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On equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players
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Cartwright, Edward and Wooders, Myrna Holtz (2009) On equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players. International Journal of Game Theory, Vol.38 (No.1). pp. 137-153. doi:10.1007/s00182-008-0150-5 ISSN 0020-7276.
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0150-5
Abstract
We demonstrate that, if there are sufficiently many players, any Bayesian equilibrium of an incomplete information game can be “ε-purified” . That is, close to any Bayesian equilibrium there is an approximate Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies. Our main contribution is obtaining this result for games with a countable set of pure strategies. In order to do so we derive a mathematical result, in the spirit of the Shapley–Folkman Theorem, permitting countable strategy sets. Our main assumption is a “large game property,” dictating that the actions of relatively small subsets of players cannot have large affects on the payoffs of other players.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
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Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory | ||||
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | ||||
Journal or Publication Title: | International Journal of Game Theory | ||||
Publisher: | Springer | ||||
ISSN: | 0020-7276 | ||||
Official Date: | March 2009 | ||||
Dates: |
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Volume: | Vol.38 | ||||
Number: | No.1 | ||||
Number of Pages: | 17 | ||||
Page Range: | pp. 137-153 | ||||
DOI: | 10.1007/s00182-008-0150-5 | ||||
Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||
Publication Status: | Published | ||||
Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access |
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