion was also underpinned by the properly political goal of national independence. As Sartre argued, assuming the voice of the Algerian people, no amount of economic and social reform could compensate for the lack of political liberty: 'Même si nous étions heureux sous les baïonnettes françaises, nous nous battrions'.¹⁵ Whilst, as the next chapter will illustrate, Sartre's was not a truly accurate representation of the aspirations of the totality of the Muslim population, he was certainly correct to point out that the nationalist movement could not be described simply as a protest against poor living conditions.

The Speed of Change

Although critical of the French colonial presence, and in part aware of some of the problems created by it, reformers were not always willing to accept full French responsibility for its 'failures'. In the words of Smith, by failing to appreciate their own exploitative role 'the French could have an easy conscience about Algeria and argue, seemingly in good faith, that the Muslim community would surely benefit from a genuine effort on the part of Paris to pursue its "civilising mission" in North Africa'.¹⁶ Rather than argue, with the anti-colonialists, that the coloniser never intended to improve the status of the colonised, Soustelle claimed that French colonial policy in Algeria had always favoured greater equality for Muslims. Its principal failure lay in the speed with which such reforms had been promulgated: 'Il est regrettable', he noted, 'qu'on n'ait marché dans cette voie ni assez vite ni assez loin' (AS, 68). Like Soustelle, Mercier contended that it was the slowness of the reform process which had created the hostility amongst the Muslim population.

La lenteur avec laquelle ce pays tendait à atteindre le niveau de la métropole dans le domaine de l'équipement, de l'instruction et du travail, jurait avec la structure départementale de son administration, pourtant prometteuse d'égalité. Cette contradiction a pu être interprétée comme une odieuse duperie par les populations autochtones qui ne bénéficiaient en fait que d'un vague statut colonial.¹⁷

This emphasis of the slow pace of reform was important since, whilst critical of colonialism's failings, it gave the impression that colonialism was capable of evolution rather than, as the anti-colonialists claimed, immobile. And since colonialism was moving in the right direction, it was, for reformers, simply a matter of speeding up the process.

This attitude had its parallel in the argument that it was not the French presence which had created the misery of the native population but, rather, a French absence. Much of the poverty in Algeria, Soustelle argued, resulted from a failure on the part of the French to have a sufficient number of administrators distributed throughout the

country and to work at a grassroots level with the rural poor. Looking back over a visit to Algeria undertaken in November 1954, he commented:

Je sentais à chaque pas combien nous avions laissé le vide se creuser derrière le décor de l'administration régulière, planant trop haut alors qu'il faudrait se tenir en quelque sorte au ras du sol avec ceux qui vivent et qui souffrent dans ces étendues. (AS, 26)

French colonialism, for Soustelle, was not inherently flawed, but had simply been wrongly targeted. The problem, as he saw it, was that France had tried to rule Algeria without putting in place adequate resources:

Alors qu'il eût fallu ranimer la vie locale et lui donner une impulsion énergique et continue, on avait cru possible d'administrer aux moindres frais, en laissant ce peuple d'ombres aux prises avec son dur destin. (AS, 26)

The same argument was taken up in *Le Bled* early in 1956. Seeking, like so many other articles, to explain the causes of the rebellion, the editorial evoked the distribution throughout Algeria of 'personnel insuffisant en nombre et pas assez spécialisé'.¹⁸ This deficiency had been compounded by an inappropriate use of a pro-French Muslim elite to administer large parts of the country whereby Muslim *caïds* had often been sent to villages with which they had had no prior contact and to which they had no attachment.¹⁹

In similar vein, Captain X, an anonymous contributor to the military review *Contacts*, stated that French rule over Algeria had not been beneficial to many of those forced to live under it. The French, concerned only with a small Muslim elite, had ignored the misery of the masses and allowed native Algerians to be exploited. His suggested remedy to atone for 130 years of colonial neglect lay in a renewed contact with 'la vie des petits et des pauvres, de ceux qui ont été exploités à notre insu'.²⁰ The charge he brought against the French was merely one of ignorance rather than wilful neglect; the true agents of colonial oppression were elsewhere and it was now incumbent upon those of good will to rectify the wrongs that had been done. Of course, we might counter this by arguing that ignorance is no defence and the extent to which French

authorities were truly ignorant of the exploitation taking place in Algeria is, at best, questionable.

A number of historians have supported the argument that the Algerian territory was under-administered. Horne, for example, refers to 'the acute problem of under-administration' leading to a situation 'whereby many an Algerian never encountered a representative of France'.²¹ Others have argued that when the rebellion broke out in 1954, the French were to have cause to rue these deficiencies as Algeria's chronic under-administration was soon exposed and exploited. The inadequacy of France's judicial and administrative structures enabled the FLN to establish a territory-wide network of contacts and activists. Ambler attributes the success of the FLN to its 'solid political-administrative organisation which (...) pulled the native population out from an undermanned French administration'.²² Kelly goes further arguing that prior to the massive reinforcement of French troops, the FLN was a force for order and stability in many parts of Algeria, bridging the gap between an inefficient French colonial administration and the former tribal rule which colonisation had upset.²³

Whilst it might be conceded that the absence of a French administrative presence allowed the FLN to establish itself and build popular support in some areas without being subject to surveillance and repression, the 'under-administration thesis', particularly when offered by the likes of Soustelle, neatly side-steps the question of French exploitation. As Smith has pointed out, to blame the rebellion upon under-administration is 'to deny the extent to which the Muslim problem lay in the character of the French presence, and to insist instead that the primary shortcoming of French rule was not its domination but its neglect of the Muslim population'.²⁴ Moreover, the under-administration thesis legitimated the European superiority complex. Since the problem lay with a 'lack' of colonialism, it followed that, when left to their own devices, the 'natives' could not cope and that French rule was therefore necessary. It also appeared to take it for granted that a more benevolent and comprehensive control

would have led to an unproblematic acceptance of colonial rule and would have prevented the rebellion. Although it must remain a matter of historical speculation, such an assumption ignores the possibility that a revolutionary opposition to French control might have developed sooner amongst Algeria's indigenous population had French rule been more visible.

Lost Opportunities

Speculation about what 'might have happened' in Algeria had French rule been different is, in fact, a common feature of writing about the conflict.²⁵ It figured in the accounts of reformers whilst the war was still ongoing and whilst, in their minds at least, Algeria remained eminently 'saveable'. Their intention was to explain that the outbreak of the rebellion could have been avoided altogether if only the French had been more liberal in their policies prior to its outbreak. However, upon closer examination, these so-called 'lost opportunities' for reform were intended to reinforce a discriminatory colonial order rather than transcend it. Writing in 1955 with regard to the French failure to promote with sufficient vigour Algeria's indigenous elite, Soustelle notes:

Entre les deux guerres mondiales, l'élite musulmane souhaitait ardemment être intégrée à la France, et lui intégrer l'Algérie. Les projets 'Blum-Violette', cependant bien timides, furent enterrés, tragique occasion manquée. On en arriva à dénoncer comme anti-français des gens qui exigeaient d'être Français. Il fallut la deuxième guerre, la part importante et souvent héroïque qu'y prirent les Musulmans, le développement des idées réformistes sous le Gouvernement provisoire, pour qu'on reprît la marche en avant, non sans avoir gaspillé un temps précieux. (AS, 68)

Whilst attacking the rejection of these projects, Soustelle's critique can be seen as only partial. His assessment relies upon a optimistic picture of the reforming nature of the provisional government following the liberation and makes no mention of the 1945 massacres at Sétif nor the limited nature (and unapplied) provisions of the Statute of Algeria of 1947. It was, after all, the 1947 Statute which had introduced the notion of the double electoral college, which, if an improvement upon previous practice, was

hardly the kind of sweeping transformation that would have shown a French commitment to real democracy in Algeria. Although criticising settler illiberalism, Soustelle did not attack the 1947 Statute for seeking to enshrine some of the principles of European domination.

A similar attempt to valorise these failed plans for reform which replicated rather than challenged colonial dominance is found in Chevallier's 1958 work *Nous, Algériens*. Like Soustelle, Chevallier saw the Blum-Violette project and the 1947 Statute as 'occasions manquées'. Had it functioned properly, the Algerian Assembly created by the 1947 Statute would have provided 'un excellent moyen de contact où se seraient exprimées, discutées et confrontées librement les opinions les plus diverses, quitte à ce qu'une opposition se manifestât, quitte même à ce qu'elle soit encouragée plutôt que détruite ou muselée' (NA,74-5). There is certainly an element of reforming good will present here insofar as Chevallier saw the Assembly as a forum in which the grievances of the indigenous population could be aired and dealt with. Lacking, however, was sufficient recognition that the nature of the Statute itself, with its institutionalised European superiority, might have been a source of chagrin for Muslims. In his criticism of the Assembly, Chevallier went no further than to attack the non-implementation of some of its provisions and what he regarded as the obstructive attitude of the administration:

Elle [l'Assemblée] aurait pu devenir excellente et asseoir pour de longues années la paix et l'amitié entre les populations si la haute administration algérienne n'était devenue maladroitement de plus en plus envahissante, comme pour reconquérir pas à pas les prérogatives légalement dévolues à l'Assemblée. (NA, 78)

This attitude is perhaps surprising since, elsewhere in his work, he recognised the centrality of the single electoral college as a means of showing the Muslims that they were French people with the same rights and the same duties. Chevallier also appeared to be blind to the reality that a strong opposition movement within the

Assembly would have furthered the cause of Algerian independence, precisely the reason the settlers wanted to stifle it in the first place.

Extraneous factors

Another tactic employed by reformers to account for Muslim poverty was to blame factors over which the French had no control, or to present poverty as an unfortunate side effect of an ongoing development of Algeria which, in itself, constituted a 'good'. Soustelle relied upon a number of explanations to account for widespread rural poverty amongst Muslims – the land was infertile (AS,57), the subsistence farming methods which they employed were inappropriate and too dependent upon the whims of the climate (AS,58), the differences in property laws made it difficult to obtain credit (AS, 58), and the high birth rate meant that the land could not easily support so many extra mouths (AS, 60). The Muslims themselves were also seen as partly responsible for their own plight. With the exception of the 1.5 million Muslims belonging to the modern economy, supplemented by a small indigenous bourgeoisie, the remainder of the population '[demeure] dans le secteur archaïque et [s'attarde] dans un moyen âge technique qui est souvent aussi un moyen âge mental' (AS, 61). Without doubt the climate was extremely harsh and large areas of land throughout Algeria were not particularly suitable for farming. However, in seeking to shift the responsibility for Muslim poverty away from the French by according a preponderant importance to such factors, or worse still, to a perceived backwardness of the Muslims, Soustelle did much to undermine the liberal credentials which he claimed to espouse.

Perhaps the work which goes furthest in shifting the blame for the 'failings' of French colonialism away from the notion of a totalising system of exploitation onto uncontrollable extraneous factors is Germaine Tillion's reforming treatise *L'Algérie en 1957*.²⁶ Tillion was a professor at the Sorbonne but more importantly had spent a good

part of her life living in Algeria and was living in the Aurès mountains at the time of the outbreak of the rebellion. The essence of Tillion's argument is that French colonialism had done both too much and too little for Algeria. The French had introduced changes into the Algerian economy with good intentions, yet whilst these changes had destabilised the sustainable, but archaic, economic system of pre-colonial Algeria, they had not been far-reaching enough to raise material conditions for the indigenous population to the same level as those enjoyed by the French. A key theme of Tillion's work is that the French had led the Algerians 'au milieu du gué'.²⁷ By introducing medical techniques, the French had helped to reduce the death rate without, by that stage, managing to stem the extremely high birth rate. This factor, she argued, had led to a population increase which in its turn had resulted in a process of over-grazing and more extensive land cultivation than could be supported. In other words, the Algerian population had grown whilst at the same time resources had diminished, trapping them in a downward spiral of poverty and malnutrition (AL,30). Widespread rural poverty and an economy unable to absorb such a large population growth had led to a process of *clochardisation* with vast numbers of Muslims lacking the means by which to support themselves. Accepting that the obvious answer to this problem would have been to introduce birth control, Tillion explained that such arguments would have fallen on deaf ears amongst those populations where the aim was to have as many children as possible to ensure their survival in old age.

Tillion's argument, at first glance, appears to condemn the French for having disturbed one pattern of living in the name of imposing another economic model upon an unwilling indigenous population which, while more technologically sophisticated, was not necessarily more beneficial. However, this is not strictly the case, for Tillion's description of an Algeria trapped in a kind of no-man's land between traditional society and modernity is placed within the context of an inevitable contact between under-developed and developed countries. In other words, the problems faced by the Algerians were not specifically of French making but were the unavoidable outcome

of a world in which societies at different levels of economic development have to co-exist. The French were thus not to blame for the state of the indigenous population in Algeria. Unlike thinkers such as Memmi, Tillion did not support the hypothesis that the French had deliberately under-developed Algeria. Although the French had caused poverty and misery amongst Algeria's indigenous population, they had done so 'sans le vouloir et sans le savoir' (AL,13). She writes of a global problem arising out of the contact between civilisations which had undergone an industrial revolution and those which had not. She summarised the extent to which the French could be blamed for the prevailing conditions in Algeria the following manner:

Responsabilité et non culpabilité, car le malheur actuel de l'Algérie était vraisemblablement inévitable – dans la mesure où il est désormais impossible d'épargner à un peuple archaïque tout contact avec ce monstre prodigieux qu'est la Civilisation Planétaire et dans la mesure où ce contact est fatal au peuple au peuple non préparé qui le subit. Il n'en est pas moins vrai que notre présence en Algérie a *accéléré* le phénomène de désintégration sociale de ce malheureux pays. Disons, si vous préférez, que si l'Algérie était restée indépendante, sa population aurait seulement doublé, alors qu'elle a quadruplé avec nous (ce qui aggrave considérablement sa position actuelle et contribue à la rendre insoluble). Mais c'est une conséquence imprévue et involontaire du « paternalisme colonial », dont nous sommes à la fois responsables et innocents – aussi responsables et aussi innocents que ceux qui en sont victimes. (AL, 67-8)

The misery of the Algerian people could be attributed to the 'suppression *mondiale* des épidémies, commercialisation *mondiale* des richesses, diffusion *mondiale* des idées, des découvertes et des événements' (AL,36) (original emphasis). Running throughout Tillion's work is a deep sense of pessimism about whether the afflictions suffered by the lesser-developed countries could indeed be solved. She believed that piecemeal intervention on the part of the Western powers would only accentuate what she saw as the existing problem of countries trapped between two different civilisations:

N'espérez pas qu'on puisse s'en tirer au rabais, avec un sixième de bulletin de vote (comme en Algérie), quelques ampoules de vaccin, une généreuse distribution de nos « invendus », et la « lutte contre l'analphabétisme » prônée par l'UNESCO. Toutes ces marques de sollicitude ne peuvent avoir qu'un seul résultat (celui qu'effectivement elles ont): effondrement fatal des valeurs, des techniques et des traditions d'un peuple, accroissement démesuré de sa population, diminution ininterrompue de ses ressources et une distorsion

sociale de nature d'autant plus explosive que la sollicitude aura été plus suivie sans être suffisante. (AL,56)

Looking at the global picture she argued:

En supposant (hypothèse peu probable) que tous les pays privilégiés se mettent rapidement d'accord pour s'imposer les plus grands sacrifices afin de "déclochariser" le reste de l'univers, en auraient-ils les moyens? Il semble bien que non. (AL,61)

Tillion is correct to point out that the rise in the indigenous population was problematic, in the same way that spiralling population growth continues to prove problematic for some of the poorest countries in the world today. As Droz and Lever note, the rapid growth in population brought with it 'un processus de paupérisation, qu'en l'absence de toute réforme de structure les autorités françaises n'étaient plus à même de maîtriser'.²⁸ Tillion's attempt to evoke the impersonal Juggernaut-like march of 'Planetary Civilisation' as the principal reason for global poverty was, however, an excuse to let the European powers, and the French in particular, off the hook. Tillion phrased the problem in absolute terms - too many mouths, not enough resources - rather than as one, at least in part, of distribution. What she failed to consider is the extent to which the impact of the population explosion might have been cushioned had the French not monopolised the most productive areas of land. As Dine has noted, the need for the coloniser to provide further food to the indigenous population should be seen as 'an indictment of the colonial relegation of the indigenous inhabitants of the territory to the most marginal of its constituent lands'.²⁹

Moreover, Tillion appeared to take it for granted that the contact between the industrialised and the non-industrialised world could only have been problematic. Even if we accept that the meeting of different models of organising society at very different levels of technological development will potentially generate problems, Tillion rather assumed that the colonial relationship as it was in practice constituted was the only possible outcome of this interaction. As the following quotation from Bhikhu Parekh illustrates, this need not have been the case:

Thanks to the great geographical explorations from the sixteenth century onwards, Europeans came into close contact with non-European societies. They could have responded to the latter in a variety of ways, such as leaving them alone, quietly settling down among them as newly arrived immigrants, establishing regular trade relations and returning home, rejoicing in the diversity of human life, learning about the native ways of life and using that knowledge to acquire a better understanding of their own, killing the natives, conquering and ruling over them, and so forth. Without exception Europeans took over the countries they had 'discovered', and in some cases exterminated or uprooted those already settled there. They were largely motivated by the desire for wealth and domination, and took full advantage of their technological and material superiority.³⁰

Of course, one can only speculate as to what might have happened had the European powers opted to pursue a different type of relationship with the inhabitants of the territories which they colonised. Yet at the very least one might challenge the assumption, in a way that Tillion never does, that European colonialism, with all its inherent inequalities and resultant problems of population explosion, was the only possible type of relationship that could have been forged.

Another question largely ignored by Tillion is the way in which France arrived in the group of countries best adapted to cope with, and indeed accelerate, the vast process of global civilisation. For Tillion, it was simply a question of good fortune. Her work stresses that France had 'la chance d'être dans le peloton de tête de la civilisation au bon moment' (AL,57). She reaffirmed this point, noting that 'nous avons eu de la chance, puisque, au moment voulu, nous nous sommes trouvés dans le clan des gagnants' (AL,66). Admittedly, Tillion does not fall back on the myth that the Europeans enjoyed some innate superiority. Nevertheless, her failure to give the question any real consideration appears as a gap in her work.

Reformer Indignation

'La mise en valeur' of Algeria

At times, this tendency towards an overly-generous reading of the French presence degenerated into the blatant self-congratulation associated with the more unyielding

apologists for French colonial rule. Supporting their arguments by citing all the things that France had done for Algeria, reformers often adopted what Dine has termed 'the system of myths developed by the settler community, and repeated by its metropolitan defenders, in an attempt to legitimize European minority control of the colony'.³¹

If Soustelle thought that the French had not done everything in their power to help Algeria's indigenous population, he would have had no truck with the idea that the French had actually contributed to worsening conditions in Algeria. For him, pre-colonial Algeria was not to be valorised but was a land beset by tyranny and pestilence:

C'était en réalité une époque où les endémies, les épidémies et la mortalité infantile liquidaient une large part de l'excédent de population, et où les guerres intertribales disposaient du reste; à ce prix, les survivants (2 millions et demi environ) végétaient dans un pays encore vaste pour eux, non sans subir durement les famines, tandis que des nuées de mesquines subsistaient grâce aux aumônes des grands propriétaires et que les dépouilles de la corse maritime enrichissaient les rays d'Alger. (AS, 62)

Studies such as Lucette Valensi's account of the Maghreb prior to colonialism tell us that there were repeated outbreaks of plague, smallpox and other fatal diseases throughout the region during the eighteenth century and the early part of the nineteenth century. Valensi also stresses that in pre-colonial Algeria climatic factors often led to famine.³² That this was the case hardly exculpates French colonialism or validates Soustelle's argument that French colonialism had been generally beneficial if a little slow in making its results felt. Moreover, Valensi points to social practices within the Maghreb which compensated for the technological inferiority of the region compared to Europe, such as the *ma'una*, or mutual help and assistance, which consisted of collections held amongst the entire community for those farmers who had suffered a particularly severe harvest or who had lost much of their flock due to disease.³³

Soustelle's praise for the settlers' contribution to the *mise en valeur* of the Algerian territory was adopted by many others who claimed to favour colonial reform. A brochure issued by the *Cinquième Bureau* in 1956 sought to cast the French coloniser in the role of saviour: 'Ce pays, que nous avons sauvé de l'anarchie et de la misère, nous l'avons peuplé.'³⁴ Similarly, in an article provocatively entitled 'Accusée de Génocide.. La France répond' published in *Le Bled* in 1957, Michel Denis and Jean Dallier aspired to convince their military readership that, under French tutelage, Algeria had been turned into nothing short of a land of milk and honey:

En 127 ans, le visage de l'Algérie s'est complètement transformé. D'un pays sous-développé, où la population vivait dans l'anarchie et dans la misère, la France a fait un pays en pleine expansion économique. Grâce à ses efforts constants, le niveau de vie de la population s'est sans cesse élevé, des terres incultes sont devenues fertiles, des usines se sont construites. L'Algérie moderne est une œuvre de la France.³⁵

One might also cite an article published by *Le Bled* in 1958 by the pseudonymous Frédéric which asserted that those who criticised French achievements in Algeria must have been unaware of the state of the country prior to the French arrival. These critics, he commented sarcastically, perhaps believed that 'd'un coup de baguette magique le pays est devenu aussi merveilleux'.³⁶ Like other reformers, the author singularly failed to appreciate that Algeria was not so marvellous for the overwhelming majority of its inhabitants who had suffered at the hands of the French. Furthermore, reformers appeared to assume that the slower pace of Algerian society and the lower level of technological sophistication would have been a permanent condition had it not been for the French presence. Such eulogies of the French pioneering spirit did not recognise any capacity for indigenous development. The idea can at least be entertained that the instruments of change within Algerian society might well have been generated internally, rather than being reliant upon the French; as Memmi put it: 'Pourquoi devons-nous supposer que le colonisé se serait figé dans l'état où l'a trouvé le colonisateur ?'(PC,131).

At times, reformer triumphalism went even further, taking on a decidedly racist tone. An exposé given by a Captain Caniol under the aegis of the *Cinquième Bureau* argues for example that ten centuries of Arab domination had effectively ruined Algeria:

10 siècles d'occupation arabe avaient complètement anéanti la civilisation de l'Afrique Romaine.

1 siècle de présence française allait redonner à l'Algérie la place qu'elle mérite au sein du monde moderne.³⁷

For the captain, the initial good work done by the Romans had been undermined and was only at that moment being reconstructed by the French. The racial and cultural bias of the author is revealed in the language employed; the Arab 'occupation' is contrasted with Roman 'civilisation' and the French 'presence'. This attack on Arab civilisation goes beyond Soustelle's attempts to valorise colonisation as a positive development which we discussed in the previous chapter for, on that occasion, there was muted praise for the Arab colonisers too. Here it is white, European colonialism which is attributed with positive, transformative value whereas Arab colonisation is seen as retrograde and destructive, a kind of anti-civilisation.

Dealing with International Criticism

Confident in the beneficence of French intentions, reformers were not prepared to tolerate international criticism. Soustelle stressed the specificity of French colonialism, presenting it as more enlightened than that of other colonising nations. The French, he claimed in 1961, had been 'plus disposés à ouvrir aux Noirs ou aux Jaunes les portes de leur société et de leur culture' than the British, the North Americans or any other imperial power (ET, 19). Five years earlier his attack on the opponents of French colonial practice had been much more pointed. In his indignation at international criticism directed at French attempts to remain in Algeria, particularly from the United States and the Soviet Union, he had countered that France's treatment of the populations of her colonies bore favourable comparison with the policies adopted by her critics:

De ceux qui nous font la mauvaise querelle du colonialisme, tel n'est pas parvenu à sa grandeur que par l'extermination massive des peuples autochtones, et pratique encore les plus blessantes discriminations raciales ; tel autre liquide physiquement des communautés entières et déporte aux confins de son empire les débris de populations mal assimilées ; d'autres encore tolèrent chez eux la vente et l'achat d'esclaves sur le marché, la misère indicible de leurs paysans, les famines cycliques. Et nous, qui n'avons pas tout fait, tant s'en faut, mais qui n'avons certes pas exterminé les Algériens autochtones, qui mêlons dans nos écoles nos fils et les leurs, qui nous soucions sincèrement d'effacer tout vestige de régimes dépassés et qui luttons contre la maladie et le dénuement, c'est nous qui serions condamnés ? Vraiment, c'est trop d'injustice et de sottise. (AS, 75)

Soustelle believed that, although not perfect, France had behaved better than all the other powers and that, metaphorically speaking, she had (almost) clean hands. In his opinion, many countries which enjoyed the full rights of sovereignty were in fact far more subject to an exploitative external control than Algeria: 'Bien des pays prétendus 'indépendants', mais dominés par de grandes puissances qui exploitent leurs ressources sans y bâtir une école ni un hôpital, sont cent fois plus que l'Algérie asservis à un colonialisme hypocrite' (AS,74).

The belief that the French were fairer colonisers than other powers was taken up by Soustelle's successor in the position of Governor-General of Algeria. Robert Lacoste argued that the French could have waged a more vigorous assault on the rebellion, but that this would have led to a 'guerre d'extermination' – an unconscious admission that the French Army was opposed by a great deal more of the indigenous population than anyone associated with the war effort was prepared to admit.³⁸ Such a war, Lacoste pointed out, would have been 'semblable à celle qu'ont menée, dans un passé récent, bien des pays qui aujourd'hui nous censurent'.³⁹ This was not merely an attack on what Lacoste saw as the hypocrisy of other powers that might have deigned to criticise the French, but almost went so far as to proclaim that the indigenous population of Algeria ought to have been grateful to the French for their 'restraint'.

The reasoning of both Soustelle and Lacoste is flawed on two counts. Firstly, the injustices of French colonialism which were legion, are hardly excused by the fact that, relatively speaking, they might be considered less pernicious than the massacre

of North American Indians or the forced resettlement policies undertaken in the Soviet Union under Stalin. Secondly, the fact that the French had not themselves embarked upon a systematic genocide in Algeria was arguably influenced by reasons other than their civilising magnanimity. Following Sartre, the extermination of the indigenous population, even though perhaps desired by the coloniser, could not have been contemplated since it would have brought an end to the coloniser's privileged place within colonial society which depended upon an exploitable indigenous mass.⁴⁰

Algeria Versus the Arab world

Another feature of the triumphalist discourse at times adopted by reformers was to offer favourable comparisons between social and economic conditions in Algeria and those of other Arab nations. A *Cinquième Bureau* brochure published in 1956 argued that France had nothing to be ashamed about as far as her colonial role was concerned: 'Nous n'avons pas', the authors commented, 'à rougir de ce que nous avons réalisé dans nos départements d'Outre-Méditerranée.' The reason that France could take pride in her colonial achievements was that Algeria's Muslim population enjoyed a higher standard of living than was to be found in any other Arab country in the Middle East. The authors invited their reader to compare the number of hospitals and the number of roads per 10,000 inhabitants between Algeria, Egypt and Iraq, in which Algeria emerged as the clear winner.⁴¹

A 1957 report from Governor-General Lacoste's office strikes a similar tone. Those who attacked French policy in Algeria, the authors argued, would do well to recall that rather than simply exploit the Algerian land for their own gain, the French had directed a considerable amount of revenue towards improving the economic well-being of Algeria's indigenous population with the result that conditions had improved markedly 'surtout si l'on établit une comparaison avec les pays arabes'.⁴²

Rather than offer excuses for the failures of the past, the French were even prepared to proclaim their achievements to the indigenous population of Algeria itself. For instance, the following extract from a tract produced by the *Cinquième Bureau* for initial contact with the Muslim population confidently lists the benefits which the French had brought to Algeria. Naively proclaiming that the Algerians had 'never had it so good' and with the implication that without the French they would never have it so good again, the authors strove to convince Muslims to put their trust in France:

La France est venue en Afrique pour lutter contre l'anarchie, développer les ressources et améliorer les conditions de vie.

La France a fait abolir l'esclavage en Afrique et dans le monde.

La France a sorti de votre sol des villes, des cités ouvrières, des hôpitaux, des écoles. Elle a créé des routes, des chemins de fer, organisé des points d'eau.

La France a construit des logements pour vos parents qui travaillent dans la Métropole.

Beaucoup de musulmans ont profité de ces bienfaits. Il y a des Préfets, des Magistrats, des fonctionnaires, des officiers, des avocats musulmans.

Nous savons qu'il y a encore beaucoup à faire, et c'est pour cela que nous créons des écoles nombreuses.⁴³

Besides the obvious point that, given the living conditions of the vast majority of Algeria's indigenous population, the French had far less on which to congratulate themselves than they actually imagined, the very fact that they thought it appropriate to produce such self-eulogising propaganda testifies to, at best, a considerable amount of self-delusion and, at worst, outright hypocrisy.

Looking to the Future

The process of *clochardisation* which Tillion described was so widespread that, whether Algeria became independent or continued under French tutelage, the future of the country was bleak. Even with a genuine commitment to reform on the part of the French, Algeria's problems would have remained enormous. Reformers did not seem to appreciate this fully. Since they under-estimated or deliberately underplayed the

nature of the problem, their assessments of what was to be done were, at times, correspondingly overly optimistic.

As far as the demographic question was concerned, Soustelle was convinced that industrialisation would have a positive effect, ameliorating living conditions which in its turn would constitute 'un puissant facteur de stabilisation démographique' (DA,35). A similarly optimistic assessment of the redemptive powers of industrialisation was offered by Denis and Dallier writing in *Le Bled*: 'C'est surtout l'industrialisation du pays qui permettra en créant des richesses nouvelles et des emplois en nombre suffisant de rétablir l'équilibre entre la population et les ressources'.⁴⁴ Attributing the problems of the Algerian economy to a lack of industrialisation, itself resulting from the lack of an energy source, Reis naively believed that newly found resources in the Sahara would remove this obstacle to economic take-off:

Ce qui freinait toute hausse réelle du niveau de vie des masses musulmanes, ce qui a produit une clochardisation incontestable (...) était l'absence d'industrialisation, conséquence du défaut de toute importante source énergétique. Or ce défaut a disparu.⁴⁵

On the ground in Algeria, the French Army's plan to deal with the huge problem of unemployment was, in the short term, to open up vast building sites to create a new infrastructure. Somewhat optimistically, a report appearing in *Le Bled* on one particular detachment of the SAS carried the subtitle 'Chômeur: un mot qui tend à disparaître'.⁴⁶ The article tells how formerly unemployed Algerians were engaged in constructing roads. Without this work, the article informed its military readership, 150 men would be reduced to misery.⁴⁷ Of course, what it neglected to mention was the fate which would befall these men once the road building was complete.

The testimony of a Lieutenant Le Merre, a French soldier attached to the SAS and posted to a small village, provides a similar example of such naivety.⁴⁸ In the sector falling under his jurisdiction, Le Merre was confronted with the problem of

widespread rural unemployment, particularly amongst the young, bringing poverty and discontent in its wake. The social malaise which this created, in his opinion, made the inhabitants of rural communities more susceptible to the message of the FLN. He decided to solve this problem by constructing rudimentary sporting facilities comprising a football pitch, high jump and long jump areas, and courts for basketball and volleyball. Girls as well as boys were encouraged to use these facilities, despite the initial resistance of some of the male heads of family. According to the report, not only did these facilities become a centre of attraction for the youth of the village, their construction also absorbed the energies of a significant proportion of the adult male population.⁴⁹

Other articles advocating colonial reform proved to be more circumspect. However, whilst they recognised that the economic transformation of Algeria would be mired in difficulty, they typically retained a belief in the possibility of a successful outcome in the long term with the application of sufficient good will on the French part.

An anonymous document emanating in 1957 from Governor-General Lacoste's advisors recognised that the rising birth rate was certain to cause problems for Algeria's future. As the authors of the document noted, 'le fait démographique domine tous les autres problèmes algériens en imposant aux travaux, aux recherches et aux réalisations, une cadence toujours plus rapide.'⁵⁰ The high level of unemployment which Algeria was experiencing at the time of the outbreak of hostilities was seen as 'la conséquence presque fatale de l'accroissement démographique' (p.37). Even in periods of growth, the Algerian economy, the report stated, 'ne peut absorber le surplus des populations actives que l'accroissement constant des naissances amène régulièrement sur le marché du travail' (p.37). Given this situation, the report argues that the opening of vast building sites would offer the best method of fighting against unemployment (p.38). However, there was a certain recognition that this could be no

more than a short term palliative and that what was required was a real economic expansion:

Le problème de sous-emploi ne sera pas réglé par le développement illimité de ces chantiers. Le chômage ne disparaîtra en Algérie qu'avec une expansion économique réelle.
(p.38)

Pierre Chaussade, a high-ranking civil servant attached to the Algerian ministry, also acknowledged that there was no 'recette miracle' capable of putting Algeria on the road to development.⁵¹ A solution to her problems could not be found even with a decade of economic expansion. That this was so, however, did not constitute 'une raison pour s'abstenir devant une action que ces besoins rendent contraignante' (p.30). This arduous task could not be completed unless French sovereignty was maintained. For Chaussade, the permanence of the political ties between France and Algeria constituted 'un instrument déterminant des apports des capitaux et des techniciens nécessaires à l'Algérie' (p.26). A less stable Algeria would be a less attractive site for French investors, worried about the potential risks involved. Strong political ties were also, in his eyes, necessary to secure support for the provision of publicly-funded state aid; people would not make sacrifices unless they could see the benefits of their investment (p.32).

Tillion was rather less optimistic about the possibility of private capital from France flowing into Algeria, believing that the prohibitive cost of energy, the lack of infrastructure, the scarcity of a technically-qualified labour force, the lack of spending power amongst the vast majority of the population and, finally, the risk of terrorist violence would deter all but the most audacious of investors (AL,115). Nevertheless, she maintained that only under continued French tutelage could the kind of investment in non-profit-making enterprises such as schools and agrarian reform be secured. Although pessimistic about global under-development in general, Tillion apparently believed in the capacity of the public purse to solve the problems which the territory was facing: 'Or, ces problèmes, nous avons entrepris de les résoudre et ils étaient

désormais solubles, au prix d'un effort énorme, mais qui n'excède pas nos moyens' (AL,79). To this end, she proposed that 2 billion old francs be invested over a five-year period to pay for the complete education of the indigenous population and the creation of 300,000 new industrial jobs in the Sahara; secondly, that an absolute priority be given in the French job market to Algerian workers over those from other former colonies or other European countries in order to ensure that sufficient money would flow back into Algeria; thirdly, that all those involved in the *Grandes Ecoles d'Agriculture et d'Administration* be required to undergo a period of compulsory service of two years in Algeria (AL,115-118).

Another document produced in 1957 for distribution amongst soldiers shared Tillion's optimism about the willingness of the French to contribute to the development of Algeria and in particular to contribute to non-profit-making enterprises. The report pointed out that France could choose the easy path of only investing in those sectors of the Algerian economy which would yield an immediate reward.⁵² However, the improvements would not be felt by the disinherited masses of the population for a much greater time period:

Dans cet optique, l'amélioration du sort des masses déshéritées ne peut provenir que de leur passage du secteur économique traditionnel au secteur moderne, c'est-à-dire d'un déracinement total; pour l'ensemble de la population, ce passage ne peut s'effectuer qu'en une période de plusieurs années, et, en attendant, le plus grand nombre ne bénéficie pratiquement d'aucune amélioration. (p.14)

Such a development of the Algerian economy did not require the continuation of the French presence for the same kind of investments could be made by other nations. France, however, had embarked on a much more generous path which was not concerned solely with the financial rewards that could be reaped from Algeria but with alleviating the poverty of all its inhabitants 'en axant particulièrement son effort sur les plus déshérités d'entre eux' (p.15).

Whilst the analyses of Tillion and Chaussade were more sophisticated than the rather naive pronouncements that industrialisation would solve all Algeria's problems, they remain, nonetheless, flawed. The willingness to contribute to Algeria on the kind of scale which the reformers wanted was not present amongst private investors. As Marseille argues, it was not in the interest of French capitalism to invest in Algeria since the changing nature of the international economy meant that it was more profitable for it to invest elsewhere. Nor was the desire to commit vast sums of money to Algeria present amongst the French public in general.⁵³

Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, we have seen that it was with a mixture of contrition and indignation that colonial reformers re-read the history of France's colonial presence. Whilst they were prepared to concede that, prior to 1954, France had not always fulfilled its (in their eyes, largely benign) civilising mission, this recognition of previous errors was far from total. Reforming zeal and commitment to change was, at times, juxtaposed with blatant triumphalism in French colonial achievements and annoyance that the benevolence of the French presence should be called into question. Whereas the militant anti-colonialists saw colonialism as immobile, reformers saw it as moving in the right direction and where the anti-colonialists saw a systemic problem, reformers recognised no such barriers to the evolution of the colonial system. From this, three main points arise which will be discussed in subsequent chapters. Firstly, because of their unwillingness or inability to recognise colonialism's exploitative nature, reformers' plans to transform Algeria were almost guaranteed to be stymied by the same 'colonial mindset'. Secondly, the triumphalism with which reformers proclaimed the merits of the French presence casts aspersions over their own good will as reformers, making them perhaps willing bedfellows with some of the more militant defenders of the French presence. Thirdly, because they did not perceive colonialism to be static, reformers were able to contemplate the 'reformability' of the settlers. In

other words, this allowed them to imagine the settlers as willing to put an end to their privileges.

CHAPTER FOUR

READING THE MUSLIM POPULATION: THE 'CONSENT POTENTIAL'

Of all the component parts of the reformers' assessments about the future French presence in Algeria, the 'consent potential' was the most important. Without it, their calls to extend the same democratic rights and duties to Algeria's Muslim population as to every other French citizen simply collapsed, leaving a policy of permanent repression or withdrawal as the only options. The essential irony, even perversity, of attempting to make Muslims into French citizens when they had no wish to become so was perfectly encapsulated in the *Manifeste des 121*. This petition appearing in October 1960 signed by 121 of France's leading intellectuals decried a war 'menée contre des hommes que l'Etat affecte de considérer comme Français, mais qui, eux, luttent précisément pour cesser de l'être'.¹

Reformers declared the vast majority of Muslims to be well-disposed towards the continuation of French rule. Where this consent was not already present, it was felt to be obtainable on condition that a process of reform was implemented. To support this argument, reformers declared the FLN to be a violent movement interested neither in democracy nor in the welfare of the Muslim population in whose name it falsely claimed to speak. Handing over Algeria to the FLN was, in reformers' eyes, anything but a liberal solution to the conflict.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the reformers' case that the 'hearts and minds' of the Muslim population could be won. It considers the arguments which they employed and the evidence which they assembled in order to challenge the view expressed by the radical anti-colonialists that the Muslim population was irretrievably wedded to the nationalist cause. Our analysis will show that whilst there were elements within the indigenous population prepared to collaborate with the French, these were not sufficient in number to gain the critical mass needed to defeat the FLN.

Representing the Muslims: A Common Past and a Shared Destiny

For Smith, given that the goal was to preserve French rule over Algeria, settlers who refused to accept any reforms were more logical than the liberals who condemned them; as he puts it, 'One wonders if those metropolitan liberals who so ceaselessly denounced the "stubborn blindness" of the settlers on the subject of reform were not themselves more truly blind.'² However blind to colonial realities reformers may have been, Smith is prepared to accept a certain amount of good will on their part. He argues that there was a time between 1944 and 1948 of 'naïve optimism' that 'genuine liberalism and French sovereignty would each serve the ends of each other'. This optimism ended when it became apparent that liberalism would 'only aid the Algerian nationalists to separate their destiny from that of France'.³ From 1948 onwards, the French were obliged to adopt repressive policies such as the falsification of elections, the banning of political parties or the threat of force in order to keep the nationalists under control. From 1954 onwards, Smith argues that the contradiction between liberalism and French sovereignty was fully exposed when the last fig leaf of liberalism was stripped away by the decisive commitment to force which occurred under the premiership of Mollet.⁴

Smith's analysis underestimates the degree of sincerity which underpinned reformers' proposals for Algeria. Certainly, Soustelle had no intention of compromising French

sovereignty, but neither did he view this as completely antithetical to the application of a liberal policy. He protested that 'le ralliement des Musulmans constituait bien une condition *sine qua non*' of his *intégration* programme (ET,33). Writing in 1958, Reis had made the same point: 'Encore faut-il que cette intégration soit voulue par les individus appelés à s'intégrer'.⁵ Chevallier also writing in 1958, concluded that Muslims were not anti-French, although they risked becoming so: 'Le musulman algérien n'est pas antifrançais. Peut-être le deviendra-t-il demain, mais jusqu'à présent ont menti tous ceux qui lui imputaient l'intention de nous chasser d'Algérie' (NA, 33). Had Muslims really wanted to bring an end to the French presence, Chevallier contended that they would have done so before, in particular in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. There seems to be a process of selective memory at work here since the events of Sétif can be interpreted as precisely such an attempt to overthrow French rule.

The same optimism can be witnessed in French Army circles. According to a *Cinquième Bureau* communiqué dating from July 1956 written by three sergeants located in Kabylia and distributed to all the troops on duty in that region, the goal of the French Army was to have the Muslim population of Algeria endorse, in free and fair elections, candidates favourable to a continued French presence:

[Nous devons] les faire voter, et ce qui complique un tantinet les choses, pas à la mode de Staline ni de Franco ni de Nasser (vous savez.....90% des voix) mais librement. (...) Il faut, sans jamais nous mêler de désignation de candidats et encore moins de cuisine électorale, que nous fassions le nécessaire pour qu'ils votent un jour librement mais pour nos amis, en n'écoulant que leur cœur.⁶

In their reference to the falsification of the democratic process, the sergeants mention Stalin, Franco and Nasser but would have been equally well advised to mention Naegelen. Underlying the sergeants' assessment of the Army's task was the conviction that the majority of Algeria's Muslim population had not already irrevocably sided with the rebellion and that France, through the actions of her Army and her government, should offer some incentive for these Muslims to choose to

remain in the French camp. Although the circular did not constitute a statement of official government policy, since the time had not yet come when the Algerian people would be offered a vote upon their own political destiny, the sentiments expressed therein did reflect the notion that consent was crucial to an eventual French success in the conflict.

If Smith was wrong to assume that reformers were aware that the French presence could only be maintained through an illiberal policy of repression, his allegations of 'blindness' seem more apposite. One possible reason for this 'blindness' is offered by Ageron who points out that because the Algerian political parties with nationalist tendencies were largely divided amongst themselves in the early years of the 1950s, the French underestimated the scope of revolutionary feeling which was bubbling beneath the surface. By way of evidence, Ageron points to much of the poetry, writing and theatre appearing during this period in which pro-nationalist sentiment was clearly evident, although overlooked by the French.⁷

The belief in the inherent 'goodness' of France's colonial exploits also perhaps explains the tardiness with which the French realised the seriousness of the situation in Algeria after 1954. Any attempts to break away from France could only be indicative of the ingratitude of a small section of the colonial peoples. As W.W. Kulski points out, in the eyes of the majority of French people, those seeking independence in Algeria were 'a small minority of malcontents who were unable to appreciate the benefits that France was conferring on her colonial subjects by her civilising mission'.⁸

The failure of the French to appreciate the seriousness of the challenge to their rule was evident in the immediate reaction of the Army to the outbreak of hostilities where the destruction of the FLN's armed bands was given a higher priority than the task of persuading ordinary Muslims of the merits of French rule. The rebellion in Algeria

was thought to be akin to the periodic outbursts of popular discontent which had punctuated the French presence in North Africa. As General Cherrière was to comment in 1956, analysing his own failing and that of his colleagues:

Les suites immédiates (de l'insurrection) firent d'abord croire qu'on se trouve en face d'un soulèvement tribal, analogue à ceux qui jalonnent notre histoire nord-africaine. On admet donc qu'il suffit pour l'armée de réduire les tribus dissidentes bien localisées, mettant en œuvre des effectifs très faibles et sans grand appui matériel de l'étranger.⁹

Reformers failed to appreciate that the international climate had moved on and Muslim opinion with it. They continued to look backwards to a time when the nationalism of Algeria's indigenous population had been less fully developed. Those occasions when Muslims had fought in the French Army were a particular locus of nostalgia. The apparent willingness of thousands of native Algerians to take up arms and even sacrifice their lives for France, as many had done during the First World War, reassured the French that their presence was appreciated and that the gratitude of the indigenous Algerian people had not diminished. French attitudes towards the colonies in general were governed, as Smith puts it, by 'the belief, widely shared in French political circles, that in their majority the colonial peoples appreciated the benefits of French rule as they had demonstrated their loyalty throughout the war'.¹⁰

Le Bled devoted a double page spread to praising the heroic Muslims who had taken up arms for France. From the 2,000 zouaves who had helped General Bourmont in 1830 through to the Second World War, Muslims had demonstrated their loyalty and devotion.¹¹ Tillion argued that since the Algerians had spilt their blood in three wars for France, the mother country had contracted duties towards them (AL,58). For Mercier, the fact that so many Muslims had died in defence of France meant that it was incumbent upon the French to remain in Algeria; France was obligated 'à tous les Algériens qui sont morts dans les rangs de nos armées pour défendre la patrie française dont ils n'avaient certainement jamais pensé qu'on pût un jour contester qu'elle fût la leur'.¹² Not only did reformers appear to assume that all the Muslims

who fought in the French Army were willing volunteers as opposed to reluctant conscripts, they also ignored the point that if France did indeed have certain obligations towards Muslims, the first of these might have been to concede the right of national self-determination. Even once hostilities had ended, Soustelle, reflecting upon the loss of Algeria with which he had still to come to terms, denounced the racism encouraged by the FLN-led government in order to break the link between France and Algeria and which took no account of 'tant d'années vécues ensemble, tant de sang arabe et berbère versé sur les champs de bataille de l'Europe dans le sillage de nos drapeaux' (PT,15).

Soustelle and the Direction of History

A further explanation for Soustelle's belief in the 'consent potential' was to be found in his refusal to accept that there was some kind of historical inevitability impelling Algeria towards independence, a theme which he first took up in *Le drame algérien*: 'Quand cessera-t-on de nous rebattre les oreilles du caractère inéluctable et sacré des nationalismes extra européens?' (DA,15). There was no 'fatalité historique' which drove the process of Algerian nationalism (DA,15). Had such a thing existed, he ventured, Europe would have fallen under Communist control in 1945, or fallen under the thousand-year domination of the Third Reich in 1940. By the same logic, no nationalist revolt whether African, Asian or Arab in origin was either inevitable or irresistible (DA, 48).

Despite the fact that by the time Soustelle came to write *L'espérance trahie* in 1961, Algeria was virtually independent, he refused to change his opinion. Those who saw the end of the French presence in Algeria written into the very logic of the colonial system were no more than the misguided 'partisans de l'abandon' (ET,27). History had no definitive ending, 'J'ai beaucoup cherché le "sens de l'Histoire" et je ne l'ai jamais trouvé', he proclaimed (ET,27). In his eyes, to evoke such a rationale was

merely a comfortable alibi for those who wanted to take the path of least political resistance ‘comme si la volonté des hommes et des peuples ne comptait pour rien’ (ET,29).

Once more it was the events of World War Two which were invoked to justify this point with, on this occasion, Soustelle’s own personal credentials as a *résistant de première heure* thrown in to bolster the case. Most people had considered any resistance to be futile since, in 1940, all the indicators seemed to point in the direction of a victory for Hitler and the forces of Nazi Germany: ‘Résistants, nous commettons une erreur, presque un sacrilège, en nous dressant sottement contre la vague irrésistible’ (ET,28). It was precisely the willingness to defy these apparent historical realities which, for Soustelle, made de Gaulle such a great figure: ‘De Gaulle fut grand parce qu’il ne crut pas à cette fatalité, suprême argument de la collaboration’ (ET, 28). References to the Second World War were, in fact, a frequent feature of writing about Algeria. As the title of an article by Dine aptly puts it, there was a kind of ‘inescapable allusion’.¹³

Soustelle was, of course, correct to point out that there are no strange, mystical forces directing the path of history. The course of world events is shaped by tangible factors such as economic power, military might and human agency. By the same token, it was a combination of tangible factors which made French defeat in Algeria inevitable, the lack of consent amongst the Muslim population not the least amongst them.

Bilans de la Pacification.

Another factor which allowed reformers such as Soustelle to continue to believe that the ‘consent potential’ was realistic was their conviction that the French Army was winning the war. Declarations of French success were particularly prominent in military publications and it is to these that we now turn our attention.

The failure of initial attempts at military repression in the opening months of the conflict coupled with the growing influence of the *guerre révolutionnaire* school within the Army saw a greater emphasis placed on the attempt to win the 'hearts and minds' of the population. *Le Bled* related the successes of SAS officers in rallying the indigenous population to the French cause. An article by André Hempé appearing in April 1956 is typical of the accounts published. It tells of a remote Muslim village which, prior to the arrival of the SAS detachment, had been largely abandoned by the French administration and the population cowed into submission by a recent attack by the FLN. As might be expected, the article recounts that the diligence and patience of the SAS had managed to restore the confidence of the population; the elders of the community rallied to the SAS officer and the villagers cast aside their superstitions about French medical techniques when a child's life was saved at the last moment following treatment by the French doctor.¹⁴

In an editorial to *Le Bled* published in August 1956, Governor-General Lacoste, probably acting on the information passed on to him by the military, cited the fact that in the preceding few weeks 215 villages had rallied to the French side in Kabylia and that in the Oran and the Constantine regions, new settlements came each day to demand French protection. Such work, he stressed, had to continue for it was necessary for 'n'importe quel observateur de bonne foi' to be able to appreciate 'la massive montée d'un mouvement de collaboration avec la France chez les Algériens de naissance' thereby allowing the French to present themselves as acting in accordance with the wishes of Algeria's civilian population if the Algerian case came to be discussed in the United Nations.¹⁵

Similar positive balance sheets also appeared in divisional bulletins. One such bulletin reports that 8,500 FLN members had been killed and 5,000 arms recovered in the Oran region during 1957.¹⁶ To this impressive total, the authors add:

Il faut ajouter à notre actif la conquête des cœurs: combien de populations revenant vers nous, que de douars assurant leur autodéfense et hissant le drapeau tricolore, que de regroupements de populations dans une atmosphère de confiance en une Algérie française, garante de la prospérité et de la paix.¹⁷

Along similar lines, a pamphlet produced for French conscripts about to be demobilised contained photographs designed to emphasise the co-operation taking place between Muslim villagers and French soldiers. Muslim women are shown bringing their children to be examined by a French doctor, a Muslim male is photographed coming to draw water from a pump manned by a French soldier, while in another a smiling Muslim with a child in one hand and a rifle slung across his shoulder poses for the camera. The accompanying text emphasises that such images were typical of Algeria and that the Muslim population had placed their trust in the French:

Qui veut la paix avant tout

Qui n'aspire qu'à mieux vivre

Qui continue à faire confiance à la France pour laquelle beaucoup sont morts sur les champs de bataille.

Vous avez vu des musulmans défendre à côté de vous leur famille, leur liberté, leur vie.

La communauté Franco-Musulmane n'est pas un vain mot.¹⁸

Clearly, military propaganda appearing in *Le Bled* or in tracts expressly designed to raise morale amongst French soldiers deliberately amplified the extent to which the Army's pacification effort was succeeding. However, similar assessments of the state of the Muslim population also appeared in restricted military communiqués where the need to convince a wider audience of the smooth conduct of the war was less apparent. By way of example, let us consider the months of July and August 1957.

General Allard gave a cautious endorsement of the Army's efforts. By dint of diligent work in the field, the Army was gradually beginning to win support amongst the indigenous population for the French cause:

Les efforts réalisés depuis de longs mois dans le domaine de la pacification commencent à porter leurs fruits. Il n'y a pas de résultats spectaculaires, mais revirement certain dans les esprits, propre à redonner confiance.¹⁹

General de Labarthe, commanding the French forces in Northern Constantine, whilst recognising that the French administrative structure was not ideally suited to the type of warfare in which the Army was engaged, believed that real progress had been made:

Malgré de nombreuses difficultés causées à la fois par l'action de l'ennemi et la lourdeur de notre appareil administratif civilo-militaire, le mois de juin a marqué de réels progrès qui se concrétisent par nos contacts de plus en plus nombreux avec la population.²⁰

In a communiqué from the Northern Oran region, General Dudognon admitted that the work of the French soldiers could be undermined by FLN action. However, even where this was the case, caution rather than hostility became the watchword of ordinary Muslims who feared FLN reprisals.

La persistance des actions terroristes en juin se traduit par une régression des marques de confiance et une attitude plus méfiante qu'hostile de la part des populations musulmanes, soucieuses en priorité de ne pas se compromettre aux yeux des rebelles.²¹

In the view of General Desfontaines, Muslims were more than willing to rejoin the French political community once the rebel hold over them had been lifted.

Partout où nous avons réussi à faire se relâcher l'emprise rebelle sur la population, cette dernière a manifesté son désir de reprise de contact avec les autorités. Les cérémonies organisées à l'occasion du 14 juillet en ont fourni la preuve.²²

Although less governed by the need to present the results of the French Army's pacification activities in a positive light, it might be argued that communiqués such as those cited above were produced by officers who relied upon their subordinates for reports on nationalist activity in the sector under their jurisdiction and who, from self-interest, wanted to present a favourable picture. A situation in which some reports exaggerating French success could have continued along the chain of command is not inconceivable. However, it is difficult to envisage circumstances under which a vast

array of military reports, bulletins and communications would all have deliberately falsified the truth for the purposes of convincing a superior officer that the war was proceeding more successfully than it actually was in reality.

The FLN and the Rule of Fear

As a necessary corollary to these innumerable accounts of individual Muslims or entire villages rallying to the French cause churned out by the *Cinquième Bureau*, the FLN was depicted as a movement lacking in mass appeal. Since there could be no denying that the FLN benefited from the passive complicity of certain sections of the indigenous population who provided food, money, shelter and information, reformers claimed that such support was given only through fear.

Fond throughout his work of quoting speeches or documents from FLN leaders as a means of establishing the validity of his argument, Soustelle asserted that, once the FLN had eliminated the leaders of a particular community in a particularly brutal and exemplary fashion, the fear of suffering a similar fate scared the civilian population into co-operating with the insurgents: 'Dans un douar où les principaux notables ont été égorgés ou mutilés, "le peuple suit par la terreur" selon l'expression du chef rebelle Zighout Youcef' (AS, 215). In an open letter penned to those intellectuals in France critical of the French Army's efforts, Soustelle claimed that 'délibérément, méthodiquement, les rebelles s'attachent à dominer par la terreur'.²³ Writing in *Le Bled* in 1956, Soustelle's successor as Governor-General, Lacoste adopted a similar stance, claiming that if Muslims followed the orders of the FLN, it was under duress.²⁴ Propaganda produced by the *Cinquième Bureau* made the same point. Conscripts about to return to Metropolitan France, for example, were informed that the fanatical rebel bands that they had encountered 'brûlent, pillent, massacrent tout ce qui est Français ou Francophile, *elles terrorisent*' (their emphasis).²⁵ The whole text is

supplemented by a picture of a half-destroyed village with dead livestock strewn over the ground.

Likewise a *Cinquième Bureau* produced 'Fiche de Contact' containing a script for French soldiers to use when coming into contact for the first time with Muslim villagers reflected back at the Muslim population the image which the French Army had formed of them as unwilling collaborators with the rebellion:

Qui êtes-vous? Nous le saurons par vous-mêmes.

Vous êtes terrorisés par les fellagha et leurs hommes de mains. Vous avez été obligés de céder à leur loi, faute d'une protection suffisante. Ils vous font beaucoup de mal.

Nous savons, par les propres déclarations des chefs rebelles, que la grande majorité d'entre vous subit à contrecœur cette loi.²⁶

Of course, whilst reformers claimed that the Muslim population gravitated towards the FLN primarily out of fear, the French Army itself was hardly an innocent party. In addition to the torture, the collective reprisals and the summary execution of prisoners perpetrated by the field units, the *Cinquième Bureau* was not averse to using threats of retribution against those who collaborated with the FLN. Thus tracts produced by the *Cinquième Bureau* declared: 'Les complices des rebelles eux aussi seront punis. Parlons'. In one such tract, the accompanying cartoon shows two Muslims cutting down telegraph poles under the watchful eye of an FLN combatant followed in the next caption, by all 3 figures being arrested by French soldiers. In another, a Muslim is pictured handing over money to the FLN collector. Predictably, the next caption shows both figures handcuffed by a French soldier.²⁷

May 1958

In the particular imaging of the Muslim population in which reformers were engaged, the events of May 1958 came to occupy a special place. The events of 13 May 1958 are well known to any observer of contemporary French society. This was the date on which a mass of Algeria's European population stormed the offices of the

Government-General in Algiers with, at least, the tacit support of sections of the Army, and set off a chain of events which swiftly led to the overthrow of the Fourth Republic, the return to the political arena of General de Gaulle and the eventual adoption of a new Constitution. The events of 16 May at the Forum in Algiers (and on a number of subsequent days throughout Algeria) in which Muslims and Europeans joined hands in an apparent show of unity, in which all joined in the singing of the *Marseillaise* and in which Muslim women tore off their veils are generally seen as a continuation of that movement.

For reformers, the presence of so many Muslims at pro-*Algérie française* demonstrations was seen as indicative of their desire to affirm their national identity as Frenchmen and women. As Soustelle puts it:

C'était là un fait capital, d'une signification bouleversante, car le FLN déconcerté et coupé de sa base voyait son emprise sur la population se relâcher, les Européens acceptaient l'intégration avec toutes ses conséquences et les Musulmans la réclamaient. (ET, 37-8)

The words *Algérie française* were not the slogan of a minority but 'le cri qui a jailli du cœur de dix millions de Français qui, quels que soient leur origine, leur confession, leur prénom ou leurs vêtements particuliers, veulent être à jamais des Français' (ET, 40).

There is little doubt that on the day prior to the *fraternisations* which took place on 16 May in the capital, French soldiers had attempted to win support from the Muslim population for a policy of *intégration*. Some of those Muslims who attended the demonstrations undoubtedly did so under duress. Nevertheless, French soldiers in Algiers hoped that around 5,000 Muslims would attend the Forum whereas in reality around 30,000 assembled. Explaining away the vast numbers of Muslims who turned up represents something of a difficulty for those who simply wanted to conclude that the whole event was meaningless. As Soustelle has argued, such an explanation overestimates the extent to which the Army's propaganda machine could influence

opinion: 'Des manifestations d'une telle ampleur, s'étendant à tout le pays, ne pouvaient pas se ramener à cette explication simpliste'(PT,80). In his eyes, 'prétendre n'y voir qu'une mise en scène, une mystification, est faire preuve d'une ignorance abyssale en même temps que d'un aveugle parti pris' (ET, 37). Along the same lines he added, 'Il est évident, pour quiconque connaît l'Algérie, que les fraternisations furent réelles et sincères' (ET,38).

For Soustelle, had these demonstrations not been sincere, and had they had no overall impact upon the war, the FLN would have had no difficulty in sabotaging them by throwing a grenade into the crowd or by the random assassination of a European:

Combien il eût été facile, pourtant, au FLN, de saboter le prodigieux élan humain qui soulevait alors les masses algériennes! Facile... si le FLN lui-même n'avait pas été atteint dans ses œuvres vives. S'il n'y eut pas d'attentats, c'est parce que les chefs désorientés et les exécutants, ébranlés ou conquis, ne purent pas en organiser. (ET, 40)

Soustelle's positive interpretation of the events of May 1958 was, predictably, shared by *Le Bled*. The edition of 24 May 1958 was devoted almost in its entirety to reporting on the *fraternisations* between Europeans and Muslims. 'L'intégration, fait acquis', proclaimed one headline. In the eyes of the reporting journalist, the massive participation of Muslims in the Forum of Algiers and throughout Algeria constituted, 'l'un des faits capitaux des journées historiques que nous vivons'.²⁸ Such events brought 'un démenti formel à tous ceux qui doutent du fondement humain de l'Algérie française' (p.5). Whilst others might have considered the events to be in some way miraculous, the author of this article claimed that it was simply 'l'expression tangible de ce que les Musulmans n'ont cessé de (...) dire depuis le début de la rébellion' (p.5). Although France was experiencing her most turbulent period since 1789, Muslims had not hesitated to affirm the fact that they were French, prompting the journalist to comment: 'En agissant ainsi, nos frères musulmans se sont comportés comme de purs patriotes, comme des Français de vieille souche' (p.5).

The same edition of *Le Bled* also reports a speech given by Azem Ouali, president of the Federation of Mayors of Grande-Kabylia in which he proclaimed that the events of 16 May constituted 'un sursaut irrésistible'. Throughout Algeria, he declared, could be heard 'l'écho rassuré de ceux qui, il y a quelques jours, hésitaient'.²⁹

The following pages of this special edition of *Le Bled* were given over to short reports from around 30 towns in Algeria where demonstrations of pro-French sentiment had taken place. The introduction to these reports resumed the events which had taken place throughout the country in the following manner: 'Il s'agit d'un vaste mouvement, d'un élan de foi et d'enthousiasme qui groupe, fraternellement unies, les populations musulmanes et européennes.'³⁰

Reformers' claims of success have received a partial endorsement from contemporary historians. Droz and Lever argue that Muslims were partly coerced and partly came willingly to the Forum and that, tired of being caught between the French and the FLN bid for domination and control, they were expressing a genuine desire for peace rather than the endorsement of any political program *per se*.³¹ Horne arrives at a similar conclusion, arguing that Muslims wanted peace and believed that de Gaulle, as a figure who commanded great respect, would be able to deliver it. The demonstrations of 16 May were 'rigged in part by the *Cinquième Bureau* but also deeply and disturbingly symptomatic of the hope that the mere name of de Gaulle could inspire in the breast of many a simple peace-craving Algerian'.³²

For anti-colonial thinkers, on the other hand, the apparent demonstrations of new found fraternity between Europeans and Muslims which took place throughout Algeria between 16 and 20 May 1958 were no more than an elaborate pantomime orchestrated by the French Army and the interpretation of the events recounted by Soustelle and in large sections of the French press was simply 'une mystification'.³³ Rather than the joyous multitudes reported in *Le Bled*, it was 'quelques dizaines

d'hommes au visage contracté, grimaçant, encadré par les "Paras" who arrived at the Forum (p.7) whilst others were pressured into attending 'sous la menace d'une dénonciation comme agent du FLN, donc d'une "disparition"' (p.7). Those women who burnt their veils were either forced to do so by the French or by their husbands who had served in the French Army (p.7). Throughout Algeria, the same scenes were repeated with the *harkis* in particular playing a leading role in terrorising the population into co-operating and providing them with pre-fabricated banners expressing sentiments of loyalty to France.

Little did it matter, the article continued, that those involved in orchestrating this vast charade were themselves unconvinced of its veracity, since the whole purpose was to convince outside observers. The Left in France, unable to shed its arrogant civilising pretensions, had been taken in by this masquerade:

La droite feint de croire à la sincérité des ralliements. Une partie de la gauche, désemparée, est impressionnée par des manifestations qui flattent secrètement son chauvinisme et son paternalisme: car les principes de 1789 sont immortellement français et seule la France peut libérer vraiment les peuples opprimés. (p.2)

Alongside the *fraternisations* of 16 May, Soustelle also attached considerable importance to the vote on the Constitution of the Fifth Republic which took place in September 1958. For Soustelle, the fact that both a radio broadcast from Algiers on 29 August 1958 by de Gaulle and *La voix de l'Algérie combattante*, a pro-FLN programme broadcast by Radio-Maroc had made the point that a vote in favour of the new Constitution would be indicative of support for *intégration* only served to confirm his assessment of the significance of the consultation (ET,64). De Gaulle's success in this referendum provided Soustelle with confirmation that the events of May 1958 had demonstrated the willingness of Algeria's Muslim community to accept *intégration*. The FLN, by attaching such significance to the vote, had taken a risk which, according to Soustelle, had not paid off on three counts: because Muslims had registered to vote in large numbers despite express orders from the FLN that they

should not do so, because they had actually voted en masse, and because they had voted in favour of the new Constitution. Soustelle argued that this electoral snub for the FLN carried enormous significance:

En dépit de terribles menaces, la population musulmane s'était prononcée, à la face du monde entier, et le sens donné *par tous, y compris le FLN*, à ce scrutin, n'était pas niable. L'Algérie, l'Algérie musulmane en tout premier lieu, avait dit 'oui' à la France, à l'Algérie française. C'était la consécration du 13 mai et surtout du 16 mai, de la fraternisation, par un vote dont le caractère authentique ne pouvait être mis en doute par aucun esprit de bonne foi. (ET, 66)

Mercier shared his opinion. Although the Algerian people had been 'terrorisé à un point difficile à imaginer' by the FLN, they had had the courage to defy the FLN openly and *en masse*. This committed France to protect them in the future: '[La France] ne peut abandonner un peuple aux brutes sanglantes qui foulent aux pieds la liberté et la vie des hommes'.³⁴

Navigating Between the Extremes

On the one hand, Chapter One presented the radical anti-colonialists' vision of a people unanimous in its struggle to throw off colonial rule while, on the other hand, this chapter has highlighted the image offered in French propaganda of Muslims willing to embrace the positive changes which the French were bringing and co-operating with the FLN only through fear. One document which unintentionally goes some way towards narrowing the abyss between these rival portraits was actually produced by the FLN command in the Oran region. The purpose of the document was to explain the workings of the SAS and the methods by which its actions could be neutralised. At the same time, the article also recognised the positive reception which the SAS officer might be accorded by the civilian population: 'Le chef de SAS sera le libérateur, le défenseur, l'apôtre qui amène avec lui la paix et la bonne parole de la France. Ce dernier cas est peut-être celui qui porte le plus.'³⁵ The work of the SAS in providing irrigation systems and alleviating the problem of unemployment was also

viewed as highly damaging to the FLN cause: 'Ce rôle, tout en étant limité, est peut-être celui qui porte le plus, nos populations étant à 90% des agricoles' (p.22). Whilst the authors did not believe in the sincerity of the SAS-led project to rapidly transform the status of Algeria, they were certainly concerned that others, less engaged than themselves, would be taken in. The final section of the document epitomises the tone of the article:

'Je sais ce que vaut se battre pour son pays, et cela me suffit'. Telle est la réponse que doit présenter chaque Algérien à l'officier de SAS. Mais c'est difficile car l'homme est faible et souvent fléchit devant les mirages sociaux et économiques que provoque la France. (p.23)

The Lack of Revolutionary Unity

Such expressions of doubt were not entirely unfounded. Firstly, there were undeniably entire Muslim villages that pledged their allegiance to the French. Secondly, whilst the only choice was ultimately between the French and the FLN, a significant proportion of the indigenous population appears to have hesitated before deciding which side to choose. Ageron argues that, following the immediate outbreak of revolutionary violence, the reaction of the Algerian population was not unanimous: 'La plupart se réfugièrent dans l'attentisme', he informs us, arguing that it was not until much later that the revolution acquired a truly national character.³⁶

Thirdly, in order to win control of the civilian population, the FLN was certainly not averse to using threats and violence. Would-be collaborators with the French were subject to reprisals. P.G. Schulte has noted, with specific reference to FLN activity in Algiers, the terrorists' 'structural need to purge their territory, by violence or intimidation'. Particularly targeted were "unreliable" elements such as criminals and drug addicts who would not resist Government pressure or bribes'.³⁷

Fourthly, throughout the war fewer native Algerians fought in the ALN than served in the French Army as *harkis*. Stora points out that a report sent to the UN on 13 March

1962 estimated that there were around 263,000 people who were pro-French, including 20,000 career soldiers, 40,000 draftees and 58,000 *harkis*.³⁸ This, at a time when many of the *harkis* had already deserted the ranks of the French Army or defected to the cause of the FLN through fear of reprisals at the hands of the victorious nationalists. This is not an indicator that Muslims favoured the French Army over the FLN since the strength of the nationalists could not be gauged, other than at a crude level, by the number of troops that it was able to put in the field. Nor should one make the mistake of believing that every *harki* was a passionate defender of the French cause. It does, however, offer an explanation of how reformers came to believe in the 'consent potential'.

Fifthly, although the FLN managed to establish itself as the most important pro-independence grouping, it was not the only nationalist organisation. The MNA under the leadership of Messali Hadj was also successful in marshalling a certain amount of support, particularly amongst those Algerians who worked in mainland France. Following the FLN-orchestrated massacre of the villagers of the MNA stronghold of Melouza, a leading figure in the MNA, Bellounis, defected to the side of the French with around 1,500 men. Ultimately, these forces were judged unreliable by the French and in July 1958 French paratroopers fought and defeated them.³⁹ Of course, the presence of a rival nationalist group hardly clinches the reformers' case that the vast majority of the Algerian population wanted to remain French, but it does further chip away at the image of an Algerian people united behind the FLN in its struggle to throw off the French colonial oppressor.

For these reasons, Fanon and the other militant anti-colonialists were not only engaged in a process of wilful exaggeration of the strength of the rebellion for propaganda purposes but also over-estimated the unity of the revolutionary consciousness of the peasantry. As Stora puts it:

Cette histoire anticolonialiste, presque aussi simplificatrice dans ses conclusions que l'histoire coloniale traditionnelle, présuppose que l'ensemble de la communauté berbéro-arabe de l'Algérie était animé d'une conscience nationale véritable, et aspirait à l'indépendance. C'était « oublier » que cent vingt-quatre ans de présence française avaient modifié la personnalité algérienne ou, plus simplement, l'avait empêché de venir à maturité. Sinon, comment comprendre la phénomène harki, qui se développera dans le cours de la guerre, et particulièrement dans les campagnes.⁴⁰

Owing to the divisions that existed within the indigenous population, Stora describes the war as a 'double guerre civile', a war between the French but equally a war between Muslims.⁴¹ A similar description is provided by Pierre Vidal-Naquet who views the conflict as a 'triple war' - between the French Army and the FLN, between the FLN and the MNA but also 'entre insurgés et ralliés à la cause française, dont le nombre ne fut pas insignifiant, et il ne s'agissait pas seulement des harkis'.⁴²

Stora has highlighted the way in which this 'mensonge du peuple unanime' has been perpetuated in Algeria since 1962. Official Algerian history of the conflict ignores the civil war between the activists of the FLN and the MNA as well as the quarrels within the FLN leadership itself. The state-authorised history portrays an anonymous war fought by a revolutionary movement without leaders since most of the prominent figures subsequently fell foul of the state and have been 'written out' of history.⁴³

The 'False Dawn' of the Reformers

Despite the inaccuracies of the portrait of revolutionary unanimity offered by the militant anti-colonialists, their image of the indigenous population was more accurate than the one offered by the reformers. Reformers were wrong to assume that the whole of the civilian population could be won over to the French cause if only the correct reforming strategy was applied. During the course of the war, the French mobilised an enormous amount of their military potential and given this overwhelming military presence, the FLN-led rebellion would have been quickly eclipsed without the support of the Muslim population. As Mao's defining principle of counter-revolutionary struggle had proclaimed, the revolutionary army, in this case the

FLN, had to be 'in' the civilian population as the 'fish is to water' in order to survive. The very fact that the French were unable to separate the 'fish' from the 'water' indicates that there was never enough support from amongst the civilian population at large for the French to gain a decisive victory.

Similarly, if the FLN had had to rely on terror alone to extend its control over the civilian population then the sheer scale of the French presence would, without doubt, have been enough to wipe them out. As an article in *Libération* appearing early in 1959 put it: 'Si elle [l'armée] n'avait eu affaire qu'à des bandes isolées de la population musulmane - celle-ci prête à 'fraterniser' à nouveau - rien ne l'eût empêché d'en venir à bout'.⁴⁴

What allowed reformers, both civilian and military, to profess that the war was going well was the existence of islands of support for the French, never sufficient for a victory but substantial enough to feed a whole propaganda machine and sustain the reformers' conviction that the 'consent potential' had not dissipated. The mistake of the reformers was to believe that the limited support which they received had the potential to expand into a truly popular appeal. Nowhere was this better illustrated than during the events of May 1958. The participation of so many Muslims in the *fraternisations* during this month was a true boon for the reformers. However, just like the examples of numerous villages rallying to the French cause, the events of May 1958 alone did not substantiate the reformers' argument that sufficient Muslims were complicit with colonialism or prepared to trust the process of colonial reform.

In similar vein, whilst the results of the vote on the Constitution of 28 September certainly prove a vexing matter for those who wish to offer an image of the Algerian people as solid in their support for the rebellion, it is difficult to sustain the argument that this vote constituted an explicit vote on the future of Algeria, despite the

significance which Soustelle and, at the time, de Gaulle and the FLN's propaganda machine sought to attach to it.

The 'consent potential' and with it reformers' dreams of a reconciliation between European and Muslim communities were indisputably discredited following the massive demonstrations in Algiers in favour of the FLN which took place between 11 and 13 December 1960, described here by Ramdane Redjala:

En sortant spontanément et massivement dans la rue avec une forêt de drapeaux vert et blanc, en s'emparant de la formule du général de Gaulle, « Algérie algérienne », et en le dépassant, les manifestants ont montré leur maturité politique et leur volonté de vivre indépendant. Les services psychologiques de l'armée ont subi un échec cuisant. En réalité, l'ampleur de ces manifestations a surpris tout le monde y compris le GPRA.⁴⁵

As we shall see in Chapter Eight, however, reformers did not question their prior conviction that it was possible to win Muslim 'hearts and minds'. Instead, de Gaulle stood at the head of a list of culprits indicted by the reformers for having given rise to Muslim disaffection.

CHAPTER FIVE

LIBERAL ALTERNATIVES TO *INTEGRATION*

Having looked in brief in the previous three chapters at some of the common themes which united reformers, the purpose of this chapter is to introduce some nuance into our definition of what reformers stood for, the nature of the problems which they faced, and the way in which their ideas on Algeria differed from figures with a similar political philosophy to their own.

Between the extreme positions of, on the one hand, the FLN who embraced the need for revolutionary violence in the service of liberation from oppressive colonial rule, and, on the other, the unyielding defenders of French colonialism who sought no more than the eradication of the nationalist uprising and the return to the *status quo ante*, lay a number of potential solutions to the Algerian crisis of which *intégration* was just one. The potential for confusion was recognised by Francis Borella writing for *Esprit* who lamented 'les querelles de mots entre fait national, personnalité algérienne, autonomie, indépendance ou droit à l'indépendance'.¹ As a means of navigating through this veritable semantic minefield, it is useful to distinguish between three broad schools of thought. The first of these was the *intégration* camp. The second school might be defined as *associationniste* or federalist whose adherents believed that a considerable number of powers should be devolved to Algeria but with overall French sovereignty left intact.² A particularly succinct exposition of this position was articulated by General de Gaulle during his speech of 16 September 1959 on Algerian self-determination:

Le gouvernement des Algériens par les Algériens, appuyé sur l'aide de la France et en union étroite avec elle pour l'économie, l'enseignement, la défense, les relations extérieures. Dans ce cas, le régime intérieur de l'Algérie devrait être de type fédéral, afin que les communautés diverses: française, arabe, kabyle, mozabite, etc., qui cohabitent dans le pays y trouvent des garanties quant à leur vie propre et un cadre pour leur coopération.³

The third position can be characterised by support for what might be termed *une indépendance française* or alternatively, again in the words of de Gaulle, 'une Algérie algérienne (...) étroitement unie à la France'.⁴ By this, he seemed to mean an Algeria governed by a Muslim-dominated majority, yet closely linked to France in economic and cultural terms, and having a similar political system. In other words, the substitution of *de facto* French political control for a more enduring French influence; a case of *partir pour mieux rester*. The precedent for such a policy had been set out in the Preamble to the Constitution of 1946. Whilst, much like *intégration*, this Constitution declared those living in the colonies to have equal rights to the citizens of Metropolitan France, its vision of the future relationship between the Hexagon and the colonies was somewhat different, apparently recognising that the territories over which France ruled would one day be sufficiently imbued with the virtues of French democracy and culture to be able to govern themselves:

Fidèle à sa mission traditionnelle, la France entend conduire les peuples dont elle a pris la charge à la liberté de s'administrer eux-mêmes et de gérer démocratiquement leurs propres affaires.⁵

This chapter will consider both the federalist and the *indépendance française* camp, and Soustelle's reaction to both. First, the federalists.

Intégration versus Federalism

Between *association* and *intégration* there was a considerable overlap; both solutions envisaged that France should retain ultimate sovereignty over Algeria, both seem to be underpinned by the notion that France had a duty and a responsibility to complete her civilising mission, and both promised to respect Algeria's ethnic and cultural diversity

while offering to provide more equitable representation for the Muslim population. As Chevallier, himself a supporter of a federal solution, argued, the only apparent difference between the two solutions was the additional local autonomy which federalism would have given to Algeria: '[Le système fédéral] permettait à l'Algérie, autant que l'intégration, mais à moindre frais et avec plus de souplesse, de demeurer dans la République française' (NA, 18-19). Evidence of a common agenda can also be seen in Camus' belief, borrowed from an Algerian law professor, that a solution which would '[unir] les avantages de l'intégration et du fédéralisme' would prove the most equitable way of resolving the conflict.⁶ Camus proposed that the French National Assembly contain representatives from Algeria's Muslim and European communities sitting alongside the *députés* from mainland France in accordance with their proportional weighting within the total population (around 15 European and 100 Muslims). This was to give rise to three different types of parliamentary session. First, the Assembly was to sit in plenary session on those matters which concerned all members of the French community. Second, the Algerian representatives (European and Muslim) were to be excluded from any discussions which only concerned Metropolitan France. Third, Muslim representatives were to retain exclusive competence in matters which were of relevance only to their community. How it was to be decided whether an issue was relevant only to the people of Metropolitan France or to the Muslims of Algeria, Camus did not say. His solution also overlooked the potential for governmental paralysis surpassing by far the worst excesses of the Fourth Republic resulting from the countless debates which would have ensued merely over which combination of *députés* was appropriate to consider any substantive issue. The impracticality of the idea aside, the crucial point to retain here is the overlap between *intégration* and a federal solution.

A further example of the common ideological terrain occupied by supporters of a federal solution and of *intégration* is revealed by Soustelle's revelation that, in the immediate aftermath of World War Two, he had envisaged that France and her

colonies (including Algeria) would form 'un seul Etat, riche par le nombre des hommes, la diversité des ressources et la variété des climats, et vivifié par la démocratie' (ET, 21). Within this 'grand corps euro-africain', racial discrimination was to be eliminated and all would enjoy equal rights and equal opportunities. As to the form that this superstate would have taken, he noted: 'Je le concevais comme une république fédérale, au sein de laquelle la France eût été l'Etat le plus peuplé et le plus développé' (ET, 21).

It is perhaps somewhat surprising, then, that the choice between *intégration* and *association* gave rise, as Chevallier noted in 1958, to 'de violentes controverses' (NA, 18). This is a point confirmed by Girardet who claims that the disagreement between the *intégrationnistes* and the *associationnistes* created a deep schism within the camp of the reformers:

Cette contradiction fondamentale a fait qu'il était absolument impossible de définir, pour les militants de l'Algérie française, une véritable politique algérienne. Cela ne tenait pas seulement à la multiplicité de leurs approches du problème mais relevait d'une opposition fondamentale.⁷

Viewed from a contemporary perspective, any discussion amongst reformers about whether Algeria should have been fully integrated into the political structure of the French Republic or linked to France by a looser, federal arrangement seems somewhat spurious given that both solutions sought to enforce the retention of Algeria under French control. As Chapter One indicated, a number of arguments can be advanced to counter the reformers' claims that *intégration* was a viable project: the unwillingness of the settlers to embrace change, the lack of political will amongst the French public and French investors, and, more importantly, the fact that insufficient numbers of Muslims wanted French rule of any kind and were determined to fight for full independence. The time spent arguing over the respective merits of *intégration* and *association* now seems somewhat spurious. The reason for the dispute between reformers is only properly appreciated, however, if we accept their assessment of the

reformability of the colonial situation and, in particular, their central proposition that the 'hearts and minds' of the Muslim masses could be won (or lost).

If winning Muslim 'hearts and minds' was the stated aim, then at first glance a federal solution seems a more promising option than *intégration*. By promising more autonomy, it offered more political power to Muslims and seemed more likely to guarantee a greater amount of cultural, linguistic and religious diversity. This argument was, however, flawed. If all reform strategies were ultimately doomed to fail through lack of Muslim support, what we will argue here is that *intégration* was the most coherent of those on offer.

Federalism and the Logic of the Conflict

The first problem with a federal solution was its potential impact upon the Muslim population. Whilst, as we saw in Chapter Four, the French never managed to achieve a sufficient volume of support amongst Muslims to defeat the FLN, fewer Muslims still would have collaborated with the French forces, even in an enterprise as worthwhile as the building of a school or hospital, without a firm guarantee that the French would not abandon them to face FLN retribution. Whilst a federal solution did not necessarily imply a French withdrawal, it hardly created that climate of confidence which reformers believed vital for their plans to come to fruition. Launched into the deeply polarised Algerian situation, the announcement of a federal solution could only have hastened the French demise, leading to a loss of support for the French cause amongst the Muslim population.

It was for this reason that Soustelle considered federalism an inappropriate solution to the Algerian problem. Under the conditions in which the war was being fought, and given the fact that no firm federal arrangements existed between France and her other colonies of the time, any federal solution, he argued, would be seized upon by the rebels with catastrophic consequences for the French hold on Algeria.

J'ai trop souvent prôné moi-même la structure fédérale pour l'ensemble de la France et de l'outremer pour ne pas avoir mûrement pesé les avantages et les inconvénients de cette solution appliquée à l'Algérie. Je n'hésiterais pas à la préconiser sans réserve si l'Algérie était calme et surtout si des institutions fédérales françaises existaient. Hélas ! Il n'en existe point. Confier l'Algérie à une fédération sans pouvoirs fédéraux, lui conférer une autonomie d'Etat sans la situer dans un cadre plus vaste et solidement établi, c'est l'aventure. Ce fédéralisme acéphale conduirait droit à la sécession, car les forces de dislocation qui s'exercent contre la France n'y verraient que l'occasion propice pour arriver dans les moindres délais à la sécession totale. (AS, 92-3)

In a communiqué sent to Edgar Faure and Maurice Bourguès-Maunoury on 1 June 1955, Soustelle had made the same point: 'Dans L'état actuel des choses, elle [la fédération] aboutirait tout droit au séparatisme.'⁸ Almost six years later, his thinking had scarcely evolved: 'Le train 'Algérie' brûlerait la station de l'autonomie interne pour ne s'arrêter qu'à celle de l'indépendance' (ET, 24). Any form of federalism, he asserted, 'déclencherait un processus irréversible et probablement très rapide qui conduira sans délai à la sécession totale' (ET, 26); Algeria had to be represented in the same way as every other French province, 'en excluant toute assemblée politique purement algérienne qui amorcerait la séparation de l'Algérie et de la métropole' (ET, 287).

The second problem with a federal solution lay in finding the personnel to administer it from within the Muslim population. In the first instance, there was no possibility of negotiating a federal deal with the FLN as it was not only unacceptable to the reformers but also to the nationalists who, from the outset of the conflict, refused to compromise their demands for full independence. Serge Bernstein and Pierre Milza write of 'un durcissement permanent du FLN qui ne cesse d'affirmer sa détermination à ne discuter que de l'indépendance'.⁹ As an article appearing in July 1957 in the FLN newspaper *Résistance algérienne* put it: 'Révolutionnaires, nous refusons tout compromis avec le colonialisme français'.¹⁰ An even stronger expression of the unwillingness of the nationalists to accept any political solution which stopped short of full independence is found in an article published in September of the same year by another FLN publication, *El Moudjahid*: 'Accepter une formule centrée sur une autre

chose que l'indépendance, c'est renoncer à abattre le colonialisme alors qu'on en a la possibilité, c'est en laisser substituer les germes virulents qui auraient vite fait d'engendrer un système d'oppression plus monstrueux que le précédent.'¹¹

Nor could the French negotiate a federal solution with a 'third force' since, in addition to its use of reprisals on potential French sympathisers, the FLN sought to establish its hegemony as the sole representative of the Algerian people by ruthlessly suppressing its political opponents or by forcing them to join its ranks. As Stora points out, rival nationalist groupings were either treated as enemies, such as Messali Hadj's MNA, or were dissolved and its members subsumed within the FLN on an individual basis.¹² Such was the nature of the conflict. As Dine has commented, 'In a revolutionary war, such as that fought by the FLN guerrillas against the French, only two positions are possible: pro and contra, with no intermediate stance being recognised either by the forces of colonial order or their insurrectionary challengers.'¹³ Schulte, reflecting on the strategic lessons of the Algerian war, notes that 'by the time the French attempted to negotiate a compromise peace, they could find no "*interlocuteurs valables*": no-one worth talking to outside the implacable FLN leadership who would accept only total French withdrawal'.¹⁴ Likewise, Horne, commenting upon the increasingly hardening attitude of Algeria's European population as well as that of the Muslims, laments 'the sad, repeated failure of the moderates, or a "third force", to compete against opposing extremes'.¹⁵

This was recognised by some reformers. Soustelle argued that between *intégration* and an independent Algeria under the control of the FLN, there was no 'middle ground', writing of 'la chimère d'une 'troisième force' musulmane ni pro-FLN ni intégrationniste' (PT, 134). Camus argued that the descending spiral of violence and bloodshed had gradually led to the disappearance of political moderates, regretting 'la disparition progressive de ce troisième camp où l'on pouvait encore garder la tête froide'.¹⁶

Since negotiation with the FLN or with a chimerical third force could be ruled out, the only remaining option was to hope that a federal administration could be put in place under the leadership of precisely those Muslims who, under *intégration*, would have sat as *députés* in the French parliament. Such an option would have required victory over the FLN prior to its implementation, a victory which could only have been achieved with the support of the vast majority of the indigenous population. And, as we have seen, since signs of failing French resolve were more likely to harm rather than bolster popular Muslim support for the French, the announcement of a federal solution, according to Soustelle's logic, led inexorably to a French withdrawal. In actual fact, since all reform plans were destined to fail, the announcement of a federal solution could only *hasten* the onset of a French withdrawal rather than *create* the conditions of its own possibility. Nevertheless, from within the reformers' view of the world, Soustelle was correct to point out in his 1955 telegram to Faure that 'la fédération n'est concevable qu'à long terme, une fois résolus les problèmes les plus aigus'.¹⁷ In *Aimée et souffrante Algérie*, Soustelle indicated that it was possible to move from *intégration* towards federation but not the reverse: 'J'ajoute qu'on peut passer de l'intégration à la fédération, et non l'inverse' (AS, 93-4). In other words, by adopting a policy of *intégration*, federation still remained on the table as a possible option once the situation in Algeria had calmed down sufficiently. If federalism was to be the preferred solution, it could only have been advanced by stealth and not revealed as the declared policy until after the defeat of the FLN.

Reformers and Liberal anti-colonialists

The 'Intermediary Margin'

Commenting in 1992, Girardet claims to have been surprised, on reading Jean Daniel's largely anti-colonial account of the Algerian conflict, to find a considerable amount of common ground between the stance adopted by Daniel and his own

position as a supporter of *Algérie française*. From this, he concludes that there existed an intermediary margin straddling the pro-independence and pro-French Algeria camps:

Il y a, dans une large fraction des deux camps, des gens qui se trouveraient à peu près d'accord sur les mêmes valeurs, sur un même but à atteindre et qui ne parviennent jamais à se rencontrer. Et après tout, le rêve d'une Algérie fraternelle, réconciliée dans la mouvance française, c'est à peu près ce que nous voulions, et c'est au fond ce que souhaitait aussi M. Jean Daniel.¹⁸

Girardet is perhaps vulnerable to the accusation that he is attempting to rehabilitate the cause of French Algeria by stressing his proximity to the pro-independence faction, thus distracting from the many elements of unyielding, reactionary colonialism with whom he had to share his platform. He also over-estimates the amount of common ground which he had with Daniel who, from as early as 1956, was arguing for the need to deal with the FLN and highlighting the possibility that the settler community would have no place in an independent Algeria.¹⁹ In essence, however, Girardet's general point about an intermediary margin is valid since both supporters and opponents of Algerian independence laid claim to liberal values as a means of justifying their stance. Given that 'liberal' is such a blanket term, it is useful to draw a distinction between the partisans of either *intégration* or federalism – the colonial reformers - and the *indépendance française* camp, the supporters of which we might term liberal anti-colonialists.²⁰

A set-piece elaboration of the liberal anti-colonialist position was expressed in *Esprit* by Marius Chatignon. Although holding the view that Algeria should be independent, Chatignon refused to accept that this independence was to be gained at any price. He presents himself as a revolutionary, defending the cause of truth and justice against tyranny and oppression. By condemning the French effort in Algeria, he saw himself as preserving the honour and vocation of France. At the same time, he declared that he would only support the FLN on condition that they respected the same liberal ideology:

Il faut leur dire [aux hommes du FLN] que nous n'avons pas pour but l'indépendance politique de l'Algérie à tout prix, que nous refusons d'être les dupes ou les victimes de la haine sacrée du 'roumi'. Nous défendons, en même temps que la vocation et l'honneur la France, la vraie cause du peuple algérien. Nous ne luttons pas uniquement pour qu'il y ait demain une jeune nation qui s'appelle Algérie, mais pour que l'exploitation du peuple algérien cesse, pour qu'il n'y ait pas de nouveaux maîtres (seraient-ils Algériens!) pour qu'il accède à une condition de vie humaine. En bref, nous sommes des révolutionnaires, notre cause est partout celle de la vérité et de la justice. Nous ne sommes - de cœur - avec les nationalistes algériens que s'ils sont, aussi, des révolutionnaires algériens.²¹

A similar view was held by *Esprit's* editor-in-chief, Jean-Marie Domenach who, although supporting the view that the Algerian people be given the right of national self-determination, was nonetheless bitterly critical of the FLN: 'Il prépare les meurtres génériques, la guerre totale. C'est une mauvaise philosophie, indigne d'un peuple en lutte pour sa libération.'²²

There are key points of both similarity and difference between these liberal anti-colonialists and the reformers. In terms of the similarity, the emphasis on humanitarian and democratic values led both groups to have a marked dislike for the methods and the ideology employed by the FLN. There is a clear resemblance for example between the above statements from Chatignon and Domenach and the condemnations of the Algerian nationalists made by reformers. In an open letter to a number of unnamed intellectuals dated 14 November 1955, Soustelle sought to discredit any notion that the actions of the FLN were justified on humanitarian or democratic grounds:

'Nos principes' (je suppose qu'on entend par là ceux de la liberté, de la démocratie et du respect de l'homme), justifient-ils la fureur raciste et la fanatisme qui se sont assouvis par le massacre des ouvriers européens d'El-Halia et de leurs familles ?²³

In *Nous avons pacifié Tazalt*, Jean-Yves Alquier claimed to accept the right of peoples to decide their own political destiny, yet rejected the idea that victory for the FLN would in any way secure this right for the Algerian people. In his mind, national liberation was incompatible with the anti-democratic, anti-progress actions of the FLN. He claimed that the villagers with whom he came into contact existed in a

constant state of fear and anguish owing to the particularly savage nature of FLN activities. For these villagers, the soldiers of the FLN were merely 'les sauvages'.²⁴ Writing in the wake of a series of FLN reprisals against villagers co-operating with his SAS unit, Alquier attacked those intellectuals who, isolated from the realities of the conflict, constantly denounced the French presence on the grounds that it violated the right of people to national self-determination:

Qu'en pensent messieurs les doctrinaires de la liberté des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes, pour qui seuls les égorgeurs du FLN représentent le peuple algérien? A Tazalt, nous n'avons jamais été plus partisans de cette 'liberté'; chaque jour, nous sommes plus convaincus que notre rôle est précisément de la rétablir pour permettre à l'immense majorité du peuple algérien d'affirmer sa fidélité à la France sans courir le risque d'être égorgé.²⁵

Michel Henry in an editorial to *Le Bled* in 1958 took up the theme, attempting to dismantle any proclaimed link between the principles of the Algerian revolution and the right of national self-determination. Since 1945, Henry argued, this right had been the main argument mobilised by the nationalists in order to justify their resistance to colonialism, an argument which had succeeded in gaining some currency at the United Nations. However, for thousands upon thousands of men, women and children in Algeria, such lofty principles meant very little; their mobilisation simply provided a 'magnifique prétexte' to 'des bandes de tueurs' to establish their rule of terror. The victory of the so-called oppressed nationalist movements would be no more than the triumph of an illiberal and fanatical regime.²⁶

The difference between the liberal anti-colonialist position and that of the reformers is, however, equally crucial. Since the reformers believed in the 'consent potential', they were able to give their unequivocal support to the French Army's pacification effort. Since, in their eyes, the FLN sought to establish its rule through terror alone, it was the French who were defending the cause of political liberalism and democracy. Liberal anti-colonialists, on the other hand, by supporting in principle the cause of Algerian independence, did not believe that the majority of Algeria's indigenous population wanted to be French. This placed them in a dilemma which the reformers,

by the logic of their position, did not face. This dilemma was typified by Chatignon who opposed both the French Army's aims and the ideology of the FLN. His liberal principles were in conflict with his desired solution to the conflict.²⁷

An escape from this dilemma could not be found by replacing the 'consent potential' with another, equally implausible notion, which we might term the 'separation potential' allowing the Muslim masses, recognised to be favourable to independence, to be imagined separately from the FLN. A re-examination of Chatignon's condemnation of the FLN cited earlier reveals that this was, in part, what he was attempting to do. Chatignon wanted to defend the cause of the Algerian people not only against French colonial oppression but also against the Algerian nationalists. Whilst this position allowed him to maintain a certain amount of ideological good faith, it bore little relation to the balance of forces on the ground in Algeria; as we have seen, there was no alternative nationalist voice to the FLN commanding widespread support. The liberal anti-colonialist was faced with a stark choice: either seek to influence the FLN to adopt a more liberal approach or support the French forces in the hope that they would be magnanimous in victory.

Trapped Between the Extremes: The Dilemma of the Liberal Anti-Colonialist

On the one hand, liberal anti-colonialists such as Chatignon would have found very little to offend their ideological sensibilities in some of the material produced by the FLN, such as the following extract from an article appearing in *Résistance algérienne*:

[Notre] doctrine est d'inspiration tout à la fois universaliste et algérienne, c'est-à-dire élaborée d'après notre propre expérience des autres nations et des valeurs essentielles du monde moderne.

Notre nationalisme participe essentiellement du 'principe des nationalités' élaboré par les penseurs libéraux des 18^e et 19^e siècles et mis en application par les divers peuples d'Amérique, d'Europe, d'Asie et d'Afrique.²⁸

Whilst this reads very much like an approval of the democratic heritage of Western European liberalism, the methods employed by the FLN to achieve their liberation

were at odds with this proclaimed concern for universalism. As Sirinelli has recognised: 'L'aversion pour le terrorisme et pour la violence à l'égard des civils rendra souvent l'engagement difficile ou réticent en faveur de l'un ou l'autre des deux camps d'un conflit qui ira en se radicalisant.'²⁹ Vidal-Naquet has also observed an incompatibility between the emphasis on liberalism, tolerance and democracy which characterised the discourse of the Left in France and the aspirations of the FLN. It was not possible to 'interpréter le mouvement algérien en des termes qui relevaient très spécifiquement du vocabulaire de la gauche française'.³⁰ Vidal-Naquet was himself an archetypal liberal anti-colonialist. Although he came into contact with the FLN during the war by virtue of his position as editor of works such as *Vérité-liberté*, he is at pains to point out that he was never 'un adorateur du FLN'.³¹ Whilst he was prepared to testify at the trial of Francis Jeanson, he subsequently felt it important to clarify that he did not share Jeanson's notion of engagement. It was, in his eyes, vital to maintain a certain critical distance from the FLN:

Mon témoignage au procès signifiait que j'estimais 'hautement normal et satisfaisant que des socialistes français se soient montrés solidaires dans l'action des militants algériens'. En revanche, il me paraît inadmissible de passer de l'alliance à l'insubordination. L'intégration au FLN des militants antifascistes a pu être inévitable dans une période de décomposition de la gauche française, elle n'a plus aucun sens aujourd'hui, où semble s'esquisser un mouvement de masse. Aucune alliance ne saurait impliquer une sacralisation de l'allié. Il me semble qu'il y a un droit et même un devoir de critique mutuelle.³²

The difficult situation of the liberal anti-colonialist who wished to somehow 'recuperate' the FLN's revolt within a French liberal, democratic tradition was also highlighted by the militant anti-colonialists of the day. In his 1959 work, *L'an V de la révolution algérienne*, Fanon argued that the nationalists recoiled in the face of certain terrorist acts, in part out of humanitarian concerns and in part so as not to distance liberal anti-colonialists. Nationalists had three concerns:

[souci] de ne pas amonceler les victimes quelquefois innocentes, souci de ne pas donner une image fausse de la Révolution, et souci enfin de maintenir de son côté les démocrates français, les démocrates de tous les pays du monde et les Européens d'Algérie attirés par l'idéal national algérien. (SR,38-9)

If such sentiments again did not seem incompatible with the views of a liberal anti-colonialist, Fanon's tone had hardened by the time he came to write *Les damnés de la terre*. In this work, he argued that there was no place for liberalism in the revolutionary situation nor was it simply the case that the nationalists hoped to turn the values of 1789 against the French: 'La mise en question du monde colonial par le colonisé n'est pas une confrontation rationnelle des points de vue. Elle n'est pas un discours sur l'universel, mais l'affirmation échevelée d'une originalité posée comme absolue' (DT,10). He extolled the values of revolutionary violence as a means by which the colonised could recapture his essential humanity which the coloniser had for so long sought to deny him and stressed that the colonised could only take the place of the coloniser after 'un affrontement décisif et meurtrier des deux protagonistes' (DT, 6-7). Such was the oppressive nature of colonial rule that in the insurrectionary period the reaction of the colonised was to '[vomir] à pleine gorge' Western values and culture (DT,12).

Fanon was not merely describing a process, he also approved of it. Looking forward in *Les damnés de la terre* to a point at which the bonds of colonialism would be thrown off by every colonised people, he condemned the whole of the Enlightenment project, with its emphasis on reason and on the triumph of the intellect, for it was in the name of these very same principles that Europe had reduced most of the globe to slavery (DT,230-1). Free from their Western oppressors, the newly independent peoples, Fanon argued, should not look to the European store of values for their guidance:

Alors, frères, comment ne pas comprendre que nous avons mieux à faire que de suivre cette Europe-là. Cette Europe qui jamais ne cessa de parler de l'homme, jamais de proclamer qu'elle n'était inquiète que de l'homme, nous savons aujourd'hui de quelles souffrances l'humanité a payé chacune des victoires de son esprit. (DT,230)

The way forward for the former colonised territories was not to be found in some 'imitation caricaturale et dans l'ensemble obscène' of Europe (DT,232), nor was it a case of attempting to better reflect the liberal principles which the Europeans

themselves ignored. For the benefit of the human race, newly independent peoples should strive to find a whole new set of values (DT,233).

In a similar, if less impassioned prose, Memmi also exposed the untenable position of liberalism within the Algerian conflict. The time when such values as tolerance, justice and democracy were applicable to the colonial situation had long since passed whilst the time of their re-emergence was yet to come:

Mais en attendant, sur le sens du combat immédiat, le colonisateur de gauche ne peut que rester divisé. Etre de gauche, pour lui, ne signifie pas seulement accepter et aider la libération nationale des peuples, mais aussi la démocratie politique et la liberté, la démocratie économique et la justice, le refus de la xénophobie raciste et l'universalité, le progrès matériel et spirituel. Et si toute gauche véritable doit souhaiter et aider la promotion nationale des peuples, c'est aussi, pour ne pas dire surtout, parce que cette promotion signifie tout cela. Si le colonisateur de gauche refuse la colonisation et se refuse comme colonisateur, c'est au nom de cet idéal. Or il découvre qu'il n'y a pas de liaison entre la libération des colonisés et l'application d'un programme de gauche. Mieux encore, qu'il aide peut-être à la naissance d'un ordre social où il n'y a pas de place pour un homme de gauche en tant que tel, du moins dans un avenir prochain. (PC, 60-1)³³

It is clear that liberal anti-colonialists were unable to support the FLN without, at the same time, setting aside the liberal principles upon which their engagement was based. Lacking a 'third force' in which to place their faith, the only remaining option open to them was to throw their lot in with the pro-*Algérie française* movement and, effectively, join the ranks of the colonial reformers. This was the path followed by Paul Rivet and as such is worth further elaboration here.

During the war, Rivet was director of the *Musée de l'homme*, President of the French delegation to UNESCO in 1957 and, moreover, an ally of Ho Chi Minh. His ideological sympathy towards decolonisation, distinguishing him considerably from the likes of Soustelle, ought to have placed him firmly in the camp of the liberal anti-colonialists, if not the militant camp. In an interview with Claude Delmas conducted in 1956, Rivet stated his belief that the Algerian movement, at its outset, had been a legitimate demonstration of the wishes of a large part of the Arab and Berber communities. However, he felt that the continuation of hostilities had seen this

movement depart from its original, legitimate goals, to become a fanatical movement: 'Ce mouvement initial s'est de plus en plus transformé en un mouvement nationaliste, religieux et raciste que, pour ma part, je ne puis approuver.'³⁴ Rivet claimed to have spent his life in the service of anti-racism and as an opponent of religious sectarianism. According to the very same principles, he was obliged to condemn the FLN and his own erstwhile intellectual allies who were prepared to support the nationalists:

Au moment où un courant que je veux croire irrésistible oriente le monde vers la tolérance politique et religieuse, et cherche à réaliser les conditions de la coexistence pacifique entre les peuples, il me semble étrange que des hommes, mes amis, qui ont travaillé avec tant de courage et de désintéressement à cette œuvre de paix, encouragent, soutiennent et même attisent par leurs propos et leurs écrits les antagonismes religieux, raciaux, politiques, sociaux et culturels qui opposent en Algérie deux communautés ethniques, alors qu'au contraire, au nom de leurs principes, ils devraient s'attacher à lutter contre cet irrationalisme qui est le principal obstacle devant la paix. (p.6)

The fight that was taking place for national liberation under the FLN was to be clearly distinguished from the struggle which Ho Chi Minh had waged in Indochina. For Rivet, Ho Chi Minh's struggle had been devoid of any racial or religious element: 'Nul plus que lui ne désirait le maintien de la présence française dans le Vietnam indépendant' (p.6); if the French presence had been eliminated, this was the fault of the French themselves. For this reason, no parallel could be drawn between the nationalism of the Vietminh and that of the FLN and, therefore a different stance, Rivet claimed, was necessary in each case.

Concluding Remarks.

This chapter has considered two liberal alternatives to *intégration*. The advantage of *intégration* over federalism was that it was unequivocal on the question of French sovereignty, seeking to offer a cast-iron guarantee to those Muslims who rallied to the French flag that they would not be abandoned. It had a simplicity and a coherence which made it the most likely of the reform solutions to stem, even where it could not

stop, the tide of Algerian nationalism. The chapter has also shown that the preferred solution of the liberal anti-colonialists did not offer a more viable alternative to those proposed by the reformers owing to the lack of a moderate, liberal alternative to the FLN. This rendered their position not only as untenable as that of the pro-*intégration* camp but also less logical. Had it really been possible for the French to win the 'hearts and minds' of the Muslim population in sufficient numbers, then *intégration* would have offered the best hope of success. For this reason, the following chapter, which considers in more detail the nature of the reforms proposed, will focus on the *intégration* programme.

CHAPTER SIX

A CLOSER LOOK AT *INTÉGRATION*

Casting a backward glance over the history of France's civilising mission, it is difficult to debate the question of whether this mission 'worked' without adding that the nature of colonial oppression lay in part in the civilising rhetoric itself with its assumptions of European superiority and its disregard for indigenous culture and values. It is not enough to simply contrast colonial rhetoric and practice without also stressing the violence inherent in the very idea of imposing the coloniser's model of the 'good society' upon the colonised.

Soustelle was keen to stress that *intégration* was not merely *assimilation* in another guise. Whereas *assimilation* contained an inherent assumption about what it meant to be French, *intégration*, in his eyes, demanded no conversion to an ill-defined norm of 'Frenchness'. By exploring the components of *intégration*, this chapter will seek to assess whether the programme did, as Soustelle claimed, escape from the obvious Eurocentrism of its forerunner. Although more sensitive to the dangers of imposing an alien culture upon Algeria's Muslim population, *intégration*, we will argue, still did not completely avoid the assimilationist logic of making Frenchmen and women out of colonial subjects. In addition, having seen in Chapter Three the way in which reformers' reading of the colonial past was insufficiently critical of the injustices it produced, this chapter will further show that in the domains of political rights, land reform and industrialisation, the specifics of Soustelle's proposals fell short of the stated aim of parity between coloniser and colonised, providing instead a continued sop to European minority rule.

Any discussion about the 'appropriateness' of French plans to transform Algeria gives rise to delicate questions born of the debate between universalism and cultural specificity which we highlighted in our introductory chapter. The question of whether democratic government represents the best form of political organisation for all peoples or whether industrialisation constitutes the best way for poor countries to escape from under-development cannot be answered in any absolute sense but any response must surely take into account the opinions of those to whom these models for a more efficacious organisation of society are on offer. This is part of the reason why, in the context of the Algerian war, the 'consent potential' was so central to the reformers' justification for their stance and why it was so strongly contested by the militant anti-colonialists. A recurrent point of reference in this chapter will therefore be Fanon's discussion of the themes of development and consent which he explicitly links in *L'an V de la révolution algérienne*.

Fanon's portrait is a polemical one. Although perhaps a more accurate representation of the Muslim population than those produced by the reformers, it nonetheless over-estimated the unanimity of revolutionary sentiment which animated the Muslim population as a whole, as Chapter Four highlighted. Its usefulness here, though, is that it imposes a constant vigilance upon our assessment of the provisions of *intégration*. Whilst there is a temptation to condone some of the ideas advanced by Soustelle on the grounds that they went at least part of the way towards promoting a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic vision of society, this approval rests upon the consent of the colonised. By keeping in mind Fanon's portrait, we remain mindful that this consent was not forthcoming.

Assimilation and Intégration

One of the key points of Soustelle's *intégration* programme was that Muslims would not have been required to renounce part of their identity as it found expression

through religion and language in order to qualify for French citizenship: 'Intégration n'est pas assimilation; l'originalité ethnique, linguistique, religieuse de l'Algérie doit être et sera respectée' (AS, 109). In *L'espérance trahie*, he shows himself to be partly sensitive to, and critical of, the blithe self-assurance which underpinned the concept of the civilising mission. Although he praised the good will of the French colonisers, a clear note of criticism is discernible in his description of the French as 'enclins à se mêler de tout et avec tous, croyant toujours bon de transposer automatiquement sous le ciel d'Afrique ou de l'Asie les institutions et les mœurs de la France' (ET,19). Camus was similarly critical of the overly-prescriptive elements of *assimilation* which offered a very narrow understanding of 'Frenchness'. He claimed that the policy of *assimilation* had been an unmitigated failure for two reasons: 'parce qu'elle n'a jamais été entreprise, et ensuite parce que *le peuple arabe a gardé sa personnalité qui n'est pas réductible à la nôtre*' (our emphasis).¹

In a note to *Président du Conseil* Edgar Faure, Soustelle emphasised the difference between these two policies: 'L'assimilation visait l'individu, l'intégration intéresse la province. Il faut renoncer à l'illusion de faire de chaque Musulman un Français de France'.² Although claiming to know a number of Muslims who had been totally assimilated, Soustelle, writing in 1961, reiterated the point that *intégration* concerned Algeria as a whole rather than a few individuals. In his eyes, the separateness of the 'Algerian personality' posed no barrier to the potential success of his programme:

Elle [l'intégration] reconnaît formellement la personnalité algérienne, faite de l'originalité ethnique, culturelle, linguistique d'une majorité de sa population. L'intégration prend l'Algérie telle qu'elle est, les Algériens tels qu'ils sont, comme l'histoire les a façonnés, pour faire entrer de plain-pied cette province dans la République française. (ET, 286)

He denounced the claim that *intégration* was comparable to *assimilation* or that it simply reinforced the colonial *status quo* as a 'mensonge stupide qu'on espérait accréditer en le répétant indéfiniment' (ET, 27); it was only because *intégration* was 'un mythe puissant' that it had attracted so much criticism (ET,27). These are ideas to

which he would remain constant, commenting during a 1988 interview: 'Ne confondons pas intégration et assimilation; l'assimilation s'adresse à des individus, c'est une utopie; on ne prend pas un musulman pour en faire un Français moyen.'³ As we shall now see from an examination of the cultural, economic and political dimensions of *intégration*, Soustelle's assertions turn out to be partly true and his indignation at being misunderstood half justified.

Changes to the Algerian Economy

Intégration promised to end the exploitation of Algeria's indigenous population and to radically improve their material standards of living. Writing in 1961, Soustelle claimed that he had wanted to 'imprimer à l'économie algérienne un dynamisme suffisant pour résorber son secteur sous-développé, créer des emplois et combattre la misère'(ET, 288). As a largely agrarian economy, land distribution and use was central to any development project. Soustelle envisaged the creation of a special agency which would redistribute some land to Algerian farmers either by offering long-term tenancy agreements with the eventual option to buy, or by selling it to them with the finance provided through long-term loans (AS, 77). He also wanted to see the abolition of the *Khammessat*, a feudal system under which peasants worked the land but were obliged to give four-fifths of their profits to the landowner. He proposed to replace this with a new system which would allow for a fifty-fifty distribution of the profits. Whilst these plans were designed to meet some of the needs of the rural poor, they only scratched the surface of what might have been attempted. A more radical and fair solution would not necessarily have meant returning all the land to the descendants of those from whom it was originally expropriated, but it certainly would have implied some financial compensation, imaginative thinking and, in all likelihood, an army of lawyers to arrive at an equitable arrangement. Certainly, to broach the question of the redistribution of land to the indigenous population would have been to venture into a potential minefield, a move which would have provoked

the anger of the settlers with all of their prejudices about 'lazy' Arabs and their highly developed sense of self-worth as pioneers and cultivators. In addition, extensive land reform would, in all likelihood, have placed extra financial demands on the French government and the French taxpayer. However, if Soustelle was sincere about wanting to right some of the wrongs of the past then land ownership was an issue which he had to tackle. Instead he provides us with an example of his unwillingness to go the extra mile down the road of reform.

Industrialisation as the way forward

If the plans for land reform were not as fully worked out in Soustelle's writing as might have been expected given that most of Algeria's Muslim population lived off the land, this was in part due to the fact that, in his eyes, the key to raising incomes of Muslim peasants lay with the promotion of industrial growth. He remained unconvinced that the overall standard of living could be significantly improved by reform in the agrarian sector:

Voici trop longtemps qu'on parle de la 'vocation agricole de l'Algérie'. Pour sauver l'Algérie, c'est-à-dire les Algériens, il faut industrialiser le pays. Même modernisée, l'agriculture ne peut à elle seule combler le vide qui s'élargit entre les subsistances et le nombre des consommateurs sous l'effet d'une démographie 'galopante'. (AS,62)

He declared himself uninterested in dogma and concerned only with efficiency when it came to the economic instruments to be employed to bring an end to human misery and suffering:

J'avoue qu'en de telles matières les partis pris doctrinaux me paraissent sans intérêt; libre entreprise et planification, ententes volontaires d'entrepreneurs et orientation d'Etat doivent concourir au même but, car ce but est d'une importance vitale et compte seul. (AS,64)

It is perhaps an unfair reading of Soustelle's good will to argue that he merely wanted to turn Algeria into an adjunct of the French economy to be exploited ruthlessly. Yet, whilst he professed no particular predisposition for any one economic orthodoxy, his

proposals in actual fact amounted to the incorporation of the Algerian economy into the capitalist system of surplus production and consumption:

Le fellah vit presque en circuit fermé: du point de vue de l'économie générale, il n'est pas un consommateur. L'ouvrier, au contraire, achète et consomme. Distribuer des salaires, c'est créer un pouvoir d'achat, et par conséquent ouvrir de nouveaux marchés à l'industrie. Celle-ci apparaît donc comme une pompe qu'il faut amorcer pour qu'ensuite elle continue à fonctionner d'elle-même. (AS, 62)

Camus largely agreed with Soustelle that only the adoption of the Western model of economic development could lift Muslims out of their misery: 'Quoi qu'on pense de la civilisation technique, elle seule, malgré les infirmités, peut donner une vie décente aux pays sous-développés'.⁴ Muslims, he believed, should not take refuge in a vague pan-Islamic movement, with its emphasis on traditional values, since this was to look backwards rather than to the future.⁵

Chaussade took a similar line, emphasising that the expansion of the agricultural sector could only have a limited effect upon the per capita income of the country as a whole: 'Le perfectionnement des méthodes archaïques utilisées dans la plus grande partie du territoire et l'extension des zones de culture intensive permettront d'accroître les revenus et les emplois tirés des activités rurales, mais dans une mesure relativement limitée'.⁶

Germaine Tillion, in accordance with her central thesis that the problems of Algeria resulted from contact between industrialised and non-industrialised societies, situated the Algerian question as a microcosm of the global problem of under-development; the transformation of Algeria and all other non-industrialised countries had to be complete and all encompassing and the problems faced by 'des peuples dits "sous-développés"' required for their resolution 'le passage d'un système dans un autre, *c'est-à-dire rien de moins qu'une mutation*' (AL,52) (original emphasis). The only possible solution to Algeria's economic woes was to continue along the path of modernisation, necessitating 'un alignement culturel, économique et social avec les

pays évolués du monde' (AL,86). Algeria had gone past the stage of being able to adapt to the problems posed by the inexorable march of planetary civilisation. The destruction of traditional society, caused by contact with modernity and accelerated by the process of colonialism, meant that there could be no return towards the past: 'Maintenant, pour [l'Algérie], c'est – tout de suite – la civilisation industrielle intensive (avec tout ce qu'elle implique) ou une rapide dégénérescence, agitée de soubresauts sanglants (AL,111).

Figures such as Tillion and Soustelle did not seem to be fully sensitised to the complexities surrounding development aid. At the very heart of their plans for the industrialisation of Algeria lay a belief in modernity and 'progress'. Essentially, these plans were underpinned by a familiar Enlightenment discourse about the triumph of man over nature, with traditional patterns of living involving minimal industrialisation, and subsistence farming seen as inferior. At no point did Tillion or Soustelle challenge the notion that surplus production is axiomatically good, or that developing land and cultivating it automatically constitutes progress. Their plans to push Algeria through an accelerated Industrial Revolution made scant mention of the massive social and cultural impact which would have followed in its wake such as the widespread population shifts from rural to urban areas. As Maran has noted, absent from Tillion's writing is 'a process of self-questioning about the attributes that she as a French social scientist thought constituted "civilization"; a questioning about the right of the peoples themselves to determine whether they wished at all – and if so by what means - to "advance" or "modernize" their civilization according to European standards'.⁷

In partial contrast, a manual produced by the *Cinquième Bureau* for soldiers on duty in the Sahara demonstrates a certain amount of sensitivity in this area by advising French soldiers against falling into the trap of being over-paternalistic:

Toute action sera menée (...) non dans un esprit de paternalisme, qui ne serait d'ailleurs pas de mise, ni dans un esprit d'œuvre de charité, mais avec la volonté et dans le but de: promouvoir la population, lui redonner, avec la conscience de ses responsabilités, la confiance dans la France et dans son destin, lui donner la volonté d'être et de rester française.⁸

If those arguments which hold that any kind of economic assistance should be rejected either on the *ultra*-liberal grounds that it distorts the workings of the market or on the grounds that it encourages recipients to remain in a position of dependency are ignored, few people would argue that the provision of economic aid is, in itself, malevolent. At a local level, it is perhaps somewhat harsh to cast the soldier engaged in the small-scale project of digging a well in order to provide a community with fresh water in the role of colonial oppressor or agent of Western capitalism. The same point might be made of the military doctor providing free medical advice and undertaking a vaccination campaign to prevent infant mortality in some of the remote Muslim communities. Certain human requirements such as food, water, warmth and shelter transcend cultural specificity and attempts to provide for these basics cannot reasonably be condemned on the grounds that they constitute an imposition of one economic system upon another.

To this we must add two qualifications. Firstly, it is important not to exaggerate the extent to which the activities of the SAS were representative of the Army as a whole nor, as we pointed out in Chapter Two, should we be overly generous in our interpretation of exactly what it was that the SAS were trying to achieve. Secondly, the question of consent must be taken into consideration. As we will recall, Fanon thought it beneficial that the coloniser share his knowledge with the colonised:

En toute objectivité et en toute humanité, il est bon qu'un pays techniquement plus avancé fasse profiter un autre de ses connaissances et des découvertes et des savants. Quand la discipline considérée vise la santé de l'homme, quand elle a pour principe même de faire taire la douleur, il est clair qu'aucune conduite négative ne saurait se justifier. (SR, 107)

At the same time, however, Fanon argued that the Western model of progress was initially rejected by the colonised not because it was intrinsically bad, but precisely because it came from the coloniser.

Imagining an Independent Algeria

The belief that the French knew best when it came to deciding which changes were most appropriate for the Algerian economy was reinforced by reformers' assessment of what would happen to Algeria were she to become independent. For Soustelle, in such an eventuality, Algeria's government would have to impose on an already impoverished population 'des sacrifices inhumains pendant des années' (AS,65). Warming to his theme, he proclaimed financial, fiscal or economic autonomy for Algeria to be a fiction, 'vingt fois plus mythique que la fameuse "fiction des trois départements"' (AS, pp.237-8). For Camus, an independent Muslim Algeria would be unable to cope economically, rendering its political freedom worthless: 'une Algérie purement arabe ne pourrait accéder à l'indépendance économique sans laquelle l'indépendance politique n'est qu'un leurre'.⁹

In a changing international situation based around 'block' politics and an increasing economic interdependence, reformers sought to depict the nationalist aspirations of the Algerian people as an irrelevance. For Mercier, the changing world order only allowed 'les grands ensembles de peuples qui se groupent autour d'une conception de l'homme et autour de structures économiques, établies et en développement'. For this reason, he proclaimed Algerian independence to be 'une duperie'.¹⁰ Chevallier employed a similar language, proclaiming independence to be 'le produit du rêve'. Given the prevailing international situation, no nation was truly independent. 'Aucun peuple', he concluded, 'ne peut désormais vivre seul sans appui économique, militaire ou financier, voire politique, du grand bloc de nations pour lequel il a opté, du camp auquel il appartient' (NA, 183).

These high-handed dismissals of Algerian independence produced by reformers were all articulated from France, a country whose status as a sovereign nation was long-established. Whereas French patriotism which had produced, amongst other things the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man, was celebrated within France for having served the cause of humankind, Algerian nationalism was perceived as out of step with the historical moment. Reformers were not, of course, prepared to extend the logic of their argument to France itself. Although France was not economically independent, there was no suggestion that she should give up her sovereign status. In the international climate of superpower domination, far from accepting the loss of their great power status, the French struggled fiercely to maintain as much independence as possible. Indeed, the retention of Empire was part of the strategy for preserving that independence.¹¹

The argument that Algerian independence served no useful purpose also derived in part from a Eurocentric attitude which suggested that, left to their own devices, Algeria's Muslim population would quickly slide back to an imagined pre-colonial level of technological inadequacy. As Soustelle wrote:

Livrée à elle-même, par ses propres forces et avec ses seules ressources, l'Algérie ne peut que succomber. Laissons-y jouer les lois naturelles: l'Algérie aujourd'hui est au niveau de la Sicile, demain elle en sera à celui de l'Egypte, après-demain à celui de l'Inde ; la disette endémique, les famines et sans doute la guerre civile y ramèneraient alors la population à un nombre plus adapté aux ressources. (AS,237-8)

This view is indicative of Soustelle's inability to see beyond the prejudices characteristic of the colonial mindset. Unable to recognise any capacity for self-improvement amongst Muslims, he assumed that Algeria had only advanced out of barbarism because of the French presence. Were the French to leave, a vague conception of the 'laws of nature' had decreed that Algeria would once again take its place amongst the poorest countries in the world. This was, in part, linked with his belief that the land was incapable of feeding the population. It was also, in his mind, associated with the likelihood of civil war, almost as though, being less civilised than

their European counterparts, the indigenous population could not avoid fighting amongst themselves. Such assumptions, of course, have very little to do with any perceived 'laws of nature' and much more to do with Soustelle's discriminatory imaging of the Algerian people. Moreover, even if such laws did exist, Soustelle saw them as acting only on the Algerians since his point was precisely that, under French guidance, they could be transcended. To this we can add that given the levels of poverty and malnutrition which already existed in French-controlled Algeria, there was more than a hint of irony, apparently unrecognised by the French, in their warnings to Muslims that, left to their own devices, they would be in dire trouble.

Soustelle's view that Algerians could not manage on their own was, in fact, widely shared by other advocates of colonial reform. In Chevallier's writing, the negative imaging of the indigenous population is attached to his valorisation of the settler community. Were the settlers to leave Algerian soil, their pioneering and entrepreneurial spirit would leave with them: 'Si demain le colon européen d'Algérie venait à se décourager et à disparaître, une présence sédentaire, un guide, une volonté s'éteindraient et des régions entières, pour un long temps peut-être, retomberaient dans la misère et dans la nuit' (NA,174). Camus adopted a similarly negative imaging of the Algerians. In his eyes, any policy which led to a French withdrawal from Algeria could not be tolerated since it would condemn the Muslim community to even greater poverty: 'Je ne puis non plus approuver une politique de démission qui abandonnerait le peuple arabe à une plus grande misère'.¹²

Cinquième Bureau propaganda reproduced these themes. A pamphlet destined for conscripts and reservists returning from Algeria opined that without France Algeria would quickly become 'un territoire qui retournerait bien vite à l'anarchie; un territoire voué à la misère faute de techniciens'.¹³ A 1956 pamphlet arrived at the same conclusion, suggesting that 'privée de la France, l'Algérie entrerait donc dans une effroyable période de misère'.¹⁴ Likewise, a prepared script designed to be read out by

soldiers upon their first meeting with Muslim villagers declared: 'L'indépendance d'un pays sous-développé c'est sur le plan social, l'arrêt de progrès et même le déclin.'¹⁵

In addition to their Eurocentric attitudes towards the potential for development within the indigenous community, reformers predictably did not recognise that French colonialism had hardly left Algeria in a position where she was well equipped to deal with the modern world. As Memmi argued, rather than lead to the development of the colonial territories, colonialism actively under-developed the colonised. The lack of technological skill amongst the colonised people did not prove that they were backward as the settlers frequently claimed, nor did it justify their subjugation. Instead, it highlighted the inherent injustice of the colonial system.

C'est vrai que les colonisés ne savent pas travailler. Mais où le leur a-t-on appris, qui leur a enseigné la technique moderne ? Où sont les écoles professionnelles et les centres d'apprentissage ? (PC,133)

For Memmi, the coloniser required only the labour of the colonised and so had no interest in training engineers and technicians from amongst the indigenous people. The distance between the level of development of the two societies became increasingly problematic as the pace of technological development in the world increased which, in a self-reinforcing spiral, reinforced the coloniser's belief that the colonised was incapable of adapting to the demands of the modern world (PC,133-5).

Culture and Identity

Muslim women and Islam

The place of women within Muslim society could not be neglected under plans for *intégration*. Whilst this programme was intended to respect the tradition and identity of Muslims, it was also concerned with equality and, had it been implemented, should have seen Muslim women gain the same rights as women in mainland France. This

would have included the right to vote, a provision incorporated into the 1947 Statute for Algeria but never applied. Soustelle had very little to say about the whole question of the emancipation of women. In his initial plans for *intégration*, he did not immediately envisage the extension of voting rights due to the potential outrage it would have caused: 'L'empressement marqué par les Musulmans à cet égard se montra si tiède, pour ne pas dire plus, que j'estimai inopportun d'être trop en avance sur les mœurs' (AS, 88).

The French Army took a more active role in advocating policies to address the woman's role in society.¹⁶ A *Cinquième Bureau* study investigating ways of promoting better relations between settlers and Muslims appreciated the need to have greater contact with Muslim women both as a necessary component of *intégration* and as a means of undermining the rebellion. The authors of the report imagined that Muslim women desired to break free of the constraints which their traditional roles as wives and mothers placed upon them:

Du côté féminin, la musulmane étant confinée dans son foyer, on trouve peu de contacts possibles à première vue. Cependant la femme musulmane se rend compte de la condition inférieure qui lui est imposée, elle ne demande qu'à briser ses chaînes.¹⁷

Writing in *Le Bled* in 1958, Cayol, drawing up a balance sheet of French achievements, made it clear that Muslim women had been specifically targeted as part of the *intégration* programme:

Pour atteindre les femmes, malgré la réclusion dans laquelle elles vivent, des équipes médico-sociales féminines ont été créées. Chacune des équipes, accompagnée d'un médecin, assure dans les douars le service médical et social. Ces équipes entrent en contact avec les femmes et les réunissent dans les cercles féminins pour accélérer leur promotion sociale.¹⁸

It should perhaps be noted in passing that not all of the material produced by the *Cinquième Bureau* for the consumption of Muslim women held out the promise of a more European lifestyle with short skirts, make-up and other trappings of liberation.

In the following tract produced by the *Cinquième Bureau*, Muslim women were addressed in their customary role as guardian of the home.

Mères d'Algérie, qui vous vole vos enfants ? Le FLN

Femmes d'Algérie, qui vous vole vos maris ? Le FLN

Jeunes filles d'Algérie, qui vous vole vos fiancés, vos frères ? Le FLN

(...)

La rébellion barbare du FLN c'est pour vous la maison sans homme.

La rébellion barbare du FLN c'est pour vous la peur, la misère

La rébellion barbare du FLN c'est pour vous les enfants qui ont faim.

(...)

Empêchez vos hommes de désertir leur foyer pour s'avilir dans la rébellion barbare.¹⁹

This caveat aside, the culmination of French plans to accelerate the social promotion of women occurred during the events of May 1958 and came to crystallise particularly around the issue of the wearing of the veil. During the so-called *fraternisations* of this month Muslim women were encouraged to remove and burn their veils as a symbol of their emancipation. These attempts to win over Muslim women by promising emancipation on Western European lines incurred the wrath of Fanon. He argued that by encouraging Muslim women to adopt European patterns of dress, the coloniser was not only attempting to undermine the rebellion but was also engaged in an attempt to impose an alien model of society:

Convertir la femme, la gagner aux valeurs étrangères, l'arracher à son statut, c'est à la fois conquérir un pouvoir réel sur l'homme et posséder les moyens pratiques, efficaces, de déstructurer la culture algérienne. (SR, 20)

With each veil that fell, Fanon claimed, it was as though the Muslim woman was accepting the rape of her identity by the coloniser (SR 24-5). It is difficult not to agree with Fanon on this point. The Army's attempt to persuade women to remove their veils was a rather clumsy attempt to impose French culture upon the Muslim women. As a marker of cultural and religious identity, and given its connections with female sexuality, the veil was central to Muslim society in Algeria and was particularly sensitive terrain upon which to venture. *Intégration* was supposedly predicated upon

respect for the indigenous culture whilst the Army's plans to unveil Muslim women, even if they added to the theatricality of the events of May 1958, scarcely differed from a policy of *assimilation*.

For Fanon, the issue of the veil was connected both to the wider issue of the emancipation of the woman and, once again, to the consent of the colonised. In his eyes, the decision over whether to wear the veil was taken in accordance with the dictates of the revolutionary conflict and the need to oppose the coloniser. In order to penetrate into the European area of the city, Algerian women adopted European fashions and hairstyles in order to pass unnoticed by the French soldiers, allowing them to carry out their revolutionary role of planting bombs. As soon as the French became alerted to this tactic, the veil was donned again to serve a different role in the revolutionary struggle, that of smuggling weapons. When the French tried to persuade Algerian women to throw off the veil, they clung to it more strongly: 'A l'offensive colonialiste autour du voile, le colonisé oppose le culte du voile' (SR, 29). After the particular events of May 1958 to unveil Algerian women, women took to wearing the veil again 'spontanément et sans mot d'ordre' (SR, 46). This did not mean, however, that Fanon was opposed to the emancipation of the woman. In fact, he largely shared the idea that the elevation of the female to a more prominent role within Algerian society was to be welcomed. When change was imposed by the French, however, any positive benefits were eclipsed simply by the fact that what was being offered was 'of the coloniser; colonialism could not impose such changes on the Algerian woman.

Il faut toujours voir l'attitude globale de refus des valeurs de l'occupant, même si objectivement ces valeurs gagneraient à être choisies. C'est faute d'avoir saisi cette réalité intellectuelle, cette disposition caractérielle (...) que les colonisateurs ragent de toujours 'leur faire du bien malgré eux'. (SR, 46)

Soustelle had almost as little to say about the status of Islam under *intégration* as he did about the role of women. In broad terms, his proposals were based upon the Republican model of the separation of Church and State with the right of religious

tolerance proclaimed. The only roles which the *intégration* process envisaged for the State were as arbitrator between different communities over the use of mosques and religious lands, and as a provider of indemnities for the religious elders in the same way that it assisted protestant and catholic priests (AS,86-7).

For Bayet, to claim that religious differences created an insurmountable obstacle to the success of *intégration* was to be unfaithful to a democratic and republican tradition: 'Infidèles à la pensée généreuse des hommes de 89, inégaux à la mission qu'ils nous ont léguée, nous oserions dire qu'entre les Musulmans et nous la diversité de croyance creuse un fossé infranchissable?'.²⁰ Proposals to respect the Islamic religion certainly constituted an improvement upon the old policy of *assimilation* since they had no implications that French identity was in any way linked with religious belief. However, given the actions of the Army in seeking to unveil Muslim women, questions must be asked about the extent to which the French truly intended to respect religious differences.

Language and Education

In Metropolitan France in the 1880s, Jules Ferry's educational reforms had sought to suppress regional dialects in favour of French in order to foster a more coherent national whole. If *intégration* was to be something more meaningful than an attempt at *assimilation*, there could be absolutely no question of attempting a similar policy in Algeria. Given that the goal of *intégration* was to allow a plurality of different cultural identities to co-exist within the same national framework, the recognition and promotion of linguistic diversity had a key role to play. Soustelle was sensitive to this since the stated aim of his *intégration* programme was to turn Algeria into a bilingual, and even trilingual, society. The teaching of Arabic was to become compulsory in all schools, even amongst those in which the overwhelming majority of the pupils were

from a European background. This, Soustelle believed, could only lead to the cultural enrichment of Algeria:

Que l'Algérie doive devenir une communauté bilingue, puisant de ce fait dans les trésors de deux civilisations, me paraissait et me paraît toujours souhaitable; l'harmonie entre les deux populations ne peut qu'y trouver son compte. (AS, 88)

In the case of the Berber language, which had only a spoken form, Soustelle envisaged that, in the long term, a written form might be provided but still thought it desirable that Berbers should learn both French and Arabic in order that they would be able to play a full role in Algerian society.

Soustelle's concerns with promoting linguistic plurality fed into a broader preoccupation with education as a whole. He intended, for example, to improve the educational facilities for Muslim children and in a radio broadcast in early January 1956, stressed the positive qualities with which he believed education to be invested and praised the work which had been undertaken by the French since the outbreak of the conflict in offering new educational opportunities to Muslims:

Chaque fois que dans un douar lointain une école a été bâtie, cela a été une victoire, une victoire pacifique du progrès humain, une victoire commune de tous les Français d'Algérie, Européens ou Musulmans, contre l'ennemi commun qui est l'ignorance.²¹

In *Aimée et souffrante Algérie*, he recounted his visit to a school and described the pleasure he experienced in seeing the children learning:

Avec quelle émotion je voyais dans les villages, l'école en activité, remplie de petits Kabyles aux têtes tondues de près, au visage fin et intelligent ; souvent, signe des temps, des fillettes vêtues de robes multicolores suivaient, dans une autre salle, le cours donné par l'institutrice. Ces enfants, avenir d'une Algérie plus heureuse, combien je leur souhaitais, au fond de mon cœur, de connaître un pays pacifié et prospère. (AS, 41)

Through his plans for the promotion of the Arabic language, Soustelle was keen that the indigenous culture should be respected. The language in which the curriculum was to be delivered remained, however, only one of a myriad of potential problems linked to the development of a suitable education programme. Although Soustelle took

pleasure in seeing schools being built and children learning, his writing did not really dwell upon what the children were being taught. Soustelle was an ethnographer by training and not an educationalist and as a consequence can hardly be blamed for not discussing curriculum content in any detail. Nonetheless, the issue was particularly delicate. Few would argue that programmes designed to promote mass literacy represent a 'good'. In the colonial context, however, the education of the indigenous population, where it took place, risked becoming not an instrument of emancipation but simply the imposition of the cultural norms of the dominant colonial power upon the indigenous society. According to this reasoning, the school teacher became the very embodiment of colonial oppression. For Memmi, induction into the education system of the colonised denied the colonised a 'voice' and a history which predated the coloniser's arrival:

Or la très grande majorité des enfants colonisés sont dans la rue. Et celui qui a la chance d'être accueilli dans une école n'en sera pas nationalement sauvé: la mémoire qu'on lui constitue n'est sûrement pas celle de son peuple. L'histoire qu'on lui apprend n'est pas la sienne. Il sait qui fut Colbert ou Cromwell mais non qui fut Khaznadar ; qui fut Jeanne d'Arc mais non la Kahena. Tout semble s'être passé ailleurs que chez lui ; son pays et lui-même sont en l'air, ou n'existent que par référence aux Gaulois, aux Francs, à la Marne ; par référence à ce qu'il n'est pas, au christianisme, alors qu'il n'est pas chrétien, à l'Occident qui s'arrête devant son nez, sur une ligne d'autant plus infranchissable qu'elle est imaginaire (PC,124).

In criticising the introduction of a Eurocentric curriculum, it might be argued that Memmi was seeking to condemn colonialism on contradictory grounds. Whereas earlier we saw him dismissing the civilising mission itself as a project never attempted, on this occasion he was condemning the violence inherent in attempts at its implementation. Ultimately, his opposition to the very ethos of the civilising mission was less extreme; he admitted that *assimilation* had 'un parfum universaliste et socialiste qui la rend *a priori* respectable' (PC,161). His critique of colonial society tended to focus more sharply on what he believed to be the inability of the colonial system to bring about a progressive improvement in the lifestyle of the colonised. In fact, rather than being contradictory, Memmi's criticisms of both the coloniser's

unwillingness to civilise and of the 'civilising activities' themselves can be seen to reinforce each other to the extent that they impale colonialism on the horns of an impossible dilemma. Either talk of a civilising mission is a 'cover' for economic exploitation or, if seen as sincere, imposes an alien system of values upon the colonised people, violating their identity and ripping apart the fabric of their society. In both these cases, the notion of the 'good' coloniser becomes a contradiction in terms since the coloniser's status *qua* coloniser is dependent upon an original and ongoing abuse of the colonised. Rather than the 'win-win' situation which the pro-colonial lobby believed would result from the French colonial presence, Memmi's point was that for those forced to live under colonial rule, the situation might more accurately be described as 'lose-lose'.

The testimony of Lieutenant Le Merre, the SAS officer whose thoughts on solving unemployment we considered in Chapter Three, is again useful here. In his report, Le Merre described the lack of schooling opportunities for young Muslims in the sector to which he was assigned. The children, unsupervised and left to run wild, simply idled away their time:

Il y avait là une centaine de jeunes garçons et filles, qui en dehors des heures de classe traînaient la savate dans le village. Une centaine de petits presque sauvages à apprivoiser - et pour cela il n'y avait rien. Rien que la bonne volonté du personnel de la S.A.S., et les deux moniteurs.²²

With the help of many of the villagers in his sector, Le Merre constructed a community centre in which the two teachers provided rudimentary education for the children and carried out adult literacy classes. The children were even sent to France to spend time at holiday camps or with French families. Le Merre stressed the positive outcome of these visits in persuading the children of their place within the national community and in provoking a whole series of attachments to France:

Nous avons envoyé des jeunes en colonie de vacances en métropole, et certains dans des familles, et tous sont revenus enchantés disant: 'C'est bon, c'est beau, la France, notre pays!...'

Et les moniteurs leur faisaient chanter: 'Ma Normandie', 'A la Claire Fontaine' et d'autres chansons (...)

Et les moniteurs leur lisaient des chapitres de leur manuel (...) qui contenaient des directives pour éduquer, instruire et distraire les jeunes 'Nous sommes Français...' 'Algérie, Province française...'.²³

For Le Merre, this was *intégration* at a grassroots level, but *intégration* nevertheless. From our perspective, however, it looks far more like *assimilation*. Nowhere are Memmi's concerns regarding the potentially exploitative nature of the educational process better illustrated. Many of the administrative tasks and the teaching functions undertaken as part of the *intégration* programme had to be performed by soldiers like Le Merre who, perhaps not devoid of a certain paternalistic good will, were unable to appreciate the delicate interplay between education and identity. One imagines the way in which an Algerian family might have reacted upon seeing their children return from school with nothing less than the propaganda of the French Army on their lips.

Once again, the question of consent must be considered. Soustelle viewed the construction of new schools as 'le témoignage et le symbole de la culture, de l'entente et de la paix' and decried the FLN's tactic of burning them down (AS,277-8). He was unable to comprehend how the nationalists could claim to have the interests of the people at heart and seemed to believe that, were the FLN to succeed, they would go on burning schools: 'Ce peuple veut accéder au savoir pour mieux vivre; eux [les terroristes] veulent l'obliger à croupir dans l'ignorance' (AS,277-8).

Fanon did not write about the FLN's tactic of burning schools in any detail but the same logic which he applied to the wearing of the veil can be extended to this situation. Whilst Soustelle was correct to argue that education offers a way out of under-development, what he failed to realise was that the tactic of burning schools had little to do with a refusal of education *per se* merely of the education imposed by the coloniser. A similar mistake was made by Alquier in *Nous avons pacifié Tazalt*. Upon discovering that a school had been destroyed, Alquier sarcastically remarked, 'La nuit dernière, (...) le FLN a poursuivi son œuvre de libération de l'Algérie'.²⁴

An article appearing in an Algerian newspaper written by a demobilised reservist and describing a school inspection by a senior officer stressed not only the lack of sensitivity of French soldiers to the issues of culture and identity connected with education but also the lack of success enjoyed in teaching young Muslim children.²⁵ According to the report, the visiting officer began by repeating familiar slogans of French propaganda such as 'L'Algérie c'est la France', 'vous êtes tous Français' and other phrases of the same ilk. Unfortunately, the children did not speak French and their attention soon waned when the usual distribution of sweets did not follow. Annoyed, the captain instructed the schoolteacher to teach the children songs with a patriotic theme on the grounds that these were very important in the development of a sense of identity. He admitted to having heard children in an Algerian village in 1946 singing 'Maréchal, nous voilà', an ironic indictment of French attempts to use propaganda on Algerian children. Most importantly of all for the author of the article was the context in which the education was being provided:

Ce que n'a pu dire l'instituteur aux deux représentants du Service Psychologique, c'est combien sa situation était psychologiquement fautive vis-à-vis de ses élèves (...) dont 17 n'ont plus leur père, arrêté et emmené par les troupes françaises.*

When the French Army had rounded up, tortured or executed so many adults during the course of the war, it was ridiculous, as the author of the article correctly pointed out, to expect Muslim children to become devoted supporters of the French cause.

Political Reform

Alongside economic and cultural change, *intégration* also promised to establish an institutional framework at both local and national level which accorded much greater representation to Muslims. For this reason, Soustelle proposed that Algeria be represented in the French National Assembly according to the same criteria as any other French province. The representation of Algeria's indigenous people would no

longer be determined by their ethnicity or religion but simply on the grounds of their membership as citizens *à part entière* of the French Republic.

Whilst at the national level Soustelle's *intégration* project denied the 'specificity' of Algeria, he nonetheless believed that it was important to preserve a certain amount of local autonomy:

Les réalités invitent l'observateur à ménager la diversité des groupes humains, à leur conférer une autonomie locale très large, et à réserver au-dessus d'eux un arbitrage qui protège chacun d'eux des empiètements et de l'arbitraire. (AS,239)

In part, Soustelle's ideas were a logical response to the scattered location of the indigenous population which did not lend itself very easily to an overly centralised system of local and regional government and made the imposition of a country-wide system based on the French model somewhat impractical. However, Soustelle also justified this position on the grounds that he did not want to see the Europeans reduced to the status of an oppressed minority and put in a position where they would be forced to leave Algeria (AS,238). If he was worried about the rights of the Europeans, the fact that, under his scheme, Algeria would have formed part of Metropolitan France and would have enjoyed equitable representation within the national parliament should have been enough. *Intégration*, whilst accepting cultural and religious differences, was supposed to eradicate the importance of ethnicity when it came to choosing a political structure. To suggest otherwise was to contradict its very ethos. Certainly, the abolition of European minority rule may well have met with a considerable amount of hostility from amongst the European population but the ability of the settlers to accept reform and the imposition of a new political settlement for Algeria which put an end to their privileged position was, like land reform, a *sine qua non* of the eventual success of *intégration*.

Soustelle's apparent unwillingness to contemplate fully the logical implications of his own *intégration* programme is also visible in his proposals for voting arrangements.

He argued for the abolition of the *communes mixtes*, which were to be replaced by elected rural communes.²⁶ In those communes where there were very few European electors, the single electoral college was to be established. However, in the *communes de plein exercice* where three-fifths of the representatives were chosen by the predominantly European college and the remaining two-fifths of the college by the second, and exclusively Muslim, electoral college, Soustelle was more conservative. Denouncing this division of power as ‘contraire à l’équité et au bon sens’, his own plans were scarcely any bolder (AS, 89). Whilst the logic of the *intégration* position required the abolition of the double electoral college altogether, Soustelle proposed merely to equalise the weighting of the two electoral colleges (AS,90). There does not seem to be any rationale, under the conditions of equality of citizenship which *intégration* demanded, for the maintenance of any form of the double electoral college. As Reis pointed out in no uncertain terms:

Il faut être net, l’intégration signifie d’abord le collège unique mais aussi – un homme valant un homme, un Africain valant un Européen, un membre de l’ex « deuxième collège » valant un bénéficiaire du Décret Crémieux, valant lui-même Bergson et Benda, valant eux-mêmes Gabriel Marcel et François Mauriac – que les 10 millions d’habitants de l’Algérie auront dans l’Assemblée politique commune une représentation proportionnelle à leur nombre.²⁷

As far as the administration was concerned, Soustelle wished to create a civil service with a much broader ethnic base in order to counter the charge that Algeria was administered in accordance with the wishes of a dominant European minority. His desire to incorporate more Muslims into the administrative hierarchy testifies to his partial willingness to accept that the French colonial enterprise had not always done as much for the Muslims as it might have done. French attitudes towards the ‘elite’ of the indigenous population had, since 1830, been ‘un tissu de contradictions et de paradoxes’ (AS,67). Having bestowed upon certain members of the indigenous population the benefits of a French education, the French had made the mistake of instituting a kind of glass ceiling which had prevented Muslims from rising to the higher echelons of the administration (AS,67). From this discriminatory policy,

backed by the ignorance of many civil servants of the Arab and Berber languages - 'ignorance qu'on ne saurait trop sévèrement condamner (AS,80)' – had come an administrative body 'séparé du pays et imperméable à lui. (AS,80)'.

Soustelle proposed a policy of preferential treatment for Muslims in the short term so as to equalise the number of Muslims and Europeans within the administration, the nationalised industries and the public service industries (AS,81). Of course, if strict proportionality was to be observed, the weighting of the indigenous population to the European settlers within the administrative corps within Algeria would have been around eight to one and if *intégration* over the long term was to be accepted in all its fullness, this should have been the target. Once again two contradictory tendencies can be observed: Soustelle did show a certain amount of good will in embracing the logic of reform but was only prepared to go so far; whilst he desired to do more for the Muslims, he persisted in defending the minority rights of the Europeans. Seen in isolation, this criticism might appear somewhat harsh, yet examined alongside his plans for the reform of local government, the timidity of his proposed changes is more discernible.

Concluding Remarks.

To the credit of reformers, *intégration* constituted an improvement over *assimilation*. Soustelle's plans for the teaching of Arabic to all of Algeria's schoolchildren, for instance, was certainly more progressive than simply stating that Muslims had to learn French. However, *intégration* was not without its problems and the similarities between the *intégration* programme and the civilising mission of the past are clear. Firstly, this was a French project designed to transplant onto Algerian soil a French version of a modern, functioning economy which made assumptions about the blueprint for development that was to be implemented. The programme prescribed the type of political system that was most appropriate for Algeria, offering specifically

French notions of citizenship. The project can be summarised as an attempt by the French, in most cases backed by a measure of good will, to tell the Algerian people what was in their best interests. Secondly, the general principles of *intégration* were more liberal than the details. The proposals for land reform and the changes to the political system, had they been implemented, would not have delivered the promised equality. Thirdly, there was the issue of consent. As Fanon concluded, even if some of the changes offered by the coloniser would have benefited the colonised, serious doubt persists over whether they could ever have been accepted 'dans une quiète neutralité' (SR,109).

CHAPTER SEVEN

OPPOSITION TO INDEPENDENCE

For Raoul Girardet, the *Algérie française* camp was a broad church. He writes of 'l'hétérogénéité de ces milieux Algérie française' comprising the 'humanisme algérien' of those who advocated a multi-racial Algeria based on equality for all of its citizens, as well as the militant defenders of the French presence in Algeria for whom the defence of French sovereignty *coûte que coûte* took precedence over, where it did not rule out altogether, the introduction of liberal reforms.¹ Preceding chapters have highlighted the deficiencies of the reformers' liberalism, suggesting that the *Algérie française* camp was perhaps more homogeneous than Girardet is willing to recognise. This chapter provides further entries for the negative side of the reformers' balance sheet. It analyses an alternative agenda for opposing independence adopted by reformers which competes for ascendancy with the liberal solution which they claimed to be pursuing.

This alternative agenda was based on the 'harmony of interests' doctrine. Reformers employed economic arguments and stressed the need to preserve French prestige to justify the retention of Algeria. These arguments were accompanied by statements emphasising the need to maintain Algeria's status as part of the French Republic. If such statements were intended to show that the future status of Algeria was a strictly French affair, reformers were also prepared to attach a wider significance to the conflict according to which the FLN were imagined as mere pawns in a global ideological struggle.

Algérie: Terre française

The human accompaniment to the theme of the *mise en valeur* of the Algerian territory was to be found in the defence of the settlers. Soustelle praised the pioneering spirit of the first European settlers, particularly in their cultivation of the Mitidja (AS,56). The purpose of such praise was to legitimise the European presence. The settlers, having cultivated the land, had, in his eyes, acquired the right to own it. In common with all other reformers, he was by no means willing to countenance the physical displacement of the settler community: 'On ne « rapatrie » pas en métropole des gens qui sont nés en Algérie, dont les pères et les arrière-grand-pères y sont nés et y reposent de leur dernier sommeil' (DA, 23). Chevallier, as a *pied-noir*, claimed the right to call himself an Algerian on the grounds that five generations of his ancestors had made Algeria their home. The frontier spirit of these pioneers, 'bouleversée par les passions', 'brûlée par le soleil' and constantly doing battle with disease, gave them the right to stay in the land (NA,12):

Du jour où, des forêts de la Mizrana qu'ils [cinq générations des miens] exploitaient sur la côte kabyle au temps des panthères, ils s'enracinèrent dans cette Algérie devenue leur terre, un peu comme leur patrie, eux et leurs descendants ne devaient plus partir. (NA, 12)

In 1960, de Gaulle was to dismiss the claims of the settlers that Algeria needed to be preserved with the barbed retort: 'l'Algérie de papa est morte'.² In order to challenge de Gaulle's implication that the period of colonial rule over Algeria could be seen as an inglorious episode in France's history, Soustelle evoked the familiar glorification of the settlers' pioneering virtue. In this instance, it was set alongside another argument intended to justify Algeria's status as forever French - the selfless sacrifice of the settlers during the two World Wars:

Quant à la gouaille sur 'l'Algérie de papa', c'était, je le répète, un 'mot d'auteur' qui a fait sourire en métropole. Mais en le proférant on courait le risque, et cela n'a pas manqué de se produire, de blesser bien des Algériens, dont le 'papa' et le 'grand-papa' avaient crevé de fièvre dans les marais de la Mitidja, défriché les terres ingrates couvertes de jujubiers et de palmiers nains, bâti des maisons et des routes, créé de la prospérité pour les Musulmans aussi bien que pour les Européens, et souvent péri à Verdun, au Chemin des Dames, en Italie, en Allemagne, en portant les armes pour défendre ou libérer la France. (ET, 104)

Since settlers had fought for France in the First and Second World Wars, their right to call themselves French could not be questioned. Since Algeria had been one of the sites from which the French had relaunched their fight against the German occupation during the Second World War, it had to be clung onto all the more vehemently in the post-war world. A brochure produced by the *Cinquième Bureau* in 1956 echoed Soustelle's praise of the 'heroic' settlers:

Qu'ils soient venus de France ou d'autres pays méditerranéens, les Européens d'Algérie se sentent profondément français. Ils l'ont bien montré, non seulement pendant la guerre 1914-18, mais également pendant la campagne de Libération, au cours desquelles tant d'entre eux ont donné leur sang pour la patrie.³

Of course, these eulogies of the role of the settlers in the Second World War ignore the pro-Pétainist and anti-Semitic attitudes displayed by many of them during the early years of the war. Moreover, to claim that Algeria, as a site of resistance to German occupation, 'saved' France during the Second World War is to overlook the alternative centres of French opposition to the Germans.⁴

The Second World War was not the only historical event called upon to justify the continuation of French sovereignty over Algeria. Pro-reform elements within the French Army employed a particularly patriotic language to describe the conflict and sought to place their combat in a historical lineage in which French soldiers had been called upon to defend the territorial integrity of the nation. According to one *Cinquième Bureau* manual, the Algerian war had provoked an instinctive reaction amongst French people to defend their homeland which could be summoned up whenever the nation and its values were under threat: 'Cet esprit se retrouve à tous les moments de notre histoire où on a pu voir "la Patrie en danger."' The Algerian war formed part of an historical continuum, the latest in a long line of historical conflicts in which the people of France had answered the nation's call. Prior to the Algerian war, such outpourings of patriotic sentiment, the manual states, had been witnessed in

the attitudes of the volunteer army of 1792, the militias of 1870, the 'sacred union' of 1914 and the soldiers of 1942.⁵

Writing in the *Revue Militaire d'Information*, General Ely made the same connection between the conscripts and reservists serving in the Algerian war and previous instances of popular participation in defence of the nation. The young men who served in the ranks of the Army, he imagined, saw themselves as soldiers of progress, advancing humankind along a difficult and torturous path towards some unidentified end. It was the same devoted attitude which had inspired draftees during the First World War and the Resistance movement during the Second:

Foi, confiance, optimisme, animés par un grand enthousiasme, sont des vertus créatrices. L'Armée se doit de les avoir et de les pratiquer. Et consciente que 'le sens inéluctable de l'histoire' est bien celui d'une progression humaine, qui n'exclue pas l'erreur ou la souffrance, elle fera bénéficier de sa foi ardente la jeunesse de France qui sert dans ses rangs et qui réclame du plus profond d'elle-même des motifs de croyance.

La France de 1914 croyait.

La France de la Résistance croyait.

La France de 1958 frémit de la croyance souveraine dont elle se sent peu à peu envahie.⁶

Of course, the idea that all the conscripts and reservists thought this way was, to a large extent, no more than wishful thinking on Ely's part. The key point to observe here, however, is that Ely apparently saw no contradiction in mobilising patriotic themes in order to justify French control, indicative of the extent to which the belief that Algeria was France had permeated thinking within the military.

For Camus, it was the fact that prior to the French conquest there had never been an Algerian nation which gave settlers the right to remain:

Si bien disposé qu'on soit envers la revendication arabe, on doit cependant reconnaître qu'en ce qui concerne l'Algérie, l'indépendance nationale est une formule purement passionnelle. Il n'y a jamais eu de nation algérienne.⁷

To recognise the *a priori* existence of both an Algerian state and a national consciousness was both to cast the French in the unwelcome role of occupying power

and to leave reformers open to the charge that theirs was a futile attempt to graft French nationality upon an unwilling people already having a national identity of their own. Whether or not there existed an Algerian nation prior to the French conquest remains a moot point. For the FLN, there was no doubt. Amongst their initial demands, they listed '*la restauration de l'Etat Algérien*' making French colonialism an interruption in the ongoing history of the Algerian nation.⁸ Stora offers some support for this position, pointing out that prior to the French conquest, Algeria enjoyed many of the trappings of statehood, with most of the European nations and the United States having diplomatic missions based there.⁹ Even if one accepts that pre-colonial Algeria was not a nation (in the sense of having neither a fully sovereign State apparatus nor a strongly developed sense of national consciousness amongst its people), Camus' argument was spurious. He assumed that nations are timeless entities, rather than artificial and unstable creations of relatively recent historical vintage. His argument ignored the likelihood that an Algerian nation would have come into being without colonialism as well as the fact that, by the time he came to write, an embryonic national consciousness had been strengthened through opposition to colonial repression.

Economic Concerns

In the last chapter, we examined reformers' proclamations that without France, Algeria would be unable to survive. If, in part, this was a reflection of their belief that the French had a responsibility to develop their North African 'province', it also revealed some of their Eurocentric assumptions about the indigenous population. This section highlights two other arguments employed by reformers based on economic concerns which sit uneasily alongside their claims that they wanted to help the Algerian people escape from poverty on purely humanitarian grounds.

Firstly, Soustelle's apparent generosity to help Muslims seems to be implicitly tied to the question of French sovereignty. His 1965 work *La page n'est pas tournée* is marked with a certain *schadenfreude* directed at the Algerian people. Once Algeria had become independent, he begrudged every penny spent to help her on the path to recovery, seeking to turn his pre-independence prediction of economic misery into a post-independence reality. Comparing the treatment handed out by de Gaulle's government to the *pieds-noirs* forced to return to France with its attitudes towards the FLN, he wrote:

Il est immoral, à coup sûr, que des Français meurent de faim ou se suicident de désespoir (...) alors que les tueurs qui les ont spoliés et jouissent de leurs biens, voient en outre une pluie d'or français ruisseler dans leurs mains toujours tendues. Notre Gouvernement est à double face: d'une prodigalité de nouveau riche envers le FLN, il tend aux Français d'Algérie le visage fermé d'Harpagon. (PT,33)

The French people who had wanted to cast off the burden of Algeria because it cost too much had been misled; Algeria continued to cost the French money with the crucial difference that the money was no longer used for any useful purpose:

L'Algérie, naguère, nous coûtait des sommes considérables, certes, mais investies dans une province française, pour élever le niveau de vie d'une population – européenne ou musulmane – qui était française, pour rétablir la paix, pour sauvegarder la sécurité de la métropole. Aujourd'hui ce flot d'or se perd sans résultat dans le gouffre sans fond d'un pays anarchique, retourné de deux siècles en arrière, pour soutenir un régime de brigandage, pour financer des entreprises de subversion. (PT,63)

In fact, Soustelle went as far as making the argument espoused by Raymond Cartier during the war by arguing that the government should prioritise spending on domestic reconstruction rather than waste it on the colonies. In particular, he criticised 'la dilapidation des deniers publics pour soutenir Ben Bella et d'autres dictatures du Tiers-Monde – contre la construction d'écoles, de lycées, d'hôpitaux, contre l'expansion et la recherche scientifique et technique, contre le logement, contre l'équipement du pays en routes, canaux, téléphones' (PT,228).

A Return to the 'Harmony of Interests'

As far as reformers were concerned, the ties between France and Algeria were not only territorial and human, but also economic. According to the 'harmony of interests' argument, the French could gain economically whilst providing the benefits of their civilisation to the Algerians. As Blaut puts it: 'The counterdiffusion of material wealth from the colonies back to the European centre is seen as part of a compensation for the gift of civilisation and, on these terms, is morally justifiable.'¹⁰ Reformers were not averse to making use of this argument. In their eyes, there was a symbiotic relationship between the two territories. Without Algeria, they claimed, the French economy would enter a massive recession.

Soustelle argued that France benefited economically from the possession of Algeria. He predicted serious consequences for France were this territory to be lost. Not only would all the other French possessions in Africa swiftly follow suit but France would lose the equivalent of 6% of its gross national product in terms of lost exports and the equivalent of 3.75% in lost imports (DA,30-1). In addition, the discovery of the considerable oil and gas reserves in the Sahara gave France an opportunity to escape her long-standing energy dependency on imports from other countries:

L'intérêt du Sahara est de nous offrir une chance, la seule qui soit en vue pour aujourd'hui et pour un avenir prévisible, de combler notre déficit énergétique sans dépendre pour cela ni des Arabes ni des Etats-Unis. (DA, 32)

Chaussade similarly stressed that the development of the Algerian economy would bring a raft of economic opportunities for France and, crucially, security of energy supply:

Si les liens qui attachent l'Algérie à la France disparaissaient, celle-ci ne pourrait, par des moyens appropriés, ni se libérer sûrement d'une dépendance pétrolière qui, jusqu'à maintenant, est allée croissant, ni éviter d'assujettir la satisfaction de ses besoins énergétiques au niveau incertain de ses ressources en devises étrangères.¹¹

Similar concerns of economic woe were expressed in *Cinquième Bureau* publications. One pamphlet warned that 'l'économie française serait sans l'Algérie gravement affaiblie' and forecast a whole series of dire consequences for the economy of Metropolitan France were she to be divorced from her North African market: in the textile industry, 15,000 workers would be laid off and a reduction of 25% in the volume of exports would ensue; in the automobile industry, 10,000 redundancies were forecast; in the agricultural sector, a massive fall in exports would result; and, more generally, the resources of the Sahara would forever be lost to France. The report concluded that it would be impossible to maintain living standards in France at the same level without Algeria. Interestingly, the question of the 'return' of the *pieds-noirs* was also mentioned, but dismissed as an unrealistic scenario on the grounds that it would be impossible to house and find employment for such a large influx of people.¹² Similarly, French soldiers about to be demobilised were informed by the *Cinquième Bureau* that one ninth of the work that took place in France was directly linked to Algeria. 'Notre Pays ne peut rester lui-même que par ses prolongements africains', the report pronounced.¹³

Such fears of French economic collapse proved to be ill-founded and the economic logic which sustained them incorrect since, as Marseille's analysis shows, many of the French exports sent to Algeria were paid for via loans obtained from the French government. Thus, he writes: 's'il est exact de dire que l'Algérie est le "premier client" de la métropole, on ne saurait dire que c'est le "meilleur client"'.¹⁴ The overall insignificance of the Algerian market for the French economy became even more clear once independence had been obtained since, despite the loss of this territory, French firms flourished and the economy continued to grow.

Grandeur

Closely linked to the threat of economic ruin that reformers believed would result from France's eviction from Algeria was the fear of a loss of prestige. In *Le drame algérien*, Soustelle seemed particularly concerned that, in the event of a French withdrawal, Algeria would fall under U.S. control, leaving the Americans to exploit the resources in the Sahara for their own purposes. He attacked Aron for believing that France would manage adequately once she had been returned to her European boundaries. The nation's role in such a situation, he quipped sarcastically, would be to 'accueillir les touristes américains et leur tendre la main pour qu'ils y jettent quelques-uns des dollars que leur rapportera le pétrole saharien' (DA, 16). There was, in his eyes, 'quelque chose d'étrange et de suspect' in Aron's insistence that France should leave Africa in order to take up a lesser role in an American-dominated Europe (DA, 17). Five years later, in *L'espérance trahie*, he returned to the theme, attacking those who 'ne voient point d'inconvénient à ce que la France, rejetée de l'Afrique, végète dans son petit hexagone continental' (ET, 214).

Under threat, in Soustelle's eyes, was France's global vocation; he believed that France should aspire to play a leading role on the world stage and was scornful of the idea that French overseas possessions could be replaced by a vague *rayonnement culturel*:

Le rayonnement de la pensée, voilà la consolation qu'on nous promet en échange du renoncement aux droits et aux devoirs de la puissance, l'impalpable royaume qui récompenserait notre résignation. Quelle illusion ! (DA, 64)

If countries maintained a certain attachment to the French language and culture, it was in the hope that France would remain an independent power in the future (DA, 65). Were this independence to be compromised, these countries, Soustelle predicted, 'se détacheraient, le cœur en deuil, d'un pauvre petit Etat qui se serait renié lui-même'

(DA,65). France's influence abroad depended above all on her prestige; 'supprimez ce prestige et tout disparaît', he warned (DA,66). In fact, it was not simply a question of prestige, at stake was the health of the French nation:

En réalité le drame n'est même pas celui de l'Algérie, c'est celui de la décadence. C'est la question, le 'défi' comme dirait Toynbee, qui nous est posée, à tous et à chacun: 'Acceptez-vous la décadence de la France ?'. (DA, 66)

At the time of writing, Soustelle remained a close collaborator of General de Gaulle. His insistence that France had a duty to preserve her great power role to meet the expectations of other nations was typically Gaullist in tone. What Soustelle did not appreciate, in a way that de Gaulle almost certainly did, was that France was hardly doing much to increase her global prestige by continuing to fight a war in Algeria which most people outside France itself thought unjust.

In his fear that a redefinition of France's role would take place that relied less on physical power and more on cultural and diplomatic ties, Soustelle anticipated the foreign policy which de Gaulle would pursue. His criticism *avant la lettre* of these policies looked forward to the accusations which he would later level at the General. In 1965, with the Empire lost, he launched a scathing attack on de Gaulle's attempt to redirect the French 'national vocation' away from North Africa. Speculating that de Gaulle's haste to rid France of Algeria derived from a desire to have a free hand to pursue a greater role in Europe with a new continental focus for the Army's activities, Soustelle countered:

[De Gaulle] a sacrifié une réalité tangible, un territoire, la vie et le bonheur d'hommes et de femmes dont il était le gardien. Les gens me font sourire, qui qualifient de 'réaliste' la politique algérienne du Général: c'est bien là, au contraire, la politique la plus irréaliste qui se puisse concevoir – celle qui consiste à lâcher la proie algérienne pour l'ombre d'une chimérique grandeur mondiale. (PT, 134-5)

Just how successful de Gaulle's foreign policy proved to be is open for debate. Whilst in his speeches he attempted to present an image of France as a player of major significance on the world diplomatic stage, it might be argued that he managed to

achieve very little other than to irritate his closest allies. Few commentators, however, attack him for deciding to withdraw from the colonies. Given that France's power had declined in absolute terms, Soustelle's belief that she could still aspire to great power status on traditional lines was hopelessly anachronistic.

Algeria: The Global Significance

The emphasis which Soustelle placed on the preservation of national prestige added an international dimension to the Algerian question. The alleged global significance of Algeria was also evident in another common theme of the reformers' writing. Reformers constructed and reconstructed the ideological motivations of the FLN along various lines whose function was to locate the Algerian conflict within a broader geo-strategic frame; Algeria became not just a local decolonisation struggle but an episode in a planetary conflict pitting the West against various ideological forces bent on its destruction. The FLN were represented alternately as agents of Soviet-led international global Communism, Islamic fundamentalists determined to wage a Holy War, or one arm of Nasser's grand strategy to unite the Arab world. At times reinforcing, yet often mutually incompatible, the various strategies to demonise the FLN attempted to play down the specifically nationalist element of the revolutionary ideology which had managed to subsume within it numerous different beliefs.

The Communist Threat

The outbreak of the Algerian War coincided with one of the most unstable periods of the Cold War. In the eyes of those French soldiers who had fought in Indo-China, the FLN became merely another manifestation of the same Communist-inspired enemy. It was common, for example, for soldiers to refer to the combatants of the FLN as 'les Viets'.¹⁵ The Communist threat was heavily stressed in military propaganda addressed to French troops. For example, a manual produced in 1957 for soldiers on duty in the

Sahara opens with a number of quotations from leading Communist thinkers including Lenin and Mao-Tse Tung who had predicted that the conquest of Europe would take place via Africa. Appearing at the very start of the manual, the portrayal of a gradually encroaching red menace was clearly intended to convince French soldiers of the necessity of their combat, especially with Indo-China lost and Asia apparently slipping out of the orbit of Western control. Faced with this threat, the Army's task was the 'défense des valeurs sur lesquelles repose notre civilisation'.¹⁶

Mercier also sought to play on fears of Communist take-over. In the global ideological combat which he believed to be taking place, the Western bloc was divided between colonial and Metropolitan powers, with the latter often failing to grasp the significance of the colonies. Decolonisation favoured the Communists by creating an ideological vacuum which they could quickly fill:

Dans les pays que l'Occident abandonne, le communisme vient s'établir, il s'apprête à combler le vide, à donner sa réponse aux questions qui se posent et son remède aux luttes intestines qui, immanquablement, se font jour. Ainsi du Viêt-Nam, ainsi de l'Indonésie, ainsi du Moyen-Orient, ainsi peut-être demain de la Tunisie et du Maroc, ainsi peut-être après-demain de l'Algérie, et voilà la citadelle, le sanctuaire du monde occidental, la vieille Europe qui a tiré toute sa sagesse, tout son équilibre, toute son humanité des antiques civilisations de la Méditerranée, tournée par la Méditerranée elle-même.¹⁷

Even where the nationalism of the FLN was accepted, it was seen as a stalking horse for future Communist infiltration, what Behr described as the 'Manichean proposition' that in 'an under-developed country, independence equals neutralism, which in turn equals satellization by the Communist bloc'.¹⁸

Such anti-Communist rhetoric projected a somewhat distorted image of the FLN. Although the leaders of the FLN were prepared to accept material help from Communist powers and whilst the regime instituted after independence was based around a version of one-party state socialism, the defining characteristic of the FLN was its nationalism rather than its Communism. As Schulte comments, 'while the

FLN accepted aid from the Communist block, they dourly avoided entanglement with it'.¹⁹

The Islamic Threat

We do not need to stand at the safer critical distance of the post-cold war world to appreciate the hyperbole contained in reformers' fears of a Communist take-over. The alternative portraits of the FLN produced at the time of the conflict by reformers themselves call into question the seriousness of the Communist threat. On other occasions, Islam rather than Communism was perceived as the driving force of the rebellion. In 1957, Maréchal Juin was to describe the rebellion as 'un terrorisme aveugle et barbare engendré dans la fièvre d'une poussée malsaine de racisme et de fanatisme religieux'.²⁰ This theme was also taken up by reformers. As Chapter Five highlighted, it was the alleged religious fanaticism of the FLN that caused Paul Rivet to abandon his anti-colonial stance and condemn the rebellion. Soustelle, in his response to Aron, labelled the Algerian nationalists as 'fanatiques rétrogrades, imbus d'un esprit théocratique et totalitaire' (DA, 52). In the aftermath of the war, he described the French withdrawal as 'la reconquête de l'Algérie par l'alliance du fanatisme islamique des Uléma et de la subversion communiste' (PT,180). Given the ideological standpoint from which Communists view the world, it did not seem to occur to Soustelle that the aims of international global communism might be incompatible with religious fanaticism.

In defence of the reformers, it might be pointed out that not all sought to attribute the causes of the rebellion to external forces or religion, thereby denying the responsibility of French colonial practice for having created resistance to it. Chevallier, whilst admitting in 1958 that external factors had some influence over the rebellion, argued that to overestimate their importance was no more than a diversionary tactic employed by those Europeans who wanted to evade their own failings.

D'aucuns qui répugnent à faire leur autocritique constructive cherchent une évasion en attribuant aux seules excitations extérieures l'origine du trouble de la masse musulmane et, du même coup, les causes de la rébellion. (NA, 30)

Against those who sought to locate the origins of the rebellion in the religious fanaticism of Muslims, Tillion argued that the followers of Islam were no more fanatical than Christians. Muslims, she argued, could not be considered *en bloc* since a Muslim intellectual had more in common with a Christian intellectual than with a simple shepherd of the same religious faith (AL, 38). In her eyes, it was wrong to under-estimate the primacy of economic under-development as a cause for revolt:

Les Musulmans vivent, en quasi totalité, dans un des secteurs terrestres les plus mal placés par rapport à l'ébranlement de la civilisation mécanique, et toutes les sornettes qu'on nous raconte sur l'Islam viennent de là. (AL,20)

The Pan-Arabist Threat

Another frequently alleged controlling influence over the rebellion was the cause of pan-Arabism. References to the nefarious activities of Egypt within the writing of French commentators are legion. The abortive Suez expedition in 1956 was underpinned by the belief that one of the keys to solving the Algerian problem was located in Egypt. The Egyptian influence is particularly prevalent in Soustelle's explanation of the origins of the rebellion. The attacks against French installations were carried out, he claimed in 1955, by a small number of conspirators, financed and trained by Nasser, gradually fomenting dissent (AS,17-21). The specifically nationalist aspect of the rebellion was denied, written out of the preoccupations of those involved in the rebellion: 'En fait, il ne fut jamais question dans tout cela de la prétendue "nation algérienne", encore moins des formes juridiques ou politiques qu'elle devait adopter' (AS,23). Later in the same work, Soustelle referred to the leaders of the FLN and 'leurs inspireurs au Caire' (AS,118). He claimed to have captured a document penned by Ben Bella in 1955 in which the latter indicated that his plans had been formulated 'avec l'accord du Grand Frère' which, as Soustelle pointed out, was none other than Colonel Nasser (AS,218). The success of the FLN in

establishing itself as the most significant of the nationalist groupings could be attributed to the fact that it received support from Egypt: 'Il tient sa force de l'Egypte, et c'est pour l'Egypte qu'il agit' (AS,233).

A propaganda brochure produced for French soldiers by the *Cinquième Bureau* in April 1956 entitled 'Alerte à l'impérialisme nassérien', and quoting extensively from Nasser's own writing, typified French military paranoia about the possibilities of a united Arab world set against them.²¹ Seeking to portray Nasser as 'un nouveau "Führer"', the pamphlet claimed that Nasser had a three-stage plan, to unite the Arab, African and Islamic world. That Nasser aspired to unite the Arab world with Egypt at its centre, that he wanted to help the sub-Saharan African countries to liberate themselves from their colonial yoke and that he wanted to forge links between Muslims the world over were offered as evidence of his hegemonic pretensions. Precisely how they differed from French plans to be at the heart of the European Community, from French dreams of a Eurafrique centred on France or from the fact that Catholics all around the world follow the words of a single figure based in Rome were never made explicit. Aspirations accepted as normal 'at home' were transformed into a dangerous form of imperialism when they manifested themselves in a similar form elsewhere. Nor in the comparison between Nasser and Hitler was any mention made of the Egyptian leader's capacity to realise his plans. Nasser certainly lacked the military-industrial capacity to unite the Arab, African and Muslim worlds through force. Whilst Egypt was favourable to the Algerian revolution, the war was not the first step in some power-crazed drive of an Egyptian dictator. Once again, no attempt was made by reformers to reconcile the threat posed by Nasser's Egypt with that of international global Communism. Indeed, *Alerte à l'impérialisme nassérien* readily cited the future President of Egypt Anwar Sadaat, at the time Minister for Islamic Affairs, who had spoken of Islamic unity as a third way between Communism and international capitalism: 'Grâce au régime économique islamique, nous pouvons créer un troisième bloc entre le bloc capitaliste et le bloc communiste.*' It would be

tempting to suggest that these attempts to fabricate an enemy or, at the very least, exaggerate the nature of the threat posed appear scarcely credible with the benefit of hindsight were it not for the fact, as Said's *Culture and Imperialism* indicates, Western media and politicians continue to engage in exactly the same process when public support for overseas military activity is required.²²

The confusion over precisely what was at stake in Algeria are perhaps nowhere better summarised than in the following quotation from Soustelle:

L'Algérie évacuée sera pan arabe, communiste ou américaine, peut-être les trois choses simultanément par voie de partage ou successivement, elle sera tout ce qu'on voudra sauf algérienne. (DA, 55-56)

The reason that Algeria might fall under this curious and highly improbable mix of different regimes was due to its strategic location. Its position on the Mediterranean seaboard, coupled with the oil resources in the Sahara, which meant that no great power could afford to let it pass into the hands of another.

Conclusion.

We began this chapter by referring to the notion of the 'harmony of interests'. For the reformers themselves, of course, the 'harmony' remained intact; the need to defend the West against Communism, protect the French economy or retain national prestige coincided neatly with the necessity of implementing a reform package and with the wishes of the indigenous population. Missing from the writing of reformers, however, is any sense of hierarchy. No indication is given as to which of their reasons for opposing Algerian independence was the priority. We can only speculate whether they would have advocated the continued prosecution of the war on the grounds of prestige, anti-Communism or economic security, if they had realised their mistake in assuming that most Muslims wanted to be French. This question must remain unanswered precisely because this was a dilemma whose existence reformers were not

prepared to acknowledge. From the evidence available, serious doubt persists that they would have been prepared to admit the illiberalism of their cause and support a French departure from Algeria.

CHAPTER EIGHT

REFORMERS AND THEIR SCAPEGOATS

For colonial reformers, driven by their misguided faith in the 'consent potential', any setbacks suffered by the reform programme could not be explained in terms of a systematic failure of colonialism. Instead, they generated a number of 'scapegoat stories' the purpose of which was to account for the success of the FLN in winning the battle for the 'hearts and minds' of the population. It is these stories which are the subject of this chapter.

The chapter is divided into three parts, each dealing with a separate story. First, France's political leadership. The governments of the Fourth Republic were attacked for their inability to put in place a package of reforms attractive enough to deflect Muslim opinion from the nationalist cause. However, since reformers believed that the *fraternisations* of May 1958 heralded the start of a new era of harmonious collaboration between Algeria's European and Muslim communities, the actions of the Fourth Republic's leaders were not seen as fatal to the cause of reform. A new story and a new scapegoat was required, with General de Gaulle the obvious candidate. In Soustelle's eyes, de Gaulle destroyed the good will generated by the events of May 1958, sabotaged the *intégration* movement, and ultimately, brought about the downfall of *Algérie française*.

Two other targets for criticism are considered here – the French Army and the Intelligentsia. The chapter charts the way in which some reformers, although crucially not Soustelle, denounced war atrocities committed by the French Army as antithetical to the very principle of reform, thereby seeking to blame elements within the Army for

the inherent flaws within their own position. As a parallel to his ambivalence towards French Army atrocities, Soustelle was scornful of those intellectuals who deigned to criticise the French Army, accusing them of undermining the chances of winning the 'hearts and minds' of the Muslim population.

The Politicians and the Failure of *Intégration*

Writing in 1955, Soustelle asserted that the main threat to the eventual success of his *intégration* programme lay in the political game-playing which dominated government practice during the Fourth Republic and which saw the national interest subordinated to personal ambition or petty intrigue. Any proposal was automatically subject to discussions which were 'interminables et byzantines' in nature (AS,52). By way of example, he claimed that a project to declare a special state of emergency in Algeria proposed by Mendès-France's government had been rejected by a number of members of parliament owing not to their opposition to the measures themselves, but to the factional rivalry which existed between supporters of Mendès-France and Edgar Faure. 'Ainsi, vont, hélas, les choses chez nous', Soustelle complained (AS, 29).

The dictates of the counter-revolutionary struggle, he argued, obliged the government to take 'une position ferme, cent fois réitérée', entailing the elaboration of a programme 'de manière à ne plus laisser aucune place à l'équivoque' (ET, 91). Although in Soustelle's mind the officers of the SAS managed to reassure those Muslims with whom they came into contact of the benevolence of French intentions, the confidence which they engendered was, he claimed, like 'une plante fragile', one that would withstand neither 'quelques averses de scepticisme' nor 'la sécheresse du doute' (ET, 90-1). Whilst the Army gave its word that the French would not abandon Algeria, the governments in Paris provided doubt and scepticism in abundance: 'Paris tergiversait, Paris polémiquait, Paris parlait de négocier. Paris s'apitoyait sur le sort des terroristes, Paris ironisait aux dépens des Musulmans fidèles' (ET, 91).

At times, Soustelle claimed, it was simply the intransigence of those who refused to accept the need for reform which prevented the implementation of the *intégration* programme. In *Aimée et souffrante Algérie* he recounts how on 23 March 1955 he had felt obliged to hold the threat of his resignation from the position of Governor-General because of the administration's reluctance to fund his proposals for reform. He had spent his time involved in acrimonious discussions with representatives from the Ministry of Finance who, like so many 'marchands de tapis' had constantly endeavoured to counter his requests either on the grounds that further funds were not required or by arguing that the money was needed for strictly military requirements such as barracks (AS, 45).

Soustelle was angered by the filibustering tactics employed by the administration in both Algiers and Paris to block his proposal to raise Muslim representation within the civil service in Algeria to fifty percent:

Tantôt on me remontrait que mes propositions sacrilèges violaient de vénérables préceptes, ce que je savais fort bien; tantôt on s'efforçait de me décourager par un feu roulant de critiques; tantôt on avait recours à la méthode dilatoire des notes, contre notes, réponses aux précédentes, observations sur ces dernières et commentaires sur ces observations, le tout suivant le cours majestueux et lent que l'administration sait imprimer à sa démarche quand (...) elle attend qu'un Ministre ou un Gouverneur importun soit amené à quitter la place en raison des bouleversements périodiques de notre système parlementaire. (AS, 82)

Chevallier also criticised the lack of reforms enacted by French governments between 1956 and 1958. In his opinion, Algeria had been the victim of a government policy which had been unable to produce any tangible results:

Pendant les deux dernières années, elle [L'Algérie] avait vécu sous le régime de la décomposition du pouvoir camouflé derrière le décor en carton-pâte des réorganisations et des réformes sur le papier à usage des congrès. Le mensonge régnait en maître. (NA, 154)

The 1957 *loi-cadre*, which, despite its obvious complexities, Chevallier believed to be a positive development, was, he contended, sabotaged by the political parties each seeking to divide up the municipal councils to find positions for their own people (NA, 158).

In his bid to secure support for his reform package, Soustelle saw himself as 'comparable à un homme qui lutterait pour sa vie contre un ennemi implacable, tandis que des vols de guêpes, tenacement accrochés à son corps, le perceraient sans répit de leurs aiguillons' (AS, 107). It was not just the defenders of the colonial *status quo* who composed these metaphorical swarms of wasps. Soustelle portrays himself as the victim of the classic pincer tactic of figures from opposite ends of the political spectrum conspiring to destroy a reasonable political project for completely contradictory reasons. Whilst some figures refused to discuss reform because they would not tolerate any change which would 'porterait atteinte aux positions acquises' others, he claimed, 's'empressent de les rejeter (...) en les déclarant insuffisantes et dépassés' or 'les condamnent parce qu'ils jouent sur le désordre et qu'ils préfèrent le trouble révolutionnaire à une évolution pacifique' (AS, 53). It was a game in which the leading lights of both the Left and the Right excelled because it won them popularity with their followers and allowed them to advance their own personal agenda even if the good of the nation was compromised in the process (AS, 53). Reis agreed, accusing the Communist Left in France of making common cause with the *ultras* from the *pied-noir* community who did not want to see any reforms at all: 'Ces *ultras* métropolitains, pour gauchistes qu'ils se donnent, se coalisent automatiquement avec les *ultras* d'outre Méditerranée. Pour dénoncer l'« hypocrisie assimilationniste » tout leur est excellent – jusqu'au témoignage du Pied Noir'.¹

Soustelle was certainly correct to point out that there were weaknesses in the regime. As Howard Machin observes, the Fourth Republic was characterised by 'multi-party rivalry with intense ideological conflict, organisational fragmentation and weak, unstable governing coalitions'.² There were seven changes of government from the outbreak of hostilities to the inauguration of the Fifth Republic, all of which resulted, directly or indirectly, from the situation in Algeria. And as Machin adds, 'Not only were there sharp conflicts between the parties, but factionalism and personal rivalries were rife within almost every party'.³ These weaknesses, which bedevilled the Fourth

Republic throughout its existence, lent an air of incoherence to government handling of all questions, not just the Algerian one, giving rise to its reputation as *le mal aimé*.

However, Soustelle was unwilling to concede that the activities of the political leaders or the endemic weaknesses of the system of government during the period from 1954-58 had little overall impact upon the unfolding of the Algerian *drame*. Given the state of opinion in France and Algeria by the time of the outbreak of hostilities, the governmental role became simply one of either hastening or prolonging the inevitable.

Smith writes of:

the essential mistake in perception made by the leaders of the Fourth Republic who held that France was being defeated in Algeria not by the historical anachronism of her goals there but by the spectacle of her parliamentary weakness and the reaction this produced in the Muslim population.⁴

Moreover, there was arguably less in-fighting within French parliamentary circles on the Algerian question than Soustelle claimed. Despite the apparent incoherence which characterised the handling of the Algerian question by the political leaders of the Fourth Republic, there was a broad cross-party consensus that Algeria should not be independent. Whilst recognising that the political system in place during the Fourth Republic had led to weak government, Smith argues that it was not immobility and indecision but a certain amount of resolve and unity which characterised the attitudes of the vast majority of the political class of the Fourth Republic towards Algeria.⁵ On the sovereignty question, there was little dissent. As Horne observes, 'In November 1954 the unyielding gospel of *l'Algérie, c'est la France* very much represented French political opinion of almost all hues'.⁶ After the fall of Mendès-France, governments of the Fourth Republic by and large continued to affirm the indissoluble nature of the ties linking the Hexagon with its North African 'province'. As Bernstein puts it: 'La thèse exposée en cet automne 1954 par les hommes de gauche qui gouvernaient alors la France ne variera plus jusqu'en 1959: l'Algérie, c'est la France.'⁷

The commitment of successive governments not to cede independence to Algeria was reflected in the vocabulary chosen to describe the conflict. A variety of terms were employed, all of which sought to reinforce the notion that Algeria did not constitute a nation in its own right. To admit that France was at war with Algeria was to concede the existence of a separate Algerian entity or, at the very least, to lend an air of legitimacy to the demands for independence as articulated by the FLN. For the French to have declared a state of war with the FLN would have amounted to a *de facto* recognition that French sovereignty over Algeria was little more than an elaborate legal fiction. As Stora puts it: 'Nommer la guerre, ce serait reconnaître une existence séparée de l'Algérie, ce serait admettre une 'autre histoire'.⁸

Merely to talk of a civil war would have been to accord a greater degree of recognition to the FLN than the French government was willing to concede. An entirely different vocabulary was required, a way of describing the conflict which made no concessions to France's opponents. Stora has observed that in the immediate aftermath of the 1954 Toussaint uprising, official language made reference to 'les événements' in Algeria. The French Army was entrusted with carrying out 'opérations de police'. During the vote in the French National Assembly of March 1956 on whether special powers were to be accorded to the Mollet government, the term employed was 'actions de maintien de l'ordre'. In 1957, at the time of the so-called Battle of Algiers, the Army was encharged with 'opérations de rétablissement de la paix civile'.⁹

Even the most frequently alleged potential *bradeurs de l'Empire* Guy Mollet and Pierre Pflimlin, had no plans to renounce French sovereignty over Algeria. Mollet, even before his conversion to a more hawkish line in the wake of the famous 'tomatoes incident' of February 1956, was hardly a pro-independence man.¹⁰ If Mollet wanted peace, it was to be a peace on French terms. Whilst Pflimlin had expressed his desire for a 'political solution' to the conflict, which meant a possible return to the

agenda of the issue of negotiations with the FLN, he was not prepared to countenance a complete French withdrawal. As Giles puts it, 'suspicions that he was contemplating a sell-out should have been without foundation'.¹¹

On the question of reform, as Talbott has noted, the Algerian policy of every government of the Fourth Republic, and even that of de Gaulle during the Fifth, amounted to a promise of reform backed by military force:

Mendès-France and each of his successors, including Charles de Gaulle, announced plans for putting down the rebellion in Algeria, modernising the backward Algerian economy, and remaking the political system.¹²

Admittedly, these reforms were not forthcoming and Soustelle was probably justified in his anger. If he had been correct in his belief that Muslims were open to persuasion about the merits of French rule, his assessment that government immobility was contributing to failure on the ground in Algeria would certainly not have been malapropos. As it was, the failure of any Fourth Republican government to produce an unambiguous Algerian policy only increased the speed with which an untenable situation deteriorated and had the effect of pushing the Army into a more openly political role than arguably at any time in its history.

May 1958 and the Return of de Gaulle

Soustelle's critique of the successive governments of the Fourth Republic must also be interpreted within the context of the particular significance which he attached to the events of May 1958. Since in his eyes the *fraternisations* which took place between Europeans and Muslims brought victory within the reach of the French, neither the system of government nor the people who staffed the Fourth Republic could be condemned for having sealed the fate of Algeria. Consequently whilst his criticisms of Fourth Republican governments were certainly not lacking in venom, the ultimate

responsibility for the loss of Algeria was located after 1958. Thus on the eve of Algerian independence he wrote:

Du 13 mai 1958 aux derniers mois de 1961, de l'espoir et de la fraternité à la haine et à la désespérance, de l'union à la division, de la victoire prochaine à la déroute organisée, la France et sa province nord-africaine ont descendu en trois ans une pente de plus en plus escarpée. (ET, 9)

Reis showed only slightly less optimism than Soustelle about the essential recuperative powers of May 1958. He believed that the failings of the Fourth Republic had contributed to the worsening of conditions in Algeria and, as a consequence did not think that victory would be easily achieved. Nevertheless, if this was not the moment for triumphalism, he still considered May 1958 as a new departure which paved the way for an eventual French success:

Les échecs passés sont significatifs: ils doivent imposer la modestie ; ils ne sont pas désespérants. Mieux vaut donc considérer la voie comme ouverte mais difficile, accessible seulement à ceux qui oseront faire preuve d'initiative et peut-être même d'invention.¹³

The FLN could never realistically have achieved a military victory and its supporters could only aspire to undermine the will of the French to remain. Had a French leader determined to pursue a policy of *intégration* at any cost assumed the reigns of power in 1958, and had it been possible to work a near miracle and secure settler, domestic and parliamentary support for such a policy, the situation in Algeria would, in all likelihood, have reached a stalemate. De Gaulle did not prove to be such a leader. Whilst one should not underestimate the extent to which the dogged resilience of the FLN forced the French to the negotiating table, de Gaulle was clearly a driving force in moving the agenda away from a policy of *intégration* towards an acceptance of Algerian independence. Unwilling to see the war drag on interminably and aware that support for its prolongation could not be maintained in anything other than the short term, he gradually shifted the tone and content of his public discourse on Algeria away from the agenda favoured by the *Algérie française* camp. Much has been written about the evolution of de Gaulle's Algerian policy and the debate over his intentions upon

his return to power is not one to which we wish to contribute at length here. In passing, let us say that it is possible, although unlikely, that his declared policy was at odds with a personal preference to keep Algeria French with only his consummate sense of political realism causing him to realise that Algeria could not be saved. There are much stronger grounds for believing that he was always searching for a *fin honorable* to the conflict even if he was unsure about the exact nature of the ties which would exist between the two territories and did not originally envisage the 'return' of the *pied-noir* community to Metropolitan France. His plans to endow France with a new European vocation and to increase France's standing on the world stage, allied with a political philosophy which believed in the 'separateness of peoples', a lack of faith in the willingness of the settler community to accept reform and a belief that the reconstruction of the Algerian economy was an economic liability, all point to the conclusion that de Gaulle never seriously envisaged *intégration* as a possible solution to the conflict. Whatever the reasons, de Gaulle's gradual public withdrawal of support for the ideas espoused by the reformers allowed figures such as Soustelle to avoid ever having to acknowledge the failure of the 'consent potential'. Although it was almost four years after de Gaulle assumed the reigns of power that the protracted Algerian conflict was finally brought to an end, his role in the decolonisation process was sufficiently active that it presented reformers with the opportunity to hold him responsible for the failure of their project. Although scarcely credible, the 'consent potential' was, ultimately, never tested to destruction.

Soustelle's 1961 work, *L'espérance trahie* attempts to dismantle de Gaulle's Algerian policy from 1958 onwards, presenting it as a betrayal not only of de Gaulle's own historical attitude to Algeria, a kind of *de Gaulle contre le gaullisme*, but also as a betrayal of both the settler and Muslim communities in Algeria.

Given that, in Soustelle's eyes, the vote of September 1958 on the new Constitution had demonstrated the ongoing viability of the 'consent potential', and given that the

Constantine Plan launched in October 1958 was largely compatible with the aims of *intégration*, the starting point for his attack on de Gaulle's Algerian policy was the latter's self-determination speech of 16 September 1959. Soustelle was hostile to the very idea that the Algerian people might be given a vote on their own political destiny at such a delicate stage in the conflict, believing that this risked undermining ground which had already been won. In his eyes, the Muslim population had already affirmed its loyalty to France and a further consultation could only give the impression that French commitment was wavering:

Le Chef de l'Etat a lui-même solennellement affirmé aux Algériens de toutes origines qu'ils étaient désormais des 'Français à part entière, égaux en droits et en devoirs'. Il ne faut pas qu'on puisse dire que sa parole a été reprise. Après les élans de fraternisation du 16 mai et des jours suivants, le référendum du 28 septembre – compris par tous les électeurs comme un choix entre la France et la sécession – a fourni une preuve non contestable. (ET, 124-5)

Irrespective of the significance which reformers attached to the *fraternisations* of May 1958 and the September vote on the Constitution, neither offered Muslims the chance to make an unequivocal pronouncement about their aspirations as the referendum on national self-determination would have done. Robert Bony, writing in *L'Aurore* two days after de Gaulle's 16 September speech, saw the proposed referendum as a perfect opportunity to confirm the fact that the vast majority of Muslims supported the French. The FLN, Bony claimed, had been unable to prevent Muslims from participating *en masse* in the referendum of September 1958, from occupying public positions in greater numbers than ever, and from fighting in the French Army. For this reason, 'France' (although in reality Bony spoke only for himself) envisaged 'sans appréhension aucune' the promised referendum. Furthermore, the FLN would be free to participate on the grounds that this was a democratic way to proceed: '[La France] ne craint nullement que le FLN présente demain ses candidats. Elle leur donne au contraire l'assurance qu'ils auront toute latitude de diffuser leur propagande. *C'est la démocratie*' (original emphasis).¹⁴

Soustelle's unwillingness to accept a democratic vote seems to suggest a possible lack of faith about its outcome and demonstrates a singular disregard for the ability of the Muslims to understand exactly what was being asked of them: 'Les Musulmans ne comprendraient pas ce retour en arrière, ni qu'on effaçât pour ainsi dire d'un trait le geste souvent courageux qu'ils ont alors accompli' (ET, 125). It was a position satirised by R. Treno writing in *Le Canard Enchaîné* who attacked those who claimed to believe in the sincerity of the *fraternisations* of May 58 and yet were unwilling to contemplate a further consultation of the electorate. He criticised the hypocrisy of 'tous ces faux jetons des prétendues organisations "patriotiques" d'Alger qui, après avoir simulé en mai 1958 le "ralliement" des Arabes, ont peur aujourd'hui que leur imposture n'éclate à la faveur d'un référendum d'autodétermination non truqué'.¹⁵

Soustelle also argued that by according the Muslims the right to separate themselves from the mother country, they would enjoy a right not accorded to other French citizens. He felt this would lead Muslims to believe that they were not citizens like everybody else: 'Certains pourront en déduire qu'ils ont une "vocation" à se séparer de la France, certains que la France ne veut pas de leur adhésion, la dédaigne et la repousse' (ET, 125). This comparison with the other provinces of mainland France, as on other occasions, was inappropriate. Irrespective of the label which the French sought to attach to the conflict in Algeria, there were not 400,000 French troops in Brittany, Corsica, Alsace-Lorraine or any other French province seeking to suppress a secessionist movement by force of arms. Had this been the case then it is to be hoped that all but the most illiberal of figures would have considered holding a referendum over the future of whichever province was concerned.

In support of Soustelle and from within the reformers' logic, it might be argued that the polarising nature of the counter-revolutionary struggle meant that any signs of a weakening French presence would seriously hamper prospects of victory. For Soustelle, a democratic consultation of the Algerian people about their future was only

to be contemplated at a much later date once the conflict had been brought to an end and the French had benefited from the chance to implement some of their reforming measures. Given this opportunity, there was no doubt in his mind that the vote would produce 'une confirmation à la fois éclatante et sereine' of the willingness of Muslims to remain French (ET, 125).

On balance, even taking into account the particular constraints which the nature of the conflict placed upon the normal process of political consultation and policy formulation, Soustelle's opposition to a referendum on Algerian self-determination was far from convincing. If he was prepared to countenance the idea of Muslims participating freely and equally in the political life of a Franco-Algerian ensemble, then, by the same logic, he should certainly have had enough faith in his convictions to believe that the Muslims were capable of understanding the significance of a vote where the question of the future relationship between Algeria and France was at stake.

Given his belief in the 'consent potential', Soustelle's attack on de Gaulle over the manner in which the referendum was framed (rather than the principle itself) was more logical. He criticised de Gaulle for his use of the term 'francisation' in the 1959 speech since, in his eyes, it failed to recognise the difference between *intégration* and *assimilation*: 'Le vocabulaire, l'insistance sur le détail des dispositions identiques à celles qui existent en métropole, et surtout l'absence de toute référence au particularisme algérien, à la "personnalité" algérienne, donnent à tout ce passage une tonalité "assimilationniste"' (ET, 285). In Soustelle's eyes, the debate over Algeria's future was already 'trop riche en disputes verbales' and the introduction of a new term provided the FLN with ample scope for propaganda. He viewed the word 'francisation' as a contradiction: 'Comme on ne peut 'franciser' que celui qui ne l'est pas, cela revenait à dire que les Musulmans n'étaient pas français' (ET, 130). He also claimed that this new term was counterproductive since it could only alarm Muslims who were willing to be 'intégrés' but not 'francisés' (ET, 130). In fairness to de Gaulle, the

speech of 16 September 1959 did refer to religious and cultural differences. However, renowned for the studied precision with which he selected his phrases, de Gaulle's avoidance of the word 'intégration' was clearly deliberate and provides evidence of the new direction which his declared stance on Algeria was taking at this point in time. The tone of the 16 September speech was such that it was clear that de Gaulle did not favour *francisation* but favoured *association*.

His severe reservations about the planned referendum of 1959 notwithstanding, Soustelle did not view the speech as the key moment of de Gaulle's betrayal and he was prepared *in extremis* to go along with the idea on the basis that the offer of a democratic consultation was valuable in convincing international opinion of France's good intentions, even though it made the situation more difficult on the ground in Algeria. Victory, in his eyes, remained possible providing not a moment was lost in launching a campaign in favour of *francisation*, despite his 'répugnance pour le mot' (ET, 131). This was a campaign which, of course, de Gaulle did not sanction. However, even more worrying than Soustelle's opposition to a vote *per se* is his attitude towards the possibility of a referendum defeat. He contended that were a vote on national self-determination to yield a Muslim majority in favour of independence, it could not be respected:

'Les Algériens' existent mais il n'y a pas de peuple algérien. On ne saurait donc admettre que la consultation envisagée soit celle du 'peuple algérien' appelé à se prononcer en bloc sur les destinées d'une entité Algérie conçue fatalement comme un Etat. L'homogénéité ethnique et culturelle est une condition indispensable pour que soit valide un vote où la majorité l'emporte sur la minorité. (ET,125)

Despite his faith that any election on national self-determination conducted under the right circumstances would not 'go against' the French, his misplaced certainty of victory can in no way be invoked as an excuse for an argument which suggests that the democratic process would only be acceptable on the condition that it produced a favourable result.

The final nail in the coffin of *Algérie française*, as far as Soustelle's account is concerned, was de Gaulle's speech of 7 March 1960. He roundly condemned De Gaulle's reference to an *Algérie algérienne*:

Les événements de mai 1958 avaient soudé, en Algérie, le peuple et l'armée, miraculeusement rapproché les communautés musulmane et européenne par-dessus des préjugés et des rancœurs séculaires, déconcerté l'adversaire, ouvert la voie de la paix pour une Algérie nouvelle. Il sembla tout d'abord que cette occasion historique allait être saisie. On sait aujourd'hui ce qu'il en advint. Incompréhensiblement écartée, la solution à la fois française et humaine que tous attendaient a disparu du langage officiel, pour être remplacée par une formule obscure incapable de susciter dévouement et espoir.¹⁶

He accused the General of altering the choices to be presented to the people in a future electoral consultation on Algeria's future. *Francisation* had been replaced by a new option in which Algeria would 'revenir à la domination directe pratiquée par la métropole depuis la conquête' (ET, 187). Soustelle countered that Algeria had never been subject to direct domination and that the French colonial presence had seen a gradual transfer of rights to the Muslims (ET, 187). In his mind, the speech could only have one intention: 'Il s'agissait de discréditer toute idée de francisation ou d'intégration en faisant apparaître ces solutions comme réactionnaires, rétrogrades et colonialistes' (ET, 188). To claim that *intégration* was the same as direct domination, was, in Soustelle's eyes 'faux et malhonnête' since the domination of Algeria was exactly the opposite of the goal which he and his fellow supporters of *intégration* had in mind (ET, 188).

Soustelle was correct in his accusation that de Gaulle had effectively shifted the parameters. What he did not appear to appreciate was that de Gaulle was more concerned with pushing ahead with the decolonisation process than he was with giving an accurate representation of the reformers' position. As a skilful polemicist himself, Soustelle should have realised that in order to win support for a particular policy, one seeks to caricature and distort the ideas advanced by political opponents. Instead, he viewed this speech as an insult to all those Muslims who had died at the

hands of the FLN in their bid to bring about an Algeria based on the ideals of equality, fraternity and progress.

In shifting the political agenda away from *intégration*, not only had de Gaulle sacrificed a highly advantageous political position but, in Soustelle's eyes, had also scuppered a certain military victory. He expressed his disbelief that 'un Etat, n'ayant subi aucune défaite militaire, ayant au contraire victorieusement contenu sur le territoire contesté la poussée et les violences de la rébellion' could decide to place the Algerian territory and all its inhabitants 'à la discrétion d'un ennemi battu' (PT, 12). Attacking Pétain's signature of the Armistice in 1940, Soustelle claimed that de Gaulle's acceptance of the Evian accords was even more worthy of condemnation. Pétain had, if not an excuse, then at least the explanation that the French Army was beaten. De Gaulle, however, had carried out 'cet abandon voulu, organisé, imposé, sans explication et sans excuse, cette capitulation devant un ennemi épuisé' (PT, 51).

Soustelle's fears that the support of the Muslim population was beginning to ebb away were shared within the *Cinquième Bureau*. In a study of Algerian opinion carried out at the end of 1960 the optimistic tone of the service notes and the military bulletins of 1957 had been replaced by a much more pessimistic note. Whereas the authors believed that the majority of the Muslim population were previously hoping for a French victory, they recognised that there had been a change in opinion: 'Pour la masse musulmane l'espoir a changé de camp'.¹⁷ At the start of the year, they claimed that 20% of Muslims had been in favour of the French, 20% had been pro-FLN and 60% had been undecided. The position at this new juncture was now 10% of Muslims in favour of the French, 40% in favour of the nationalists and 50% still undecided but leaning towards the rebellion. The report argued that those favourable to the French had seen their hopes of victory dashed and felt betrayed by de Gaulle's government which had reneged on the commitment of previous administrations never to abandon Algeria: 'Ils éprouvent aujourd'hui le sentiment d'être 'lâchés' par la France dont ils

avaient délibérément choisi le drapeau pour l'idéal'.* Those Muslims who had previously been reluctant to commit themselves to either camp were turning to the rebellion as the only viable option:

Ils sentent que l'hésitation n'est plus de mise et que le temps est venu de s'engager: ils choisissent donc pour la plupart le camp de l'Indépendance, sans se cantonner dans une position intermédiaire qu'ils considèrent comme intenable dans de brefs délais.*

The report attributed responsibility for the situation to General de Gaulle and for having placed the Army in an extremely awkward position:

Notre action est devenue de plus en plus délicate au cours des derniers mois du fait de l'extrême sensibilisation des communautés et de l'opposition formulée à l'égard de la politique gouvernementale par une partie de la population.*

Soustelle's sentiment that a certain military victory had been denied only by the machinations of General de Gaulle were also shared by a number of disgruntled Army officers, many of whom would go on to take part in the Generals' Putsch. As Stora puts it 'ils sont nombreux à considérer que de Gaulle – un officier comme eux – les a trahis et a transformé leur victoire militaire face au FLN en débâcle politique'.¹⁸ Viewed from a certain perspective, the situation on the military front for the French after de Gaulle's return to power, far from deteriorating, did indeed improve. The ALN's combat strength was severely weakened by the Challe plan.¹⁹ However, these successes, whilst providing further grist to the mill of those who wished to condemn de Gaulle were hardly conclusive evidence that victory was close at hand. Indeed, such claims contradicted the idea which had assumed almost mantra-like status amongst many French soldiers virtually throughout the conflict that the key to victory lay in winning over the 'hearts and minds' of the civilian population. Military dominance counted for little whilst the nationalist impulse remained unchecked since, like the hydra from classical mythology, new combatants emerged to take the place of those cut down in battle. Victory in Algeria entailed not only the capitulation of the FLN but also the eclipse of the independence ideal which drove their struggle; the triumph of an ideology as well as one of arms.

Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the war, with an independent Algeria already an established reality, Soustelle continued to believe in the 'consent potential', arguing that the Algerian people had been treated with nothing short of contempt. Any attempt to define the conflict as a movement of national liberation was a wilful distortion of the truth. The Evian accords had not led to greater liberation and less misery for the indigenous population. (PT, 14). In the change of sovereignty, the will of the Algerian people had counted for nothing: 'Qui, à vrai dire, s'en est soucié dans cette cynique mascarade par laquelle, sous prétexte du droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes, on a disposé des Algériens comme d'un bétail qui change de maître?' (PT, 16-17).

The Failings of the French Army

Nowhere were the divisions within the French Army more apparent than in the debate over torture which pitted the reforming elements against those who have been described as 'military realists'.²⁰ Once again, the 'consent potential' was central to this debate. With their continuing belief that the majority of the Muslim population did not share the beliefs of the FLN militants, reformers inside and outside the Army argued that many soldiers were undermining the mission to win 'hearts and minds'.

The opposition of colonial reformers to the methods employed by the Army is well-known and was based around two key points of principle. Firstly, the collective reprisals at times exacted on Muslim villages thought to be harbouring FLN combatants and the use of torture were held to be morally wrong, a fundamental contradiction with a whole tradition of religious, political and philosophical thought concerned with the 'rights of man' which the French claimed to uphold.²¹

Secondly, reformers condemned as counterproductive the use of what they saw as excessive force. From the perspective of the colonial reformer, such methods signalled that French soldiers, preoccupied with suffocating any manifestations of opposition to

French rule, cared little for the transformation of Algeria and were unmoved by the miserable existence eked out by most Muslims. The systematic round-up and torture of Muslims could not fail to create a sense of schism with the civilian population on one side and the French Army on the other. The Muslim population, rather than becoming the object of the Army's concern, took on the role of enemy. The Army was not 'in' the civilian population as the logic of counter-revolutionary warfare required; on the contrary, it had set this civilian population apart. Once this had taken place, reform was stripped of any real meaning.

Amongst the protestors from within the military, Colonel Barberot is an important figure. The shootings of innocent Muslims by French soldiers were, for him, 'non seulement inutiles mais nuisibles' and for this reason alone had to be absolutely condemned.²² The blatant disregard for human life shown by some soldiers indicated that the Army was incapable of according Muslims 'la pleine dignité humaine' which, in his eyes, was more important than the practical measures involved in the reform process (p.116). The Army gave the impression of wanting to do no more than protect the privileged position of the European population, becoming, 'un instrument de protection au service de la fraction d'origine européenne et de sa situation privilégiée' (p.116). Each Muslim wrongfully killed by the French Army led ten other Muslims to join the rebellion. The final and tragic consequence of the prolongation of such tactics, Barberot warned, was either genocide, which he saw as '[une] hypothèse exclue par la définition', or capitulation (p.117).

Barberot was supported in this view by his immediate superior, General Paris de Bollardi re who argued that the use of torture contradicted the very goal of the counter-revolutionary struggle: 'La guerre r volutionnaire est une guerre dans laquelle la population est l' l ment essentiel et l'action que l'on peut avoir sur la population ne se r sume pas   la torture. C'est une v ritable d viation de l'esprit'.²³

One could cite a number of similar statements made by colonial reformers, protesting against torture or other atrocities. Prominent amongst this group of figures was Camus, who in 1956 condemned FLN and French Army atrocities and naively, given the nature of the conflict, appealed to both sides to exclude non-combatants from the fighting. Mention should also be made of Pierre Henri Simon who in his work *Contre la torture* denounced the practices undertaken by the French Army, whilst in *Portrait d'un officier* he encapsulated the moral quandary of the liberal officer in Algeria.²⁴ Chevallier was also critical of the French Army which had managed to swell the ranks of the FLN by behaving in the early stages of the war as though it were possible to vanquish the rebellion simply through the application of more force (NA, 34-5). The logical implication of these criticisms is that had the Army behaved better, the war might not have been lost. The loss of consent amongst the Muslim population could thus be blamed upon human failing and the specific violence perpetrated by soldiers of the Army, rather than the structural violence embedded in the colonial system.

The reformers' position has come under criticism from a number of different sources. In his article *La Paix des Nementchas* published in April 1957, Robert Bonnaud gives a disturbing account of acts of torture and the execution of wounded FLN soldiers witnessed during his period of service in Algeria. Responding to the argument that those who spoke out against such atrocities were dishonouring France, Bonnaud commented, 'Si l'honneur de la France ne peut aller qu'avec ces tortures, alors la France est un pays sans honneur'.²⁵ Yet, in his eyes, there was no possibility that France's honour might be redeemed, short of bringing the war to an end. Incidents such as those he witnessed were an inevitable consequence of the war:

Il n'y a pas d'Algérien innocent du désir de dignité humaine, du désir d'émancipation collective, du désir de liberté nationale. Il n'y a pas de suspect arrêté à tort et torturé par erreur. (p.582)

For Bonnaud, the way in which the French were fighting the war could not be improved since the battle for the 'hearts and minds' had long since resulted in a victory

for the cause of the FLN. Consequently, even the most genuine attempts at pacification quickly became acts of repression: 'les mieux intentionnés et les plus naïvement pacificateurs glissent très vite sur la pente de l'immoralisme répressif' (p.583).

Assailed by militant anti-colonialists, reformers were also criticised by members of the French Army who justified torture on the grounds that it was an essential element of the conflict in which they were involved, a necessary means of gaining information. The Army faced a stark choice; either such tactics were employed or defeat would follow. The chief spokesperson of these 'military realists' was General Massu. His 1971 work *La vraie bataille d'Alger* provides an informed and uncompromising account of the events which took place in the capital in 1957. Without the use of torture, he submitted, it would have been impossible for the French to counteract the terrorist activities which the FLN were using in Algiers.

A number of contemporary commentators have approved the thesis of the military realists and the militant anti-colonialists over that of the reformers that the recourse to torture by the Army was the logical consequence of the French desire to retain control over Algeria. Looking in particular at the Battle of Algiers, Horne argues that the French Army could not have afforded an ignominious reverse in the capital as this would have led to a groundswell of support for the rebellion after which 'the whole of Algeria would almost certainly have been swamped by the FLN'.²⁶ In similar vein, Schulte suggests that by the time of the Battle of Algiers, the French Army was caught in a dilemma: 'It seems unlikely that by January 1957 the French could have won the Battle or even contained the situation *without* torture - but neither could they accept defeat in the capital city.'²⁷ For Dine, it was the nature of the struggle which placed the reformers in an impossible position:

The fact remains that the principal contention of the 'realists', both the anti-war radicals on the Left and the theorists of *la guerre révolutionnaire* on the Right, was the one borne out

by history: the war in Algeria could not be made more humane, since the conflict's political and military logic defied all attempts to impose moral limits upon it.²⁸

In describing the 'set-piece confrontation between liberal humanism and military realism' Dine's own stance is also apparent for the use of a term such as 'realism' in itself shows that, in his eyes, the reformers were misguided. Similarly, the notion of a term such as 'liberals' dilemma' (intended to convey the irreconcilable nature of liberal [reformer] support for French control with their horror of the necessary methods used to achieve it), indicates a certain rejection of the reformers' position.²⁹ For reformers, there was no dilemma – liberal methods and the prolongation of French rule were not perceived to be contradictory.

On balance, Bonnaud's claim that every Muslim was in the camp of the rebellion, with its logical implication that a French soldier could open fire into a crowd at random and still not kill an innocent civilian, clearly formed part of those Manichean rhetorical portrayals of the Muslim population which characterise polemical writing on the conflict. According to Bonnaud's logic, terms such as 'blind repression' and 'excessive force' had no real meaning as the entire Muslim population was seen as complicit with the rebellion. Clearly, as reformers claimed, and as is evident from our argument in Chapter Four, it was possible to shoot or torture innocent people. And, from this, one must come to the conclusion that on numerous occasions the French Army caused Muslims to turn to the FLN by inappropriate action. This did not mean, however, that a more humane attempt at pacification would have succeeded in preventing the drift of the population into the camp of the nationalists. The reformers' case that the 'hearts and minds' of the civilian population were lost through the actions of the Army was flawed because it relied upon the veracity of the 'consent potential', which as we have argued, does not stand up to scrutiny. Had the Army refrained from torture then potentially the falsehood of the 'consent potential' would have been exposed sooner since the necessity of torture was in part a reflection of the implacable

logic of the conflict but was equally indicative of the fact that the 'hearts and minds' of too many Muslims had already been lost to the rebellion.

Soustelle's Stance

At this point, it is worth digressing for a moment to consider the position of Jacques Soustelle. Rather than join the moral protest amongst reformers against war atrocities, his position can be seen as more akin to that of the 'military realist'. Following the massacre at Philippeville in 1955, the official death toll amongst the European community was 71. The repression which followed it, even according to official figures, caused 1,273 deaths, whereas the FLN advanced a figure of around 12,000. Whilst even the lowest estimate of the scale of the repression marks this episode down as an atrocity, Soustelle simply commented: 'Notre riposte avait été sévère, mais non aveuglément brutale ni inutilement sanglante (AS, 125).

In early 1955, Roger Willaume was mandated by François Mitterrand, then Minister of the Interior, to investigate the French Army's treatment of prisoners in Algeria. As Maran's study of torture and human rights in the war points out, Willaume's report was hardly the damning indictment of French Army atrocities that it might have been. Soustelle accepted the findings of the investigation that no attempt should be made to find those responsible for acts of torture committed prior to 1 February 1955 and effectively buried the report.³⁰ In a 1988 interview, he washed his hands of his own responsibility for torture, simply stating: 'J'avais donné des instructions contre toute espèce d'irrégularités'.³¹

If Algeria was part of France, as the official line proclaimed, then France and Algeria could not be at war. As a result, the French were placed in a difficult situation when it came to deciding how much power was to be invested in the Army under these 'peacetime' conditions. Despite the legal and institutional ties linking the two territories, Soustelle advocated the suspension of normal judicial practices for

captured members of the FLN: 'on ne pouvait songer à rétablir l'ordre en Algérie sans disposer de pouvoirs adaptés à la situation: c'était là un fait perceptible au simple bon sens.' (AS, 45). He disagreed with the way in which rebels were given full access to civil procedures whereas French soldiers were often called to account for their actions, even those committed under fire. This is particularly disingenuous on Soustelle's part. Whilst the French Army was largely left to torture with impunity by successive governments with only a few token inquiries set up to deflate the protests largely orchestrated by intellectuals, thousands of Algerians were tortured without ever receiving a semblance of justice such as having access to a lawyer.

Soustelle's attitude to Army atrocities also reveals a certain amount of hypocrisy. In the aftermath of the war, writing from exile in 1965, he continued to defend the settler community, denouncing the ignominy of the regime for its complicity with the shooting of Europeans in the violence of the rue d'Isly on 26 March 1962 (PT, 83-88). He condemned the torture carried out by the French Army on European settlers whilst saying very little about the treatment which thousands of Muslims suffered at the same hands throughout the war (PT, 96-99).

It was Soustelle's attitude towards the issue of war atrocities which has given rise to the idea that he changed from reformer to *ultra*. Maran writes of the way in which Soustelle's 'liberal views as head administrator in Algeria had turned hawkish because of the escalating violence'.³² Throughout this thesis we have seen how Soustelle's attitude has, at times, fallen short of the liberal values he claimed to hold. His attitude towards atrocities was perhaps the most flagrant betrayal. Rather than speak of a political conversion to the camp of the *ultras*, it is perhaps more appropriate to posit the existence of an unresolved contradiction in his thought. For, if Soustelle genuinely believed in the 'consent potential', and there is no reason to suggest the contrary, how could he have offered his tacit endorsement of some of the worst atrocities committed by the Army during the war? The question is never

thoroughly investigated in Soustelle's own writing and we can only speculate as to what the answer may have been. A clue, however, is provided in the writing of Massu. In essence, Massu constructed an image of a 'clean torture' limited in time and space.

This 'clean torture' was limited in time because Massu did not believe that such practices would have to be used on a permanent basis. Massu argued that torture was viewed within the Army only as a means of gaining information rather than as a punishment to be inflicted upon a particular individual for having supported the FLN. Defending what he saw as the 'véritable caractère de notre mission', he was also keen to point out that a certain amount of restraint had been employed during interrogation sessions; force was only to be employed 'avec le souci constant de ne pas attenter à la dignité humaine et de ne jamais détruire la personnalité, comme cela se pratique dans bien d'autres pays'.³³ For Massu, if torture meant temporarily casting aside humanitarian concerns, it was only so as to be able to defend them better; recourse to such tactics constituted a lesser evil than the endless stream of brutal and unprovoked attacks which had been carried out in Algiers by the FLN. Massu invoked 'l'incroyable sauvagerie par laquelle le FLN décida de rallier à sa cause les masses musulmanes, sauvagerie dont la vue fut intolérable même pour les plus endurcis'.³⁴ This, of course, begged the question as to when the liberalism that was supposed to be defended would actually be resumed.

Torture was limited in space because, for Massu, it would not need to be inflicted upon vast numbers of people. Massu claimed that torture was employed 'dans le seul but de remonter les filières du terrorisme'³⁵ This was contrary to the reality of what actually took place in the Battle of Algiers during which it is estimated that up to 40% of the male population of the Casbah was arrested.³⁶ Such a high percentage of arrests demonstrates that the French Army viewed almost every Muslim as a potential FLN member.

However flawed, the reformers' position at least has the merits of logical consistency since, had the 'consent potential' been a valid notion, the need to torture as a means of gaining information would not have existed. Soustelle's endorsement of brutal measures was less logical. Although it was a more realistic assessment of the nature of the warfare, it left unreconciled his tacit approval of severe and indiscriminate repression with his ongoing belief in the 'consent potential'. Furthermore, any attempt to reconcile the 'consent potential' with the use of war atrocities through the notion of a 'clean torture' proved equally unsatisfactory since the fact that torture was extended to the many, rather than limited to the few, simply exposed the myth of the 'consent potential' itself.

The Intellectuals

Unwilling to attack the Army for its atrocities, Soustelle instead vented his anger at the intellectuals who led the campaign against these atrocities. In an open letter penned in 1955, Soustelle argued that intellectuals should strive to 'substituer aux vagues images passionnelles qui sont l'instrument habituel de la politique les notions de probité, de précision et de rigueur auxquelles nous tenons par profession'. Unless intellectuals constantly approached their work with a constant vigilance and 'impartiality' - Soustelle's word - then their opinion counted for no more than that of an individual chosen at random.³⁷ This was a particularly strange attitude given the bias of Soustelle's own convictions and was perhaps indicative of his outright refusal to envisage a position other than the one he adopted as being in any way intellectually honest. He admitted that his attitude was one of incomprehension towards those intellectuals who sought to criticise his reform project:

Je ne parvenais pas à comprendre comment des 'nationaux' pouvaient faire aussi bon marché de l'intérêt du pays en accablant d'injures celui - quel qu'il fût - qui se trouvait représenter la France à Alger, en pleine tourmente; comment des Chrétiens, et qui se proclamaient tels avec plus d'insistance que d'humilité, pouvaient montrer tant d'injustices, de passion et d'aigreur; comment des hommes de progrès pouvaient sacrifier à leur sectarisme les

possibilités qu'ouvrait une politique de réformes sincères, et s'associer en fait avec les tenants du fanatisme le plus féroce et le plus rétrograde. (AS, 106)

The attack against the intellectuals is continued in *Le drame algérien*, where the stance adopted by Raymond Aron is seen as symptomatic of a wider intellectual decadence. The work opens with a reference to the Mongol conquest of Mesopotamia. To commemorate their victory, the Mongols had erected a monument made from the skulls of the inhabitants of Baghdad who had not defended themselves against the invasion. The intellectuals of 1957, Soustelle warned, were opening the gates of France to a new incarnation of the Mongol hordes (DA,1).

For Soustelle, the FLN had no need to produce its own publicity since this particular task was undertaken by the French press: 'C'est notre presse quotidienne ou hebdomadaire, c'est notre *intelligentsia* qui leur offrent arguments, slogans, thèmes de propagande' (DA,2). As far as Soustelle was concerned, the actions of a figure such as Aron simply delayed a French victory, causing additional bloodshed (DA, 49).

In Soustelle's later writing, it is the hypocrisy and inconsistency of the protesting intellectuals that are the subjects of his attack. Intellectuals were only opposed to oppression when the 'oppressors' were white Christians whereas they readily supported the tyranny of Muslims or Arabs (ET, 22). Passionate opponents of any form of European nationalism, they remained 'furieusement entichés de tout nationalisme africain ou asiatique (ET, 22). Such sentiments derived from a mixture of defeatism, crass ignorance, a snobbish desire to be in the intellectual *avant-garde* and an admiration for the exotic (ET, 22).

Soustelle's critique of the Intelligentsia was taken up within French Army circles. In March 1958, an editorial in *Le Bled* provocatively entitled 'La grande muette est-elle morte', attacked 'la presse progressiste prêtant consciemment ou non son concours aux ennemis de la France'.³⁸ Looking forward to the discontent of the Army which would

find expression in the events of May of that same year, the editorial claimed that the soldier could no longer remain neutral on the much wider question posed by the Algerian crisis: 'Est-on pour ou contre la Patrie et la Civilisation qu'elle incarne?'.³⁹ An article on the same page reporting a visit to the Constantine region by Lacoste praised 'ces unités parachutistes qui se battent sans faiblir pendant que les imbéciles les insultent à Paris'.⁴⁰

If these opinions were to be found in publications such as *Le Bled* which were largely favourable to a pro-reform agenda, it is little surprise that they were also shared by some of the more extreme figures from amongst the French military, further highlighting the fact that reformers and hard-liners at times held common views. By way of example, let us consider the case of Antoine Argoud, a colonel in the French Army and later a defector to the ranks of the OAS, whose own condemnation of the intellectuals was coloured by his fascist leanings. Intellectuals, Argoud claimed, were incapable of understanding the stakes in the Algerian conflict because they had no first-hand knowledge of counter-subversive warfare. Distant from the fighting and safe in their luxurious Parisian apartments, they made erroneous analyses of the conflict and, in so doing, undermined the Army's mission. For Argoud, there was something perverse about those intellectuals who, it appeared to him, delighted in decrying France. He referred to the 'intellectuels pervers' and decried their 'masochisme intellectuel'.⁴¹ In the total and unyielding combat to thwart the Communist conspiracy to take over the world, the fine principles which many intellectuals claimed to defend were inappropriate to a struggle in which the free world faced a fight for its very survival. For Argoud, the reservoir of abstract arguments 'digne de Byzance' from which intellectuals drew was often no more than a reflection of cowardice in the face of the danger confronting France (p.27). The Intelligentsia was pusillanimous and decadent, having lost 'l'instinct de conservation' (p.27).

Camus: A More Moderate Protest

Camus' conception of the role and purpose of the intellectual was vastly different from Argoud's extremist invective. He was himself a protesting intellectual and, unlike Soustelle, did speak out on the question of torture. Nevertheless, Camus repeated, albeit in diluted form, some of their complaints against the intellectuals. Whereas, for Soustelle, any intellectual who spoke out against the war was suspect, Camus tended to direct his criticisms at those intellectuals more engaged than himself, specifically the militant anti-colonialists.

Camus believed that the intellectual not only had a key role to play in the formation of opinions but, to a certain extent, acted as the 'conscience' of society. Claiming that his personal predilections caused him to shy away from the political arena, he believed that he had a duty as a writer to speak out on certain matters:

Je ne suis pas un homme politique, mes passions et mes goûts m'appellent ailleurs qu'aux tribunes publiques. Je n'y vais que forcé par la pression des circonstances et l'idée que je me fais parfois de mon métier d'écrivain.⁴²

As a *pied-noir*, Camus believed that his personal connection to Algeria led him to take a more responsible position than some of the more inflamed writing on the subject of colonialism. He argued that it was the duty of the intellectual to be responsible: 'Quand le destin des hommes et des femmes de son propre sang se trouve lié, directement ou non, à ces articles qu'on écrit si facilement dans le confort du bureau, on a le devoir d'hésiter et de peser le pour et le contre.'⁴³ Turning to those intellectuals who had no personal knowledge of the Algerian situation, Camus commented 'ceux qui ne connaissent pas la situation dont je parle peuvent difficilement en juger', an argument which was always vulnerable to the response that, as a member of the European community, he was blind to, and complicit with, the exploitation of the Muslims.⁴⁴

Influence of the Intellectuals

As Jean-François Sirinelli has commented, the Algerian war constituted ‘un moment clé de l’histoire récente des intellectuels français’.⁴⁵ Daily newspapers enjoying wide circulation such as *Le Monde* or *Le Figaro*, weekly publications such as *L’Express* and *France Observateur*, and monthly reviews with a more restricted readership such as *Esprit* or *Les Temps Modernes* all carried numerous articles by intellectuals which attacked either the aims of the conflict or the means by which it was being waged. Alongside the regular weeklies and monthlies, other publications were established with the specific purpose of providing oppositional comment on the war. By way of example one might cite Francis Jeanson’s pro-FLN review *Vérités pour*. Anne Simonin’s study has drawn attention to the prominent role played by the publishing houses the Editions de Minuit, Maspero and Seuil which were influential in bringing reports of the atrocities committed by the French Army into the public domain and in providing a forum for writers to engage in a more wide-ranging condemnation of the French pacification effort. Their role, as Simonin notes, can be considered as ‘l’un des symboles de la résistance intellectuelle française à la guerre d’Algérie’.⁴⁶ Many of their publications specifically attacked the Army, with the accounts of war atrocities by a number of reservists contained in *La Gangrène* (Editions de Minuit) and Henri Alleg’s *La Question* (Editions Minuit) being possibly the best known. These were not the only publishing houses involved. The year 1957, the most fertile point of the anti-repression campaign, saw the publication of Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber’s *Lieutenant en Algérie* published by Julliard, and *Des Rappelés témoignent* by the *Comité de Résistance spirituelle*. And, as Talbott has pointed out, the charges that found their way into print were only a fraction of those circulating in manuscript.⁴⁷

Despite the proliferation of material, it is unlikely, although impossible to prove definitively, that the activities of intellectuals had anything other than a minimal impact upon the eventual outcome of the conflict. Whilst one might speculate that the campaign against war atrocities might have succeeded in sensitising the public in

France to the horrors of the conflict and, at the margins, contributed to the growing popular disenchantment with the war, it is unlikely that their influence was a determining factor. By the same token, although articles critical of the war appearing in the French press might have found their way into the hands of Muslim civilians in Algeria, it is doubtful that these articles would have played a major part in convincing them to join the nationalists. Soustelle, in his indignation that the French Army might be challenged failed to recognise this.

Concluding Remarks

By the time the French sent reinforcements to Algeria in 1954, the chances of 'saving' French rule were limited to a full-scale and prolonged military repression. The gradual disenchantment of the Muslim population, created by the logic of the colonial system, which eventually gave way to an armed uprising had only two outcomes: either it was suppressed by the French military as had happened at Sétif in 1945, with the result that any pretensions of liberalism on the French part had to be abandoned, or, the FLN would succeed in undermining the French will to remain, as proved to be the case. This underlying dynamic meant that neither individuals such as de Gaulle, groups of protesting intellectuals, nor the French Army in its entirety could have influenced the failure of *intégration* other than at the margins, by prolonging or shortening the inevitable. In his pursuit of a policy of decolonisation, de Gaulle pursued a more realistic policy than the reformers who wanted to keep Algeria. It is a matter of debate over whether he did it from more noble sentiments. Nevertheless, he was undoubtedly better able to read the political mood than the colonial reformers.

CHAPTER NINE

THE SETTLERS AND THE PEOPLE OF METROPOLITAN FRANCE

A democratic solution to the Algerian conflict which provided the same rights to all of Algeria's population was impossible without the consent of the majority of the settler population and that of the people of mainland France. This final chapter is divided into two parts. The first examines the way in which Soustelle in particular sought to present the settlers as capable of accepting reform. The second considers Soustelle's claim that domestic support to pay for the reconstruction of Algeria could be found. In each case, we will seek to show that these assessments of the reformers were incorrect since there was no substantial evidence of a readiness to accept reform either amongst the settlers or the people of mainland France.

Reading the Settlers

Faced with the twin argument that the colonial system forced the settler community into an inflexible authoritarian role and condemned in advance any reforming intentions, Soustelle's response was twofold. Firstly, despite a thick dossier of evidence showing previous settler intransigence, he presented settlers as both willing and psychologically able to accept a series of reforms which would end their dominance. Secondly, he reversed the argument used by Memmi in his portrait of the coloniser of good will. In Soustelle's imaging of the settler community, 'good will' was the norm rather than the exception with those opposed to reform depicted as an irreducible core of *ultras*, unrepresentative of the majority.

Soustelle did not arrive at his belief in the 'reformability' of the settler without expressing considerable reservations. His account of *pied-noir* reaction to his plans for reform was not one of unadulterated success and, at times, almost went as far as validating Memmi's argument that any liberal intent was bound to founder on settler illiberalism.

Soustelle claimed that every effort was made to ensure that the local elections which took place in April 1955 proceeded fairly with the result that eight seats out of a total of 75 were won by supporters of Ferhat Abbas (AS,102). Although Soustelle was not personally disappointed by the results of the election, the settler population was less pleased, sending him letters and telegrams expressing their annoyance that the nationalists had been 'allowed' to win so many seats and accusing him of playing into the hands of the rebellion (AS,103). Rather than interpret this as the routine reaction of the settler population who simply assumed that elections would be falsified as they had been in the past, Soustelle attributed the responsibility for these protests to the *ultras*. Similarly, the hostile reception which greeted him during a visit to Constantine was not to be interpreted as the ingrained hostility of a community engaged in a reactionary movement aimed at safeguarding their privileges. Instead, those who bayed for his blood were simply 'de pauvres gens égarés et mal guidés', led astray by a small minority of hard-liners and countless false rumours circulating in the press and throughout the country (AS,104). His account of his period as Governor-General also largely glossed over the declaration of no confidence brought against him in June of 1955 by the *Fédération des Maires d'Alger* because they thought him too liberal in his reforming intentions (AS,112).

Despite these initial hitches, Soustelle believed that 'l'immense majorité des Européens admettait de larges concessions pourvu que l'appartenance française de l'Algérie ne fût pas menacée' (AS, 204). Admitting that it had been a struggle to win

support from the settler population for some of the measures which *intégration* entailed, he thought that by 1958 this goal had been achieved:

[Ma] conception de l'intégration supposait que fût achevée la véritable décolonisation de l'Algérie, notamment par la suppression du double collège électoral. L'opposition de certains Européens à ma politique se cristallisait autour de ce point. J'ai suscité, en préconisant le collège unique, bien des rancœurs chez des Français qui n'avaient pas compris. Il est de fait, cependant, qu'entre 1955 et 1958, aidé par certains Européens d'Algérie, je parvins à faire accepter par l'immense majorité des non-Musulmans l'idée du collège unique, à *condition* – et c'était là une condition *sine qua non* – que fût réalisée l'*intégration*. (ET, 26) (original emphasis).

Whilst he admitted that the abolition of the double electoral college was the main point of dispute between himself and the settlers, which was only to be expected since it was the embodiment of the apartheid-like discrimination which reigned in Algeria, he attributed the causes of this hostility to a misunderstanding on the part of the Europeans over what the consequences of such a measure would have been. In the context of over a century of settler resistance to such egalitarian reforms, his analysis seems, at best, naïve. One person, one (equal) vote was hardly a difficult concept to grasp. Those who opposed it, far from lacking understanding of its implications, in all likelihood knew only too well what such changes would have entailed, hence their hostility. As Chevallier commented in 1958, settler hostility to the single electoral college prior to that moment had always been grounded in their fear of being reduced to a minority within Algeria: 'Chacun comprenait qu'en cela le collège unique était véritablement "la clef de la maison"'(NA, 20).

As was the case with the Muslim population, Soustelle invested the events of May 58 with immense significance as an indicator of settler opinion. The *fraternisations* marked the apotheosis of the gradual drift by settlers towards acceptance of the Muslim as equal; 'le jaillissement visible d'une source souterraine' as he was to describe it a full seven years after the events themselves (PT,78-9). His interpretation was simple: 'les Européens acceptaient l'intégration avec toutes ses conséquences' (ET,38). The whole history of colonial failures had been swept away by this powerful

movement. The demonstrations of fraternity had 'miraculeusement rapproché les communautés musulmane et européenne par-dessus des préjugés et des rancœurs séculaires' (ET, 212). Soustelle's immediate reaction to these events, he tells us in *L'espérance trahie*, was to inform people in France and abroad of 'le véritable visage populaire, à la fois national et démocratique, d'un mouvement que l'on s'obstinait à affubler du masque hideux d'un "putsch fasciste"' (ET, 39). Even in 1988, Soustelle had not changed his opinion on the question of reforms:

Les *pieds-noirs* n'étaient pas hostiles à toute réforme raisonnable ; ils avaient compris que je les avais compris. J'avais réussi à persuader les *pieds-noirs*, et notamment les maires, que les réformes que je proposais n'étaient pas de nature à chasser les Français mais à assurer une cohabitation correcte. ¹

Chevallier was similarly convinced, writing in October of 1958, that a miraculous conversion had taken place amongst the European population. With an emphasis on climatic factors which strangely (and ironically in the context) echoed Camus' fictional character Meursault claiming that he killed the Arab because of the sun, Chevallier asserted that a good dose of Mediterranean passion and lots of sun had succeeded in sweeping away in a few seconds ten years of opposition to the single electoral college (NA, 24). From this he concluded: 'Ne pouvant mettre en doute la sincérité de tels mouvements et sentiments, il faut donc prendre acte que désormais, tous les Algériens sont d'accord sans esprit de retour' (NA, 24). Despite his preoccupation with the 'lost opportunities' for implementing reforms prior to the outbreak of the rebellion, Chevallier's whole work is based on the presumed sincerity of May 58.

La masse européenne d'Algérie, courant au devant de la masse musulmane et lui tendant des mains fraternelles, avait fait litière de tous ses préjugés, banni ses rancœurs et accepté tout ce qu'elle avait si longtemps condamné. (NA, 159)

It is an argument which has received only limited endorsement. Brian Crozier and Gerard Mansell view the *pied-noir* enthusiasm for *intégration* as an emotive response whipped up by the collective hysteria of May 1958 yet do not seem to cast doubt upon

its sincerity; the assembled crowds 'were at last prepared to accept what scarcely any Europeans had ever dared to envisage in the past - equality of political rights for French and Muslims alike'.² Gillespie, on the other hand, cast aspersions on the sincerity of European motivations, arguing that the settlers 'adopted the Army's formula for an Algerian solution - integration - out of no love for the Algerian Muslims'.³ This impression of the settler community embracing *intégration* only reluctantly, as the last realistic hope of keeping Algeria French is also offered in Droz and Lever's more recent account: 'Les Français d'Algérie, (...) se rallient *in extremis* derrière l'étendard de l'intégration, considérée dès lors comme un moindre mal'.⁴

The events of these few heady days in May 58, however moving to those who witnessed them, can scarcely be taken as anything like conclusive evidence of a far-reaching psychological change within the settler community. Had it been possible to enshrine in law the principle of equality between European and Muslim, destroying the structures of power which had been in place since the earliest days of colonialism, the superiority complex which underpinned French colonialism could not be so easily swept away with a few strokes of a lawyer's pen. As Soustelle himself pointed out: 'Si le problème algérien est de nature économique, sociale, politique, il est aussi, et plus encore peut-être, un problème de relations humaines'.⁵

To rid colonial society of its deeply-held prejudices would, arguably, have required years and one could hardly be convinced of the sincerity of such a huge attitudinal change based on the flimsy evidence of a few days. A glance forward at the evolution of the Algerian conflict from 1958 onwards appears to offer little in the way of supporting evidence for Soustelle's proclamations of settler good will. The violence of the OAS, the descending spiral of horror which saw random assassinations of Muslims and a scorched earth policy, can hardly be held up as examples of the settlers' fraternal affection for the Muslims but do seem very much like a desperate attempt to cling onto the privileges of colonialism. Soustelle's response, far from

disinterested given his own sympathy for the OAS, was to justify the actions of the settler population by subsuming them within another myth, that of the betrayal of *intégration* by de Gaulle.

De Gaulle's Betrayal of the Settlers

De Gaulle was certainly unconvinced of the willingness of the *pied-noir* community to accept the implications of *intégration*. In an interview for the *Echo d'Oran* in 1959, he argued that the settlers were looking for a convenient flag under which they could sail when in reality they favoured a return to the 'good old days' of European domination:

Ceux qui crient aujourd'hui le plus fort 'intégration' sont ceux-là qui alors [en 1943] étaient contre cette mesure. Ce qu'ils veulent, c'est qu'on leur rende l'Algérie de papa, mais l'Algérie de papa est morte, et si on ne le comprend pas, on mourra avec elle.⁶

Soustelle's reaction was vitriolic. The claim that the Europeans wanted to preserve the vestiges of an outmoded form of colonialism was, in Soustelle's eyes, 'à la fois sommaire, injuste et dangereux' (ET,104). His argument was three-pronged. Firstly, he contended that there was now a different generation of Europeans to those who had historically resisted change, illustrating his view that the failings of colonialism were due to 'bad' colonisers rather than the logic of the system. Secondly, consistent with his earlier explanations for opposition to reform, the proponents of the *status quo* were no more than a minority. Thirdly, like the repenting sinner from Christian tales, the realisation by the Europeans of the error of their past ways was to be taken as a cause for joy rather than for further attacks upon them:

Il est faux, en effet, bien que ce soit là un slogan ressassé par tous les adversaires de l'Algérie française, que les 'intégrationnistes' de 1959 soient, par définition, les mêmes que les immobilistes de 1936 ou de 1947. Beaucoup d'eau avait coulé sous les ponts, et même dans les oueds depuis quelques années. La petite minorité des véritables '*ultras*' restait, elle, irréductiblement anti-intégrationniste. Mais on oublie trop que la masse européenne d'alors, où l'on comptait d'ailleurs beaucoup de jeunes sans passé politique, était venue à l'intégration, sincèrement et même passionnément, depuis qu'à partir de 1955 elle avait été mise en présence de son sens et de sa portée.

Au demeurant, s'il était parmi les partisans de l'intégration en 1959 des hommes qui l'avaient combattue quelques années plus tôt, fallait-il leur en faire grief? Ou ne fallait-il pas plutôt se féliciter, et les féliciter, de cette heureuse évolution. (ET, 104)

Soustelle attempted to justify the increasingly hard-line attitude adopted by the settlers as the conflict continued into its seventh and eighth years by stressing their place as victims. Drawing upon a particularly tenuous portrait of the settler as both good-humoured and politically left-leaning, Soustelle claimed that the settler population had had little choice but to gravitate towards the camp of the *ultras*:

Comment se fait-il que les paisibles 'Hernandez', au caractère jovial, qui d'ailleurs le plus souvent votaient 'à gauche', fournissent mois après mois, semaine après semaine, des troupes à ces mouvements qui surgissent de l'angoisse populaire? La réponse est simple: c'est la politique du pouvoir, faite d'équivoque et de ruse, de promesses non tenues, d'abandons camouflés puis avoués, qui 'fabrique de l'*ultra*', qui rend intenable toute position modérée et rejette tout Algérien soit vers la rébellion soit vers la résistance à la rébellion. (ET, 133)

For Soustelle, the responsibility for settler intransigence was entirely that of France's political leadership. If right-wing demagogues such as the café owner Jo Ortiz managed to garner popular support, this could, in Soustelle's opinion, be attributed to the machinations of a duplicitous government. For Memmi, by way of contrast, it was not the activities of the government which turned the liberal-minded individual into a violent reactionary, but the colonial system itself:

Cet homme, peut-être ami sensible et père affectueux, qui dans son pays d'origine, par sa situation sociale, son milieu familial, ses amitiés naturelles, aurait pu être un démocrate, va se transformer sûrement en conservateur, en réactionnaire ou même en fasciste colonial. (PC,79)

Owing to the fact that the coloniser's personal and professional life was so intimately tied up with the colonial system, he would, according to Memmi, inevitably approve discrimination and the codification of injustice, take delight in police tortures and even condone massacres (PC,79-80). The history of the French colonial presence, from its very beginning through to the terrible violence which marked its end, certainly offers more evidence in support of Memmi's claim that the colonial situation

transformed the settler into a reactionary than it does to Soustelle's description of the jovial, left-leaning European forced by the government into adopting extreme measures.

Whilst willing to admit widespread European consent for the aims of the OAS, Soustelle also attempted to exculpate settlers of any responsibility for the particularly violent activities carried out in the name of this organisation. OAS atrocities remained, in Soustelle's eyes, the work of a particularly violent minority of Europeans. By attacking the whole of the settler community, the government was seeking a pretext to discredit the cause of French Algeria and a justification for its policy of abandoning Algeria: 'En rejetant sur l'ensemble des Français d'Algérie la culpabilité de ces actes honteux, on s'efforce de justifier l'injustifiable, de faire apparaître comme un châtement qui leur était bien dû le sort de parias qui leur a été infligé' (PT, 83).

In the previous chapter, we argued that it was de Gaulle's active role in advancing the decolonisation process which allowed Soustelle to argue that the General had destroyed the 'consent potential' amongst the indigenous population. The same argument can be applied to Soustelle's account of settler betrayal. The myth of the sincerity of the settlers conversion in May 1958 was never truly exposed. De Gaulle did not believe in it and was not prepared to pursue a policy of *intégration* long enough to put it to the test.

Domestic Support.

France in Transition.

The willingness of the people of mainland France to contribute to the transformation of Algeria proposed by Soustelle has to be evaluated against the climate of social

changes which were taking place within the Hexagon. Whilst the French Army persevered in its relentless bid to rid Algeria's towns, villages and deserts of the FLN, France's socio-economic landscape was undergoing a process of change which was both rapid and far-reaching in character. Initiated by the State planners and a dynamic class of entrepreneurs during the Fourth Republic, and invigorated by the support of General de Gaulle during the Fifth, the process of modernisation was very much underway whilst hostilities raged on the other side of the Mediterranean. As Giles has observed: 'After having lingered for so long in the climate of the nineteenth century, France was now advancing with impressive speed into the twentieth'.⁷ Although the trappings of modernisation were not always immediately welcomed, nor universally shared, the French people, on the whole, were developing a taste for higher standards of living and for consumer goods. France was becoming, if she had not yet already become, a modern, bourgeois, liberal, capitalist state. For Bernstein and Milza, the growth of consumerism provoked a profound change in the nature of French society:

La croissance de la consommation se traduit par la mise à la disposition des Français de logements, d'automobiles, d'appareils électroménagers, par l'augmentation du niveau d'éducation de la masse de la population, par une course aux loisirs et aux vacances, qui amènent une transformation totale des mentalités et des réactions.⁸

These changes provided fertile terrain to be charted by observers of the society of the day as seen in Roland Barthes' *Mythologies*.⁹ Writing at a much later date, Ross provides an interesting angle on the way in which the stories of decolonisation and modernisation are to be read as parallel processes. According to her analysis, the rapid changes within French society served as a substitute for the colonies:

In the roughly ten-year period of the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s in France – the decade that saw both the end of empire and the surge in French consumption and modernization – the colonies are in some sense 'replaced,' and the effort that once went into maintaining and disciplining a colonial people and situation becomes instead concentrated on a particular 'level' of metropolitan existence: everyday life.¹⁰

Modernisation, Ross argues, led to a sense of turning in on oneself, a concentration on the private space. She refers to a process of 'privitization', where interest was

displaced from broader political questions and instead came to be concentrated in the trivial – shampoo, kitchens, household products (pp.106-8). Modernity, she writes, destroys ‘the political socialization of individuals, such that one experiences public or even social matters not only as hostile or foreign but also as out of one’s grasp, unlikely to be affected by one’s actions’ (p.106).

The depoliticising elements of modernity, as reflected during the Algerian war attracted considerable criticism from Sartre, who in *Vous êtes formidables*, attacked the way in which the population had become distanced from the political process and caught up in its own private concerns.¹¹ Francis Jeanson’s article *Para-pacification* also attacked the inadequacy of the response of the French public to the atrocities which were going on in Algeria, accusing them of being passively complicit with the rebellion.¹² As Stora puts it ‘*la société sait mais se contente de partager le secret d’une guerre non déclarée*’.¹³ However, if the French people did not oppose the war as vigorously as the likes of Sartre and Jeanson would have liked, they were even less committed to the defence of French Algeria as the results of the opinion polls taken at the time indicate.¹⁴ The frequently articulated belief that Algeria was part of France carried less weight at a popular level than it did amongst activists. As Ross puts it:

The French felt the war to be both a foreign affair, something far away and extraneous, and a disruption within the very body of French society; these two perceptions were experienced simultaneously in France.¹⁵

- Both of these perceptions led to the same conclusion – the war needed to be brought to an end. Since the war was distant, the French people did not have the emotional involvement towards Algeria that they might have had for one of the provinces of Metropolitan France. Since the war was disrupting life within France, if for no other reason than a whole generation of young Frenchmen were forced to serve in Algeria, there was also a strong incentive to disengage. Stora has emphasised that the enormous cost of two World Wars meant that the French preferred to enjoy the new era of comfort rather than consent to yet further sacrifices.¹⁶

In short, the people of mainland France lacked the political will to accept the bill for the reconstruction of Algeria for many years to come whilst simultaneously bearing the burden, both financial and personal, of a long-term French military presence. Even if the image of *la France généreuse*, willing to pay for the reconstruction of Algeria, had been supported by the French public in times of economic plenty, recession might well have brought with it resentment of the financial burden imposed by Algeria, with untold consequences for the future of any fledgling Franco-Muslim community.

The apparent lack of will to allow Algerians to share in the spoils of the modernisation process which France was undergoing was perhaps evident in the hostility directed at Muslims working in France whilst the war was ongoing.¹⁷ Indeed, looking back on more recent hostility directed at immigrants of North African origin, Jean Daniel has offered a kind of retrospective scepticism that *intégration* could ever have worked:

La France [aurait]-elle été accueillante pour une nation de Dunkerque à Tamanrasset, alors qu'aujourd'hui on supporte mal la dose jugée excessive d'injections islamiques dans notre paysage sociologique.¹⁸

A Strategy of Denial

The reformers' response to the charge that the French people were unwilling to fund the war was largely one of denial. Soustelle had surprisingly little to say about popular opinion prior to 1958. In fact, for the most part he seemed to ignore that there was a problem at all, arguing that the views of a figure like Aron were simply the expression of a personal agenda rather than a prescient analysis of the mood within the country as a whole. He took issue with Aron's claim that fifty percent of the French people were opposed to the war, noting that in all the by-elections which had taken place under the legislature of the day, the candidates in favour of the maintenance of French Algeria had won huge victories over the 'porte-parole de l'abandon' (DA, 46). It was not the whole of France which opposed the war but rather Aron himself, who was attempting

to pass himself off as a spokesperson of the nation: 'Il *faut* que la France ait mauvaise conscience puisque M. Aron en souffre lui-même'(DA, 47). Aron had claimed that the French were being cowardly in not grasping the nettle of decolonisation, a point for which he was strongly criticised by Soustelle: 'De quelle lâcheté parlez-vous? Ceux qui se battent pour l'Algérie française sont-ils donc des lâches?' (DA, 47). The young men who went off to fight for France, Soustelle imagined, were well aware that if Algeria was to go the same way as Indochina, Tunisia and Morocco, the consequences for the future of the nation would be grave. For this reason, the people of France had understood that there could be no more 'abandons':

Cela, le peuple français le sent, lui qui paie de son argent et de sa personne, et qui découvre au-delà d'une mer étroite et bleue l'étonnant prolongement de la France que bien souvent il ne soupçonnait même pas. (DA, 68)

The whole of France, Soustelle asserted, shared his vision that Algeria must not be given over to the FLN. They understood that the loss of Algeria was equivalent to signing the death warrant of the French nation itself:

La France est alertée et alarmée. Elle se rend compte plus ou moins clairement (...) qu'en abandonnant l'Algérie elle commettrait le geste du suicide, qu'elle abattrait la dernière digue qui contienne encore le flot, qu'elle souscrirait elle-même à sa déchéance. (DA,68-9)

It is not really until after 1958, when popular opinion had undoubtedly evolved away from *intégration* towards de Gaulle's Algerian policy of *dégagement*, that Soustelle became more critical of the French people. However, just as we have seen on previous occasions, de Gaulle's role in manipulating popular opinion was perceived as crucial.

For Soustelle, de Gaulle's success in the 1961 referendum could not be attributed to an overwhelming desire amongst the people of Metropolitan France to bring an end to the conflict but rather to the General's deceitful rhetoric which had fooled them into accepting his policies. It was 'un triomphe illusoire, comme celui de cet empereur qui fit battre la mer et se proclama vainqueur de Neptune' (ET,219-220). Soustelle's critique of the 1961 referendum is four-fold. Firstly, he pointed out that de Gaulle

used the referendum as a thinly veiled personal plebiscite, with the propositions submitted to the public containing a thinly veiled threat to resign were he not to get his way (ET,221). Secondly, he complained that de Gaulle did more than just violate the spirit of the referendum by censoring the 'no' campaign and preventing its supporters from having an equal platform from which to state their case (ET,221). Thirdly, he argued that the referendum itself was confusing. He pointed to the contradictory nature of the two questions contained within it, the first asking whether the French people approved the notion of self-determination for Algeria, the second asking whether they approved the implementation of the provisional authorities of an *Algérie algérienne*. When compared to the referendum of September 1958, this new consultation was, in his eyes, nothing more than a clever manipulation of the electorate:

Le référendum du 28 septembre 1958 avait été un véritable référendum ; le peuple, mis en présence d'un projet soigneusement préparé et étudié, qui avait fait l'objet de discussions approfondies et publiques, avait à l'adopter ou à le rejeter. Il s'agissait d'un texte constitutionnel, destiné à régler, espérait-on, pour une longue suite d'années, le fonctionnement des pouvoirs publics. En janvier 1961, au contraire, on fixait aux citoyens la tâche irréalisable de répondre par 'oui' ou 'non' sur un ensemble de deux questions qui s'annulaient l'une l'autre, relatives à un problème immédiat et brûlant à propos duquel on entretenait volontairement la confusion la plus noire. (ET, 220)

Soustelle's complaints had some validity. De Gaulle's referendum was confusing (although the September 1958 vote was even less explicit in terms of its implications for Algeria). In response to the accusation that de Gaulle was not a democratic leader, the Gaullist commentator Jacques de Montalais has argued that 'toute la politique de Gaulle repose sur le consentement [...] il n'a rien entrepris de décisif sans que le peuple y ait consenti'.¹⁹ Whilst de Gaulle did obtain popular support for his policies, it would be slightly inaccurate to depict him as simply a passive register of popular opinion. On the occasion of each referendum, the choice was presented to the French people as one between de Gaulle and chaos, a return to the instability of the Fourth Republic and the difficulties associated with the previous regime. De Gaulle did not only respond to popular will but also managed to compress it into a mould determined

by him. However, Soustelle under-estimated the fact that none of these tactics would have been effective had the French people been determined to keep Algeria; the simple fact is that they did not.

Soustelle's fourth criticism, on the other hand, was simply the result of muddle-headed thinking. He claimed that de Gaulle's referendum campaign was a false one because it deliberately dangled the carrot of a peace settlement in front of the French people rather than concentrating on the actual questions, contradictory as they were, contained within the referendum (ET,220). Firstly, by the logic of Soustelle's own argument, a 'yes' vote did open the gates to peace because it effectively gave de Gaulle a free hand to deal with the Algerian question as he saw fit. Secondly, by admitting that the people wanted peace, Soustelle undermined his own case because his *intégration* project, even under the most favourable circumstances, would have required a continued military presence in Algeria for many years afterwards.

As far as the popular endorsement of the Evian accords was concerned, Soustelle argued that the population had once again been misled by de Gaulle. They had been tricked into believing that these accords would solve the problem:

On a fait avaler au peuple français, à force de propagande, l'illusion selon laquelle les accords d'Evian réglaient tout; satisfait, il a voté 'oui' et s'est empressé, le cœur léger, de partir en vacances pendant que l'Algérie plongeait dans l'enfer déchaîné par ce 'oui'. (PT,54)

Popular attitudes, Soustelle claimed, were determined to a greater extent than is generally thought by the stance adopted by the State (PT,171). De Gaulle, through his actions in Algeria, had taught the French people that the notions of honour and duty were meaningless. It was not only Algeria which had been lost but, echoing de Gaulle's own words, 'une certaine idée de la France'. To replace it, the only substitute which de Gaulle had found was a bland, apolitical materialism, described by Soustelle as 'une sorte de morne "Enrichissez-vous" ou "Amusez-vous bien". Français, nous dit-

on dormez tranquilles, mangez, buvez, partez en vacances: Papa s'occupe des affaires sérieuses' (PT, 171). Whereas Ross blamed modernisation for this disengagement, for Soustelle, it was much more personal, linked to the particular brand of politics embodied by de Gaulle. De Gaulle's attempt at the politics of grandeur were seen as responsible for having depoliticised the French people and turned them into an unthinking, consuming, pliable mass:

La prétendue politique de grandeur et l'abaissement de l'esprit français ne sont que les deux faces d'une seule et même médaille. A partir du moment où l'on baptise 'grandeur' la liquidation du patrimoine national, l'égoïsme féroce qui se dérobe à la solidarité élémentaire entre fils d'un pays, la soumission aveugle aux caprices d'un Pouvoir qui ordonne le mardi le contraire de ce qu'il a ordonné le dimanche, on ne saurait s'étonner de l'abaissement de l'esprit public. (...) Le régime, loin de combattre cet abaissement, fait tout pour le précipiter, car cet abaissement le sert. Un peuple 'dépolitisé' comme on dit, occupé de babioles, de chansonnettes et de strip-tease, voilà une bonne pâte bien molle et facile à pétrir. (PT, 168-69)

Soustelle's arguments are, once again, very similar to those adopted by certain sections of the Army who came to denounce the moral decadence of the society which they were supposed to be defending. Modernisation, along with the intellectuals, was another subject of Argoud's rage. He argued that the cult of material progress had led to the atrophy of the nation which had developed a soft underbelly and rendered the French unfit to take part in the combat for its survival: 'La richesse matérielle, la sécurité, amollissent peu à peu le corps et l'esprit, atrophient l'instinct vital, rendent l'individu moins propre au combat pour la vie'.²⁰ He reasoned that the French people had taken refuge in their materialistic dreams making them unable to recognise the sacrifices needed to obtain victory in Algeria:

Le Français se laisse séduire par un langage qui pare la facilité du manteau de la vertu (...) il en arrive à se persuader que la victoire militaire est impossible et à souhaiter avec l'adversaire un compromis qui sauve l'honneur, mette fin au conflit et lui permette de jouir sans arrière-pensée de ses week-ends et de ses congés payés.²¹

If France was so degenerate, one wonders why Argoud and others of his ilk were so concerned to protect it. Soustelle was, in part, saved from this contradiction by his argument that it was de Gaulle who had made unthinking consumers of the French

people. By using this convenient scapegoat, he did not need to fully confront the true nature of the changes affecting France nor come to terms with the fact that the French people did not share his vision of the future. Just like the settlers, the French people were largely unacknowledged by Soustelle as instrumental in undermining his plans. Domestic and settler opposition to reform was more crucial in rendering *intégration* an unfeasible policy than the intellectuals, politicians or soldiers to whom Soustelle more readily attributed the blame.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing discussion has attempted to highlight the impossibility of colonial reform within the Algerian situation. The significance of the study, I have hoped to show, lies in bringing out a more thorough understanding of the ideas of those figures described by Memmi as 'colonisers of good will'. Focussing primarily upon the writing of Soustelle and to a lesser extent, Camus, Chevallier, Tillion and various figures connected to the Army's *Cinquième Bureau*, the study has indicated where their good will was misdirected and where it was, in fact, lacking altogether.

Drawing on the work of leading anti-colonial writers as supporting evidence, the study has highlighted three areas in which the assessments of the reformers were flawed. Firstly, the 'consent potential', central to reformers' attempts to present French aims in Algeria as compatible with liberal values of tolerance, democracy and freedom from oppression, was greatly over-estimated. The study showed that whilst reformers managed to convince themselves that Muslims supported their proposals for the transformation of Algeria, with particular emphasis being placed on the so-called *fraternisations* of May 58, they failed to recognise that most of the Muslim community had long since turned against France. Secondly, reformers, and Soustelle in particular, could not accept that, on both a psychological and economic level, the *piets-noirs* were not prepared to put an end to a system which enshrined their privileges and ensured their minority control of the territory. Thirdly, reformers failed to appreciate that insufficient domestic support existed to sustain a long-term financial commitment to Algeria.

The study has exposed gaps in the reformers' professed liberalism in four areas. Firstly, reformers offered a generous reading of the French colonial past; whilst

figures like Soustelle praised the endeavour of the settlers in making land suitable for farming, they paid little attention to the fact that this land had been expropriated from Muslims. Secondly, the details of *intégration* were less liberal than the general principles which underpinned it. If equality was the stated aim, the policies intended to bring it to fruition were insufficient; although damaging, they would not have been fatal to European minority control. Thirdly, whilst Soustelle was correct to claim that *intégration* was more respectful of the cultural differences of the Muslims than the discredited policy of *assimilation*, he nonetheless tended to overlook crucial issues relating to the separate identity and culture of the indigenous population in the elaboration of his programme. This was most visible in plans for the transformation of the Algerian economy where little thought was given to the potential impact of French proposals upon Muslim society. Fourthly, reformers mobilised other arguments to support the continuation of the French presence in Algeria based on the notion of the 'harmony of interests' which had very little to do with liberalism and probably placed them closer in terms of their ideological standpoint to the hard-line opponents of reform than they thought.

Despite these failures, the ideas in which *intégration* was grounded should not be condemned absolutely. If, following Memmi, assimilation had a universalistic flavour and socialistic flavour which made it *a priori* acceptable (PC,161), *intégration* was even more so. It should not be regarded as a betrayal of a cosmopolitan, multi-cultural, 'progressive' outlook to state that there are some positive elements within the *intégration* programme, however much they were doomed to failure within the context of the colonial situation or undermined by the lack of sincerity of those who claimed to support them.

The study has also highlighted the way in which reformers mistakenly attributed the blame for the failure of their proposals to politicians, soldiers and intellectuals. Owing to the perceived recuperative powers of May 1958, which allowed reformers to

believe that the slate had been wiped clean of all past colonial injustices and governmental failures, the principal responsibility for the failure of *intégration* to come to fruition was seen as de Gaulle's. Our analysis was concerned to show that, whilst the actions of the various individuals or groups cited by reformers might have played the role of catalyst in bringing to an end the French presence, they were not the determining factor.

Considerable importance has been accorded to the role of the French Army. It has not been our intention to rehabilitate the Army as a body. In many ways the Army can be considered as a microcosm of the *Algérie française* camp as a whole. Just as civilian supporters of colonial reform and hard-line defenders of the *status quo* found themselves on the same side and often articulating similar themes, so the French Army contained a mixture of reformers and hard-liners. There is still much more work to be done on the Army. This study has drawn upon only a small percentage of the material which was generated from within its ranks during the conflict and the texts chosen focus on those areas of its activities most closely connected with reform. From our relatively limited investigation, it is clear that the contribution of some military commentators to the pro-reform camp was not insignificant, even if this conclusion cannot be extended to the Army as a whole.

Colonial Reform in a Wider Context

Intégration as it was proposed by Soustelle was a policy inextricably linked with the colonial environment within which it was meant to operate. Nevertheless, it might be argued that some of the conclusions which can be drawn from an examination of this programme are not only restricted to the colonial situation. In *Culture and Imperialism*, Said considers the notion of 'overlapping histories', between the former colonial powers and their colonies. The multi-ethnic character of cities such as London and Paris can only be properly understood through an appreciation of the

colonial processes which brought them into being.¹ The questions raised at the time of the Algerian war by the *intégration* programme are not vastly dissimilar to those posed within the more contemporary setting of present day France concerning the relations between its different ethnic and religious communities. As Stora puts it:

En France, « le problème de l'intégration » occupe une place centrale dans les débats politiques, idéologiques. Derrière les mots « intégration », « assimilation », se dessine la grande question des Arabes en France, leur place, leur rôle comme nouveaux citoyens. Nombre de souvenirs qui paraissent perdus se réveillent, se manifestent : peut-on être musulman et français à part entière ? A nouveau se lève le défi, non réglé, qui a conduit à la guerre d'Algérie.²

In the current debate, the term *intégration* continues to be confused with *assimilation* just as it was during the Algerian war. As Alec Hargreaves and Mark McKinney note, *intégration* is 'a term which is not without ambiguity, but which more often than not is used as a polite circumlocution for assimilation.'³ David Blatt concurs, referring to France's republican model of integration where *intégration*/assimilation stands in opposition to multi-culturalism, the latter defined as a recognition of ethnic communities and the support for the preservation of cultural differences.⁴ The general principles of *intégration* as they were defined by Soustelle during the Algerian war and summarised by Droz and Lever as 'l'égalité des droits dans le respect de la différence' therefore seem to be closer in meaning to current ideas about multi-culturalism.⁵ For this reason, those who seek to overcome social division through an emphasis on shared humanity allied with a celebration, rather than a rejection, of difference, will find that a study of the *intégration* programme repays its investment both for its positive points and in its failures.

Whilst this thesis has broadly attacked the position of the reformers, as a final point it should be stressed that, if this critique is pushed too far, it can, paradoxically, come to resemble the illiberal attitudes more commonly associated with the extreme right. To disregard *intégration* in any context as both impossible and undesirable on the grounds that any political project which lays claim to certain universal principles

denies cultural specificity is to venture on dangerous ground. Such an attitude gives rise to what Slavoj Žižek has termed apartheid 'legitimised as the ultimate form of anti-racism, as an endeavour to prevent racial tension and conflicts.'⁶ This point is not just relevant within the context of contemporary France but can be extended beyond national boundaries. In his work *The Clash of Civilisations*, Samuel Huntington divides the world into seven different civilisations and forecasts potential conflict between them.⁷ His controversial analysis is flawed, as Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal argue, since civilisations are far from the homogeneous and separate entities which Huntington imagines them to be.⁸ However, Huntington's recipe for global stability is precisely to turn his description of the different civilisations into a political reality. Huntington rightly denounces the messianic tendencies of the West and argues that global crusades in the name of so-called Western values are always likely to generate sites of resistance. However, he offers by way of an alternative what might be described as a civilisational apartheid which not only posits minimum interaction between civilisations but also calls upon Western civilisation to reject 'the divisive siren calls of multiculturalism' in the domestic setting.⁹ It is to be hoped that Huntington's vision of the future, evoking memories of the constantly warring civilisations in George Orwell's *1984*, does not prove to be accurate.

Notes to the Introduction

- 1 Martin Evans, 'The French Army and the Algerian war: Crisis of identity' in *War and Society in Twentieth Century France*, ed. by Michael Scriven and Peter Wagstaff (Oxford: Berg, 1991), pp. 147-62 (p.153).
- 2 *La France en guerre d'Algérie*, ed. by Laurent Gervereau, Jean-Pierre Rioux and Benjamin Stora (Paris: Bibliothèque de documentation internationale contemporaine, 1992), p.9.
- 3 The FLN was both a political and military organisation. The armed combatants formed the *Armée de Libération nationale* (ALN). The *Organisation Politico-Administrative* (OPA) was set up in Muslim communities by nationalist operatives as a covert parallel authority to the French administration in order to undermine French control. Both of these branches of the FLN based inside Algeria were supplemented by an external political leadership which from 1958 onwards gave itself the title of *Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne* (GPRA). It was with this external political leadership that the French government finally entered negotiations. Unless we wish to draw particular attention to one particular branch of the organisation, we will use FLN as an umbrella term to signify the totality of the liberation movement.
- 4 Michel Crouzet 'La Bataille des intellectuels français', *La Nef*, 12-13 (special double issue), (1962- 1963), 46-65 (p.51).
- 5 Madeleine Rébérioux, 'La gauche à l'épreuve', *Le Nouvel Observateur - Dossier Spécial: La Guerre d'Algérie 30 ans après*, (1992), 52-57 (p.55).
- 6 David L. Schalk, *War and the Ivory Tower. Algeria and Vietnam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp.48-52.
- 7 Pierre Vidal-Naquet, *Face à la raison d'Etat. Un historien dans la guerre d'Algérie* (Paris: la Découverte, 1989), p.11. [Henceforth FRE]. For a more lengthy discussion of this typology, see in this same work of collected essays by Vidal-Naquet, 'Une fidélité têtue. La résistance française à la guerre d'Algérie', pp. 45-72 and in particular pp. 58-62 [Article first published *Vingtième Siècle, Revue d'histoire*, 10 (1986), pp.3-19]
- 8 Raoul Girardet 'Trois avertissements', in *La guerre d'Algérie et les intellectuels français*, ed. by Jean-Pierre Rioux and Jean-François Sirinelli (Brussels: Eds. Complexe, 1991), pp. 329-43 (pp.333-5).
- 9 Jacques Soustelle, *Aimée et souffrante Algérie* (Paris: Plon, 1956) [henceforth AS]; Jean-Yves Alquier, *Nous avons pacifié Tazalt. Journal de marche d'un officier parachutiste* (Paris: Laffont, 1957); Christiane Fournier, *Nous avons encore des héros* (Paris: Plon, 1957).
- 10 See Benjamin Stora, *La Gangrène et l'oubli* (Paris: La Découverte, 1991), p.242 and Jacques Massu, *La vraie bataille d'Alger* (Paris: Plon, 1971).
- 11 Philip Dine, *Images of the Algerian War: French Fiction and Film, 1954-1992* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p.236.
- 12 See *La guerre d'Algérie et les Français*, ed. by Jean-Pierre Rioux (Paris: Fayard, 1990).
- 13 Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962* (London: Macmillan, 1977) and John Talbott, *The War Without a Name: France in Algeria, 1954-1962* (London: Faber and Faber, 1981). The relationship between the academic writing on the war

and the more polemical literature is a point to which we will return later in this introduction.

14 *La Gangrène et l'oubli*, p.248.

15 Benjamin Stora, 'La Guerre d'Algérie quarante ans après: connaissances et reconnaissance', *Modern and Contemporary France*, NS2[2] (1994), 131-9 (p.131).

16 Benjamin Stora, *Le dictionnaire des livres de la guerre d'Algérie* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1996).

17 See Philip Dine, 'Reading and remembering *la guerre des mythes*: French literary representations of the Algerian war', *Modern and Contemporary France*, NS[2] (2) (1994), 141-150 (pp.141-2); Jean-Pierre Rioux, 'La guerre d'Algérie sans voile', *Le Monde*, 24 November 1989, p.25; *La Guerre d'Algérie*, ed. by Patrick Eveno and Jean Planchais (Paris: Editions Le Monde /La Découverte, 1990), p.5. The Algerian War has not only been portrayed through the medium of literature. Numerous films have been released in France which have dealt, directly or indirectly, with this subject. See Dine *Images of the Algerian War*, pp. 215-232 for a wider discussion of this issue.

18 See *Images of Algeria*, p.72 and *La gangrène et l'oubli*, p.76 respectively.

19 According to a poll carried out by *L'Express-Europe* 1- Louis Harris in 1979, public opinion in France held that the country was wrong to have gone to war in Algeria, that the Algerian bid for national independence was legitimate, and that independence had been inevitable. Cited in Stora, *La gangrène et l'oubli*, pp. 269-270.

20 Tony Smith, *The French Stake in Algeria*, (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 1978). The whole work deals with the formation of this consensus, but see in particular pp.23-6 where the idea of the colonial consensus is outlined.

21 Chuter defines the meta-strategy as 'a complex of ideas, memories and associations that set the boundaries within which a government can work'. See David Chuter, *Humanity's Soldier: France and International Security 1919-2001* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1996), p.5.

22 See 'Trois avertissements' in Rioux and Sirinelli (eds.), p.331.

23 See Charles-Robert Ageron, 'L'opinion française à travers les sondages' in Rioux (ed.), pp. 25-44.

24 Bernard Droz and Evelyne Lever, *Histoire de la guerre d'Algérie (1954-1962)* (Paris: Seuil, 1982), p. 71.

25 Albert Memmi, *Portrait du colonisé précédé du portrait du colonisateur*, 2nd edition (Paris: Gallimard, 1985), pp.47-69. [Henceforth PC].

26 See Rita Maran, *Torture and the Role of Ideology: The French-Algerian War* (London: Greenwood Press, 1989). See also Kristin Ross, *Fast Cars, Clean Bodies. Decolonization and the Reordering of French Culture*, 2nd edition (Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1996) [First published 1995].

27 See *Images of Algeria*, especially pp. 64-106, 146-177.

28 Interview of 15 June 1988 cited in Eveno and Planchais, p.104. Stora points out that *intégration* had been studied in May 1946 by a lawyer, Maître Bee. See *La gangrène et l'oubli*, p.19 [footnote].

29 Jacques Soustelle, *Le drame algérien et la décadence française: Réponse à Raymond Aron* (Paris: Plon, 1957) [Henceforth DA]; Jacques Soustelle, *L'espérance trahie (1958 -1961)* (Mayenne: Editions de l'Alma, 1962) [Henceforth ET]; Jacques Soustelle, *La page n'est pas tournée* (Paris: Editions de la table ronde, 1965) [Henceforth PT].

30 *War and the Ivory Tower*, p.75.

31 See Martin Evans, *The Memory of Resistance. French Opposition to the Algerian War (1954-1962)* (Oxford/New York: Berg, 1997), p.121 [footnote] and Stora, *La gangrène*

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- et l'oubli, p.17. For details of the Philippeville massacre see Gervereau, Rioux and Stora eds., p.30.
- 32 Jean-Marie Domenach, 'Pourquoi Non', *Esprit*, 26[9] (1958), 294-308 (p.297).
- 33 Christopher Norris, "The Dream of a Purely Heterological Thought...": Said, Kristeva and the Ethics of Enlightenment', in *Forms of Commitment. Intellectuals in Contemporary France* ed. by Brian Nelson (Melbourne: Monash Romance Studies, 1995), pp.65-100 (p.70).
- 34 See 'Une fidélité têtue. La résistance française à la guerre d'Algérie' in FRE, pp.58-62 and see Raoul Girardet, *L'idée coloniale en France* (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1972), pp. 303-402.
- 35 Although Vidal-Naquet does not explicitly locate himself in any of the camps, his concern for individual rights and his distance from the FLN probably makes him a *dreyfusard*. See FRE, p.10 where Vidal-Naquet sets out his own ideological credentials. He is a figure to whom we will return in Chapter Five. Schalk, in his work on Algeria and Vietnam, similarly locates Vidal-Naquet as a *dreyfusard*. See Schalk, p.97.
- 36 FRE, pp.8, 8-9, 9.
- 37 Both quotations from 'Trois avertissements' in Rioux and Sirinelli (eds.), p.330.
- 38 'The Dream of a Purely Heterological Thought' in Nelson (ed.), p.76.
- 39 Edward Said, *Representations of the Intellectual* (London: Vintage, 1994). Adjacent references to this work are given in the text.
- 40 Norris argues that by the time of the publication of *Representations of the Intellectual*, Said had undergone a considerable theoretical shift bringing him much closer to an acceptance of the universalism of the Enlightenment. See 'The Dream of a Purely Heterological Thought' in Nelson (ed.), pp.67-8. *Representations of the Intellectual* certainly reveals Said's (new-found) mistrust of postmodernism given the lack of universality of its message.

Notes to Chapter One

- 1 Communiqué of 1 June 1955, cited in *ET*, p.25.
- 2 Benjamin Stora, *Histoire de l'Algérie coloniale (1830-1954)*, (Paris: la Découverte, 1991), p.7
- 3 Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (London: Vintage, 1994), p.62.
- 4 See *L'idée coloniale en France* and Charles-Robert Ageron *France coloniale ou parti colonial?* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1978) respectively.
- 5 Masao Miyoshi, 'Sites of resistance in the global economy', in *Cultural Readings of Imperialism. Edward Said and the gravity of history*, ed. by Keith Ansell Pearson, Benita Perry and Judith Squires (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1997), pp.49-67 (p.60).
- 6 See James M. Blaut, *The Colonizer's Model of the World: Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric History* (New York; London: Guildford, 1993). The inside-outside notion can be mapped fairly closely onto the notion of dominant centre- dependent periphery which is characteristic of the Marxist-Leninist school of international relations and, in particular, Raoul Prebisch's Latin-American Structuralism.
- 7 *Ibid.*, p.17.

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- ⁸ See *Poètes d'aujourd'hui: Léopold Sédar Senghor* texts chosen and edited by Armand Guibert (Paris: Editions Pierre Seghers, 1961) and *Poètes d'aujourd'hui: Aimé Césaire* texts chosen and edited by Lilyan Kesteloot (Paris: Editions Pierre Seghers, 1962). For a broad survey of the ideas of Césaire and Senghor see Girardet, *L'idée coloniale en France*, pp. 247-251.
- ⁹ Wole Soyinka, *Myth, Literature and the African World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p.136.
- ¹⁰ *The Colonizer's Model of the World*, p.1. Adjacent references to this work will be included in the text.
- ¹¹ Having denied that either geographical or environmental factors played any role in accounting for European predominance, Blaut uses them in his own explanation. He accounts for the fact that Europe and not Africa or Asia conquered America because of its geographical proximity and argues that the reason that America was not able to rebuff European conquest was due to disease. The status of America also remains somewhat problematic. He does not explain how, or when, America was able to make the transition from the 'outside' to the 'inside' nor does he suggest why a similar transition was not made by African and Asian societies.
- ¹² *Culture and Imperialism*, p.55.
- ¹³ See Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, 2nd edition (London: Penguin, 1991) [first published London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978]. Robert Young has attacked Said's methodology, pointing to the contradiction in Said's claim that Orientalism was both a representation divorced from the 'real' Orient and a system of knowledge which created the conditions which it described. See *White Mythologies: Writing History and the West*, (London: Routledge, 1990), p.129.
- ¹⁴ *The Colonizer's Model of the World*, p.16.
- ¹⁵ Frantz Fanon, *Les damnés de la terre*, 2nd edition (Paris: Maspero, 1970), p.107 [Henceforth DT].
- ¹⁶ *L'idée coloniale en France*, p.135.
- ¹⁷ Jack Hayward, *Governing France: The One and Indivisible Republic*, 2nd edition (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1983), pp. 258 [first published 1973].
- ¹⁸ Michel Winock, *Parlez-moi de la France* (Paris: Plon, 1995), p.217.
- ¹⁹ Michel Winock, *Nationalisme, Antisémitisme et Fascisme en France* (Paris: Seuil, 1990), p.37.
- ²⁰ Interview with Claude Bourdet cited in Hervé Hamon and Patrick Rotman, *Les porteurs de valises* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1979), p.28.
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 28.
- ²² Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, 'Changes in French Foreign Policy Since 1945', in *In Search of France: The Economy, Society and Political System in the Twentieth Century*, ed. by Stanley Hoffmann, Charles P. Kindleberger, Laurence Wylie and others (Paris: Seuil, 1974), pp. 305-58 (p.339).
- ²³ Agnes Murphy, *The Ideology of French Imperialism 1871-1881* (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1948), p.226.
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*, p.226.
- ²⁵ Stuart Michael Persell, *The French Colonial Lobby 1889-1938* (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1983), p.1. Persell points out that even those who developed their rationale for colonialism primarily in economic terms often constructed their argument in terms of the benefits which the indigenous population would gain. Whilst some held that France should not try to assimilate the colonial peoples but should instead promote a looser association and concentrate on the economic benefits of colonialism, their justification was still couched in terms of the rhetoric of French

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- benevolence, stressing that the indigenous peoples would prefer jobs to culture. See pp. 150-1.
- 26 Daniel Leconte, *Les pieds-noirs. Histoire et portrait d'une communauté* (Paris: Seuil, 1980), p.91. See also Girardet, *L'idée coloniale*, pp. 81-90.
- 27 See *The French Stake in Algeria* and *L'idée coloniale en France* respectively. The three main ideas which constituted the Ferry doctrine were over the course of time supplemented by other rationales such as the belief that the colonial Empire provided a bulwark against the spread of an aggressive global Communism determined to conquer Africa as a means of encircling Western Europe.
- 28 I have borrowed the term 'harmony of interests' as a description of the attitudes of pro-imperial Frenchmen from its more usual economic context where it was originally employed by the Scottish thinker, Adam Smith.
- 29 Alistair Horne estimates that the number of European settlers from French stock was as few as one in five by 1917. See *A Savage War of Peace*, p.51. Joan Gillespie places the figure higher, stating that the European population numbered around 1 million of which 150,000 were of Jewish origin, and of the remainder 50% were of French extraction. See *Algeria. Rebellion and Revolution* (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1976), p.31.
- 30 Benjamin Stora, *Histoire de l'Algérie coloniale*, p.29.
- 31 See Camille Brière, *Ceux qu'on appelle les pieds-noirs ou 150 ans de l'histoire d'un peuple* (Versailles: Editions de l'Atlanthrope, 1984), p.75 and Stora, *La gangrène et l'oubli*, p.257. As a point of interest, we should note that both of these authors are of *pied-noir* origin.
- 32 *Histoire de l'Algérie coloniale*, p.100.
- 33 For Dine, the notion of the One and Indivisible Republic comes to occupy a mythic function when applied to justify the defence of Algeria, See *Images of Algeria*, pp. 15, 110.
- 34 The conference was held in Corsica on 15 and 17 October 1955. The declaration was published under the heading 'L'œuvre française en Afrique du Nord', *L'Africain*, 23 November 1955, pp.2-3. All adjacent references to this article will be included in the text.
- 35 Declaration of President Coty, 'De Verdun à Alger', *Revue militaire d'information*, 274 (1956), 4-5 (p. 5).
- 36 *Ibid.*, p.5
- 37 See Horne, p.63.
- 38 *Histoire de la guerre d'Algérie*, pp. 37, 38.
- 39 See Horne, p.70 [footnote].
- 40 See Horne pp.70-1 for a more detailed explanation.
- 41 Hocine Aït-Ahmed, 'Pourquoi nous avons pris les armes' interview published in *Phosphore*, November 1994, p.25.
- 42 These figures from Charles-Robert Ageron, 'Aux Origines de la Toussaint 1954' in Gervereau, Rioux and Stora (eds.), (20-29), p.21. Similarly damning statistics are also presented in Stora, *Histoire de l'Algérie coloniale*, p.105; Gillespie, p.35; and Smith, p.94.
- 43 For a fuller description of the events at Sétif see Horne, pp.23-9.
- 44 Frantz Fanon, *Peau noire, masques blancs*, (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1975), p.28 [Henceforth PN]. In *Peau noire*, Fanon is writing about blacks in particular but his ideas can be extended as an attempt to describe the colonial situation as a whole as he saw it at the time.

- 45 Frantz Fanon, *L'an V de la révolution algérienne: sociologie d'une révolution* (Paris: Maspero, 1959), pp.139-54 [Henceforth SR].
- 46 Jean-Paul Sartre, 'Le colonialisme est un système' in *Situations V* (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), pp.25-48 (p.38) [Article first published in *Les Temps Modernes*, 123 (1956)]. Adjacent references to this article will be included in the text.
- 47 Jean-Paul Sartre, 'Portrait du colonisé' in *Situations V*, pp.49-56 (p.52) [Article first published in Albert Memmi, *Portrait du colonisé précédé du portrait du colonisateur* (Paris: Corrêa, 1957)].
- 48 *L'idée coloniale en France*, pp.303-22.
- 49 *A Savage War of Peace*, p.32
- 50 See *Histoire de la guerre d'Algérie*, pp.20-1. Quotations from p.21
- 51 See *Histoire de l'Algérie coloniale*, pp. 46-8
- 52 *La gangrène et l'oubli*, p.259
- 53 *Les pieds-noirs. Histoire et portrait*, p.111
- 54 *The French Stake in Algeria*, pp.89-104.
- 55 Joseph Kraft, 'Settler Politics in Algeria, in *Foreign Affairs* ,39[4] (1960-1), 591-601 (p.596)
- 56 *The French Stake in Algeria*, p.94.
- 57 *Ibid.*, p.101
- 58 Anon., 'La Révolution algérienne. Ses principes', *Résistance algérienne*, 22 July 1957, p.6
- 59 Maurienne (pseud) [real name Jean-Louis Hurst], *Le déserteur*, 2nd edition, (Levallois-Perret: Editions Many, 1991), p.30 [first published 1960]. The SAS stood for *Sections Administratives Spécialisées* about whom we will say more in the next chapter.
- 60 Anon., 'L'inéluctable indépendance', *Résistance Algérienne*, ?? April 1957, p.4 [exact dates of publication not given].
- 61 John Strachey, *The End of Empire* (London: Gallance, 1959), pp.141-2.
- 62 *La gangrène et l'oubli*, p.128
- 63 *Ibid.*, p.135
- 64 'Pourquoi nous avons pris les armes', *Phosphore*, November 1994, p.25.
- 65 *La gangrène et l'oubli*, p.156
- 66 *The French Stake in Algeria*, p.104.
- 67 *Ibid.*, p.101.
- 68 Jacques Marseille, 'La guerre a-t-elle eu lieu? Mythes et réalités du fardeau algérien' in Rioux (ed.), pp.281-88, (p.281).
- 69 See *L'idée coloniale en France*, p.322-32
- 70 See *Paris-Match* 11 August 1956, 18 August 1956 and 1 September 1956.
- 71 This phrase comes from Nathalie Ruz, 'La force du "Cartiérisme"' in Rioux (ed.), pp.328-36 (p.329)
- 72 Raymond Aron, *La Tragédie algérienne*, (Paris: Plon, 1957)
- 73 Raymond Aron, *L'Algérie et la République*, (Paris: Plon, 1958). See Dorothy Pickles, *Algeria and France: From Colonialism to Co-operation* (London: Methuen, 1963), p.46.

- 74 Charles de Gaulle, Conférence de presse tenue au palais de l'Elysée (11 April 1961), cited in *Discours et Messages: Avec le renouveau Mai 1958 – Juillet 1962*. (Paris: Plon, 1970), pp. 286-304 (p.288)
- 75 Ageron, 'L'opinion française à travers les sondages' in Rioux (ed.), p.41.
- 76 See Jean-Pierre Rioux, 'Une guerre trouble-fête', in Gervereau, Rioux and Stora (eds.), pp.146-150 (p.146) and Ageron, 'L'opinion française à travers les sondages' in Rioux (ed.), p.41.
- 77 Jacques Marseille, 'Empire et capitalisme français. Histoire d'une divorce' (Paris: Albin Michel, 1984), p.370.
- 78 *Ibid.*, p.372. See also Marseille's shorter account 'La guerre a-t-elle eu lieu? Mythes et réalités du fardeau algérien' in Rioux (ed.), pp.281-88 and, in the same volume Jean-Charles Asselain, "'Boulet colonial" et redressement économique (1958-1962)', pp.289-303.
- 79 See Daniel Lefeuvre, 'L'échec du Plan de Constantine' in Rioux (ed.), pp.320-7 (p.324).

Notes to Chapter Two

- 1 This is not to assert that the Algerian revolution of 1954-62 was directly comparable to French resistance to Roman rule thereby allowing it to be recuperated according to myths already contained within the French historical tradition, but it does show that Soustelle's comparison lends itself equally well in support of the FLN-led rebellion.
- 2 *Images of Algeria*, p.98.
- 3 Albert Camus, 'Lettre à un militant algérien', in *Chroniques algériennes 1939-1958*, (Paris: Gallimard, 1958), 123-30 (p.126) [Henceforth CA] [Article first published in *Communauté algérienne*, 1 October 1955]. Adjacent references to this article will be included in the text.
- 4 J. Reis, 'Algérie, socialisme et intégration', *Combat*, 6 (1958), 97-118, (p.97). [First published in *La Revue Socialiste*, June 1958].
- 5 *Ibid.*, p.103.
- 6 Albert Bayet, 'Le faux dilemme', *Le Bled*, 15 April 1956, p.3. At the time of writing, Bayet also held the following other titles: President of the *Ligue Française de l'Enseignement*, President of the *Fédération Nationale de la Presse Française*, Secretary-General of the *Union Rationaliste*.
- 7 *Ibid.*, p.3
- 8 Roger Barberot, *Malaventure en Algérie avec le Général Paris de Bollardière* (Paris: Plon, 1957), pp.237-8.
- 9 'Algérie, socialisme et intégration', *Combat*, 6 (1958), pp.112-3.
- 10 Cited in ET, p.289.
- 11 Comments made by Bayet in the parliamentary journal, cited in ET, p.211.
- 12 We do not wish to suggest here that there are somehow natural limits to a nation. Many stable nation-states are not separated by natural frontiers such as rivers and mountains. Moreover, the notion that there are natural frontiers to a nation can easily be turned into a rhetoric which advocates the conquest and annexation of adjacent

territories as, indeed, was the case in the France of 1793 and throughout the Napoleonic period.

13 *Images of Algeria*, p.77

14 Communiqué to Edgar Faure of 7 September 1955 cited in ET, p.25.

15 *The French Stake in Algeria*, p.155.

16 Jacques Chevallier, *Nous, Algériens* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1958), pp. 11-12 [Henceforth NA]. Chevallier uses the word 'Algerian' to refer to the European settler community.

17 Albert Camus, 'Algérie 1958', CA, 199-212 (p.201).

18 *Ibid.*, p.200.

19 Avant-propos, CA, p. 23.

20 *The French Stake in Algeria*, p.88

21 For a fuller treatment of the French colonial Army, see Douglas Porch, *The March to the Marne. The French Army 1871-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) and Raoul Girardet, *La société militaire dans la France contemporaine 1815-1939* (Paris: Plon, 1953).

22 *Malaventure en Algérie*, p.193.

23 Philippe Herreman, 'L'officier SAS, le "militant de base" de la pacification', in Eveno and Planchais (eds.), pp.162-3 (p.162) [Article first published in *Le Monde*, 24 July 1957]. On the various roles played by the SAS see also Horne, p.109.

24 John Ambler, *The French Army in Politics 1945-1962* (Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1966), p.181. Following the success of the SAS in certain areas of the Algerian outback, the Resident Minister in Algeria decided to extend the formula to certain urban centres. For this reason, six *Sections Administratives Urbaines* (SAU) were set up in those areas with a high concentration of Muslims.

25 Patrick Rotman and Bertrand Tavernier, *La guerre sans nom: Les appelés d'Algérie 54-62* (Paris: Seuil, 1992), p.110. 'Fells' is here an abbreviation for 'fellaghas', the name often used to describe the combatants of the FLN.

26 *The French Army in Politics*, pp.162-3.

27 Frank Giles, *The Locust Years: The Story of the Fourth French Republic 1946-1958* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1991), p.292

28 *A Savage War of Peace*, p.109.

29 *War and the Ivory Tower*, p.31.

30 Pierre Sergent, preface to Guy Vincent, *Képi bleu*, (France: Association Jeune Pied-noir, 1988). The preface is not paginated. The eye-witness account mentioned in this quotation is Vincent's semi-autobiographical novel about his period of service in Algeria

31 In this thesis, the term *Cinquième Bureau* is broadly employed for ease of reference to encompass the totality of the Army's psychological warfare divisions. This represents a slight inaccuracy. In March 1955, a body entrusted with psychological warfare in Algeria was created within the French Army with the name *Bureau régional d'action psychologique* and subsequently *service psychologique* or *bureau psychologique*. In November, the name of this body was changed to that of *Le Cinquième Bureau* and the existing *Cinquième Bureau* was renamed *Le Sixième Bureau*. In March 1960, de Gaulle dissolved the *Cinquième Bureau* and a part of its activities were taken over by the *Troisième Bureau* (section *Problèmes Humains*). In 1961, the section *Problèmes Humains* was itself replaced by the *Bureau du Moral*.

32 For examples of French Army tracts see the archives of the *Service historique de l'armée de terre* (SHAT) and in particular the following dossiers: 1H2461-2 *Action*

psychologique sur la population (tracts) ; 1H2460-1 *Population musulmane 1956 – 1961* ; and 1H2500-4 *Bureau central de documentation et d'information. Décret de création [6 July 1955], tracts, affiches, brochures et textes de propagande en français et en arabe produits par le bureau central de documentation et d'information, le bureau psychologique régional et le gouvernement général (1955-1958)*. A small but broadly representative sample of these are reproduced in Appendix 1 at the end of this thesis. In a small number of cases, the fragile condition of the original document did not allow it to be photocopied. I have typed out the text seeking to preserve, as far as possible, the layout of the original.

- 33 On the evolution of the Army's political role, see Raoul Girardet 'Problèmes idéologiques et moraux' in his own edited work *La crise militaire française* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1964), pp.151-218 (p.195) ; George Armstrong Kelly, *Lost Soldiers. The French Army and Empire in Crisis 1947-62* (Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1965), p.364; and Ambler, p.219.
- 34 Horne, p.291. The events of this month will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four.
- 35 *Lost Soldiers*, p.257
- 36 'Problèmes idéologiques et moraux', p.195
- 37 J. Cayol, 'Les armes de la pacification', *Le Bled*, 8 March 1958, p.16.
- 38 *Ibid.*, p.16
- 39 See Paul-Marie de la Gorce, *La République et son armée* (Paris: Fayard, 1963), p.530. *Guerre révolutionnaire* theory had been heavily influenced by, and developed in response to Mao-Tse Tung's theories of guerrilla warfare. Mao had argued that for the smaller resistance forces, military victory, at least until the very final stages of the conflict, was of secondary importance compared to the need to establish political control over the civilian population. This was to be achieved through the infiltration of a small number of rebel activists who would live among the community and be indistinguishable from them, substituting the authority of the 'occupying' army (in this case the French) with their own parallel hierarchies. With the rebel army 'in' the civilian population as the 'fish is to water', the only options available to the 'occupying' army were withdrawal or genocide.
- 40 'Problèmes idéologiques et moraux', p.193.
- 41 André Souyris, 'L'Action psychologique dans les forces armées', *Revue militaire d'information*, 298 (1958), 34-45 (p.40)
- 42 Anon., 'Mémento pour la mise en œuvre des moyens de pacification' (1957: 1H2538 *Pacification 1955-7*), p.19 [Henceforth *Memento*].
- 43 Colonel Charles Lacheroy, 'La guerre révolutionnaire', *La Défense Nationale* ed. by Centre de Sciences Politiques de l'Institut d'Etudes Juridiques de Nice (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1958), 307-30 (p.327)
- 44 See, for example, *Le Bled*, 15 January 1956, p.3; *Le Bled*, 15 February 1956, p.3; *Le Bled*, 15 June 1956, p.17.
- 45 *Memento*, (1H2538), p.14
- 46 Anon., 'Maintenant vous connaissez l'Algérie' (undated: 1H2500-1 *Tracts, projets de tract, presse, planches et dessins et études sur l'action psychologique (1954-1959)*), unpaginated. *Cinquième Bureau* propaganda was addressed to conscripts and reservists about to return to France in the hope that, following their demobilisation, they would testify to the benevolence of the pacification effort and offer a counterpoint to the negative publicity surrounding the Army which was circulating in the press at that time.
- 47 On the significance of the division between those who served in Indochina and those who did not, see Ambler, p.161. On the influence of the *guerre révolutionnaire* school within the French Army, see Ambler pp. 325-7.

- ⁴⁸ See *The French Army in Politics* pp. 319-325 for a fuller discussion of these different groupings within the Army. The quotation is taken from p.320
- ⁴⁹ For works which provide a very good survey of the cross-section of opinion which existed within the conscripts and reservists who served in the French Army, see Tavernier and Rotman, *La guerre sans nom*; Jean-Pierre Vittori, *Nous, les appelés d'Algérie* (Paris: Messidor/Temps actuels, 1983); and Andrew Orr, *Ceux d'Algérie: le silence et la honte* (Paris: Editions Payot, 1990). For a more partisan, pro-Algérie française compilation of reservist opinion, see *Ceux d'Algérie. Lettres de rappelés précédées d'un débat*, ed. by Jean-Yves Alquier, Roger Barberot, Jean-Claude Kerspern and others (Paris: Plon, 1957). For a survey of the fictional material produced by former conscripts and reservists see Dine, *Images of Algeria*, pp.109-145.

Notes to Chapter Three

- ¹ Camus, 'Misère de la Kabylie', CA, 33-90, (p.90) [This is the collective title given in *Chroniques Algériennes* to a group of articles first published between 5 and 15 June 1939 in *Alger républicain*].
- ² *War and the Ivory Tower*, p.63.
- ³ 'Algérie 1958', CA, pp.200-1
- ⁴ Jacques Soustelle, circular of 5 April 1955, addressed to préfets, sous-préfets, maires and administrators, cited in NA, p.54.
- ⁵ Jacques Mercier, 'L'Algérie, occasion de repenser la patrie', *Contacts*, 6 (1958), 9-21 (pp.16-7).
- ⁶ Anon., 'Etude sur une campagne de fraternisation en Algérie', (1958: 1H2460-1), p.3
- ⁷ *Ibid.*, p.3
- ⁸ Anon., 'Il ne peut y avoir plusieurs sortes de Français', *Bulletin d'Information de la Quinzaine du BPCAO*, 1 February 1958, p.6
- ⁹ Dine draws attention to Camus' description in *Le Minotaure ou la halte d'Oran* of the pleasures of having his boots shined by the Arab boot-blacks. See *Images of Algeria*, p.169.
- ¹⁰ 'Algérie 1958', CA, p.200.
- ¹¹ 'Misère de la Kabylie' in CA, 49. Adjacent references to this particular article will be included in the text.
- ¹² 'Le faux dilemme' (LB, 15/5/56), p.3.
- ¹³ 'Etude sur une campagne de fraternisation en Algérie', (1H2460-1), p.1. Adjacent references to this document will be given in the text.
- ¹⁴ *Histoire de la guerre d'Algérie*, p. 37
- ¹⁵ 'Le Colonialisme est un système' in *Situations V*, p.26.
- ¹⁶ *The French Stake in Algeria*, p.84
- ¹⁷ 'L'Algérie, occasion de repenser la patrie', *Contacts*, 6 (1958), p.16.
- ¹⁸ Anon., 'La pacification: tache primordiale' *Le Bled*, 1 February 1956, p.3.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.3

- 20 Capitaine X, 'Pour toucher l'élément féminin', *Contacts*, 3 (1958), 91-93 (p.91)
- 21 *A Savage War of Peace*, p.108.
- 22 *The French Army in Politics*, p.158
- 23 *Lost Soldiers*, p.174
- 24 *The French Stake in Algeria*, p.84
- 25 See Dine, *Images of Algeria*, pp 176-7 where the 'myth of lost opportunities' is discussed.
- 26 Germaine Tillion, *L'Algérie en 1957* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1957) [Henceforth AL].
- 27 This is the title of the chapter running from pp. 24-33 but also a theme to which she returns on numerous occasions throughout the work.
- 28 *Histoire de la guerre d'Algérie*, p. 41
- 29 *Images of Algeria*, p.96. Dine's comment was made by way of criticism of Camus' *Misère de la Kabylie* but is equally valid here.
- 30 Bhikhu Parekh, 'The West and Its Others' in Pearson, Perry and Squires (eds.), pp.173-193 (p.173).
- 31 *Images of Algeria*, p.146
- 32 Lucette Valensi, *On the Eve of Colonialism: North Africa Before the French Conquest*, trans. by Kenneth J. Perkins (London; New York: Holmes & Meier, 1977), pp. 1-4.
- 33 *Ibid.*, p.41
- 34 Anon., 'C'est l'intérêt de tous les Français que la France reste en Algérie' (1H2500-4), p.6
- 35 Michel Dennis and Jean Dallier, 'Accusée de Génocide.. La France répond', *Le Bled*, 9 March 1957, 10-11, (p.11).
- 36 Frédéric (pseud.), 'L'assèchement des marais de la Mitidja', in *Le Bled*, 5 April 1958, p.19
- 37 Capitaine Caniot, 'Exposé sur ce que serait l'Algérie sans la France', (1957: 1H2571 *Algérie. Quelques aspects des problèmes économiques et sociales*), unpaginated.
- 38 Robert Lacoste 'C'est à nous de tenir les rênes', *Le Bled*, 29 August 1956, p.3.
- 39 *Ibid.*, p.3.
- 40 See Sartre preface to 'Portrait du colonisé', *Situations V*, p.54.
- 41 'C'est l'intérêt de tous les Français que la France reste en Algérie' (1H2500-4), p.5.
- 42 Anon., 'Algérie. Quelques aspects des problèmes économiques et sociaux', (1957: 1H2571), p.7
- 43 Fiche de Contact, (undated: 1H2460-1), p.2
- 44 'Accusée de Génocide... La France répond' (LB 9/5/57), p.11.
- 45 'Algérie, socialisme et intégration', *Combat* 6 (1958), p.111.
- 46 André Hempé 'SAS Dukhemis: Le salaire de la peur n'a plus cours', *Le Bled*, 15 April 1956, p.7.
- 47 *Ibid.*, p.7
- 48 Lieutenant Le Merre, 'Un des multiples aspects de la mission des chefs de SAS: Fondation d'un foyer sportif', (undated: 1H1206 S.A.S. 1955-1961).
- 49 *Ibid.*, p.3
- 50 Anon., 'Algérie: Quelques aspects des problèmes économiques et sociaux' (1H2571), p.14. Adjacent references to this article will be included in the text.

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- 51 Pierre Chaussade, 'Que représente l'Algérie pour les finances et l'économie de la Métropole', (1958:1H2571), p.30. Adjacent references to this article will be included in the text.
- 52 Anon., 'Le role moteur de la France dans le développement économique de l'Algérie', (1957: 1H2571), p.13. Adjacent references to this article will be given in the text.
- 53 See *Empire colonial et capitalisme français*, pp.372-3

Notes to Chapter Four

- 1 'Déclaration sur le droit à l'insoumission dans la guerre d'Algérie' reprinted in Vittori, 182-4 (p.182).
- 2 *The French Stake in Algeria*, p.101.
- 3 *Ibid.*, p.146.
- 4 *Ibid.*, p.146.
- 5 'Algérie, socialisme et intégration', *Combat*, 6 (1958)Reis, p.103
- 6 E. des Touches, E. de Lassagne and R. Brive, untitled service note (4 July 1956: 1H1206), pp. 1-2.
- 7 See Charles-Robert Ageron, 'Aux Origines de la Toussaint 1954' in Gervereau, Rioux and Stora (eds.), pp. 20-29.
- 8 W.W. Kulski *De Gaulle and the World. The Foreign Policy of the Fifth French Republic* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1966), pp. 322-3.
- 9 Général Chérière, 'Les débuts de l'insurrection algérienne' in *Revue de la Défense nationale*, 12 (1956), 1450-62 (pp.1451-2).
- 10 *The French Stake in Algeria*, p.58.
- 11 See Michel Denis, '125 ans de sacrifice communs ont fait de l'Algérie une province française' in *Le Bled*, 19 January 1957, pp.18-19.
- 12 'L'Algérie, occasion de repenser la patrie', *Contacts*, 6 (1958), p.18
- 13 See Philip Dine, 'The Inescapable Allusion: the Occupation and the Resistance in French Fiction and Film of the Algerian War', in *The Liberation of France. Image and Event*, (Oxford: Berg,1995) ed. by H.R. Kedward and Nancy Wood, pp.269-82. As we see from the above example, references to the Second World War during the Algerian conflict were not only located in the more obvious comparisons made by opponents of the war between the French Army and the Gestapo or between the FLN and the French Resistance. The Second World War was also mobilised as an historical and personal reference point by supporters of the war. Many OAS activists were former Résistants and proudly drew upon their role in this movement. That both sides drew upon this period to vindicate their stance on Algeria is indicative of the way in which, as Roussio has highlighted, the Algerian War occupied a shifting and unstable relationship with France's Second World War legacy, fragmenting existing political families and defying simplistic comparisons. See Henry Roussio, *Le syndrome de Vichy 1940-198...*, (Paris: Seuil, 1987)
- 14 'SAS Dukhemis: le salaire de la peur n'a plus cours' (LB 15/4/56), pp. 6-7.
- 15 'C'est à nous de tenir les rênes' (LB 29/8/56), p.3.

- 16 Anon., 'Les Fellaga n'ont pas connu la 'trêve des confiseurs', *Bulletin d'Information de La Quinzaine du B.P.C.A.O.*, 1 February 1958, p.1
- 17 *Ibid.* p.2
- 18 'Maintenant vous connaissez l'Algérie', (IH2500-1),unpaginated.
- 19 Général Allard, untitled service note (19 July 1957: 1H2542 *Bilans de la contribution de l'armée à l'œuvre de pacification*), unpaginated.
- 20 Général Labarthe, untitled service note (13 July 1957: 1H2542), unpaginated.
- 21 Général Dodognon, untitled service note (26 July 1957: 1H2542), unpaginated.
- 22 Général Desfontaines, untitled service note, (13 August 1957: 1H2542), unpaginated.
- 23 Cited in AS, p.283
- 24 'C'est à nous de tenir les rênes' (LB 29/8/56), p.3.
- 25 'Maintenant vous connaissez l'Algérie', (1H2500-1), unpaginated.
- 26 Fiche de Contact, (1H2460-1), p.1.
- 27 Anon., 'Les complices des rebelles eux aussi seront punis. Parlons', (undated: 1H2500-4)
- 28 Anon., 'L'intégration, fait acquis', *Le Bled*, 24 May 1958, p.5. Adjacent references to this article will be included in the text.
- 29 Speech by Azem Ouali "'Nous affirmons notre foi dans l'avenir de nos destinées françaises'", *Le Bled*, 24 May 1958, p.5.
- 30 Anon., 'Dans toutes les localités d'Algérie les populations unanimes manifestent leur enthousiasme patriotique', *Le Bled*, 24 May 1958, pp. 7-10 (p.7).
- 31 *Histoire de la guerre d'Algérie*, pp.177-8
- 32 *A Savage War of Peace*, pp. 314-5
- 33 'L'opération "fraternisation"', *El Moudjahid*, 29 May 1958, p.7. Adjacent references to this article will be included within the text).
- 34 'L'Algérie, occasion de repenser la patrie', *Contacts*, 6 (1958), p.19.
- 35 Commandement Général de la Wilaya d'Oran: Service de renseignements et de liaisons, 'Les SAS - Leur politique, rôle et méthodes', *Echos politiques de la Wilaya*, (undated), 6-23 (p.19). Adjacent references to this article will be incorporated in the text.
- 36 Ageron, 'Aux origines de la Toussaint 1954', in Gervereau, Rioux and Stora (eds.), p.29.
- 37 P. G. Schulte, *Interrogating Pontecorvo: The Continuing Significance and Evolving Meaning of The Battle of Algiers* (unpublished, course material for Royal College of Defence Studies course, 1996), p.39. See also Horne *A Savage War of Peace*, p.112 on this point.
- 38 *La gangrène et l'oubli*, pp.163-4.
- 39 See Ramdane Redjala, 'La guerre d'indépendance du FLN' in Gervereau, Rioux and Stora (eds.), pp. 58-65 (p.63).
- 40 *La gangrène et l'oubli*, p.163. The whole chapter from which this quotation is taken is entitled 'le mensonge d'un peuple unanime', see pp.161-172.
- 41 *La gangrène et l'oubli*, p.187.
- 42 Introduction, FRE, p.13.
- 43 *La gangrène et l'oubli*, pp. 242-245;302-308)

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- ⁴⁴ Fouvieille-Alquier, 'Agitation a Alger en vue d'un nouveau 13 mai', *Libération*, 30 March 1959, p.11.
- ⁴⁵ Ramdane Redjala, 'La Guerre d'indépendance du FLN' in Gervereau, Rioux and Stora (eds.), p.65.

Notes to Chapter Five

- ¹ Francis Borella, 'Une procédure de négociations', *Esprit*, 25[1] (1957), 138-149 (138).
- ² In this chapter, the terms *association* and federalism are treated as synonymous.
- ³ Charles de Gaulle, speech of 16 September 1959 in *Discours et messages 1958-1962*, 117-121 (pp.121-22) .
- ⁴ Press conference 5 September 1960, in *Discours et messages*, 234-251 (p.241).
- ⁵ Constitutional text cited in *Année politique 1946* (Paris: Grand siècle, 1947), p.576-b. Since Algeria was legally part of France, it was not technically implicated by this statement. Martin Shipway has indicated that Algeria slipped in and out of French statements and policy-making documents about the Empire between 1945-58. References to North Africa in policy documents, he observes, often meant only Tunisia and Morocco. See Martin Shipway, 'Algeria and the "Official Mind": Algeria's Special Status as a Problem for French Colonial Policy South of the Sahara, 1945-58', [unpublished, presented at *The Algerian War and the French Army: Experience, Image, Memory (1954-1962)* conference organised by the European Studies Research Institute 11-13 October 1996].
- ⁶ 'Algérie 1958', CA, p.208.
- ⁷ 'Trois avertissements', in Rioux and Sirinelli (eds.), p.339. At the head of the *intégrationnistes*, Girardet placed Georges Bidault whereas those preferring to make some concessions to limited Algerian autonomy were labelled 'la tendance soustellienne'. Given Soustelle's leading role in the *intégration* programme and his opposition to de Gaulle's version of *association*, it would seem somewhat misguided to identify Soustelle with the camp of the *associationnistes*. Whilst Girardet is correct to point out that Bidault favoured the full incorporation of Algeria into the French Republic and was possibly willing to concede even less local autonomy to Algeria than Soustelle envisaged under *intégration*, these two figures remained very close on the question of Algeria's future status. Chevallier was a better example of a supporter of the federal solution and, as we have seen, Camus positioned himself somewhere between the two camps.
- ⁸ Cited in ET, p.24.
- ⁹ Serge Bernstein and Pierre Milza, *Histoire de la France au XXe siècle. Tome IV: 1958-1974* (Brussels: Editions Complexe, 1992), p.28
- ¹⁰ 'La Révolution algérienne: ses principes', *Résistance algérienne*, 22 July 1957, p.6
- ¹¹ Anon., 'L'indépendance nationale, seule issue possible', *El Moudjahid*, 10 (1957), p.6 [No publication date was printed on this particular issue, simply the volume number]
- ¹² See *La gangrène et l'oubli*, pp.144-6.
- ¹³ *Images of Algeria*, p.188
- ¹⁴ *Interrogating Pontecorvo*, p.9

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- 15 A *Savage War of Peace*, p.15
- 16 Avant propos, CA, p.13
- 17 Cited in ET, p.24.
- 18 'Trois avertissements' in Rioux and Sirinelli (eds.), p.342.
- 19 See Jean Daniel *Le temps qui reste* (Paris: Stock, 1973), p.79.
- 20 Mention should also be made at this stage of Pierre Vidal-Naquet's well-known typology of intellectual opposition to the Algerian war and, in particular, those he terms *Dreyfusards*. See 'Une fidélité têtue', FRE, pp. 58-62. Like the term 'liberal', the appellation *Dreyfusard* does not distinguish between the liberal anti-colonialist and the colonial reformer. Vidal-Naquet describes the *Dreyfusard* position as characterised by a concern for individual rights, civil liberties and general fidelity to the spirit of 1789. This was coupled with a strong patriotic element which led *Dreyfusards* to conclude that France was dishonouring herself by the way in which she waged the combat. Since Vidal-Naquet's typology was constructed to define one particular manifestation of *opposition* to the Algerian war, the term *Dreyfusard* might logically be expected to exclude colonial reformers. However, owing to the ideological heritage upon which colonial reformers drew, the *Dreyfusard* label might with some justification also be attached to their number. As Jean-François Sirinelli comments: 'Il faudra pourtant poser cette question apparemment incongrue: n'est-ce pas aussi au nom d'une certaine forme de postérité dreyfusarde que se produiront quelques-uns des engagements en faveur de l'Algérie...française?'. Sirinelli cites the figures of Albert Bayet and Paul Rivet to show that the question was not quite as incongruous as he imagined his reader would consider it to be. See Jean-François Sirinelli, 'Guerre d'Algérie, guerre des pétitions' in Rioux and Sirinelli (eds.), pp.265-306 (p.271). The views of Rivet will be considered at a late point in this chapter.
- 21 Marius Chatignon, 'Les Assassins ont même visage', *Esprit*, 25[6] (1957), 1003-4 (1004).
- 22 Jean-Marie Domenach, 'Une mauvaise philosophie', *Esprit*, 26[2] (1958), 247-249 (249).
- 23 Cited in AS, p.281.
- 24 *Nous avons pacifié Tazalt*, p.30.
- 25 *Ibid.*, p.165.
- 26 Michel Henry, untitled editorial, *Le Bled* 11 January 1958, p.3.
- 27 In writing about the war, commentators such as Dine and Talbott have made mention of a 'liberals' dilemma'. See *Images of Algeria*, pp.64-74 and *The War Without a Name*, p.248 respectively. We might suggest that there were two strands to this dilemma. Firstly, there was that of the colonial reformers who, to use Paul Sorum's phrase, 'condemned the methods of war that the French Army was using, rather than the aim of the war in Algeria'. See Paul Clay *Intellectuals and Decolonisation in France*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1977), p.113. Opposing the use of torture and other atrocities by the French Army, reformers could not bring themselves to contemplate an independent Algeria. We will return to this version of the liberals' dilemma in Chapter Eight. The second version of the liberals' dilemma was that of the liberal anti-colonialist as typified by Chatignon.
- 28 'La Révolution algérienne: ses principes' *Résistance algérienne*, 22 July 1957, p.16
- 29 Jean-François Sirinelli, 'Les intellectuels français en guerre d'Algérie' in Rioux and Sirinelli (eds.), pp.11-32 (p.13).
- 30 Introduction, FRE, p.9
- 31 'Une fidélité têtue', FRE, p.62 [footnote].
- 32 Pierre Vidal-Naquet 'Le sens d'un refus' in FRE, pp.86-92 (p.91) [Article first published in *France-observateur*, 6 October 1960]

- 33 In this extract, Memmi is writing of the difficulties of the 'colonisateur de bonne volonté'. Whilst his general point about the inapplicability of liberal principles to the struggle for national liberation is a valid one, his account of the difficulties faced is perhaps more appropriate if seen as relevant only to the liberal anti-colonialists rather than the colonial reformers as we have defined them to be. Since reformers believed in the 'consent potential', the dilemma which Memmi describes of supporting the broad goal of independence whilst opposing the means is not one which they saw themselves as having to face.
- 34 Claude Delmas, 'Le professeur Paul Rivet condamne la rébellion algérienne', *Le Bled*, 25 July 1956, p.6. Adjacent references to this article are given in the text.

Notes to Chapter Six

- 1 Camus, 'La vraie démission', CA, 144-7 (p.145) [The *Chroniques Algériennes* do not give the exact date of first publication of this article. It is grouped with a series of articles published in *l'Express* between July 1955 and February 1956].
- 2 Cited in ET, p.25
- 3 Interview of 15 June 1988 cited in Eveno and Planchais, pp.104-5.
- 4 Camus, 'Les raisons de l'adversaire', CA, 148-152 (p.150) [Again, the *Chroniques Algériennes* do not give the exact date of first publication of this article. It is grouped with a series of articles published in *l'Express* between July 1955 and February 1956].
- 5 *Ibid.*, p.150.
- 6 'Que représente l'Algérie pour les finances et l'économie de la Métropole, Ministère de l'Algérie, (1H2571), p.28.
- 7 *Torture and the Role of Ideology*, p.161.
- 8 Memento (1H2538), p.16.
- 9 'Algérie 1958', CA, p.202.
- 10 'L'Algérie, occasion de repenser la patrie', *Contacts*, 6 (1958), p.18.
- 11 See Chapter Seven where the question of the preservation of French independence is incorporated into a discussion of the issues of national prestige.
- 12 Avant-propos, CA, pp. 11-2
- 13 'Vous qui rentrez au pays ... et qui connaissez l'Algérie', (undated: 1H2500-3 *Tracts, affiches, textes de propagande sur les rappelés et les démobilisés (1955-1958)*)
- 14 'C'est l'intérêt de tous les Français que la France reste en Algérie' (1H2500-4), p.4
- 15 'Fiche de Contact', (1H2460-1), p.3.
- 16 It was not only the Army itself but also the wives of some of its officers, in particular Mme. Salan and Mme Massu, who participated in this campaign.
- 17 'Etude sur une campagne de fraternisation' (1H2460-1), p.3.
- 18 'Les armes de la pacification', (LB 8/3/58), p.16.
- 19 'Femmes d'Algérie', (undated: 1h2500-4)
- 20 Cited in ET, pp.210-1.
- 21 Speech of 26 January 1956 broadcast on Radio-Algérie cited in AS, pp.277-8.

- 22 'Un des multiples aspects de la mission des chefs de SAS: Fondation d'un foyer sportif', (1H1206), p.1.
- 23 *Ibid.*, p.3
- 24 *Nous avons pacifié Tazalt*, p.159
- 25 Anonymous article appearing *L'espoir d'Algérie* 12 November 19[?]. This publication was seized and I have been unable to trace full publication details of the original. A copy is stored at 1H2460-1. Adjacent references to this article are simply marked with an asterisk in the text.
- 26 Algeria was divided into *communes de plein exercice* and *communes mixtes*. The former were organised along similar lines to Metropolitan France with a mayor and an elected municipal council. In marked contrast, the *communes mixtes*, in place in predominantly Muslim areas were left under the control of a single French administrator and a few gendarmes.
- 27 'Algérie, socialisme et intégration', *Combat*, 6 (1958), p.116.

Notes to Chapter Seven

- 1 Trois avertissements, in Rioux and Sirinelli (eds.), pp.335-6, p.338.
- 2 Charles de Gaulle, Interview with *Echo d'Oran* in 1959 cited in Jean Touchard, *Le gaullisme 1940-1969*, (Paris: Seuil, 1978) pp. 175-6.
- 3 'C'est l'intérêt de tous les Français que la France reste en Algérie' (1H2500-4), p.2
- 4 Namely, the Resistance organised from London and based around the person of General de Gaulle and the Resistance movement within France in which the Communist Party played a leading role. In Gerard Namer's study of the collective memory of the Resistance in France as it is shown through the process of commemoration, the divided and fragmented nature of the Resistance legacy, particularly the way in which it was fought over by Gaullists and Communists is illustrated. See Gerard Namer, *La commémoration en France de 1945 à nos jours* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1987).
- 5 Memento (1H2538), p.276.
- 6 General Paul Ely, 'Les véritables espérances de la France et de l'Occident', *Revue militaire d'information*, 298 (1958), 7-10 (p.10).
- 7 'Algérie 1958', CA, p.202.
- 8 Cited in Redjala, 'La guerre d'indépendance du FLN' in Gervereau, Rioux and Stora (eds.), p.59.
- 9 *Histoire de l'Algérie coloniale*, p.15
- 10 *The Colonizer's Model of the World*, p.16
- 11 'Que représente l'Algérie pour les finances et l'économie de la Métropole', (1H2571), pp.26-7.
- 12 'C'est l'intérêt de tous les Français que la France reste en Algérie', (1H2500-4), p.4
- 13 'Maintenant vous connaissez l'Algérie' (1H2500-1), unpaginated
- 14 'Mythes et réalités du fardeau algérien' in Rioux (ed.), p.286
- 15 See Schulte, p.23

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- 16 Memento, (1H2538), pp.11, 276.
- 17 'L'Algérie, occasion de repenser la patrie', *Contacts*, 6 (1958), p.16
- 18 Behr, 'The French Army as a Political and Social Factor', *International Affairs* 35[4] (1959), 438-447 (pp.442-3).
- 19 *Interrogating Pontecorvo*, p.23. The attitude of the United States is interesting in this respect. The mediation undertaken in 1957 by American envoy Robert Murphy in the aftermath of the Sakhiat bombing is indicative of American attempts to play an even-handed role. The vehemence with which the United States threw itself into its anti-Communist crusade during this period and its readiness to pick up the baton where the French left off in Vietnam suggests that if the American administration seriously believed that the FLN was Communist-inspired, their neutrality would have been shed in favour of greater support for the French. Charles Cogan has pointed out that the Eisenhower administration wanted to be seen as the champions of anti-colonialism and also did not want to see NATO's defences weakened by France's intervention in Algeria (Charles Cogan, 'France, the United States and the Invisible Algerian Outcome', (unpublished) presented at *The Algerian War and the French Army: Experience, Image, Memory (1954-1962)*).
- 20 Maréchal Alphone Juin, preface to Fournier, p.11
- 21 Anon., 'Alerte à l'impérialisme nasserien', (April 1956: 1h2500-4), unpaginated. Adjacent references to this article will simply be marked with an asterisk in the text.
- 22 *Culture and Imperialism*, p. 357

Notes to Chapter Eight

- 1 'Algérie, socialisme et intégration', *Combat*, 6 (1958), p.99.
- 2 Howard Machin, 'The President, the Parties and the Parliament' in *De Gaulle to Mitterrand: Presidential Power in France*, ed. by Jack Hayward, (London: Hurst, 1983), p.122. The respective Prime Ministers were: Pierre Mendès-France, Edgar Faure, Guy Mollet (following a general election), Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury, Félix Gaillard, Pierre Pflimlin and Charles de Gaulle (who technically presided over the Fourth Republic until his new constitution was approved in the referendum of 28 September 1958).
- 3 *Ibid.*, p.122.
- 4 *The French Stake in Algeria*, p.128
- 5 *Ibid.*, p.23.
- 6 *A Savage War of Peace*, p.99
- 7 Serge Bernstein, 'Une guerre sans nom' in Gervereau, Rioux and Stora (eds.), pp.34-9 (p.34).
- 8 *La gangrène et l'oubli*, p.18. The extent to which political capital could be made from a declaration of war is evident from the vigorous attempts made by the FLN to have the Algerian question discussed in the United Nations and the equally vigorous attempts of the French to stop any such discussion. Since the United Nations had no mandate to discuss the internal affairs of any particular member state, the decision to place Algeria on the agenda constituted a significant political victory for the FLN.
- 9 *Ibid.*, p.13

- 10 Upon his investiture, Mollet appointed General Georges Catroux to the position of Governor-General in Algeria, considered by the settler community to be too much of a reformer. When Mollet visited Algeria, he was pelted with rotten fruit by settlers demonstrating against his nomination of Catroux and what they perceived to be his 'soft' attitude towards the rebellion. That very evening, Catroux resigned to be replaced by Lacoste, perceived to be less liberal.
- 11 *The Locust Years*, p.323.
- 12 *The War Without A Name*, p.56.
- 13 'Algérie, socialisme et intégration', *Combat*, 6 (1958), p., 101)
- 14 Robert Bony, untitled editorial, *L'Aurore*, 18 September 1959, p.5
- 15 R.Treno, 'Je vote pour la sécession', *Le Canard Enchaîné*, 27 September 1959, p. 9
- 16 Soustelle, press conference of 19 October 1960, cited in ET, pp.212-3.
- 17 Anon., 'L'état de l'opinion musulmane' (December 1960: 1H2460-1), unpaginated. Adjacent referenced to this report will simply be marked in the text with an asterisk.
- 18 *La gangrène et l'oubli*, p.208. The comments of General Challe are indicative of the opinion within certain sections of the Army that victory was within their grasp. In an interview in 1959, he stated: 'J'estime qu'il peut y avoir une solution militaire à l'affaire algérienne, parce que les barrages aux frontières remplissent leur rôle et qu'il est possible de se débarrasser assez rapidement de l'adversaire'. Cited in Eveno and Planchais (eds.), p.222 [Article first published as 'Une solution militaire' interview by Eugène Mannoni, *Le Monde*, 23 April 1959].
- 19 A military offensive named after General Challe who devised it. The aim of this intensification of the French military effort was to reduce the fighting strength of the FLN by 50%.
- 20 See Sorum, pp. 105-15. See also Dine, *Images of Algeria*, p.54
- 21 See Rita Maran, *Torture and the Role of Ideology*. Particular attention should be paid to pp.137-185 which deal with intellectual opposition to torture. This chapter highlights the way in which many of the protests against torture were articulated with reference to the values of French civilisation by which commentators meant the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man. Maran also notes, however, that references to Human Rights conventions signed in international law were less often used as points of reference by French writers seeking to speak out against the use of torture. See in particular p.174. See also Dine *Images of the Algerian War*, pp.64-88 for a discussion of the way in which the debate over torture has been replayed in the fiction generated by the war.
- 22 *Malaventure en Algérie*, p.116. Adjacent references to this work will be included in the text.
- 23 Cited in *Malaventure en Algérie*, p.180. See Maran pp.106-23 for a detailed discussion of the anti-torture stance adopted by General Bollardiére during the war.
- 24 See Pierre-Henri Simon, *Contre la torture* (Paris: Seuil, 1957) and by the same author *Portrait d'un officier* (Paris: Seuil, 1958).
- 25 Robert Bonnaud, 'La paix des Nementchas' in *Esprit*, 25[4] (1957), 580-92, (p. 580). Adjacent references to this article will be included in the text.
- 26 *A Savage War of Peace*, p.205.
- 27 *Interrogating Pontecorvo*, p.8.
- 28 *Images of Algeria*, p.72.
- 29 *Ibid.*, pp.54, 64-75.
- 30 *Torture and the Role of Ideology*, pp.47-50.

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- 31 Cited in Eveno & Planchais, p.105.
- 32 *Torture and the Role of Ideology*, p.158.
- 33 Jacques Massu, letter to *Le Monde*, 22 March 1972 cited in Eveno and Planchais, pp.134-9 (p.135)
- 34 *Ibid.* p.137
- 35 *Ibid.* p.135
- 36 See Horne, p.199
- 37 Cited in AS, p.279
- 38 Anon., 'La grande muette est-elle morte', *Le Bled*, 8 March 1958, p.3. The Army was historically known as *la grande muette* on the grounds that, as a body, it largely remained isolated from political issues.
- 39 *Ibid.*, p.3
- 40 Anon., 'Triumphal voyage de M. Lacoste dans l'Est-Constantinois', *Le Bled*, 8 March 1958, p.3.
- 41 Antoine Argoud, *Le problème algérien: solution française*, mimeo, (Organisation Armée Secrète: Bureaux d'études troisième section, 1961), p.2. Adjacent references to this article will be included in the text.
- 42 Camus, 'Appel pour une trêve civile en Algérie', speech delivered in Algiers, 22 January 1956, cited here in CA, 167-84 (p.170)
- 43 Avant-propos, CA, p.13
- 44 Avant-propos, CA, pp.13-4
- 45 Jean-François Sirinelli, 'Les intellectuels français en guerre d'Algérie' in Rioux and Sirinelli (eds.), 11-32, (p.12).
- 46 Simonin argues that the type of works published were highly polemical, typical of the activist rather than the academic: 'Par la régularité, le ton de leur production, les nombreuses saisies dont elles sont victimes, elles rompent les règles implicites de fonctionnement de champ éditorial, où l'entrepreneur l'emporte en règle générale sur l'intellectuel'; see Anne Simonin 'Les Editions de Minuit et les Editions du Seuil' in Rioux and Sirinelli (eds.), 219-46 (pp.219-20). Simonin also recognises the significant, although less radical, contribution of the *Editions du Seuil*, a much larger publishing house. For Simonin, *Le Seuil* adopted a more moderate and cautious approach towards the Algerian question, preferring to 'privilégier les études universitaires ou 'sérieuses' et (...) écarter les essais trop polémiques' (p.234).
- 47 *The War Without A Name*, p.91.

Notes to Chapter Nine

- 1 Cited in Eveno and Planchais, p.106.
- 2 Brian Crozier and Gerard Mansell, 'France and Algeria' in *International Affairs*, (3) 1960, 310-22 (p.312).
- 3 *Algeria. Rebellion and Revolution*, p.15
- 4 *Histoire de la guerre d'Algérie*, p.169.

- 5 Jacques Soustelle, circular of 5 April 1955, addressed to préfets, sous-préfets, maires and administrators, cited in NA, p.55
- 6 Cited in Touchard pp. 175-6.
- 7 *The Locust Years*, p.278
- 8 *Histoire de la France au XXe siècle. Tome IV: 1958-1974*, pp.12-3
- 9 See Roland Barthes, *Mythologies* (Paris: Seuil, 1957)
- 10 *Fast Cars, Clean Bodies*, p.77. Adjacent references to this work will be included in the text. Schalk adopts a similar argument to Ross although rather than a process of 'replacement', he sees the function of the colonies as one of retarding the full expression of the consumer revolution: 'The Algerian war was masking a number of French cultural, social and economic realities - those connected with the post-modern era, the age of consumption, technocracy, the Concorde and the Common Market, mass media, the ethic of vacations, Club Méditerranée and all the rest - and that only needed the settlement of the Algerian crisis to appear in full force.' See *War and the Ivory Tower*, p.95.
- 11 Jean-Paul Sartre Jean-Paul Sartre, 'Vous êtes formidable' in *Situations V*, pp.57-67 [Article first published in *Les Temps Modernes*, 135 (1957)]
- 12 Francis Jeanson, 'Para-Pacification' in *Esprit*, 25[5] (1957), pp. 815-7.
- 13 *La gangrène et l'oubli*, p.73.
- 14 See 'L'opinion française à travers les sondages' in Rioux (ed.), pp.25-44
- 15 *Fast Cars Clean Bodies*, p.123.
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- 17 See *La gangrène et l'oubli*, pp. 21-22.
- 18 Jean Daniel, 'Lettre à un ami d'enfance', , *Le Nouvel Observateur - Dossier Spécial: La Guerre d'Algérie 30 ans après*, (1992), p.7.
- 19 Jacques de Montalais, *Qu'est-ce que le Gaullisme* (Paris : Maison Mame, 1969), p.42.
- 20 *Le problème algérien: solution française*, p. 8.
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Notes to the Conclusion.

- 1 *Culture and Imperialism*, pp. 1-72
- 2 *La gangrène et l'oubli*, p.279
- 3 Alec G. Hargreaves and Mark McKinney, 'The post-colonial problematic in contemporary France' in their own edited work *Post-Colonial Cultures in France*, (London; New York: Routledge, 1997), pp. 3-26 (p.21).
- 4 David Blatt, 'Immigrant Politics in a Republican Nation' in Hargreaves and McKinney (eds.), pp.40-51 (p.46)
- 5 *Histoire de la guerre d'Algérie*, p.71
- 6 Cited in Neil Lazarus, 'Transnationalism and the Alleged Death of the Nation-State' in Pearson, Parry and Squires (eds.), pp.28-48 (p.31).

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- ⁷ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
- ⁸ Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, 'A Western Theme', *Prospect*, 27 (1998), 18-24 (p.19)
- ⁹ See *The Clash of Civilizations*, pp.301-318. Quotation from p.307.

APPENDIX 1:

A SELECTION OF TRACTS PRODUCED BY THE CINQUIEME BUREAU:

1H2500-4

1H2461-2

1H2460-1

O Frères Musulmans !

Les Fellaghas vous ont promis beaucoup depuis 2 ans, et qu'ont-ils apporté en vérité ?

- La guerre,
- La terreur,
- La misère dans vos mechtas.

Et que font-ils maintenant après ces beaux résultats ?

Ils se cachent de Mechtas en Mechtas comme des bêtes traquées et non comme des Moudjahadines.

Ils égorgent leurs frères Musulmans qui désirent vivre en Paix.

Ils attaquent les femmes, les enfants.

MAIS OU SONT LES GRANDS COMBATS CONTRE L'ARMÉE FRANÇAISE qu'ils évitent soigneusement et qui devient chaque jour plus forte ?

IL EST TEMPS DE COMPRENDRE LA VÉRITÉ

Les fellaghas vous ont menti. La France ne quittera jamais l'Algérie mais, par contre, elle n'attend que la Paix pour vous traiter comme ses fils, vous accorder les droits des citoyens libres, et vous faire bénéficier de sa puissance et de sa richesse. Les réformes qu'elle prépare vous étonneront par leur générosité.

Mais chaque jour est un jour perdu pour vous

Tout l'argent dépensé pour les soldats et les fusils ne servira plus pour construire vos maisons et nourrir vos enfants.

TRAVAILLEZ DONC ENFIN dans votre intérêt et celui de vos familles.

Aidez les troupes à combattre les fellaghas.

Prévenez les Postes quand ces derniers se dirigent vers vos Mechtas.

Alors LA PAIX reviendra rapidement.

HABITANTS DU DOUAR MIHOUB

LES FELLAGA ETAIENT SUR VOTRE TERRITOIRE

LE 26 OCTOBRE

VOUS N'AVEZ PAS PREVENU LES AUTORITES
VOUS ETES DONC COMPLICES DES FELLAGA

CHOISISSEZ

ENTRE

LE FELLAG QUI PILLE ET TUE

ET LA FRANCE QUI DONNE LA PAIX ET L'ABONDANCE

SINON

DEMAIN

LA PUNITION VIENDRA

PLUS DURE

K A B Y L E S

---000000---

Vous n'avez pas voulu entendre l'appel du Gouvernement français.

Vous continuez à vous laisser abuser par les rebelles.

Vous les accueillez chez vous.

Vous refusez d'envoyer vos enfants à l'école et de participer à la vie administrative.

Vous commettez des sabotages sur les routes et les lignes téléphoniques.

Vous êtes complices des assassinats que commettent les rebelles sur les Officiers S.A.S. qui vous apportent du travail et de l'argent, ainsi que l'ordre et la paix dans vos villages.

Ceci justifie les mesures spéciales prises par les Autorités.

Elles concernent le renforcement du contrôle de vos activités et de vos déplacements.

*
* *

Ces mesures seront levées dès que vous aurez compris vos erreurs, abandonné ceux qui vous trompent et retrouvé le droit chemin.

~~DES~~ ETRANGERS SONT
VENUS VERS VOUS. ILS VOUS
ONT DIT "NOUS COMBATTONS
POUR L'ISLAM ET NOUS VOUS
APPORTONS LA PAIX ET
LA PROSPERITE."

~~CE~~ SONT DES ORGUEILLEUX, FILS
DE SATAN, DES MENTEURS ET DES
CRIMINELS

Ils nous apportent du sang, des larmes
et une misère.
REJETEZ LES LOIN DE VOUS.

NOUS LES ABATTRONS TOUS UN A UN AVEC
VOTRE AIDE

CEUX QU'ILS AURAIENT ENTRAINES AVEC
EUX PAR FORCE ET PAR TRAITRISE
QU'ILS S'ECHAPPENT

NOUS LES ACCUEILLERONS ET NOUS LES
METTRONS A L'ABRI EUX ET LEUR FAMILLE

FAITES CONFIANCE A LA GRANDE
FRANCE

FIERE ET GENEREUSE

DIEU L'AIDE



1. — Ahmed et Salah, qui vont au souk, surprennent des rebelles en train de parler.

— Ils écoutent la conversation et apprennent que les rebelles vont venir à la mechta pour enlever des hommes.



2. — Ahmed et Salah racontent ce qu'ils viennent d'apprendre.

— Nous voulons vivre en paix, disent les habitants de la mechta. Il faut prévenir les militaires français.



3. — Les habitants de la mechta demandent la protection des troupes françaises.

— Ils indiquent l'endroit où se trouvent les rebelles dans la montagne.



4. — Les rebelles barbares sont arrêtés.

— La mechta pourra vivre en Paix.

Le silence c'est la guerre, la mort, la misère.
La parole c'est la paix, la vie, la prospérité.

PARLONS POUR DEFENDRE NOTRE VIE

البي يعاون المجرم مجرم وكيفية يتعاقب



MOHAMED ET KADDOUR AIDENT LES REBELLES A SCIER LES POTEAUX



MOHAMED ET KADDOUR SONT COMPLICES DES REBELLES — ILS SERONT PUNIS

LES COMPLICES
DES REBELLES EUX AUSSI
SERONT PUNIS
PARLONS

البي يعاون المجرم لمجرم
و كيبه يتعافب

LES COMPLICES



DES REBELLES

EUX AUSSI



SERONT

PUNIS

PARLON

DES MENSONGES QUI RAPPORTENT

MUSULMANS,

On vous a trompés.

On vous a dit que le Front de la Libération était sans fissure et que tous les chefs politiques étaient derrière le F.L.N.

Demandez donc à ce sujet l'avis de MESSALI Hadj.

On vous a dit que l'Egypte pouvait compter sur des appuis puissants et obtiendrait à l'O.N.U. une condamnation sévère de la France.

On vous a dit que jamais les condamnés à mort ne seraient exécutés.

Que ne vous a-t-on pas dit encore, que de promesses perdues dans le sang et les larmes.

Quelle est la réalité ? Quelle est la vérité ?

La France sort victorieuse du débat de l'O.N.U. et ceux-là même des peuples afro-asiatiques qui étaient les plus résolus à obtenir contre elle une condamnation sans équivoque ont dû, l'Egypte en tête, faire stopper un vote qui consacrait leur défaite.

Quant aux condamnés à mort, les journaux vous apportent tous les jours des réponses définitives à leur sujet, vous confirmant ce que vous saviez déjà. La justice française est lente peut-être, mais elle veut offrir toutes garanties, être sereine et impartiale. La décision prise est ensuite implacablement EXECUTEE.

Pendant que vous souffrez, ceux qui s'intitulent vos chefs, vivent A VOS FRAIS confortablement installés à Ouïda ou dans les palaces du Caire ou de New York à 50.000 francs par jour.

Leurs représentants, sous le prétexte de vous apporter la liberté, dont vous jouissiez pourtant déjà, sèment dans vos douars et vos mechtas la ruine, la souffrance et les deuils.

Voilà le bilan de leurs actions.

On comprend que ceux qui profitent de votre argent et abusent de votre hospitalité forcée ne souhaitent pas voir la fin d'une aventure aussi avantageuse pour eux.

C'est à vous qu'il appartient de mettre un terme à ces abus.

Ne vous laissez pas berner plus longtemps.

Surmontez votre peur. Rejetez définitivement la terreur qui pèse sur vous. Aidez-nous à démasquer les agitateurs et les assassins.

Encore un effort de votre part et nous vous délivrerons de leur oppression. Vous pourrez alors reprendre normalement vos activités et vivre heureux au milieu de vos familles dans une Algérie prospère et apaisée.

KABYLE

écoute la voix de la raison

Tu vivais dans la paix.

Tu allais tranquille sur de belles routes pour te rendre au marché.

Tu étais fier de voir tes enfants instruire, de les voir lire et écrire.

Ton village était fier de son école.

Tu es privé de tout. Tes enfants pleurent et te réclament à manger.

Que de peine il te faut dans ton rude pays pour récolter quelques grains et économiser un peu d'argent.

Tu étais un homme libre, tu pouvais fumer comme il te plaisait.

Après une bonne journée, tu aimais parler avec tes voisins dans l'air calme du jour s'achève, assis près de ta maison.

Tu avais la place de ton ami sur une grosse pierre quand il venait vers toi.

Ton pays est troublé

Qui sème le désordre?
Qui coupe les routes?

Tes petits enfants errent dans la campagne et sont ignorants

Qui a brûlé l'école?

Ceux qui te privent égorgent les moutons et vivent grassement.

Les bandits ramassent ton argent.

Où va cet argent?

C'est interdit.

Tu vis dans la peur.

Ta maison est devenue ta prison.

La place est vide. Son sang a peut-être coulé. L'auraient-ils égorgé?

***Ces heures de souffrance tu ne peux pas les
laisser en héritage à tes enfants***

PENSE A DEMAIN, SOIS AUJOURD'HUI AVEC NOUS

PARLONS POUR DEFENDRE NOTRE VIE ET CELLE DE NOS PARENTS

LE SILENCE EST DANGEREUX !

- Celui qui se tait quand il a faim, meure sans être secouru !
- Celui qui se tait quand il est égaré dans le mensonge, meurt sans revoir la lumière
- Celui qui se tait quand il est menacé, meurt sans être protégé

LA REBELLION BARBARE

***QUI NOUS OBLIGE A NOUS TAIRE,
VEUT NOUS FAIRE MOURIR***

Elle pille pour nous affamer.

Elle nous ment pour nous égarer.

Elle nous menace pour nous asservir.

***DIEU NOUS A DONNE LA PAROLE,
CESSONS DE NOUS TAIRE***

PARLONS pour être sauvés de la famine !

PARLONS pour retrouver la lumière de la Vérité !

PARLONS pour échapper à la terreur !

LE SILENCE,

C'EST LA GUERRE, LA MORT, LA MISERE !

LA PAROLE,

C'EST LA PAIX, LA VIE, LA PROSPERITE !

ACTIONS DESTRUCTIVES DES FELLAGHAS

Référence : Propagande - Fiche No. 1

LA FRANCE CONSTRUIT - LE FELLAGHA DETRUIT

1. -Le Fellagha s'impose par la terreur, il égorge femmes, enfants, vieillards.
2. -Il prétend lutter pour vous libérer des Européens, mais il assassine surtout les Musulmans.
3. -Il prétend lutter contre la misère, mais il brûle vos récoltes, égorge vos troupeaux, incendie vos fermes.
4. -Il prétend lutter pour le progrès, mais il détruit les tracteurs, sabote les voies ferrées, les lignes téléphoniques, (détruit les ponts), les routes, incendie les écoles.
5. -Le fellagha prétend lutter pour la liberté, mais par la menace et la terreur, il supprime la vôtre.

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