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Contractual structure in agriculture with endogenous matching

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Ghatak , Maitreesh and Karaivanov, Alexander (2013) Contractual structure in agriculture with endogenous matching. Working Paper. Coventry, UK: Department of Economics, University of Warwick. CAGE Online Working Paper Series, Volume 2013 (Number 120).

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Abstract

We analyze optimal contractual forms and equilibrium matching in a double-sided
moral hazard model of sharecropping similar to Eswaran and Kotwal (1985). We
show that, with endogenous matching, the presence of moral hazard can reverse the
matching pattern relative to the Örst best, and that even if sharecropping is optimal
for an exogenously given pair of agent skills, it may not be observed in equilibrium
with endogenous matching. The economy with endogenous matching features less
sharecropping compared to an economy with agent skills drawn at random from the
same distribution. This suggests that studies of agency costs in sharecropping may
underestimate their extent if focusing only on the intensive margin and ignoring the
extensive margin.

Item Type: Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
S Agriculture > S Agriculture (General)
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Sharecropping, Economics -- Mathematical models , Tenant farmers
Series Name: CAGE Online Working Paper Series
Publisher: Department of Economics, University of Warwick
Place of Publication: Coventry, UK
Official Date: 2013
Dates:
DateEvent
2013Published
Volume: Volume 2013
Number: Number 120
Number of Pages: 26
Status: Not Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Open Access (Creative Commons)
Date of first compliant deposit: 1 August 2016
Date of first compliant Open Access: 1 August 2016
Funder: Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC)

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