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When bigger isn't better : bail outs and bank behaviour
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Miller, Marcus, Li, Han Hao and Zhang, Lei (2011) When bigger isn't better : bail outs and bank behaviour. Working Paper. Coventry: Centre for Economic Policy Research. CEPR Discussion Paper (No.DP8602). (Unpublished)
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Official URL: http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP8602.asp
Abstract
The traditional theory of commercial banking explains maturity transformation and liquidity provision assuming no asymmetric information and no excess profits. It captures the possibility of bank runs and business cycle risk; but it ignores the moral hazard problems connected with risk-taking by large banks counting on state bail outs. In this paper market concentration and risk-shifting is incorporated in an analytically tractable fashion; and the modified framework is used to consider measures to restore competition and stability--including, in particular, those recommended for the UK by the Independent Commission on Banking (2011), chaired by Sir John Vickers.
Item Type: | Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper) | ||||
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Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions |
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Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | ||||
Series Name: | CEPR Discussion Paper | ||||
Publisher: | Centre for Economic Policy Research | ||||
Place of Publication: | Coventry | ||||
Official Date: | October 2011 | ||||
Dates: |
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Number: | No.DP8602 | ||||
Institution: | University of Warwick | ||||
Status: | Not Peer Reviewed | ||||
Publication Status: | Unpublished | ||||
Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access | ||||
Description: | Also circulated as CAGE WP 66/2011 (http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/centres/cage/research/papers/archive/) |
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