The Library
Individual accountability in teams
Tools
Marx, Leslie M. and Squintani, Francesco (2009) Individual accountability in teams. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol.72 (No.1). pp. 260-273. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2009.05.009 ISSN 0167-2681.
Research output not available from this repository.
Request-a-Copy directly from author or use local Library Get it For Me service.
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.05.009
Abstract
We consider a model of team production in which the principal observes only the team output, but agents can monitor one another (at a cost) and provide reports to the principal. We consider the problem faced by a principal who is prevented from penalizing an agent without evidence showing that the agent failed to complete his assigned actions. We show the first-best (high effort but no monitoring) can be achieved, but only if the principal assigns second-best actions. The principal requires monitoring, but agents do not monitor, and as long as output is high, the principal does not penalize agents who fail to monitor. If the principal has the responsibility for monitoring, the first-best outcome cannot be achieved, thus we identify an incentive for delegated monitoring even when agents have no informational advantage.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory | ||||
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | ||||
Journal or Publication Title: | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization | ||||
Publisher: | Elsevier BV * North-Holland | ||||
ISSN: | 0167-2681 | ||||
Official Date: | October 2009 | ||||
Dates: |
|
||||
Volume: | Vol.72 | ||||
Number: | No.1 | ||||
Number of Pages: | 14 | ||||
Page Range: | pp. 260-273 | ||||
DOI: | 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.05.009 | ||||
Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||
Publication Status: | Published | ||||
Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access |
Request changes or add full text files to a record
Repository staff actions (login required)
View Item |