Haldane, Adrian (1999) On the possibility of Kant's answer to Hume : subjective necessity and objective validity. PhD thesis, University of Warwick.

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Abstract

This thesis argues that Kant is able to maintain the distinctiveness of his position in
opposition to Hume's naturalism (contrary to the arguments of R. A. Mall and L. W.
Beck) without invoking premises which are question begging with regard to Hume's
scepticism. The argument of Kant's Transcendental Deduction of the Categories, as
presented in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, is considered in relation
to the two sets of criticism that have been levelled at it from its publication up to the
present day, both of which aim to demonstrate that synthetic a priori judgements are
subjectively necessary but without objective validity.
The first set of criticisms involves problems raised with regard to the status of
transcendental arguments. The difficulties identified here (by B. Stroud, M. S. Gram,
and others) are that the Deduction can either, at best, show that it is necessary for
experience to be regarded in a certain way without demonstrating anything as to the
nature of experience as such, or the argument is circular in that it begins by making
assumptions regarding the nature of our experience.
Alternatively, if the Deduction is taken to establish the objective nature of concepts
via an analysis of the conditions under which it is possible for us to have some
knowledge of ourselves, then incoherence is said to arise because this requires either an
implausible reflective theory of consciousness (according to D. Henrich) or that we
have knowledge of the subject-in-itself (as held by J. G. Fichte and other
contemporaries of Kant).
Through a consideration of both the historical and contemporary manifestations of
these criticisms, the thesis advances an interpretation of the Deduction, with special
attention paid to the role and nature of the subject, which does not fall prey to the
alleged incoherence. As such, the thesis defends both the distinctiveness and legitimacy
of transcendental philosophy.

Item Type:	Thesis (PhD)
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 -- Criticism and interpretation, Hume, David, 1711-1776 -- Criticism and interpretation
Official Date:	1 July 1999
Dates:	Date Event 1 July 1999 Submitted
Institution:	University of Warwick
Theses Department:	Department of Philosophy
Thesis Type:	PhD
Publication Status:	Unpublished
Supervisor(s)/Advisor:	Battersby, Christine, 1946-
Extent:	vii, 209 leaves
Language:	eng

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