Skip to content Skip to navigation
University of Warwick
  • Study
  • |
  • Research
  • |
  • Business
  • |
  • Alumni
  • |
  • News
  • |
  • About

University of Warwick
Publications service & WRAP

Highlight your research

  • WRAP
    • Home
    • Search WRAP
    • Browse by Warwick Author
    • Browse WRAP by Year
    • Browse WRAP by Subject
    • Browse WRAP by Department
    • Browse WRAP by Funder
    • Browse Theses by Department
  • Publications Service
    • Home
    • Search Publications Service
    • Browse by Warwick Author
    • Browse Publications service by Year
    • Browse Publications service by Subject
    • Browse Publications service by Department
    • Browse Publications service by Funder
  • Help & Advice
University of Warwick

The Library

  • Login
  • Admin

Focal points in tacit bargaining problems : experimental evidence

Tools
- Tools
+ Tools

Isoni, Andrea, Poulsen, Anders, Sugden, Robert and Tsutsui, Kei (2013) Focal points in tacit bargaining problems : experimental evidence. European Economic Review , Volume 59 . pp. 167-188. doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.12.005 ISSN 0014-2921.

[img]
Preview
Text
WRAP_Isoni_1-s2.0-S0014292112001602-main.pdf - Published Version

Download (1972Kb) | Preview
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.12.005

Request Changes to record.

Abstract

We use a new experimental design to test Schelling's hypotheses about the nature and effectiveness of focal points in tacit bargaining problems. In our design, as in many real-world bargaining problems, each player's strategies are framed as proposals about what part of a stock of valuable objects she is to take, and there are payoff-irrelevant cues which define relations between players and objects. In line with Schelling's hypotheses, we find that such cues serve as powerful focal points. Their presence increases efficiency even in games where there is no efficient and equal division, and induces systematically unequal payoff distributions.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School > Behavioural Science
Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Economics, Economics, Mathematical, Economics -- Sociological aspects
Journal or Publication Title: European Economic Review
Publisher: Elsevier
ISSN: 0014-2921
Official Date: 2013
Dates:
DateEvent
2013Published
Volume: Volume 59
Page Range: pp. 167-188
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.12.005
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Open Access (Creative Commons)
Date of first compliant deposit: 24 December 2015
Date of first compliant Open Access: 24 December 2015
Funder: Economic and Social Research Council (Great Britain) (ESRC), Leverhulme Trust (LT)
Grant number: RES-000–22-3322 (ESRC), F/00204/AV (LT)

Request changes or add full text files to a record

Repository staff actions (login required)

View Item View Item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics

twitter

Email us: wrap@warwick.ac.uk
Contact Details
About Us