Isoni, Andrea, Poulsen, Anders, Sugden, Robert and Tsutsui, Kei (2013) Focal points in tacit bargaining problems : experimental evidence. European Economic Review , Volume 59 . pp. 167-188. doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.12.005

Preview

Text WRAP_Isoni_1-s2.0-S0014292112001602-main.pdf - Published Version Download (1972Kb) | Preview

Request Changes to record.

Abstract

We use a new experimental design to test Schelling's hypotheses about the nature and effectiveness of focal points in tacit bargaining problems. In our design, as in many real-world bargaining problems, each player's strategies are framed as proposals about what part of a stock of valuable objects she is to take, and there are payoff-irrelevant cues which define relations between players and objects. In line with Schelling's hypotheses, we find that such cues serve as powerful focal points. Their presence increases efficiency even in games where there is no efficient and equal division, and induces systematically unequal payoff distributions.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School > Behavioural Science Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Economics, Economics, Mathematical, Economics -- Sociological aspects
Journal or Publication Title:	European Economic Review
Publisher:	Elsevier
ISSN:	0014-2921
Official Date:	2013
Dates:	Date Event 2013 Published
Date of first compliant deposit:	24 December 2015
Volume:	Volume 59
Page Range:	pp. 167-188
DOI:	10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.12.005
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
Funder:	Economic and Social Research Council (Great Britain) (ESRC), Leverhulme Trust (LT)
Grant number:	RES-000–22-3322 (ESRC), F/00204/AV (LT)

Request changes or add full text files to a record

Repository staff actions (login required)

View Item

Downloads