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The theory of clubs and competitive coalitions
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Wooders, Myrna Holtz (2012) The theory of clubs and competitive coalitions. Annual Review of Economics, Volume 4 . pp. 595-626. doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080511-111006 ISSN 1941-1383.
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080511...
Abstract
This review discusses research demonstrating that club economies and coalition economies with many participants and relatively small effective groups (clubs, jurisdictions, or coalitions) are competitive. Small groups are effective if all or almost all gains to collective activities can be realized by cooperation restricted to them. At this point, there are many papers in the literature demonstrating the competitiveness of club and coalition economies in a variety of contexts. To facilitate the exposition, I treat economies with quasilinear utilities and games with side payments. The main concepts and results for this framework are discussed. Additionally, relationships are established with regard to broader models of club and coalition economies, including very recent contributions to the literature.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
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Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory | ||||
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | ||||
Journal or Publication Title: | Annual Review of Economics | ||||
Publisher: | Annual Reviews | ||||
ISSN: | 1941-1383 | ||||
Official Date: | 2012 | ||||
Dates: |
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Volume: | Volume 4 | ||||
Page Range: | pp. 595-626 | ||||
DOI: | 10.1146/annurev-economics-080511-111006 | ||||
Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||
Publication Status: | Published | ||||
Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access |
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