Evolution of the Rationales for Québec's Cultural Policy from 1959 to 1992: In Search of a Compromise

by

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A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of a degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Cultural Policy Studies

University of Warwick, Centre for Cultural Policy Studies
November 2013

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Acknowledgements

Despite the fact that the PhD process is often a solitary one, it would have been impossible for me to write this thesis without the support of many people. First and foremost I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Eleonora Belfiore at the Centre for Cultural Policy Studies of the University of Warwick, for her guidance, enlightened advice and unfailing support at all stages of this long process. I am also grateful towards every member of the staff at the Centre and previous PhD students, Boyun, Lorraine, Hsiao-Ling, Anna, and Paul, for their warm welcome and kindness. I would also like to thank Yves-Marie Abraham at HEC Montréal for having given me the confidence to undertake doctoral studies, and François Colbert for all his encouragements.

I would like to acknowledge the financial support of the University of Warwick for a scholarship covering my registration fees (2008-2011) as well as the Fonds de recherche du Québec - Société et culture for a scholarship (2010-2013) which enabled me to dedicate my time to my research.

Last but not least, I would like to express my gratitude to my lover, partner, and best companion, Martin, for his unconditional support; my father, Jean-Pierre, for having read the first draft of my thesis and for having provided me with relevant comments; my mother, Mireille, and mother in law, Claudette, for having been so caring to my daughter Charlotte whilst I was finishing the writing of the thesis. Finally, a special thanks to Charlotte who, regardless of how small she is, has brightened up the last phase of this journey.

Declaration

Except for commonly understood and accepted ideas, or where specific reference is made, the work reported in this thesis is my own and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration. I also confirm that this dissertation has not been submitted in part or in whole to any other university for any degree.

I acknowledge that a shorter version of chapter one ('Methodology') was presented at the 2010 International Conference on Cultural Policy Research in Jyväskylä and was subsequently made available online at the conference's website.

Abstract

This thesis stems from a questioning of the instability of the state's discourse in the cultural domain. In effect, since the appearance in the Western world of the first explicit cultural policies, arguments justifying the state intervention in this domain have ceaselessly changed over time, appealing sometimes to notions such as that of 'democratisation of culture', 'cultural democracy', or to notions of 'cultural development', 'cultural economy', or 'cultural diversity'. The inconsistencies that characterise the state's rationales in this domain notably reflect a continuous quest for legitimacy that is worth analysing.

Like elsewhere, the consensus over the legitimacy and the purpose of a cultural policy was not easily reached in the Canadian French province, Québec. Several policy statements have indeed been formulated before the adoption, in 1992, of Québec's official cultural policy. To understand the evolution of the justifications for state intervention in this field, we analyse three policy statements that were key in the history of Québec's cultural policy: *Pour une politique* (1959); *La politique québécoise du développement culturel* (1979); and *La politique culturelle du Québec: Notre culture, notre avenir* (1992). In a first phase, we examine the politico-historical context from which these policy statements emerge. Secondly, we recount the origins of the most important ideas that we find at the core of these statements and which were rooted in the work of intellectuals (such as Edmond de Nevers, Edouard Montpetit, Marcel Rioux, Fernand Dumont) as well as in governmental reports that predated their elaboration. We then analyse the argumentation of each cultural policy statement as well as the critiques they raised at the moment of their publication. These critiques were formulated as much by journalists as by politicians, artists and other professionals working in the field of culture. The analysis of the argumentation is carried out with a theoretical model that has been developed by French sociologist Luc Boltanski and economist Laurent Thévenot, the *Economies of Worth*. We explore more particularly the concept of 'compromise' such as it was designed in the model. This concept enables us to understand why cultural policies have difficulty achieving consensus. The application of this model to cultural policy has not been attempted before, so this is one of the original aspects of this thesis.

Abbreviations

A21c	Agenda 21 for culture
EW	Economies of Worth
FLQ	Front de libération du Québec
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
LPC	Liberal Party of Canada
MACQ	Ministère des Affaires culturelles du Québec
MACF	Ministère des Affaires culturelles de France
MSA	Mouvement Souveraineté-Association
PQ	Parti Québécois
PLQ	Parti libéral du Québec
RIN	Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale
UN	Union nationale

INTRODUCTION

On recent debates

Over the past five years it has not been unusual to come across newspaper articles relating the impact of the last global financial crisis, caused by the 2007 credit crunch, on culture. Confronted to a lack of financial resources, many governments have chosen to reduce their culture budget (Bonet and Donato 2011). Recently, the British newsweb the *Guardian* (with the collaboration of *Le Monde*, *El País*, *La Stampa*, *Gazeta Wyborcza* and *Süddeutsche Zeitung*) has started to map the impact of the 'culture cuts' in Europe[1], identifying hundreds of cultural institutions (galleries, museums, theatres, cinemas, festivals, orchestras, etc.) affected by state austerity measures (Rice-Oxley et al. 2012). In some European countries, these measures have been particularly drastic: 'In the Netherlands, government financing for arts programs has been cut by 25 percent', writes Larry Rohter from *The New York Times* (Rohter 2012), and 'Portugal has abolished its Ministry of Culture' (*Idem*). In the United Kingdom, 'Arts Council England, the main arts-funding body, has reduced its expenditure by 30% in real terms over 2011-15', says *The Economist* (2012c) and, thus far, more than two hundred previously subsidised organisations have completely lost their funding (Rogers and Free 2011). Other countries such as Spain, Belgium or Germany have also been hit by important contractions where, as we can see from the map drawn up by the *Guardian*, a great number of institutions have suffered from the cuts.

These financial contractions are obviously a source of serious concern for artists and cultural workers who have mounted protests against budget cuts. Some of their demonstrations have also been quite spectacular, as it was the case when the Italian director of the Casoria Contemporary Art Museum, Antonio Manfredi, burned a work of art

[1] Cuts have been identified in Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom.

to object against the arts cut in his country (2012a). But of course, not everybody is against governments' decision to reduce their culture budget and, following this incident, the international affairs publication *The Economist* launched an online debate on arts funding, asking: 'should governments fund the arts?' (2012b). Pete Spence, from the libertarian think-tank Adam Smith Institute in London, was invited to debate against the motion, whilst Alan Davey, Chief executive of the Arts Council England, debated in favour of the motion. In his argument, Davey defended the democratising mission of the Arts Council, but he also put much emphasis on how the arts sector 'drives Britain's rich creative economy'. In his view, cultural workers indeed 'contribute to growth, through the development of creative skills and economic regeneration, as well as the visitor economy' in addition to making the United Kingdom 'a better place to be for its citizens' (Davey cited in *The Economist* 2012). For his part, Spence notably deplored the patronising attitude of bureaucrats who, in his view, are not entitled to decide for everyone which art deserves the attention of the public, for such judgement can only be subjective. According to him, 'through markets, everyone can have their say, not just those in charge of the purse strings' (Spence cited in *The Economist* 2012). As Spence puts it,

> *[w]hen government seeks to get between artist and art lover, art will surely suffer. No elite panel of experts should decide what art is best for us. We should decide what is best for ourselves. The dead hand of the state doesn't have much going for it—we should put it to rest and embrace the messy, diverse, vibrant tapestry of commercial funding.*
>
> (*Idem*)

In Canada, whilst the country has been relatively spared by the crisis (Pouliot 2012), we hear similar objections against public funding of culture in the media.[2] Even in the French

[2] In 2011, an interview given by the famous Canadian modern dancer Margie Gillis to Krista Erickson at the *Sun News* aroused the indignation of thousands of Canadians. During the interview Erickson 'challenged Gillis on why she and her dance foundation should receive taxpayers' money' recalls the Canadian Broadcast Standards

province, Québec, where the political culture is historically more left-leaning than in other parts of the country, the same ideas circulate. Indeed the libertarian discourse, which questions the welfare state and, more particularly, its intervention in the cultural sphere, is more and more present. Nathalie Elgrably-Lévy, an economics teacher and columnist, belongs to that school of thought, and she recently provoked the debate in Québec, arousing many reactions from artists and cultural professionals. In May 2011, she indeed published a series of three opinion editorials against public support to the arts (Elgrably-Lévy 2011b, 2011c, 2011a). In her articles, Elgrably-Lévy resorts to arguments quite analogous to Spence's own, denouncing the elitism of the subsidy system, questioning the interest and desirability of subsidised art and even its artistic value. According to her, the state support to the arts only aims at helping unpopular if not untalented artists who cannot make a living from their work; the only acceptable way to foster culture, she argues, is to reduce or abolish taxes on cultural products as this would preserve the freedom and sovereignty of consumers.[3]

However, whilst the recent global crisis might have exacerbated the debate over culture funding these last years in different countries, the questioning on the legitimacy of the state intervention in the cultural domain is, in fact, not a new phenomenon. In effect, the criticisms against the state's project to democratise high arts was criticised in the early 1960s for not being able to achieve its ends and, worse, for reinforcing the unequal distribution of 'cultural capital' as Bourdieu and Darbel showed in their authoritative study on cultural practices, *L'Amour de l'art* (1966). In the 1970s and 80s the policies of 'cultural

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Council which had to decide whether the interview violated or not the 'agreed standards of ethics'. The aggressiveness of Erickson had indeed shocked a great number of Canadians who sent a record number of complaints to the council. Inevitably, the interview has re-launched the debate on arts funding in Canada. For more information about this event, we suggest the reading of these webpages: http://www.cbsc.ca/english/decisions/2012/120203.php; http://www.torontosun.com/2011/06/30/sun-tvs-erickson--gets-it-right; http://www.theglobeandmail.com/arts/television/ruling-on-sun-news-krista-erickson-is-a-triumph-for-the-obnoxious/article544541/.

[3] Of course, Elgrably-Lévy is not the only one to defend such stance in Québec and others before her have used the same arguments to criticise the public funding of the arts. See for example Pierre Lemieux, 'Réflexions Libres Sur L'état Et La Culture', in Florian Sauvageau (ed.), *Les Politiques Culturelles À L'épreuve: La Culture Entre L'état Et Le Marché* (Sainte-Foy: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, Institut québécois de recherche sur la culture, 1996), 151-69.

development' that, amongst other things, sought to encourage and foster diverse artistic expressions — including popular culture — were, for their part, criticised for dumbing down culture. The polemical book *L'Etat culturel: Essai sur une religion moderne* by French essayist Marc Fumaroli is certainly emblematic of this position (1991). And despite the government's effort to respond to the criticisms of pro-market advocates, the more recent economic justifications for public support in the arts have not been spared either; they have been impugned on the ground that other policy measures are more effective in stimulating the economy (McCarthy et al. 2004), or that the methods of economic analysis on which these arguments are based are unreliable (Farchy and Sagot-Vuvauroux 1994). In fact, despite the governments' efforts to legitimate the state's intervention in the cultural sector, the rationale behind cultural policies is continuously questioned, criticised, and discredited.

On the legitimacy of cultural policies

I first became aware of these debates in the early 2000s, when I was studying arts management part-time at the university business school HEC Montréal. During that period, I was still making a living from my art (music) and, as an artist, I never questioned the value of art; it appeared obvious to me, though it also seemed ineffable. Moreover, I was myself 'consuming' a lot of 'subsidised art' and I enjoyed the services provided by the various cultural centres in the city. In my mind, the arts' public funding, at the municipal, provincial or federal level of government, was indispensable to the arts sector. I thus felt strongly about this debate and my aim in pursuing a doctorate was firstly to better understand the reasons behind the lack of legitimacy of state cultural policies. I was intrigued by the fact that rationales behind cultural policies have ceaselessly changed over time. The inconsistencies that characterise the state's rationales in this domain reflect a continuous quest for legitimacy that, in my view, was worth analysing. The question that was really

haunting my mind was thus: 'Why is the state intervention in cultural matters so difficult to justify?'.

Evidently, other researchers before me have analysed the question of the state's rationale for cultural intervention and have done so from a diversity of angles and perspectives. Several authors in the United Kingdom, where cultural policy studies are well developed, have explored this issue. For instance, British cultural analysis scholar Jim McGuigan (1996, 2004, 2005) has raised the issue of the hegemonisation of the neo-liberal ideology in cultural policy discourses and criticised the commoditisation of culture. British cultural policy specialists Oliver Bennett and Eleonora Belfiore (2008) have drawn a comprehensive intellectual history of the ideas on the social impacts of the arts that are commonly displayed in cultural policy discourses. Belfiore (2009) has also underlined the presence of much 'bullshit' — or 'disregard for truth and accuracy' (*Ibid*, p. 6) — in British cultural policy discourses, which, she argues, often use poorly based evidence to defend the state's funding of culture, notably when it comes to demonstrating the social impacts of the arts. She has further explored this issue in a subsequent article by highlighting the rhetorical function of 'bullshit', and has called for a better understanding of the performative role of discourse in cultural policy (Belfiore 2010). Political scientist Clive Gray has, for his part, reflected on the 'attachment' strategy of the arts policy to other policy concerns as a means to increase their legitimacy, for example by presenting investments in the arts as part of an employment policy or an urban regeneration program (Gray 2002). Closer to my own preoccupations are other studies by Oliver Bennett, Vincent Dubois, and Gabriel Dussault who have sought to understand the reasons why cultural policies suffer from a deficit of legitimacy, and I will now briefly reflect on their work, starting with Oliver Bennett.

In the mid 1990s, Bennett described the state of crisis in which the British cultural sector found itself following the years of financial scarcity imposed by the Thatcherite

regime (1995, 1996, 2002). Several observers, Bennett noted, made sombre projections for British cultural policies, him included. In his view then, put simply, British cultural policies were confronted with the obsolescence of their rationale. Indeed, Bennett explained how the arguments used to justify cultural policies from the nineteen century onward (national prestige, economic importance of the arts, civilising mission of the arts, correcting the market, post-war reconstruction) had gradually lost their relevance, leaving the cultural sector in a crisis state (O. Bennett 1995). He developed further his analysis some years later, underlying how the belief in the transformative power of the arts and their civilising effects had been central to the United Kingdom's cultural policies. According to Bennett, there existed a strong consensus over the arts' value until the 1980s, when 'cultural authority' finally gave way to 'cultural pluralism' (or cultural relativism). To the consensus over the intrinsic value of the arts succeeded an 'ideological vacuum':

> *It is no longer clear what the arts or cultural policies are for, so new rationales have to be constantly invented and re-invented. The proliferation of economic and social impact studies […] is one symptom of this.*
>
> (O. Bennett 2002, pp. 9-10)

Whether one agrees with Bennett in his analysis of the breakdown of the old consensus over the transformative power of the arts and their civilising mission, the question could still be posed of whether — if such consensus still existed today — it would provide the state with the indisputable legitimacy to intervene in the cultural sphere. Commentators such Spence or Elgrably-Lévy do not deny the arts their ability to transform peoples' lives but more simply contest the state's role as patron of the arts. Such followers of the neo-liberal doctrine have indeed great faith in the market's mechanisms which, in their view, provide everyone with access to a great variety of artistic works, from the most elitist to the most popular ones. Besides, in Spence's view 'the entire British artistic canon was the product of commercial funding' (Spence cited in The Economist 2012b). I am thus inclined

to think that, in the current context, even if the belief over the power of the arts remained intact, it would not necessarily prevent cultural policies from being challenged. Also, when Bennett published his article in 1992, he genuinely felt cultural policies were in an unprecedented state of crisis and he suggested that, unless a 'new vision' capable of 'command[ing] widespread intellectual and political support' emerged, the only alternative remaining was 'to abandon the notion of cultural policy altogether' (O. Bennett 1995, p. 215). As history has shown, cultural policies were not abandoned in the UK, but the debates are still much alive twenty years later there, as well as in many other countries. The question that then comes to mind is: could cultural policies be in a state of crisis for such a long period or is there something about cultural policies which might make them inherently prone to regular crises?

As in the UK, France's cultural policies have been confronted with much criticism. In the late 1990s, French sociologist and political scientist Vincent Dubois thoroughly analysed the history of the institutionalisation of culture as a new 'category of public intervention' in France (Dubois 1999, p. 8) and he brought to light the difficult process by which French cultural policies finally acquired their legitimacy. But regardless of the fact that, according to Dubois, these policies are more legitimate than ever before (Dubois 2010, p. 27), he recently acknowledged the fact that they have been subject to much debate in France in the last twenty years (*Ibid*, pp. 19-20) and are, these days, 'particularly uncertain' (*Ibid*, p. 50).[4] According to Dubois, the 'crisis' of the 'French model' is due to a double failure: first, the failure of the democratisation project and, second, the failure to spread the French culture worldwide (*Ibid*, p. 19). Dubois strongly emphasised the problematic aspect of the failure of cultural democratisation that neither cultural policies nor the increased access to

[4] Like Oliver Bennett, Dubois situated the turning point in the 1980s whilst the policies of the charismatic Jack Lang were losing their impetus and beginning to show their limitations. Thus, in principle, the policies of the 1980s aimed at enhancing local cultural diversity and legitimising new artistic practices (such as rock music, graffiti art, design, cartoons), but in reality, most of the cultural budget remained allocated to the 'most institutionalised forms of culture' or to great cultural institutions located in the capital, such the Musée du Louvre, the Opéra, or the Bibliothèque Nationale de France, etc.

higher education have solved. For Dubois, this fundamental objective constituted a 'common belief', a '*modus vivendi*' (*Ibid*, p. 38) which gave cultural policies their legitimacy but, of course, the repeated admissions of failure of these policies 'have more largely instilled a persisting doubt over the founding principles and the validity of a cultural policy'[5] (*Ibid*, p. 40, our translation).

So, according to Dubois, the main grievance against French cultural policy is that, as statistics have shown, the attendance levels to cultural activities have not significantly changed within the different classes of people in the French society. But was the consensus over the very aim of cultural policies that obvious in France? Dubois recalled that the French Department of Cultural Affairs originally circumscribed its action to the domain of the French heritage and contemporary art' (*Ibid*, p. 29), and, as some of the research I conducted as part of the writing of this thesis have lead me to conclude, Malraux himself had no illusions as regards to the communicability of art, more particularly of contemporary art, the main object of his policy. Indeed, in an interview he gave a few years before becoming the French Minister for Cultural Affairs, Malraux clarified his view: 'I think that the art of our time is not intended for all men and that, alas!, it will not be intended for all proletarians anymore than it was for all aristocrats and all bourgeois'[6] (Malraux 1996, p. 166). In other words, Malraux believed that art could touch certain people, but not everyone. This raises the question as to whether Malraux's fundamental intention was well interpreted, and the fact that Malraux himself did not believe in the possibility of making art accessible to all (regardless of people's social status) sheds doubt on the idea that a clear consensus on widening access as the aim of the French cultural policy existed from the start.

[5] 'D'abord ces constats répétés [de l'échec de la démocratisation de la culture], affaiblissant la croyance fondatrice dans la démocratisation culturelle, ont plus largement instillé un doute persistant sur les fondements et le bien-fondé des politiques culturelles.'

[6] '*je crois que l'art de notre temps ne s'adresse pas à tous les hommes, et qu'il ne s'adressera pas plus à tous les prolétaires, hélas ! qu'il ne s'adressait à tous les aristocrates, ou à tous les bourgeois.*'

Beside the questioning of the 'founding principle' of the democratisation of the arts, Dubois identified other problems that have contributed to weakening the legitimacy of French cultural policies, some of which result from questions of an administrative nature (such as the excessive budget absorption for operating cultural facilities or the administrative overlapping between the various governmental levels), whilst others are more closely associated with sector-based issues (for example, the long-lasting problem of the management of employment in the audio-visual sector). Of course, ideals come up against practical issues and, clearly, we cannot underestimate problems of an administrative and management nature when assessing cultural policies. However, these problems seem to remain secondary when addressing the question of the legitimacy of cultural policies. In effect, it is commonly known that the French and British state interventions in cultural matters have been constructed and structured on a different basis; the French model being more interventionist and bureaucratic, the British model, based on the arms' length model, being less interventionist and leaving to the private sector a greater share of responsibility. However, the feeling of 'crisis' in cultural policy matters is as strong in France as it is in the UK. The issue of the legitimacy and relevance of cultural policies would thus seem to go beyond national historic-politico-administrative realities, again, as if something more fundamental was at stake here.

Finally, it is important to note that the very question of the rationale for state intervention in the field of culture has rather been neglected in Canada and I have identified only one paper which looks specifically into this issue.[7] Written some while ago, in 1986, by sociologist Gabriel Dussault, this paper proposes to undertake a 'critical

[7] Although Michael Dorland has attempted to demonstrate how the Foucauldian theory of governmentality could be useful in understanding Canadian cultural policy discourses, he left the task of doing it to others (see Michael Dorland, 'Policying Culture: Canada, State Rationality, and the Governmentalization of Communication', in Jody Berland and Shelley Hornstein (eds.), *Capital Culture: A Reader on Modernist Legacies, State Institutions, and the Value(S) of Art* (Montreal & Kingston; London; Ithaca: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000), 142-51.) Guy Bellavance has also shown an awareness of the difficulty for cultural policies to remain coherent, but has not, to our knowledge, explored this issue further (see Guy Bellavance, 'La Démocratisation, Et Après?', in Guy Bellavance, Lise Santerre, and Micheline Boivin (eds.), *Démocratisation De La Culture Ou Démocratie Culturelle?* (Sainte-Foy: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 2000), 27-43.).

examination of some of the main common justifications for state intervention' in culture[8] (Dussault 1986, p. 19, our translation). Despite the fact that Dussault discusses ideological justifications rarely brought to the fore ('cultural needs'; 'cultural rights', and 'cultural development'), his paper is more of an all-out attack against cultural policies. Unfortunately Dussault's article, in my view, is not convincing and the objections he raises against these policies fail to explain their lack of legitimacy. His arguments are not fully convincing for two reasons: first, his arguments tend to suffer from much generalisation and, second, his claims are not based on enough concrete evidence. For instance, Dussault highlights the fact that governments justify their intervention by claiming to fulfil the cultural needs of the citizens but, he argues without solid evidence, the government has provided cultural services that, in fact, did not respond to any need. That the state be criticised for its lack of efficiency is certainly justified, but it is not evident at all that all cultural interventions have failed. Dussault would need to examine more closely the objectives of specific policies and their real impact to provide a convincing argument. Dussault's paper also generally displays much suspicion over the state's agenda. For instance, the author is fast in concluding that because, in the past, dictatorships have invoked 'access rights' to culture to set up a propaganda system these 'access rights' justifications must always serve hidden (if not dangerous) agendas. But regrettably, Dussault's analysis remains superficial and, worse, the argumentative tricks he uses to discredit cultural policies altogether is unpersuasive: the government of a dictatorship or a eugenic regime is not comparable to a democratic one. Again, the process of generalisation in Dussault's rhetoric is, in my view, ineffective in undermining policy justifications based on 'cultural rights', and concrete evidence is needed for the critique to become more credible to the reader. Nevertheless, his paper is interesting in that it illustrates the fact that critiques against cultural policies take various forms and come from diverse perspectives.

[8] '*un examen critique de quelques-unes des principales justifications courantes de l'intervention culturelle étatique*.'

The question of the legitimacy of cultural policies has thus interested other researchers at different moments of time and in different countries. Given the fact that these policies are still widely debated nowadays, the question certainly needs to, again, be scrutinised. This thesis thus seeks to pursue this reflection and open new avenues for thought and it does so by addressing the main research question: **Why is the state intervention in cultural matters so difficult to justify?**

Methodological choices

As I have explained, this thesis seeks to understand the reasons why cultural policies fail to reach long-lasting consensus. To transform this question into a realistic research project, I have chosen to study more particularly the specific case of the French-speaking province of Québec, bearing in mind the fact that, by restricting thus my field on investigation, the possibility to generalise my results would also inevitably be reduced (but as Dussault's article showed, to embrace too wide a field is risky: too much generalisation can also lead to meaningless results). Now, in Québec, like elsewhere, the rationale for state intervention in cultural policy matters has continuously changed over time, as if in an attempt to convince the detractors of the validity for such state intervention. In order to better understand this situation, I have formulated two other questions: **1) How have justifications for state intervention in the cultural field evolved in the province of Québec? 2) How have the critiques against the policies affected the evolution of cultural policy in the province of Québec?**

The decision to analyse this case was evidently motivated by the fact that, having lived all my life in this province, I am more familiar with its political and cultural reality than anywhere else, and especially interested to explore it further. But the Quebecois case interested me for two other important reasons: first, the government of Québec has been prolific in terms of the number of cultural policy proposals produced. In effect, five

comprehensive cultural policy proposals have been elaborated in a span of thirty years before the official cultural policy was finally adopted in 1992.[9] The case of Québec is thus interesting as it illustrates the fact that the consensus over the legitimacy and the purpose of a cultural policy is not easily reached. Second, I soon realised that this field of studies had not been much investigated in this region, as we will see further in this section.

To answer the first of the research questions listed above ('How have the justifications for state intervention in the cultural field evolved in the province of Québec?'), I have decided to examine more closely three policy statements that were key in the history of Québec's cultural policy: 1) *Pour une politique* (1959); 2) *La politique québécoise de développement culturel* (1978); 3) *La politique culturelle du Québec: Notre culture, notre avenir* (1992). The first two policy statements were formulated by governments which were able to carry out their respective political agenda — at least partially — as they remained in power long enough to do so. The third one is the official cultural policy of Québec which was adopted in 1992 and which remain, to this day, the official strategy for the sector.[10] My interest in these policy statements also lies in the fact that they were released at wide intervals and therefore clearly mirrored the changing tendencies in cultural policy at different times. In the conclusion chapter, I have also briefly analysed the most recent governmental statement, the *Agenda 21C* formulated in 2011, to highlight emerging themes and issues in Québec's cultural policy discourse. To answer the second research question ('How have the critiques against the policies affected the evolution of cultural policy in the province of Québec?'), I have decided to analyse the arguments of the detractors of these policies. These critiques were formulated as much by

[9] *Pour une politique* (1959); *Livre blanc de la culture* (1965); *Pour l'évolution de la politique culturelle* (1976); *La politique québécoise du développement culturel* (1978); *Une politique de la culture et des arts* (1991). Québec has also produced numerous sector-based policy statements. The reader can find the complete list of policy statements in *Annex 1*.

[10] The 1959 manifesto led to the creation of the *ministère des Affaires culturelles* (MACQ) along with three other agencies; the 1978 white paper led to the creation of the *Société de développement culturel*, better known as the *Société québécoise de développement des industries culturelles* and the *Institut québécois de recherche sur la culture,* notably; and the 1992 official policy led to the creation of a *Ministère de la Culture* as well as the creation of an arm's length body, the *Conseil des arts et des lettres du Québec*.

journalists as they were by politicians, artists or other professionals working in the field of culture, and they were assessed through an analysis of their appearance in media reactions to the publication of the policy documents at the centre of the study.

The overall analysis of the argumentation presented in the chosen key policy texts was carried out employing the model the *Economies of Worth* (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006), which was developed by French sociologist Luc Boltanski and economist Laurent Thévenot. As Boltanski and Thévenot put it, the model was originally conceived to 'analyze the critical operations that people carry out when they want to show their disagreement without resorting to violence, and the ways they construct, display, and conclude more or less lasting agreements' (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 25). The model indeed stems from the observation that people, whenever placed in situations where they have to justify their stance, base their argumentation on what the authors call a 'superior common principle'. But if people elaborate arguments to justify themselves, policy statements do so too. These documents effectively display different sets of arguments to justify the governments' decision to intervene in a particular sector — arguments that obviously have to refer to the same common principles that ordinary people use. As I was interested in the process of justification and denunciation that affects cultural policies, the *Economies of Worth* model seemed to be a promising interpretive device which could provide me with new insights. My interest in this model also lies in the fact that, to my knowledge, it has never been used in cultural policy analysis and it seemed important to test whether it might be helpful in explaining the fact that debates over cultural policy are continuously going on. I have thus adapted and applied the model to analyse the arguments displayed in all three policy statements as well as the ones deployed by the critics. Also, to have a greater understanding of the ideas and principles evoked in the documents under study, each chapter includes an analysis of the historic-political context of the time and an overview of the origin of the ideas that have fed into the policy statements under study.

As I have said earlier, the field of cultural policy studies has not been much investigated in Canada. Of course, the uncertain limits of the field of cultural policy studies makes it difficult to do a precise inventory of the research in this domain. A few years ago, Australian sociologist Tony Bennett asserted that there was 'no consensus regarding the nature and the scope of [cultural policy studies'] concern' (T. Bennett 1998, p. 271) and, when looking at the work of researchers who have reflected on the nature of cultural policy research thereafter, it is clear that cultural policy analysis can be undertaken from a variety of perspectives (Ahearne 2004; T. Bennett 2006; Garcia and Scullion 2005; Gray 2010; Popa 2006) (my own approach is, transdiciplinary and combines sociological theory to historical investigation and history of ideas as I explain further in the text). In a relatively recent literature review, Diane Saint-Pierre drew similar conclusions to her international counterparts as regards to cultural policy research in Canada, which is also characterised by the diversity of approaches (Saint-Pierre 2002, p. 986). Moreover, research related to issues of cultural policy in Canada has mostly been produced by governmental bodies or advocate organisations[11] whilst academic research only started to develop in a more consistent fashion in the 1980s-1990s (*Ibid*, p. 987-88). The fact that there are no Canadian universities offering postgraduate degrees in the field of cultural policy (and no strong cultural policy academic community) certainly contributes to this state of affairs.[12] This, besides, explains in great part my decision to study abroad: the University of Warwick's Centre for Cultural Policy Studies enabled me to focus on my research project and to use a

[11] Such as the Canada Arts Council, the Canadian Conference of the Arts, or professional artistic associations.

[12] According to my research, there are several universities offering diplomas in Arts Administration, Heritage Management, Communication Studies, or Cultural Studies, but, it would seem that, at present, only York University in Ontario offers the specialisation Politics & Policy within the graduate program in Communication & Culture (I made broad research on the Internet and consulted several databases, such as the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada's database, the Canada's Higher Education and Career guide's database, and the ENCATC / UNESCO Directory). In 2008, Carleton University in Ottawa offered a Master of Arts in Canadian Culture and Cultural Policy (which was then just one of six other specialisations for this master), but the programme is not available anymore. The Simon Fraser University's School of Communication has also briefly hosted a Centre for Policy Studies on Culture & Communities from 2005 to 2008. Moreover, amongst all the programmes, only a few ones include a course on policy in these sectors (Athabasca University's undergrad programme in Communications Studies; University of Victoria's Fine Arts diploma, HEC Montréal postgraduate diploma in Management of Cultural Organisations; UQAM's certificate in Cultural Animation, INRS's Master in Research Practices and Public Action).

transdisciplinary methodology, in line with the Centre's own approach to researching cultural policy.

My literature review also led me to the same conclusions as Saint-Pierre with regards to the small amount of research in the field. And although academic literature in this domain appears to be fast-growing since the 2000s, there are many gaps still to be filled in cultural policy studies in Canada and in Québec, notably with regards to the analysis of official policy statements. Indeed, despite the fact that the statements that I have chosen to analyse have had a significant impact on Québec's cultural sector, only one cultural policy statement has been the subject of an in-depth analysis: the official cultural policy, *La politique culturelle du Québec* (Québec 1992). In 2003, Diane Saint-Pierre indeed published a book entitled *La Politique culturelle du Québec de 1992: continuité ou changement?*, in which she uses Paul A. Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith's *Advocacy Coalition Framework* to understand the various factors (the role of ideas, the beliefs of actors, the socio-economic, cultural and institutional events of significance, etc.) that led to the elaboration of the official policy. The other policy documents my thesis examines are important policy statements in their own right, even though they were not official policy, but few researchers have analysed them. The case of *Pour une politique* (1959) is distinctive in two ways. First, the manifesto is not a cultural policy proposal as such: it is, in fact, a comprehensive political programme that goes well beyond the realm of culture. Second, during his living time, the author of the manifesto, Georges-Émile Lapalme, ex-leader of *Parti libéral du Québec* (PLQ) and creator of the *Ministère des Affaires culturelles* (MACQ), always refused to make it public. In 1988, the political scientist Claude Corbo finally obtained the authorisation of Lapalme's family to posthumously publish the manifesto, and since then, Lapalme's contribution to Québec's cultural policy has been more widely acknowledged. The book entitled *Georges-Émile Lapalme* edited by Jean-François Léonard (1988) was one of the first to include articles discussing Lapalme's policy, notably by

sociologist Marcel Fournier and art sociologist Francine Couture, two important researchers in the field of culture. Lapalme's cultural vision has also interested the historian Jean-Charles Panneton (2000) who published the first (and only) biography of Lapalme. And, more recently, sociologist and historian Fernand Harvey (2010) has provided a thorough and well-documented study on Lapalme's cultural project. As for the other document under analysis, *La politique québécoise du développement culturel* (Québec 1978b), it has been the object of just one study: Yvon Leclerc, former cabinet director and PhD researcher at the *Institut national de la recherche scientifique* (INRS), has published a book chapter (Leclerc 2010) in which he analyses the content and the ambitions of the policy. However, despite the fact that these studies are of great value, there exist very few in-depth analyses on the policy statements that we have chosen to study, and our thesis seeks to contribute to filling this gap.

As I have said earlier, to better understand the policy statements under study, I have also decided to retrace the origin of the ideas that have fed them. Again, the history of ideas of Québec's cultural policy has not been undertaken by other scholars so far. Having said that, the work of Claude Corbo (2006) on the *Rapport de la Commission d'enquête sur l'enseignement des arts au Québec* has been very useful in understanding the ideas behind the policies of the 1970s. The book *Nationalism and the Politics of Culture in Quebec* by the American anthropologist Richard Handler (1988) has also provided me with invaluable information on the policies of the 1960s and 1970s. Finally, apart from a few articles retracing the main stages of Québec's cultural policy and two Master theses (G. Bellavance and Fournier 2002 [1992]; Gattinger and Saint-Pierre 2008; Groisard 1995; Hyman 1988), there are no comprehensive historical studies of Quebecois cultural policies. By following the evolution of Québec's cultural policy through the analysis of policy statements that were published at wide interval, I hope to contribute to building a historical comprehension of Québec's cultural policy. Obviously, since few analyses were

available on my research topic, I needed to consult many primary sources (correspondence, working documents, memoirs, government documents, newspaper articles, etc.). I have also interviewed the author of one governmental report published in the 1980s, a period particularly neglected by researchers. My methodological approach is further explained in the first chapter of the thesis.

To sum up, the aim of this thesis is three-fold. It seeks to contribute to the studies of cultural policy by 1) pursuing the reflection over the legitimacy of cultural policies; 2) by exploring the application of a theoretical model that has never been used in cultural policy analysis; 3) by filling a (some) gap(s) in Québec's literature on cultural policy.

The constitutional question

Before presenting briefly the content of each chapter, it might be useful for the non-Canadian reader to be reminded that, in Canada, '[c]ultural policy is an area of concurrent jurisdiction' that 'has given rise to jurisdictional conflicts between the federal and provincial governments, most notably with the province of Québec' (Gattinger and Saint-Pierre 2008, p. 336).

Indeed, the Canadian Constitution, the fundamental law of the Canadian confederation, recognises a relative autonomy to all ten provinces and spells out the areas of power of the federal and provincial governments respectively. The federal government thus has the power to legislate on matters of 'general interest', such as trade and commerce, taxation, currency, national defence, naturalisation, criminal law, etc. (Beaudoin 2012). For their part, the provincial governments can legislate on 'local areas' such as education, health and social services, property and civil rights, municipal institutions, natural resources (Québec 2013a), and, 'broadly, any matters with a purely local or private

nature in the province'[13] (Beaudoin 2012, our translation). However, the division of constitutional powers in cultural matters is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution (Brouillet 1998, p. 23). This has given rise to diverse interpretations of the law. Historically, the clause related to 'peace, order and the good government' (Brouillet 1998, p. 24, our translation) has provided the federal government the justifications to intervene in matters such as communications, including telegraph, radio-television, cable broadcasting (J. Harvey and Marsh 2012), and to an extent the Internet[14] (Beauregard 2007). Even though the 'article 93' gives the provinces the exclusive power 'to make Laws in relation to Education' (Canada 1867), the federal government has, in fact, intervened in higher education since the end of the nineteen century. Initially, national defence served as a justification for the federal government to act in this sector, but its intervention gradually increased and, today, this level of government significantly contributes to the financing of Canadian universities as well as academic research (Cameron 1992). Moreover, since the 1940s, the federal government has also used its 'spending power' to a greater extent to intervene in areas that were not originally in its jurisdiction (Asselin 2002). As attorney Mollie Dunsmuir explains:

> *The concept of a federal "spending power" is a relatively recent constitutional development. It arises from federal government initiatives immediately following the Second World War, and is closely linked with efforts to centralize the taxing power. […] The spending power thus became the main lever of federal influence in fields that are legislatively within provincial jurisdiction, such as health care, education, welfare, manpower training and regional development. By making financial contributions to specified provincial programs, the federal government could influence provincial policies and program standards.*

[13] '*À l'opposé les provinces se réservèrent les compétences relatives aux affaires locales […]: l'éducation, la propriété et les droits civils dans la province, en règle générale, les travaux et entreprises d'une nature locale, les institutions municipales dans la province et, généralement, toutes les matières d'une nature purement locale ou prive dans la province*.'

[14] The question of Internet is currently debated and various instances are working on delimiting the respective areas of responsibility of the federal level and the provinces in this regard.

(Dunsmuir 1991, p. 1)

In other words, despite the prescriptions of the Constitution, the federal government can, in the name of the national interests, arrogate the rights to intervene in areas of provincial jurisdiction. Now, without entering the meanders and complexities of the Canadian constitution, suffice it so say that the interpretations of some clauses of the Canadian constitution are debatable. This has given rise to many political conflicts between the federal and provincial governments, but the province of Québec, which houses the most important French-speaking population, has, more than others, often strongly contested the federal government's interpretation of the country's fundamental law, and resisted the centralising tendencies of the federal government, most notably in cultural matters. As the reader will see, this issue is a recurring one and will often be mentioned throughout this thesis.

Finally, as rapidly mentioned earlier, municipal institutions fall under the jurisdiction of the provinces, in Canada. In effect,

> *[s]ection 92 of the [1867 Constitution] Act sets out the exclusive powers of provincial legislatures in 16 areas, with section 92(8) giving the legislature of each province exclusive responsibility for making laws relating to that province's municipal institutions. Of the other sections of the* Constitution Act, 1867 *with implications for municipalities, section 92(2) grants the province the power to impose direct taxes to carry out provincial responsibilities.*
>
> (Dewing and Young 2006, p. 2)

However, despite the fact that municipalities are 'legally subordinate to provincial governments' (*Idem*) does not mean that they have been deprived of means to show initiative in matters of public culture; quite to the contrary, municipalities have, in fact, often been pioneers in this domain. In Québec, the first public library was created in 1917 thanks to the Montréal city hall (Dagenais 1996) and, similarly, the very first arts council in

Canada was created by Montréal mayor, Jean Drapeau, in 1956 (Renaud and Des Landes 2009), being again ahead of both the provincial and the federal governments which had not yet created their main instruments for cultural intervention, namely the *Ministère des Affaires culturelles* for the former, and the Canada Council for the Encouragement of the Arts, Letters, Humanities and Social Sciences for the latter. The city of Sherbrooke was also the first to be endowed with an official policy in 1983 (and was followed by eight other municipalities) (Durantaye 2002, p. 1014) before the provincial government had been able to formulate its own policy. But, despite of these progressive initiatives in cultural matters and despite the growing regionalisation of the state's cultural services—that entailed increased dialogue with local governments—which had begun at the end of the 1960s to gain more strength in the 1970s[15], the involvement of municipalities remained relatively limited until the 1990s. The contribution of municipalities in cultural matters became truly significant when Québec state adopted its official cultural policy in 1992 and redefined the respective responsibilities of the various levels of governments (Durantaye 2002, pp. 1008-15), as we will see in the fourth chapter of this thesis.

Summary of the chapters

Given the importance of the model in my analysis, I devote most of chapter 1 to discussing it. Having presented its purpose and its core concepts, I then explain how I have applied the model but I also point to its limits. I then justify my choice to complement the analysis by contextualising the policies and by providing a history of the ideas that have informed them.

Chapter 2 covers the period of the 1950s and 60s. After an overview of the particular political context of the time, I look at the ideas that have influenced the writing

[15] Sociologist and historian Fernand Harvey published in 2011 a chronology retracing the main state cultural initiatives, and in which the various stages of the regionalisation of the state cultural services appear clearly. See Fernand Harvey, 'Chronologie De L'action Du Gouvernement Du Québec Dans Le Domaine Culturel - 1867-2011', (Québec: Québec - Ministère de la Culture, des Communications et de la Condition féminine, 2011), 150.

of *Pour une politique*, a manifesto that includes the first elaborated cultural policy proposal for Québec. Despite the fact that the author of the manifesto, Georges-Émile Lapalme, is generally described as a precursor, the ideas that fed into his manifesto were essentially formulated at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century by two French Canadian intellectuals: Edmond de Nevers (1862-1906) and Edouard Montpetit (1881-1954). Since Lapalme also claimed to follow André Malraux, French Minister of Cultural Affairs, I explore further the links between the two, but conclude that their respective approaches were different in many respects. I then analyse the main critiques addressed to Lapalme's proposal. These mainly stemmed from the new PLQ leader: Jean Lesage. Indeed, not only do the content of Lesage's speeches on culture contrast with Lapalme's owns, but a closer look at their correspondence reveals important differences of views. Although Lapalme was named, at his own instigation, the first Minister of Cultural Affairs, his vision never fully realised, hindered by the resistance of the members of his own party.

Chapter 3 focuses on the 1970s, but overlaps with the periods discussed in chapter 2 and 4. After an overview of the main historical events that are of significance to understand the policy statements produced in the 1970s, I retrace the emergence of the concept of cultural development that was originally formulated in France (and later promoted by UNESCO) before being used for the first time in the *Rapport de la Commission d'enquête sur l'enseignement des arts au Québec* (1968) to which anthropologist Marcel Rioux contributed. The concept was again put forward in the *Rapport du Tribunal de la Culture* in 1975 and in the green paper *Pour l'évolution de la politique culturelle* in 1976 before being fully developed in the 1978 white paper entitled *La politique québécoise du développement culturel*. The elaboration of this last policy statement was initiated by Dr. Camille Laurin, State Minister of Cultural Development, but its writing was entrusted to sociologist Fernand Dumont. The chapter considers both their contributions and analyses

the content of the policy. I then present a discussion of the articles published just after the release of the 1978 white paper as well as few academic papers that criticise one or the other aspects of the policy proposal. I conclude by making a failure assessment: four years after the release of the white paper, people from the cultural sector demanded that an official policy of cultural development be formulated without ever referring to the 1978 white paper.

Chapter 4 covers the period between the 1980s and '90s. As with previous chapters, I first present an overview of the major events that occurred on the Canadian and Quebecois political and economic scenes, events that obviously had a strong influence on the evolution of Québec's cultural policy. After having underlined the impact of neo-liberalism on the government's discourses on culture, I analyse the content of the policy government of Québec which deployed a new strategy to prevent and neutralise critiques. I conclude by explaining why the government succeeded in reaching a (temporary) consensus over the 1992 cultural policy.

The chapters of this thesis will aim to demonstrate how the *Economies of Worth* model can be used as an interpretive device for explaining the difficulty for cultural policies to reach widespread and long-lasting consensus and to be perceived as being fully legitimate.

1 METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This chapter presents the methodological approach of the thesis, which is centred on the model the *Economies of Worth*. Developed by Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot, the model can be used to shed new light on the nature of arguments displayed in policy statements to justify state intervention in cultural matters. In the first section of this chapter we present the model, its purpose and its core concepts before exploring further, in the second section, the concept of 'compromise' that we use as a structuring element throughout the thesis. After having explained the functioning of 'compromises', we provide some examples as to how the concept can be applied to policy statements more globally. In the third section, we explain more precisely how we work with the model to analyse key Quebecois cultural policy statements. We also point to the limits of the model, suggesting that they can be overcome by supplementing it with an analysis of the historical context in which these cultural policy proposals have been elaborated, and also by retracing the origin of the ideas that have most influenced the elaboration of the statements under analysis. We finally explain how the model can enable us to understand why consensus in cultural policy matters is hard to reach.

1.1 The model

French sociologist Luc Boltanski and economist Laurent Thévenot have developed a theoretical model that sheds new light on the nature of arguments displayed in policy statements to justify state intervention in cultural matters. Although the model was designed to analyse critique itself, it extends its scope to the various forms of agreement, of which policy statements can be part. Basically the *Economies of Worth* model (EW model)

aims at understanding how people express their disagreement in conflicting situations without using force and how they reach and maintain a more or less stable and lasting agreement (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 25). More precisely, the model is a means to analyse the nature of arguments to which people refer to when asserting their rights (rights that, besides, might follow implicit rules such as social etiquette) and explain why some arguments are more convincing than others. According to the model, valid arguments possess a certain universality and refer to forms of generality, to 'principles of equivalence' (also called 'principles of justice'), that allow the production and the distribution of worth — or, in other words, that enable processes of evaluation. In effect, in order to make sense of the social world, we are brought in everyday life to judge people and things that are involved in various situations, and when an event does not unfold 'rightly', when we perceive an injustice, we call into question the legitimacy of the situation, provoking thus a conflict. Because 'crisis situations' cause people to deploy arguments so as to denounce or justify certain behaviours and decisions, the authors have been particularly attentive to them. In the EW model, the authors have identified six 'polities' (*cités*) that hinge on various principles of equivalence: the polity of 'fame'[16], the 'civic', the 'inspired', the 'market', the 'industrial', and the 'domestic' polities. As mentioned, the model extends its scope to the possible exits from a conflict (reaching an agreement through 'tests' or by making 'compromises') but also identifies the various ways to 'avoid' conflict without using legitimate forms of justification. Although we will present and discuss the whole model, we will mostly centre our analysis on the idea of 'compromise' that is of particular interest to us since this thesis sets out to demonstrate, on the basis of the Quebecois case, that

[16] The principle of fame has also been translated as principle of 'renown' (opinion). If we agree with the *The Oxford Pocket Dictionary* of Current English's definition of the word 'fame': 'the condition of being known or talked about by many people, **esp. on account of notable achievements**' (emphasis added) or with the *Cambridge Dictionary* definition: "when you are known or recognized by many people **because of your achievements, skills**, etc" (emphasis added), then the idea of 'fame' would be more coherent with the model. Effectively the word 'fame' is associated with the idea of 'achievement', and in the EW, status of 'worthies' are granted conditional on a sacrifice ('form of investments'), or in other words, some kind of endeavour beneficial to themselves but also to others.

considering public policies as 'compromises' opens up new interesting heuristic avenues for the study of cultural policies. Before looking at the model's main concepts, we will first present the epistemological stance underlying the model.

1.1.1 Epistemological questions

For reason of space, we cannot explore in detail the epistemological questions that have led to the elaboration of the model. However, it is important to stress that Boltanski and Thévenot have designed this model in reaction to 'critical sociology' whilst both of them have been trained by Pierre Bourdieu, who was himself amongst the most important representatives of this sociological approach. Very briefly, according to Boltanski and Thévenot, critical sociology holds an unbearable position by trying to analyse the social world with a positivist and descriptive approach whilst seeking to develop a critical and normative perspective at the same time (Boltanski 2009, p. 13). In effect, to be able to denounce injustices, sociologists have to lean on some moral values — or as Boltanski says 'the critical impulse presupposes reference to ideals with which the reality to be criticized can be compared' (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007, p. x) —, but the positivist stance prevents them from referring to any moral principles. According to them, the critical approach thus seeks to reconcile two antinomic stances — scientific objectivity versus denunciation of injustice — but reaches an impasse. Social scientists should thus, in Boltanski and Thévenot's view, acknowledge the principles of justice to which they refer when they criticise the world as it is (Boltanski 1990a, p. 130). The authors of the model also refuse to comprehend social relations as strictly submitted to immutable power relations and their model therefore breaks with theories that reduce 'every social relations to force relations […] as it has often been the case in Marxist inspired works or in different forms of sociology

derived from utilitarianism'[17] (*Ibid*, p. 124, our translation). German sociologist Ulf Wuggenig summarises their stance thus:

> *The sociology of critique in Boltanski's sense opposes theoretical approaches in sociology and in social philosophy that tend to reduce norm demands to the level of conflicts of interest between groups, classes or individuals, to grant them no autonomy, but instead to regard them merely as a veiled form of power relations.*
>
> (Wuggenig 2008)

For Boltanski and Thévenot insufficient attention is given, in classical sociological studies, to ordinary people's demands for fairness: 'the main problem of critical sociology, they argue, it its inability to understand the critical operations undertaken by the actors' (Boltanski and Thévenot 1999, p. 364). In their view thus, critical sociology creates exaggerated 'asymmetries' between the critical and reflexive capacities of scientists and that of ordinary people (Boltanski 2000). As Boltanski put it: 'critical sociology, as developed in the 60s and 70s […] granted the sociologists too much power to unveil and, by the same token, overshadowed the critical capacities of people themselves'[18] (Boltanski interviewed by Bourmeau 2009, our translation).

Boltanski and Thévenot have thus decided to rehabilitate the common person's judgmental capacities and have developed a theoretical model that identifies the common principles of justice to which people implicitly refer in their daily lives, usually in situations of dispute — i.e. in situations in which they have to develop an acceptable argumentation to defend their position. It is important to stress here that the model excludes situations

[17] As presented by French sociologist Christian Laval (Christian Laval, *L'ambition Sociologique : Saint-Simon, Comte, Tocqueville, Marx, Durkheim, Weber* (Collection Recherches; Paris: Découverte / M.A.U.S.S., 2002) 512.), the utilitarianism thesis is that social relations have evolved around economic exchanges serving to fulfil individual interests; social cohesion is then the result of egoist dispositions or natures. Determining figures of utilitarianism are, amongst others, Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer. According to Laval, much of contemporary sociology takes utilitarianism as its main object and, in this sense, derives from it. For their part, Boltanski and Thévenot do not start from the principle that individual interests drive people's behaviour.

[18] '*Mon reproche à l'égard de la sociologie critique, telle qu'elle s'était développée dans les années 60-70 (pas seulement en France), était donc qu'elle accordait un trop grand pouvoir de dévoilement aux sociologues et qu'elle occultait du même coup les capacités critiques qui étaient celles des personnes elles-mêmes.*'

where force or violence is used. But, aware that their model could explain certain types of social actions only, Boltanski has explored, in subsequent studies, other 'regimes of action', which notably include situations in which people resort to violence or love to bring disputes to an end.[19] The EW model, however, only concerns situations in which individuals resort to processes of argumentation to maintain peace and order. Boltanski calls this regime of action a 'regime of dispute in justice'.

Finally, it is worth mentioning the fact that Boltanski and Thévenot have developed their model over a long period of time: the preliminary version took three years to take shape and was published in the Cahiers of the Centre d'Etudes de l'Emploi in 1987.[20] This exploratory publication enabled the researchers to polish their model, re-work some concepts before publishing their book *De la justification: Les économies de la grandeur* in 1991 (the English translation *On Justification* was published in 2006).[21] In response to the critiques[22] that arose from the book, Boltanski published in 1999, in collaboration with French sociologist Eve Chiapello, *Le nouvel esprit du capitalisme* (the English translation *The New Spirit of Capitalism* was published in 2005) modifying some elements of the model and introducing a new 'polity': the 'projective' one.[23] Contrary to *On Justification*, which aims to objectively present the various polities, *The New Spirit of Capitalism* intentionally adopts a critical stance towards the new emerging polity.[24] For his part, Thévenot also continued

[19] See Luc Boltanski, *L'amour Et La Justice Comme Compétences: Trois Essais De Sociologie De L'action* (Paris: Métailié, 1990b) 384.
[20] Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot, *Les Économies De La Grandeur* (Cahiers Du Centre D'études De L'emploi; Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1987) 361.
[21] For example, the concept of *common world* has replaced the one of *nature*, the concept of *dispute* has been developed and clarified, etc.
[22] For instance, even though Boltanski and Thévenot acknowledge that force and violence can be used in society to 'resolve' a conflict, some detractors blamed the model for not paying sufficient attention to this facet of reality. Others also pointed to the fact that the role of the researcher as presented by Boltanski and Thévenot is reduced to that of a 'reporter' who merely describes people's justifications but fails to provide a critical understanding of a given situation. See Philippe Juhem, 'Un Nouveau Paradigme Sociologique? À Propos Du Modèle Des Économies De La Grandeur De Luc Boltanski Et Laurent Thévenot', *Scalpel,* 1 (1994), 115-42. See also Thomas Bénatouïl, 'Critique Et Pragmatique En Sociologie. Quelques Principes De Lecture', *Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales,* 54/2 (1999a), 281-317.
[23] Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello, *The New Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Gregory Elliott (2nd edn.; New York: Verso, 2007) 601.
[24] In this book, Boltanski recovers coherence with the idea according to which sociologists need to acknowledge the principle of justice to which they refer when denouncing an injustice as he himself acknowledges the moral

working on the model and published in 1993, in collaboration with French sociologist Claudette Lafaye, a study introducing the 'green' polity.[25] Their collaboration has led them to conjointly work on another project in 2000, which deepens the understanding of the 'green worth'.[26] The EW model is thus not a 'closed system' (*système clos*) but 'an unfinished model' (*modèle inachevé*) (Nachi 2006, p. 24) to which new 'polities' and 'principles' can be added. Besides, the fact that the model is an 'open and dynamic' one (*Ibid*, p. 112) reflects Boltanski and Thévenot's acknowledgement of the complexity of a social world that is characterised by pluralism.[27]

Because the EW model is an 'analytic framework that gives an account of the form that justifications can and must have to be acceptable'[28] to others (Boltanski cited in Blondeau and Sevin 2004, our translation), it can be used to analyse all sorts of statements, including policy statements which need to deploy various arguments to win the consensus of a majority in a given population.[29] Yet, as we have seen in the introduction, cultural

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principles that guide him. Moreover, he does not seek to unveil a truth hidden to others; he instead builds his argumentation by giving an account of the recent resurgences of critique against capitalism (critiques formulated by ordinary people), and he adds his voice to them, evaluating how those critics could be restored and refreshed.

[25] Claudette Lafaye and Laurent Thévenot, 'Une Justification Écologique? Conflits Dans L'aménagement De La Nature', *Revue française de sociologie,* 34/4 (1993), 495-524.

[26] Laurent Thévenot, Michael Moody, and Claudette Lafaye, 'Forms of Valuing Nature: Arguments and Modes of Justification in France and American Environmental Disputes', in Michèle Lamont and Laurent Thévenot (eds.), *Rethinking Comparative Cultural Sociology: Repertoires of Evaluation in France and the United States* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press; Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 2000), 229-72.

[27] It is worth underlining here the fact that the appearance of new polities does not involve the disappearance of former ones and also that polities are not ordered hierarchically; they are symmetrically constructed.

[28] '[*Nous avons cherché à construire] un cadre d'analyse permettant de rendre compte de la forme que peuvent prendre, que doivent prendre les justifications pour être recevables.'*

[29] There exist other studies that analyse different kind of texts using Boltanski and Thévenot's model. For example, French arts sociologist Nathalie Heinich has developed a typology of the different modes of assessment of contemporary art which is largely inspired by Boltanski and Thévenot's model. Her main material of analysis was visitors's books of exhibitions and visitors' letters (see Nathalie Heinich, 'L'art Contemporain Exposé Aux Rejets: Contribution À Une Sociologie Des Valeurs', *Hermès,* 20 (1996), 193-204.; and Nathalie Heinich, 'From Rejection of Contemporary Art to Culture War', in Michèle Lamont and Laurent Thévenot (eds.), *Rethinking Comparative Cultural Sociology: Repertoires of Evaluation in France and the United States* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press; Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 2000), 170-209.). Canadian Management scholars Pascal Daigle and Linda Rouleau have for their part analysed, using the EW model, the content of strategic plans to understand how cultural organisations combine their artistic and managerial objectives (see Pascale Daigle and Linda Rouleau, 'Strategic Plans in Arts Organizations: A Compromising Tool between Artistic and Managerial Values', *International Journal of Arts Management,* 12/3 (2010), 13-30.). Finally, Education scholars Héloïse Côté and Denis Simard have analysed Québec's argument in favour of the integration of culture into schools by applying the model to several Education policy statements produced between 1991 and 2004 (see Héloïse Côté and Denis Simard, 'What Is the Meaning of the Integration

policies are regularly called into question (Dubois 2001) and we expect the model to provide some explanation as to why their rationale is not fully persuasive and, more generally, why their legitimacy is still undermined after more than half a century. The model will hence enable us to develop a new perspective on the state's cultural policies by giving us the means to identify the principles of justice on which these policies are based. Besides, in spite of seeing cultural policies as an expression of power exerted on the members of the civil society or as discourses hiding some other interests, we will analyse them as an effort to articulate ideals. The aim of this exercise is not, however, to deny the existence of relations of power or force in the political arena, but to acknowledge the possibility that cultural policies also seek to defend and promote a common good (although what that common good might be is a contested issue). To introduce the model, we will now present the concepts that, in our view, are crucial for its understanding and its application to the case of Quebecois cultural policies.

1.1.2 The *Economies of Worth* and the six principles of equivalence

To be able to develop the *Economies of Worth*, numerous empirical studies have had to be conducted and multiple theories have fed into the intellectual process that led to the formation of the EW model. Reconstructing the entire process would go beyond the scope of this study. Suffice it to say that these ground studies have enabled Boltanski and Thévenot to observe that the process of justification is based on people's capacity to refer to some shared conventions to give their claim more weight (Blic 2000). In effect, Boltanski and Thévenot have observed that arguments have to possess a certain 'degree of generality' to be acceptable to others:

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of the Cultural Dimension into Schools, According to the Official Discourse of the Province of Quebec?', *McGill Journal of Education,* 43/3 (2008), 327-50.).

> *[w]hen one is attentive to the unfolding of disputes, one sees that they are limited neither to a direct expression of interests nor to an anarchic and endless confrontation between heterogeneous worldviews clashing in a dialogue of the deaf.*
>
> (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 13)

A valid 'public justification' is thus rather directed towards a common reference, a 'principle of equivalence' (Thévenot 2001, p. 19), such as equality between citizens. Indeed, a principle of equivalence somewhat resembles the idea of cultural value, but unlike this latter notion, it is neither universal (a single reference on which we would all base our judgment in all times) nor relativist (an infinity of principles that vary according to eras, places and cultures). According to Boltanski and Thévenot, there exists a plurality, but not an infinity, of principles of equivalence that can be invoked to justify the assessment of someone else's status (Boltanski and Thévenot 1999, p. 365). And it is after much to-ing and fro-ing between ground inquiries and the reading of several Western political philosophies, that they have identified the six principles to which people most often resort when they engage in a quarrel (Blondeau and Sevin 2004). They have also remarked that some political philosophies 'offer systematic expression of the forms of the common good that are commonly invoked in today's society' (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 66).[30] They have thus brought to light the six higher principles on which agreements are generally based and have modelled them in the form of 'polities' (or *cités*):

> *the* inspired polity *where people's worth is defined through the attainment of a state of grace, the* domestic polity *where worth depends on a hierarchy of trust based on a chain of personal dependencies,* a polity of fame *where worth is the result of other people's opinion, the* civic polity *where worth is based on the renunciation to particular*

[30] They are: Augustine's *City of God*; Bossuet's *Politics*; Hobbes's *Leviathan*; Rousseau's *Social Contract*; Adam smith's *Wealth of Nations*; Saint-Simon's *Du système industriel*. The authors explain how and why they have chosen specific political philosophies in Boltanski and Thévenot, *On Justification*, 2006, pp. 66-74.

> *interests, a* market polity *based on distribution of goods, in accordance with the market law,* the industrial polity *where worth is based on efficiency.*[31]
>
> (Boltanski cited in Blondeau and Sevin 2004, our translation)

Boltanski and Thévenot have also used these political philosophies as 'grammars' prescribing the rules and norms for founding a 'harmonious polity' (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 66). Although each polity hinges on a different principle, they all respect six 'axioms' — or constraints — making them legitimate orders as opposed to eugenic orders, for example, or caste systems. French political scientist Philippe Juhem summarises these as follows:

> *The first axiom, designated as the "principle of common humanity" of the members of the "city", requires that every human being be included in the political order. […] The second and fourth axioms stipulate that the members of the city can have at least two different states and that these states be ordered following a growing level of happiness. […] The third axiom specifies that all members of the city have "identical power to all the states". […] Two other axioms are added, the first, linking access to higher states to an investment formula, i.e. a cost or a sacrifice, explains why all members of the city do not stand at the top of the hierarchy; the second specifies that happiness of the great, attached to superior states, is a common good, meaning that it is beneficial to the whole city.*[32]
>
> (Juhem 1994, pp. 3-4, emphasis in the original, our translation)

[31] '*Nous avons donc une cité inspirée où la grandeur des personnes est définie par l'accès à un état de grâce, une cité domestique où la grandeur tient à une position dans une chaîne hiérarchique de dépendances personnelles, une cité de l'opinion où la grandeur dépend de l'estime des autres, une cité civique où la grandeur tient au renoncement à l'état particulier, une cité marchande fondée sur une répartition des biens selon le principe du marché, une cité industrielle, où la grandeur est mesurée par l'efficacité*.'

[32] '*Le premier axiome, appelé « principe de commune humanité » des membres de la « cité », exige que l'ensemble des êtres humains soit concerné par l'ordre politique. […] Les axiomes deux et quatre stipulent qu'il existe au moins deux états pour les membres de la cité et que ces états peuvent êtres classés par ordre de bonheur croissant. […] L'axiome trois précise que tous les membres de la cité ont « une puissance identique d'accès à tous les états ». […] S'ajoutent deux autres axiomes, le premier, liant l'accès aux états supérieurs à une formule d'investissement, c'est-à-dire à un coût ou un sacrifice, explique pourquoi tous les membres de la cité ne se trouvent pas au sommet de la hiérarchie ; le second précise que le bonheur des grands, lié aux états supérieurs est un bien commun, c'est-à-dire qu'il profite à l'ensemble de la cité*.'

One of the fundamental dimensions of this model is hence the acceptance of hierarchies founded on a notion of common good, where some members can access higher states not by using force or violence but by making a sacrifice. However, the members' state of worthiness is always liable to assessment and is never permanent (*Idem*).[33]

1.1.3 Common worlds

Boltanski and Thévenot's preliminary studies have also enabled them to observe that the process of justification involves an ability to use or identify various 'objects' to assert or assess one's worth. According to the EW model, people's value or worth (*leur grandeur*) does not depend on some inalienable and permanent qualities (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 130); on the contrary, people must constantly be re-assessed by means of various instrumental methods, themselves composed of various 'objects' (*Idem*). For example, 'good manners', 'titles', 'gifts', 'announcement' are objects that are used to assess the domestic worth; 'wealth' and 'luxury' can help assess the market worth; 'tools', 'methods', 'tasks', 'plans', 'graphs', 'criterion', etc. are useful to measure the industrial worth whilst 'rights', 'legislation', 'code', 'policy', 'statement', 'formality' etc., are used to evaluate the civic worth.

Objects that are used to assess someone's worth are thus designed to answer specific needs and are useful in certain situations only. They cannot serve as legitimate proof in all circumstances (Thévenot 2002, p. 9) and can only be inserted in specific arrangements. For example, the fact that someone possesses a postgraduate diploma will have, in principle, no impact on the fact that he or she is invited to a wedding. The person's worth will be assessed in function of the proximity, the kindredship with the marrieds and their families (which is notably visible in the disposition of the guests at the tables).

[33] Besides, this theorisation of regimes of justice must not be understood as a theory explaining or legitimating 'fair inequalities'. Indeed, Boltanski repudiates such an interpretation of the model and this has motivated the writing of *Le Nouvel esprit du capitalisme* (1999) (in English *The New Spirit of Capitalism*) and *De la critique: Précis de sociologie de l'émancipation* (2009), books in which Luc Boltanski repositions his work.

Accordingly, the authors have sought to understand how, concretely, beings are evaluated in various situations or, as Boltanski and Thévenot would put it, how 'tests of worth' are conducted in everyday situations. In order to do so, they have designed the 'common worlds' which are the concrete expression, the embodiment of the 'polities'. In effect, if the principles on which cities can be erected are abstract and inalterable, the 'common worlds' are made of repertoires of objects that can be modified or adapted. To create them, they have drawn their inspiration from 'how-to guides to correct behaviour' that could be 'matched' to the political philosophies (Boltanski and Thévenot 1999, p. 369). These common worlds are thus closely tied to 'polities' and, accordingly, they have been designated as the inspired, the domestic, the civic, the market, the industrial worlds and the world of fame. The objects listed above form an integral part of Boltanski and Thévenot's 'worlds'.

Now, if common worlds are notably made of objects, other beings also inhabit them. Boltanski and Thévenot have included these beings in a list of 'subjects' that can be human or not. For example, if people's refer to a 'spirit' or a 'god' to justify their behaviour or to assess others' worth, these will be included in the list of subjects. And, similarly, if an association or a group of people has the power to influence the coordination of other human beings, it is also considered as a subject. Moreover, subjects, in the EW model, are defined through the role they play.[34] The model indeed brings to light the fact that individuals bear multiple roles in their day-to-day lives, being sometimes parents, children, workers, citizens, consumers, dreamers, etc. This also explains that there exists various

[34] In fact, the idea of 'subjects' derives from the concept of 'actant' (also translated as 'beings') that was originally conceived by Lithuanian linguist Algirdas Julien Greimas (see Nachi, *Introduction à la sociologie pragmatique*, 2006, p. 49). This term has become commonly used and is defined in the Oxford Dictionary of English as: 'a person, creature, or object playing any of a set of active roles in a narrative'. Boltanski thoroughly worked with this concept in *La dénonciation* (1984) by elaborating a system ('*système actanciel*'). In this study, Boltanski showed that, in all kinds of denunciations, there are four actants: the 'denouncer', the 'victim', the 'persecutor', and the 'judge', but he also demonstrated that an individual can bear more than one role, being for example both the denouncer and the victim. Moreover, if an 'actant' can be an individual it can be a collective grouping as well: the denouncer can effectively be embodied by an association, such as a group against racism.

ways to assess someone's worth. So, for instance, a man could be unemployed, having thus a low status in the industrial world, but nonetheless be a 'worthy' in another world by being an exemplary father (domestic world) or for having fought to improve the conditions of all unemployed people (civic world). However, the man could always be hired by a private company and reach a higher position in the business over the years and neglect his parental responsibilities; his status of worthy being would then shift in a different world. Hence, by using this system, Boltanski and Thévenot not only distinguish people from their role (Boltanski et al. 1984, p. 6), but they renounce to defining people by using concepts such as social status, class, norms or culture, and emphasise the performative — and temporary — dimension of the subject's identity (*Idem*). Also by using the concept of 'subject', Boltanski and Thévenot blur the boundaries between the collective and the individual, an antinomy that would limit our understanding of the social world, they argue (Boltanski et al. 1984, p. 4; Boltanski 2002, pp. 275-81; Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, pp. 25-32).

To illustrate more clearly both concepts of subjects and objects, we can mention, as an example, the following situation: a producer is preparing a new movie and he is interested in offering a contract to an actor he has seen in a great number of blockbuster films, and who he also knows because of the numerous interviews he has given, the many articles that praised him, and because he has won an Oscar prize the year before. According to the producer, this actor is a great star and, for that reason, he will offer him the role. Thus, the 'subjects', here, are the producer and the actor (the star); the subject's 'worth' (the actor) is evaluated according to his more or less important celebrity, and the proofs of success with public opinion constitute the 'objects' on which the judgment is based. The 'world' or logic tacitly invoked here is then that of 'fame'.

Finally, common worlds are also composed of other categories ('relation of worth', 'natural relations among beings', 'harmonious figures of the natural order', 'model tests',

etc.). These categories are important as they will help us identify the worlds invoked in various texts or speeches along with a list of subjects and objects. For instance, the 'natural relations among beings' are expressed with verbs. The verb 'function' links subjects and objects of the industrial world; the word 'invite' is a kind of action peculiar to the domestic one; the verb 'dream' is, for its part, typical of the inspired world; and 'mobilise' qualify a type of relations present in the civic one.

1.1.4 Exits from disputes

For Boltanski and Thévenot, disputes are unavoidable in 'regimes of dispute in justice'. In fact, although each polity model hinges on a 'single principle of justification', each of them must also conform to several constraints or 'axioms' (see section 1.1.2). The two main ones are: '1) [the] requirement of common humanity that presupposes a form of identity shared by all persons; and 2) [the] requirement of order governing this humanity' (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 77). Put together these axioms 'yield a tension, since persons are equal with regard to their belonging to humanity while being placed within a hierarchy according to a specific principle of order' (Boltanski and Thévenot 1999, p. 367). Thus,

> *the basic property of the polity model, which is to ensure that all members of the polity have an equal capacity to accede to all states, introduces an uncertainty that weighs upon the assessment of worths, thus making this assessment the point of contestation whenever a dispute occurs within a polity.*
>
> (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 130)

In fact, the polity model 'is a response to the multiplicity of principles without which the world would be an *Eden*' (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 78). As the authors explain, if the world was an *Eden* nothing would differentiate its members and harmony would last forever as there would be no reason to disagree (*Ibid*, p. 74). Conversely, disputes do occur

because multiple principles of equivalence can be invoked to assess someone's worth (*Ibid*, p. 78).

Now, when disputes do occur, it may lead to two forms of critiques: in the first scenario, the worth of a subject is contested but the principle of equivalence on which the evaluation is based is not questioned. More precisely, a '**contention**' (*un litige*) is 'a disagreement over the worths of the persons, and thus over the equitability of the way worths have been distributed in the situation at hand' (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 133). In these situations, beings are perceived as not being 'well ordered' and this leads to reassessing their 'worth' (*Idem*). Those conflicts notably arise from the fact that traces of some other world disrupt the harmony of a situation in which 'beings from the same world' should be 'arrayed in natural relations compatible with their states of worth' (*Idem*). More precisely, the judgment is altered due to some 'transport of worths' or 'transport of deficiency' that translates in overestimating or underestimating someone's worth because the person's worthiness (*taille*) in another world influences the outcome of a given situation. It is the case when, for example, employees argue that one of their colleagues has been promoted 'just because she is the boss's niece' and despite of her true competence. Indeed, the woman's worth may have reached a higher rank due to her position in another world (transport of worth). Thus, her kindred relation with the Director (domestic world) may have contributed to her promotion in the corporation (industrial world). The woman is then accused of having been granted a higher rank by reason of privilege instead of satisfying the conditions required for being promoted in this corporation. In contentions, 'reference to other worlds **seeks not to challenge** the test's relevance or **the principle on which the test is based** but, on the contrary, to **reinforce its validity** by purifying the conditions of its realization' (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 218, emphasis added). Moreover, the 'purification' of the situation 'requires the involvement of beings better identified in the world from which the test stems, beings that are

consequently more worthy' (*Ibid*, p. 219). Therefore, to return to our example, in order to maintain her position, the promoted employee might be urged by the Human Resources Director (a worthy being in the industrial world) to do several tests. The examination will serve to measure her knowledge and skills (to undertake 'a purified test' in the industrial world) so as to confirm whether she possesses or not the competence necessary to the good functioning of the enterprise (reassessment of her worthiness). In sum, 'contingent circumstances' may affect the way worth is distributed and 'in order to settle the controversy, the parties involved' will re-evaluate the person's worth under 'valid conditions' by conducting a test that 'draw[s] exclusively upon resources of a single world' (*Ibid*, pp. 135-37).

Conversely, people can disagree over the very principle of equivalence on which the evaluation is based: the '**clash**' (*le différend*) is indeed 'a more fundamental disagreement over the nature of the **beings that matter**' (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 134, emphasis added). In fact, it is 'the very principle of the test' that is questioned which might lead 'to overturn the situation by **replacing the test** that is under way **by a test relevant in a different world**' (*Ibid*, p. 218, emphasis added);

> *In clashes, the discord thus has to do […] with the true nature of the situation, with* reality *and the common good to which reference may be made to reach agreement. The goal is no longer to repeat the test in a purer and more equitable fashion by eliminating privileges and neutralizing handicaps, but to demystify the test as such, in order to place things on their true ground.*
>
> (*Ibid,* p. 224, emphasis in the original)

For example, an actor (actor Z) could be less successful than another one (actor Y) but nonetheless demand that their remuneration be revised because he (Z) has to play more scenes, and work twice more than Y. Although actor Z's wages depend on his popularity, he refers to another principle of equivalence (the industrial one) making the problem more

difficult to solve. In effect, Z contests the very principle on which the test is actually based and denounces the fact that another 'general principle' (his productivity) has been ignored and that it should, in fact, prevail. Here, 'the parties involved disagree about the world in which the test must be carried out if it is to be legitimate' (*Idem*): i.e. the industrial world versus the world of fame.

In sum, 'critiques' that consist in unveiling some injustice, deception or imposture can lead to 1) 'setting aside the items on which the unveiling depended in order to set the test once again in its world of origin' or to 2) 'go back to a single test […] by reversing a situation to make it shift into another nature' (*Idem*).

Finally, Boltanski and Thévenot identify other ways to exit from a conflict: the '**private arrangement**', '**relativization**' and '**relativism**'. Put simply, the 'private arrangement' is a 'contingent agreement between two parties that refers to their mutual satisfaction rather than to a general good' (*Ibid*, p. 336). 'Relativization', for its part, consists in agreeing on the fact that 'disagreement is pointless' as the problem that sparked off the conflict is purely incidental and not worth debating about (*Ibid*, pp. 339-40). Finally, 'relativism' consists in adopting 'a position of externality on the basis of which what goes on in the world can be subordinated to a general equivalent' (*Ibid*, p. 341). This general equivalent does not however rest on a common good: it is reduced to a 'force, power, interest, or strength and treated as if it were naturally attached to all beings' (*Idem*). In other words, the disagreement is understood as stemming from the desire from each party to serve his/her own interests only, and no reference to any form of worth is invoked to legitimise the position of the beings involved in the situation. To put it differently,

> *critical relativism allows someone to formulate a denunciation without making explicit the position from which the denunciation is issued, because relativism aims at abolishing not a particular form of the common good but the very possibility of the existence of a common good.*

(*Idem*)

1.2 The compromise

The 'compromise' is another way to exit from conflict. As we have seen, conflicts arise when incompatible elements disrupt the harmony of a given world; they can be settled 'through recourse to a test in just one world' (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 277), but can also be simply 'suspended' by maintaining a 'composite' situation. In effect, in a situation of compromise '[b]eings that matter in different worlds are maintained in presence, but their identification does not provoke a dispute' (*Idem*). For example, a young star singer could decide to be accompanied by her mother — a 'complete unknown'— at a gala without this causing a scandal. Although the gala is reserved for celebrities, people could acknowledge the worthiness of the mother and accept her presence (compromise between the domestic world and the one of fame). Thus, in the **compromise**, the beings involved are aware of and acknowledge the existence and the worth of beings from another world and they 'do not attempt to clarify the principle of their agreement' (*Idem*).

In a compromise, the beings are also 'favourably disposed toward the notion of a common good': they seek to satisfy their own interests ('interests of the parties') but also that of beings not immediately involved in the compromise as such (*Ibid*, p. 278). It is the case when a business community (which belongs to the market world) accepts that the state (representative of the civic world) regulates to some extent the market so as to strengthen the position of smaller businesses that, otherwise, would not be able to face international competition. The compromise not only serves to give smaller businesses means to compete in a global market but it preserves local economies for the well-being of all citizens. It is in this sense that the compromise 'aims at a common good that transcends the two different forms of worth in presence by including both of them' (*Idem*). However, although the compromise seeks a form of common good, the principle on which it rests is

not a 'common good **constitutive of a polity**' (*Idem,* emphasis added). In effect, the principle of equivalence on which hinges the compromise has not been the subject of universalisation; it has not been 'formalised' in any political philosophies and no higher common principle necessary to coordinate human relations has been clearly identified. Yet in the absence of such principle of equivalence, no order of worth can clearly be established which makes this form of agreement more easily dismountable.

So the compromise is a composite form of agreement that holds together principles belonging to different worlds, and because the compromise does not allow reference to a single principle — to a higher common principle — on which all parties can agree, it is particularly susceptible to critiques and remains a fragile form of agreement.

1.2.1 Policy statement: a form of compromise

A policy can also be labelled a compromise: according to the EW model, a policy is an object that —unsurprisingly — belongs to the civic world. But as policies seek the endorsement of a majority, they are also modulated in function of the diverse logics that compose complex societies so as to have the most impact. For instance, international policies are particularly permeated with elements coming from the 'world of fame'. Québec's International policy (Québec 2006), whose aim 'is to strengthen Québec's international **influence**' (p. VIII) illustrates this well. Amongst its priorities, we find these four objectives: 1) '**Attracting** foreign direct investment'; 2) '**Positioning** Montréal as one of the major cities of the world'; 3) '**Promoting** tourism'; 4) 'Making Québec's education opportunities **better known**'. To express these objectives, verbs that correspond to the nature of the relationships peculiar to the world of fame have been used. As Boltanski and Thévenot explain,

> *[t]he relation of inclusion among the worthy through their fame and their audience is expressed in terms of* influence*. To establish a relation of* influence*, one has to* hook*,* attract*,* alert*,* gain a following *(*fans*) or a* reputation*,* persuade*,* reach, sensitize*,*

> mobilize*,* interest*,* inform*,* seduce. *[…] In this world in which anything that has value is immediately* known *and* visible*, persons are constantly making* comparisons*.*
>
> (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 182, emphasis in the original)

Thus, as we see, each of the four priorities above mentioned contains a word that is relevant in the world of fame, but the whole policy document is in fact filled with words that belong to this world. Similarly, a policy that targets the agricultural sector will integrate components of the industrial world by implementing measures that will foster the efficiency and the productivity of this sector; and an economic development policy will integrate elements stemming from the market world by encouraging competition.

So, the state has to take into account elements stemming from the worlds targeted by the compromise without however losing sight of its fundamental *raison d'être*: the well-being of the collective. As the representative of a given collectivity, the state must effectively — and inevitably — emphasise the fact that it serves first and foremost the citizens and must also reassert the necessity to treat them equally and without discrimination. Therefore a policy should, in principle, put its collectivist preoccupations forward. Québec's International Policy is faithful to that rule; and in the following excerpt the inclusive values of the civic world — which welcomes everyone regardless of their nationality, age, sex, or their political and religious views (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, pp. 185-86) — are clearly expressed:

> *[t]he* ***values behind*** *the Québec government's international initiatives are those of a* ***democratic society*** *respectful of* ***human rights****. Québec has been enriched by the* ***diverse origins of its population*** *and cherishes the principles embodied in the Québec* ***Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms****, such as* ***democracy, equal rights for women, rejection of violence, secularization of institutions****, and* ***pluralism****.*
>
> (Québec 2006, p. 20, emphasis added)

1.2.2 Cultural policy statements: compromises built on antinomic principles

Now, if the compromise that these policies build between the different worlds appears as obvious, the same does not hold for cultural policies. In fact, more than any other policies, cultural policies are regularly questioned; it is the relevance of their very existence that is prone to debate. As French Professor of Political Science Vincent Dubois writes '[f]rom media intellectual controversies to budgetary arbitrations, many are the occasions that force to re-asserting the soundness of public cultural intervention and to re-mobilising its defenders.'[35] (Dubois 2001, p. 367, our translation). And one of the most common critiques to the legitimacy of cultural policy is the idea that the state logic is opposed to that of culture:

> *[t]he recognition of the public intervention's appropriateness in the cultural domain does not go without saying. Within the field of art, this intervention has, for a long time, been viewed as a contradictory state interference to the creators' essential freedom. […] the legitimacy of public action in this domain is far from being considered, everywhere and in all times, as self-evident.*[36]
>
> (*Idem*, our translation)(Dubois 2001, p. 367, our translation)

This passage is interesting as it mentions the idea of 'the creators' essential freedom' which is far from being insignificant. Indeed, the idea of freedom is at the very core of Boltanski and Thévenot's 'inspired world':

> *[the worthy persons in the inspired world] have the duty of shaking off the yoke, of separating themselves from the herd, of seeking* individual liberation*, not in order to*

[35] '*Des polémiques médiatico-intellectuelles aux arbitrages budgétaires, nombreuses sont les occasions qui obligent à réaffirmer le bien-fondé de l'intervention culturelle publique et à remobiliser ses défenseurs.*'
[36] '*La reconnaissance de l'opportunité d'une intervention publique dans le domaine culturel ne va pas de soi. Au sein du champ artistique, cette intervention n'a longtemps été envisagée que comme une ingérence étatique contradictoire avec la nécessaire liberté des créateurs. […] la légitimité de l'action publique dans ce domaine est bien loin de s'imposer partout et toujours comme une évidence.*'

> *pursue a selfish goal but in order to achieve human dignity while re-establishing authentic relations among human beings.*
>
> (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 162, emphasis in the original)

Moreover, Dubois suggests that cultural policies are aimed at the 'creators' or, at least, that they need to acknowledge their existence. It is the case of Québec's official cultural policy that also recognises their contribution to the whole society:

> *The whole professional artistic milieu plays a fundamental role in the cultural expression of the society. In its cultural policy, the government grants a predominant place to creators, artists, artistic organisations and cultural industries.*[37]
>
> (Québec 1992, p. 18, our translation)

Thus, the figure of the creator, or of the artist, is generally central in cultural policy. In Boltanski and Thévenot's 'inspired world', the worthy beings are 'spirits', 'monsters', 'devotees', 'hermits', 'women', 'madmen', etc. but, as the authors say, artists 'often embody inspired worth today' (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 160). The worthy beings in the inspired world are also characterised by their 'uniqueness', their 'originality' and their 'universality' (*Idem*). Yet it is through a personal and original approach that artists grasp the humanity of 'men' in all its hues and complexity. In effect, all artists possess a unique talent that makes them recognisable amongst all, but their own single voice is also the expression of all 'men', each artist being thus an archetype and a symbol of humankind. Like the other worthy beings of the inspired world, artists are 'at once unique and universal' (*Idem*). Furthermore, like the other worthies of this world, artists are marked out by an extraordinary capacity to surpass themselves, even at the risk of losing everything they possess and love, and even of losing themselves, their mind. Their integrity and their devotion to their art endow them with immortality.

[37] '*L'ensemble du milieu artistique professionnel joue un rôle fondamental dans l'expression culturelle de la société. Dans sa politique culturelle, le gouvernement accorde donc une place prépondérante aux créateurs, aux artistes, aux organismes artistiques et aux industries de la culture.*'

Of course, not all creators correspond to this description, but it would be difficult not to acknowledge that those who are generally considered to be 'true artists' correspond to Boltanski and Thévenot's description of the inspired worthy beings. Suffice it to think of Baudelaire, Beethoven, Dostoyevsky, Gaudí, Pollock, Van Gogh, Wilde, all artists of different eras and countries who shared what we call a tragic destiny. The fact that many great artists have experienced loss and decline while at the same time becoming more inspired and exalted is probably not just pure coincidence or merely the result of external circumstances.[38] To push this idea further, it is interesting to add that in the EW model:

> *The worthiest persons in terms of inspiration are often despised by the world at large; they may be poor, dependent and useless. But their deficient state actually enhances their access to knowledge of the world's truly harmonious figures (*heaven, the imaginary*,* the unconscious *and so on).*
>
> (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, emphasis in the original)

So Dubois points out the fact that, to some, the state intervention is hardly compatible with the activity of the creators who should preserve complete freedom (and thus remain authentic: for why would the state interference be problematic if it was not seen as a threat to artistic integrity?). The compromise uniting the civic world, where the state represents the collectivity, and the inspired world, animated by creators, certainly produces a tension.

Similarly, German thinker Theodor W. Adorno talks about a 'feeling of irreconcilability in the relation of culture and administration'. In effect, in his text *Culture and Administration*, Adorno expresses particularly well, and with much insight, the opposite logics of the public administration which notably 'represents the general against the particular' and that of culture which constitutes, on the contrary, 'the perennial claim of

[38] The unprecedented rise of the star system is certainly changing the order of things (although, to some extent, it has also been built on artistic icons who have suffered decline, such as Marilyn Monroe, Elvis Presley, Jim Morrison, Romy Schneider, Serge Gainsbourg, to name but a few).

the particular over the general' (Adorno 2005, p. 113). Again, the EW model might help us better understand Adorno's assertion. As we have said, the civic world is characterised by the fact that '[t]he ones who accede to higher states of worth are not human persons but rather the collective persons that they constitute by meeting together' (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 185). As Boltanski and Thévenot explain further,

> *'[t]he common aspiration to unity defines the dignity of persons […]* ***as particular persons****, they are* ***unworthy*** *because they are reduced to being merely* themselves*, "isolated* individuals*", slaves of their own particular interests and condemned to powerlessness'.*
>
> (*Ibid*, p. 187)

As we can see, the state of worthiness in the civic world is radically opposed to that of the inspired world: the civic world values beings that 'make themselves the expression of the *general will'* (*Idem*, emphasis in the original) whilst 'worthy persons in the inspired world understand other beings, encompass them and bring them fulfilment, […] by asserting their own uniqueness (*Ibid*, p. 161). Thus, the very intention and motivation of beings from the inspired world are fundamentally different to those of the civic one: the beings of the civic world dissolve into the 'collective', 'surmount the singularities that divide them in order to bring about the union of all' (*Ibid*, p. 185), while the beings of the inspired world embark on an 'inner adventure', a solitary 'quest' so as to welcome 'illumination', 'inspiration' and 'accede to perfection and happiness'. The EW model can hence help us better seize the scale of the opposition — general versus particular — identified by Adorno. Moreover, we understand that by encouraging the unique talent of creators, the state denies the basic premises of equality between all citizens. And indeed, American philosopher Noël Carroll has not been blind to this fundamental issue, which concerns the limits of the state's responsibilities: '[w]elfare is a legitimate arena of state activity but,' he argues, 'it is not clear that *all* prospective arts funding is' (Carroll 1987, p. 23). Indeed, further in a text in

which he systematically deconstructs the arguments generally deployed to justify governmental intervention in cultural matters, he develops his thought on the question of supporting the career of artists, something that, according to him, would go in opposition to the principle of equality between citizens:

> *Questions of justice and equal opportunity do not seem to bear on the issue of artistic unemployment. […] It does not seem to me that the state's responsibility in regard to the unemployed extend to guaranteeing that everyone has the job he or she most desires. […] If artists are unemployed, the state will have certain duties to them, though it is not clear that those duties include finding them employment as artists.*
>
> (*Ibid*, p. 30)

He also doubts that the financing of artistic projects, whose aim would be to entertain the citizens, can ever be any more legitimate:

> *It may be suggested that a certain conception of **fairness** can be used to ground government art support. […] The deeper question, however, is whether any leisure activity should be supported. For **if any is supported**, **then all should be** in proportion to the allegiance to that leisure activity in the society.*
>
> (*Ibid*, p. 31, emphasis added)

Indeed, Carroll's rationales are faithful to the democratic ideals where all citizens are equal and where the distribution of wealth and goods should be equitable and fair. In reality, in this paper, Carroll is rejecting the compromise on which arts subsidy is predicated, and is undertaking the 'purification' of the situation by strongly reasserting the validity of a single principle: the pre-eminence of the collective.

1.2.3 Reinforcing the compromise

We have therefore seen that the EW model enables us to confirm the existence in cultural policy of some aporia but also to better understand why it is difficult to make those

opposite principles coexist. However, the model also teaches us about the way compromises can be reinforced. Indeed, Boltanski and Thévenot have also observed that one way to strengthen a compromise is to

> *place objects composed of elements stemming from different worlds at the service of the common good and endow them with their own identity in such a way that their form will no longer be recognizable if one of the disparate elements of which they are formed is removed. Transformed in this way, the compromise is more resistant to critiques, because it now relies on indivisible objects.*
>
> (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 278)

More concretely, these 'composite objects' can be identified through 'formulations and designations that establish references to the worlds of origin in a single utterance' (*Ibid*, p. 281). Boltanski and Thévenot give as an example the designation of 'domestic employee' that 'presupposes a compromise with the industrial world' (*Idem*). But the notion of *democratisation of culture* could also be considered a composite object. It is indeed a formulation that seeks to seal the alliance between the civic and the inspired worlds. Considered to be a distinctive feature of French governmental intervention in cultural matters, it has spread in many Western societies, including the Quebecois one. Despite the fact that this notion dates back to the end of the 19th century (Saez 2001, p. 201), it is usually attributed to the cultural policies of the 1960s, and more particularly to the political intervention of the well-known French Minister André Malraux. Also, although no consensus exists over its definition (Donnat 2000, p. 33; Fleury 2008, pp. 81-82), it is usually defined as a 'top-down' state intervention that consists in making the great works of art and thought available to the most (Mulcahy 2006, pp. 323-24). Now, as we know, the project of democratisation of culture has been criticised for not being able to achieve an equitable redistribution in cultural matters, notably by Pierre Bourdieu (Teillet 2009, p. 41) — and such critique in fact emerges from the civic world. But the policies of

democratisation of culture have also been severely criticised for being too 'authoritarian' or paternalistic (*Idem*). This reveals the existence of another source of tension created, in fact, by the presence of another logic: the domestic one. In effect, the 'compromise' proposed by the French ministry not only involved the civic and the inspired worlds, but it also included elements from the domestic one. As explained in the EW model, 'the familial analogy' can be expanded to the idea of living within a territory and sharing traditions (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, pp. 90-98) and this is why we find elements of the domestic world in policy statements: they are indeed designed to protect the interests of a population living within certain borders and to preserve the common references that link people together (history, traditions, language, ancestors…). The de Gaulle government (and Malraux's ministry) thus sought to preserve the French traditions and to reinforce a sense of fraternity by putting emphasis on the French heritage and by specifically directing those efforts towards the 'French'.[39] Moreover, by identifying and selecting the 'major works' to be 'offered' to all, the government also sought to educate people and prepare them to 'public life', to 'civism' (Saez 2001, p. 201). Interestingly, the position of subordination in which ordinary people were then put towards the elite is very similar to that of the less worthy beings of the EW model's domestic world: in an analogous manner, the 'inferior' beings in the EW model are raised up, taught 'good manners' and 'poise' by more worthy beings, i.e. those who possess authority and who are responsible for them (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 167).

Being largely rejected, the existing compromise was gradually dismantled and reformulated. New composite objects were developed such as that of *cultural development*, a concept developed by French intellectual Joffre Dumazedier (Poirrier 2000) that was also adopted by Québec's government. In reality, it is at the core of the 1978

[39] In effect, the French Minister for Cultural Affairs aimed at: '*making the major works of humanity, and first and foremost from France, accessible to as many French people as possible; ensuring that our heritage has a vast an audience as possible; [and] encouraging the creation of works of art and the mind that enrich it*'. See page 8 of Jeremy Ahearne, *French Cultural Policy Debates: A Reader* (London, New York: Routledge, 2002) 221.

white paper *La politique québécoise du développement culturel* which includes a quote by Unesco's Executive Director:

> *The notion of cultural **development** became progressively […] broader, more diversified and detailed so as to include, beyond the purely economic aspects of the human condition's **improvement**, the social aspects. And this is due to the fact that we have not only discovered that certain social **variables**, such as health, education, employment, determined in fact economic **growth**, but also that it was on that level that behaviours and motives commanding […] the basic options of a global **development planning** were to be found.*[40]
>
> (René Maheu cited in Québec 1978b, pp. 38-39, our translation, emphasis added)

So the emergence of this new ambiguous composite object bore witness of the new political orientations of the mid 60s and 70s: the industrial principle was penetrating cultural policy discourses, and the objectives of development, growth, progress, return on investment were being established so as to replace the pre-existing ones that notably consisted in valuing the contribution of inspired beings to humanity or those of civilising the working classes. But, like the former, this compromise has also been criticised and gradually demolished. For reason of space we cannot explore further the constitution of new compromises. Suffice it to say that cultural policy making can be seen as a series of compromises that have been regularly questioned and dismantled in favour of new compromises involving elements stemming from different worlds. These compromises systematically offer new 'layouts'. Besides, the fragility of the compromises made on the basis of the civic and the inspired worlds indicates that the tension between those two

[40] '*La notion de développement s'est, en effet, progressivement élargie, diversifiée, approfondie, de manière à englober, au-delà des aspects purement économiques de la condition humaine, les aspects dits sociaux. Et cela parce qu'on a découvert non seulement que certaines données sociales, comme la santé, l'éducation, l'emploi conditionnaient en fait la croissance économique, mais encore que c'était sur ce plan que se situaient les comportements et les raisons qui commandent ou devraient commander les options de base d'une planification globale du développement*'.

worlds is hardly suppressible, but also that the common good these compromises intend to defend are not universally recognised and certainly not unanimously approved.

Before concluding, a last word on the characteristics of compromises: in the EW model it is specified that '[a] compromise can be worked out more easily when it can be made to accommodate beings or qualities that are *ambiguous* in the sense that they may derive, depending on the way they are understood, from more than one world' (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 279-80, emphasis in the original). Yet, we know that the signification of the world 'culture' is ambiguous and polysemous. As French commentator Augustin Girard writes,

> *It is difficult to talk about cultural public policies without trying to situate them in the vast universe of all possible acceptations of the notion of culture. American anthropologist Kluckholm has counted 400 definitions of the word culture, and there is no month, each year, where a philosopher or an historian does not pen a new, rich and fecund definition of culture but alas! not pertinent to deciding on the distribution of the cultural policy's funds.*[41]
>
> (Girard 2001, p. 509, our translation)

According to the EW model, the ambiguity of the notion of culture would actually facilitate the compromise. Because the word culture has evolved going from 'the more restricted and traditional meaning, which designates the system of works of civilization specific to a particular society' to 'the meaning attributed to it by ethnologists — that is to say the set of models governing the behaviour and thought of the members of a society' (Bourdieu cited in Ahearne 2002, p. 62) it can be associated to worlds other than the inspired one. We could thus presume that cultural policy statements seek to preserve that ambiguity and

[41] '*Il est difficile de parler des politiques publiques de la culture sans essayer de les situer dans l'univers très vaste des acceptions diverses de la notion de « culture ». Kluckholm, anthropologue américain, a dénombré 400 définitions du mot culture, et il n'est guère de mois, chaque année, où n'apparaisse sous la plume de philosophes ou d'historiens quelque nouvelle définition de la culture, inédite, riche, féconde mais non pertinente hélas! pour décider des affectations de crédits pour une politique culturelle.*'

hence render the compromise more easily acceptable. Besides, an analysis of several cultural organisations' strategic plans done through the lens of the EW model reveals that 'the use of vague and ambiguous terms […] seems to be appealing because the plan is more likely to be attractive to the greatest number of stakeholders' (Daigle and Rouleau 2009, p. 34). As Daigle and Rouleau explain '[b]y promoting empathy towards diverse worldviews and logics, strategic ambiguity fosters commitment and consensus' (*Idem*). Although this hypothesis remains to be verified in the case of cultural policies, we can reasonably advance that the use of such strategy in political documents is to be expected. The following chapters will seek to provide an answer on this question.

1.3 Using the *Economies of Worth* and overcoming its limits

We have seen that, through a textual analysis, the model enables us to identify the principles on which a policy statement rests. We have also succinctly showed that cultural policies hinge on more than one principle of equivalence and that some of these principles are fundamentally opposed to each other, so that they are antinomic. We have seen how this might explain why cultural policies, understood qua 'compromises', are often at the centre of controversies and arguments. Conversely, the model has also been useful in understanding how a compromise can be reinforced to better resist criticism. The concept of compromise, as elaborated by Boltanski and Thévenot, will thus represent a structuring element throughout the thesis, and each chapter will seek to answer four underlying questions: 1) on what principles is the compromise built? 2) In the name of what common good has it been established? 3) How has the compromise been reinforced? 4) How has it been criticised?

As mentioned in the introduction, the Quebecois government has presented five comprehensive cultural policy proposals, in a span of thirty years, before the official cultural policy was finally adopted in 1992. These are *Pour une politique* (1959); *Livre blanc*

de la culture (1965); *Pour l'évolution de la politique culturelle* (1976); *La politique québécoise du développement culturel* (1978); *Une politique de la culture et des arts* (1991).[42] The case of Québec is thus interesting as it illustrates well the fact that the consensus over the legitimacy and the purpose of a cultural policy was not easily reached. In effect, it raises the question as to why these policy statements did not become 'official policies' as such.[43] Of course, even though some of these policy statements remained 'unofficial', they nevertheless gave rise to intense debate. Some of the recommendations put forward in these documents were also implemented shortly after their formulation, and it is because of their impact on the cultural landscape of the province that we have decided to pay closer attention to three of them. In the second chapter we thus analyse the content of ***Pour une politique* (1959)**; in chapter three we focus to ***La politique québécoise du développement culturel* (1978)**; and we dedicate chapter four to the analysis of the official cultural policy ***La politique culturelle du Québec: Notre culture, notre avenir* (1992)**. Finally, we briefly discuss the content of Québec's 2012 ***Agenda 21C*** in the conclusion.

As explained previously in this chapter, it is through the identification of words stemming from the six worlds developed in the EW model (such as subjects, relations, objects, state of worthiness, and so on) that we can identify the 'principles of equivalence' (also called 'principles of justice') on which an argument is based. However, restricting the analysis to a quantification of words belonging to different worlds would fail to indicate what importance the author grants to the principle(s) implicitly invoked. Without recourse to the 'superior level of analysis: the sentence, the paragraph or the whole text' (Dodier 2005, p. 17), we are unable to understand the critical meaning of the text. And this is indeed a flaw of the model that French sociologist Nicolas Dodier has identified (*Idem*). Effectively, a text might be filled with words belonging to the market world, but unless we

[42] This list excludes all sector-based cultural policies.

[43] Evidently, this can partly be explained by the fact that a change of government occurred just after the release of some of these policy proposals — change that is often accompanied by a redefinition of governmental priorities. Such was the case for the white paper *Livre blanc de la culture* (1965) and the green paper *Pour l'évolution de la politique culturelle* (1976).

undertake an analysis at a superior level, we will not know what the author's point of view is with regards to the principles at stake. Similarly, in the chapters dedicated to culture in the manifesto *Pour une politique*, we have found many words belonging to the 'domestic world' (such as 'frontiers', 'clan', 'territory', 'descendants', 'past', 'children', 'our history', 'our houses', 'commemorative', and so on), but we had to undertake a more global content analysis before we could ascertain if the author of the manifesto was seeking to defend some traditions (principle of the domestic world) or if he was, on the contrary, criticising them.

Furthermore, although the model enabled the identification of the principles present in each policy statement, it could not reveal on what grounds these principles were invoked. Thus, in the case of *Pour une politique* (1959), even if we could confirm the fact that the preservation of traditions was an important issue for its author, the model could not tell us *what* traditions required protection nor *why*. Similarly, although the industrial world manifested itself throughout the 1978 white paper *La politique québécoise du développement culturel*, thus revealing a preoccupation in this policy for 'efficiency', the model could not tell us *what* needed to become efficient and *why* such principle became important in the domain of cultural policy at that moment. As for the 1992 cultural policy, the model could not shed light on the reasons why the market logic was suddenly becoming paramount. In other words, the model has proved to be a helpful interpretive device to observe the appearance as well as the disappearance of some worlds from policy discourse, but it failed to explain the causes for the emergence (or the fading) of one particular world at any given moment. Only an analysis of the content combined with an understanding of the topical issues of the time could enable us to shed light on these questions. The EW model thus provided us with a set of guiding questions as well as with material on the basis of which to push further our reflections, but, by itself, it could not provide a sufficient understanding of what was at stake in each policy. This explains why we

have decided to give the analysis of the **historical and political context** in which these policies emerged a substantial role. This reasoning also explains our choice to present a brief **history of the ideas** that have fed into the cultural policy proposals that are the centre of our research. We have effectively decided to give more importance to ideas that have influenced the elaboration of these policy statements, the latter representing, as it were, the realisation and the achievement of prior reflections. Situating the context from which these policy statements emerged and retracing the origins of the ideas they put forward has helped us to provide a richer discussion of the main cultural policy proposals of Québec.

The scope of our thesis thus goes beyond the content analysis of some statements to include the study of their genesis, but we also wanted to analyse the reactions that these proposals aroused since the construction process of Québec's cultural policy was not and could not be linear, for all the reasons discussed so far. Some aspects of each proposal were necessarily rejected whilst others were approved; otherwise why would there be any need to formulate new policy statements? As mentioned already, the concept of compromise is central to this thesis and to understand the process of construction and deconstruction of a cultural policy understood qua 'compromise', we decided to analyse the critiques formulated against the three policy proposals under analysis.

For the 1978 white paper *La politique québécoise du développement culturel* we have analysed newspapers articles published in the two weeks after the release of the policy. By capturing the instantaneous reactions that the policy provoked, our aim was to have an idea of the main critiques it raised. We have also analysed the few magazine and journal articles that presented a more elaborate view on the document. We have repeated the same exercise with the 1992 official policy, *La politique culturelle du Québec*: we have analysed the newspaper articles published in the week after the release of the policy as well as journal and magazine articles that commented further on several aspects of the

policy. The press coverage was however much less abundant in 1992 than in 1978. In 1978 the press coverage was indeed very intense: over two weeks, more than forty articles were published in the three most important newspapers of the province. In 1992, the press coverage did not exceed one week, and less than a dozen articles were published in the same newspapers. As mentioned in the introduction, because of the unique character of the 1959 statement *Pour une politique*, we had to proceed differently. In effect, the policy statement (which contained not only a cultural policy proposal but a full political programme) was not made public on request of its author, Georges-Émile Lapalme. There were thus no reactions to the policy proposal as such. However, several ideas of this statement were presented to the public prior to their implementation in newspaper articles, allowing people to comment on them. We thus have selected for analysis archived newspaper articles published mainly in 1960 and 1961 as the policy was gradually revealed to the public. We have also analysed the declarations of the Québec Prime Minister of the time, who was the main detractor of Lapalme's proposal.

Each of the following chapters is therefore divided in four sections: 1) the first discusses the historical and political context in which the policy emerged; 2) the second section retraces the ideas that most influenced the policy; 3) the third section presents and analyses the content of the main policy proposal; 4) the fourth section explores the main critiques the policy proposal aroused. The EW model is explicitly applied as an interpretive device predominantly in the last two sections of each chapter.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have presented the methodological approach that is adopted throughout the thesis and that mainly rests on the *Economies of Worth* model, which was developed by French sociologist Luc Boltanski and economist Laurent Thévenot. Given the underlying importance of the model, we have devoted most of the chapter to presenting its

functioning. First, we have clarified the model's epistemological foundation, which notably seeks to acknowledge the existence of great principles underlying the organisation (or the arrangement) of Western societies; great principles that ordinary people commonly invoke without however necessarily making explicit their reference to them. We have also presented the model's core concepts, which include the six 'polities' that all hinge on a 'superior common principle' and that find their incarnation in six 'common worlds': the 'inspired world', the 'domestic world', the 'civic world', the 'world of fame', the 'industrial world', and the 'market world' (the 'projective' and the 'green' worlds have later been added to the model). We have then explained that the coexistence of different worlds can prove problematic and give rise to disputes. Boltanski and Thévenot have thus identified the various ways to solve conflicts; amongst them, the 'compromise'. In the second section of this chapter, we have explained that the latter concept can be applied to policy statements that need to deploy various arguments to win the support of various groups, whose respective values and interests differ from one another. It is precisely because policy statements refer to more than one 'superior principle' that they arouse criticism, some principles being hardly compatible with each other. The concept of 'compromise' is thus very useful for understanding the difficulty to legitimate the state intervention in cultural matters. However, in the last section of this chapter, we have seen that the model on its own is only of limited usefulness to fully understand the issues raised in each cultural policy statement under analysis. We have explained that, to complete the analysis made using Boltanski and Thévenot's model we provide in each chapter a discussion of the political context as well as history of the ideas that fed into Québec's cultural policy.

2 HEIRS OF FRENCH CULTURE

Introduction

This chapter covers the period of the 1950s and '60s. The chapter is articulated in four parts: the first section of the chapter presents and discusses the political atmosphere that reigned at the eve of Québec's Quiet Revolution — an era characterised by major social and political transformations to which the first Minister for Cultural Affairs, Georges-Émile Lapalme significantly contributed. The second section retraces the origins of Lapalme's cultural policy by exploring the ideas that most influenced him, whilst the third section presents and analyses, using the theoretical model the *Economies of Worth*, the cultural policy proposal that he elaborated in 1959 in his manifesto *Pour une politique*. Finally, the fourth section presents and analyses the reactions to Lapalme's proposal when he started implementing it; we indeed identify, by means of the *Economies of Worth* model, the nature of the critiques made in the newspapers but also those made by Lapalme's main detractor, the Prime Minister Jean Lesage. This analysis enables us to understand why Lapalme was not able to fully concretise his vision, or in other words, why his proposal did not reach consensus.

2.1 'It's time for a change' [44]

The 1960s represents a watershed in Québec's history: the Quebecois society was in a state of deep transformation during this decade as the movement towards its secularisation and modernisation was well and truly on its way. The political action of the liberal government elected in 1960 was decisive in these regards. It undertook major political, economical and educational reforms that deeply and permanently transformed the society (Durocher

[44] '*Il faut que ça change*' was the slogan of the *Parti libéral du Québec* in 1960.

2011).[45] The rise of neo-nationalism that occurred at the same moment also contributed to the redefinition of the collective identity and aspirations (L. Dion 1995, pp. 25-28; Fournier 1983, pp. 19-20; 2001, p. 341). This period of Québec's history, commonly called the Quiet Revolution (*Révolution tranquille*), saw the emergence of new ideals and values. Amongst the main actors of this revolution stood Georges-Émile Lapalme, a lawyer who spent almost twenty years in the Canadian and Quebecois political arenas. From 1945 to 1950, Lapalme was deputy at the Canadian House of Commons in Ottawa, sitting with the Liberal Party of Canada that was then in power. In 1950, Lapalme quit Ottawa to become the leader of the *Parti libéral du Québec* (PLQ), a position he kept until 1958 in the hope of defeating the Québec Prime Minister of the time, Maurice Duplessis, leader of the *Union nationale* (UN)[46] (Panneton 2000; Piotte 1988).[47] During this eight-year period, not only was Lapalme unable to defeat his adversary but neither was he able to preserve his position as leader of the PLQ. In 1958, he was replaced by the charismatic Jean Lesage and, in 1960, the PLQ finally won the election. Lapalme decided to remain in the party, but his experience as Deputy Premier and Minister responsible of the Justice and Cultural Affairs departments were marked by disappointments and failures. To better understand the nature of Lapalme's contribution, it seems important to briefly depict the political culture of the time and explain further the challenges Lapalme had to face during his political life, starting with the regime of Maurice Duplessis (F. Harvey 2010, Boily 2002, Denis 1988, Fournier 1988, Piotte 1988). As we will see in this chapter, Lapalme played a significant role in the modernisation of the Quebecois society, although he rarely received any rewards for all his efforts and

[45] These reforms included the development of welfare state, the secularisation and democratisation of education, the nationalisation of private electricity companies, legislative reforms, and so on.

[46] Founded in 1935, the party of *Union nationale* was a fusion of the *Parti conservateur du Québec* and of the *Action libérale nationale*. The latter had been founded by dissidents of the *Parti libéral du Québec* a year before. The members of this party were notably in favour of social and economic reforms but many of them left the *Union nationale* shortly after the party's accession to power. In their view, Duplessis was not applying the programme. The *Union nationale* was in power from 1936-1939; 1944-1959 and from 1966-1970. It remained active on the political scene until 1988 but its popularity strongly decreased in the 70s. In 1985, it captured less than one per cent of the vote.

[47] Maurice Le Noblet Duplessis was Prime Minister of Québec province from 1936 to 1938 and from 1944 to 1959. Duplessis was thus in power for eighteen years in total and received five majority mandates.

achievements during his lifetime. Notable is the fact that the creation of the first *Ministère des Affaires culturelles du Québec* (MACQ) was one of the achievements he most cared about. But before discussing the genesis of the MACQ it is worth making a brief overview of the Quebecois political landscape of the time.

2.1.1 The Duplessis way

To this day the personality of Duplessis is still controversial (Gélinas 2010b, pp. 16-17; Jones 1983, pp. 1-2), but the uninterrupted fifteen-year-long tenure (1944-1959) of the all-powerful Prime Minister, whom Lapalme was tenaciously fighting, has been accused of having plunged the French Canadian society in corruption and backwardness, or as many say, in 'Great Darkness' (*Grande noirceur*) (Fournier 1986). Even if the rather sombre assessment of the Duplessis era has been toned down in the last decades[48] (Bourque and Duchastel 1988b, 1988a; Jones 1983; Sarra-Bournet and Gagnon 1997), the man is nevertheless seen as having generally held a backward and traditionalist vision of politics. Three features characterise Duplessis' government: its 'autonomist' stance; the use of patronage; and the limited scope of the state intervention. In effect, whilst the federal government as well as other European governments were adopting the Keynesian model of the welfare state (Dostaler and Hanin 2005; Moscovitch 2013), the conservative-nationalist government of the UN, for its part, believed the state had merely a supplementary role to play in social matters, leaving the control in these regards to the Catholic Church (Chevrier 1994; Jones 1983). The UN indeed forcefully rejected the Keynesian formula that Duplessis tagged as 'foreign, socialist, atheist and immoral doctrine' (Dostaler and Hanin 2005, p. 22, our translation).

The development of the welfare state in Canada (accelerated by the 1929 Great

[48] In a recently published article, Xavier Gélinas (2010) describes the different phases of the research on Duplessis. Gélinas notably deplores the fact that much of the literature on Duplessis tends to revile or exalt the man and his party. The author calls for a realistic analysis based on verifiable facts. See Xavier Gélinas, 'Duplessis Et Ses Historiens, D'hier À Demain', in Xavier Gélinas and Lucia Ferretti (eds.), *Duplessis, Son Milieu, Son Époque* (Québec: Septentrion, 2010a), 19-35.

Depression as well as the Second World War) was accompanied by a centralisation of powers at the federal level of government to which Duplessis strongly resisted. The 'Chief', as he was called, defended an 'autonomist' position that claimed decentralisation of powers (i.e. more powers to the provinces) so as to preserve the 'French Canadian race''s distinctiveness (Jones 1983, p. 6). As Duplessis put it in a 1948 speech: 'Québec's legislature is a fortress that we must defend with an iron will. It enables us to build schools that are suitable for us, to speak our own language, to practice our religion, to make laws that are applicable to our population' (Duplessis cited in Saint-Aubin 1979, pp. 198-99, our translation). 'Autonomy' for Duplessis was indeed nothing less than 'the soul of the province, the soul of the race'[49] (Duplessis cited in Boily 2002, p. 113, our translation), and the Canadian governmental intervention was seen as an intrusion and a threat to social stability[50] and to the very survival of the French Canadian group. Indeed Duplessis, whose discourse was permeated by religious references emphatically rejected any federal intrusion: 'you shall not crucify the province of Quebec, even on a cross of gold', he protested (Duplessis cited in Jones 1983, p. 13). As Richard Handler, American anthropologist and expert in Québec politics, further explained: 'Duplessis went to elaborate lengths to refuse or sabotage [the social services] offered by Ottawa on the grounds that Quebec's institution were adequate, if not "the best"' (Handler 1988, p. 86, emphasis in the original). The Prime Minister's refusal of federal university grants in 1952, despite the provincial universities' crying need for funds, is an example of his political obstinacy (*Ibid*, p. 87).

Duplessis' discretionary methods have also often been mentioned and condemned.

[49] '*l'autonomie c'est l'âme de la province, c'est l'âme de la race*'

[50] For example, the creation of the family allowances in 1944 was not well received by a majority of people in Québec: although the programme mostly benefited Quebecois families (owing to their great size), the fact that these allowances were distributed to mothers contradicted the Quebecois traditional and paternalist social values p. 39 of Luc Bertrand, *Maurice Duplessis* (Célébrités/Collection Biographique; Montréal: Lidec, 2005) 62. Besides, Québec was the last province to adopt the women's suffrage in 1940 against the will of a large part of the population, the clergy and the conservatives of the UN who were then in the opposition. Canada for its part, voted the law in 1917.

His 'patronage system' became regrettably known for having 'reached legendary proportions' (Black 2013). In his attempt to control the electorate, Duplessis went as far as reprimanding and depriving of some privileges those who did not vote for him or those who overtly criticised him (*Ibid*, p. 48). As Jones put it: '[p]atronage became an instrument of blackmail, even of intimidation, a veritable octopus whose tentacles extended to all areas of provincial administration' (Jones 1983, p. 14). But even though his political manoeuvres were understandably criticised by some, his populist positions and his obstinacy in defending the province's autonomy nevertheless rallied an important part of the population.

As we will see, Lapalme adopted a radically different position with regards to the question of the scope of the state intervention and he also forcefully denounced Duplessis' antidemocratic procedures. However, although Lapalme did not endorse the same autonomist and conservative views, he was no less concerned by the question of the survival of the nation.

2.1.2 Another Québec

Contrary to Duplessis, Lapalme had a progressive vision of what Québec could be. The theme of social justice was dear to him[51], and the leader of the PLQ put forward a series of progressive policies, such as those seeking to improve the working conditions and facilitate the formation of trade unions. He also promoted gender wage equity, universal social security, universal health insurance (Panneton 2000, pp. 79-87), and advocated for a free, modern, secularised, and universal education system (V. Lemieux 1988, p. 11; Panneton 2000, pp. 113-19). Also, during the eight years he spent in opposition, Lapalme regularly denounced the UN's patronage practices and asked for the implementation of various measures in the state apparatus to avoid corruption and clientelism (V. Lemieux 1988, p.

[51] The slogan Lapalme used during his first campaign against Duplessis — *Etre liberal, c'est être socialement juste!* (Being a liberal is to be socially fair!) — is revealing in this regard.

9).[52] In his 1956 programme, Lapalme promised to put in place 'a truly independent commission of the civil service' as well as 'an electoral reform' (*Idem*). Lapalme thus aimed at replacing the Duplessis's paternalistic system with a democratic one (Panneton 2000, p. 110)[53] and he wanted to introduce a series of reformist measures so as to change the political attitudes that had prevailed for a long time in Québec.

Despite Lapalme's tenacity in denouncing the anti-democratic tendency of the duplessist regime (he reprimanded those who did not vote for him or who overtly criticised him), he did not succeed in countering the formidable electoral 'machine' that the Prime Minister had put in place, and thus lost the 1952 and the 1956 elections. He did not succeed either in having support from the members of the Liberal Party of Canada and from his own 'troupe' who did not share his progressive positions (Panneton 2000, pp. 41-42). This, of course, contributed to seriously weaken Lapalme's leadership, finally leading him to resign from his position as head of the party in 1958 for the benefit of the charismatic Jean Lesage, an experienced politician who had served the Liberal Party of Canada from 1945 to 1958 (Québec 2009b).[54] Although Lapalme abandoned his post as leader of the PLQ, he remained within the party and continued to fight against the UN. In a reversal of fortune, Duplessis suddenly died in 1959 (his designated successor also died a few months later) and, since the UN had essentially been the party of a single man, this incident left the government weakened and set the coast clear for the PLQ to gain power in 1960.[55]

Even though Lapalme failed to defeat Duplessis and was not able to remain leader of his party, he nonetheless played a significant role in changing the political system in

[52] Irony of fate, Duplessis had himself won the election after having denounced the patronage system of the preceding liberal governments.
[53] Besides, Lapalme had himself modernised and democratised his own party. He created a provincial federation free from financial pressures which united several associations of militants, asserting the autonomy of the provincial liberal faction *vis-à-vis* the federal one.
[54] Lesage became successively deputy, parliamentary secretary (for External Affairs and Finance) and minister (for Resources and Development, and for Northern Affairs and National Resources).
[55] Other social forces have of course contributed to the UN's defeat, such as groups of artists (notably the signatories of the famous 1948 manifesto *Refus global*), intellectuals who gathered around the journal *Cité libre*, as well as trade-unionists, for instance.

Québec. The ideas he defended have indeed inspired the numerous reforms taking place after 1960. More interesting to us is the fact that Lapalme also contributed to the enhancement of culture. He effectively presented a cultural policy proposal — along with other political projects — in a manifesto entitled *Pour une politique* (1959). For Quebecois historian Jean-Charles Panneton, the social and political importance given to culture constitutes 'the most original element in Lapalme's thinking' (Panneton 2000, p. 162). As he explains:

> *In his essay [*Pour une politique*], the former liberal chief formulates a new definition of culture to which he gives a social function. Literature, arts, cinema and theatre become primordial spaces of creation because they contribute to reinforcing and expressing the Quebecois culture. Once this social function is recognised, the Quebecois state must support, with new policies, cultural organisations as well as artists and writers. Lapalme proposes the creation of the Cultural Affairs Department inspired by the French model and thus establishes culture as an essential and strategic element for the survival and the blossoming of Québec.*[56]
>
> (*Ibid*, pp. 162-63, our translation)

The ideas presented in *Pour une politique* were taken up — in a more succinct fashion — in the 1960 political programme of the PLQ. Lesage had effectively asked Lapalme to prepare the programme following the ideas he had put forward in his manifesto (F. Harvey 2010, pp. 20-21). Notable is the fact that the creation of a new department dedicated to culture, the MACQ, appeared as the very first article of the programme. But, as Handler explains, '[n]one of the Liberal Party leaders, other than Lapalme, was particularly attached to the idea [of the MACQ], and its prominent position in the program was due only to the fact that

[56] '*Dans son essai, l'ancien chef libéral formule une nouvelle définition de la culture en lui attribuant une fonction sociale. La littérature, les arts, le cinéma et le théâtre deviennent des lieux de création primordiaux, car ils contribuent au renforcement et à l'expression de la culture québécoise. Une fois cette fonction sociale reconnue, l'État Québécois doit soutenir par de nouvelles politiques en la matière les organismes culturels de même que les artistes et les écrivains. Lapalme propose la création d'un ministère des Affaires culturelles en s'inspirant du modèle français, établissant ainsi la culture comme un élément essentiel et stratégique pour la survie et l'épanouissement du Québec.*'

Lapalme was the principal author' (Handler 1988, p. 104). In fact, without Lapalme's insistence, the MACQ might not have been created at all.

Before considering more closely Lapalme's contribution in the field of culture, we will discuss the ideas in this domain that have most influenced him.

2.2 The emergence of a cultural vision

Between the moment of his resignation and the party's accession to power, Georges-Émile Lapalme undertook the writing of *Pour une politique* (1959). Despite the fact that this 300-page manuscript was, according to its author, the unfinished version of a new political doctrine meant to be read by just a few[57], it constituted the very basis of the PLQ's 1960 political programme (Lapalme 1970, p. 287; Panneton 2000, p. 77). During his lifetime, Lapalme never agreed to publish this manuscript; in his view, the book was as a 'first draft' that needed to be 'completely re-written' (the book was posthumously published in 1988). The informal character of *Pour une politique* thus sets the document apart from other policy statements: the book, which is composed of Lapalme's testimonial and personal views, as well as political recommendations, stands somewhere between the manifesto and the memoir. Unlike reports of commissions, white and green papers, or official policies, it centres on the very personal perspective of a single individual, rather than expressing the official position of a government or of his party. Thus, because of the very personal character of the project, we will be attentive to the ideas that have directly contributed to Lapalme's cultural thinking and that he himself mentioned in *Pour une politique* as important sources of inspiration.

2.2.1 Edmond de Nevers

In the chapter of *Pour une politique* entitled 'For a New "French Canadian Miracle"' (*Pour*

[57] Ten or so copies were distributed within the party in 1959.

un autre « miracle canadien-français ») Lapalme sought to demonstrate the importance of culture in the building of Québec's future and, more particularly, the special role of language as a means to increase the level of culture. It is not by accident that Lapalme introduced his chapter with an epigraph of one of the first important French Canadian intellectuals: Edmond de Nevers (1862-1906)[58] (S. Simard 2006, p. 17). The citation reads as follows (Lapalme quoted from memory)[59]: '[w]hen we will have regained the cult of French language, we will stand at the level of other nations; we will be able to produce and create; the power of language will be at our service'[60] (Lapalme 1988 [1959], p. 76, our translation). Harvey (2010) and Panneton (2000) have acknowledged Nevers' influence on Lapalme's thinking, notably on the importance he later attached to French language. But we go further by arguing that the measures he put forward in his cultural policy proposal all ensue from this very vision. The ideas that influenced most Lapalme were exposed in Nevers' essay *L'avenir du peuple canadien-français* ('The Future of the French Canadian Nation'). It is worth looking more closely at it.

Defined by historian Laurent Mailhot as 'a cultural and deeply political essay, a mixture of idealism, pessimism and prophecy essay' (Mailhot 2011), *L'avenir du peuple canadien-français* presented itself as a reflection over the state of the French Canadian society at the dawn of the twentieth century. In this book, Nevers identified the scourges that threatened the nation's future: the American invasion, the non-exploitation of intellectual resources and the problem of emigration (Nevers 2003 [1896], p. 81). To those problems, Nevers foresaw three solutions: 1) the purification of French language 2) the

[58] Nevers was a lawyer, writer, journalist, translator and civil servant. He is considered to be one of the first important intellectuals in Québec. He lived in Europe twelve years: he first studied history, literature and political economy in Germany, then visited Austria, Hungary and Italy before settling down in France to work as a editor and translator (he spoke thirteen languages) for the news agency Havas. He also sent his articles to the Quebecois newspaper *La Presse*. Nevers published three major publications: *L'avenir du peuple canadien-français* (1893), *L'Âme américaine* (1900) as well as a translation of Matthew Arnold's *Civilization in the United States* (1902). He died at 44 years old after many years of illness and without being able to finish the books he had in mind.

[59] The original citation differs from Lapalme's transcription but the meaning remains pretty much unaltered.

[60] '*Quand nous aurons retrouvé le culte de la langue française, nous serons au niveau des autres peuples; nous pourrons produire et créer; nous aurons à notre service toute la puissance du verbe.*'

development of intellectual resources 3) the expansion of colonisation (Nevers 2003 [1896], p. 91). The book was written over a period of three years whilst Nevers was living in France. It was published for the first time in 1896 as a vanity publication for the benefit of the author's close entourage and some journalists (Nevers 2003 [1896], pp. 9-10).[61] Even if narrowly distributed, his book proved to be successful (Saint-Jacques and Lemire 2005, p. 244) and is nowadays seen as a key piece of work in Quebecois intellectual literature.

L'avenir du peuple canadien-français is divided in three main sections.[62] In the second section — the source of Lapalme's inspiration — Nevers addressed questions of language and culture. The main argument Nevers put forward was that the survival and the future of the French Canadian nation essentially resided in the preservation of French language (Nevers 2003 [1896], p. 94). Indeed, Nevers granted much value to the role of language in transmitting tradition and history. As he put it '[t]he French language, a glorious legacy all the more precious that its conservation has cost many efforts, […] has been transmitted to us as the soul of ancestors, as the living incarnation of all they have been'[63] (Nevers 2003 [1896], p. 95, our translation). He also considered French language as being endowed with a particular genius that French Canadian could appropriate (*Ibid*, p. 95). But regardless of the intrinsic qualities French language bore, Nevers argued, people had nonetheless the duty of preserving their mother tongue, a task that proved all the more difficult that, according to Nevers, the French language was constantly threatened in America: 'Anglicism', he wrote, 'is the enemy'[64] (*Ibid*, p. 100, our translation). For him, the intrusion of English words in French language was harmful; it was a hindrance that held up the Canadians' intellectual development. In fact, Nevers believed that the 'four or five

[61] Nevers would not have been satisfied with this version but he would also have been concerned by the negative reactions his book might cause. Being critical about the French Canadian society, Nevers feared provoking adverse reactions. He died before having achieved his project of a second version.
[62] The three sections are entitled: 'Glimpse of the past' (*Coup d'œil sur le passé*); 'What needs be done to secure the future' (*Ce qu'il faut faire pour assurer l'avenir*); and 'The future' (*L'avenir*).
[63] '*La langue française […] nous a été transmise, héritage glorieux d'autant plus cher que sa conservation a coûté plus d'efforts, comme l'âme des ancêtres, comme l'incarnation vivante de tout ce qu'ils ont été.*'
[64] '*L'Anglicisme, voilà l'ennemi*'

hundred years of barbarism, of Anglicism and of carelessness' led to the impoverishment and the transformation of French language into a mere 'patois', (*Ibid*, pp. 101-02). As a result, the French Canadians found themselves in a state of 'inferiority', that which excluded them from the rest of the civilised world. For Nevers there existed a strict correlation between the mastery of a language and the individual and social development.

If, to Nevers, language was necessary to reach a certain level of enlightenment and social development, general culture was also a guarantee of national success: '[i]ntelligence should be cultivated like the land' he argued before adding 'to reach the ideal development of a nation and a country; we should not leave any plot uncultivated nor any uncultured villager soul'[65] (*Ibid*, p. 113, our translation). Nevers was indeed very sensitive to the fact that a nation could be judged and valued 'according to what it create[d], according to its contribution to the economic and intellectual progress'[66] (*Ibid*, p. 114*,* our translation). In his view, if a nation proved its usefulness and utility to the 'New World' it could then secure its 'preservation' and 'expansion'. The following passage is very evocative — poignant even, as it reveals Nevers' feeling towards the French Canadian population which he felt was vulnerable — and summarises his thought well:

> *Time has come for us […] to lay the foundations of a special civilisation that is incumbent upon us on this continent […]. We have to take part in the movement of high studies and progress […]. We have to make a contribution to the nations' intellectual production in order to secure our incontestable rights of an autonomous life so that no one dares dreaming of our absorption in the future.*[67]
>
> (Nevers 2003 [1896], pp. 118-19, our translation)

[65] '*Les intelligences devraient être cultivées comme le sol; pour obtenir le développement idéal d'un pays et d'une nation, il ne faudrait laisser inculte ni une parcelle de terrain, ni une âme de villageois*.'
[66] '*Mais aujourd'hui, on ne juge un peuple que sur ce qu'il a créé, sur sa contribution au progrès économique et intellectuel du monde.*'
[67] '*Le temps est venu pour nous, je le répète, de jeter les bases de l'œuvre de civilisation spéciale qui nous incombe sur ce continent, de préparer les voies à l'avenir, de prendre, en Amérique, une position en vue, afin de ne pas être perdus et oubliés au milieu des populations de race étrangère qui nous entourent. Il nous faut entrer dans le mouvement des hautes études et du progrès, afin de ne laisser se perdre aucune de nos forces vitales. Il nous faut apporter notre contingent à la production intellectuelle des nations, afin de nous assurer des droits incontestables à une vie autonome afin que personne à l'avenir n'ose rêver notre absorption*.'

To become strong and win 'its right of entry in the circle of highly civilised nations', the French Canadian society needed to form a powerful scientific, artistic and literary elite (*Ibid*, p. 114*,* our translation). Nevers effectively believed that only an elite trained in the arts, letters and sciences — 'fruits of old civilisations' (*Ibid*, p. 140) — could enable French Canada to become the civilised nation he was dreaming of. The emergence of such an elite could thus bring 'glory' to the nation, a glory that in turn would act as a 'rampart' against assimilation (*Ibid*, p. 149).[68] In other words, for the essayist, culture was the very means by which French Canada could resist domination. As we will see later in the chapter, Lapalme shared the same belief that culture and language were of utmost importance for the development of the French Canadian culture.

2.2.2 Edouard Montpetit

Another determining influence for Lapalme was Edouard Montpetit (1881-1954)[69] whom he also cited on multiple occasions in *Pour une politique*. Montpetit, was a fervent admirer of Nevers whom he saw as a guide (Montpetit 2003 [1931], p. 66) and was deeply inspired by the essayist. Like him, he believed language and culture were the French Canadians' main means of defence and survival (Montpetit 2001 [1940], p. 95). But, contrary to Nevers, Montpetit put more emphasis on the preservation of the 'French spirit' — synonym, for him, of moderation, order, distinction and harmony (Montpetit 2005 [1941], p. 6). The restoration of language was thus not a simple question of 'vocabulary': 'speaking a language means *thinking* and *living* the words' he maintained, before adding that it was with a 'daily contact with French thinking' that people could 'truly possess French' (*Ibid*, p. 72). In fact, Montpetit believed the 'spirit' of the French civilisation expressed itself in the

[68] And in the three subsequent chapters, Nevers pleads in favour of a new appraisal of higher education, a reform in primary and secondary education (better trained teachers, new modules, etc.), for the development of artistic education (conservatories and art schools) and for the recognition of artists, professors and scholars who are the 'likeable symbol of civilisation itself' (*symbole sympathique de la civilisation même*).

[69] Montpetit was a French Canadian lawyer, economist, founder of the *Université de Montréal*'s School of Social Sciences (first layman amongst the founders), and also Lapalme's former professor.

'most diverse forms of existence' (*les formes les plus diverses de l'existence*) (Montpetit 2001 [1940], p. 82). Therefore 'culture' was not so much, in his view, the sum of specific traditions and practices, but rather a 'frame of mind' (*état d'esprit*) (Montpetit 2001 [1940], p. 12) that permeated every aspect of life. And it was by injecting this specific 'genius' that, according to him, French Canadian culture could be protected against the 'harmful' American industrial invasion. Nevertheless, according to him, the protection of French language was of utmost importance: it was the very 'condition of [the French Canadian] survival'[70] (*Ibid*, p. 95). And Montpetit went further by proposing what he called the 're-frenchification' (*refrancisation*) of the province: to 're-frenchify' (*refranciser*), he argued, means to be revived to French civilisation and to retrieve its fundamental features: it means speaking, building, eating Canadian-like, **that is to say French-like**'[71] (*Ibid*, p. 82, our translation, emphasis added).

Montpetit also deplored the state of the arts in the province for he thought they were being distorted by foreign influences (*Ibid*, pp. 25-26). Besides, as an economist, he was particularly inclined to appreciate and defend art forms that he associated with the tourism industry (*Ibid*, pp. 7-25): architecture, urbanism, furniture, decorative and culinary arts were indeed the forms of cultural expression that he cherished most. To him, these traditions not only 'expressed the personality of a people' (*Ibid*, p. 67) but also participated in creating material wealth. However, like language, he thought that they too were falling into decay in Québec. Speaking of the built environment supposedly being altered by American and Anglo-Saxon new standards, Montpetit wrote:

> *A part of the countryside, a village area had kept […] all its French charm, then the most incongruous fantasies exploded, full of pretentiousness or deprived of style […]. Was it not an image of our language? An impoverished expression of things, like the*

[70] '*La langue, en particulier, est le cran de notre résistance et la condition de notre survivance.*'
[71] '*Refranciser, c'est renaître à la civilisation française et en retrouver les traits profonds : c'est parler, bâtir, vivre, manger à la canadienne, c'est-à-dire à la française.*'

> *lack of ideas translated through words. We build like we speak. There are holes in our language and in our house.*[72]
>
> (*Ibid*, p. 27)

Montpetit thus criticised the American cultural invasion, which was deeply transforming the cultural habits of French Canadians (*Ibid*, p. 29; 83; 94), and proposed to re-create 'an environment true to [the French Canadian] genius' that would be preserved 'from the infringement of the mechanised civilisation'[73] (*Ibid*, p. 58, our translation). As we will later see, Montpetit and Lapalme shared the same concern for the preservation of a French architectural and urban landscape.

2.2.3 Tremblay Report (1956)

In addition to these influences, Lapalme often referred, in his manifesto, to the *Tremblay Report* which was commissioned by Duplessis following the release of the *Massey Report*: in 1949, the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences (known as the Massey Commission or Massey-Lévesque Commission) was appointed by the federal government. In 1951, this commission submitted an important report which

> *gained recognition as a document of utmost importance in the cultural history of Canada since it advocated the principle of federal government patronage of a wide range of cultural activities and proposed the establishment of a Canada Council for the Encouragement of the Arts, Letters, Humanities and Social Sciences.*
>
> (Kallmann 2013)

[72] '*Un bout de campagne, un coin de village, gardaient […] tout le charme de France, puis éclataient les fantaisies les plus hétéroclites, soufflées de prétention ou démunies de style […]. N'était-ce pas là une image de notre langue ? Une expression appauvrie des choses semblable à la pénurie des idées traduites par les mots. Nous bâtissons comme nous parlons. Il y a des trous dans notre langue et dans notre maison.*'

[73] '*nous pourrions nous constituer un milieu conforme à notre génie ; à plus forte raison, si nous tirons de notre passé français, de notre caractère, de nos goûts et de nos aptitudes une discipline qui préserve notre architecture, notre mobilier, notre art décoratif, des atteintes de la civilisation mécanisée.*'

As we will often repeat throughout this thesis, the 1867 Constitution Act — which is the 'fundamental law of the country' (Saint-Pierre 2003, p. 91) — delimits the powers of the federal Parliament as well as that of the provinces, but is silent on the question of culture. The sharing of powers in this matter has thus regularly given rise to jurisdictional conflicts between the federal and the provincial governments, and particularly with the government of Québec which has always been more prone to defending the right to protect its own distinctive culture. Furthermore, education is an area of jurisdiction that belongs to the province[74], and in Québec, many saw the initiative of the federal government as an encroachment onto the provinces' jurisdiction, all the more so since culture and education were considered to be closely interrelated.[75]

The *Massey Report* thus opened up the debate over the jurisdictional responsibilities of the federal and provincial governments respectively: in Québec, some argued the federal level was better positioned to guarantee the development of both the English and French Canadian cultures, but others thought the Québec government should be the sole one dealing with French Canadian culture. The Prime Minister Duplessis appointed the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Constitutional Problems (Tremblay Commission) partly to answer the questions raised by this debate and to back up his 'autonomist' views. Despite the fact that the *Tremblay Report* was kept secret for a while, the opposition, and the media, finally laid their hands on it. The Prime Minister's refusal to diffuse its conclusions — apparently, Duplessis thought the commissioners had needlessly

[74] Although, as explained in the introduction, the federal government contributes to the financing of universities since the end of the nineteenth century.

[75] The Massey Commission replied to theses accusations by establishing a difference between 'formal education' and 'general education': 'Culture is that part of education which enriches the mind and refines the taste. It is the development of the intelligence through the arts, letters and sciences. This development, of course, occurs in formal education. It is continued and it bears fruit during adult life largely through the instruments of general education; and general or adult education we are called upon to investigate. There is no general prohibition in Canadian law against any group, governmental or voluntary, contributing to the education of the individual in its broadest sense.' Reference: Canada, 'Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters, and Sciences. Report.', (Ottawa: E. Cloutier, Printer to the King, 1951), 596.

made their task too complex and thus rejected their entire work by refusing to read it[76] — rather whetted the appetite of his opponents who, contrary to the 'Chief', approved its recommendations (Durocher and Jean 1971, pp. 358-63). Like them, Lapalme paid close attention to the content of the *Tremblay Report*.

Of significance to us is the fact that the *Tremblay Report* suggested that the government of Québec be endowed with a real 'cultural policy' (Québec 1956, p. 64). In effect, the commissioners believed that because of the particular history and political context in which it evolved, the French Canadian culture needed to be preserved by a state that best represented the interest of the nation (the French Canadian nation), i.e. the government of Québec. The commissioners indeed believed that

> *[t]o preserve its culture, to enrich culture from one generation to the other […], a national community must have the power to express itself freely, therefore, to create its institutions, to organise by itself and according to its own spirit its economic and social life.*[77]
>
> (*Ibid*, p. 60, our translation)

To achieve this end, the commissioners recommended that the province 1) set up various educational and cultural institutions, such as elementary schools, research centres, extracurricular institutions dedicated to science and arts; and 2) that it adopt laws and encourage diverse economic and social undertakings (*œuvres économiques et sociales*) so as to 'maintain and raise the community in the same spirit' (*Ibid*, p. 67). Although the commissioners were not very specific as to what the government ought to do in cultural matters, it is obvious that their idea of a cultural policy was all-encompassing and not

[76] To know more about the fate reserved to the Report, see Durocher and Jean, 'Duplessis et la Commission royale d'enquête sur les problèmes constitutionnels', 1971.

[77] '*Pour conserver sa culture, l'enrichir d'une génération à l'autre, la faire fructifier en valeurs de vie, pour elle-même et pour les autres, une communauté nationale doit avoir la faculté de s'exprimer librement, donc, en tout premier lieu, de créer ses institutions, d'organiser elle-même et selon son esprit sa vie économique et sociale.*'

restricted to the arts; the notion of culture was approached in a global way, like Lapalme would himself do.

2.2.4 André Malraux

Finally, another inescapable influence of Lapalme was the French Minister of Cultural Affairs André Malraux, whom Lapalme met in June 1959 during a trip to Paris (Lapalme 1973, p. 43) whilst he was still in the process of writing of *Pour une politique*.[78] This was a determining and memorable moment for Lapalme (*Ibid*, p. 44) who deeply admired Malraux (*Ibid*, p. 46). During this encounter, Malraux invited Lapalme to create a *Maison du Québec à Paris* (A Québec House in Paris) but the meeting was also significant as it gave Lapalme the idea of creating a ministry for Cultural Affairs. Moreover, it further convinced him of the importance of culture: like him, Malraux believed culture was the guardian of great civilisations.

In effect, according to French political scientist Mossuz-Lavau, Malraux's cultural policy was guided by a fundamental mission: to preserve the old and humanist civilisations threatened by materialism and industrialism which were notably incarnated by two new world forces: the United States and the USSR (Malraux 1996, p. 20). For Malraux, France could be at the core of a 'third continent' (not defined by geographic barriers) where the values of freedom, justice and human dignity could radiate. He also saw in the industrialisation of culture a direct threat to the values he defended:

> *Our civilisation gives birth every week to as many dreams as it does for machines within a year. […] And if States create, one after another, Departments for Cultural*

[78] According to sociologist and historian Fernand Harvey the book was finished on 15 July 1959.

Affairs, it is because every civilisation is threatened by the proliferation of its imaginary, an imaginary that is not driven by values.[79]

(Malraux 1996, p. 290, our translation)

For Malraux, culture — art, indeed — could protect this humanist civilisation that he so cherished. As he mystically put it: 'culture is the free world's most powerful protection against the demons of its dreams; its most powerful ally to lead humanity towards a dream worthy of men — because it is the legacy of the world's nobility' (Malraux 1996, p. 294, our translation).[80] For him, art was 'a humanisation of the world' (*Ibid*, p 17), and the artist's role was to help men recover their dignity (*Ibid*, p. 136; 226; 257) as well as to give human destiny a meaning *(Ibid*, p. 133). The significance Malraux conferred on arts went beyond the idea of 'arts for art's sake'. In his view, arts had a major role to play in creating the 'planetary civilisation', guardian of humanist values that alone could awaken 'brotherhood' and allow the existence of a 'reign of peace' (*Ibid*, p. 23). Malraux's vision was utopian: although France remained at the heart of this humanist civilisation, Malraux's project sought nothing less than to unite all human beings through arts. To achieve this end Malraux notably created several Houses of culture (*maisons de la culture*) (Malraux 1996, pp. 256-257; Poujol 1996, p. 149) in which he wanted the great works of arts and thought (*les oeuvres capitales de l'humanité*) to be accessible to all French people in the hope that they be illuminated by their evocative power. Contrary to Lapalme, Malraux thus placed the arts at the very centre of his policy.

In the following section we will analyse how the ideas expressed by Edmond de Nevers, Edouard Montpetit, the *Tremblay Report* and André Malraux shaped Lapalme's own vision of culture and influenced his cultural policy proposal.

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[79] '*Notre civilisation fait naître autant de rêves chaque semaine, que de machines en un an. […] Et si les États créent tour à tour des ministère des Affaires culturelles, c'est que toute civilisation est menacée par la prolifération de son imaginaire, si cet imaginaire n'est pas orienté vers des valeurs.*'

[80] '*La culture est le plus puissant protecteur du monde libre contre les démons de ses rêves; son plus puissant allié pour mener l'humanité à un rêve digne de l'homme — parce qu'elle est l'héritage de la noblesse du monde.*'

2.3 Lapalme's cultural policy

Our interest in *Pour une politique* lies in the fact it sets out in detail the justifications for what became the first significant state intervention in cultural matters in Québec, which concretised with the creation of a *Ministère des Affaires culturelles du Québec* as well as three other cultural agencies placed under its jurisdiction, namely the French Language Bureau (*Office de la langue française*); the Extra-territorial French Canada Branch (*Département du Canada français d'outre-frontières*); the Provincial Arts Council (*Conseil provincial des arts*) (Québec 1964).[81] Even though the first significant state interventions in the cultural domain dated back to the beginning of the century in Québec[82], *Pour une politique* **represents the first sketch of an explicit cultural policy in Québec** that displays the rationale for a coherent and comprehensive state intervention in cultural matters. Moreover, the document interests us as it has given rise to new institutions: the ideas it contained, or some of them, were implemented and materialised. Two chapters of *Pour une politique* will draw our attention particularly as they present Lapalme's cultural programme. We will also refer to his personal memoirs (published between 1969 and 1973), as well as various document prepared whilst he was responsible of the MACQ to better understand Lapalme's vision.

2.3.1 The French roots

In the chapter entitled 'For a New "French Canadian Miracle"' (*Pour un autre « miracle canadien-français »*), Lapalme was very much influenced by *L'avenir du peuple canadien-français* and made Nevers' ideas his own. Like Nevers, Lapalme argued that, unless French language was purified, the French Canadians could not produce an elite capable of making the nation shine. He too contended that French language acted as a protection (he used the

[81] The realisation of the project was also the result of Lapalme's commitment for he insisted with Lesage that he should himself become the Minister of the new department.
[82] See Fernand Harvey, 'La Politique Culturelle D'athanase David, 1919-1936', *Cahiers des dix,* 57 (2003), 31-83. And also Fernand Harvey, *La Vision Culturelle D'athanase David* (Montréal: Del Busso, 2012) 265.

word 'shield' instead of 'rampart') against English domination. Lapalme indeed believed that the poor mastery of French language in Canada — for which the invasion of English language was deemed responsible — was the cause of the lack of a strong literary and intellectual elite. Deprived of this genuine scientific, literary and artistic elite, the nation could not vie with the more advanced nations and thus risked being surpassed and assimilated. As Lapalme put it: '[t]here is no intellectual climate because there is no language capable of creating it'[83] (Lapalme 1988 [1959], p. 81, our translation). Echoing Nevers, Lapalme thus deplored the state of French language in Canada and denounced its impurities and imperfections: the forged 'Canadianisms', 'Anglicisms', and 'English words' had to be hounded.[84] The return to French roots constituted, for Nevers as much as for Lapalme, a crucial issue. In a working document written a few years later, Lapalme clarified his thinking: 'French Canadians continue to use some French vocabulary, but they do not speak [proper] French, moreover they do not possess anymore the genius of language nor the pride of the civilisation of which they are the heir' (Lapalme 1961-62?, pp. 2-3, our translation). In fact, Lapalme not only wanted to improve the quality of language in the province but he wanted French Canadians to acknowledge their French roots. In his view, Québec had the responsibility of fittingly representing France's culture: it indeed had to become 'France's best success'[85] (1960c, 1960b; Jenson 1961). The cultural policy that Lapalme conceived was indeed deeply guided by this quest and to achieve this society project, Lapalme intended to create four agencies (some of them came into being but not all). We will now discuss how these agencies could help the minister achieve his aim.

[83] '*Il n'y a pas de climat intellectuel parce qu'il n y'a pas une langue capable de le rendre. Comment parler un tant soit peu le langage scientifique, quand on ne sait pas parler le langage de tous les jours ?*'
[84] He even used a formula evoking Nevers' own words: 'the English word is the enemy who appears in a uniform and is recognisable at first glance; Anglicism is the spy who puts on a French uniform' (our translation). See Georges-Émile Lapalme, *Pour une politique,* 1988 [1959], p. 80.
[85] '*Il faut faire du Québec la plus belle réussite de la France dans le monde*.'

Linguistic Bureau

In the following chapter entitled 'The inspired hill' (*La colline inspirée*)[86], Lapalme argued that the PLQ needed to become the 'champion of a total renovation centred on the cult of French language, guardian of a dynamic and strong culture' (Lapalme 1988 [1959], p. 88, emphasis added). To do so, he proposed various means by which the party could enable French Canadians to restore or recover their French identity (*leur visage français*). For Lapalme, this mission would not only aim at giving Québec a 'proper culture' but it would allow the society to evolve and progress, going from a state of 'survival' (*survivance*) to one of 'revival' (*renaissance*) (*Ibid*, p. 87).

To achieve this cultural 'revival', he suggested implementing a **Linguistic Bureau** (*Office de la linguistique*), an organism whose mission would go beyond technical questions of language. The idea of a Linguistic Bureau had already been mentioned twice[87] in the *Tremblay Report* (F. Harvey 2010, p. 17). Lapalme retained it, but he conferred on this agency more responsibilities and symbolic power. In effect, for Lapalme a 'language policy' was not just about correcting language mistakes. As he explained further in a working document, '[t]he salvation of language will come when the **French spirit will have been regained**, the genius of French language rediscovered, the French pride re-conquered'[88] (Lapalme 1961-62?, p. 8, our translation). Lapalme indeed wanted the Linguistic Bureau to transmit cultural values that were in accordance with a 'French spirit', and he even compared his Linguistic Bureau to a 'French Renaissance Bureau' [*Office de la renaissance française*] (*Ibid*, p. 3).

[86] On Lapalme's admission, this chapter ironically takes on the title of French author Maurice Barrès' famous novel.
[87] The idea was submitted to the commissioners by two societies: the *Société du Parler français au Canada* and the *Académie canadienne-française*.
[88] '*Le salut de la langue viendra lorsque l'esprit français aura été retrouvé, le génie de la langue redécouvert, la fierté française reconquise.*'

Lapalme gave some examples as to how the Bureau could accomplish its mission: the Bureau could 'guarantee the purity of language' (*Ibid*, p. 1) in schools, in all media, at work, and in the public administration (*Ibid* pp. 6-7); support societies dedicated to the cause of French language in Canada; create competitions and 'spectacular prizes' in order to stimulate and reward good usages of French. It could also supervise a network of libraries in the province so that every citizens access culture; and, finally, functioning like a French Academy, the Linguistic Bureau could create words that need to be adapted to the French Canadian context (Lapalme 1988 [1959], pp. 89-91).[89] Lapalme indeed put great hopes in the Linguistic Bureau and as he said: 'the Bureau could represent one of the most important weapons for the restoration and progress undertaking of French Canada and become over time one of the governmental action's key means'[90] (Lapalme 1961-62?, pp. 8-9).

Provincial Office for Urbanism

Lapalme has never made secret his admiration for Edouard Montpetit who was, in his own word, his 'idol' (F. Harvey 2010, p. 6). He stood in his master's footsteps when he envisaged the creation of the **Provincial Office for Urbanism** (*Bureau provincial d'urbanisme*), an agency that would have the duty to 'revalue the architectural heritage' and contend the 'impoverishment of Québec's French character' (Panneton 2000, p. 103). Like Montpetit, Lapalme deplored the destruction of the French aspect (*composition française*) of the villages:

> *the public powers have put the axe and the ram in the very French conception of our villages […]. [O]ur administrations […] have mown the past and the beauty down […].*

[89] Lapalme also suggested that the Bureau should change toponyms that he simply found 'preposterous' or 'monstrous' in reason of their bilingual construction or excessive religious resonance.

[90] '*[L]'Office représenterait une des armes les plus importantes dans l'entreprise de restauration et de progrès du Canada français et deviendrait avec le temps un des moyens-clés de l'action du gouvernement.*'

Needless to say that, from these new wild imaginings, no memories of French architecture remain.[91]

(Lapalme 1988 [1959], pp. 92-93, our translation)

Concretely, Lapalme suggested that this new agency should control — in unison with the already existing Historic Monuments Commission — the development of an 'official architecture' (governmental, municipal and school buildings) and create a style peculiar to French Canadians. He also recommended that the Provincial Office for Urbanism classify and protect the 'piece[s] of land loaded with French history' and put a hold on billposting (an American import). In sum, Lapalme wanted the Provincial Office for Urbanism to protect the built and natural heritage from losing its French character and history, and to develop a coherent plan for future urban development peculiar to French Canadian culture and distinct from the industrial American standards.

Extra-territorial French Canada Branch

Lapalme also encouraged the development of cultural relations with countries sheltering French communities (with, of course, France sitting on top of the list). Although there had been Quebecois commercial agencies in European cities in the past, and although Québec continued to support promising students who wished to study abroad or sent missionaries in various countries, no comprehensive international policy existed yet. But Lapalme believed Québec had a role to play on the international scene: 'there is an expression that suggests the role we can hold, and that expression is: overseas France', to which he added: '[w]e have an *extra-territorial French Canada* and the province of Québec is, in some way, its metropolis'[92] (Lapalme 1988 [1959], p. 97, our translation, emphasis in the original).

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[91] '*les pouvoirs publics ont mis la hache et le bélier dans la conception toute française de nos villages. […] nos administrations , à la grandeur de la province, ont fauché dans le passé et la beauté. […] Inutile de dire qu'il ne reste aucun souvenir d'architecture française dans ces élucubrations nouvelles.*'

[92] '*il y a une expression qui fait penser au rôle que nous pouvons tenir, et cette expression, c'est: la France d'outre-mer. Nous avons un* Canada français d'outre-frontière *et c'est la province de Québec qui en est, en quelque sorte, la métropole*.'

The **Extra-territorial French Canada Branch** (*Département du Canada français d'outre-frontière*) imagined by Lapalme would thus foster the influence of the province outside its territory, on the international scene, but also serve as a gathering point for all the Francophones living in the rest of Canada as well as in the United States. And, to increase the power of the Francophones in North America, Lapalme suggested that this agency control the immigration flow in Québec: 'we need a bigger French numerical strength if we do not want to be submerged by immigration. We have to assimilate those who share the same Latin origin. […] We need immigration coming from France'[93] (Lapalme 1988 [1959], pp. 97-98, our translation). Again, behind the creation of the Extra-territorial French Canada Branch lied the desire to 're-Frenchify' (*refranciser*) the province of Québec and to restore the French Canadian pride.

Cultural Affairs Department

Like Nevers and Montpetit who had decried, in their respective times, the lamentable state in which the arts found themselves in Québec (Montpetit 2001 [1940], p. 25; Nevers 2003 [1896], p. 149), Lapalme also deplored the absence of a dynamic cultural life: '[w]e do not have theatre, he lamented, we do not have films, we do not have monuments, we do not have an arts city, we do not even have a "*Son et lumière*"'[94] (Lapalme 1988 [1959], pp. 94-95, our translation). This concern had preoccupied Lapalme for some years already; indeed, the PLQ's 1956 electoral programme included a section entitled 'Arts and Sciences' whilst Lapalme was still at the head of the party. The liberals then notably promised to give 'concrete support to the development of Arts and Sciences, free from partisan politics' by creating a Provincial Council for Arts and Sciences' (Hyman 1988, p. 60). According to historian Hyman, it was the first time the 'arts' were given such importance in a provincial

[93] '*Nous avons besoin d'une force française numérique plus grande si nous ne voulons pas êtres noyés par l'immigration. Nous nous devons d'assimiler ceux qui sont de la même souche latine que nous […] Nous aurions besoin d'immigration venant de France.*'

[94] '*Nous n'avons pas de théâtre, nous n'avons pas de films, nous n'avons pas de monuments, nous n'avons pas une seule ville d'art, nous n'avons même pas « Son et Lumière ».*'

party platform in Québec (*Idem*).[95] However, the encounter of Lapalme with French Minister of Culture, André Malraux, made him foresee an option more promising than the Arts Council: the *Ministère des Affaires culturelles.* In effect, Lapalme seems to have been seduced by the idea of creating a Department instead of limiting his intervention with an arts council. The MACQ would allow him to intervene on a wider scale: it could oversee the action of the Linguistic Bureau, the Provincial Office for Urbanism, the Historic Monuments Commission, and the Extra-territorial French Canada Branch. The MACQ would also directly support the Arts and Letters. Therefore, contrary to the model of the Canada Council for the Encouragement of the Arts, Letters, Humanities and Social Sciences, the MACQ would coordinate the ensemble of the cultural action in the province and would be destined to serve the French Canadian culture more globally.

Although researchers such as Couture (1988), Hyman (1988), Bellavance and Fournier (2002 [1992]) or Panneton (2000) have argued that the MACQ was designed following the French model[96], the structure of the MACQ ended up being quite different from that of the *Ministère des Affaires culturelles de France* (MACF).[97] Of course both of them inherited departments and institutions from previous administrations which made their respective structure different, but Lapalme's cultural policy included the development of a culture that went beyond the frontiers of the arts. Moreover, the importance Lapalme gave to Arts and

[95] Without explicitly mentioning the influence of the report of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences (known as *Massey-Lévesque Report*), which was appointed by the federal government in 1949, Lapalme was certainly well aware of its existence and recommendations. As we have seen, the *Massey-Lévesque Report* notably suggested the creation of the Canada Council for the Encouragement of the Arts, Letters, Humanities and Social Sciences based on the model of the Arts Council of Great Britain. Yet, from 1945 to 1950, Lapalme was a deputy at the Canadian House of Commons in Ottawa, sitting with the federal Liberals (then in power). Moreover, the *Massey-Lévesque Report* had opened up, in Québec, the debate over the jurisdictional responsibilities of the federal and provincial governments respectively, and Lapalme was doubtlessly aware of it.

[96] Lapalme effectively explained in his memoirs that he wanted to reproduce the French law creating the Ministry (he discovered that the French Department had been created by a simple decree). See Georges-Émile Lapalme, *Le paradis du pouvoir*, p. 85. However, he did not reproduce the MACF's structure; in fact, he adapted the idea so that it serves other objectives.

[97] According to the 1959 organisation chart, the French Department for Cultural Affairs structured its action around four directions: the Directorate of Arts and Letters; the Directorate of Architecture; the National Centre of French Cinematography and the Directorate of French Archives. See Annex 10 in Augustin Girard and Geneviève Gentil, *Les Affaires Culturelles Au Temps D'andré Malraux, 1959-1969: Actes Des Journées D'étude Des 30 Novembre Et 1er Décembre 1989* (Paris: Comité d'histoire du ministère de la Culture; La Documentation française, 1996) 508.

Letters was significantly less important in his overall programme than it was for Malraux. Lapalme wanted to restore the whole French Canadian culture that was losing track of its true origins, the French culture, whilst Malraux wanted to give art a new place in society notably by making it accessible to the most.[98]

So, as we see from this rapid overview, Lapalme's cultural programme essentially aimed at **protecting the French Canadian nation through the revival of the French culture in Canada**. And despite Lapalme's progressive ideas in social matters, he proved rather conservative in cultural ones. In fact, he shared with the former state Secretary, Jean Bruchési — who compared his service to a 'Cultural Affairs Department before the name existed' (Bruchési 1974, p. 67)[99] — the same desire to protect the French traditions. Indeed, Bruchési (who held his position for more than twenty years of which the majority under Duplessis' direction) had defended the same ideal:

> *Did we not become, in some way, the 'depositaries of culture and French traditions'? Did we not have to protect against the 'wind of evil' the 'French tree' by taking over the torch that French hands, too weak because chained up, […] had let fall.*[100]
>
> (Bruchési 1974, p. 81, our translation)

The fundamental difference between Lapalme and his predecessor Bruchési did not lie in the aim of the cultural policy but in the means by which Lapalme sought to achieve these goals and the new importance he attributed to them. For Lapalme, the state had to be at the service of this 'mission' (he used the expression 'cultural State') and its power therefore ought to be extended accordingly. Although researchers see Lapalme's choice to place

[98] Another significant aspect of Lapalme's proposal was the suggestion that the MACQ be directed by an '*organisateur de la vie française*' ('Organiser of the French life'), instead of a 'man of culture', for example. This expression is symbolically significant.

[99] In fact, Fernand Harvey has shown that state secretary Athanase David, who held his position from 1919 to 1936, was really the first to one to develop a coherent cultural action, although not to the same extent as Lapalme. See Harvey, 'La politique culturelle d'Athanase David', 2003; and Harvey, *La vision culturelle d'Athanase David*, 2012.

[100] '*N'étions-nous pas devenus, en quelque sorte, « dépositaires de la culture et des traditions françaises »? Ne devions-nous pas, contre le « vent du mal », protéger « l'arbre français » en ramassant le flambeau que d'autres mains françaises, trop faibles parce qu'enchaînées — et elles le resteraient jusqu'en 1945 au moins —, avaient laissé choir? ».*'

culture at the centre of the government's political project as a bold gesture (Fournier 1988, p. 159; F. Harvey 2010, p. 43; Panneton 2000, p. 11), Lapalme's cultural policy was rather a collection of ideas that had been in circulation for a while in the province of Québec. The culture he promoted was not different, not new: on the contrary it was in accordance with a vision that had been formulated at the end of the nineteenth century. In fact, Lapalme essentially deserves merit for having combined these various ideas in a coherent system and for having proposed the state as an instrument at the service of this restoration project. The tool Lapalme was using was new, but the object he tried to shape with it was a replica of what had been done before. Lapalme's vision of culture sought not to be different from that of the past as he himself admitted it:

> *Today, everything still lies on a French basis. The language, the traditions, the civil laws. With some changes of course. But everything is there. Changing this for another culture, another language, another civilisation is unthinkable.*[101]
>
> (Lapalme 1988 [1959], p. 95, our translation)

2.3.2 Lapalme's cultural policy qua compromise

In the previous chapter we have seen that a compromise is a composite form of agreement that holds together principles belonging to different worlds. We have also explained that a compromise does not rest on a common good 'constitutive of a polity'. The principle on which the compromise hinges has indeed not been subject to a process of universalisation; it has not been 'formalised' in any political philosophies. Consequently, it does not appear in the common 'repertoire' used by people to evaluate various situations or persons and adjust their behaviour accordingly. However, the compromise also seeks to satisfy the interests of a majority and therefore still needs to put forward the existence of some other

[101] '*Aujourd'hui tout repose encore sur une base française. La langue, les traditions, les lois civiles. Avec des changements, bien sûr. Mais tout est là. Transformer cela pour une autre culture, une autre langue, une autre civilisation est impensable*.'

form of common good. Because the compromise does not allow reference to a single principle — to a commonly accepted higher common principle — on which all parties can agree, it is particularly susceptible to critiques and remains a fragile form of agreement. The question now is: what compromise was Lapalme trying to set up in his cultural policy? And what common good was he pursuing?

We have seen in the first part of the chapter that Lapalme, qua leader of the PLQ, defended progressive values for Québec. He firmly believed Québec had to become more democratic. In Boltanski and Thévenot's interpretive device, democracy is a form of government that allows the expression and the 'pre-eminence' of a 'general will' (or 'collective will') which is the principle that we find at the core of the 'civic world':

> *The civic world, which can only develop in the context of a state, finds its most perfected form in* republics *and in* democracies*, which ensures the* representation *of citizens united in* electoral bodies*. […] Thanks to such institutions, the* general will *can emanate from the* base*.*
>
> (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 192, emphasis in the original)

We have also seen in the first part of the chapter, that, for Lapalme, civil rights and participation in the democratic process had to be defended and protected. This view again inscribes itself in the logic of Boltanski and Thévenot's civic world: '[i]n the civic world', they explain, 'beings are persons when they are capable of having rights and obligations' (*Ibid*, p. 187). Moreover, all means suited to guaranteeing the representativeness of the 'collective will' must also be used, and 'to make itself hear, [the collective will] requires "*seats* to be filled," "*polling places*, *voting booths*, *ballots*," "*measures* allowing an *electoral campaign* to take place normally" — *slates of candidates*, for example' (*Ibid*, p. 188, emphasis in the original). As we know, Lapalme was precisely trying to put such measures in place to improve the representativeness of the political choices available to the population at a time where the government was accused of arbitrariness and paternalism. Lapalme thus granted

much value to the role of the democratic State. Moreover, he also wanted the state to play a greater role in cultural matters:

> *The Parliament, master of laws, therefore observer of traditions and customs from which laws spring; dispenser of tax revenues, therefore provider of education; territory organiser, therefore authorised to create municipalities; regulator of rights and obligations, therefore catalyst of creative energies; the Parliament, I contend, was and still is the higher authority capable of activating the common denominator that is a culture peculiar to us.*[102]
>
> (Lapalme 1988 [1959], p. 87, our translation)

Lapalme indeed believed that the state was better suited to be in charge of the nation's culture than, for instance, associative groups, educational and religious institutions, which thus far had largely assumed this task. A view to which, as we will later see, not everybody adhered.

As discussed, Lapalme's cultural policy was all-encompassing and, unlike Malraux, he did not place the artists at the centre of his programme (although he certainly saw in them an element of prestige that could contribute to the preservation of the French Canadian nation). In effect, in Malraux's view, artists had an important social role to play due to their capacity to reveal the greatness of men and to protect societies from dehumanisation. As mentioned in the previous chapter, for Boltanski and Thévenot, artists — who 'often embody **inspired worth** today' (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 161) — 'have the duty of […] seeking *individual liberation*, not in order to pursue a selfish goal but in order to achieve human dignity while reestablishing authentic relations among human beings' (*Ibid*, p. 162, emphasis in the original). Malraux's policy gave great importance to artists (or to the

[102] '*Le Parlement de Québec, maître des lois, par conséquent observateur des traditions et coutumes qui donnent naissance aux lois, dispensateur du produit de la fiscalité, par conséquent distributeur de l'éducation, ordonnateur du territoire, par conséquent libre de créer des municipes, régulateur des droits et obligations, par conséquent catalyseur des énergies créatrices, le Parlement, dis-je, était et est encore la plus haute autorité capable de mettre en opération le dénominateur commun « d'une culture qui nous soit propre »*'

'inspired beings') and thus attempted to make the inspired world coexist with the civic one. In this view, the state had the duty to make accessible to all citizens, regardless of their social status, works of art and thoughts that could, for their part, contribute to enrich everyone's existence and make the world a better place to live. Conversely Lapalme's cultural policy fundamentally aimed at protecting the French Canadian nation through the revival of the French culture. If we again refer to Boltanski and Thévenot's model, the 'beings' of the '**domestic world**' are

> *worthy because they are rooted in* tradition*, that is, they are* proper *(as opposed, for example, to* legal *in the civic world, or to* exact *in the industrial arrangements). They exist in* continuity *(a property of the unworthy in the inspired world)*.
>
> (*Ibid*, p. 166, emphasis in the original)

Now, we know that the preservation of 'traditions' constituted Lapalme's main concern, and France was to him a 'cultural reference' that had to be followed. Besides, he did not hesitate to ask for the 'recognition' of France ('the true holder of French culture in the world') (Lapalme cited in Jenson 1961). As Lapalme explained in an interview: 'If the Province of Québec is to be representative of the French in America we need the moral aid of France to do so' (Lapalme cited in Palmer 1961). Interestingly, in the EW model, the beings of the domestic world are 'worthy owing to the relation that connects them to worthier beings by whom they are *appreciated* and *valued*' (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 165, emphasis in the original). Lapalme followed that logic by submitting the French Canadian culture to French cultural authority. Lapalme's cultural policy was not so much about seeking enlightenment through the arts, but to be faithful to the legacy of the French ancestors. **The distinctive compromise Lapalme was thus trying to set up was essentially making the civic and the domestic worlds coexist**.[103] But another world entered Lapalme's

[103] The two chapters dedicated to the theme of culture in *Pour une politique* are also filled with words belonging to the domestic world: 'frontiers', 'clan', 'territory', 'descendants', 'past', 'children', 'our history', 'our houses', 'commemorative', and so on.

compromise: the question of 'prestige', for Lapalme, was indeed a recurring preoccupation during his mandate qua Minister for Cultural Affairs (Lapalme 1962). As he put it, 'the government's support will guarantee the influence of our culture and will restore, in the eyes of other countries, the prestige that the quality of our artistic production earns us'[104] (1961e). Implicitly, Lapalme referred to what Boltanski call 'the reality of the public opinion' on which the '**world of fame**' hinges: '[i]n the world of public opinion, worthy beings are the ones that *distinguish themselves*, are *visible*, *famous*, *recognized*' (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 179, emphasis in the original). Like French President de Gaulle, Lapalme wanted to conduct nothing less than a 'politics of grandeur' so as to restore the image of the nation, and he attributed this function to the MACQ: 'Over the years […], the *Ministère des Affaire culturelles* will perhaps succeed in establishing a basic humanism which will be the brand (*la marque*) of this culture and which will earn us "**prestige**"'[105] (Lapalme 1988 [1959], p. 98, our translation, emphasis added).

Finally, as we have seen in the previous chapter, in Boltanski and Thévenot's model, all compromises seek to defend a common good that is not constitutive of a polity. The common good Lapalme was trying to defend was not clearly spelled out, but his cultural policy was obviously designed to ultimately protect the survival of **French culture** in America. To reinforce the compromise, Lapalme created what Boltanski and Thévenot call a 'composite object', i.e. a ministry (an object belonging to the civic world) whose mission would be to protect the French traditions (domestic world): the MACQ. The very creation of this new department made official and tangible the compromise between the civic and the domestic worlds. Its legal status also made it more difficult to dismantle or suppress. However, as we will see in the next section, his cultural policy was far from receiving

[104] '*la collectivité ne parviendra à son épanouissement qu'avec l'appui du gouvernement qui assurera le rayonnement de notre culture et redonnera, aux yeux des autres pays, le prestige que nous mérite la qualité de notre production artistique.*'

[105] '*Avec les années et au fur et à mesure que de nouvelles obligations lui seront dévolues, il finira peut-être par établir ici un fond d'humanisme qui sera la marque de cette culture et qui nous vaudra « ce prestige » dont parlait, il y a 25 ans, André Siegfried.*'

unanimous support, not even from other members of his own party amongst whom the Prime Minister Jean Lesage. This political opposition is a clear symptom of the persisting fragility of the sort of compromise the institution of the MACQ embodied.

2.4 A cultural policy challenged

In this section we will examine the critiques that have been addressed to Lapalme's cultural policy, and formulated in the newspapers. Contrary to the two other statements analysed in this thesis, the policy statement *Pour une politique* was not initially made public. For this reason, we have collected journal articles commenting on the different initiatives progressively put in place by the Minister for Cultural Affairs and which effectively constituted his cultural policy. The law creating the MACQ was submitted in early March 1961 (and sanctioned later that month) (Potvin 2013; Québec 2013b)[106], but the other agencies were only gradually set up: the Linguistic Bureau was created in April 1961 (under the name French Language Bureau) (F. Harvey 2010, p. 22), the Québec House in Paris was created in October 1961 (1961c; Palmer 1961), the Provincial Arts Council became active in November 1961 (1961e) whilst the Extra-territorial French Canada Branch was only created in September 1963 (F. Harvey 2010).[107] Moreover, to our surprise, we could not find any articles commenting on the law creating the MACQ itself. Two hypotheses could be put forward to explain this lack of media coverage: firstly, the journalistic practice was certainly different in Lapalme's time from what we see today, and the activities at the Legislature were maybe not a sufficient source of public interest to warrant extensive coverage. However, a second possibility is that the lack of publicity and commentary around the MACQ's creation might have in fact been deliberate: as we will see later in this chapter, the

[106] Harvey and Panneton assert that the Assembly adopted the law on 8 March 1961 and Panneton adds that it was 'officially' created on the 1st April. Lapalme writes that on April 1st the law creating the MACQ was adopted. For their part, Potvin and Hyman assert that it was presented at the Assembly on the 2nd of March but Potvin specifies that it was adopted on March 24th. A website created by Québec government and dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the Quiet Revolution indicates that the law was voted on March 24th but effective from April 1st. Lapalme was appointed Minister for Cultural Affairs on the 28 March 1961.

[107] The Provincial Office for Urbanism for its part was never created.

Prime Minister Lesage was never keen to create any publicity for the MACQ for he feared that this new department would arouse the interest of too many people and artists in quest of financial support. Lapalme's cultural policy was thus revealed to the press little by little, and in order to have a general overview of the reactions that his proposal provoked, we have selected journal articles that could be found in a research collection, the *Fonds d'archives Georges-Émile Lapalme* hosted by the *Université du Québec à Montréal* (UQAM), and which contains Lapalme's personal documents as well as documents related to his career (discourses, reports, manuscripts, correspondence, press clippings, photographs, films, etc.).[108]

The articles presenting or commenting on several aspects of Lapalme's policy that we have collected were published between November 1960 and May 1962. For reasons we were not able to establish, the articles from the year 1963 were not preserved in the fonds of archives, whereas the articles relating Lapalme's resignation in 1964 were included. However, the fact that we did not have access to the 1963 press review was not problematic as our main objective was to capture the first reactions to Lapalme's cultural policy proposal rather than the critiques over its implementation — critiques that, besides, started to be formulated some months after the MACQ's creation as we will later see. In total, we identified twenty-five newspaper articles published in Québec: nine of them gave a neutral and descriptive account of Lapalme's ideas; another nine were favourable to Lapalme's proposal; four were critical; and three presented a mixed position. These articles were published in various newspapers[109], the most influential and oldest newspapers in the province being *La Presse*, *The Gazette*, *Le Soleil*, and *Le Devoir*. Unfortunately, in a number of articles, the author's name did not appear (it was not possible to establish if the name was not printed in the original version or simply cut off from the press clippings). Before

[108] The fonds of archives was donated to UQAM by Lapalme's family.
[109] *La Presse* (6); *Le Devoir* (4); *Le Droit* (3); *Le Soleil* (2); *Montréal Matin* (2); *Le Nouvelliste* (2); *The Gazette* (1*); The Montréal Star* (1); *La Tribune* (1); *L'Action catholique* (1); *L'événement-journal* (1); and *Le Rivière-du-Loup* (1).

looking at the articles in more detail, we have to stress that our aim here is not to give a precise account of the number of articles published on Lapalme's policy but to have an indication as to how it was received, and to have an idea of the kind of critiques this initiative aroused.

We will also pay attention to some of the Prime Minister's speeches which defended a vision in cultural policy matters that, in some regards, conflicted with Lapalme's own; a divergence of views that ultimately prevented Lapalme from fully realising his own vision. These speeches were delivered on various occasions: the first one was presented to the Legislature in 1961 for the introduction of the bill creating the MACQ[110]; the second one entitled *L'Université, l'État, la Culture* (University, state and Culture) was delivered in January 1961 on the occasion of the award of a degree Honoris Causa and it interests us because there Lesage explained further his conception of what role the state should play in cultural matters; and the third speech was presented in October 1963 during a dinner offered to Minister André Malraux. Finally, we will also analyse the content of a letter Lesage wrote to Lapalme in August 1964, a few weeks before Lapalme's resignation, which illustrates clearly the divergence of opinions between the two men.

2.4.1 Positive reactions

According to Guy Frégault, who was Lapalme's assistant Deputy Minister, the MACQ generally received a 'nice welcome' (*accueil sympathique*) (Frégault 1976, p. 27). And effectively, the inventory of articles published between 1960 and 1962 confirms that, even if the creation of the new department did not make the front pages, the overall reception of Lapalme's cultural policy was warm. The idea that the provincial state should become the 'protector of all French-speaking people in Canada and in America' (Prince 1961) through the setting up of a Department for Cultural Affairs, the Extra-territorial French

[110] Available in the fonds of archives Georges-Émile Lapalme.

Canada Branch and the Linguistic Bureau particularly received good support. As one of the journalists put it:

> *[The MACQ] has given rise, amongst French Canadians, […] to immense hope […]. A vibrant culture (*une culture rayonnante*) is indispensable to the survival (*survivance*) of the French Canadian group in America. It is thus advisable that this concern be taken into account by the provincial government through a distinct department. The first steps of [the department] will be followed with attention and sympathy by all French groups of North America.*[111]
>
> (1961d)

The comprehensive action of the state in the cultural sphere through its various agencies was also seen very positively: according to the journalist Vincent Prince, those agencies would enable the state to intervene in a more 'official, far-reaching, sustained, rational and well coordinated' way (Prince 1961). The creation of the Extra-territorial French Canada Branch was particularly appreciated: 'it's there, obviously, that the department will fully play its role. And it is of major importance' wrote another (unnamed) journalist (1962, our translation). Lapalme's 'politics of grandeur' and 'magnificent programme' (Laporte 1961) thus seemed to win over support from a majority of journalists and even to impress. Notable is the fact that, as it was related by parliamentary correspondent and editorialist L'Heureux, the proposal to create both the Extra-territorial French Canada Branch and the Linguistic Bureau obtained unanimous agreement from the ensemble of the members at the Legislature (L'Heureux 1962). Besides, it is also interesting to note that some journalists remarked on and praised Lapalme's eloquence. He was described by one of them as defending the question of language and French culture with great 'lucidity', 'elevation of

[111] '*[le ministère des Affaires culturelles] a soulevé chez les Canadiens français […] un immense espoir […]. Une culture rayonnante est indispensable à la survivance du groupe canadien-français en Amérique. Il est donc souhaitable que cette préoccupation se fasse sentir au niveau provincial par l'intermédiaire d'un ministère propre. Les premiers pas de ce dernier seront suivis avec attention et sympathie par tous les groupes français d'Amérique du Nord.*'

thought' and 'true emotion' (1960c); another journalist dubbed him 'the most noble representative of this highly civilising thought [that consisted in seeking to preserve the French culture]'[112] (Jenson 1961, our translation).

Most of these journalists thus shared with Lapalme the conviction that, by giving their culture more influence and prestige, the state would guarantee the survival of the descendents of the French people who settled on the American continent. The preservation of French traditions was indeed seen as essential to the survival of the French Canadian group. Implicitly, these journalists defended the principle at the core of Boltanski and Thévenot's **domestic world**: i.e. 'the engenderment according to tradition' (or to put it differently, the transmission of tradition by descendents). Besides, Lapalme was seen as a respectful figure of this world as he himself possessed, mastered and valued these traditions. Interestingly too, the deployment of the state's levies to achieve this end was also welcomed: the compromise between the civic world and the domestic world was thus largely accepted and endorsed by the press.

2.4.2 Critiques from the civic world

As mentioned, we have found fewer negative critiques than positive ones formulated on Lapalme's policy in the archived press review. The few ones that we have found were criticisms that mainly stemmed from the civic world. In one case, Lapalme was accused of lacking modesty and having 'ideas of grandeur' whereas his government was not able to support citizens in greater need, i.e. the unemployed (1961a). Implicitly, the journalist blamed Lapalme for not being aware of the most important and pressing social issues and for not being at the service of the citizens. Another source of controversy was the composition of the Provincial Arts Council: the fact that all twenty-six members appointed by Lapalme himself came from only two cities, Montréal and Québec city, was seen as

[112] '*M. Lapalme qui est peut-être le plus noble représentant de toute cette pensée hautement civilisatrice.*'

inequitable; the other regions were not duly represented in the Council (1961d). The journalist Claude Picher also deplored the arbitrariness of these appointments[113] (Picher 1961) whilst another one described the Council as a 'superchapel of self-subsidy destined to increase the artistic centralisation in Montréal'[114] (1962, our translation).

In Boltanski and Thévenot's 'civic world', the assessment of people's worth depends on their capacity to represent a collective group:

> *[a] being can also be qualified as worthy if it is* recognized *as* representative*, a term that, in the civic world, designates the way in which other beings are included and the relation of worth among beings. To be a representative gives* authority *within an* organization*, and confers the* capacity *to exercise a* power*.*
>
> (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 186, emphasis in the original)

These journalists precisely contested the way appointments had been made at the Arts Council and they did not grant legitimacy to those holding the power to distribute subsidies; the members of the Council were not seen as qualified 'representatives' (and were particularly poor representatives of one group of citizens: the artists living outside the great cities). These critiques also reflected the inherent tension between the civic world and the domestic one. In effect, in the latter the persons' worth depends on the assessment of worthier ones (in this case the worthier is Lapalme), and the more they are appreciated by the worthier being, the higher they find themselves in the hierarchy. On the contrary, in the civic world, election (or nomination) proceedings 'presuppose complete independence on the part of persons who have to be disengaged from subjection to *others* and sheltered from *influences*' (*Ibid*, p. 253, emphasis in the original). Thus, when the journalists criticised the discretionary or arbitrary methods of Lapalme, they rejected a method of assessment that yet is legitimate in the domestic world. Even if the members of

[113] Picher also disapproved the appointments made at two Music conservatories as well as at the Montréal School of Fine Arts.

[114] '*[L]e Conseil des Arts s'est révélé dès le début comme une superchapelle d'auto-subvention destinée à accentuer la centralisation artistique à Montréal.*'

the council were not elected, there was an expectation among some journalists that the logic of the civic world prevail — i.e. appointments made according to well-established criteria and rules that guarantee the representativeness of candidates — so as to avoid conflicts of interests.

2.4.3 Critiques from the industrial world

At the end of 1961, some months after the creation of the MACQ, journalists started to question the efficiency of the new department. Amongst them, Camille L'Heureux expressed his desire to know what was precisely the MACQ's policy, 'its orientation, its practical plan of action' (L'H. 1961) and he deplored that so far nobody had been appointed as head of at the Extra-territorial French Canada Branch or at the Linguistic Bureau. In May 1962, the same journalist reiterated his regrets that the implementation of the government's cultural policy should 'take so much time' (L'Heureux 1962). As for Claude Picher, he bluntly questioned Lapalme's competence and hoped that the MACQ be directed by an 'expert in cultural affairs' like Malraux (Picher 1961). These journalists questioned the efficiency of the MACQ but also the competence of Lapalme, a kind of critique that, in Boltanski and Thévenot's term, stemmed from the industrial world. As they explain '[t]he ordering of the industrial world is based on the *efficiency* of beings, their *performance*, their *productivity*, and their capacity to ensure *normal operations* and to respond usefully to *needs*' (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 204, emphasis in the original). Besides, one of the critiques commonly addressed to the civic world from the perspective of the industrial one 'consists in underlying the *inefficiency of administrative procedures*' (*Ibid*, p. 271, emphasis in the original), which is what these journalists were indeed doing.

So, despite the fact that the MACQ had, at first, been welcomed by journalists, intellectuals and artists, the Department ended up accused of not being able to carry out its policy and to live up to its promises (Gow 1986, p. 247). But Lapalme himself was not

satisfied with the progress of his Department (Frégault 1976, pp. 113-22; Lapalme 1973, pp. 222-58). In fact, Lapalme's action was impeded by various constraints that he vainly attempted to bypass. Firstly, before being in charge of the MACQ Lapalme had been appointed Attorney General, a function that took much of his time and that he was only allowed to quit in 1963. Secondly, Lapalme constantly struggled to receive funds for the MACQ: for its first year, the MACQ received $3,1 millions (Canadian dollars) but, by comparison, the Ministry of Youth received 259 millions dollars and the Ministry for Education (created in 1964) received 500 millions dollars.[115] Moreover, as we learn from sociologist and historian Fernand Harvey, in 1962-63, twenty-three per cent of the expenses claimed by the MACQ were not authorised by the Treasury Board and were thus transferred to the province's consolidated revenue fund (*Fonds consolidés du revenu du Québec*), meaning that they were lost for the MACQ and used for other purposes. In 1963-64, this rate reached twenty-seven per cent (F. Harvey 2010, pp. 44-46). Thirdly, the Treasury Board was very slow to approve nominations to positions made available within the MACQ's various services (*Ibid*, p. 32-33). As a result the MACQ lacked both financial and human resources, and that could only hinder the progress of Lapalme's project. Finally, the Information and Publicity Board was instructed not to communicate the announcement of grants distributed by the MACQ to artistic organisations and artists so as to avoid whetting 'appetites' within the cultural sector (Frégault 1964). The fonds of archives Georges-Émile Lapalme besides contains several letters written by Lapalme to denounce this situation to the Deputy Chief of the Prime Minister's Cabinet. Evidently, this could only contribute to reinforcing the perception of the MACQ's inefficiency.

Lapalme's policy thus aroused some critiques but his main obstacle was not public opinion, as we will now see; it was the Prime Minister himself who did not share the same

[115] The MACQ received 3,1 M$ in 1961-62; 3,7 M$ in 1962-63; and 5,2 M$ in 1963-64.

idea as to how the state should intervene in cultural matters and therefore withdrew his support from Lapalme's initiatives.

2.4.4 Critiques from the inspired world

If some applauded the idea of further involving the state to enhance French culture, others were more cautious, especially one person who was however particularly influent: the then Prime Minister Jean Lesage. According to historian Panneton and political scientist Dale C. Thomson, Lesage would have reluctantly accepted to create the MACQ. Indeed, he would have given in to Lapalme's insistence, but for Lesage the department was nothing more than 'Lapalme's plaything' (*la bébelle à Lapalme*) as he himself openly said (Thomson 1984, p. 318; Panneton 2000, p. 143). Lesage was not against all state intervention in cultural matters, however. '[A]s a federal cabinet minister', Thomson writes, '[Lesage] had gone along with the [Prime Minister] Saint-Laurent's decision to create the Canada Council to support the arts, letters and social sciences, since it was to be independent of the government' (Thomson 1984, p. 312). Actually, Lesage was favourable to a mode of intervention closer, in its principles, to the British 'arm's length' model and thus less inclined towards Lapalme's approach which was more interventionist and fashioned, rather, upon the French centralised cultural ministry model. In the speech he gave to the Legislature in 1961 on the occasion of the adoption of the bill creating the MACQ, Lesage had already asserted his intention to limit governmental intervention: 'Government does not create culture and the Government does not direct culture. The Government only seeks to create a climate that facilitates the blossoming of the Arts' (J. Lesage 1961, p. 6, our translation). To do so, the MACQ simply had to provide 'assistance and support' to organisations which already sustained the development of culture (such as universities, artistic and literary societies or patriotic associations); he effectively wanted these organisations to be more influential rather than involving the state too directly in these

matters (J. Lesage 2013 [1961]). He made explicit the reasons justifying that the state should maintain some distance in a speech, given the same year, entitled *L'Université, l'État, la Culture*:

> *A people's culture is a spontaneous overflow of its soul; a surge of freedom, of work and reflection. It cannot be imposed from the outside, and all States that have attempted to establish a national culture by tricks of laws or constraints have only ended up in drying up the very sources of creation […]. If art is a collaboration between God and the artist, it goes without saying that the less a government makes intrusion in the sacred dialogue, the better it will have held its role.*[116]
>
> (*Idem*, our translation)

Lesage thus expressed a view that conveyed different intentions and values from that of Lapalme without, however, directly criticising the MACQ: for Lesage something fundamental, 'sacred' in culture had to be preserved from the state's authority. By advocating the adoption of the 'arm's length principle', Lesage sought to limit as much as possible all forms of interventions that could interfere with the creative process and be detrimental to the artists by preventing them from experiencing a genuine artistic inspiration. From the perspective of the EW model, Lesage's argument invoked a principle that we find at the core of the 'inspired world', i.e. the 'outpouring of inspiration' that only occurs under particular conditions:

> *In an inspired world, the state of worthiness has the attributes of* inspiration *itself, in the form of* illumination*, a gratuitous benefit that is at once external and internal, felt in the* experience *of an inner movement that takes over and* transforms*: the state of*

[116] '*La culture d'un peuple est un jaillissement spontané de son âme; elle est un élan de la liberté, du travail et de la pensée. Elle ne peut être imposée du dehors et tous les États qui ont voulu établir une culture nationale sur l'artifice des lois ou des contraintes, n'ont abouti qu'à tarir les sources elles-mêmes de la création; la culture, chez eux, n'a été que le masque nouveau des barbaries antiques. Si l'art est une collaboration entre Dieu et l'artiste, il va de soi que moins le gouvernement fera intrusion dans le dialogue sacré, mieux il aura tenu son rôle.*'

> *worthiness is* spontaneous *[…] because it is an inner state that beings receive from outside themselves.*
>
> (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 159, emphasis in the original)

Spontaneity and freedom are, in this world, the preconditions necessary to the outpouring of inspiration; this also implies that 'what is worthy is what cannot be controlled or — even more importantly — what cannot be measured' (*Idem*). Lesage adopted and defended such a view, and his hostility for the MACQ and Lapalme's cultural project more generally are the direct result of such a position. However, matters are further complicated by an even deeper and significant disagreement between Lesage and Lapalme which concerns the very nature of the 'common good' each of them was trying to pursue, as the next section will show.

2.4.5 Disagreement over the common good

As we have said earlier, the common good Lapalme was seeking to defend was French culture. And his definition of culture went, as we have also seen, beyond the arts and letters; he indeed defined culture as being 'a civilisation, an art of living' (Lapalme 1973, p. 96). In our review of reactions from the press, we have only found one article contesting the notion of culture presented by Lapalme (1961b). The main point of contention rather seemed to be the reference to France as a cultural model. Although some of the press applauded Lapalme's intention to protect the French culture in Québec and to make of French Canadians the 'qualified representatives' of French culture (Laporte 1961), all did not share this view. Besides, as we will see in more detail in the next chapter, the 1960s marked the beginning of the neo-nationalist movement that was characterised, amongst other things, by the self-assertion of a collective identity free from any form of domination, including the cultural one. Obviously, the English domination was denounced, but the French ascendant also began to be questioned. Journalist Claude Picher was amongst those

who criticised and even ridiculed Lapalme's admiration for French works of art. According to him, the state's duty was to support local creators, not to encourage, for instance, Quebecois troupes to 'play Molière in France:' '[Lapalme] should mostly know that creation in the artistic domain is more immediately essential to us than the interpretation of others' works, [and] that we need creators in all domains'[117] (Picher 1961, our translation). Another journalist (again unnamed) criticised the fact that Lapalme advocated the hiring of French educators to teach French language in the province and argued that French Canadian teachers were competent enough to accomplish the work (1960a).

More significant however is the fact that the Prime Minister himself privileged the development of a culture peculiar to Québec rather than emphasise the country's cultural indebtedness to France. In his first speech on the MACQ, Lesage effectively suggested that the Provincial Arts Council stimulate creation, and particularly Quebecois creation. As he put it '[the Provincial Arts Council] must also give rise to artistic expressions that bear a seal, a mark, a manufacturing trademark which calls the world's attention to them as PRODUCTS OF QUÉBEC'[118] (Lesage 1961, p 8, emphasis in the original, our translation). Making a parallel with the spoken Quebecois accent, he added: 'we are entitled to have our own accent […] the same could be said of our artistic production: it should have an accent that is truly ours'[119] (*Ibid*, p. 8, our translation). Similarly, Lesage insisted that Quebecois people do not try to imitate the French accent and suggested that the Linguistic Bureau make research on the typical, original and peculiar expressions of the 'French Canadian language' so as to 'establish the reasonable limits according to which citizens of French expression not living in France should conform' (*Ibid*, p. 13). In other words, for Lesage

[117] '*[Lapalme] devrait surtout savoir que la création dans le domaine artistique est plus immédiatement essentielle pour nous que l'interprétation des oeuvres des autres, qu'il nous faut ici des créateurs dans tous les domaines.*'
[118] '*Il doit aussi tâcher de susciter des manifestations artistiques qui portent un sceau, une marque, un poinçon de fabrication qui les désignent à l'attention universelle comme des PRODUITS DU QUÉBEC.*'
[119] '*Je dirai tout à l'heure, au sujet de la langue parlée dans la province de Québec, que nous avons droit à un accent bien à nous […] on pourrait en dire autant de notre production artistique: elle devrait avoir un accent bien à nous*.'

France was not the ultimate cultural model and French Canadians were entitled to have their own traits. Two years later, he explained to André Malraux the necessity for the French Canadians to become independent of their origins thus:

> *Just like your humanism [understood as a universal system of thought and values that French inherited from previous civilisations], Mister the Minister, has not made you […] less French, our French heredity has not made us less Canadian. If the son of a great man had no other ambitions than to be a copy of his father, he would miss his life. More, he would be the traitor of his father by despising the very richness of its inheritance which enables him […] to "cultivate his difference". […] Heir of one the most individualist nations of the world, the French Canadian could only, in turn, be independent of its very origins.*[120]
>
> (J. Lesage 2013 [1963], our translation)

Contrary to Lapalme, Lesage valued what made French Canadians distinct from the French people and he wanted to encourage the expression of this very specificity. In August 1964, the Prime Minister sent Lapalme a letter in which he clearly expressed his desire to see the MACQ encourage the diffusion of French Canadian works of art instead of financing the diffusion of French works within Québec. He warned Lapalme in these words: 'if this policy is not generalised within your ministry, this means that it will be the lackey of other cultures […]. It is an insult to French creativity to pretend that it has a Canadian offspring who is only capable of copying his father'[121] (J. Lesage 1964, our translation).

As Handler put it '[a]t the time of the creation of Quebec's ministère des Affaires culturelles, there was no consensus as to what constituted the French Canadian culture'

[120] '*Tout comme votre humanisme; Monsieur le ministre, ne vous a pas — bien au contraire! — rendu moins Français, notre hérédité française ne nous a pas rendus moins Canadiens. Si le fils d'un grand homme n'avait d'autre ambition que d'être un calque de son père, il raterait sa propre vie. Bien plus, il serait traître envers son père par le mépris de la richesse même de son héritage qui lui permet et ici je veux reprendre votre expression de "cultiver sa différence". […] Héritier du peuple le plus individualiste de la terre, le Canadien français ne pouvait, à son tour, qu'être indépendant même de ses origines, tout en approfondissant sa communion avec elles.*'

[121] '*si cette politique ne se généralise pas dans ton ministère, cela veut dire que celui-ci sera le valet des autres cultures […]. C'est injurier la créativité française que de lui supposer un rejeton canadien qui ne sait que copier son père.*'

(Handler 1988, p. 107). There were in fact two tendencies: one that consisted in seeking to reconnect with the French culture; and another that, on the contrary, asserted more vigorously than ever the Quebecois' cultural autonomy and specificity. As we will see in the next chapter, the latter tendency gained more and more strength during the late 1960s and 70s. Another source of tension was, as we have seen, the question of what ought to be included or not in the notion of culture (and hence how wide the scope of the MACQ's intervention should be). Although we have only found one person questioning Lapalme's definition of culture, this issue became a recurring one throughout the development of the Quebecois cultural policy, as we will see in the next chapters. But what is important to stress here is the fact that the notion of culture used by Lapalme, and even more particularly, his desire to encourage the preservation and the expression of French culture in Québec more specifically provoked dissent, notably within the government itself, and this finally constituted Lapalme's main obstacle. To put it differently, the 'common good' on which the 'compromise' was built in the 1960s failed in achieving widespread consensus, and this contributed to weaken Lapalme's cultural policy by making it more vulnerable to criticism.

2.4.6 An unachieved policy

In sum, the creation of the MACQ generally initially received a warm welcome. The idea that the MACQ be at the service of the French Canadian group was the most appreciated aspect of the policy (which represents a positive critique from the domestic world). A few months later, however, some journalists accused the MACQ of serving the interests of a few, notably by distributing grants and subsidies inequitably; these journalists were pushing for a fair representation of all artists (a critique from the civic world). The public perception of the MACQ deteriorated even more as the gap between Lapalme's declared intentions and the MACQ's concrete actions widened. The department was soon blamed for its

inefficiency (critique from the industrial world). The main resistances though came from the Prime Minister Jean Lesage who contested the legitimacy of the policy on two grounds: 1) for Lesage the state's interference could potentially become detrimental to creators; he thus wanted to limit as much as possible all state intervention (a critique from the inspired world); 2) Lesage also had a different idea of what should be the very aim of the policy, i.e. to support and encourage the expression of the French Canadian cultural specificity instead of seeking to preserve French culture in North America.

The conflict between him and Lapalme was certainly as much the result of a power struggle as the result of a disagreement over fundamental principles and values. Consequently, Lesage restricted as much as possible the MACQ's powers: the Provincial Office for Urbanism was never created and all other agencies struggled to accomplish their mandate. The director of the French Language Bureau, Jean-Marc Léger, who 'complained that lack of funds for personnel not only was causing inefficiency, but was imperilling the very existence of the Office' (Thomson 1984, p. 316) resigned one year after his nomination. The MACQ could not remunerate the members of the Provincial Arts Council, and the Extra-territorial French Canada Branch, that was only created in 1963, 'also failed to meet its promise' by providing support to just a very small number of organisations (*Idem*). The Québec House in Paris inaugurated in 1961 following Malraux's invitation was, for its part, placed under the authority of the Department of Industry and Commerce (Thomson 1984, p. 411)[122]; Lapalme only succeeded in obtaining that a cultural service be created within the Québec House (Rolland 1995, p. 53).[123] The lack of agreement between the Prime Minister and the Minister of Cultural Affairs indeed directly contributed to the failure of Lapalme's project (Panneton 2000, p. 152). Actually, there existed a genuine conflict between the two men and their relationship deteriorated to the point where the situation became unmanageable for Lapalme (their acerbic exchange is recorded in

[122] It became the General Delegation of Quebec in Paris in 1964.
[123] The cultural attaché of the Quebec House was under the MACQ's authority.

Lapalme's archived correspondence).[124] Lapalme's department was not dismantled but the lack of human and financial resources obviously prevented him from fully implementing his policy. In 1964, Lapalme resigned from his position and quit bitter active political life altogether (Panneton 2000; Piotte 1988).[125]

Conclusion

In the first sections of this chapter, we have discussed the context in which the first explicit cultural policy for the Québec province was developed. We then have retraced the origins and analysed the content of the policy as Georges-Émile Lapalme elaborated it in his book *Pour une politique*, and which resulted in the creation of the *Ministère des Affaires culturelles du Québec* (MACQ) in 1961. It has often been said that the MACQ was created following the French model, but as we have seen in this chapter, although Lapalme was a fervent admirer of the French Minister of Cultural Affairs André Malraux, his cultural policy was in fact mainly inspired by two Quebecois intellectuals, Edmond de Nevers and Edouard Montpetit. Like his mentors, Lapalme believed the nation could progress only on the condition that the French cultural values be revived and that they permeate again the French Canadian 'spirit'. In pursuit of this 're-frenchified' civilisation, language – the bearer of the French genius — had a major role to play. Despite the fact that Lapalme, as head of the PLQ, had proposed many progressive measures, the aim of his cultural policy, which was inspired by ideas developed in the late nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth, was rather traditional. The originality of Lapalme's cultural policy in fact resided in the extensive use of the state apparatus to achieve what he called the French Canadian cultural revival. For his part, Malraux influenced Lapalme insofar as he convinced him of the

[124] Lapalme also mentioned this personal conflict with Lesage in his memoirs.
[125] Lapalme remained deputy of his county until 1966 to defend his reputation after having been accused by the leader of the opposition of having taken part in an alleged electoral fraud. Lapalme was cleared of all accusations in 1972 only.

importance of culture for the preservation of civilisation, but he also enabled him to intensify the cultural relations with France.

In its ideal version, the MACQ's action was comprehensive and sought to address all spheres of life (language, arts, letters, sciences, urbanism, immigration, international relations, etc.). To do so, Lapalme suggested the creation of three agencies complementing the MACQ's action: the Linguistic Bureau; the Extra-territorial French Canada Branch; and the Provincial Office for Urbanism (which was finally never created). Thanks to Lapalme's initiative a Québec House in Paris was also created in 1961. Using Boltanski and Thévenot's interpretive device, the *Economies of Worth*, we have analysed Lapalme's policy qua form of compromise between various 'worlds' that all hinge on a different 'superior principle'. We have seen that Lapalme's compromise essentially made the civic and the domestic worlds coexist by placing the state (civic world) in charge of the preservation of a culture inherited from the French settlers (domestic world). Traces of the world of fame were also found in his policy as the enhancement of the French culture was also a means to confer 'prestige' to the French Canadian nation. Finally, we have identified the 'common good' in the name of which the compromise was set up: French culture.

In the last section of the chapter, we have analysed the reactions to Lapalme's policy by reviewing the press coverage from 1960 to 1962. We have also paid attention to the point of view of the Prime Minister Jean Lesage, since he was the most powerful detractor of Lapalme's policy. Using Boltanski and Thévenot's model, we have been able to observe that some accepted the compromise as Lapalme proposed it, whilst others revealed the tension that the coexistence of the civic and the domestic worlds posed, notably by questioning the way to legitimately assess the worth of those holding the power to judge subsidy requests. Besides, some also put forward worlds that were not dominant in Lapalme's compromise: the industrial world and the inspired one. Some journalists indeed asked for more efficiency whilst the Prime Minister, for his part, raised the question

of the artists' freedom. Finally, we have seen that a disagreement over the very common good to be defended was a source of conflict, particularly between Lapalme and Lesage. In sum, the failure of Lapalme's policy cannot be reduced to mere administrative problems and cannot be blamed on the inefficient bureaucratic machinery of the MACQ. Beyond financial questions lie issues of conflicting values and principles that the EW model enables us to clearly identify and spell out.

3 A POLICY FOR A CULTURE TO COME

Introduction

The present chapter covers a period that overlaps with the preceding chapter, going from the mid-1960s to the beginning of 1980s. Despite the fact that this period of Québec's history is filled with social change, we do not intend to present a complete overview of the events that transformed Québec's society and political life, as this is not the aim of this paper; we simply want to recall the events that, in our view, enable us to better understand Québec's 1978 cultural policy proposal that is the real focus of the analysis. The first section of this chapter thus presents an account of the emergence of the Quebecois neo-nationalist movement that manifested itself in the beginning of the 1960s and led to the election of the first sovereignist party, the *Parti Québécois* in 1976, and it also skates over the federal government's response to the new claims of the Francophones. The second section retraces the origin of the concept of 'cultural development' that is central to the cultural policies of the 1970s in France as well as in Québec, and which signals the formation of a new 'compromise' as Boltanski and Thévenot understand it. The third section presents and analyses, using the *Economies of Worth* model, the content of the ambitious 1978 white paper entitled *La politique québécoise du développement culturel*. Finally, the fourth section analyses the numerous critiques that the white paper aroused shortly after its release.

3.1 The rise of the Quebecois neo-nationalism

As we have seen in the previous chapter, the *Ministère des Affaires culturelles* (MACQ) was created in Québec in 1961 at the beginning of the Quiet Revolution, a period of Québec's history marked by important political and social transformations. The architect and master

builder of this new Department, Georges-Émile Lapalme, resigned from his functions in 1964 when the Quiet Revolution was nearing its end[126] and new social tendencies were appearing on the horizon. In effect, the sovereignist movement (also called the 'separatist' movement) was re-emerging in Québec's social life with more assertiveness than ever, creating tension with the rest of Canada and leading to a reconfiguration of the political arena in Québec. This section gives an account of this important shift in Québec's social life.

3.1.1 A new consciousness

Although the idea of independence had manifested itself throughout Québec's history (Séguin 1968), political organisations that promoted independence became more active and influential in the early 1960s and 70s. Indeed, during this period, no less than a dozen such organisations or parties emerged, thereby attesting to the expression of new aspirations.[127] The rise of the sovereignist nationalism notably corresponded with the growth of post-colonialism that denounced social inequalities of which colonised peoples were the victims. One of the most influential sovereignist groups, the *Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale* (RIN), diffused a manifesto in 1960 that clearly illustrates this growing awareness of the French Canadians' condition of dominated people:

> *Nowadays, whilst peoples from all over the world free themselves from the colonial yoke and nations claim their full independence, French Canada cannot accept to*

[126] Several authors such as Dion (1998), Durocher (2011), and Milner and Milner (1973) effectively situate the end of the period called Quiet Revolution in the mid 1960s (1965-66). 1966 is also the year when the Liberals lost their election.

[127] In fact, various groups were formed and dissolved before resuscitating, as new members joined, under a new name, whilst others were the ferment of clandestine and more radical cells. Amongst these separatist organisations, we find the *Alliance laurentienne* (1957-62); the *Action socialiste pour l'indépendance du Québec* (1960-196?) the *Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale* (RIN) (1960-68); *the Parti républicain du Québec* (1962); the *Front de libération du Québec* (FLQ) (1960?); *Comité de libération nationale* (1962); *Réseau de résistance* (1962-6?); the *Regroupement national* (1965?-1966); the *Ralliement national* (1966-68); the *Mouvement Souveraineté-Association* (MSA) (1967-68). Note that some of these movements were left wing whilst others were right wing. The separatist movement gradually became associated with policies of the left as the Marxist and post-colonialist movements developed and expanded. To know more about these sovereignist groups, we suggest the reading of Lionel Bellavance, *Les Partis Indépendantistes Québécois De 1960-73* (Montréal: Anciens Canadiens, 1973) 98.

> *remain under economic and political domination of foreigners any longer. The ideal of national independence […] is valid for French Canada as much as anywhere else.*[128]
>
> (RIN 1999 [1960], our translation)

In reaction to the rise of the separatist movement in Québec, the federal government set up a Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Laing 2012; F. Rocher et al. 2007). The objective of the Commission (also known as the B&B Commission) was to respond to the French Canadians' desire to see their culture and language better recognised from (and in) the rest of Canada.[129] However, the enquiry, fed by numerous studies (the commission published six volumes between 1965 and 1970) also brought to light the gap between the living conditions of the French and English-speaking people in Canada (L. Dion 1998, p. 158). The confirmation that the French Canadians were effectively disadvantaged thus appeared unequivocally evident to all. As one of the former commissioners, Gertrude Laing, put it

> *[the study] revealed that Francophones [who then formed 30 per cent of the population of Canada] did not occupy in the economy, nor in the decision-making ranks of government, the place their numbers warranted; that educational opportunities for the francophone minorities were not commensurate with those provided for the anglophone minority within Québec; and that French-speaking Canadians could neither find employment nor be served adequately in their language in federal-government agencies.*
>
> (Laing 2012)

[128] *'À l'époque actuelle où dans le monde entier les peuples s'affranchissent du joug colonial et les nations revendiquent leur pleine indépendance, le Canada français ne peut plus accepter de demeurer sous la tutelle économique et politique de l'étranger. L'idéal de l'indépendance nationale […], est valable au Canada français comme partout ailleurs.'*

[129] The mandate of the B&B Commission was as follows: 'To inquire into and report upon the existing state of bilingualism and biculturalism in Canada and to recommend what steps should be taken to develop the Canadian Confederation on the basis of an equal partnership between the two founding races, taking into account the contribution made by the other ethnic groups to the cultural enrichment of Canada and the measures that should be taken to safeguard that contribution'. Excerpt taken from page 71 of Guy Laforest, *Trudeau and the End of a Canadian Dream* (Montréal: McGill-Queen's Press) 217.

Although the B&B Commission aimed at softening the French Canadians' ire by asserting the bicultural and bilingual character of the country, the exercise rather revived the acrimony between Anglophones and Francophones (L. Dion 1998, p. 159) as well as upsetting other minority groups living in Canada (Aquin et al. 1968). As Laing explains, '[f]or many Anglophones, especially in western Canada, [the B&B Commission] was an attempt to force the French language on an unwilling population' (Laing 2012). For other minority groups, Canada was a multicultural country and hence rejected the idea of biculturalism (F. Rocher et al. 2007, pp. 31-32). As for many Francophones, the Commission was a manoeuvre — a 'lure, a 'trap' — to 'appease the colonised people's thirst of independence' instead of seeking to develop a truly 'equal partnership between the two founding nations' of Canada, which was what, in principle, the B&B Commission was aiming for (Rioux 1969, p. 320).[130]

3.1.2 A new party in Québec's political landscape

Inevitably, this new awareness of the French Canadians' inferior position contributed to fuel the separatist movements which, carried to an extreme, gave rise to terrorist activities.[131] The *Front de libération du Québec* (FLQ) was certainly one of the most important radical groups. The FLQ notably attacked what they saw as the 'colonial symbols and institutions' and the businesses or manufacturing outfits that discriminated in a way or another (for example by not using French) against Francophones (Dickinson and Young

[130] The 'two nation philosophy' was clearly exposed during a 1960 conference organised by French Canadian intellectuals, members of the short-lived *Nouveau Parti Démocratique du Québec* that had been founded by intellectuals and labour union leaders. This idea basically affirms that the constitution of the country is based on an agreement between two nations: the English-Canadian and French-Canadian ones. See Henry Milner and Sheila Hodgins Milner, *The Decolonization of Quebec: An Analysis of Left-Wing Nationalism*, ed. Jean-Marie Tremblay (Les Classiques Des Sciences Sociales Chicoutimi: J.M. Tremblay, 2007 [1973]) 215.

[131] The RIN notably gave rise to smaller more radical and violent sub-groups such as the *Parti républicain du Québec* (1962), the *Comité de libération nationale* (1962), *the Réseau de résistance* (1962), and the *Front de libération du Québec* (FLQ) (1960?).

2008, p. 320).[132] Its first terrorist activities took place in 1963[133] (L. Dion 1998, p. 206) but culminated, in 1970, in the kidnapping of two men, the British diplomat James Richard Cross and the Québec Labour Minister Pierre Laporte[134] (who was found dead a week after his abduction[135]). At the request of the government of Québec, the federal government stepped in: the War Measures Act was applied in the province of Québec and suspended civil liberties, authorised more than four thousand perquisitions and led to almost five hundred arrests (L. Dion 1998, pp. 23-26; Smith 2012).[136] Although the death of Pierre Laporte 'discredited the revolutionary movement' in the eyes of the most Quebecois people (Dickinson and Young 2008, p. 322), this moment of history called the 'October Crisis' (*Ibid*, p. 321) nonetheless represents a milestone in the evolution of the Québec/Canada conflict.

Another determinant historical moment for the self-assertion of the French Canadian people was the visit of the French President Charles de Gaulle in 1967. In a speech he gave in Montréal on the 24th of July (as the city was proudly holding the successful International and Universal Exposition *Man and his World*), de Gaulle congratulated the French Canadians for their achievements and encouraged their further emancipation by officially guaranteeing France's support (Gaulle 2013 [1967]). He concluded his speech with the memorable rallying cry[137]: '*Vive Montréal ! Vive le Québec ! Vive le Québec libre !*' (Long live Montréal! Long live Québec! Long live free Québec!). This

[132] The FLQ was also involved in anti-capitalist activities. To know more about the FLQ, we suggest the reading of Louis Fournier, *F.L.Q. Histoire d'un mouvement clandestin* (Les classiques des sciences sociales; Chicoutimi: J.M. Tremblay, 2006 [1982]), 444.

[133] Bombs were placed in the barracks of the Royal Montréal Regiment (that was seen as a colonial symbol), killing the night watchman.

[134] Former Minister for Culture but then Minister for Immigration and for Manpower and Labour.

[135] To this day the cause of his death remains uncertain.

[136] The counterattack was quite harsh considering the fact that less than twenty individuals were involved in the kidnapping of both men.

[137] The discourse was then captured by the national radio-television service and largely diffused. The sentence '*Vive le Québec libre !*' is still often heard in various radio-television programmes, songs, etc. The video is available online on Radio-Canada's website (<http://archives.radio-canada.ca/politique/provincial_territorial/clips/1048/>).

allocution inevitably aroused much controversy within Québec and Canada[138], but it also contributed to convince the undecided of the possibility for Québec to become an independent country, supported by other solid allies, amongst whom was the to-be Prime Minister and iconic leader of the *Parti Québécois*, René Lévesque (1922-1987) (R. Lévesque 2013 [1967]).[139]

Former war correspondent and a well-known media personality, Lévesque joined the *Part libéral du Québec* (PLQ) in 1960 and, at the time when de Gaulle gave his address, he was 'probably the most powerful minister in the Lesage government' (Milner and Milner 2007 [1973], p. 151).[140] A few weeks after de Gaulle's sojourn in Québec, Lévesque prepared in 1967 a manifesto *Un pays qu'il faut faire*[141] (Bilan-du-siècle 2013) in which he proposed that Québec be completely autonomous politically but that it form with Canada an economic union. His 'sovereignty-association' project (R. Lévesque 1968), however, did not reach consensus within the PLQ, and this led Lévesque to resign and form a new party. Lévesque hence straight away founded the *Mouvement souveraineté-association*, which became, a year later, in 1968, the *Parti Québécois* (PQ) (Latouche 2012). His party finally succeeded in uniting the various separatist groups and obtained twenty-three per cent of the votes in the 1970 elections before dislodging, in 1973, from its role as the official opposition, the *Union nationale* (UN) which had occupied it until then (*Idem*). Three years later, in 1976, new elections were launched, and one of the PQ's electoral pledges was the promise to hold a referendum on the sovereignty-association during the first mandate (Comeau 2012). This collective project aroused great enthusiasm amongst the population

[138] This diplomatic incident effectively resulted in the cancellation of his visit to other Canadian cities. For more details on this event, we suggest the reading of Thomas Axworthy, 'De Gaulle And "Vive Le Québec Libre"', *The Canadian Encyclopedia* (Historica-Dominion, 2012).

[139] Lévesque gives an account of the impact of de Gaulle's speech on his own conviction in a letter he had addressed to Jean Lesage but that, for unknown reasons, Lévesque never sent. See René Lévesque, *Projet de lettre addressée à Jean Lesage*, 1967.

[140] Lévesque was notably the principal architect of the megaproject of nationalisation of electricity that proved to be one of the most important economic leverage for Québec.

[141] This document will be the basis of the PQ's manifesto, published a year later: René Lévesque, *Option Québec* (Montréal: Éditions de l'Homme, 1968) 175.

and boded well for the sovereignist movement; the PQ took power that year with a record rate of fourty-one per cent of the votes (*Idem*).

3.1.3 From biculturalism to multiculturalism

Before concluding this section, it is important for our purpose to mention the Multiculturalism Policy of Canada that was conceived in 1971 by the federal government, then led by liberal Pierre Elliott Trudeau. The policy which aimed at promoting 'an awareness of the pluralistic nature of Canadian society' was also part of Trudeau's 'coherent strategy for containing Quebec nationalism' (Dickinson and Young 2008, p. 327). This policy incited much resentment amongst the Francophones who saw this federal initiative as a new affront to them (Bourque and Duchastel 2000, p. 22; Houle 1999, p. 103): in effect the policy clearly recognised **bilingualism** but completely expelled the notion of **biculturalism** to the benefit of that of **multiculturalism**.[142] From the Francophones' point of view though, the policy was seen as a means to completely dilute the principle that had been put forward in the B&B commission, to wit equal partnership between the two founding nations (Conrick and Regan 2007, p. 37). As government analysts Michael Dewing and Marc Leman put it,

> *[f]or many Quebecois, the idea of reducing the rights of French-speaking Canadians to the same level as those of other ethno-racial minorities in the name of multicultural equality* [was and still] *is inconsistent with the special compact between the two founding peoples of Canada.*
>
> (Dewing and Leman 2009, p. 10)

[142] Excerpt of the Government of Canada's "Appendix to Hansard, October 8, 1971": '[W]e believe that cultural pluralism is the very essence of Canadian identity. Every ethnic group has the right to preserve and develop its own culture and values within the Canadian context. To say we have two official languages is not to say we have two official cultures, and no particular culture is more "official" than another. A policy of multiculturalism must be a policy for all Canadians'. Excerpt taken from Sourayan Mookerjea, Imre Szeman, and Gail Faurschou, *Canadian Cultural Studies: A Reader* (Durham [NC]: Duke University Press, 2009) 589.

Thus in the span of a few years, a new conscience emerged in Québec transforming, in the process, the French Canadians' perception of the federal government which was more and more seen as an obstacle to their emancipation. A party reflecting their new aspirations appeared on the political scene and it took power in 1976 with a clear mandate: to realise the sovereignty of Québec. It is in this particular context that the PQ formulated a new cultural policy that was articulated in *La politique québécoise du développement culturel* (1978) also known as Laurin's white paper. As we will see in the third section, this policy sought to retaliate against the recent federal initiatives that had created much bitterness amongst the Francophones, but it also tried to outline future prospects for a country to come. Before analysing the 1978 white paper we will make an overview of the ideas that have fed into the policy by, most specifically, looking at the concept of 'cultural development'.

3.2 The seeds of a new cultural policy

As we have seen in the first chapter, the expression of 'cultural development' would be, in Boltanski and Thévenot's language, a 'composite object', i.e. a formulation that seeks to seal an alliance between different worlds, signalling by the same token the formation of a new 'compromise'. In effect, the word 'development' — despite its polysemous character — seems to indicate the presence in the policies of the 1970s of the industrial world. For its part, the word 'cultural' (or culture), which meaning is also very fluid, cannot be easily assimilated to one specific world. However, as we have seen, 'culture' when defined as artistic or literary activity or as the sum of human creations can be associated to the inspired world, whilst 'culture' when defined as cultural heritage or traditions can also be associated to the domestic world. To clarify the meaning attributed to the notion of 'cultural development' as well as the policies that ensued from it, we will, in this section, retrace the emergence of this concept.

3.2.1 The new French cultural policy

In the early 1960s the concept of 'cultural development'[143] became central to European cultural policies, particularly in France where the concept was first used (Chosson 1996, p. 60; Dubois and Georgakakis 1993, p. 57; Poirrier 2000, pp. 130-32). Indeed, two events were successively organised in 1964 to reflect on the French 'cultural development': the *Rencontres d'Avignon*[144] took place in the summer gathering politicians, intellectuals and artists and were followed by the Bourges conference[145], which theme was 'Scientific Research and Cultural Development' (Poirrier 2011 [2000], pp. 2-3). It is during one of these events that sociologist Joffre Dumazedier proposed the first 'operative definition' (*définition opératoire*) of the concept (Poirrier 2000, p. 131)[146]: 'cultural development is defined as the enhancement of the physical and mental resources of mankind in function of the needs and the personality of the society'[147] (*Idem*, our translation). To better understand Dumazedier's wide-ranging definition of 'cultural development', it is necessary to briefly discuss the cultural questioning through which the French society was going at that moment.

The emergence of the concept of 'cultural development' indeed followed the claims for 'cultural relativism' based on anthropologist Levis Strauss' argument that no civilisation

[143] In 1946, General de Gaulle created a Plan Commission so as to improve the economic situation of the country. The Fourth Plan (1962-1965) extended, for the first time, the idea of development, until then associated with economics, to include the social aspects of life that needed to be improved. According to French political scientist Jean-François Chosson this plan represented the 'Golden Age' of the ideology of 'cultural development'. See Chosson, 'Les politiques publiques', 1996.

[144] The *Rencontres d'Avignon* were organised by theatre director Jean Vilar from 1964 to 1970 and gathered academic researchers, local councillors, heads of associations, arts managers, state representatives, etc. We suggest the reading of Catherine Trautmann, Philippe Poirrier, and Augustin Girard, *La Naissance Des Politiques Culturelles Et Les Rencontres D'avignon Sous La Présidence De Jean Vilar, 1964-1970* (Travaux Et Documents; Paris: Ministère de la Culture et de la Communication, Comité d'histoire, 1997) 570.

[145] The Bourges conference gathered for the first time scientists who became very active and influential in the field of culture, such as Joffre Dumazedier, Pierre Bourdieu, Paul-Henry Chombart de Lauwe, and Michel Crozier. The conference proceedings has been archived online: A. Marechal, 'Les Actes Du Colloque De Bourges: La Recherche Scientifique Et Le Développement Culturel ', <http://www2.culture.gouv.fr/deps/fr/bourges.htm>, accessed 15 Apr 2013.

[146] Philippe Poirrier asserts that Dumazedier first exposed his ideas on cultural development as part of the 1964 Rencontres d'Avignon (see Poirrier, *L'État et la culture*, 2000, p. 131). Augustin Girard asserts that he presented this definition as part of the Bourges conference (see France, 'L'invention de la prospective culturelle', 2010, p. 9).

[147] '*Le développement culturel se définit comme une mise en valeur des ressources physiques et mentales de l'homme en fonction des besoins de la personnalité et de la société.*'

is superior or inferior to another, authorising thus the 'right to difference' — and, concurrently, the dismantling of the belief in a 'universal culture' (Chosson 1996, p. 61; Menger 2001, pp. 183-84). This change of perception brought the cultural leftists of the May 68 generation to protests against the 'classical culture' of the elite, and to claim the right for dominated classes to affirm their own and peculiar cultural identity (Poirrier 2000, p. 130). At the same time, a critique rising up against the 'State's ideological apparatus' — accused of favouring the dominant class — was shaking up the entire political system (Althusser, Bourdieu) (Chosson 1996, p. 61). Despite Malraux's efforts to give every French person access to the great works of arts, the first scientific enquiries on the cultural practices conducted in the mid 1960s by Pierre Bourdieu and Alain Darbel (1966) confirmed that inequalities remained in this sphere: high culture was still the privilege of a few (Poirrier 2000, p. 126). These results thus incontestably legitimised the critiques raised against the state and Malraux's policies. The equitable distribution of the cultural resources between individuals and regions was becoming an imperative as well as the participation of every citizen in the enrichment of the collective culture. The French Minister of Cultural Affairs Jacques Duhamel attempted to integrate the notion of cultural development in the French cultural policy in the 1970s. It is worth quoting him at length:

> *Cultural development is a dimension of social development, if by this we mean the optimal development of individuals and groups in a society in quest for well-being and equalisation of chances […]. The improvement of the living, working, transport and leisure conditions is at the very basis of cultural development. I once said that culture is what we need for a day of work to become a true day of life.*[148]
>
> (Duhamel cited in France 2010, p. 9)

[148] '*Le développement culturel est une dimension du développement social, si l'on entend par là l'épanouissement optimal des individus et des groupes dans une société en quête de mieux-être et d'égalisation des chances […]. L'amélioration des conditions de vie, de travail, de transport et de loisirs est la base même du développement culturel. J'ai dit un jour que la culture, c'est ce qu'il fallait pour qu'une journée de travail soit une vraie journée de vie*.'

So despite the vagueness of the concept of cultural development, it clearly was associated to the full development of individuals who, once in full possession of their faculties, could in turn contribute to better society. Henceforth, the state was in charge of encouraging the genuine and diverse cultural expressions of the citizens without seeking to impose any cultural norms on them and, to do so, it had to provide the best conditions for the blossoming of the people's capabilities. And because the notion of culture included all aspects of life that contributed to the development of individuals, the scope of cultural policy accordingly expanded well beyond the field of arts.

Besides, the idea of cultural development was also driven by the desire to complete the process of democratisation of the society **by means of a rationally conceived policy**. As French political scientist Vincent Dubois puts it, 'the field of high administration in the beginnings of the 1960s was marked by the utopia of a planning public intervention that, thanks to science, could be rationally programmed'[149] (Dubois 2007 [2003], pp. 2-3, our translation). After the failure of Malraux's policies, the question of the efficiency of the public interventions became crucial; the belief was that only a rigorous planning and the attainment of precise objectives could bring legitimacy to the state's intervention in the cultural field. A research service (*Service des Etudes et de la Recherche*) was thus set up in 1962[150] to help the French Ministry for Cultural Affairs in planning cultural development (Poirrier 2011 [2000], p. 3). As the former Director of this service Augustin Girard explained 'the setting up of rational, consensual policies opposable to budget plans could not [anymore] be deduced from humanist or aesthetic definitions of culture'[151] (Girard cited in Dubois and Georgakakis 1993, pp. 68-69, our translation), and the service resorted to scientific research to make a census of the French's cultural needs: 'we needed numbers to

[149] '*Le champ de la haute administration des débuts des années 1960 est fortement marqué par l'utopie planificatrice d'une action publique programmée rationnellement grâce à la science*.'
[150] Jacques Delors was the first director of this service.
[151] '*l'établissement de politiques culturelles rationnelles, consensuelles et opposables aux budgétaires, ne pouvait se déduire des définitions humanistes ou esthétiques de la culture*.'

make the portrait of the situation, explained Girard, and we needed sociological inquiries to spend money with a social objective'[152] (*Ibid*, p. 69, our translation).

In the following years, the idea of 'cultural development' continued to evolve and its political scope continued to widen. In effect, the political project of cultural development was rapidly endorsed and promoted by UNESCO during the successive conferences that took place in the 1970s decade in several countries. French cultural policy specialist Pierre Moulinier lists the four objectives UNESCO pursued by encouraging 'cultural development' for its country members: 1) as well as giving access to culture, a policy of cultural development must seek to encourage 'the participation and the contribution of the masses to "cultural life"'; 2) it 'aims at developing cultural identities' and hence encourages the preservation of distinct cultural features; 3) it promotes the 'dialogue between cultures' whether these cultures are within or outside the borders of a State; 4) it must give prominence to the cultural dimension of an 'integral development' and hence must interact with 'other sectors of the social life (education, communication, environment, science and technology, work, habitat, health, economy, etc.)' (Moulinier 1994, pp. 3-4).

The ambitions of 'cultural development' thus largely overtook the field of arts and heritage to open out to all spheres of life. Moreover, for minority peoples, this idea conferred a new legitimacy to their claims for greater recognition and autonomy, and for a nation such as the Quebecois one, this could only be appealing: the Francophone group was going through a process of emancipation and affirmation; its population was mainly composed of a working class and lower income individuals; and even their idea of culture that tended to be inclusive[153] came closer to the one proposed by the thinkers of cultural development. Unsurprisingly thus, the concept was rapidly adopted in Québec. Sociologist

[152] '*Pour faire l'état des lieux, il fallait créer des chiffres, et si on voulait ensuite dépenser l'argent avec un objectif social, il fallait des enquêtes sociologiques.*'

[153] As we have seen in the previous chapter, culture is often described as what expresses the 'soul', the 'spirit' of the French Canadians.

and anthropologist Marcel Rioux (1919-1992) was in the vanguard of this new tendency; he was effectively one of the first to clearly propose that Québec be endowed with a policy of cultural development, as we will now see.

3.2.2 Rioux Commission (1968)

In 1966, the sociologist-anthropologist Marcel Rioux was chosen by the *Parti libéral du Québec* (PLQ) to chair the *Commission d'enquête sur l'enseignement des arts au Québec* (known as the Commission Rioux) which was set up to evaluate the status of arts education in Québec.[154] Despite their relatively restricted mandate, the commissioners went beyond their object of study to propose a 'unified vision for a society project' where arts were of fundamental importance (Couture and Lemerise 2004 [1992], p. 5). The authors also dedicated a large section to cultural policy in the third volume of their 900-page report, in which they notably recommended that the MACQ become a Department for Cultural Development (*Ministère du Développement culturel*). Visibly informed of the latest developments in cultural policy making in France[155], the commissioners took over the themes of cultural participation and democracy, decentralisation, cultural animation, quality of life, cultural communities, etc. — all themes recurrent in the French discourses of cultural development. They also chose to define culture broadly: 'culture largely extends beyond work of arts and thought', they argued, 'it encompasses man in his entirety — his customs — his life style — his world vision — his politics'[156] (Excerpt of the *Rapport Rioux* in Corbo 2006, p. 312, our translation). In fact, the commissioners elaborated their analysis

[154] The commission was ordered to pacify the protesting arts students on strike in Montréal and Québec cities. The students demanded that the quality of teaching be improved and that the role of the artists be socially recognised. The students also put pressure on the government to nominate Marcel Rioux who was openly Marxist and independentist. To know more about the circumstances surrounding the creation of the Commission, we suggest the reading of the introduction of Claude Corbo *Art, éducation et société postindustrielle*, 2006, as well as the reading of Couture and Lemerise, 'Le Rapport Rioux', 2004 [1992], pp. 7-10.

[155] French sociologist Joffre Dumazedier, who took part in the conception of the Plans and who was renowned for having 'forged the notion of 'cultural development' was asked to realise a study on behalf of the Quebecois commission.

[156] '*Cette culture, pour devenir, elle aussi, l'affaire de tous, doit être voulue par tous. Mais cette adhésion doit avoir un caractère positif qui reconnaît que la culture déborde largement le cadre des œuvres d'art et de l'esprit — qu'elle englobe l'homme tout entier — ses mœurs — son mode de vie — sa vision du monde — sa politique.*'

from a cultural theory developed by 'one of the greatest intellectuals Quebec produced in the twentieth century' (Buxton 2006, p. 190): sociologist, philosopher, theologian and poet Fernand Dumont. American philosopher Richard T. Hull summarises Dumont's theory thus:

> *Dumont distinguishes between primary culture and secondary culture […], not to be confused with popular and high cultures. The primary culture is a milieu, a set of models that orient daily life. Men and women are closely embedded in complex social networks, they make things, they build villages and cities and they raise a family. But they are not confined to their milieu, because they are able to take some distance, to interpret the world, to build a secondary culture. Individuals develop a historical consciousness, they adhere to ideologies, they create knowledge, they develop cultural works that incarnate a significant world, they communicate with others, and build shared values. Ideologies, artists' productions, and learned works are different modes of production of culture.*
>
> (Hull 2005, pp. 677-78)

In other words, the 'primary culture' (that Rioux also called *culture-code*) is given to us in our daily lives and in our milieu of origin, whilst the 'secondary culture' (that Rioux also called *culture-dépassement*) is a personal 'construction' of meaning that entails a process of detachment (*distanciation*) from this first culture which notably results in the productions of artistic and scientific works (Dumont 1997, p. 154). Without going into too much detail, it is important to mention that in Dumont's view, the 'primary culture' and the 'secondary culture' maintain a dialectical connection (Laberge 1996, pp. 812-13). Now, according to the authors of the *Rapport Rioux*, the industrialisation of the society was depriving people of their traditions and of their tools to understand the world, thus reducing them to mere consumers. '[T]he gap between traditions and the technological rationality, the authors asserted, is such that the primary culture has been eroded through and through' (Excerpt of the *Rapport Rioux* in Corbo 2006, p. 103). Yet because both cultures, it was argued, evolved

dialectically, arts and science also became compromised by the increasing industrialisation. In effect, if the primary culture — the 'universe of symbols, feelings, values' — disappeared with the rise of the industrial society, arts and science risked becoming at the sole 'service of technique'. According to the commissioners, 'the essential problem of [contemporary] societies' was to 'construct a primary culture that fe[d] the secondary culture' (*Idem*).

Hence, a policy of cultural development ought to favour a 'spirit of creation' in every sphere of life and encourage citizens in taking part in the elaboration of a 'new culture'. In effect, the commissioners did not opt for the protection of traditional culture as they believed the challenges posed by the industrial society could be overcome by favouring the emergence of a new culture: the 'open culture' (*culture ouverte*)[157], which would be characterised by its ability to welcome rapid and unpredictable changes. We have to bear in mind, here, that the Quebecois society was rapidly evolving at that moment: the strong urbanisation of the population was accompanied by the emergence of new ways of life; institutions, such as the Church, that had been central in defining the French Canadian identity were losing their influence; and the emergence of a new conscience incited a new positioning. An anxiety about the future thus permeated the whole report, and the commissioners believed that 'emancipatory practices' — developed through creative processes such as the arts — could enable the Quebecois to confront these challenges. As they put it, only a person 'inured to the unexpected' (*rompu à l'imprévu*) could be able to face the challenges that the 'collapse of systems and doctrines posed to him [*sic*]' [158] (*Ibid*, p. 131, our translation). They thus suggested that the state help citizens in retrieving the meaning of their life (*resémantiser notre univers*) through the practice of arts and by taking part in the creation of this new 'open culture' (*Ibid*, pp. 112-18). In an interview he gave just after the release of the report, Marcel Rioux explained his vision thus:

[157] Also called 'mosaic culture'.
[158] '*relever le défi que lui pose l'effondrement des systèmes et des doctrines.*'

> *The task that is given to our society is hence to reconstruct a code, reconstruct traditions; this is not about a change of form, it is about making again a code of life by using the arts which enable the preservation, in technocrat driven societies, of the "imagination function".*
>
> (Rioux cited in Couture and Lemerise 2004 [1992], p. 16)

More globally, they proposed that the state contribute to the emergence of the 'normative man'[159] (*l'homme normatif*), an individual who, thanks to its creative capacities, would be able to define his own norms and become emancipated (Corbo 2006, p. 105). Implicitly, Rioux also hoped that by encouraging a cultural revolution, the process of independence would be eased. In his mind, the ability to create a culture was closely linked to a capacity to build a country (Couture and Lemerise 2004 [1992], pp. 15-17). The emancipatory power of the arts could help the Quebecois people to become free from any form of domination.

Besides, if the report proposed a utopian solution to the challenges of the industrial world, it also demonstrated some pragmatism. In effect, despite the fact that the authors argued that the arts (or, more largely, creativity) was the 'antidote' to the cultural crisis caused by the industrial society, they also put forth the necessity for a policy of cultural development to be efficient: 'the **production** of cultural goods should be **rationalised** in the same way as other goods. […] Moreover, [the Department of Cultural Development] will have to take **measures** so that the collectivity **benefit to the full** from these goods' (Excerpt of the *Rapport Rioux* in Corbo 2006, p. 317, our translation, emphasis added). The quest for efficiency expressed in terms of 'planning', 'expert training', 'cost-effectiveness' is present throughout this section of the document. In these respects, the commissioners were in line with the French designers of the Fourth and Fifth Plans: the new cultural policy had to produce results and to do so, the state had to be endowed with new 'rational' tools.

[159] The concept was borrowed to German biologist Kurt Goldstein. Rioux often used it.

Despite the density and the richness of the report, the government did not apply its recommendations for a series of reasons that we will not expose here, as it is not the aim of this paper.[160] But, in 1975, Rioux reiterated his ideas. Effectively, the sociologist chaired another 'commission' allowing him to propose again his society project, whilst at the same time exposing unambiguously his sovereignist stance. We will now have a closer look at the commission's ideas.

3.2.3 A Court of culture (1975)

The 1975 commission, called the *Tribunal de la Culture* (Court of Culture), was the outcome of a series of demonstrations organised by politically engaged artists and 'cultural workers' unsatisfied with the MACQ (G. Bellavance and Fournier 2002 [1992], p. 21). The *Tribunal de la Culture* was thus created so as to give the opportunity for artists and cultural workers to once more expose their grievance (Duchastel 2005 [1981], pp. 91-92). Following the hearings, the members of the 'jury' produced a report in which they excoriated the MACQ for being inconsistent and disorganised (Linteau et al. 1989, p. 714) before suggesting that it be abolished and replaced by a Department for Cultural Development, whose mandate, as we will see in this section, would be redefined and enlarged. Despite the fact that this commission was independent from any governmental initiatives, it gathered influential artists and intellectuals and had a significant impact on the government. Indeed, a year later, the *Rapport du Tribunal de la Culture* was largely cited in the government's 1976 green paper entitled *Pour l'évolution de la politique culturelle*.

The protests against the MACQ were obviously not groundless. Since its creation, the evolution of the MACQ had been difficult. Thus from 1964 to 1978, no less than seven ministers of Cultural Affairs succeeded one another (Potvin 2013), many of them proposing the restructuring of the Department. As a result, five organisation charts were produced

[160] For more information on this aspect, we suggest the reading of Claude Corbo *Art, éducation et société postindustrielle*, 2006, pp. 78-86.

between 1966 and 1976 and, as American anthropologist Richard Handler puts it, '[t]he ministry's weakness was demonstrated both by its inability to stick to a plan of internal organization and by the growing criticisms of its clientele' (Handler 1988, p. 113). Furthermore, the scope of the MACQ's intervention shrunk over time: the Department of Intergovernmental Affairs created in 1967 took the lead of all international cooperation projects; in 1968, questions of immigration were directed to the newly created Department of Immigration; and the French Language Bureau was transferred to the Department for Education in 1971 (Ibid, p. 110). The MACQ thus 'cultivated little more than its own marginality, despite the growing strength of cultural nationalism among the population' (Ibid, p. 113)[161] and the *Tribunal de la Culture* did not hesitate to expose and condemn all the mistakes, flaws and failures of the ministry in its report. Indeed, the dissatisfaction towards the MACQ was such that not only was the department deemed inefficient but worse it was said to be harmful to the cultural sector.[162]

Beside critiques of administrative nature, the MACQ was also accused of not being able to block the American and French cultural 'colonisation' of Québec's cultural industries, whereas the federal government was already imposing quotas and supporting the creation of Canadian products (Rioux et al. 1975, pp. 10-14). The authors of the *Rapport du Tribunal de la Culture* deplored the fact that foreign products inundated the markets of music, film, comics as well as book and magazines, and accordingly, deplored that few Quebecois products were available to the population. More importantly, the MACQ was blamed for not being able to achieve a fundamental objective: 'cultural sovereignty' (*souveraineté culturelle*), a notion first introduced in 1973-74 by the PLQ then in power

[161] Lacroix et Lévesque note that in 1963 the MACQ's budget represented 0.6 per cent of the total budget of Québec and in 1974 it had dropped to 0.39 per cent.
[162] The authors of the *Rapport du Tribunal de la Culture* argued, for example, that the MACQ was the cause for job loss, cancellation of projects, and that it caused the disorganisation of cultural organisations.

(Denis 2003 pp. 267-69).[163] Here, we have to recall again the fact that culture, in Canada, is an area of concurrent jurisdiction. If, for some, culture is 'a sphere of shared responsibility' (Gattinger and Saint-Pierre 2010a, p. 4), others interpret the constitution differently and maintain that culture falls within the jurisdictional authority of the provinces. As we have seen in previous chapters, this constitutional ambiguity has given rise to conflicts between the federal and the provincial government of Québec, which claimed a different sharing of powers (*Idem*). So, not only did the members of the *Tribunal de la Culture* demand that the government of Québec retrieve all the powers in this matter, but they also established a direct correlation between 'cultural sovereignty' and 'absolute sovereignty'. Contrary to moderate nationalists, they believed sovereignty was not 'divisible' since, they contended, 'everything is inextricably linked'. As they put it, 'culture is in the political and the economical, and similarly, the political and the economical are in culture'[164] (Rioux et al. 1975, p. 40, our translation). In other words, cultural sovereignty was, in the commissioners' view, impossible unless Québec was in control of all the economical and political levers. In accordance with the broad definition UNESCO gave to culture, the commissioners insisted that the notion of culture be all-encompassing: Québec's cultural policy not only had to favour individual development but, in order to guarantee the cultural survival of the Francophones, the policy also had to value the behaviours and elements that constituted the originality and specificity of the Quebecois qua distinct ethnic group (*Ibid*, pp. 30-31). Of course, the idea of 'cultural sovereignty' was also a reaction to Trudeau's policy of multiculturalism which implicit intention, argued the members of the *Tribunal de la Culture*, was to assimilate French Canadians.[165] In other words, the authors of the

[163] The idea of 'cultural sovereignty' that defended Robert Bourassa included three elements: that French be recognised as an official language in Canada; that Québec develop its own immigration policy; and hold more powers in radio-television broadcasting.

[164] '*La culture est dans le politique et l'économique de même que le politique et l'économique sont dans la culture.*'

[165] They even compared this policy to the strategy elaborated by British colonial administrator Lord Durham (1792-1840), a much-abhorred figure in Québec, who produced a report in 1839 in which he notably recommended the assimilation of the French Canadians.

Rapport du Tribunal de la Culture argued that a policy for cultural development had to firstly prevent the loss of the cultural identity of the Quebecois and, secondly, stimulate the 'awakening of a Quebecois conscience', encourage the citizens to take charge of their culture and their destiny. The ultimate goal of a policy of cultural development was thus to give the citizens the tools to create an independent country.

The *Rapport de la commission d'enquête sur l'enseignements des arts au Québec* and the *Rapport du Tribunal de la Culture* were thus the first documents to clearly suggest that the government of Québec elaborate a policy of cultural development. But if the 1968 report insisted on the challenges that the mass-consumption industrial society represented for the Quebecois, the 1975 report, for its part, warned against the dangers of cultural assimilation that threatened the Quebecois of 'cultural death' (*Ibid*, p.33). In a span of ten years, there was thus a shift in the discourse on cultural development that was firstly seen as a means to humanise the society before becoming a weapon against all forms of cultural domination. After having thus retraced the origin of the concept of 'cultural development' in Québec, we will examine how it was placed at the heart of the 1978 *Politique québécoise de développement culturel*, the main object of our analysis in the present chapter.

3.3 The cultural policy of the *Parti Québécois*

In May 1976, whilst the PLQ was still in power, the Minister of Communication and Cultural Affairs Jean-Paul L'Allier officially put the idea of 'cultural development' on the government's agenda. As we have said earlier, large excerpts of the *Rapport du Tribunal de la Culture* were reproduced in the green paper entitled *Pour l'évolution de la politique culturelle* as well as excerpts of the *Rapport Rioux*.[166] In many respects L'Allier's green paper, which was published two years before the release of the PQ's own cultural policy, paved the way for the authors of the 1978 white paper. L'Allier's policy proposal expanded

[166] Large excerpts of working documents written by assistant deputy minister Guy Frégault recommending that the future orientations of the MACQ be based on the concept of 'cultural development' were also reproduced.

the field of action of the state so as to include the cultural industries (Québec 1976, p. 147), the cultural environment (*Ibid,* p. 179), and the communication sector (*Ibid,* p. 184). It proposed an increased decentralisation[167] of the state's intervention with the creation of regional councils for culture as well as autonomous organisms, such as the *Conseil de la culture*, the *Régie du patrimoine*, the *Commission des musées du Québec*, etc. (*Ibid,* pp. 206-15). It also rethought the administrative structure of the MACQ so as to improve its efficiency (*Ibid,* pp. 194-98). A few months later, however, the PLQ lost its election, and that abruptly put and end to L'Allier's project. Two years later, the PQ presented its own cultural policy, *La politique québécoise du développement culturel*, a policy that proved bolder, more assertive as well as more ambitious than L'Allier's. We will examine the content of the policy in this section but, before doing so, let us say a few words about the initiator of the policy, Camille Laurin.

3.3.1 A State Minister for cultural development

When the PQ took the lead of the government of Québec in 1976, René Lévesque decided to create five ministerial committees that would group several ministries around a major common theme so as to strengthen 'interministerial cohesion' (Poirier 2005, p. 238). These five themes included: Economic Development; Social Development; Territorial Planning (*Aménagement du territoire*); Democratic Life; and Cultural Development (Leclerc 2010, p. 111). Culture was, for the first time, given prime importance within a government (Poirier 2005, p. 238) and the ministerial committee for Cultural Development was created to coordinate the activities of four other ministries: that of Education, Cultural Affairs, Communication and the High Commissioner for Youth, Leisure, and Sport (*Idem*). The new ministerial committee thus defined culture broadly, faithful in that respect to the recent tendencies in cultural policy making.

[167] Bellavance and Fournier (1992) recount the beginning of the process of decentralisation in 1966 with the creation of some *bureaux d'aménagement culturels régionaux* (BAC) and *centres culturels*.

As a prominent personality of the PQ, the psychiatrist Dr. Camille Laurin (1922-1999) was given the responsibility of the ministerial committee of Cultural Development. The experiences and reflections of Laurin qua 'socially engaged psychiatrist' were determining for his political career. Effectively, his leap into politics did not represent a professional breach for the psychiatrist; as we will see, it was entirely inscribed in continuity with his healing career (J.-F. Simard 2010, p. 27). First trained in medicine in Montréal, Laurin continued his formation in psychiatry and psychoanalysis (Picard 2003, pp. 61-111). After having spent six years abroad to pursue his specialisation, Laurin came back to Montréal in 1957 where he was rapidly offered prestigious positions despite his young age.[168] Laurin's commitment to the modernisation of the psychiatric system in Québec, which was also accompanied by its share of controversy, rapidly earned him much media attention (*Ibid*, pp. 175-77). This reputation enabled Laurin to rapidly gain ground within the sovereignist movement that he joined in 1968.[169] He was also amongst the first seven members of the PQ to win a seat as deputy in the 1970 election whereas his chief Lévesque, however well known he was, did not. From the beginning, Laurin was thus an influential and respected figure in the PQ (*Ibid*, pp. 190-92).

From the moment he joined the PQ until his death, Laurin remained an ardent defender of sovereignty. But this had not always been so. The psychiatrist explained his conversion in a document he wrote in 1972 entitled *Témoignage de Camille Laurin: Pourquoi je suis souverainiste?*[170]. This document is worth a short presentation as it reveals Laurin's fundamental motivation for being involved in politics, the driving force behind all his political battles. In this text, Laurin indeed explained how his professional experience as psychiatrist convinced him of the necessity for Québec to become independent (Laurin

[168] He was appointed Scientific Director of Québec's main psychiatric institute (Albert-Prévost Institute) and Head of the Psychiatry Department of the *Université de Montréal*'s Faculty of Medicine. He left his mark both at the institute where he renewed the medical practices and at the university where he undertook an important pedagogical reform.

[169] As soon as he decided to become involved in politics, he was elected President of the executive council of the newly created *Parti Québécois.*

[170] The title that could be translated thus: 'Testimony of Camille Laurin: Why Am I a Sovereignist?'

1972). Essentially, he recounted that after several years of practicing psychiatry, he realised that the majority of his francophone patients suffered from a psychological disorder taking root in an identity problem. The recurrence of this personality trouble convinced him that the distress of his francophone patients went beyond their personal history; their angst was rather linked to the collective destiny of a people that had always been under the yoke of empires and powerful institutions (*Ibid*, p. 25-38).[171] Influenced by the reading of the *Portrait du colonisé*[172] (1957) by Albert Memmi — a Tunisian sociologist known for his contribution to postcolonialism — Laurin argued that the Quebecois, like the slave who identifies with his masters, had internalised values and norms foreign to him to the point where he was forgetting his true self and worth (Laurin 1972, p. 10-22). As a result, 'the Quebecois, wrote Laurin, is a confused and tormented being, divided against himself, unfinished and incapable of […] fully assuming his liberty, his history and his existence' (*Ibid*, p. 5). But, according to the psychiatrist, despite the fact that the Quebecois' collective personality was heterogeneous (*composite*) and incomplete, its original nub or essence (*fond original*) remained intact (*Ibid*, p. 15). Hence, he went on, the full development of the unique collective personality of the Quebecois was still possible and Laurin believed that a 'collective psychotherapy' was the remedy (*Ibid*, p. 32). Although the psychiatrist was not explicit as to how he intended to apply his therapy, we understand that he wanted to give the Quebecois the means to develop their awareness and become engaged in a process of self-construction (*Ibid*, pp. 54-55). Indeed, Laurin was persuaded that the collective personality of the Quebecois could fully develop only if they made the choice to take control of their destiny.

[171] In Laurin's view, the French settlers rapidly sought to assert themselves and distinguish themselves from the French people (they indeed designated themselves as Canadians before the arrival of the British) but they were soon subjugated by Great Britain. The penetration of the American way of life after WWII is, according to Laurin, another form of domination. Thus, in his view, three empires — France, Great Britain, and the United States of America — have 'enslaved' the group now called Quebecois.

[172] The book is known in English under the title *The Colonizer and The Colonized*.

As social scientist Jean-François Simard puts it, Laurin 'has never made secret the fact that his public mission consisted in wiping off the colonial complexes from the Quebecois society' by feeding 'the pride of a people that had for too long been engaged in a logic of survival'[173] (Simard 2010, p. 52, our translation). The two policies that Laurin elaborated qua State Minister for Cultural Development stemmed from this initial intention. The first policy retrospectively represents his greatest realisation: the white paper *La politique québécoise de la langue française* (1977) was indeed at the basis of the *Charte de la langue française* (Bill 101) which 'made French the official language of the state and of the courts in the province of Québec, as well as making it the normal and habitual language of the workplace, of instruction, of communications, of commerce and of business' (Hudon 2012b).[174] The charter was presented first as Bill 1 to emphasise the symbolic dimension of the law but, unsurprisingly, the project aroused much discontent amongst the Anglophone community in Québec. Under the pressure of various groups, the content of Bill 1 was soon softened and presented again as Bill 101.[175] Despite the compromises Laurin agreed to make for the benefit of the English population, he was nonetheless able to achieve with this policy one of his fundamental objectives: 'to shake the structural edifice and reverse the hierarchy of powers' (G. Rocher 2010, p. 79, our translation). Besides, *La politique québécoise de la langue française* had announced this objective unequivocally:

> *The Québec that we want to build will be French. The fact that the majority of its population is French will become clearly visible: at work, in the communications, in the*

[173] *'[Laurin] n'a jamais fait mystère du fait que sa mission publique consistait à gommer les complexes coloniaux de la société québécoise […] afin de rebâtir la fierté au sein d'un peulple depuis trop longtemps engage dans une logique de survivance*.'

[174] Prior to Bill 101, were the Bill 63 and Bill 22 that also created much debate in Québec, and that many Francophones considered too lax and thus incapable of changing the situation of the French language in Québec. Moreover, the Gendron Commission that was set up in 1968 to 'enquire into and report on the status of French as a language of use in Québec' revealed that English dominated at work, and the majority of immigrants chose to send their children to English speaking schools. To know more about the evolution of the linguistic policy of Québec, we suggest the reading of chapter 9 and 10 of Michel Plourde and Pierre Georgeault, 'Le Français Au Québec : 400 Ans D'histoire Et De Vie', (Québec; Montréal: Conseil supérieur de la langue française; Fides, 2008), 679.

[175] Some years later, the Supreme Court of Canada declared unconstitutional and invalid the sections of Bill 101 that concerned the language of instruction. Indeed, some articles were judged incompatible with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

landscape. It is also a country where the traditional balance of powers will be modified, particularly where the economy is concerned: the use of French will not only be generalised to mask the predominance of great powers that are foreign to Francophones; it will accompany, symbolise, encourage the recovery by Québec's francophone majority of the control over the economic levers that is owed to them.[176]

(Excerpt of *La politique québécoise de la langue française* in Picard 2003, p. 275, our translation)

3.3.2 Laurin's white paper (1978)

The linguistic policy represented the first step in Laurin's collective psychotherapy. Jean-Claude Corbeil, linguist and former member of Laurin's team, evocatively described this policy as 'a linguistic shock treatment, first cornerstone of the creation of a strong Quebecois state'[177] (Corbeil, p. 89, our translation). Nevertheless, the ambitions of the psychiatrist did not stop there. Laurin effectively had another project in mind: he wanted to give 'Québec society a policy of cultural development encompassing all the fields of human activity' (Picard 2003, p. 311, our translation). Despite the fact that his linguistic policy had drawn more media attention than his cultural policy (it was also and still is a much analysed policy), Laurin granted much value to the latter. As his biographer Jean-Claude Picard puts it, *La politique québécoise du développement culturel* (officially translated *A Cultural Development Policy for Québec*) represented, for Laurin, the next step towards the 'resurgence of the Quebecois soul and the recovery of the collective ego in preparation of the accession to political sovereignty' (*Ibid*, p. 314, our translation).[178] And effectively, in

[176] '*Le Québec que nous voulons construire sera essentiellement français. Le fait que la majorité de sa population est majoritairement française y sera nettement visible: dans le travail, dans les communications, dans le paysage. C'est aussi un pays où sera modifié l'équilibre traditionnel des pouvoirs, particulièrement pour ce qui concerne l'économie: l'usage du français ne sera pas simplement généralisé pour masquer la prédominance des puissances étrangères aux francophones; cet usage accompagnera, symbolisera, favorisera une reconquête par la majorité francophone du Québec de l'emprise qui lui revient sur les leviers de l'économie.*'

[177] '*un traitement linguistique de choc, la première pierre e la création d'un État québécois fort*.'

[178] Laurin actually considered this policy as the 'work of his life' (*l'œuvre de sa vie*). See Bernard Descôteaux, 'Feuille De Route Du Québec…', *Le Devoir,* 7 Jun 1978, sec. 1. and Lysianne Gagnon, 'Un Pas De Plus Vers La Souveraineté Politique ?', *La Presse,* 10 Jun 1978a, sec. A5.

the introduction of *A Cultural Development Policy for Québec*, Laurin explained the necessity of such a policy thus: '[t]here is nothing more important for this than a policy of complete (*intégral*) and collective development […] because Quebec is still suffering from underdevelopment' (Québec 1978a, p. 4). For Laurin the province was effectively in a state of dependency and marginality of which it had to free itself: 'Québec must pull itself out of its rut and reach out not merely for economic autonomy but for cultural and social autonomy as well' (*Idem*).

Like the authors of the *Rapport du Tribunal de la Culture*, Laurin defended the idea that 'everything [was] interrelated'. For him, it was 'no longer either possible or permissible to think of economic development, cultural development, social development, territorial planning as isolated phenomena' (*Ibid*, p. 3). Accordingly, Laurin's project was a vast enterprise that was 'interested by all aspects of life in society' (Leclerc 2010, p. 105). *A Cultural Development Policy for Québec* is thus a voluminous document that is composed of two volumes. In the first volume, the authors elaborated on the justifications for a state intervention in cultural matters. In the second one, they exposed the policy itself, with a hundred measures. Interestingly, the policy of cultural development was articulated around three 'dimensions' that were said to be 'largely interdependent': the ways of life, creation, and education (Québec 1978b, p. 139). More concretely, the document first proposed to address issues of housing, health, leisure, work, communications, and information. Secondly, it proposed to support scientific research, arts and letters but, above all, the cultural industries. And, finally, *A Cultural Development Policy for Québec* was concerned about questions of education that, according to the text, included heritage, diffusion of creation, and schooling.

Because Laurin wanted the policy to be a 'joint undertaking' (*œuvre commune*) many civil servants have contributed to its writing (*Ibid*, p. 2). However, he gave sociologist Fernand Dumont — whose work, as we have seen, had inspired the authors of the *Rapport*

Rioux — the task of supervising the ensemble (Leclerc 2010, p. 103). Although Laurin never ceased to follow the progress of the work (Corbeil 2010, p. 89), Dumont was largely responsible for the elaboration of the content of the white paper.[179] If Dumont's theory on culture was not presented as such in the policy statement, it certainly influenced the decision to propose, in the second volume, both 'a policy on ways of life' reminded of his concept of 'primary culture', as well as a 'policy on creative activity' that corresponded to his concept of 'secondary culture' (in this volume the authors also proposed a 'policy for education and the propagation of culture'). The first volume of the policy was, for its part, more clearly tinged with Dumont's own reflections on the evolution of the Quebecois culture (Simard 2010, p. 51) and, as we will see, his analysis had obviously much in common with Laurin's own.

Originally entitled '*Perspectives d'ensemble — De quelle culture s'agit-il?*' (officially translated as 'The Culture under Consideration'), the first volume of the white paper presented a reflection over culture in Québec but it was also an indictment against the federal government most particularly. The text's main argument was that, the federal government, which denied the existence of a unique distinct French Canadian culture, in fact sought to assimilate the Francophones. And because it possessed a powerful cultural system to do so, it represented a serious threat for French Canadians who had to rely on the government of Québec to ensure their existence:[180]

> *What do we expect from the Québec of tomorrow? That it will assume complete responsibility, and consequently provide the means, for ensuring that every citizen of*

[179] Dumont was also the main author of the white paper *La Politique québécoise de la langue française* and of the green paper *Pour une politique québécoise de la recherche scientifique*, published in 1979.

[180] The emergence of the French Canadians separatist movement in Québec had the effect of breaking the solidarity of all French Canadians living in the country. It also corresponded with a replacement in Québec of the expression 'French Canadians' to designate the Canadians of French origin to the 'Quebecois' one.

> *Québec has "bread and books", the basic material and cultural minimum.*[181] *The dignity and the well-being of Quebecers must make it impossible to live as a "kept" people, which was the ideal of "workable federalism". Also, their dignity and their well-being make it impossible for them to live in a tributary society, a society that pays tribute to an overlord to enable him to develop his own culture.*[182]
>
> (Québec 1978b, p. 37)

After having claimed the right for the French Canadians living in Québec to protect their culture, the authors of the white paper proposed a society model that excluded the idea of multiculturalism. Despite the fact that they recognised that Québec was the host of diverse cultures, they instead proposed that, within its borders, the culture of *Québécois de tradition française* (officially translated by the expression 'French Quebecers') become the 'cornerstone (*point d'appui*) of cultural development'. If there was an agreement over the desire to see French language becoming the common language in Québec, culture, the authors maintained, also had to become a 'focal point' (*point de convergence*) for cultural groups living in Québec (*Ibid*, pp. 41-45). Without going into the details as to how the white paper responded to the challenge of ethno-cultural pluralism[183] as it falls beyond the scope of this thesis, suffice it to say that this social reality forced the authors to develop further their reflections on the culture of the *Québécois de tradition française*. Effectively, to become the 'focal point', this culture needed to be defined, but the exercise proved perilous. First, the authors asserted that the Quebecois culture of French traditions was composed of a 'vast body of borrowings' from the French, British, American but also Amerindian cultures whilst possessing at the same time a 'distinctive character'. But then,

[181] Interesting fact, French Minister of Cultural Affairs Jacques Duhamel used a similar expression in 1968. See Augustin Girard, 'Développement Culturel Et Politique Culturelle', *Education et Culture,* 8/Numéro spécial, automne (1968).

[182] The French version reads as follows: '*Qu'est-ce que nous attendons du Québec de demain? Qu'il prenne l'entière responsabilité, et donc les moyens, d'assurer à chaque Québécois « le pain et le livre », le minimum vital matériel et le minimum vital culturel. Il y va de la dignité des Québécois et de leur bien-être de refuser de vivre dans une société entretenue, ce qui était l'idéal du « fédéralisme rentable ». Il y va aussi de leur dignité et de leur bien-être de refuser de vivre dans une société tributaire: celle qui paie tribut à un suzerain qui développe ainsi sa propre culture.*'

[183] The authors actually devote a whole chapter to the question of minorities.

they admitted that the singularity of this culture was difficult to capture, and they indeed struggled to identify what made it distinguishable. They thus contented themselves with stating that '[t]he originality of Québec, [was] an inner quality' (*Ibid*, p. 46). Moreover, the authors admitted that the *Québécois de tradition française* had 'not really succeeded in moulding the main structures and institutions of their collective life to satisfy their deepest aspirations' (*Ibid*, p. 47). According to the white paper, the 'numerous borrowings grafted on an undeniable original way of life appear[ed] […] as the result of a series of historical forces which [were] suffered more than they [were] sought' (*Ibid*, p. 51); historical circumstances, and more particularly the Conquest, were in fact the cause of the French Canadians' 'withdrawal' and cultural lag (*Ibid*, pp. 47-51).

The correlation with Laurin's theory on the Quebecois' collective identity is evident here. As we have seen, according to the psychiatrist, the Quebecois' collective identity was intact in its essence but still unaccomplished and immature; it was underdeveloped. Similarly, Dumont argued in the white paper that the francophone group was culturally specific, but he conceded in the same breath that its singularity was elusive, indefinable or, to put it differently, that it had not been exteriorised. This state of affairs was, in the white paper's view, the result of years of political, economical and cultural subjection; an argument similar to the one Laurin gave to explain the state of underdevelopment of the Quebecois' 'collective personality'. Moreover, Dumont, like Laurin and Rioux, believed that the French Canadians had to redefine who they were and create a new culture: 'tactics which a short while ago were still valid will no longer serve to ensure their survival or their cultural development' (*Ibid,* p. 52) the white paper stated. To catch up with the rest of the world, the *Québécois de tradition française* had to go past this phase of *survivance*, cease to passively suffer subjection and become the masters of their future (*Ibid*, pp-54-55):

> *The community will have to discover new ways of adjusting to its condition. It must understand that culture is not a reservoir of foreign commodities into which one can*

> *dip at need but rather, very basically, a constant endeavour to create and to master one's own destiny. Quebec must create its own cultural image or be drawn into the anonymity of the North American melting pot.*
>
> (Québec 1978b, p. 52)

The community was hence urged to 'take over the main instruments of cultural expression' (*Ibid*, p. 53) — which included 'language, education, employment, the economy, lodging and environment, leisure, tourism, and communications' — so as to 'preserve and develop its own identity' (*Ibid*, p. 54). And obviously, this cultural policy was a way to encourage the emancipation of the Quebecois and feed the sovereignty project, an objective overtly expressed in the last paragraph of the second volume:

> *there is no reason to stand idle while waiting for the province to become a nation [the original word is* un pays *but was translated by nation in the official translation of the document]. This white paper makes that sufficiently clear. A province is not transformed into a nation by rewriting constitutions, but by building, stone on stone, day after day, with patience and enthusiasm, the conditions in which culture can thrive.*
>
> (*Ibid*, p. 431)

3.3.3 A new compromise

In the previous chapter we have seen that Lapalme proposed that the Quebecois state be responsible for the preservation and enhancement of the French traditions, traditions that constituted an element of distinction of the French Canadian culture. The cultural policy he proposed was thus mainly articulated around principles belonging to the domestic, the civic worlds as well as the world of fame, although it also inevitably involved the presence of beings belonging to the inspired world, i.e. artists. As we have also seen his compromise did not achieve consensus particularly as regards to the worth he gave to the French heritage. In effect, his desire to enhance the French traditions was going against another social trend

that consisted in recognising and valuing the cultural specificity of people living in Québec. This tendency undoubtedly culminated in the 1970s. *A Cultural Development Policy for Québec* illustrates this very well. For instance, in the second volume of the white paper, the government expressed its intention to stimulate the creation in Québec of 'a true urban civilization, founded on the quality of the habitat and reflecting what we have been, what we are, and what we may become' (Québec 1978b, p. 154). According to the document, 'cultural democracy require[d] the decentralization of government administration to enable citizens and citizen groups to organize their leisure activities according to local and regional characteristics' (*Ibid*, p. 184). In the sphere of the cultural industries, the government sought to give the Quebecois a 'privileged position for the production and distribution of [their] cultural products' (*Ibid*, p. 303), notably by establishing quotas or by supporting their national and international promotion and marketing (*Ibid*, p. 303-28). Elsewhere it encouraged the implementation of a 'label policy' (*politique d'étiquette*) in the arts and crafts sector 'guarantee[ing] the regional and national authenticity of a Québec-made cultural product' (*Ibid*, p. 325). This desire to value the cultural specificity of the Quebecois also concerned the field of education, about which the white paper stated: 'a school policy for Québec cannot be identical with that of any other community. Regardless of the directions it takes, Québec education cannot forget the geographical, political and economic situation of the society in which it exists' (*Ibid*, p. 414). Such examples indeed abound throughout the 300 pages of the second volume, reflecting the feeling of urgency around endowing Québec with a unique and original cultural identity.

But the white paper went even further by encouraging 'the emergence of a new collective awareness, stemming from a questioning of our system of values' (*Ibid*, p. 158). Indeed, it was nothing less than a whole cultural renewal in the Quebecois society that it wanted to achieve: 'in formulating a cultural policy the government's primary aim was to restore to the people their ability to contribute to [the creation of] their own culture

[*contribuer à l'édification d'une culture*]' (*Ibid*, p. 423). This desire to foster a culture that would have reflected the inner character of the *Québécois de tradition française* indicated the presence of Boltanski and Thévenot's inspired and the civic worlds:

> *[t]he capacity to* create*, which is an attribute of* genius *in the realm of inspiration, can enter into a compromise with the civic world when it is granted to a* group*. The exaltation of the spirit of an entire people, that is, of its capacity as a collective to engender literary, artistic, and political forms in keeping with its own genius, constitutes one of the canonical expressions of this compromise.*
>
> (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 301, emphasis in the original)

It is clear that the white paper wanted to, most of all, give the citizens the possibility to take part in the creation of a culture peculiar to Québec. Thus attached to their culture, Laurin and his team believed people would, in time, more easily opt for the independence of Québec (Picard 2003, p. 315).

Thus, despite the fact that the expression *Québécois de tradition française* is used in profusion in the document, the preservation of these very French traditions did not constitute an objective for the policy. This obviously contrasted with the initial proposal formulated in 1959 by Lapalme. And if traditions are sometimes evoked in the document, this happens timidly; and if they are, the statement is accompanied with a discourse on their importance in revitalising cultural practices. This passage on heritage illustrates this well:

> *Heritage is not an empty shell containing the ashes of a dead past but [it] rather carries forward the eternally creative faculty of a people […]. It moves us to the creative act, and conversely, the creative act alone can breathe new life into our heritage. Indeed, our heritage would merely induce in us a vain nostalgia for the past if in pursuing our present creative activities we were unable to weave into the very fabric of our future.*
>
> (Québec 1978b, p. 333)

The compromise proposed by Laurin and his team thus involved the civic and the inspired worlds. In addition, as said earlier, the idea of 'cultural development' entailed the presence of elements stemming from the industrial world. As we have seen, French thinkers of 'cultural development' wanted to 'rationalise' their cultural policy; the *Rapport Rioux* also showed concern for the efficiency of the state's intervention. Similarly, *A Cultural Development Policy for Québec* is filled with elements belonging to the industrial world, particularly in the second volume. Before looking at some example taken from the white paper, it is worth exposing briefly the main aspects of this world. According to Boltanski and Thévenot '[t]he ordering of the industrial world is based on the *efficiency* of beings, their *performance*, their *productivity*, and their *capacity* to ensure *normal operations* and to respond usefully to *needs*' (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 204, emphasis in the original). Consequently, in the industrial world, there is a constant effort to 'optimise' operations and to make the most of 'human potential' (*Ibid*, p. 206). As Boltanski and Thévenot put it, [t]he quality of worthy beings, beings that are functional, *operational professional*, thus expresses their capacity to integrate themselves into the *machinery*, the *cogwheels* of an organization [or, we should add, that of a society]'(Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 205, emphasis in the original). Conversely,

> *[p]eople are in a state of unworthiness when they produce nothing useful, when they are* unproductive*, when they fail to do much* work *[…] or when they turn out work of poor quality—because they are* inefficient*, unmotivated,* unqualified*,* unsuited *to the job.*
>
> (*Ibid*, p. 205, emphasis in the original)

In the same spirit, the white paper proposed various measures destined to improve the cultural system. For instance, it proposed to conceive a '**socio-economic growth model** which [would] **ensure the full, coherent development** of physical and intellectual potential of Quebecers' (Québec 1978a, p. 186, emphasis added). As regards to communications, the

white paper notably explained that 'the government [was] considering a variety of **measures** […] in order to ensure a **better distribution** of Québec newspapers and periodicals in all regions' (*Ibid*, p. 218, emphasis added). The white paper also reaffirmed its duty to contribute in making 'first-class journalism' thus ensuring the **quality** of the medias' content. In the field of arts and letters, the government announced its intention to entrust professional associations of writers, artists and craftsmen 'with **responsibilities** which they [could] **carry out effectively** and which [would] be of service to the entire population' (*Ibid*, p. 270). The professionalisation of artistic activities was also on the government's agenda: '[a] society needs **professional** writers as much as it does professional musicians and accountants, the text asserted before adding, **[p]rofessionalism** is no infallible guarantee of **quality**, but in the normal course of events, it is a common prerequisite' (*Ibid*, p. 269). The government also wanted to 'help the creative artist escape the social isolation in which the government itself [had] often tended to confine him by treating him as a **non-productive** citizen' (*Ibid*, p. 269).

To ensure the efficiency of the state's intervention in the cultural field, the white paper thus proposed a rational governmental intervention and it suggested the creation of various measures or, as Boltanski and Thévenot would put it, various 'tools'. It also proposed to create new 'instruments' to achieve this end, such as the *Ministère du Loisir,* the *Conseil des directeurs des communications*, the *Commission des arts et des lettres* or the *Société de développement culturel*, to name but a few. Finally, the white paper also encouraged the professionalisation of cultural workers as well as the integration of artists in the labour force.[184]

[184] Artists in the 1970s claimed their integration in the labour force. They organised themselves and demanded that their skills be recognised in the professional world. To know more about these manifestations, we suggest the reading of Couture and Lemerise, 'Le Rapport Rioux', 2004 [1992], pp. 7-10 and Corbo Claude Corbo *Art, éducation et société postindustrielle,* 2006, pp. 12-25.

Paradoxically, though, the white paper also remained ambivalent towards the industrial reality. In effect, like the *Rapport Rioux*, the white paper condemned industrialisation and urbanisation for their destructive effects on society. From wreaking havoc within popular culture (Québec 1978b, p. 175) to causing the deterioration of health (*Ibid*, p. 160) or making work meaningless by forcing excessive specialisation (*Ibid*, p. 197), industrialisation and urbanisation were said to engender a loss of humanity in society.[185] Regardless, it was as if the logic of industrialisation was inescapable: in effect, although the authors of the white paper expressed reticence towards the process of industrialisation in many passages, the authors also gave up their resistance to it and, in the end, contributed to reinforcing it. A passage of the policy about the leisure industry clearly illustrates this shift:

> *The growing role of professional in [the leisure] sector is a source of concern. Spontaneity and natural ability are giving way to theoretical knowledge and technical know-how. The concern is not unfounded but, despite certain risks, are professionals not as essential to the leisure sector as they are to other areas of social life? […]. If leisure activity is accepted not only as an essential but as one of the best tools for the promotion of Québec culture, it can hardly be denied that the marriage of popular inspiration and professional organization, of natural ability and acquired skills is the best possible guarantee of progress.*
>
> (*Ibid*, p. 180)

To sum up, the cultural policy proposed by the PQ in the 1970s was a compromise involving mainly three worlds: the civic, the inspired and the industrial worlds. Interestingly, the presence of the inspired world was not so much driven by the desire to give inspired beings such as artists and creative practitioners a special role in the society, it rather indicated the desire to collectively define the bases of a new national culture. Indeed, according to the

[185] Mercantilism (which belongs to the market world) was also deemed responsible for a loss of meaning and values in society (174, 216).

PQ, the project of sovereignty (and the rise of modernity) entailed giving up the references to a 'French Canadian' identity so as to create a new modern (or 'updated') identity. To achieve this 'cultural revolution', the participation of all citizens of the polity was considered essential, hence the stated desire to develop a real 'cultural democracy' in Québec. However, contrary to the French case, the idea of cultural democracy was not motivated by a desire to redistribute cultural capital amongst the society's different social classes; it rather aimed at giving citizens, particularly the French ones, the right to participate in defining this new Quebecois culture, broadly speaking. Now, the fact that this new culture be mainly defined by the francophone group also revealed the presence of the domestic world, despite the fact that we could only find very few tangible traces of it in the text. In effect, although the policy suggested a break from the past, the definition of this new culture was mainly reserved to those people we could call 'former French Canadians' and ultimately sought to guarantee the survival of this group. Finally, the presence of the industrial world was not justified by the desire to have more rational policies and objectives following the failure of a previous cultural policy, as it was the case in France; in fact, the problem in Québec, was rather associated to the no longer adequate cultural behaviours (caused, as we have seen, by the condition of domination endured by this people) that have prevented the Francophones from taking part in the great affairs of their time and that have caused the Quebecois society to suffer from an important cultural lag. The presence of the 'industrial logic' was thus justified by the government's will to resolutely lead Québec to modernity by using the tools of modernity.

Before concluding this section, we want to tackle the question of the common good. As we have seen in the previous chapters, a compromise is aimed at protecting a common good although this common good is not constitutive of a 'polity', in the sense that Boltanski and Thévenot give to this concept (meaning that no higher common principle on which all can agree has been clearly identified). Like other cultural policy statements, the common

good defended by the 1978 white paper was 'culture', however the PQ's definition of culture was, as we have seen, quite undefined and hesitant:

> *A visitor to Québec cannot immediately detect signs of a specific and truly original cultural entity […] Large elements of Québec life have been borrowed without hesitation […] To comprehend it, one has to go beyond the signs and grasp the allusion, listen to the songs and poems, perceive the particular tone of attitudes and behaviour, which seem to be the vehicle of a certain mentality, a special spirit […] This mentality can be felt in the same way you can detect a feeling in the air: it is not tangible but can be sensed.*
>
> (Québec 1978b, pp. 46-47)

In fact, the only certainty about this culture (that was yet to come) was that it had to be defined by the French Quebecois themselves and that they would only fully discover their 'collective personality' once relieved of their political, economical and cultural dependencies. As we have seen the white paper proposed an all-encompassing policy of cultural development that included a 'policy of ways of life' along with a 'policy on creative activity' (*politique de la création*), as well as a 'policy for education and the propagation of culture' (*politique de la diffusion culturelle et de l'enseignement*), all policies supposed to protect a still hypothetical or virtual Quebecois culture, very broadly defined. The common good defended here was thus difficult to grasp. Besides, two anglophone articles pointed out to this lack of precision and, a few years later, French editorialist Lise Bissonnette did so too (1978a; Bissonnette 1982; Thomson 1978).[186] But this state of affairs was not without

[186] The most elaborate critique formulated against the white paper's conception of culture came from François Ricard. According to the author, the fact that culture was so largely defined proved problematic for several reasons. The first one was that, according to Ricard, the assertion of the all-encompassing character of culture — which included, as the authors underlined it, 'language, the arts, the economy, the territorial planning, leisure, health, work, international relations, etc.' — constituted a 'clever manoeuvre' that enabled the government to control everything. Secondly, the author warned that such a large definition of culture could result in rendering the evaluation of the government's intervention in this sector difficult to make, and that it could also make the claims for more support in the fields of arts and letters vain: the government could indeed always retort that it is already massively investing in the field of culture. Finally, Ricard expressed profound uneasiness with the fact that the state 'set itself up as definer of culture', all the more so as he did not agree

providing some political advantages; as anthropologist Handler suggested, 'the white paper's "empty" definition of Quebecois culture [was] politically motivated: it permit[ted] the assertion of national existence without denying what [was] seen as cultural underdevelopment' (Handler 1988, p. 131).[187] If there certainly is some truth in this view, the identity quest of the French Quebecois was however no less real back then.

3.4 Reactions to the policy

The release of the *La politique québécoise de développement culturel* was much expected but also much dreaded by the anglophone community, which had just been shaken by the release of the (drastic) language policy in 1977. Even before it was officially launched, the white paper on culture had aroused controversy. Journalist Peter Cowan relates the following facts in an article published in June 1978:

> *It was originally to have been made public in November. Then there was a talk of December. At one point Laurin said Jan. 26 would be the date. In the meantime, Lévesque made it clear his priorities were economic. Parti Québécois insiders were also concerned about the government's popularity which was sagging badly. In March the white paper became a hot issue. Maclean's magazine, following an interview with Dumont, ran an article saying it would be a blueprint for a « new order » in Quebec. […] The Maclean's piece sparked the big controversy: its claims of a rigidly interventionist cultural policy were denied by Lévesque and Laurin. […] What was more significant however was Lévesque's revelation the white paper was under study and government policy was far from initial. […] following the publication of the cultural policy, Laurin admitted there had been major changes and said it represented a cabinet consensus.*

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with the white paper's conception of the Quebecois culture. In effect, for Ricard, the idea of Québec's popular culture that the white paper sustained ensued from an idealised vision of traditions that, in reality, no longer existed in Québec. As the author ironically put it 'when reading the first volume, most particularly […], we could think that we are in a cultural paradise, in a society miraculously preserved (or preservable) from modern decline, in a world of living and noble traditions, full of vigour an dynamism'. Ricard thus reproached the authors of the white paper to base their definition of culture on an outdated and marginal expression of the Quebecois culture. See François Ricard, 'Le Livre Blanc Sur La Culture', *Liberté,* 20/4-5 (1978), 3-12.

[187] Michel Audet developed a similar argument in one of his article. See Michel Audet, 'La quête d'un État', 1979.

(Cowan 1978b)

Thus, to be able to present his white paper as a collective undertaking resting on a consensus, Laurin was obliged to involve numerous people in its writing. For his part, Dumont admitted later on that, due to the unequal quality of the white paper's content, he himself was unsatisfied with the final result (Dumont 1997, p. 200). But as we will now see, Dumont was not the only one left in a state of discontent. Between the 6th and the 15th of June 1978, we have identified more than fifty (51) articles on the white paper. We have decided to limit our analysis of the media coverage to a two week period for two reasons: 1) after a period of two weeks there were significantly less articles treating of the white paper; 2) we wanted to analyse the immediate reactions to the policy, so as to have a grasp of the main critiques raised against the policy statement; analysing more articles would only have served to confirm already present results. Amongst these articles, one third (15) presented a **neutral** and descriptive account of the white paper's content; the other two thirds (36) were **critical** on one or another aspect of the policy. These critical ones interest us more particularly. We have to stress that by 'critical' articles, we mean articles that do not necessarily present a negative account of the policy but display an **opinion** that can be positive, negative or mixed. The collected articles were published in three of the most influential newspapers in the province of Québec, two being in French language, the other in English. These are: *La Presse*, *Le Devoir*, *The Gazette*. Given the scale of the policy, it was not surprising to find very few overall analyses. In effect, the authors (journalists, editorialist, cultural workers) rarely presented and discussed the whole content of the policy; they rather focussed on a specific area of the policy that usually corresponded to their own field of specialisation. Besides, in the category loosely defined as 'critical', we have also included articles that gave an account of the reactions of politicians in Ottawa to the Québec initiative (such as the Canadian Prime Minister and the Canadian State Secretary) (1978b, 1978c).

We have also included in the analysis of responses four articles published in academic journals and cultural magazines published in the year following the release of the white paper and presenting a more detailed critique; four of them draw our attention more particularly: a text by sociologist Michel Audet; one by essayist, literary critic and professor of letters, François Ricard; one by Louis-Dominique Lavigne, Simon Leblanc and Lise Roy, all members of the *Association Québécoise du Jeune Théâtre*; and finally, one article written by Fernand Dumont himself who indirectly criticised certain aspects of the policy. These four articles are particularly interesting as they crystallise different points of view.

In this section of the paper, we do not propose to make a systematic review of all such points of view. We rather want to emphasise the very process of policy critique by illustrating the different kinds of criticism and comments that the white paper aroused. The ultimate aim for the exercise is to bring to light the disagreement over what Boltanski and Thévenot call the 'principles of justice' (or 'principle of equivalence') lying behind the arguments (*argumentaire*).

3.4.1 Critiques from the industrial world

The most recurrent critique that we have found in the newspapers' articles concerned the policy's general imprecision and its lack of concrete, practical or adequate solutions to achieve its objectives.[188] The critique formulated by Claude Ryan, then leader of the *Parti libéral du Québec*, epitomises the various charges against the white paper's lack of concrete measures. Briefly, in his article, Ryan argued that the white paper 'needlessly' tackled issues

[188] See Anonymous, 'Le Livre Blanc, Un Coup De Trompette Dit Le Plq', *Le Devoir,* 9 Jun 1978d, sec. 2.; Anonymous, 'Work Site Plan 'Nice' but Boss Sceptical', *The Gazette,* 7 Jun 1978e, sec. 10.; Marcel Adam, 'Comment Concilier Cohérence Et Liberté', *La Presse,* 8 Jun 1978, sec. A4.; Conrad Bernier, 'Une Déchirante Révision De La Politique Du Livre', *La Presse,* 10 Jun 1978, sec. D2.; Albert Brie, 'Un Livre Blanc À Succès', *Le Devoir,* 10 Jun 1978, sec. 4.; Peter Cowan, 'Ambiguity Is Key to Culture Paper', *The Gazette,* 7 Jun 1978b, sec. 9.; Peter Cowan, 'White Paper : Another Step toward a Nation-State?', *The Gazette,* 10 Jun 1978a, sec. 9.; Anonymous, 'Pitfalls in White Paper (Editorial)', *The Gazette,* 7 Jun 1978f, sec. 8.; Lysianne Gagnon, 'Le Reflet De L'incertitude Du Gouvernement', *La Presse,* 7 Jun 1978b, sec. B1.; François Roberge, 'Ryan Prône La Création D'un Conseil De La Culture Indépendant Du Ministère', *Le Devoir,* 10 Jun 1978, sec. 7.; Michel Roy, 'Le Livre Blanc Sur La Culture', *Le Devoir,* 9 Jun 1978b, sec. 4.; Joel Ruimy, 'Document Was Leaked, Reporters Complain', *The Gazette,* 7 Jun 1978, sec. 10.; Susan Schwartz, 'Stiff Tobacco Tax Won't Stop Smokers, Top Physician Says', *The Gazette,* 7 Jun 1978, sec. 10.

related to sectors that had already been the object of former policies, such as health, leisure, and education, undermining thus the whole process (Ryan cited in Roberge 1978). Moreover, according to him, '[t]he authors wanted to embrace everything under the label of culture' but, he went on, '[m]ore often than not, they were drowned in generalities' (Ryan cited in Ernhoffer 1978). By saying so, Ryan raised doubt as to the relevance of the overall policy and behind his comment lies a key question: how can an imprecise tool enable the government to reach clear objectives? Ryan also contended that the white paper's diverse financial commitments were not backed up by a solid economic analysis and that it unrealistically evaluated the cost of the policies it intended to implement. We know that, according to Boltanski and Thévenot, a 'common expression' of a critique addressed to the civic world from the industrial world precisely 'consists in underlying the inefficiency of administrative procedures' (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 271). The example of Ryan's critique, as we have seen, is a good illustration of the industrial world coming into tension with the civic world.[189] But this critique does not necessarily only challenge the collective principle: it also seeks to reinforce the predominance of the efficiency principle already present in the white paper.

Sociologist Michel Audet, for his part, presented the most exhaustive critique as regards to the feasibility of the white paper's core project: the creation of a new culture in an independent country. As Audet reminded, the white paper suggested that, as long as Québec would remain a province within Canada, the Quebecois nation would not be able to implement a genuine cultural democracy. But, Audet replied, the creation of a national state culture could not radically change Québec's overall situation; should the independence of Québec occur, the economical chessboard would remain almost unchanged, and risks of cultural domination and erosion would not vanish (Audet 1979, pp.

[189] It is interesting to note that even Fernand Dumont later admitted that the policy had, in his mind, few chances of success. To him, 'the project was too ambitious' and 'far too vast'. See Fernand Dumont, Récit D'une Émigration: Mémoires (Montréal: Boréal, 1997), 268.

271-72). The sociologist also deplored the fact that the white paper ignored an important cultural reality in Québec: the economic and cultural hegemony of the United States and the omnipresence of the capitalist and industrial mode of production. As he put it, 'a cultural revolution destined to free Québec from an '*industrialité*' and to create a post-industrial society with indefinable characteristics stands in direct contradiction with heavy tendencies present in Québec'[190] (*Ibid*, p. 274, our translation). In his view, the replacement of the economic values — which were dominant in Québec — with new values was far from being feasible: 'if the rise of a national state and a democratised culture are *possible*, a cultural revolution creating a new type of society is *utopian*', concluded the author (*Idem*, emphasis in the original). Contrary to Ryan's, Audet's critique was rather addressed to the inspired dimension of the project. In the EW model, the industrial world enters in conflict with the inspired one when

> *[the inspired beings] are criticized for the* wastefulness of improvisation*, attributable to the unpredictability of "muddled" activity, as illustrated in particular in the behavior of "visionaries." The intrusion of unforeseen events […] is risky for the functioning of the industrial order and is subject to criticism for the breakdown it causes.*
>
> (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 269, emphasis in the original)

Similarly, the critique Audet formulated questioned the very 'vision' of the white paper. The sociologist effectively undermined the 'revolutionary' project by arguing that it did not take all risks into consideration and that it was therefore deluded (implicitly he also suggested that the 'designers' of this society project had not thought their plans through).

[190] '*Une révolution culturelle destinée à sortir le Québec de l'« industrialité », à créer une société post-industrielle, aux caractéristiques encore indéfinissables, est en opposition directe avec des intérêts lourdement présents au Québec*.'

3.4.2 Critiques from the inspired world

Although some believed 'this document should have had the effect of a bomb on artisans of culture' (Lavigne et al. 1979, p. 243), only few articles displaying a critique from the inspired world could be found. However, the ones we have identified essentially deplored the fact that artists had the smallest share in the government's cultural policy (Perreault 1978; C. Roy 1978a; Toupin 1978). For example, film critic Luc Perreault believed the policy in the movie sector mainly benefited 'economic agents' to the detriment of creators (Perreault 1978). As for historian Clément Roy, he believed the writing of the white paper was a waste of money; resources should have been given to researchers and artists themselves (Roy 1978). The most elaborate and convincing critique was however formulated by essayist, literary critic and professor of letters, François Ricard. Indeed, in his paper, Ricard was particularly attentive to the role devoted to artists and savants. He notably cited a passage where the white paper suggested that artists 'be invited to spend time in [their] original locality or neighbourhood' so as to incite other citizens to develop their own creativity, and he deplored the fact that the white paper tried to change the artist into a 'productive citizen' possessing an 'awareness of his high responsibility towards the collective life' as well a as 'sense of usefulness' (Ricard 1978, p. 8). For Ricard, these measures were inspired by a 'cheap Maoism' (*Ibid*, p. 9) and he resisted them by denouncing what he saw as the likely suffocating effect of the policy on creators:

> *[T]he slightest individual creative endeavour is straight away snatched, hijacked, overshadowed by the omnipresent national conscience […], the slightest thought, from the moment it emerges, dissolves, drowns in the Great Entirety of the collective discourse* [le Grand Tout du discours collectif] *[…] We are not able to articulate the first word of a novel sentiment, utter the first syllable of the word liberty, and now they*

impose on us a national duty in exchange for a position of accountant, which we do not want'[191]

(*Ibid*, p. 9, our translation)

The following passage in Boltanski and Thévenot's *Economies of Worth* is helpful to the interpretation of Ricard's own critique:

In the context of a revolution, civic worth can enter into a compromise with inspiration. It is criticized from the standpoint of the inspired world, when it is envisaged in its most institutionalized forms, heavily instrumented and detached from persons; in this respect, critiques of civic worth intersect with the industrial world.

(Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 239)

And effectively, Ricard denounced the fact that the creativity of artists was at peril to be stifled by a collective imperative that did not recognise the singularity of individuals. He also accused the white paper of seeking to exploit (*instrumentaliser*) the arts for instrumental reasons, thereby depriving the creative act from its essence: freedom (or art for art's sake). Ricard's paper clearly illustrates the tension produced by the coexistence of an 'industrialised' civic logic and the inspired one[192].

Finally, let us mention an essay Dumont published shortly after the release of the 1978 white paper 'that provides some insight into why he was less than satisfied with his experience as an architect of cultural policy' (Buxton 2006, p. 193). Although, as Buxton rightly points out, Dumont did not explicitly refer to the white paper in this essay (*Idem*), he nonetheless developed a critical reflection over the concept of 'cultural development'. Without going into the details of this very dense paper — which, alone, could be the

[191] '*Notre problème, justement, c'est que la conscience individuelle, parmi nous, émerge avec la plus grande peine, que le moindre effort créateur, chez l'individu, est aussitôt happé, récupéré, occulté par l'omniprésente conscience nationale […], que la moindre pensée, aussitôt née, se fond, se noie dans le Grand Tout du discours collectif. […] Nous n'arrivons pas à articuler le premier mot de la première phrase d'un énoncé neuf, à proférer la première syllabe du mot liberté, et voilà qu'on nous remet dans la gorge l'os du devoir national, en échange d'un statut de comptable dont nous n'avons que faire.*'

[192] It might be worth specifying here that Ricard's point of view was not representative of a majority of artists; the 1970s were characterised by the political involvement of many artists who publicly supported nationalist and left-wing movements.

subject of an entire chapter — suffice it to say, here, that the concept of cultural development was, in Dumont's view, closely associated to a process of 'instrumentalization of culture and its removal from public control and local expression' (*Ibid,* p. 192). Indeed, Dumont deplored the divorce between the spontaneous, natural and authentic culture that we find in all human communities and the artificial, rational cultural productions that modern civilisations foster. He also accused the industrialisation processes of being responsible for the deterioration of the original source of all cultural productions, the primary culture: '[t]hrough even deeper social transformations, the *lived* culture is drained from its resources to the benefit of a *prescribed* culture'[193], he wrote (Dumont 1979, p. 23, emphasis in the original, our translation). For these reasons Dumont also felt uneasy with the excessive professionalisation of cultural practices that distanced them from a natural human organisation and solidarity (*Ibid*, pp. 8-9). Dumont's critique thus reveals a tension between the inspired and the industrial worlds.

3.4.3 Critiques from the civic world

Beside the critiques emerging from the industrial and inspired worlds, we have also identified three kinds of critique stemming from the civic world. The most recurrent one consisted in accusing the white paper of being too interventionist and paternalistic (1978g, 1978f; Ernhoffer 1978; Goldbloom 1978; Thomson 1978). As Boltanski and Thévenot explain 'domestic *authority*, denounced as *authoritarianism*, is rejected because it subordinates *everyone*'s destiny to the decision of a single person' (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 253) or, we could add, of a single institution. Political scientist Dale C. Thomson was amongst those who decried the excessive intrusion of the state in the private life of its citizens:

[193] '*Par des transformations sociales plus profondes encore, la culture* vécue *se vide de ses ressources au profit de la culture* prescrite.'

> *Laurin has presented the white paper under the catchword cultural democracy. In view of the "dirigiste" approach that is reflected in it, and the government "instruments" it proposes to control the cultural life of Quebec, cultural socialism would be a more appropriate description.*
>
> (Thomson 1978)

The Liberal deputy John Ciaccia, for his part, went as far as saying that the white paper held a totalitarian conception of culture and that people needed to 'remain vigilant and evaluate to what extent the state sought to substitute itself to individuals'[194] (L. Gagnon 1978c, our translation).

The second kind of critique was expressed by the members of the *Association Québécoise du Jeune Théâtre*. Briefly, in their article, the authors accused the white paper of maintaining an 'immutable hierarchy' by giving priority to 'professional artists' to the detriment of popular cultural movements (Lavigne et al. 1979, p. 247). A cultural group (the professional artists) was accused of being privileged to the expense of another, the amateurs and the young artists.

Finally, last but not least, comes the denunciation of the preferential treatment granted to the French majority in Québec (Ernhoffer 1978; L. Gagnon 1978d; Thomson 1978). Dale C. Thomson was again amongst those who reacted against the fact that the white paper promised to give particular attention to a group of citizens living in Québec: the French Quebecois. As he put it:

> *The most invidious aspect of the white paper is the distinction between "the majority" and the "minorities". For who can say that it is not a form of discrimination to relegate English-speaking Quebecers, for instance, with their two century old-record of participation in Quebec life, to just another albeit the largest minority group?*
>
> (Thomson 1978)

[194] '*Il faudrait « être très vigilants afin d'évaluer dans quelle mesure l'État viendrait se substituer aux individus », dans quelle mesure cela n'aboutirait pas à une conception totalitaire de la culture.*'

Thomson argued that all citizens who had taken part in the construction of the society should have been treated equally regardless of their ethnic origins. In all these examples, the civic world comes into tension with the domestic one.

3.4.4 Relativism

By denouncing all forms of discrimination, Thomson's critique did not only seek to reinforce the principle at the core of the civic world, i.e. the 'pre-eminence of the collective'. Indeed, he introduced another 'general equivalent' which is not to be confounded with Boltanski and Thévenot's concept of 'principle of justice': the strength of number. In fact, we can see a shift in the Thomson's argumentation that firstly opposed a principle of equity to protest against a preferential treatment before drifting to what Boltanski and Thévenot call a 'critical relativism'. We will illustrate this more clearly now.

In the methodological chapter (chapter 1), we have tackled the question of relativism, which is a way to criticise a situation without referring to any principles of justice. Relativism is therefore a kind of critique that differs from the ones that we have analysed so far. It is worth explaining the concept with more detail, and to do so, we think it is useful to quote Boltanski and Thévenot at length here:

> *To move on toward relativism […] one must put the constraints of the polity into parentheses and adopt a position of externality on the basis of which what goes on in the world [or in a given situation] can be subordinated to* ***a general equivalent that is not a common good****. In our day, this general equivalent is most often qualified as a force, power, interest, or strength, and treated as if it was naturally attached to beings […] Thus while, in a denunciation, a challenge to the validity of a given principle is made by relying on a different one that is brought to light as a result, critical relativism allows someone to formulate a denunciation without making explicit the position from which the denunciation is issued,* ***because relativism aims at abolishing not a***

particular form of the common good but the very possibility of the existence of a common good.

(Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 341, emphasis added)

The article written by political scientist Dale C. Thomson exemplifies Boltanski and Thévenot's concept of relativism. As we have seen, Thomson denounced an unjust situation and brought up the notion of equal rights for all citizens, something we could call a prerequisite in the civic world. But Thomson also denounced the fact that the white paper sought to serve the interests of a group only on the ground that it outnumbered other groups and that it was thus in a position of strength: '[t]o them [Québec nationalists] French speaking Quebecers are the majority, hence by sheer force of numbers their "culture" or way of life is dominant' (Thomson 1978). By saying so, Thomson implied that the aim of the French Quebecois consisted in dominating others and, by the same token, he denied the existence of any sort of common good that could justify the white paper's intention, such as the necessity to revive an endangered culture, or to correct a situation that had been unjust for French-speaking Quebecois. Paradoxically, Thomson also used the argument of number to claim more rights for the English-speaking community in Québec: to him, the Anglophones could not be compared to other minorities as their number (as being the 'largest minority group') conferred them a special status.

Thomson's observation, however, forces us to acknowledge the existence of power relations between Anglophones and Francophones. As we have seen, the elaboration of the white paper stemmed from the very desire to change the extant balance of power. Indeed, Laurin himself admitted that an important step in the 'healing process' of the French Quebecois began with the affirmation of their collective self and their occupation of the spheres of control and power. Thus, the three main justifications that we have identified for state intervention in cultural matters in Québec all stem from a quest for more power for a given group: the participation of all citizens in the cultural life; the development of

instruments to eliminate a cultural lag; and the creation of a new collective culture ultimately serve to reinforce the position of French Quebecois. The PQ did not use sheer force to change the balance of powers but instead resorted to a rhetoric based on various 'principles of justice'. Could we then advance the conclusion that the elaboration of justifications hinging on principles of justice is a more sophisticated and nuanced version of power struggles? The question is certainly worth asking. But in sum, when 'moving toward relativism' the person who criticises a situation questions the existence of a legitimate quest for justice and reduces the conflict to a pure desire to gain more power. The suspicion that the expression of ideals merely hides a permanent power struggle becomes predominant. This is what Thomson did and he refused to acknowledge the historical and political context that yet explains Laurin's desire to change the balance of power.

3.4.5 Unachieved policy

The 1978 cultural policy proposal was all-encompassing and quite ambitious as we have seen. One of the most important administrative structure it gave rise to was the *Société de développement culturel*[195], which was designed to favour the development of the cultural industries in Québec by supporting the production and diffusion of cultural products (Québec 1978b, p. 335).[196] It also gave rise to the *Institut québécois de recherche sur la culture*, an independent research centre that was notably in charge of assessing the evolution of the Quebecois culture (F. Harvey 2001, p. 352). A green paper on scientific research was elaborated in 1979[197], and, in 1980, the committee prepared a study on the

[195] Its name was later changed for *Société québécoise de développement des industries culturelles*.

[196] Inspired by initiatives destined to stimulate the mine, forest or gas exploitation as well as the food-processing industry, the *Société de développement culturel* was created to assume various roles: that of 'investor, financier, promoter and manager'.

[197] *Pour une politique québécoise de la recherche scientifique* (1979). This document was followed by a report on a consultation tour entitled *Pour une politique québécoise de la recherche scientifique: la consultation* (1980) as well an orientation statement and plan of action entitled *Un projet collectif: énoncé d'orientations et plan d'action pour la mise en oeuvre d'une politique québécoise de la recherche scientifique* (1980).

socio-economic conditions of artists and the use of their copyright works[198] (Leclerc 2010, p. 116; Lucier 2010, p. 175). The white paper did not however give rise to a Department for Cultural Development, as it was advocated in the *Rapport Rioux*. In 1982, the Prime Minister René Lévesque even abolished all five ministerial committees, including the committee for Cultural Development[199] (G. Lesage 1982).[200] That same year, the MACQ undertook a consultation tour in Québec to appraise the cultural situation; to find a solution to the general dissatisfaction that the MACQ aroused (Trudel 1982); and to collect the opinions of various cultural stakeholders on specific issues (Québec 1982, p. 1).[201] A 442-page document entitled *Rapport de la consultation du ministère des Affaires culturelles* ensued from this consultation tour summarising the grievances and claims of more than seven hundred stakeholders, individuals or organisations (*Idem*). Notable is the fact that nowhere in this report was there a mention of the 1978 white paper and neither was there any reference to the State Minister's role.

In a written interview conducted with the author of the report, Claude Lamonde, we were told that contrary to Sectorial Ministers (those in charge of a specific department), State Ministers (like Laurin) were not entitled to act 'by virtue of law'; they mainly had 'moral power' over Sectorial Ministries and their authority was conferred upon them by the only will of the Prime Minister who had endowed them with the mandate of coordinating the governmental action. Yet although State Ministers' were entitled to formulate a position statement, they had no ability whatsoever to implement the recommendations they had put forward (Claude Lamonde, email interview, 2 Sept 2012). Besides, the State Ministers' interventions potentially conflicted with the Sectorial Ministries' own initiatives

[198] *La juste part des créateurs: pour une amélioration du statut socio-économique des créateurs québécois* (1980).
[199] It became the committee for Cultural and Scientific Development in 1980.
[200] Laurin was no more state Minister of Cultural Development since 1980, but he was one of the six ministers chairing the 'reinforced' Comité des priorités (Priorities Committee). There, he was in charge of all questions related to Education as well as Cultural Development.
[201] These issues were: the development of new partnerships with the MACQ; the regionalisation of cultural development; the creation of an independent commission for the arts and letters; the federal intervention in cultural matters.

and policies and were thus not always welcomed by them (Claude Lamonde, email interview, 26 Aug 2012). Thus deprived of administrative responsibilities (Québec 2012b), the influence of State Ministers was limited. This notably explains why, in 1982, cultural workers made no mention of Laurin's policy for cultural development. In fact, the members of the cultural sector naturally turned to the MACQ to express their claims and even entrusted the MACQ with the task of defining a policy of cultural development, as if none existed yet (*Ibid*, pp. 74-77). Besides, it is interesting to note the difference of perception between regional cultural workers and arts professionals as regards to the aim of a cultural development policy. Indeed, the first ones associated cultural development to a 'policy of ways of life' whilst the second associated it with a 'policy of creative activities'. This illustrates the fact that the idea of cultural development as defended by the authors of the 1978 white paper, in addition to having been seriously criticised, had not been well understood either.

In sum, Laurin was able to create some agencies, such as the *Société de développement culturel*, and his committee published an impressive amount of studies designed to guide the cultural action of the government. But despite the impetus given by Laurin, the coordination of all cultural action by a Committee on Cultural Development proved difficult as the recommendations it put forward eventually conflicted with the Sectorial Ministries' own actions and objectives. As we have seen, Lévesque solved the problem by abolishing the function of State Minister. The influence of the 1978 white paper was thus restricted by the fact that the minister in charge of its formulation did not have the power to implement all the recommendations that had been put forward. Moreover, the scope of white paper was such that, without a continued coordination, the full implementation of the policy proved impossible. Finally, Laurin's vision was manifestly not well understood by the various cultural stakeholders: not only was there no consensus as regards to the aim of 'cultural development' but, four years after the release of his policy

statement, the cultural workers also demanded that an official cultural development policy be formulated without referring to the 1978 white paper.

Conclusion

As we have seen in this chapter, the white paper entitled *La politique québécoise de développement culturel* was released whilst the sovereignist movement in the province was at its height. We have seen that it was inspired by the idea of cultural development which emerged in France in the 1960s before being adopted and promoted by Unesco in the 1970s. In Québec, the concept first appeared in the *Rapport de la Commission d'enquête sur l'enseignement des arts au Québec* (1968); and the *Rapport du Tribunal de la Culture* (1975) that were both written under the supervision of anthropologist and sociologist Marcel Rioux. In 1978, the newly created *Parti Québécois* took power and elaborated a policy proposal based on the concept of cultural development. This policy aimed at giving the Quebecois citizens, and most particularly those of French traditions, the means to create a new culture, broadly speaking. The white paper indeed suggested that this new culture, although undefined, would break with the past and favour the rise of a new era in which the *Québécois de tradition française* would be emancipated from all forms of domination. The originality of the white paper lies in the fact that it proposed to develop simultaneously a 'policy on ways of life', a 'policy on creative activity' and 'policy for education and the propagation of culture' within the global frame of cultural development. To analyse further the policy, we have used the EW model so as to identify the principles of justice on which the justification of the 1978 white paper hinged. We have identified the presence of elements belonging to the civic, the inspired and the industrial worlds. The presence of these worlds translated into three preoccupations: a) to give all citizens the right to participate in the cultural life (civic); b) the desire to inspire the creation of a new culture (inspired); c) the development of new tools and instruments to realise the effective

and efficient implementation of the policy (industrial). However, we have also argued that, although the presence of the domestic world was not obvious in the text, this policy proposal nonetheless aimed at saving, through a process of revival, the French Quebecois culture – an objective that can indeed be linked to the values of the domestic world. We have also seen that, in the EW model, the coexistence of different principles of justice supposes the existence of a common good. In the case of the 1978 cultural policy, the common good was difficult to define: the compromise was built in order to defend a culture that still remained to be defined. Finally, we have analysed the reactions to the policy statement in the press, in order to bring to light the tension created by the coexistence of different principles of justice within the white paper. This analysis has clearly revealed the difficulty inherent in trying to make different principles coexist which have all, individually, been contested. We have also seen that the idea of culture as defended by the authors of the white paper was a source of criticism or misunderstanding making the 'compromise' especially difficult to grasp and accept.

4 BEING CULTURALLY COMPETITIVE

Introduction

This chapter covers the period going from the 1980s to 1992, the year in which Québec finally adopted its official cultural policy, and it is articulated in four parts. The first section of the chapter presents an overview of the major changes that occurred on the Canadian and Quebecois political and economic scenes, and which notably provoked a reassessment of state intervention in cultural matters. The second section introduces the new ways of approaching cultural policy making that were developed in the period in question. More specifically, we examine two Canadian reports concerned with the cultural situation of the country, and we also draw some parallels with reflections put forward by the international community on the occasion of a UNESCO seminar in 1982. This part of the chapter enables us to understand how Québec cultural policy making has been influenced by trends and events taking place in the international context. We explore this question in more detail in the third section of the chapter: here we analyse two Quebecois reports that have contributed to the formal elaboration, in 1992, of the official cultural policy entitled *La politique culturelle du Québec: Notre culture, notre avenir*; we then also analyse the content of the cultural policy following the framework developed by Boltanski and Thévenot. Finally, in the fourth section, we analyse public reactions to the 1992 cultural policy, which was overall well received. We try to explain how the government succeeded in reaching a good level of consensus around its proposed policy referring again to Boltanski and Thévenot's model.

4.1 A time for pragmatism

The 1980s were a challenging decade for many countries around the world which were confronted with a serious world economic crisis. Québec was not spared either, and at the same time when the crisis developed, the political aspirations of the Quebecois were deeply challenged. This section reviews the main political and economic events of this decade in order to provide a picture of the context in which the cultural policy developments under examination took place, and the way in which broader societal, political and economic events at the time influenced and affected debates around policy making for the cultural sector.

4.1.1 The constitutional 'crisis'

The French-Canadians have always defended and protected their peculiar cultural institutions (the use of the French language, the practice of the Catholic faith, the application of the legal customs of France, etc.). Since the beginning of the coexistence of the French and the British people in North America, the former have indeed ceaselessly pushed for more recognition of their cultural customs, and these claims were at the core of major agreements between the two peoples (the 1774 Quebec Act; the 1834 Ninety Two Resolutions; the 1867 British North America Act). At the end of the twentieth century, the question of the recognition of the French population's distinct character surfaced again. Indeed, the recognition of the cultural specificity of Québec from the rest of Canada was again an issue at stake during the negotiations surrounding the 'patriation' of the Canadian constitution. Canada had effectively decided to 'patriate'[202] the constitution of the country — the 1867 British North America Act (BNAA) — still under British jurisdiction, but the process leading to the transfer of constitutional responsibilities from the United Kingdom to

[202] The terms 'patriate', 'patriation' are mainly used in Canada. The justification for this neologism comes from the fact that the Constitution has never been under Canadian jurisdiction; hence it could not be 'repatriated' or 'returned' to Canada.

Canada, which spread over more than fifty years[203], revealed itself to be difficult and controversial.

The question of the patriation of the constitution was first raised in Canada during a 'federal-provincial conference'[204] held in 1927 whereas the autonomy and equality of status of Canada with the United Kingdom had just been recognised in the Balfour Declaration of 1926 (Dupras 1992, p. 3). However, before patriating the Constitution, a 'domestic procedure for amending the Constitution' (*Idem*) had to be formulated, and a series of gatherings were organised to negotiate an amending procedure as well as the distribution of powers between the two orders of government, the federal and provincial ones (Onorio 1984, p. 134). None of them concluded with an agreement between the Prime Minister of Canada and the First Ministers of the provinces. Without going into the complex details surrounding the debate over the constitution, suffice it to say that the position of Québec remained roughly the same throughout the years, independently of the level of allegiance of the successive First Ministers of the province to the federation: Québec demanded that 'the constitutional reform be based on a new distribution of powers between the two orders of government that would recognise the distinct character of the Quebecois society'[205] (Gagnon and Latouche 2006 [1991], p. 19, our translation). Although the nine English-speaking provinces generally rallied to Québec's side to dispute the concentration of powers at the federal level of government, they however refused to recognise Québec any special status (*Idem*). For its part, the federal government resisted any limitations of its powers. In 1980, after numerous conferences (from 1964 to 1980 the constitutional

[203] Indeed, the debate related to the formula of amendment of the constitution as well as its patriation dates back to 1927. The list of the federal-provincial conferences in which this question was tackled is available on the Canadian Parliament's website. See Canada, 'Constitutional Conferences', <http://www.parl.gc.ca/parlinfo/compilations/Constitution/ConstitutionalConferences.aspx>, accessed 30 Apr 2013.

[204] They are also known as 'First Ministers Conferences'. Such 'conferences' enable the first ministers of the province and the Prime Minister of Canada to discuss federal-provincial relations and constitutional issues.

[205] '*Pendant de nombreuses années, le gouvernement du Québec a insisté pour que la réforme constitutionnelle porte sur un nouveau partage des pouvoirs, entre les deux ordres de gouvernement, qui reconnaîtrait le caractère distinct de la société québécoise*.'

question was put on the agenda of a dozen conferences) and the elaboration of several proposals and recommendations[206], the impasse still remained.

In the meantime, the determination of Quebecois society to assert and to give value to the distinct cultural features of the Francophones culminated, as we have seen in the previous chapter, in the election of the first separatist party in 1976, the *Parti Québécois* (PQ). One of the electoral promises made to the population by the PQ was the holding of a referendum on 'sovereignty-association'. The aim of Lévesque's project was to 'enable Québec to acquire the exclusive power to make its law, levy its taxes, and establish relations abroad […] and at the same time, to maintain with Canada an economic association including a common currency' (description of the project on the referendum ballot in Dickinson and Young 2008, p. 327). The referendum was planned for May 1980, but a strong opposition was organised both by the federal government then led by the Liberal Party of Canada, and the opposition party in Québec, the *Parti libéral du Québec* (PLQ) (A. G. Gagnon and Latouche 2006 [1991], p. 51; Morin and Woehrling 1994, p. 52; Woehrling 1993, p. 5).[207] The overall liberal strategy proved successful, for sixty per cent of the Quebecois voters finally rejected Lévesque's sovereignty-association project[208] (Hudon 2012a, p. 656; Linteau et al. 1989).

Following the failure of the Québec referendum, negotiations started again as promised. However, Québec, which was no longer in a position of strength, lost much influence during the next round of negotiations (Morin and Woehrling 1994, p. 52), and in 1982 the patriation and the modification of the Constitution were finally achieved without

[206] The *Fulton formula* (1961); the *Fulton-Favreau formula* (1964); the *Victoria Charter* (1971); the *Molgat-McGuigan Report* (1972); the Federal proposals (1975-76); the white paper *A Time for Action* (1978); the *Pépin-Robarts Report* (1979).

[207] The Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, supported — politically and financially — the leader of the PLQ, Claude Ryan, in his campaign against sovereignty-association. Trudeau also promised 'a number of the Quebecois that a rejection of the *péquiste* option would lead to negotiations for a new Canadian federalism' that would take into account the demands of the Francophones.

[208] The vote of the Francophone electorate was completely divided.

the consent of Québec (*Ibid*, p. 54).[209] In the years that followed the patriation of the constitution both René Lévesque and his successor the liberal Robert Bourrassa[210] attempted to find an agreement with the federal Prime Minister by submitting the conditions for Québec's ratification of the 1982 Constitution Act (Dupras 1992, p. 11; Lacoursière et al. 2001, pp. 519-20)[211] but once again these negotiations aborted (Woehrling 1993, pp. 89-124).[212] In a last attempt to solve the issue, a national referendum was submitted to all Canadians in 1992 on the Charlottetown Agreement. The Charlottetown solution was rejected by more than fifty six per cent of Quebecois and by fifty four per cent of English Canadians (Woehrling 2006, p. 7). For the former, the agreement 'did not give Québec enough', for the latter the agreement was giving Québec 'too much' (*Idem*). To this day, the country's constitution has not been ratified by Québec.

Thus, following the election of the PQ, not only were the hopes of a sovereign state abruptly suspended but Québec received a serious setback in 1982 when the constitution was patriated without the province obtaining what it sought: the recognition of the 'distinctive character of the Quebecois society' which required that Québec be granted specific powers. The year 1992 was in the sequel nothing more than a reminder of Québec's incapacity to have its specificity recognised but also, of course, a reminder of the

[209] Trudeau managed to reach an agreement with the nine English-speaking provinces, but Québec had been completely excluded from the process. He also inserted the Charter of Rights and Freedom in the 1982 Constitution Act, which reduced the coercive power of some of Québec's own legislations, notably the language bill 101 mentioned in the previous chapter. Some Quebecois deplored the fact that, from then on, individual rights took precedence over the collective ones.

[210] Bourassa himself had failed ten years earlier. In effect, this was not Bourassa's first mandate as Prime Minister. He was first elected in 1970 after having promised the Quebecois that he would renew federalism which, in his view, could be profitable to Quebecois. In 1971, however, a year after his accession to power, he refused Trudeau's constitutional reform proposal, the *Victoria Charter*, unsatisfied with the proposed distribution of power and resources in social security matters. For more information on Bourassa's political career, we suggest the reading of L. Ian Macdonald, *From Bourassa to Bourassa: Wilderness to Restoration* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002) 363.

[211] In reaction to Bourassa's proposal, the other provinces demanded that the conditions claimed by Québec be applied to all provinces. Four conditions concerned the provincial control of immigration; the judicial nomination at the Supreme Court; the limitation of the spending power of the federal government in provincial jurisdictional areas; and the provinces' veto power on specific constitutional questions. In the end, only one condition remained peculiar to Québec: the recognition of Québec's distinct status.

[212] To know more about the patriation and the modification of the constitution as well as the reasons of Meech Lake Accord failure, we suggest the reading of Louis Balthazar, Guy Laforest, and Vincent Lemieux, *Le Québec Et La Restructuration Du Canada 1980-1992: Enjeux Et Perspectives* (Sillery: Septentrion, 1991) 312.

'humiliation' imposed upon the province from the rest of Canada in 1982 (Nemni 1991, p. 174).

4.1.2 A new political creed: economy first and foremost

As we have thus seen, the PQ began its mandate with two political defeats — the failure of the 1980 referendum and that of Québec's ratification of the constitution — but the province was moreover confronted with the consequences of the 1979 oil crisis. Like the rest of the world, the crisis considerably weakened Canada's overall economy (Fréchette 1992, p. 27; 35; Joanis and Montmarquette 2005, p. 13). In Québec, the unemployment rate reached fourteen per cent in 1982-83, and many companies showed a deficit or incurred bankruptcy (Linteau et al. 1989, p. 402). The public finances were also seriously depleted: in a span of only five years the government's net debt had quadrupled (Joanis and Montmarquette 2005, p. 12). As a result, the policies of the PQ that were originally characterised by their social-democrat orientations became similar to those defended by the PLQ, which inscribed itself in an emerging world neo-liberal tendency (Gow 1990, pp. 698-99). To reduce the government spending, René Lévesque adopted a series of legislative and administrative measures — such as the reduction of the salaries in the civil service and the adoption of anti-union laws (Comeau 2012; Linteau et al. 1989, p. 402; Tremblay 2006 [1990], p. 24) that contrasted with its original political programme. Thus, not only did René Lévesque disappoint the nationalists when he put aside the sovereignty project in a last attempt to find a compromise with the federal government, but the coercive measures implemented to limit the impact of the recession also inevitably upset the employees of the civil service as well as left-wing groups that, until then, had been the PQ's closest allies (Gagnon and Latouche 1991, p. 34). The disastrous results of the 1985 election clearly reflected the extent of the defection: the PQ lost more than half of its seats at the National

Assembly whereas the liberal party of Robert Bourassa won a comfortable majority (Comeau 2012).

If Bourassa took over the constitutional negotiations where Lévesque had left them, he also pushed further the neo-liberal tendency that had begun to permeate Lévesque's post-crisis policies. In fact, Bourassa (who had been Québec's Prime Minister from 1970 to 1976) was known for his right-wing stance[213] and upon his arrival to power in 1985, he created three committees: one on privatisation (*Fortier Report*), another on governmental reorganisation (*Gobeil Report*) and the last one on deregulation (*Scowen Report*)[214] (Brunelle and Lévesque 2007). The government indeed wanted to explore new ways of making public administration more effective whilst reducing the financial burden of the state by privatising several state societies and agencies, and it also sought to make Quebecois businesses generally more competitive (Gow 1987, pp. 10-13). The committees composed almost exclusively of businessmen submitted their reports in 1986 (Gow 1990, p. 700; Saint-Pierre 2003, p. 113). As economist Johanne Bergeron pointed out, 'the operative words' (*maîtres mots*) of these publications were: 'economic efficiency, freedom, competition, profitability' (Bergeron 1987, p. 129). These reports were however harshly criticised at the time of their publication (Paquet 2003, p. 68; Saint-Pierre 2003, p. 113);[215] as a result, Robert Bourassa only partially applied their recommendations, rejecting 'the

[213] Bourassa notably undertook some reforms to tighten the control over government spending during his 1970-76 mandate.

[214] The titles of the reports presented by the Fortier committee are *Privatisation des sociétés d'Etat: orientations et perspectives* and *De la révolution tranquille... à l'an deux mille. Rapport du groupe de travail sur la privatisation des sociétés d'Etat.* The Gobeil committee presented a document entitled *Rapport du groupe de travail sur la révision des fonctions et des organisations gouvernementales*; and the Scowen committee's document was entitled *Réglementer moins et mieux. Rapport final du groupe de travail sur la déréglementation*.

[215] The *Gobeil Report* was particularly criticised. Amongst other measures, it recommended the privatisation of all public health centres, the issuing of school bonds, the abolition of seventy-nine state agencies and the privatisation of several state companies representing forty-four per cent of all state organisations. For more information, see Stéphane Dion and James Iain Gow, 'L'administration Québécoise À L'heure Des Libéraux', *L'année politique au Québec 1987-1988,* (1999 [1989]).

fundamentalist vision of a state absent from the economic activity'[216] (B. Lévesque et al. 1999, p. 4, our translation).

In addition to reforming the public administration, Bourassa also actively supported the newly elected Canadian and conservative Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's campaign in favour of the bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Canada and the United States. Bourassa, who gave economic issues predominance throughout his time in power, saw in the FTA the best possible means to protect Québec's economy and the expansion of its market (Bourassa 1995, p. 168). Besides, according to political columnist Macdonald's analysis, Bourassa did not hesitate to promote the FTA since, for the Prime Minister, 'Quebec's language and culture were in no way threatened by commerce with the United States', on the contrary, 'its prosperity had every prospect of being enhanced by liberalized access to the world's richest market right next door' (MacDonald 2002, p. 293). Bourassa was indeed 'convinced that economic development was […] indispensable to cultural progress' (Fortin 2002, pp. 1-2, our translation): to him, only a strong economy could prevent Québec from being culturally subjugated by the 'richer' nations.

In sum, despite the fact that the Prime Minister adopted a less radical approach than the one advocated by Fortier, Gobeil and Scowen, he nonetheless followed and asserted the neo-liberal mindset that, since the last economic crisis, had indeed become 'remarkably successful ideologically around the world' (McGuigan 2005, p. 231). From then on, as economist Louis Gill puts it,

> *privatisation, deregulation, budget cuts, reduction of the government's size, setting of charges for public services, profitability, the free play of market forces, a tax system*

[216] '*Robert Bourassa, à partir de 1987-1988, refuse d'adopter la vision fondamentaliste d'un État absent de l'activité économique.*'

favourable to private investment, these were the key words in the name of which the economic policy was made. [217]

(Gill 2008 [2004], p. 26, our translation)

In a span of ten years, there was thus an important shift in the preoccupations of the Quebecois society. Despite having renounced their sovereignist aspirations, the hopes of the Quebecois of gaining more recognition within the Canadian Confederation were nonetheless mightily disappointed. Moreover, the economic crisis that hit Québec and the rest of the world put a stop to the ever-expanding state apparatus and forced a period of reflection over its role and functions. This was also an occasion to redefine the scope of cultural policies in Canada and in Québec, as we will now see.

4.2 The Canadian government's cultural intervention reassessed

In this section we will analyse the evolution of cultural policy in Canada against the backdrop of the international developments exemplified by two specific documents that proposed new avenues for supporting culture in Canada in the changed political and economic climate of the 1980s. This section argues that these reports have had a significant influence on the reorientation of Québec's own approach to cultural policy making.

4.2.1 Applebaum-Hébert Report (1982)

Even if the 1980 economic crisis exacerbated a growing concern, in Canada, for matters of accountability, efficiency and good governance at the level of the State, this preoccupation was not completely absent from previous administrations. At the federal level of government, the expansion of the welfare state had indeed generated some anxiety, and

[217] '*Privatisation, déréglementation, compressions budgétaires, diminution de la taille du gouvernement, tarification des services publics, rentabilisation, retour au libre jeu des forces du marché, fiscalité favorable à l'investissement privé.*'

commissions were appointed with the aim of improving the efficiency of the state apparatus (Beauchemin et al. 1995, p. 33; O'Neal 1994). In 1960, a Royal Commission on Government Organization (Glassco Commission) was launched

> *to inquire into and report upon the* ***organization and methods of operation*** *of the departments and agencies of the government of Canada and to recommend the changes [that] would best* ***promote efficiency, economy*** *and* ***improved service in the despatch of public business****.*
>
> (Canada 1962, p. 19, emphasis added)

Being very critical towards the federal public service, the *Glassco Report* notably advocated 'for greater managerial flexibility and fewer controls in the pursuit of efficiency and innovation in delivering public services' (Juillet and Mingus 2008, p. 217). Then, a few years later, following the release of the 1976 report by the Auditor General who averred that Parliament '[had] lost or [was] close to losing, effective control of the public purse' (report of the Office of the Auditor General cited in O'Neal, p. 4), the federal Prime Minister immediately set up the Royal Commission on Financial Management and Accountability (Lambert Commission). The latter had the mandate to inquire 'into the best means of providing for financial management in the federal administration' as well as for 'the accountability of deputy ministers and heads of Crown agencies' (Canada 1979, p. vi, emphasis added). Both the Glassco and the Lambert Commissions served as a reference for the Federal Cultural Policy Review Committee — known as the Applebaum-Hébert Committee (Berland 2012).

Appointed in 1980 by the Liberal government, the Applebaum-Hébert Committee was asked to report on the country's overall cultural situation and to propose guiding principles in matters of public policy and programs in the cultural field[218] but, as cultural

[218] Although Trudeau had set up several inquiries on specific cultural issues since the election of his party (see Jean-Guy Lacroix and Benoît Lévesque, 'Les Libéraux Et La Culture: De L'unité Nationale À La Marchandisation De La Culture (1963-1984)', *L'ère Des Libéraux. Le Pouvoir Fédéral De 1963 À 1984* (Montréal: Les Presses de

theorist Jody Berland puts it, '[i]ts findings were largely shaped by its purpose: to propose improved means of administering arts funding following the 1979 Lambert Report' (Berland 2012). As a result, the Applebaum-Hébert Commission recommended a series of measures that sought to strengthen administrative control whilst at the same time reaffirming the arm's length principle. In effect, the Commission defended the idea that 'freedom from ministerial and central government agency direction in financial and personnel administration […] be granted to all cultural agencies' (Canada 1982, p. 38) but warned that '[i]mmunity from ministerial direction and central administrative controls [could] not absolved the cultural agencies for their accountability to Parliament and the public' (*Ibid*, p. 40). Therefore, the commission recommended that each cultural agency 'develop appropriate measures for the disclosure of its **plans and performance**, including the preparation and publication each year of a **corporate plan** and an **annual report**' (*Ibid*, p. 41, emphasis added). In fact, the authors of the report did not innovate by asserting the arm's length principle, which indeed had been at the core of the federal government's first cultural initiatives. However, in addition to using this principle as a means to protect the 'fragile and unpredictable creative process' (*Ibid*, p. 5) from the constraints of political agenda, they also sought to transform it into a means to improve the management of cultural programs. Cultural agencies, such as the Canada Council for the Arts, the National Arts Centre or the National Film Board, were indeed seen as being best positioned to develop and deliver their own cultural policies and programs and thus better fulfil the needs of the cultural sector (*Ibid*, p. 47-48). However, as we have seen, these agencies were also asked to make their numbers public and demonstrate that the public money was 'well spent'. This phenomenon was of course not peculiar to Canada. In Great Britain, where the

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l'Université du Québec, 1988), 442.), the last such federal initiative in the cultural domain dated back to 1949 with the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences (Massey-Lévesque Commission). Previous studies and commissions investigated the fields of academic research (1969); mass medias (1970); new technologies (1971-72); telecommunications (1972); book publishing industry (1975). The Massey-Lévesque Commission was notably at the origin of the creation of the Canada Council for the Encouragement of the Arts, Letters, Humanities and Social Sciences which was split in 1977 to form the Canada Council for the Arts and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.

neo-liberal rationality forcefully developed under the leadership of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, managerialisation 'spread rapidly across the public-sector arts and media, the underlying assumption being that public agencies should function like private businesses' (McGuigan 2004, p. 46). The Canadian government was simply following the same path as Great Britain.[219] Always in line with the world neo-liberal tendency, the Applebaum-Hébert Report also advocated an increasing role for the private sector in the field of cultural policy and it 'urged that the federal government enlarge its role as catalyst by increasing the tax incentives offered to private donors on the United States model' (*Ibid*, p. 73). Indeed, the authors of the report 'hope[d] that the efforts of business organizations […] [would] succeed in stimulating an increased flow of resources into the cultural sector' (*Ibid*, p 88).

This shift in Canadian cultural policy aroused much criticism (McCormack 1984, p. 267; Paradis 1983, p. 17). Sociologist Thelma McCormack explained the general perception thus:

> *No doubt the committee thought it was adhering to a deeply felt commitment to cultural development as a national goal. However, it attempted to attain this objective through a modified market concept, and no one, outside of the commercial sector […], was psychologically ready for that; least of all for an approach that looked suspiciously American.*
>
> (McCormack 1984, p. 268)

Independently of the critiques made against the report, it is significant that the members of the committee — coming in majority from the cultural field — sought to give the market a prominent role in supporting artists and cultural organisations.

[219] Besides, in his book *Rethinking Cultural Policy*, Jim McGuigan illustrates well how the British Arts Council's 1985 document, *A Great British success story: An invitation to the nation to invest in the arts*, reflected the emergence of the new corporatist approach: the document, as McGuigan puts it, 'presented the case for continuing public expenditure on the arts in the format of a glossy and colourfully illustrated company prospectus, addressing an ideal investor who is seeking a good return on share capital'. See McGuigan, *Rethinking Cultural Policy*, 2004, p. 44.

Besides, two years later, UNESCO confirmed this new tendency: it organised in 1982 an International Seminar on the Financing of Culture gathering participants from everywhere around the world.[220] On that occasion, the participating countries agreed to the idea that all States be endowed with Culture Departments to support national cultural heritage (UNESCO 1982, Annex 21, p. 12) complemented by autonomous bodies (destined to specifically support artistic creation) but also that 'the ideal institution for cultural financing would be one where the public sector and the private sector would closely collaborate'[221] (*Ibid*, p. 8, our translation):

> *Before all, we have to […] resort to the private sector from where most resources come, and favour modern corporate patronage […] by encouraging foundations, businesses and individuals through tax relief and legal measures that would abolish economic and psychological obstacles.*[222]
>
> (*Ibid*, p. 8, our translation)

Given the context and the influence of neo-liberalism, it is not surprising to see the Canadian government reasserting once again, in 1986, in another report, its intention to now propose concrete ways to apply this new agenda in the field of cultural policy.

4.2.2 Bovey Report (1986)

Less ambitious than the Applebaum-Hébert Commission, the Task Force on Funding the Arts in Canada to the Year 2000 (Bovey Commission) was constituted in 1986 under Brian Mulroney's conservative government which was then, as the authors of the report put it, confronted with a 'slower economy and a general climate of constraint' (Canada 1986, p.

[220] Delegates came from Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Lebanon, India, Italy, Ivory Coast, the Netherlands, Peru, Portugal, Senegal, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.A.

[221] '*L'Institution idéale de financement culturel serait celle où le secteur public et le secteur privé collaboreraient étroitement.*'

[222] '*[i]l faut avant tout, […] recourir au secteur privé d'où provident la plus grande partie des ressources et favoriser le mécénat moderne […] en encourageant les fondations, les entreprises, les particuliers par des dégrèvements fiscaux et par des mesures légales qui aboliraient les obstacles économiques ou psychologiques […] et feraient évoluer plus vite les mentalités.*'

19). The Task Force thus had the mandate to 'inquire into the means by which the arts in Canada [could] be more effectively funded' (*Idem*) but, in reality, this meant finding new sources of revenues for the arts sector. In effect, although it targeted an overall growth objective of five per cent in funding the arts, it nonetheless had to take into consideration the fact that (the federal and provincial) governments had to 'maintain their current programs of economic restraint' (*Ibid*, p. 20). To reach their goal, the authors of the report thus advocated for 'a fair share of responsibility' (*Idem*) between the 'three major segments of our society', which included 'the public sector (the federal and provincial governments but more particularly the municipal government); the private sector (individuals, corporations, and foundations); and the arts community and arts consumers' (*Idem*). Besides, it is interesting to note that it is in times of economic recession and financial restriction that the arguments of the economic impact of the arts started to surface. The authors of the report indeed saw the 'arts growth' as 'essential to the well-being not only of the arts community' but also, as they put it, 'of our **economy,** our national consciousness, ourselves' (Canada 1986, p. 22, emphasis added). To give this argument more weight, they dedicated part of the report to the 'economic importance of arts and culture activities', providing an overview of what this sector then represented for the Canadian economy in terms of gross domestic product, or employment, for instance (*Ibid*, pp. 26-28). These measures inscribed themselves in what public policy specialists Diane Saint-Pierre and Monica Gattinger have called the 'neo-liberal turn in cultural policy' (Gattinger and Saint-Pierre 2010b). According to them, this neo-liberal turn is characterised by four elements: 1) 'the concepts of culture, cultural policy, and economy come to be linked'; 2) 'economic imperatives emerge or come to dominate rationales, objectives, and targets'; 3) 'government intervention is reduced or reoriented'; 4) and 'cultural responsibilities are decentralized or devolved to lower levels of government or non-government actors' (*Ibid*, p. 280).

The *Bovey Report* thus espoused the neo-liberal ideas put forward in the *Applebaum-Hébert Report* but came up with a series of concrete solutions. For example, to stimulate business involvement in financing the arts and culture, the authors of the report proposed that a federal program of matching funding be implemented following the British model, and it also recommended that they provide 'management assistance' to arts organisations. As the authors of the report put it: 'the business community will become much more interested in the arts when artists learn to speak the language of business and to "sell" themselves, their ideas, their work' (*Ibid*, p. 75). To maximise autonomous revenues, the authors insisted on the necessity to expand 'the arts-consuming public' and to do so, they proposed diverse measures, such as the introduction of customer discounts or payback schemes (*Ibid*, p. 61) or the creation of a government body for the promotion and marketing of the arts (*Ibid*, p. 63). Concerned with the quality of management in arts organisations, the report advised, amongst other things, that an expertise in ticket pricing be developed within these organisations; that museums start charging admission fees or ask visitors for a voluntary contribution (*Ibid*, p. 64); it also proposed that arts organisations exploit ancillary sales activities to the most (activities that of course went beyond their artistic mandate) (*Ibid*, p. 65); or else, that organisations think strategically about the composition of their governing boards. Besides, the report went as far as suggesting that success and good management should be rewarded, and by the same token, that non-performing organisations (i.e. those accumulating a deficit) should be penalised by removing them from public subsidy programs (*Ibid*, p. 66-67).

Without expanding further the list of recommendations, these examples illustrate how 'the language of branding, consumer-sovereignty, market reasoning and management' (McGuigan 2005, p. 233) pervaded the Canadian policy discourse of the early 1980s. And if the economic crisis and the scarcity of financial resources served as a justification for limiting the federal government's support, the authors also put forward the idea that more

support from the private sector would not only alleviate the financial burden of the state but that it would even be profitable to the arts: 'the arts would be much more protected from the uncertainties of government financing', they argued (*Ibid*, p. 73). In other words, the authors of the report presented this political reorientation as not detrimental to the arts despite the fact that they precociously announced the possibility of government cuts in this field. The authors of the *Bovey Report* thus defended the idea that the market was at least as capable as the state to support Canadian culture. But again, their stance stood in accordance with the neo-liberal ideology that, as Australian Professor of Economics David Throsby explains, 'relies on the proposition that free markets are the appropriate mechanism for the allocation of resources in the economy, and that the public interest is best served by governments that confine their intervention to ensuring that markets work as freely as possible' (Throsby 2010, p. 34). As we will now see, this tendency rapidly gained strength in Québec too.

4.3 Towards an official cultural policy for Québec

As we have seen in the previous chapter, in 1982, the Minister for Cultural Affairs, Clément Richard, undertook a vast consultation to survey the opinion of cultural workers on certain issues of concern (such as the development of new partnerships with the MACQ; the regionalisation of cultural development; the creation of an independent commission for the arts and letters; the federal intervention in cultural matters) but, more globally to make an appraisal of the cultural situation in Québec as well as to receive feedback on the services provided by the MACQ. This consultation enabled the elaboration of a program of action, *Des actions culturelles pour aujourd'hui: programme d'action du Ministère des affaires culturelles*, which was published a year later. It is interesting to note that, already, issues such as the identification of new 'partners' to share the responsibility of 'managing culture', or that of the creation of an autonomous 'commission of arts and letters' were addressed

in this document (Québec 1983). Even the question of the economic impact of culture had been raised during the consultation (Québec 1982, pp. 161-69), and despite the fact that it was not given a prominent importance in the ministry's final plan, Clément Richard was nonetheless the first to 'introduce the idea of the cultural investments' profitability' (C. Lamonde, email interview, 1 sept 2011). These questions forcefully came back at the fore of the discussions a few years later in the *Coupet Report* (1990) and the *Arpin Report* (1991), both documents that have served as a basis for the elaboration of Québec's official policy as we will see in this section.

4.3.1 Coupet Report (1990)

In 1986, fearing that the newly elected PLQ might cut the MACQ's budget, a coalition composed of representatives of fifty cultural organisations was formed in order to defend the interests of the cultural sectors (Féral 1990, pp. 226-27; Saint-Pierre 2003, pp. 156-57). The *Coalition du monde des arts et de la culture* (also known as *the Coalition du 1%*) rapidly became a powerful lobby gathering ninety-five professional arts associations (Saint-Pierre 2003, p. 160). Its main claim was that the government should devote one per cent of its budget to support culture.[223] Although the coalition succeeded, in a span of four years, in obtaining significant budget increases, it was not able to reach the one per cent objective (*Ibid*, p. 160). In fact, in 1990, the government promised to increase the culture budget to one per cent within three years, but the province entered another economic recession and the government was again confronted with a growing deficit (S. Dion and Gow 1999 [1992]). The then Minister for Cultural Affairs, Lucienne Robillard, commissioned a study from the private business firm Samson, Bélair, Deloitte & Touche so as to find new ways of financing culture (Saint-Pierre 2003, p. 162). This initiative raised much criticism as it was

[223] In 1986-1987, the MACQ's budget represented 0,60 per cent of Québec's overall budget. In 1989-1990 it represented 0,71 per cent and in 1991-1992 it represented 0,74 per cent.

seen as a disengagement of the state (*Ibid*, p. 178), yet it nonetheless had a determining impact on the elaboration of Québec's official policy.

Following the Canadian example, the authors of the 1990 *Études sur le financement des arts et de la culture au Québec* (known as the *Coupet Report*) acknowledged the cultural sector's crying need for funds (Samson 1990, p. 58; 117). However, they also insisted on the importance of finding new ways to support the arts: municipalities had to take greater responsibility for supporting the arts, they argued; the contribution of the private sector (through sponsorships and donations) also had to be enhanced and encouraged (*Ibid*, pp. 71-72); and individuals, they believed, should 'be disposed to contribute to the financing of arts and culture insomuch as they were asked to do so in an explicit and convincing way'[224] (*Ibid*, p. 31, our translation). Obviously, the *Coupet Report* was not innovative: it used the same formula that we had seen in the federal reports and advocated for the reduction of the state interventions to the benefit of the market. It also defended the idea that cultural organisations had to function like performing businesses. In fact, cultural organisations were even criticised for they 'refused to admit that they were in competition'[225] with other organisations (*Ibid*, p. 113, our translation). They were hence encouraged to have a governing board, hire skilful managers as well as marketing specialists (*Ibid*, pp. 36-37). Always in the spirit of favouring the play of market forces, the authors of the report suggested to 'consolidate' the 'cultural offer', or to 'control' it, by increasing the 'selectivity' of the MACQ which should support fewer cultural organisations and sanction those showing bad artistic and administrative performances (*Ibid*, p. 210) — an idea that, as we have seen, had already been presented in the *Bovet Report.* The authors of the *Coupet Report* also deplored that the 'cultural market' suffered from a lack of 'demand' (or from

[224] '*S'il est clair que personne ne veut supporter davantage d'impôt, il apparaît évident à nombre d'observateurs qu'une bonne partie des Québécois seraient disposés à contribuer au financement des arts et de la culture si on le leur demandait de façon explicite et convaincante.*'

[225] '*On peut surtout déplorer, de la part de nombres d'organismes culturels, un manqué de vision globale, de perspective dans le temps et de réalisme. C'est ainsi que l'on refuse d'admettre que l'on est en compétition avec tel ou tel autre organisme parce que l'on est « spécifique » alors que le soleil ne brille pas forcément pour tout le monde.*'

the existence of a large 'non-public') and to correct the situation, recommended using various marketing strategies, such as segmentation and targeting (*Ibid*, p. 43; 188). But the introduction of these new marketing strategies was not without consequences as it actually entailed a profound political shift. As McGuigan rightly observes, marketing techniques which are

> *targeted upon increasing attendance by 'attenders' and encouraging 'intenders' to actually attend, and not wasting time, effort and money on attracting 'non-attenders', as social-democratic cultural policy was supposed to do.*
>
> (McGuigan 2004, p. 45)

The ideal of making arts accessible to the most was thus being abandoned with the emergence of a new market-driven doctrine, and the user-pays principle replaced the principle of universality which guaranteed the universal protection by the state of some fundamental rights, including the right to have access to culture independently of one's capacity to pay for it.

Contrary to previous documents, the authors of the *Coupet Report* also completely avoided the question of the cultural specificity of the Quebecois society as they felt the need to go beyond 'the nagging and costly debate over language'[226] (*Ibid*, p. 128, our translation) that, for them, had already been resolved. Protecting the French language and Quebecois identity were thus presented as outdated and irrelevant issues:

> *Beyond the defensive approach and the necessity to assert the specificity of Québec in the context of an Anglophone North America, Quebecois culture can enable Québec to be positioned on the international scene. Obviously, the idea is not to propel a folk image or one that is simply based on language but rather the image of a creative country, where the avant-garde can forcefully be expressed.*[227]

[226] *'le lancinant et coûteux débat de la langue.'*
[227] *'Au delà d'une approche défensive et de la nécessité d'affirmer la spécificité du Québec dans le cadre anglophone de l'Amérique du Nord, la culture québécoise peut constituer l'élément permettant au Québec de se*

(*Ibid*, p. 129, our translation)

So, clearly, the consultants did not perceive the Quebecois culture as being in danger or threatened in any way; neither did they insist on its 'distinct' or peculiar character. And notable is the fact that nowhere in the document was there a mention of the constitutional crisis dividing Québec from the rest of Canada. Indeed, the authors of the report did not see the intervention of the federal government in financing the arts in Québec as a problematic issue, or one that could be harmful to the Quebecois culture. Quite to the contrary, they viewed its intervention very pragmatically and deemed it necessary and complementary to the MACQ's own action (*Ibid*, p. 94; 154) and thus beneficial to the Quebecois culture. But by taking such a stance, the authors of the report implicitly rejected the sovereignist option and rather underlined the 'practical' advantages of the Canadian federation.

Finally, it is worth stressing the fact that the authors of the *Coupet Report* provided a description of the 'Quebecois model' of intervention in the field of culture. They presented it as a mix of the three following 'traditions': the interventionist French tradition (the 'architect state model'), the British tradition based on the arm's length principle (the 'patron state model'), and the American tradition that indirectly supports the arts and culture — through tax incentives notably — and in which foundations play an important role (the 'catalyst state model') (*Ibid*, pp. 134-51). According to the authors, the Quebecois model was thus a genuine mix of different models of state intervention in the cultural domain. A distance from the French influence in cultural policy making which was charted in earlier chapters started to appear clearly to the benefit of a rapprochement with the Anglo-Saxon world.

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positionner sur la scène internationale. Il ne s'agit pas, évidemment, de propulser une image folklorique ou simplement basée sur la langue, mais bel et bien l'idée d'un pays créateur, un lieu où l'avant-garde s'exprime avec force.'

4.3.2 A new Minister for Cultural Affairs and the creation of an Advisory Committee

A few months later, Liza Frulla-Hébert was named Minister of Cultural Affairs. Like many ministers of Bourassa's team, Frulla-Hébert came from the business world where she had held various positions (manager of a radio station, first female sport journalist, marketing director for a beer company, etc.). By her own admission, she was not a political activist and had never thought of becoming a politician, but was convinced by a member of Bourrassa's cabinet to go into politics. She was first appointed Minister of Communications from 1989 to 1990 before being entrusted with the Cultural Affairs portfolio in October 1990 (Frulla and Beaudoin 2007, p. 17). Soon after taking position, she created an Advisory Committee in charge of the preparation of a 'Proposition for a policy for culture and the arts' (Saint-Pierre 2003, p. 162). The committee was presided over by Roland Arpin who had an impressive professional path.[228] In his role as Director (and founder) of the *Musée de la civilisation du Québec*, Arpin enjoyed an excellent reputation within the cultural milieu and his presence in the committee along with people representing various artistic sectors[229] (*Ibid*, pp. 180-81) was certainly reassuring for those who feared more cuts in the culture budget.[230]

Whilst these developments were taking place, Québec was still trying to find a solution to the constitutional problem. The recent failures in the negotiations surrounding the recognition of Québec's specificity within the constitution had revived the nationalist flame in Québec, and the Québec National Assembly was then considering holding another referendum on Québec's sovereignty (Bélanger-Campeau Commission). Frulla-Hébert took

[228] Arpin had been College director; vice-president of the Education Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in Paris; deputy minister in Education as well as in Cultural Affairs; and, at the moment, of his appointment by Frulla-Hébert, he was the director (and founder) of the Musée de la civilisation du Québec.

[229] The eleven members of this committee represented the following sectors: heritage; the music, the publishing and the film industries; the arts presenters (or arts venues); and the performing arts.

[230] Contrary to her predecessor Lucienne Robilard, Frulla-Hébert did not alienate herself with the *Coalition du monde des arts et de la culture*: by choosing Arpin, the minister rather managed to have the coalition on her side.

advantage of the situation by declaring her intentions to repatriate, in the province, the federal powers in cultural matters. Effectively, the minister was taking up again the idea of 'cultural sovereignty' that had been promoted by Bourassa in the early 1970s. In the previous chapter, we have briefly mentioned the rejection of this political project by the Quebecois separatists. We have particularly presented the point of view of the authors of the *Rapport du Tribunal de la Culture* — amongst whom we found Marcel Rioux — who believed that sovereignty could not only be cultural and therefore argued that only full political sovereignty was desirable for Québec. For Bourassa, however, 'cultural sovereignty' consisted in protecting the culture and the language of Francophones living in Québec without compromising the federal system (Denis 2003, p. 266). In order to do so, Bourassa proposed 1) making French the official language of the province; 2) having greater control on Québec's immigration policies; 3) retrieving powers in matters of communication; 4) intensifying Québec's collaboration with other francophone States through the *Agence de coopération culturelle et technique* (known today as the *Organisation internationale de la francophonie*) (*Ibid*, pp. 267-70).

Liza Frulla-Hébert thus undertook to continue the process of establishing Québec's cultural sovereignty. At this point, though, it is worth saying a word on the political style and beliefs of the minister. Although there are no monographs or journal articles specifically written on Frulla-Hébert, she revealed many aspects of her political ambitions in a book published in 2007 entitled *Amitié interdite* ('Forbidden Friendship'), which is a transcription of a conversation between another female politician, Louise Beaudoin from the PQ, and herself. In this book, Frulla-Hébert described herself as a pragmatic politician (Frulla and Beaudoin 2007, p. 42) whose objective was never to embrace a cause, but to 'make things work' (*Ibid*, p. 58). Indeed, Frulla-Hébert avowed that she could support a political project even if that meant going opposite to her own personal convictions. For instance, she explained that she voted in favour of René Lévesque's sovereignty-association

during the 1980 referendum despite the fact that she had always been a 'federalist'. At that time she thought: 'we did not do all this for nothing, we cannot let others laugh at us, we are being asked to negotiate and we will say no?'[231] (*Ibid*, p. 42, our translation). In other words, Frulla-Hébert did not want Québec to become a sovereign State, but believed it had to fully enter the process of negotiation with the federal government or else the Quebecois' claims would lose credibility. Throughout the pages of the book, Frulla-Hébert indeed repeatedly asserted her pragmatic vision of politics, and the following quotation probably illustrates her political style well: 'I am not an ideologue, I will never engage myself in a political battle if I am not convinced that the majority of the population will follow'[232] (*Idem*, our translation). Frulla-Hébert thus sought consensus without trying to impose her own ideological convictions, and we might thus infer that the decision to put cultural sovereignty back on the agenda was motivated by Frulla-Hébert's desire to gain more support without her being necessarily committed to the idea. The minister certainly intended to gain the backing of as many people as possible by holding this stance without however being fully committed to it herself. And indeed, 'the minister's repeated declarations on the necessity to repatriate the federal powers in cultural matters pleased a majority of actors in the [cultural] milieu as well as the whole of the political elite and the Quebecois population'[233] (Saint-Pierre 2003, p. 162, our translation) who, understandably, were upset by the recent setback in the constitutional negotiations. However, as public policies specialist Diane Saint-Pierre also showed, as soon as the Minister of Cultural affairs felt the tide turn she abandoned her ambitions to repatriate federal powers in cultural matters. The issue was eventually abandoned, as we will later see (*Ibid*, pp. 243-44).

[231] '*On n'a quand même pas fait ça pour rien, on n'est pas pour faire rire de nous autres, on nous demande la permission d'aller négocier et on va aller dire non!*'
[232] '*Je ne suis pas idéologue, je ne m'engagerai jamais dans un combat politique si je ne suis pas convaincue que la majorité de la population va suivre*.'
[233] '*De plus, les déclarations répétées de la ministre sur la nécessité de rapatrier les pouvoirs fédéraux en matière culturelle plaisent à une majorité d'acteurs du milieu, mais aussi à l'ensemble de l'élite politique et de la population québécoise*.'

For their part, the members of the Advisory Committee clearly positioned themselves in favour of the complete withdrawal of the federal government in the cultural field in their 1991 report entitled *A policy on culture and the arts: proposal presented to Québec Minister of Cultural Affairs Liza Frulla-Hébert by the Groupe-conseil under the Chairmanship of Mr. Roland Arpin* (know as the *Arpin Report*) (Québec 1991, p. 29). Unlike the authors of the *Coupet Report*, the Arpin Committee assumed a 'nationalist' position and maintained that because of the distinct character of the Quebecois society, the Québec state, through its *Ministère des Affaires culturelles* '[had] to be the only master-builder [of the Quebecois cultural project]' (*Idem*). Again in contrast to the *Coupet Report*, the committee also reasserted the centrality of French language in defining the Quebecois culture. However, they also emphasised the contribution of all the different groups forming the whole of the Quebecois society that included a majority of 'Quebecois of French origin', 'Amerindians and Inuits', an 'important Anglophone community', as well as 'new citizens' of 'diverse cultural and ethnic origins' — also designated in the report as 'Allophones'[234] (*Ibid*, p. 43). So although the members of the Arpin Committee took over the theme of the repatriation of cultural powers that was dear to many Francophone nationalists, they nonetheless conveyed a vision of the Quebecois society that insisted on its multicultural character.

The *Arpin Report* also distinguished itself from the *Coupet Report* as its authors clearly recommended that the budget of the MACQ be increased.[235] Nevertheless, Frulla-Hébert wanted the Advisory Committee to take the recommendations of the *Coupet Report* into consideration (Saint-Pierre 2003, p. 183). Therefore, despite the fact that the committee advised that the MACQ be endowed with increased financial means and thus remain an important ministry, it also recommended the devolution of responsibilities (Québec 1991, pp. 286-87). In fact, the report was divided in three sections dedicated to

[234] The term 'allophones' refers to people who do not have English or French as native language.
[235] It also insisted on changing its name for that of Culture Department (*ministère de la Culture*).

three main aims: 1) '**developing** the domain of arts and culture'; 2) 'encouraging **access** to cultural life'; 3) 'increasing the **efficiency** of the intervention **of the government and its partners** in the **management of the cultural mission**'[236] (*Ibid*, p. 19, our translation, emphasis added). This last section essentially recycled the ideas exposed in the *Coupet Report* (*Ibid*, p. 281; 286), such as the development of new partnerships; an increased support to cultural industries; or the development of measures designed to encourage the diversification of the arts organisations' sources of revenues.

These main aims were themselves articulated around three core principles. Indeed, for the first time, the principles justifying a cultural policy proposal were clearly spelled out. American political scientist Kevin Mulcahy concisely presents them:

> *The Arpin Report was rooted in three basic assumptions about the proper place of cultural policy as a public policy. First, that **culture is an essential public good** and the cultural dimension is necessary for the life of a society. Second, that **cultural activities need to be accessible to all** citizens. Third, that **the state has the obligation to support and promote the cultural dimension** of the society.*
>
> (Mulcahy 1995, p. 336-37, emphasis added)

The first aspect that draws our attention is the fact that the *Arpin Report* clearly presented **culture as a common good**. Yet if the common good was clearly identified in the report, the definition of this very common good — culture — remained rather elusive. In fact, although the commissioners asserted that 'culture is a concrete fact', and that it is therefore something easily perceivable, they nonetheless admitted that that none of the existing definitions of the words was 'fully satisfying' (Québec 1991, p. 37). They even suggested that there could even be 'a certain danger in defining culture with too much precision

[236] '*Développer le domaine des arts et de la culture; favoriser l'accès à la vie culturelle; accroître l'efficacité de l'intervention gouvernementale et de ses partenaires dans la gestion de la mission culturelle.*'

within the framework of a governmental policy'[237] (*Idem*, our translation). 'However open and generous' this definition of culture might be, they argued, 'it would raise protests or, at least, some distrust' and 'would eventually be condemned as a way to impose a cultural orthodoxy, insufficiently open to creation and evolution'[238] (*Idem*, our translation). To establish the scope of their proposal, the members of the advisory committee resolved themselves to 'empirically' define culture. As they put it, '[i]nstead of defining a concept of culture that is located somewhere between "sociological" culture or "highbrow" culture, we propose an empirical approach, delimiting the domain of cultural activities that will be covered in the *Proposal*'[239] (*Idem*, our translation, emphasis in the original). As a result, and without being explicit as to how they finally made their selection, the authors identified six domains that a cultural policy should address: visual and performing arts; literature; cinema and television; living environment; cultural heritage; cultural industries. To these they added 'three means that have a determining influence over [culture]': professional resources; a network of presenters; school education. The Arpin Committee thus attempted to avoid the risks of creating controversy by providing an explicit definition of the word culture that would be too precise and instead chose to simply delimit the scope of the policy by identifying the artistic sectors targeted by the proposal. But, of course, by doing so the committee inevitably and awkwardly asserted a particular conception of what culture is.

Contrary to the *Coupet Report*, which essentially took over the ideas that had been put forward in the *Applebaum-Hébert Report* and in the *Bovey Report*, the *Arpin Report* submitted a comprehensive cultural policy proposal that went beyond the search for means

[237] '*Il y a même un certain danger à définir la culture avec trop de précision dans le cadre de l'élaboration d'une politique gouvernementale*.'
[238] '*Si généreuse et ouverte fût-elle, cette définition susciterait la contestation ou, à tout le moins, une certaine méfiance. Elle serait éventuellement condamnée à être qualifiée de démarche visant à imposer une orthodoxie culturelle, peu ouverte à la création*.'
[239] '*Plutôt que de définir un concept de culture se situant entra la culture « sociologique » et la culture dite « savante », on propose une approche empirique, délimitant le domaine d'activités culturelles qui sera couvert par la* Proposition.'

to alleviate the financial contribution of the state in the cultural sector. It effectively strongly reasserted the democratic objectives of cultural accessibility even though it also integrated the managerial discourse. We will now analyse how these two reports have influenced the content of the 1992 official policy and see how the government has managed to reconcile the diverse justifications that guide its intervention in the cultural field.

4.3.3 Québec's official cultural policy (1992)

The *Arpin Report* was published in June 1991 and was particularly well received, notably by the Francophones (Saint-Pierre 2003, p. 186). But the minister wanted the proposal to be more widely debated. The recommendations of the report were thus discussed in autumn during the proceedings of the Parliamentary Committee.[240] Diane Saint-Pierre presented the different positions emerging from the testimonies and memoirs submitted to the Parliamentary Committee in her book *La politique culturelle du Québec de 1992: continutié ou changement?*. Without repeating her analysis, suffice it to say that divergences of opinion started to appear more clearly during the hearings. In the end, the repatriation of powers in cultural matters did not achieve consensus due to the firm opposition of the film and television industry for financial reasons. The centralisation of powers within a Department of Culture was also an important source of worry as detractors feared increased state interventionism and bureaucratisation (*Ibid*, pp. 187-89). In order to facilitate the task of developing an official cultural policy capable of reaching a general consensus, an analysis of the reports (*mémoires*) submitted to the Parliamentary Committee was prepared. A vast interdepartmental consultation was also undertaken (twenty-one ministries and secretariats were involved in the process), and the staff of the Cultural Affairs was asked to identify, in the *Arpin Report*, the ideas on which consensus

[240] The proceedings of the Parliamentary committee lasted two months. The committee heard a hundred and eighty-one testimonies and received two hundred and sixty-four memoirs.

might be reached and to put aside those arousing controversy (*Ibid*, pp. 196-202). From January to June 1992, no less than seventeen sector-based committees outlined a plan for Québec's official cultural policy (*Ibid*, p. 202) which was finally submitted in June to the National Assembly of Québec, just one year after the publication of the *Arpin Report* (*Ibid*, p. 206). The policy was adopted in December of that year (*Ibid*, p. 243).

Four principles

The *Arpin Report* largely inspired *La politique culturelle du Québec: Notre culture, notre avenir* (*The Cultural Policy of Québec: Our Culture, Our Future*). As Kevin Mulcahy put it, the report 'provided a philosophical and theoretical framework' essential to the 1992 cultural policy (Mulcahy 1995, p. 336). Indeed, its three core principles were taken up in the government's policy statement, although a fourth one (below in bold print) was also added:

- *Culture is an essential good and the cultural dimension is, along with the social and economic dimensions, necessary to life in society;*
- ***Autonomy of creation and freedom of expression constitute fundamental values in all democratic societies;***
- *The state must encourage access to culture for the greatest number of citizens;*
- *The state, in collaboration with its partners, must support and develop the society's cultural dimension.*

(Québec 1992, p. 15, our translation, emphasis added)

The added principle — 'autonomy of creation' to which the idea of freedom of expression was melded — was in fact pushed for by representatives of the artistic sector (Québec 1992, p. 10). Basing her analysis on a summary of the reports submitted to the Parliamentary Committee[241], Saint-Pierre explains that groups discussing the question of

[241] The summary was made by political scientist Brigitte Von Schoenberg and sociologist Jacques Hamel. See both Brigitte Von Schoenberg and Jacques Hamel, 'Synthèse Préliminaire Des Mémoires Soumis À La Commission Parlementaire Sur La Culture Concernant La Proposition De Politique Sur Les Arts Et La Culture', in

creation predominantly advocated for the protection of freedom of art (Saint-Pierre 2003, pp. 220-22; 234-35). As some have put it, the state must 'recognise the higher mission of protecting creative individuality'[242] (*Mémoire de la Société historique du théâtre du Québec* cited in Saint-Pierre 2003, p. 221, our translation) whilst others went as far as rejecting all kinds of state intervention in the name of the autonomy of artists (Saint-Pierre 2003, p. 222). The fact that thirty per cent of the reports discussed the question of freedom of art indicated that the matter was of significance for many. Knowing that the aim of the policy was to reach the widest possible consensus, it is not surprising to find this principle included in the official policy. The three other principles, first exposed in the *Arpin Report*, were said to have earned a vast consensus during the proceedings of the Parliamentary Commission. Here again the minister and her team acknowledged this state of affairs and adopted these ideas as the official policy's core principles.

Now, a careful reading of the policy will enable us to analyse how these principles were concretely applied in the policy. *La politique culturelle du Québec* is divided in three main chapters and each of them hinges on a different 'axis': 1) 'the assertion of our cultural identity'; 2) **'**support to creators and to creation'; 3) 'access and participation to cultural life'.[243] The so-called 'axes' can thus be described as areas of intervention where the government sought to have an impact. We will now discuss these four 'axes' before analysing further the policy using Boltanski and Thévenot's model.

Direction Des Politiques Et De L'évaluation Ministère Des Affaires Culturelles (ed.), (Québec, 1991b).; and Brigitte Von Schoenberg and Jacques Hamel, 'Synthèse Des Mémoires Soumis À La Commission Parlementaire Sur La Culture Concernant La Proposition De Politique Sur Les Arts Et La Culture', in Direction Des Politiques Et De L'évaluation Ministère Des Affaires Culturelles (ed.), (Québec, 1991a).

[242] '*S'il est un besoin pressant […] c'est bien celui de ne réaffirmer le caractère autocratique de l'art et de la création véritable qu'à travers une liberté totale […] au nom du Bien commun incarné par l'état souverain qui se reconnaîtrait ainsi la mission supérieure de protéger l'individualité créatrice'.*

[243] The policy thus retained two of the main 'purposes' (*finalités*) that had been spelled out in the *Arpin Report:* the objective 'developing the domain of arts and culture' inspired the second axis of the policy; and the objective 'encouraging access to cultural life' inspired the third axis of the policy.

First axis: the assertion of our cultural identity

One of the reproaches that was made to the *Arpin Report* was that its scope was too restricted, focussing mainly on the arts (Saint-Pierre 2003, p. 199). Yet, as we mentioned in the introduction, the preservation and the assertion of the Quebecois' cultural specificity has always been an important preoccupation amongst cultural policy makers, and according to the staff of the MACQ, a credible cultural policy ought to address the question of 'the protection, the promotion and the development of the Quebecois society's cultural identity (language, heritage, contribution of the cultural and Amerindian communities, socio-cultural leisure, etc.)'[244] (cited in Saint-Pierre 2003, p. 199, our translation). The first chapter of the policy document thus proposes three objectives (*orientations*): 1) to promote (*valoriser*) the French language as a means to express culture and to access it; 2) to promote (*valoriser*) cultural heritage; 3) to reinforce the dialogue between cultures within Québec.

Contrary to Arpin's original proposal, the official cultural policy stresses the importance of valuing French language as part of the overall governmental cultural strategy on the grounds that language is 'one of the bases of cultural identity, and French language characterises most particularly the cultural specificity of Québec'[245] (Québec 1992, p. 23, our translation). In fact, language seems to be the only element that the government can put forward in order to articulate the notion of the cultural specificity of the Quebecois.[246] Interestingly, though, the arguments put forward to justify the 'improvement of the mastering of French language' are depoliticised: as the argument goes, the need to improve

[244] '*La politique doit fondamentalement s'attarder « à la protection, à la promotion et au développement de l'identité culturelle de la société québécoise (langue, patrimoine, apport des communautés culturelles et amérindiennes, loisirs socio-culturels, etc.) ».*

[245] '*La langue est un des fondements de notre identité culturelle et la langue française caractérise tout particulièrement la spécificité culturelle du Québec.*'

[246] Obviously, the secular Québec of the 1990s cannot proclaim its catholic faith as it did in the 1950s to assert its specificity; it cannot praise the preservation of a French genius that would have made French-Canadians different from Anglo-Saxons (see chapter 2); nor can it speak of an intangible 'mentality' or a 'special spirit' peculiar to the Quebecois people and that a Laurin or a Dumont perceived in the 1970s (see chapter 3), but the use of French language is (still) indisputable.

the mastering of French language arises due to the new requirements of the job market which is being transformed by 'the development of new technologies, the continentalisation of the economy[247] as well as the globalisation of information'[248] (*Ibid*, p. 27, our translation). As we have seen, however, the acknowledgement of the weaknesses of the French language are not new in cultural policy discourse: in the 1960s, the very first minister of Cultural Affairs, Georges-Émile Lapalme, already deplored the lack of French language skills among the people of Québec, but he mainly attributed this situation to the omnipresence of English, which affected the French-Canadians' ability to express themselves in their own language. For Lapalme, the improvement of French equated with the preservation of the French 'genius' and guaranteed the presence of a French Canadian intellectual elite (the capacity to express oneself correctly in French was associated to the capacity to elaborate a complex thought). In Frulla's policy under examination here, the need to improve the language skills is now justified by the imperatives of the market that forces companies (and, consequently, employees) to adapt to the new business environment and become more 'competitive'. The 1992 cultural policy is thus clearly distinctive in many respects, yet also bears marks of continuity with previous measures for the cultural sector. Most notably, as we have already seen, the promotion of access and of international cultural dialogue and exchange remain central priorities, as they were in earlier policies. Like previous governments, this too 'intends to favour actions aiming at making more accessible and at promoting works of art and cultural products in French language' (*Ibid*, p. 28, our translation). Also following Lapalme's example, the cultural policy proposal submitted by Frulla grants much importance to the reinforcement of international cooperation and cultural exchanges with francophone countries as well as with the French-Canadians living in provinces other than Québec (*Ibid*, pp. 29-31).

[247] I.e., made conform to norms established for the American continent.

[248] '*Bien que les assises linguistiques du Québec soient maintenant bien établies, le développement des moyens de communication, la « continentalisation » de l'économie et la mondialisation de l'information […] accroissent constamment la demande de compétences linguistiques dans Presque tous les milieux de travail.*'

In the second part of this first chapter in the policy document, the policy advocates for the promotion of cultural heritage which is described as invaluable for it 'has symbolic value, possesses an essential educational character, has a material value that increases with time, and constitutes an irreplaceable cultural, social and economic asset'[249] (*Ibid*, p. 33, our translation, emphasis added). As we can see, heritage is not only valued for its function of remembrance but, for the first time, the government speaks of its economic value. Moreover, no mention of the French Canadian past is made as such; the cultural heritage is indeed 'de-ethnicisised'. It is described as a collective legacy bequeathed by 'previous generations' to the 'present generation' (*Ibid*, p. 34) and it belongs to all Quebecois, independently of their ethnic origin. What is valued here is not so much the transmission of traditions within a group of people sharing the same ethnic origin, but the appropriation of a collective resource by the citizens. Besides, in accordance to the decentralisation tendency, the policy announces that the state will encourage municipalities, local collectivities and the network of museum institutions to take charge of the heritage, leaving to the MACQ, essentially, a normative role (e.g.: enforcing the cultural property act; revising the objectives of the cultural properties' classification).

Saint-Pierre also reports that fifteen per cent of the documents submitted to the Parliamentary Committee criticised the fact that the *Arpin Report* did not sufficiently insist on the pluralist character of the Quebecois society (Saint-Pierre 2003, pp. 217-20). The third part of this chapter is without doubt a response to those criticisms and reflects an important change of attitude: the government becomes more inclusive of all its citizens. In effect, the policy statement emphasises the need to 'reinforce the dialogue between cultures' within Québec and to do so, the government commits to: 1) giving Quebecois of English expression greater recognition for their 'contribution to the Quebecois culture'

[249] '*L'héritage culturel, légué de génération en génération, est précieux parce qu'il a valeur de symbole, possède un caractère pédagogique essentiel, comporte une valeur matérielle qui croît avec le temps et constitue un actif culturel, social et économique irremplaçable*.'

(Québec 1992, p. 51); 2) facilitating access to state financial support for Québec's diverse cultural communities (*Ibid*, p. 53); 3) helping the Amerindian nations to take charge of their own cultural development and promote the First Nations' cultures (*Ibid*, p. 54); 4) and, finally, supporting the exportation of Quebecois cultural products and facilitating the reception of artists from around the world (*Ibid*, p. 57). Of course, what is most striking here is the change in the discourse on the Anglophones: this community, we are being told, has been involved in the support and the encouragement of the arts and education for a long time (*Ibid*, p. 51) and it has 'largely contribute[d] to the cultural open-mindedness of Québec and to the definition of a pluralist Quebecois culture'[250] (*Idem*, our translation). Similarly, it is significant that the *Politique culturelle du Québec* does not insist on the question of the preservation of a national identity on the pretext that the province Québec shelters a French-speaking population surrounded by Anglo-Saxons. To be more precise, in her introduction of the policy, the minister Frulla-Hébert indeed argues that is it important for the Quebecois state to promote the unique francophone society in North America (Québec 1992, p. VII) but the idea that the society is threatened by an Anglophone majority has disappeared from the political discourse. Following the advice of the authors of the *Coupet Report*, the *Politique culturelle du Québec* seems to seek to go 'beyond the defensive approach' (excerpt of the *Coupet Report* cited earlier).[251] Contrary to previous policy statements, this one seems to suggest that the Quebecois have solid cultural bases which are not in immediate danger and in need of special protective measures. Indeed, for the Liberal government, the quality of the Quebecois artistic outputs and its unique heritage contribute 'to the emergence of a clear awareness of the Quebecois cultural identity' (Québec 1992, p. 6). But this culture is not entirely safe either, according to the document: a threat still exists but it mainly comes from globalisation that notably leads to

[250] '*Et aujourd'hui encore, cet engagement demeure considérable et contribue d'ailleurs largement à l'ouverture culturelle du Québec et à la définition d'une culture québécoise pluraliste.*'

[251] Paradoxically, the *Politique culturelle du Québec* has not been translated in English contrary to the 'nationalist' 1978 white paper.

foreign products flooding the Quebecois cultural market (*Ibid*, p. 7; 28).[252] So, whilst the question of the preservation of the national identity and the assertion of the Quebecois' cultural specificity is posed in new terms, it nonetheless remains an important preoccupation of the policy.

Second axis: support to creators and to creation

The second axis is entirely dedicated to the question of the support to creators and to the arts. As we have said earlier, the question of freedom of art was often raised during the proceedings of the Parliamentary Committee (Saint-Pierre 2003, pp. 221-22), and the *Politique culturelle du Québec* endorses the view according to which 'creation must be free of any constraint that would have the effect of inflecting its meaning or its scope'[253] (Québec 1992, p. 59, our translation). 'Autonomy of creation and freedom of expression' are thus the first objective to be tackled here. Interestingly, the involvement of the artistic community in 'defining the programmes that are designed for them' is also desired and expected. For the first time in the policy-making process, artists are explicitly called upon to participate in the definition of the criteria for receiving state support (through the peer-review process of evaluation). And the main practical application of the principle of 'autonomy of creation' is the setting up of an arts council functioning according to the 'arm's length principle': the *Conseil des arts et des lettres du Québec*. As we have seen, this idea had been in the air for a while in Québec. Moreover, Quebecois artists who received support from the federal governments seemed to be satisfied with this system, hence their case that the province ought to follow suit.

The second objective presented in this chapter of the policy concerns the 'improvement of the creators and artists' professional living conditions'. 'Like other

[252] The emergence of new technologies and the adjustments to recent social changes (new demographic profile of the province; the expansion of its main cities; or the devaluation of its regions) are also seen as challenges that a cultural policy of the 1990s ought to tackle.
[253] '*la création doit se faire, libre de contraintes qui auraient pour effet d'en infléchir le sens ou la portée*.'

professionals, it is argued, artists and creators want to be able to benefit from social protection'[254] (*Ibid*, p. 68, our translation). In other words, artists and creators must not suffer from discrimination and must be treated as equitably as other workers. Several measures are thus suggested to improve the socio-economic conditions of artists, such as the setting up a system of retribution for the use of artistic works; the creation of new programs for professional development; an increased support to art professional associations. As Saint-Pierre shows, these governmental commitments were indeed a response to the many claims made by art associations that decried the artists' poor conditions (Saint-Pierre 2003, pp. 229-30).

The third objective of this chapter aims at 'securing the vitality of art organisations'. Here, the influence of the *Coupet Report* and the *Arpin Report* is significant. Most of the recommendations contained in both reports concerning the diversification of the sources of revenue and improving the management of arts organisations are taken on board.

The last objective entitled 'elaborate and carry out a development strategy for cultural industries' proposes solutions to provide greater stability for the Quebecois cultural industries. In this document, the cultural industries are highly valued. These 'corporations' are not only said to have 'an important place in culture' (Québec 1992, p. 85), but they are also praised for their 'indisputable role in the economy' (*Ibid*, p. 86) and the fact that they create numerous jobs. They are even considered as 'one of the strategic industrial clusters' that the government will support to foster the economic development of Québec (*Ibid*, p. 88). To foster the cultural industries, the policy again suggests various measures, such as the setting up of fiscal measures designed to encourage private investments, or the development of the cultural industries' workforce. The government also reasserts its

[254] '*À l'instar des autres professionnels, les artistes et les créateurs veulent pouvoir bénéficier d'une protection sociale liée au fait qu'ils exercent une profession*'.

commitment to regulating the markets so as to advantage Quebecois cultural products[255] and it suggests to improve the programmes designed to support the film and television industry, etc.

Interestingly, in his book *The Economics of Cultural Policy*, David Throsby notably brings to light the reasons that have contributed to giving cultural industries such importance in the cultural policies in recent years. Indeed, according to him,

> *[hard-headed economic policy-makers] have tended to be uneasy with cultural policy where the primary focus is on public assistance to the arts; typically they have believed that there is no special case for governments to support activities that should be commercially viable […]. These sceptics have remained unconvinced as to the existence of public-good benefits from the arts […]. But the cultural industries are a different matter. Now the arts can be seen as part of a wider and more dynamic sphere of economic activity, with links through to the information and knowledge economies, fostering creativity, embracing new technologies and feeding innovation.*
>
> (Throsby 2010, p. 7)

The importance given to this sector in the 1992 cultural policy indeed corroborates Throsby's assertion.

Third axis: access and participation to cultural life

The last axis of the policy is devoted to the question of 'access and participation of citizens to cultural life'. Right from the introduction, the government reasserts its intention to defend the right to culture: 'it is the state's role to see that the Quebecois, whatever their origin or the region where they live, can have access to a cultural and artistic life'[256]

[255] '*contrôlées par des intérêts privés, soumises aux lois de la concurrence et du profit, en compétition avec des entreprises étrangères d'envergure internationale, peu d'entreprises québécoises peuvent espérer satisfaire aux critères de performance économique et financière de notre économie de marché ans une intervention énergique de l'État.*'

[256] '*C'est cependant le rôle de l'État de s'assurer que les Québécois, quelles que soient leur origine ou la région où ils habitent, puissent avoir accès à une vie culturelle et artistique*.'

(Québec 1992, p. 98, our translation). Typical governmental measures to 'facilitate access to arts and culture' consist in improving the territorial distribution of cultural resources. Likewise, the Québec government promises to organise the touring of great artistic events, to develop cultural facilities throughout the province and to improve the accessibility and the quality of the services provided by local libraries. Also, to 'favour the citizens' participation to artistic and cultural life', the government proposes to encourage the amateur practice of cultural activities amongst the citizens. It is interesting to note that the government also wants to give greater recognition to voluntary work by providing support for volunteer training programs as well as by highlighting the contribution of volunteers. This measure responds to the desire of governments to involve individuals and arts consumers in supporting culture in order to alleviate its own contribution.

A new compromise

The *Politique culturelle du Québec* proposes a compromise that involves three worlds mainly: the civic, the inspired and the market worlds. As we have explained previously, '[t]he civic world, which can only develop in the context of a State, finds its most perfected form in republics and in democracies' (Boltanksi and Thévenot 2006, p. 192). Qua representative of the citizens, the state has the responsibility to represent and work in the interest of all its citizens, regardless of their social class, their age, their gender, and also regardless of their ethnic origin. In the years under examination here, Bourrassa's government particularly emphasises its desire to include groups other than the French one in its cultural policy. The desire to 'bring' culture to the regions, to expand the cultural facilities available on the territory and to improve the quality of their services is also motivated by the wish to give greater access to culture for all citizens, including those who live in places less well-served in this regard. These objectives follow a logic that belongs in **the civic world**. In effect, in this world, '[p]ersons are all subject to the same justice' (*Ibid*, p.

185) and therefore are entitled to the same rights. Since 'cultural rights' have been defined and recognised in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) along with social and the economic rights (art. 22 and 27 of the UDHR), a democratic state has the duty to guarantee its citizens equal access to culture and to encourage their participation in cultural life. Thus, culture must be as accessible to citizens with lower income revenues or living in remote regions or communities as it is for those with higher income revenues or those living in a metropolis (hence the policy of free admission in subsidised institutions, the development of cultural infrastructures in remote regions, or the organisation of touring cultural events). Moreover, all citizens have the right to participate in the collective cultural creation of humankind, an activity that should not be reserved to artists alone, and this cultural right notably translates in encouraging amateur arts (the existence of such rights besides creates a tension with the inspired world since the privileged status of artists, qua sole depositaries of culture, is indeed questioned). These two fundamental objectives (equal access and participation) have been recurrent ones, as we have seen in previous chapters, since the end of the 1960s in the cultural policies of Québec and of other western countries (France notably) and are still present in Québec's 1992 cultural policy.

The question of the 'autonomy of creation', which is central to the 1992 policy, implicitly refers to the **inspired world**. In this world, the worthy beings — who, as we have seen in previous chapters, are often embodied by artists in contemporary societies — must not be 'subject to industrial measures, reason, determination' or otherwise they might not be able to 'welcome what is *mysterious*, *imaginative*, *original*, *unspeakable*, *unnameable*, *ethereal*, or *invisible*' (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 160) or, in other words, be 'capable of experiencing the outpouring of inspiration' (*Ibid*, p. 159). But the 'inspired logic' hardly exists in the state apparatus which is essentially driven by the logic of the 'civic world' and where, as we have seen, the general will prevails over individual expression. As Boltanski and Thévenot explain,

> *Beings [of the civic world] may escape from chaos—in this world, that means from* division—*and thus attain worth because they are naturally* political*. They harbor in themselves an* aspiration *that inclines them toward what is* common*, toward what* unites *them and incites them to* break down their isolation*. This is what confers on them the quality of citizens invested with* civil rights*.*
>
> (*Ibid*, p. 187, emphasis in the original)

But in the perspective of the inspired world, there is a risk, when being supported by the State, to be constrained to follow a political doctrine. Such constraint, as we have also seen in previous chapters, can obstruct the very 'outpouring of inspiration' and prevent artists from 'acceding to perfection and happiness' (*Ibid*, p. 159). To access 'inspired worth', Boltanski and Thévenot tell us, '[o]ne must "*break out* of habits and routine," "accept *risks*," "reject habits, norms, sacrosanct principles," and *call* everything *into question*' (*Ibid*, p. 161, emphasis in the original). Indoctrination, party lines or any form of subjection to authority are in contradiction with the search of singularity and originality that characterises the artistic approach. We also know that in the inspired world, '[w]hat is worthy is what cannot be controlled or […] measured' (*Ibid*, p. 159). Yet States that tend to more and more respond to an industrial logic allocate very precise goals and objectives to their intervention. This is also inconsistent with the unpredictability of the inspired process: 'The "*unforeseen accidents* of creation" ("with all its—happily—*uncontrolled* and *mysterious* aspects"), its *detours*, call for *humility*, which allows one to "transcend the prideful assurance of the expert"' (*Idem*, emphasis in the original). Hence, behind the defence of the principle of autonomy of creation lies the belief that state interference might be a threat to artistic freedom and integrity. The presence of the 'principle of autonomy' in a cultural policy statement thus aims at reducing the tension (the contradiction) that the coexistence of the (industrialised-)civic world and the inspired one creates. In order to make the compromise acceptable, the Québec government suggested

to support artists in a way that sought to minimise the imposition of non-artistic objectives on the activities of artists and other representatives of the 'inspired world'. They proposed to achieve this by setting up an agency independent as much as possible from government influences. However, as Boltanski and Thévenot explain,

> *In order to identify a compromise situation, then, it is not enough to note the presence of disparate objects. One must also verify that their importance has been established and that they are not treated by the participants [those involved in making the compromise] merely as contingent items noted by a single observer.*
>
> (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 277)

To put it differently, it is necessary for the people involved in a compromise to acknowledge the presence of objects or beings that belong to the different worlds that form the compromise; their presence and their worth must clearly be recognised and valued for what they are. Participants must thus be assessed according to the worth they embody in a given situation (for example, 'artists', in the context of a cultural policy, have to be recognised for their inspired worth and not for any other forms of worth). The 1992 cultural policy does what previous policies did not: it gives more importance than ever before to artists and workers in the cultural industries. In effect, a whole section is dedicated to them and several measures are proposed to recognise the value of their work, to improve their living conditions or to facilitate the diffusion of their work. The fact that the government also acknowledges the necessity for artists to be free from political imperatives so as to welcome the 'outpouring of inspiration' is significant in relation to our analysis. The state indeed accepts to 'support [the artistic approach] without expecting tangible and immediate benefits'[257] (Québec 1992, p. 59, our translation). By doing so, the policy not only enhances the role of artists and recognise their worth, but also takes into account and

[257] '*Quelle que soit la démarche artistique, l'environnement doit en favoriser la progression, la soutenir sans en attendre de bénéfices tangibles et immédiats.*'

defend the principle that prevails in **their world**. The peer jury process used in the arts council precisely seeks to enable the assessment according to the inspired worth.

Paradoxically though, if the creation of the arts council aims at preserving artists and artistic organisations from political interference, they are not spared by commercial and productivity imperatives. We have extensively showed the various ways in which the market reasoning permeated the discourse in cultural policy. The vitality of cultural organisations and industries is seen as essential and closely linked to their ability to strive in the market. To increase their chances of succeeding, the government proposes various strategies that aim at increasing their competitivity as well as improving their ability to rake in profits so as to, ultimately, secure their continued existence. Interestingly, the policy statement carefully reassures the cultural sector by reasserting its intention to inject new money in the subsidy system but it nonetheless argues that 'the preservation of the artistic organisations' autonomy and freedom of action is notably achieved through the diversification of their sources of revenues'[258] (Québec 1992, p. 79, our translation). Inevitably though, the introduction of the market logic impose on artists and artistic organisations a new constraint: not only do they have to convince a jury of peers of the worth of their artistic approach but their art, or 'product', has to gain value from the perspective of the market advocates. In effect, 'worthy objects' in this world, have to be '*salable* goods' (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 196). And, conversely, the state of unworthiness in the market world 'is one in which persons *fail*, *stagnate*, and *lose out*, and in which goods are *rejected*, *spurned*, *hated*, instead of *desired*' (*Ibid*, p. 197). Evidently, the imperatives of the market world can create much tension with the inspired one where, ideally, persons 'attain worth without needing recognition from others or of other people's opinion' (*Ibid*, p. 88). This is the case, argues Boltanski and Thévenot, with 'artists who do not necessarily reject public esteem or money […], but who do not make these goods the

[258] '*La sauvegarde de l'autonomie et de la liberté d'action des organismes artistiques passé notamment pas la diversification de leurs sources de revenus.*'

very basis for the value of their work and for their worth' (*Idem*). There is thus a contradiction here when the government pretends that it does not expect 'tangible and immediate benefits' from artists and artistic organisations whereas it clearly watches for them to be financially successful. But to reduce the tension between the inspired and market logic, the government tries to convince actors of the art world that the call for private investment and the development of new 'partnerships' with municipalities and businesses is necessary for the good of artists and artistic organisations.[259]

In sum, **the novelty of the compromise proposed by the 1992 policy resides in the efforts made to ensure the coexistence of the inspired and the civic worlds — notably through the creation of an independent arts council. The policy also distinguishes itself from the previous policy statements by introducing elements stemming from the market world and by putting aside the domestic one.**

Finally, we have mentioned, in previous chapters, the importance of a clear identification of a 'common good' to reinforce a compromise such as Boltanski and Thévenot define it. The 1992 policy statement clearly identifies 'culture' as the ultimate common good which both the collective solidarity and the inspired outpouring serve. Even the market law is presented as something profitable to culture since it also serves to protect it from excessive state dependency. Thus the presence of these three worlds is justified by the fact that they all serve and are subordinated to a higher common good: culture. Moreover, in our first chapter we have underlined the fact that, according to Boltanski and Thévenot, 'a compromise can be worked out more easily when it can be made to accommodate beings or qualities that are ambiguous in the sense that they may derive, depending on the way they are understood, from more than one world' (*Ibid*, p.

[259] French Economist and sociologist Eve Chiapello has devoted a book to the question of the conflict between artists and managers in cultural organisation in France and showed how the tension between them has faded over time and how they have managed to make a compromise between their different logics. In many respects, the functioning of French artistic organisations presents common features with other organisations in the world, making Chiapello's reflections relevant to researchers interested by similar questions. See Eve Chiapello, *Artistes Versus Managers* (Paris: Éditions Métailié, 1998) 258.

280). Indeed, as we have seen throughout the chapters there is no definition of culture that reaches consensus in the policy arena. The definition of culture proposed by Lapalme or by Laurin were widely contested, and the one proposed by Arpin was subject to the same fate: Saint-Pierre reports that more than twenty-five per cent of the reports submitted to the Parliamentary Commission expressed 'important reservations' towards the definition it presented of culture (Saint-Pierre 2003, p. 215). Basically, it was said to be too narrowly focussing on the arts and it was criticised for putting aside other 'dimensions of the cultural life and human activity' such as 'cultural leisure, scientific and technical culture, work, research and intellectual productions, popular culture and its various forms of expression, education and communications'[260] (*Ibid*, p. 217, our translation). Contrary to the *Arpin Report* which rather unconvincingly evaded the question, the *Politique culturelle du Québec*, for its part, completely avoids the debate on the definition of culture altogether. In effect, although the policy includes a section on 'cultural identity', which suggests that the concept of culture goes beyond the realm of arts**, nowhere in the policy statement is there any explicit definition of culture or discussion over the notion of culture**. Again Frulla-Hébert and her team showed political cleverness and **the search for consensus results in maintaining ambiguity on the notion of culture so as to avoid any divisive discussions**. Interestingly, none of the articles published following the release of the policy statement questioned the policy's (absent) conception of culture, as we will now see.

4.4 A cultural policy finally achieving consensus?

As we have seen in the previous section, the minister Frulla-Hébert took great care to avoid the presence of any controversial issues in the government's policy statement. The analyses of the testimonies and memoirs submitted during the proceedings of the Parliamentary

[260] '*Enfin, selon certains, les choix posés par le groupe-conseil, et qui se rattachent à une définition « restreinte » de la culture, font que plusieurs autres dimensions de la vie culturel et de l'activité humaine sont pour ainsi dire très peu présentes, sinon absentes. Il en est ainsi du loisir culturel, de la culture scientifique et technique, du travail de la recherché et de la production intellectuelle, de la culture populaire et de ses diverses formes d'expression, de l'éducation et des communications'*.

Committee were key to the elaboration of the official cultural policy: all contentious issues were identified and carefully treated and resolved, or ignored. And, as we will now see, *La Politique culturelle du Québec* which was publicly released on the 19th June 1992 indeed received a good reception.

Between the 18th and 30th June 1992 — that is, immediately before and in the ten days following the publication of this policy document — we have identified twelve (12) articles written on Québec's new cultural policy in the newspapers: *La Presse*, *Le Devoir*, and *The Gazette*, as in the preceding chapter. Amongst these articles, almost half (5) presented a neutral and descriptive account of the policy's content; the other half (7) was critical of one or another aspect of the policy. We have to stress that 'critical' articles do not necessarily present a negative account of the policy; they display an opinion that can be positive, negative or mixed. Although we have looked through articles in the newspapers published up to two weeks after the release of the policy, the news of the publication of *La Politique culturelle du Québec* only grasped the interest of the medias for a period of less than one week. We have also included in the analysis six articles published in academic journals and cultural magazines presenting a more detailed critique of the policy; three of them are especially interesting for the present discussion: one article was written by André Vanasse; another one was signed by '150 film and video makers' (*150 cinéastes and vidéastes québécois*); and Roland Arpin himself commented on the policy in an article published in 1993.

4.4.1 Positive reactions

If we exclude the newspaper articles that gave a neutral account of the policy's content, most of other articles were well disposed towards Frulla-Hébert's policy. For instance, editorialist Agnès Gruda of *La Presse* asserted that Frulla-Hébert's cultural policy was making a 'step in the right direction' by favourably responding to the demands of the

artistic sector. The creation of an independent arts council, she argued, was more likely to protect artists from political interference than the MACQ. She also praised the policy for mobilising the whole government and for being accompanied by 'hard cash'. To her, such support to artists also represented a profitable undertaking:

> *[B]y creating a firm* (une boîte) *whose first mandate will be to help creators, but more, by placing culture at the core of the governmental priorities, we will finally maybe […] let prevail the idea that when helping artists, Québec does not give to beggars but makes an investment in the future.*[261]
>
> (Gruda 1992, our translation)

Editorialist Lise Bissonnette from *Le Devoir* shared more or less the same opinion: she applauded the minister's capacity to come up with an official policy, to gain extra money for culture, to finally create the much demanded autonomous council, and to make of culture a central issue of the government's agenda by involving several other ministries in the implementation of the policy. Bissonnette also expressed satisfaction towards the 'healthy and contemporary discourse' on the Quebecois identity that the policy promoted. In her opinion, the policy statement 'dodge[d] the pitfall that ha[d] stopped so many of [Frulla-Hébert's] predecessors'[262] (*Ibid*, our translation). For these reasons, she thought that 'before quibbling on details we should, unanimously, offer her laurels'[263], '[t]he minister for Cultural Affairs, Mrs Frulla-Hébert, deserves an ovation'[264], she added (Bissonnette 1992, our translation). For her part, journalist Paule des Rivières saluted the fact that the minister was able to bring the policy project to completion and reported positive feedback from representatives of different sectors (the cultural sector, the government's opposition as well as members of the Advisory Committee who had worked on the *Arpin Report*) (Rivières

[261] '*En créant ainsi une boîte dont le premier mandat sera d'aider les créateurs, et plus encore, en plaçant la culture au rang des priorités gouvernementales, on finira peut-être […] par faire valoir l'idée qu'en aidant un artiste, le Québec ne fait pas la charité mais un placement d'avenir.*'
[262] '*[Son texte] esquive ainsi l'écueil qui a stoppé tant de ses prédécesseurs.*'
[263] '*Avant de chipoter sur les détails on devrait, à l'unanimité, lui offrir des lauriers*'.
[264] '*La ministre des Affaires culturelles, Madame Frulla-Hébert, mérite une ovation*'.

1992a, 1992b). Jocelyne Richer who wrote more factual articles nonetheless admitted that, although the policy lacked concrete answers to some of the challenges it addressed, it still had 'the merit to exist' (Richer 1992). Finally, despite the sarcastic tone of Joan Fraser's paper entitled 'It could have been far worse', the Anglophone editorialist from *The Gazette* conceded that the policy 'actually contain[ed] a few good things' (Fraser 1992): the creation of an arm's length arts council; the recognition of the Anglophones' contribution to Québec's cultural life (along with a promise to support Anglophone artists); the importance given to arts education; and the identification of the cultural industries sector as 'one of the "clusters"' for Québec economic development were all, according to her, positive aspects of the policy.

So all these newspapers noted several positive elements of the policy: the efficiency of the minister Frulla-Hébert was underlined (industrial world) by a majority of journalists; Joan Fraser thought that the policy was fairer to non-francophone groups than previous policy statements (civic world) and glad that the economic impact of culture be recognised (market world). Others, like Bissonnette, appreciated the fact that the policy went beyond the idea of preserving a certain French-Canadian heritage (a sign of the importance of the domestic world fading). More importantly, these journalists agreed on the necessity or the relevance of creating an arts council based on the British arms' length model. To put it differently, they conceded that the province's cultural policy had to be more attentive and responsive to the needs of artists and creators and saw in the arts council a means to achieve this end (encouraging the compromise between the inspired and the civic worlds). In sum, these journalists endorsed the compromise as it was presented to them: none of the principles put forward in the policy was questioned.

4.4.2 Some apprehension

Although the policy was generally well received by journalists and members of the cultural milieu, the creation of the new arts council, albeit desired, also aroused some concerns. Paule des Rivières reported that representatives of the cultural sector wondered what kind of arts council would be set up. For instance, Pierre Brousseau, director of the *Conseil québécois du théâtre* wondered about how the money would be redistributed and whether the overall support to artists would really increase. Roland Arpin and Serge Turgeon, who was president of the *Union des artistes* (UDA) and also a member of the Advisory Committee chaired by Arpin, hoped that the 'arms' length' would 'be shorter' in Québec than in Canada. For them, to be able to pursue the government's major objectives in cultural policy matters, the minister needed to maintain some influence over the arts council. Lise Bissonnette shared the same concerns: the creation of the arts council was maybe good news, but she warned against the fact that its financing might be more difficult to maintain as this organism would have less influence on the government — such had been the case of the Canada Council for the Arts, she maintained. Finally, both Bissonnette and Gruda argued that the arm's length formula could not guarantee complete absence of political interference (Bissonnette 1992; Gruda 1992) and the latter also wondered if this new organism would 'treat artists with more care and respect than civil servants (*fonctionnaires*) of the ministry [of Cultural Affairs] d[id]'[265] (Gruda 1992, our translation).

Besides the newspaper articles, few cultural magazine articles discussing the policy were published between 1992 and 1993. Again, these were not so much critical but apprehensive towards Frulla-Hébert's document, and on very specific aspects of the policy. These opinions emanated from people working in a particular area of the cultural field and expressed the fear that their sector would not be adequately supported. For instance,

[265] '*Rien ne garantit encore que le futur conseil traitera les artistes avec plus de délicatesse et de respect que ne le font aujourd'hui les fonctionnaires.*'

literature professor and editor of the magazine *Québec français*, Roger Chamberland, declared attractive the idea of restructuring the MACQ, but he nonetheless pondered on the possible consequences of the decentralisation of cultural responsibilities. Could the transfer of the government's responsibilities to municipalities, schools and regions be detrimental to the Quebecois literature? Could the national literature suffer from the fact that its promotion would, from then on, mainly rest on the expertise and accountability of individuals not always prone to promote Quebecois literary works? These were Chamberland's worries (Chamberland 1992, p. 7). For his part, writer, librarian and editor Daniel Sernine deplored the little amount of attention given to 'the question of reading' in the policy: '[i]n total, the words *book* and *reading* do not appear more than ten times in this publication'[266] he bemoaned before adding '[w]e will have to see, concretely, what the new Ministry for Culture and the new Arts Council that has been announced will do'[267] (Sernine 1992, p. 2, our translation). A year later, writer, editor and literature professor André Vanasse also added his voice to express some reservation towards the new arts council:

> *In itself [the Québec Arts and Letters Council] is not a bad idea. I would even say that I applaud to this initiative, but the question I ask myself […] is the following: "Will the Québec Arts and Letters Council be as inefficient as is the present department for Cultural Affairs?"*[268]
>
> (Vanasse 1993, p. 3, our translation)

Finally, it was the turn of the film and video makers to express their concerns: a hundred and fifty of them wrote a letter to the minister, which was published in the magazine *24 images*. Briefly, these cultural professionals pleaded for the support of independent cinema

[266] '*Au total, les mots* livre *et* lecture *ne reviennent pas dix fois dans cette publication*.'
[267] '*Il nous restera à voir, concrètement, ce que feront ce nouveau ministère de la Culture et ce nouveau conseil des Arts qu'on nous annonce*.'
[268] '*En soi, [le Conseil des arts et des lettres] n'est pas une mauvais idée. Je dirais même que j'applaudis à cette initiative, mais la question que je me pose et à laquelle j'aurais souhaité avoir une réponse Claire est la suivante: « le Conseil des arts et des lettres du Québec sera-t-il aussi inefficace que l'actuel ministère des affaires culturelles? »*'

through direct subsidies to filmmakers instead of producers or artist-run centres. They deplored that the imperatives of profitability and budget balancing of the *Société générale des industries culturelles* (SOGIC) responsible for supporting the film industry had the effect of reducing or eliminating the 'artistic productions' in the movie sector to the benefit of commercial films. They thus demanded support from the Québec Arts and Letters Council that, so far, had no subsidy program designed to support independent filmmakers (1993).

As Saint-Pierre has shown, in the end, the first beneficiaries of the policy (and of the budget increase in this sector) were artists, closely followed by municipalities (Saint-Pierre 2003, pp. 250-57). Nevertheless, at the moment of the policy's release the most important concern was that the new arts council might not serve the interest of artists as well as it was expected and hoped. On the other hand, no one really questioned the wisdom or the legitimacy of the principles and objectives established in the policy document or the means to achieve them. More striking is the absence of critiques on the planned devolution of cultural responsibilities: the fact that the release of the policy statement was accompanied by the announcement of an additional fifty-seven million dollars for culture, and by the transformation of the MACQ into a Department for Culture seemed to have neutralised all critiques in these regards. Besides, at the moment of the cultural policy's release, the minister also announced that sector-based policies would be elaborated in the near future; some of these comments certainly served as a reminder of their expectations which, they hoped, would be taken into consideration in the next phase. In sum, even though journalists and representatives of the cultural sector remained generally circumspect and prudent, the policy was, overall, well received. In fact, very few critical comments on the cultural policy can be found, and they will be the focus of the next section.

4.4.3 Critiques from the industrial world

Even if we have said that Anglophone editorialist Joan Fraser found positive aspects to the policy, she was nonetheless the most critical: 'this policy suffers from some of the flaws that ruined the Arpin report, she argued, [f]or starters it is written in the same windy, pompous jargon and with the same bureaucratic perspective' (Fraser 1992). The editorialist, for whom the question of 'support for creators and or the arts' was the most important, then deplored the fact that the government intended to subsidise arts organisations instead of artists themselves. As she put it: 'One suspects that it would be more useful to give the money straight to the photographers than to pay for a union secretary' (*Idem*, emphasis added). Fraser also denounced the 'stunning silence about relations with the federal government' (*Idem*). According to her, the negation of the problems of coordination with the other level of government could only result in the squandering of public money: '[Frulla-Hébert] had […] the opportunity to propose ways to use scarce taxpayers' dollars effectively by working co-operatively' (*Idem*, emphasis added), she argued. For Jocelyne Richer of *Le Devoir*, too, the policy lacked clarity. For instance she underlined the fact that the policy did not clearly indicate how the government intended to compensate artists for the use of their work and 'this question, like many others, she wrote, remains without an answer'[269] (Richer 1992, our translation). Moreover, although she mentioned the fact that the policy was accompanied by an action plan, she dismissed it as it was 'impossible to evaluate the importance of the diverse measures announced, most of them remaining quite vague and being presented without any precise time frame or budget'[270] (*Idem*, our translation). As we have seen, as Boltanski and Thévenot explain, 'a

[269] '*Cette question, comme bien d'autres demeure sans réponse, le document de 150 pages ne révélant pas toujours clairement les changements concrets qui résulteront des mesures annoncées.*'

[270] '*Intitulée* Notre culture, notre avenir*, la politique culturelle est accompagnée d'un plan d'action qui touche de près ou de loin plusieurs ministères du gouvernement. Il est cependant impossible de mesurer l'importance des diverses mesures annoncées. La plupart demeurant très vagues et étant présentées sans échéancier précis, ni budget.*'

common expression' of the critiques stemming from the industrial world and addressed to the civic world 'consists in underlying the inefficiency of administrative procedures' (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 271), and this is precisely what Fraser and Richer did in their respective articles. By doing so they also sought to make prominent the principle of efficiency. Having said that, their opinion did not seem to be shared by a vast number of commentators and their overall position towards the policy was rather positive.

4.4.4 Critiques from the civic world

One year after the release of the policy, Roland Arpin published an article in the French journal *Revue française d'administration publique*. In this paper, Arpin explained his idea of what a cultural policy ought to be and briefly summarised the long process leading to the adoption of the 1992 policy. He thus retraced Québec' previous attempts in this matter but also described the one year consultation process that preceded the 1992 policy statement. Arpin then presented the policy itself in a rather factual fashion. Nevertheless, he expressed his opinion on two specific aspects. The first one was a positive comment he made on the scope of the governmental action in cultural matter:

> *[t]he most original aspect [of the policy] and one that is promising is constituted by the numerous measures that involve other ministries […]. There is here an obvious effort to break culture out from the administrative isolation in which it has often been placed within the government.*[271]
>
> (Arpin 1993, p. 46, our translation)

But despite the fact that Arpin generally adopted a favourable tone towards the policy statement, he expressed some reservations on the policy's position towards the 'audiences':

[271] '*Mais l'aspect le plus original et porteur d'avenir est constitué par les nombreuses mesures culturelles qui impliquent d'autres ministères […]. Il y a ici un effort manifeste pour sortir la culture de l'isolement administrative dans lequel elle a souvent été tenue au sein du gouvernement.* '

> *The cultural policy appears quite timid towards audiences* (les publics)*. This almost results in the absence of their recognition. On the one hand, audiences are treated like* ***consumers*** *or* ***buyers of cultural goods and services****, on the other hand, they are treated like* ***amateurs*** *practicing a cultural hobby. This aspect* [the democratisation of culture] *only fills a few pages since it is deeply inscribed in the convictions of the writers* [of the policy] *that, in cultural matters, we first need to carry out a* ***policy of offer****.*[272]
>
> (*Idem*, p. 47, our translation, emphasis added)

In other words, Arpin expressed uneasiness with the presence of the market logic in a governmental cultural policy. In Arpin's view, citizens must not be treated like mere consumers or buyers transacting in a cultural market; access to culture should not depend on the financial means of individuals and neither should it remain the privilege of a few 'initiates'. '[T]he question that emerges is, asked Arpin, if culture is *a private good or a public good*'[273] (*Ibid*, p. 48, emphasis in the original, our translation). In other words, Arpin argues that leaving culture to the private sector entails that the state abandons its responsibilities, as it does not properly defend the common good that is culture. Therefore, according to Arpin, a cultural policy should not lose sight of a fundamental objective that only a state can achieve: the democratisation of culture or the fair distribution of cultural resources amongst the citizens. A cultural policy should also aim at increasing the 'cultural level of the citizens' by helping them seek excellence in the arts. However, Arpin's criticism was an isolated voice, and despite the few criticisms he made, he did not question the whole policy.

Besides, Lise Bissonnette perceived things differently: she rather deplored the absence of the private's sector involvement that she would have expected to be more

[272] '*En revanche, la politique culturelle apparaît bien timide à l'endroit des publics. Cela se traduit presque par l'absence de leur prise en compte. D'une part, les publics sont considérés comme des consommateurs ou des acheteurs de biens et de services culturels, d'autre part, comme des amateurs pratiquant un* hobby *culturel. Cet aspect fait à peine l'objet de quelques pages tant il est profondément inscrit dans les convictions des rédacteurs qu'en matière culturelle, il faille pratiquer d'abord une politique de l'offre.*'

[273] '*émerge la question de savoir si la culture est un bien privé ou un bien public.*'

significant: '[the reflection over the partial privatisation of the arts] is an exercise that we will need to make again for it is unthinkable to ignore the engagement of the private sector whilst Québec still has catching up to do' (Bissonnette 1992, our translation). Thus, for Bissonnette the involvement of the private sector was a matter of collective responsibility: the private sector had to share the financial burden of the province's cultural development just like the state or the individuals did. It was, above all, a matter of equity rather than the expression of a desire to let the market law shape the cultural sector.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have seen that the 1980 economic crisis led to a reorientation of the public intervention in cultural matters. Not only did successive governments seek to improve the efficiency of the state's action in this domain, but they expressed a will to involve or reinforce the contribution of new partners to cultural development: the municipalities and the private sector (which included businesses, foundations, and individuals or cultural consumers). The federal government of Canada wholeheartedly embraced this new attitude: indeed two reports published at close interval proposed significant changes to the Canadian cultural policy approach. The *Applebaum-Hébert Report* (1982) constituted the statement of principles on which the authors of the *Bovey Report* based themselves to elaborate a series of concrete measures for alleviating the state's burden in arts funding. We also observed that the decentralisation and privatisation of the intervention in the cultural domain constituted a strong tendency that expressed itself in several other countries. For its part, Québec took some years before following suit. But, at the beginning of the 1990s, two reports were published confirming the Quebecois government's desire to engage itself in the same direction: the *Coupet Report* (1990) and the *Arpin Report* (1991). Besides, Québec also distanced itself from the French model by proposing the creation of an autonomous Arts and Letters Council that would follow the

British and Canadian 'traditions'. The failure of the sovereignty project and the constitutional impasse that put Québec at a disadvantage was accompanied by the gradual abandonment of the claims of Quebecois who hoped to see the distinct character of their culture recognised. Although the Minister of Cultural Affairs Liza Frulla-Hébert had promised to recover some powers in the cultural field from the federal government, the cultural policy she submitted in 1992, in fact, only barely touched upon the question of the redistribution of powers in cultural matters and it also put aside the claims for the recognition of the Quebecois specificity.

Despite an important change of orientation, the official cultural policy of Québec received a good reception. Indeed, vast public consultations enabled the government to identify all contentious issues so as to find ways to neutralise them. Having said that, the analysis of the policy's content by using the theoretical model developed by Boltanski and Thévenot enabled us to understand further some of the elements that certainly contributed to its success. The main one was the recognition and the enhancement of the role of artists and creators in the cultural policy (inspired world). The other one was the defence of the right to culture for all citizens regardless of their ethnic origin (civic world). But such pre-eminence of the civic logic was achieved at the expense of the domestic world: even if the cultural policy proposed various measures to encourage the diffusion of cultural products in French, it abandoned the fight for the recognition of the French Quebecois' cultural specificity, and presented a policy designed to enhance the cultural expressions of the diverse groups forming the Quebecois society. We have further observed that the compromise the policy put forward also involved the market world. Interestingly, the presence of a market discourse did not arouse much reaction, although the cultural sector was initially not well disposed towards the idea of privatising the financing of the arts. In fact, even if the authors of the cultural policy took on board the ideas put forward in the *Bovey Report* or the *Coupet Report*, which upset the members of

the cultural sector, it did so in a way that was less obvious by strongly insisting on two other principles: the freedom of creation and access to culture. As a result, the government's reorientation seemed less radical. Moreover, despite the fact that the provincial state intended to incite the private sector into playing a greater role, the injection of new public funds into the sector of culture neutralised the apprehensions of the cultural stakeholders who feared a withdrawal by the State. Finally, another factor of success was the refusal to define too precisely the common good on which the compromise was built. In effect, the absence of a clear definition of culture enabled it to avoid accusations of discrimination towards certain groups (the policy did not only support the French culture) or accusations of neglecting other cultural dimensions of the society that were not related to arts strictly speaking (such as education or the collective identity). In other words, the policy offered the possibility for everyone to interpret culture in their own way and to find in the policy document satisfying answers to their preoccupations.

5 SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION

This thesis stemmed from the general observation that the rationale for cultural policy is constantly changing as if the state intervention in cultural matters were difficult to legitimate. Despite the fact that this situation is not specific to one particular nation or country, we have decided to focus on the case of Québec. The first and the most obvious reason for looking more specifically at Québec, is that we were, from the beginning, more familiar with its reality; and the second one is that the long and difficult process leading to the adoption of Québec's official cultural policy illustrates particularly well this legitimacy problem. The aim of this thesis was thus to answer two core questions: 1) how did the Quebecois state justify its intervention in the cultural field and 2) how and why have these justifications evolved.

Before attempting to understand the reasons behind such exploration of the soundness of a state intervention in cultural matters, we wanted to, first, discuss the justifications put forward by the government at different moments in Québec's history. We have thus chosen to examine policy proposals that were presented in different periods of time and which clearly mirrored the changing tendencies in cultural policy. To better understand the arguments put forward in these policy statements we have undertaken a work of contextualisation and recounted the origin and the evolution of their most important ideas. Then, using Boltanski and Thévenot's model the *Economies of Worth* (EW model), we have brought to light the very rationales for state intervention, as well as the arguments proposed by the policies' detractors which have affected the evolution of Québec's cultural policy.

In spite of the fact that our thesis goes beyond the content analysis of policy statements, the use of the EW model in cultural policy analysis nonetheless constitutes a

fundamental and original feature of our research. In this conclusion we will thus assess the heuristic value of the model before reflecting on future research perspectives.

5.1 Analysing cultural policies with a new theoretical model, the Economies of Worth

Before looking into the usefulness of the interpretive device the *Economies of Worth* in our study, let us briefly recall its main features.

In Boltanski and Thévenot's own words, the EW model was originally conceived to 'analyze the critical operations that people carry out when they want to show their disagreement without resorting to violence, and the ways they construct, display, and reach more or less lasting agreements' (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 25). One of the main postulates advanced by Boltanski and Thévenot is that the process of justification entails a capability to refer to some shared conventions or principles to make their claim acceptable to others. The authors have identified six superior common principles to which people commonly refer in situation of dispute. Even though the reference to such principles may sometimes remain implicit, it is indeed essential for the distribution of worth among people and for the establishment of rules or, as Boltanski and Thévenot's would say, of 'testing devices'. Now from these six principles, Boltanski and Thévenot have conceived six 'common worlds' which all follow a different logic: the 'inspired world'; the 'domestic world'; the 'world of fame'; the 'civic world'; the 'market world'; the 'industrial world'. As we have seen, the architecture of these worlds responds to the constraints or 'axioms' of what Boltanski and Thévenot call the *cités*. The two fundamental 'axioms' of the *cités* consist in 1) recognising the common humanity of people and 2) enabling them to reach different statuses (to become more or less worthy) by making (or not making) some sacrifices, sacrifices that have to be made in the name of a common good.

After having thus identified the fundamental principles that rule the modern and democratic societies, the authors have conceptualised different cases where these worlds enter into tension. In effect, according to them '[o]ne can demonstrate empirically that most of what are today ordinary criticisms are made possible by connecting two (or more) of the different worlds' (Boltanski and Thévenot 1999, p. 373). Boltanski and Thévenot have then observed that the encounter of two worlds gives rise to two kinds of criticisms: 'contentions' and 'clashes'. In a situation of 'contention', people criticise the laxity or the confusion over the evaluation criteria in use in a given context. These criticisms call for a strengthening of the rules: the test has to be purified and the reference to the principle of justice on which all had agreed before needs to be reasserted. In a 'clash', which is a deeper form of disagreement, the very 'rules of the game' are disputed: here, people contest the pertinence of referring to one specific principle of justice (or world) and ask that the test be redesigned according to another principle of justice. Although the ways to regain peace vary according to the level of discord, in both these cases, the outcome of the conflict resides in finding an agreement over one, and only one, principle of justice, whether this principle is reinforced or conversely chosen to replace another one. But Boltanski and Thévenot have also identified another way of 'reaching an agreement': the 'compromise'. As we have seen, the compromise involves more than one principle of equivalence. But because the common good defended by the compromise is not 'constitutive' of a polity, it remains a fragile form of agreement that is particularly vulnerable to criticisms. This form of agreement interested us more specifically in this thesis. We indeed hypothesised that the dynamics of the compromise — i.e. the ways it makes different principles coexist, the ways it can be reinforced or criticised — could help us understand the difficulty in legitimating the state's action in the field of culture. Although the idea of compromise was not initially conceptualised by Boltanski and Thévenot specifically to analyse policy statements, we nonetheless have endeavoured to test its relevance to our object of study. To our

knowledge the concept of compromise, as elaborated within the *Economy of Worth* model, has not been extensively explored in any other cultural studies.[274] We thus approached the model from an original angle and applied it to a novel area. We will now offer a reflection on the model's actual contribution to our understanding of Québec's cultural policy, with a view of outlining the benefits of its application to cultural policy research.

5.1.1 Different compromises

The use of the model first enabled us to observe that the 1959 manifesto, the 1978 white paper, and the 1992 cultural policy invoked more than one 'principle of justice' (or 'principle of equivalence'), as defined by Boltanski and Thévenot. We have also seen that these statements did not express consistent principles, but rather each of them put forward a new compromise. More precisely, the 1959 manifesto which was written by the first Minister for Cultural Affairs Georges-Émile Lapalme, articulated a compromise invoking mainly the principles belonging to the domestic world (traditions), the world of fame (reputation) as well as the civic world (collective will). As we have seen, a certain line of thought stemming from the 19th century maintained that the French spirit or French genius could act as a shield against English assimilation and more globally as a protection against cultural degeneration. We have shown that Lapalme was strongly influenced by two intellectuals who embodied this outlook particularly well and, despite the fact that he was depicted as a progressive-minded politician who sought to break away with the traditionalist approach of the Duplessis government in many areas, his cultural policy was entirely dedicated to the preservation of French traditions. The domestic world thus

[274] Thévenot, Boltanski and Chiapello sometimes refer to the concept of compromise, but none of them use it as a structuring element for their analysis or explore further its peculiar dynamics (such is the case of Laurent Thévenot and Michael Moody, 'Comparing Models of Strategy, Interests and the Public Good in French and American Environmental Disputes', in Michèle Lamont and Laurent Thévenot (eds.), *Rethinking Comparative Cultural Sociology: Repertoires of Evaluation in France and the United States* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press; Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme 2000), 273-306.); Chiapello, *Artistes Versus Managers*.; or Boltanski and Chiapello, *The New Spirit of Capitalism*. Similarly, Daigle and Rouleau have studied the 'compromise nature' of strategic plans, but they have not pushed further the comprehension of the concept of compromise itself by seeking to understand its fragility (see Daigle and Rouleau, 'Strategic Plans in Arts Organizations: A Compromising Tool between Artistic and Managerial Values', (.

manifested itself through the desire to revive the 'French spirit' inherited from the settlers and preserved by a certain elite. We have also seen that the survival of this nation was perceived as being closely linked to questions of prestige, which of course, respond to the logic of the world of fame. In effect, the cultural policy proposal aimed at increasing the international influence of French Canadians by reinforcing cultural relations with francophone countries and regions, but also by reaching the cultural standards (standards that were notably borrowed from the French society) that would make the nation shine. Lapalme's cultural policy thus sought to increase French Canada's image and reputation. The presence of the civic world, for its part, manifested itself through the very creation of a Department for Cultural Affairs (as well as the French Language Bureau and the Extra-Territorial French Canada Branch) which would protect the French legacy for the benefit of all citizens. This governmental initiative asserted the state's new role in cultural matters.

The 1978 white paper commissioned by State Minister for Cultural Development Camille Laurin put forward principles respectively pertaining to the industrial, the inspired and the civic worlds. The fact that this policy statement displayed a different combination of principles reflected the appearance of new social preoccupations. The emergence of the industrial world in the white paper notably corresponded to the rise of modernity in Québec. The question of efficiency in cultural matters became predominant in the white paper which, as we have seen, proposed to improve the cultural system by making more effective the production line and the distribution of cultural products (by establishing higher quality standards, for example, or by encouraging the professionalisation of artist). And despite the fact that the white paper entertained some ambivalence towards the industrial logic, which was also feared for its destructive effects on society, it was nonetheless seen as the way of the future. The white paper also put forth the inspired world, but the presence of this world did not translate into greater recognition for the artists' contribution to society; rather, it indicated a desire to reinvent the Quebecois

society. The white paper was indeed released on the eve of Québec's first referendum on sovereignty and was driven by a desire to help Francophones define themselves qua 'distinct' and 'emancipated' people. The white paper indeed sought to initiate a cultural movement that aimed at giving citizens, particularly Francophones, the possibility to participate in redefining their collective identity and to rethink their 'ways of life', widely speaking. Cultural creativity was thus the prerogative of all. Moreover, by calling for general citizen participation, the 1978 white paper pushed further the logic of the civic world that, so far, only concerned the state's involvement in supporting culture; from then on, all citizens had the right and the obligation to participate in the collective culture. Finally, the fading out of the domestic world clearly indicated that Québec was breaking with the past, and rejecting some of its traditions. Despite the fact that we could find few traces remaining of the domestic world, the policy was nonetheless conceived to enhance the culture of one particular group 'with common ancestors': the Quebecois of French origin.

Frulla-Hébert's 1992 cultural policy, for its part, predominantly involved the market, the inspired and the civic worlds. This policy statement also inscribed itself in the trends of its time, which was marked by the hegemony of the neo-liberal ideology. The cultural policy thus gave much importance to the market world. As we have seen, the 1980 world economic crisis forced many states to reassess their finances and, in order to attenuate the effects of cuts in the field of culture, governments suggested various measures that aimed at increasing the contribution of the private sector through sponsorship and donations. In Québec, the resistance of cultural workers was such that the government, whilst taking a clear 'neo-liberal turn' by encouraging private initiatives as well as the managerialisation of cultural organisations, nonetheless increased its overall cultural budget. Advocacy coalitions which put pressure on the government indeed succeeded in obtaining a budget increase for culture. The formation of those coalitions also contributed to place artists and cultural workers at the centre of the cultural policy. As a result, the 'inspired logic' gained

greater recognition from the government. In effect, the 1992 cultural policy granted artists a recognition never before obtained by involving them in the definition of criteria for funding allocation. It also took into account the artists' need for independence by creating an arts council, based on the arm's length principle, meant to limit the state interference in cultural funding decisions. Besides, we have also seen that the government of Québec was never able to obtain the recognition of the cultural specificity of the Francophones in the Canadian Constitution. During the 1980 decade, the multiculturalism ideology indeed took precedence over all other considerations and Francophones found themselves treated like any other ethnic minority in Canada. One of the consequences of multiculturalism was that the discussion over the Quebecois collective identity in cultural policy discourse went from the original assertion of a common French heritage that needed to be protected, revived or reinvented to the assertion of a Quebecois cultural specificity loosely based on the idea of 'creativity'. Also, by refusing to insist on the idea of a French specificity, the 1992 policy put aside the domestic logic to the benefit of the civic one: from then on, every citizen, independently of his/her ethnic origin, was entitled to contribute to the expression of the Quebecois' original identity. Below is a table of the three main worlds present in each policy statements:

Table 5.1 - Main worlds present in each policy statements

POLICY STATEMENT	WORLDS COMPOSING THE 'COMPROMISE'		
1959 manifesto	Domestic	Fame (or Renown)	Civic
1978 white paper	Industrial	Inspired	Civic
1992 cultural policy	Market	Inspired	Civic

As the table shows, the three policy statements under study all presented a different 'compromise' between elements from different worlds, therefore rather attesting to the

diversity of intents, values and perspectives that can be buried within a cultural policy. The only consistent feature is the presence of the civic world that gained importance over the years in Québec's cultural policy. In the 1960s, the civic logic mainly translated in granting the state — the very institution that is supposed to represent the voice of all the citizens — greater responsibilities in cultural matters. From that moment onward, the state had the duty to preserve French traditions for the benefit of all. Then in the 1970s, the government went further by defending the citizens' right for cultural participation: citizens were called to play an active role in defining their culture and collective identity. But despite its intention to thus reinforce the democratic process, the government nonetheless favoured the emancipation of the Quebecois of French origin, which contradicted the principle of equality between all citizens proper to the civic world. The 1992 policy statement sought to correct the situation, or lessen this injustice, by valuing the contribution of all ethnic groups to Québec's cultural life. The Quebecois state thus made a point of honour to treat its citizens non-discriminatorily.

We have also seen that the presence of other worlds in the policy statements was largely tributary of the historico-political and economical context of the time. The mere observation of the presence of a 'world' did not enable us to answer the question 'in the name of what is this world invoked?'. Without a comprehension of the specific context and ideologies that favoured their emergence, the very purpose behind their use remained unclear. A return to the context and to the ideas that circulated during this period thus enabled us to understand why some principles were prominent at a given time. For instance, we know that the idea of French *survivance* had been circulating since the end of the 19th century-beginning of the 20th and entailed a concern for the preservation of traditions inherited from the settlers. By itself this concept testified to the predominance of the domestic world in the French Canadian general thinking, and this up until the 1960s. Also, the reference to the broader context was not only useful in explaining the emergence

or predominance of some worlds, but it enabled us to better understand the originality of the Quebecois cultural policy. Finally, although we found many traces of the inspired world in the 1978 white paper and in the 1992 official policy, its presence expressed itself very differently in each statement. In the first case, the policy designers sought to entrust the whole population with the virtues of inspiration in order to transform the whole civil society. In the second case, these virtues were seen as the prerogative of artists who had to be supported so that they could fully exploit their creative capacities (and not be obliged to earn their living by doing something that could hinder the inspirational process). These examples show that we could have two policy statements displaying the same worlds but designed to achieve very different objectives. The work of contextualisation was thus essential as it significantly enriched the analysis made with the EW model and deepened our understanding of the policies' purposes.

5.1.2 Reinforcing the compromise

As seen in our first chapter, Boltanski and Thévenot have observed that a compromise can be reinforced by means of 'composite objects'. These are made of 'elements stemming from different worlds' but are endowed with 'their own identity' (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 278). In this thesis, we have come across the notions of 'cultural rights', 'cultural development' or 'cultural economy', notably, which are all examples of 'composite objects'. As part of our analysis, the identification of 'composite objects' was useful as they signalled the emergence of new compromises. We have seen that the expression 'cultural rights' (1960-70s) announced the reinforcement of the civic logic in cultural matters; the idea of 'cultural development' (1970-80s) for its part signalled the emergence of the industrial logic in cultural policy; and finally, the notion of 'cultural economy' (or even 'cultural consumers') (1980-90s) revealed the appearance of the market world. A Department for Culture, an Arts Council or even an official cultural policy also constitute 'composite

objects' (they are the tangible expressions of a compromise of principles) and their existence endows the compromise of principles with greater stability and permanence. The fact that they possess a legal status contributes to reinforcing the compromise (and by the same token the status quo) since it is obviously more difficult to put an end to their existence. However, the permanence of the 'agreement' is never guaranteed. In effect, a cultural policy can cease to be followed and state agencies can be abolished or, at least, deprived of financial means to such an extent that they become useless; the compromise thus no longer holds. Besides, we have seen in the second chapter that the Prime Minister Jean Lesage, who did not support Lapalme's vision, used such a strategy to restrain the actions of the *Ministère des Affaires culturelles* (MACQ). Our research showed that if composite objects are used as means to reinforce a compromise they cannot guarantee its permanence either.

5.1.3 Policy proposals vulnerable to criticism

To better understand the dynamic of the 'compromise' we have also undertaken the analysis of critiques made against the three policy proposals under study. Interestingly, the critiques made in 1960, in 1978 and in 1992 all stemmed from the same worlds although some became progressively less visible. The critiques recurrently came from three worlds: the **civic** world; the **inspired** world; and the **industrial** world. Let us briefly recall what those critiques consisted of before assessing their impact on cultural policy making.

The critiques stemming from the civic world in the early 1960s mainly came from journalists who thought the procedures for appointments made by the minister at the Arts council were arbitrary. To guarantee the representativeness of candidates they demanded that appointments be made according to well-established criteria and rules. Their critiques reflected a desire to see the civic world prevail over the domestic one (representativity vs. arbitrariness and clientelism). In 1978, the civic critique again surfaced: the white paper

was deemed too authoritarian and intrusive in the private life of citizens and some also denounced the preferential treatment granted to the French majority in Québec. Again, these critiques targeted the domestic world and aimed at reinforcing the civic logic (freedom and equality of citizens vs. paternalism and discrimination). In 1992, Roland Arpin expressed his fear of the market logic penetrating Québec's cultural policy. He argued that, by targeting 'cultural consumers' more specifically, the policy was losing sight of the cultural democratisation project, which sought to give access to culture to all, regardless of their financial means. He thus deplored the weakening of the civic logic to the benefit of the market one (democratisation vs. profitability).

As for the critiques stemming from the inspired world, they mainly came, in the 1960s, from the Prime Minister: Jean Lesage preferred the arm's length model to Lapalme's more interventionist approach, as he believed culture should not be created or directed by the government. State intervention could be detrimental to the 'sacred dialogue' between God and artists, he maintained. For Lesage, Québec's cultural policy needed to better acknowledge the particular conditions necessary to the 'outpouring of inspiration' (artists' independence vs. state interference). In 1978, the literary man François Ricard published a vigorous critique of the white paper in which he denounced the fact that the creativity of artists was stifled by a collective imperative that did not recognise the singularity of creators, and accused the white paper of seeking to instrumentalise the arts. The civic and the industrial logics were thus seen as incompatible with the inspired one (self-expression vs. indoctrination and intrumentalisation). In 1992, however, the mobilisation of artists who advocated the creation of an arts council and more consideration for their contribution to society finally bore fruit: the 1992 policy gave artists greater importance and the critiques from the inspired world were eventually completely silenced.

Finally, critiques stemming from the industrial world have been addressed to all three proposals but they significantly weakened in 1992. In fact, as we have seen,

Lapalme's policy proposal was not discussed on the basis of a policy document but on the basis of the minister's declarations to the press, and the question of the efficiency of the policy only appeared months after the creation of the MACQ. These critiques notably underlined the administrative slowness of the MACQ as well as the lack of a clear orientation (efficiency vs. excessive bureaucratisation). In 1978, the critiques that we have analysed directly targeted the content of Laurin's policy statement, and the most common ones concerned its lack of concrete, practical or adequate solutions to reach its ends. In effect, the policy proposal that embraced many sectors (language, arts, housing, leisure, health, work, communication, etc.) left people sceptical over its capacity to accomplish its objectives and over its real impact (realism vs. utopia). In 1992, the critiques emerging from the industrial world became more specific and only concerned some aspects of Frulla-Hébert's policy (e.g. the way funds were distributed or the methods of compensation for the use of artistic works), but most journalists in fact recognised the efficiency of the minister who had been able, in a short period of time, to submit to the National Assembly the long-expected official cultural policy.

In sum, even though the three policy proposals presented a different 'compromise', the critiques they raised emerged from the same worlds: the civic, the inspired and the industrial ones. The 1992 policy answered most of them by giving these worlds more importance, particularly the civic and the inspired ones, and, as a result, these critiques weakened or were even silenced altogether. The appearance or the domination of some worlds over others in cultural policy statements is thus partly attributable to the existence of these critiques, and the policy makers' desire to respond to them and address the issue they raised, although the acknowledgement of the context in which they were formulated is also essential to understanding the appearance of a world, or of its (re)positioning in the scale of priorities. Besides, the analysis of the media articles commenting on the three policy proposals confirms that the aim of a critique is often to reinforce the presence of one

particular world over others (such was the case of the civic logic that critiques have constantly sought to strengthen), or to force the recognition of a principle that so far had not been taken into adequate consideration (such was the case when Lesage put forward the necessity to give more weight to the inspired logic). To understand the evolution of Québec's cultural policy, it thus is necessary to take into consideration the critiques that the different governmental proposals aroused, and the reactions they engendered.

5.1.4 In the name of culture

Finally, the EW model particularly enlightened our understanding of the role of the 'common good' in justifying the setting up of a compromise. As we have seen, all three policy statements sought to defend a form of common good, i.e. 'culture', but the 'culture' that was defended in the 1959 manifesto was different from the 1978 white paper. Moreover, the conception of culture that each of these policy proposals defended was also the subject of dispute. For Lapalme the only culture worth being supported by the provincial state was the one that stressed the nation's French origin, however — over time — more and more French Canadians, including the Prime Minister Lesage, sought to take some distance from the French model to assert their own cultural specificity. The 1978 white paper, for its part, provoked many reactions: its all-encompassing definition of culture aroused much dissatisfaction on the grounds that its conception of culture was too vague; for others it aroused suspicion and distrust for it was seen as a means for the government to control too many areas of social life. It was also criticised for privileging the culture of Francophones to the detriment of the cultural expression of other communities. Some even rejected the folklorist conception of culture that the white paper implicitly conveyed. For their part, the designers of the 1992 cultural policy avoided being trapped in such controversy by refusing to give any definition of 'culture', leaving thus more room for the readers' interpretation. Indeed, one of Boltanski and Thévenot's premises is that a

'compromise can be worked out more easily when it can be made to accommodate beings or qualities that are *ambiguous* in the sense that they may derive, depending on the way they are understood, from more than one world' (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 279-80, emphasis in the original). Similarly, the 1992 policy simultaneously played with two conceptions of culture: in effect, the policy's scope implicitly suggested that the government's notion of culture was essentially focussing on a particular area of social and economic activity: the arts sector (inspired world). However, the fact that the policy also addressed the question of national identity opened up the possibility to associate 'culture' with another world, the domestic one, in which the transmission of traditions and ways of life is important. So even though Québec's cultural policy mainly elaborated measures designed to support the arts sector, it also gave questions of identity some importance.

The concept of 'compromise' such as Boltanski and Thévenot define it has thus proved useful for our analysis, as it has enabled us to better understand and explain the complexity of policy proposals which, as we have seen, refer to more than one 'principles of justice'. We have also seen that the coexistence of different principles in cultural policy statements was particularly hard to achieve as they involve worlds that follow different logics and that are not always compatible. The coexistence of the civic world with the domestic world one is particularly problematic in cultural policy statements, and the case of Québec's cultural policy is revealing in this regard. We have indeed observed that the ideal of equity of all citizens stood in direct contradiction with the protection of the cultural features of one particular group of citizens, the Francophones. In fact, to be acceptable such 'special treatment' had to be justified by the necessity to protect this people for the sake of its survival, but such claim has also been denied by the Anglophone community, notably, which has, instead, positioned itself as victim of francophone domination. Our research has also showed that the coexistence of the inspired world with the civic or the industrial ones, (but also the market one, although few critiques raised this issue following

the release of the 1992 policy), was also difficult to achieve: throughout times, the creative autonomy of artists has always been perceived to be endangered by the necessity to conform to a doctrine, to norms or any other constraints. Besides, in accordance with the model, the analysis of the critiques expressed against the policy proposals has demonstrated that they either seek to introduce a new principle in the evaluation of the new proposed policy or that they intend to reinforce the presence of one particular principle. In that sense, critiques contribute to the redefinition of priorities in cultural policy matters and therefore to the formulation of new 'compromises'. It is significant that, to this day, the 1992 cultural policy, which raised for its part very few criticisms, remains a key reference point in cultural policy matters; in effect, no other cultural policy proposals have been formulated since. However, as we will see further in this chapter, the government is currently undergoing a consultation process to adjust its intervention to the new exigencies of the 2000's.

5.2 Limits of the *Economies of Worth*

5.2.1 Giving an account of the complexity of the social world

Our research showed that the six worlds identified by Boltanski and Thévenot were helpful in analysing the policy statements formulated in Québec between 1950 and 1992, although the way 'worlds' interact with each other vary over time, thus producing different results at different times. We have seen that the coexistence of the inspired and the civic worlds, for instance, gives rise to different 'compromises': the democratisation of culture aims at giving all citizens the possibility to be personally enriched by the aesthetic experience that works of great artists can generate, whilst 'cultural democracy' aims at giving citizens the possibility to explore their own their own capacities of self-expression through art. Besides, if artists are often at the centre of cultural policies, we must not forget that many other beings inhabit the inspired world (such as priests, children, women, gods, etc.), opening up

more possibilities of interaction with the other worlds. There are no definite patterns that allow one to anticipate the outcome of a given 'compromise'. There is more than one way in which Boltanski and Thévenot's worlds can be made to coexist; the compromise that a cultural policy proposes only constitutes one possibility amongst many others. By acknowledging the different possible ways to appraise the social world, the model seeks to render an account of the social world's complexity. However, restricting the analysis to the identification of some worlds would fail to illustrate this complexity: in fact, the complexity rather lies in the multiplicity of interactions that these worlds allow.

5.2.2 Generalising some observations

As we have seen, all six worlds appeared at least once in one or the other policy statement at the centre of this study: some being recurrently invoked, others appearing only occasionally. The length of time considered in this thesis did not enable us to establish to what extent these worlds possess permanence. As we have seen, the presence of some worlds, such as the domestic one, tends to fade over time, but its disappearance could be temporary. Only a study analysing the evolution of cultural policies over a longer period of time could enable us to confirm if some worlds become indeed permanently obsolete in cultural policy matters, and only a comparative study would enable us to confirm if a tendency is shared in more than one geo-political context. This question however was beyond the scope of our thesis which had for object a changing socio-political phenomenon and a limited span of time, but it would certainly be interesting to explore further this issue in future research.

5.2.3 Hidden dynamics

One of our goals in using the EW model was to better understand how a policy proposal reaches a high level of consensus. If the model partly enabled us to answer that question,

the little importance it gives to the participative process in policy making might eclipse another aspect that is key to gaining the support of the greatest number. In effect, we have seen that part of the success of the 1992 cultural policy lay in the fact that an important public consultation had taken place before the policy was submitted to the National Assembly. Contrary to previous policy proposals that stemmed from the very vision of individuals (Lapalme, Laurin and Dumont), the 1992 cultural policy sought to reconcile the demands of various stakeholders who had had the opportunity to voice their opinions before the official policy was released. Having had the possibility to make themselves heard and to deliberate, and participate in the reformulation of Québec's cultural policy, stakeholders' reasons to protest disappeared. It is then not surprising to observe no or little contestation following the launch of the policy. Moreover, the issue of French language, which was certainly the most likely to bring about the mobilisation of people, was solved with the adoption of Laurin's Bill 101 in the 1970s. The success of the 1992 policy was thus not only dependent on the setting-up of an acceptable compromise: the very process leading to the compromise was indeed as important as the compromise itself, but such process is not the object of a theorisation in the EW model.

We also know that Boltanski and Thévenot's model seeks to break with theories that reduce social relations to social force relations. To them, the configuration of the social world is not uniquely tributary to conflicts of interest between groups, classes, and individuals; it also responds to the rules of different legitimate orders (the polities) that hinge on a principle of justice and which transcend personal interests. This study is predicated on the hypothesis that if people could refer to a superior principle to coordinate their behaviour, cultural policies could be seen to do so too. Instead of being an expression of power exerted on the members of the civil society or as discourses hiding some other interests, we supposed that cultural policies were based on some commonly shared ideals. If the analysis through the model confirmed the fact that cultural policies in Québec do

invoke different principles of justice, we have also seen that the choice to give predominance to one or the other principle at a given time is also the result of pressures exerted by influential individuals or well-organised groups. The mobilisation of actors in the cultural sector over the years is a good example of this as they finally acquired substantial influence on the political agenda in the 1990s. In effect, although we did not cover the evolution of the artistic context in this thesis to avoid risks of digression, the 1980s and 90s were characterised by the increasing professionalisation of the cultural sphere, leading to the creation of many artistic professional associations whose mission was to defend the interests of artists towards government officials. These decades also saw the growing disengagement of artists to the nationalist cause (which was at its height in the 1970s) (G. Bellevance and Fournier 2002 [1992], p. 31) and this partly explains that the abandonment of the claims for cultural sovereignty from the government did not cause much opposition to the 1992 policy. The compromises proposed by the different policy statements are thus also the outcome of force relations that only become visible when undertaking a work of contextualisation and historicisation. Interestingly though, the fact that these compromises lean on some higher principles renders them acceptable for as long as no strong protest is made. In that sense, a compromise temporarily allows peace, but as soon as its relevance is questioned, it risks being challenged, and it is only after a 'period of public deliberation' that the compromise is replaced by a new one. To put it differently, the reference to higher principles does not eliminate the play of force relations but only suspends it temporarily by providing justifications that are deemed legitimate and acceptable in that particular time and place. Finally, it is important to add that the 'lifespan' of a compromise also depends on the evolution of relations of force on a global scale. In effect, social movements continuously change, fed by new ideologies that transform the social structures and 'redistribute' the power amongst the various political actors. All these plays of forces and

ideologies are not taken into account in the EW model but ignoring them can obviously reduce the comprehension of cultural policies.

Whilst it is important to acknowledge and address the limitations of the application of the EW model to the study of cultural policy development, the thesis aspires to demonstrates that what this model offers the cultural policy scholar outweighs the limitations (especially when integrated with a systematic process of contextualisation as done here). Whilst this thesis has shown what the EW model can offer to the historical reconstruction of post-war cultural policy in Québec, arguably, the model equally lends itself to helping with the interpretation of new and contemporary policy developments. Indeed, the next section briefly points out how the EW model might helpfully illuminate the most recent (and still on-going) phase in Quebecois cultural policy, and in so doing points to further possibilities for the development of the interpretive frame that has been elaborated in this thesis.

5.3 New developments and opportunities for future research

As we have seen, the 1992 cultural policy reached a level of consensus never before obtained but Québec's latest policy statements reveal the emergence of new values which could have the effect of cancelling the agreement reached in 1992. We will now briefly discuss Québec's most recent initiative in cultural policy matters and will reflect on the relevance of using the EW model to pursue the analysis in future research.

In 2010, the *Ministère de la Culture, des Communications et de la Condition féminine*[275] (MCCCQ) decided to 'spur a renewed vision of cultural development' (Québec 2010) by proposing a 'framework for taking action to build stronger ties between culture and the social, economic, and environmental dimensions of sustainable development' (*Idem*). Known as the *Agenda 21c* (A21c), this plan of action was largely inspired by an

[275] In December 2012, the *Ministère de la Culture, des Communications et de la Condition féminine* became the *Ministère de la Culture et des Communications* following the election of a pequist government.

international proposal bearing the same name, *Agenda 21 for culture*.[276] Formulated in 2004 by the United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) — an association defending the interests of local governments internationally — the *Agenda 21 for culture* is addressed to 'cities and local governments from all over the world' (UCLG 2008, p. 3). Following the footsteps of the UCLG, the European Commission also adopted its own Agenda for culture in 2007 (European-Commission 2012) spreading further some of the ideas put forward by the UCLG. Before looking at Québec's own version of an agenda 21 for culture, we will highlight some elements of the UCLG document.

5.3.1 UCLG's Agenda 21 for culture

Very briefly, the UCLG's document is a series of principles, undertakings and recommendations to which cities and local governments can adhere in order to assert their commitment to 'ensure that culture takes a key role in urban policies' (UCLG 2008, p. 4). According to the document, the sixty-seven articles that it comprises can be grouped under five themes: 1) culture and human rights; 2) culture and governance; 3) culture, sustainability and territory; 4) culture and social inclusion; and 5) culture and economy (*Ibid*, pp. 5-6). The *Agenda 21 for culture* essentially reaffirms the principles that have shaped most cultural policies in contemporary societies — such as that of access to culture, citizen participation in culture, protection of heritage, assertion of the cultural specificity of peoples, the economic importance of culture, etc. — whilst reasserting the growing role of local governments in fostering cultural development. But the *Agenda 21 for culture* also introduces new expectations, such as the recognition of the importance of cultural diversity. This principle, which echoes the most recent preoccupations in matters of the environment, is central to the *Agenda 21 for culture* and is given all the more weight as it

[276] The *Agenda 21 for culture* was also formulated in the wake of the United Nations' 1992 *Agenda 21*, an action plan on sustainable development. In 2007, the European Commission also adopted its own Agenda for culture. See: http://ec.europa.eu/culture/our-policy-development/european-agenda_en.htm

was officially endorsed by UNESCO in its 2001 *Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity*. Making an analogy with the natural world, the *Agenda 21 for culture* thus states that:

> *Cultural diversity is the main heritage of humanity. It is the product of thousands of years of history, the fruit of the collective contribution of all peoples through their languages, imaginations, technologies, practices and creations. […] Cultural diversity is "a means to achieve a more satisfactory intellectual, emotional, moral and spiritual existence" (UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, article 3). […] The current situation also provides sufficient evidence that cultural diversity in the world is in danger due to a globalization that standardizes and excludes. UNESCO says: "A source of exchange, innovation and creativity, cultural diversity is as necessary for humankind as biodiversity is for nature" (UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, article 1).* [277]
>
> (*Ibid*, p. 7)

Another original demand of the document is its call for participative democracy in all cultural development initiatives. Accordingly, local governments are invited to 'implement the appropriate instruments to guarantee the democratic participation of citizens in the formulation, exercise and evaluation of public cultural policies' (*Ibid*, p. 9). If, thus far, political authorities have showed their desire to democratise the political process by organising consultation tours prior to the elaboration of cultural policies, the *Agenda 21 for culture* goes one step further by seeking the involvement of citizens at all stages of political decision-making.

Finally, it is interesting to note that the *Agenda 21 for culture* targets specific areas of culture, such as language (art. 7) or heritage, be it tangible or intangible (art. 9). It includes cultural goods or services that are amateur or professional, traditionally or industrially-made, individual or collective (art. 12). It also considers 'the appropriation of information

[277] The tenth article of the document further stipulates that 'cultures' — in addition to being indispensable to the well-being of human societies — also ensure the sustainability of cities.

and its transformation into knowledge' qua 'cultural act' (art. 14); and identifies 'work' as 'one of the principal spheres of human creativity' (art. 15); whilst 'public spaces' (art. 16); 'urban and regional planning'; 'religion' (art. 21), 'scientific culture and technologies' (art. 41) are the object of other articles. So despite the fact that there is no explicit definition of culture in the UCLG's document, the conception of culture underlying the *Agenda 21 for culture* is not restricted to the field of art nor does it correspond to the anthropological all-encompassing definition of culture. The boundaries of the term 'culture', in fact, remain vague and susceptible to change.

5.3.2 Québec's Agenda 21c

In the wake of Québec's adoption of the Sustainable Development Act in 2006, the *Ministère de la Culture, des Communications et de la Condition féminine* (MCCCQ) elaborated an action plan entitled *Notre culture, au cœur du développement durable*[278] (2009). The formulation of an agenda for culture was at the top of the list of this policy statement, which presented the 'fifteen actions representing [the] ministry's contributions to reaching the government's objectives' (Québec 2009a) in matters of sustainable development. Following the advice of the UCLG to involve the citizens in the conception of cultural policies, the MCCCQ undertook, in 2010, a major 'collective participatory process'. The A21c 'brochure' thus presents the ministry's approach:

> *An interministerial committee made up of 18 ministries and organizations was formed to examine methods for integrating culture into all aspects of government policy. In addition, a liaison committee made up of 12 leaders from various sectors of society was tasked with orchestrating a major public dialogue and fostering active public participation in developing the preliminary propositions for Agenda 21 for Culture. From November 2010 to April 2011, a total of 98 meetings were held in 44 municipalities, drawing over 5,000 participants. On May 6, 2011, an interministerial*

[278] 'Our Culture at the Cornerstone of Sustainable Development'.

forum was held and, on May 30, a provincial forum brought together 220 participants from every region on the theme of "The Future of Culture in Québec, a Commitment to Be Shared by All."

(Québec 2012a, p. 3)

Following a one-year consultation process, the A21c was officially launched in December 2011[279]. Without entering into a detailed analysis of the document, let us highlight some peculiar features of the proposal.

In tune with the times, the government decided to use the World Wide Web to present its project. A website entirely dedicated to the *Agenda 21c*[280] (available both in French and English) presents briefly the document (which takes the form of a short fifteen-page brochure that is downloadable from the website). The three principles that are said to be guiding the *Agenda 21c* are: the 1) preservation of cultural diversity; the 2) sustainable use of cultural resources; and 3) creativity and innovation. Now, although the A21c brings to the fore again some of the objectives formulated in previous Quebecois policy proposals — such as the preservation French language; access and participation to cultural life; support art awareness programs at school; the enhancement of art-business partnerships, for instance — it also displays a series of new objectives. It thus suggests to integrate culture **into municipal family policies** and **social policies** (*Ibid,* p. 13) and to 'promote the role of culture **as a determining factor for health**' (*Idem*). It proposes to 'build on the power of the arts and culture to **drive excellence in other sectors of economic activity**' (*Ibid,* p. 14); and to 'develop and promote creativity by making culture a **part of innovation policy**' (*Idem*). Like the UCLG document, the A21c invites us to 'recognize culture's role as a source for practices, knowledge, and traditions that help protect and **stimulate biological**

[279] The English version of the A21c was published in 2012

[280] At first, the website served two main purposes: to present the project and to announce the holding of consultation meetings. Today, we can find the official document online, learn more about the process leading to its formulation, consult the list of those who have adhered to the *Agenda 21c* and, of course, 'signup the Charter' qua 'individual' or 'organisation'.

and cultural diversity' (*Idem*) and suggests to 'take into consideration culture when developing **policies for environmental protection**' (*Ibid,* p. 15).

These objectives all reflect the government's intention to promote an integrated vision of culture by enhancing its contribution to the social, economic, and environmental spheres. The role given to culture thus clearly goes beyond the 'traditional' idea of revitalising the Quebecois identity, enhancing the national image, or that of stimulating the economy. In fact, the A21c sustains the idea that culture is a means to achieve multiple objectives, which can be described as socially 'useful'. Moreover, the A21c presents many new objectives tying culture to environmental issues. In fact, the document pushes the analogy with environmental issues sometimes quite far:

> *Cultural resources such as heritage, the arts, and cultural expressions must be used responsibly in a manner respectful of their essence and balance, so as to ensure they aren't overexploited, distorted, or impoverished in a way that could compromise their long-term use by future generations.*
>
> (*Ibid*, p. 9)

Such passage can, of course, leave the reader slightly perplexed as to what the 'good' use of 'cultural resources' really means, but it is clear that 'culture' is now at the service of a greater common good: sustainable development.

A further analysis based on the most recent development of the *Economies of Worth* model could again help us better understand the logics at play here. In effect, we have seen in our first chapter that Laurent Thévenot and French sociologist Claudette Lafaye have continued working on the model introducing a new 'polity': the 'green' one (Lafaye and Thévenot 1993). Although the formalisation of this polity is unachieved (*Ibid*, p. 513), Thévenot, along with other researchers, have nonetheless referred to the 'green worth' in a more recent comparative cultural analysis, illustrating more precisely what this new world consists of (Thévenot et al. 2000):

> *Actions or entities are worthy, with regard to this green justification, when they support or reflect the principles of environmentalism or green-ness, e.g. clean/non-polluting, renewable, recyclable, sustainable and in harmony with nature. Justifications based on environmentalism consider the general good of humanity to be advanced through a sensitivity to environmental issues, and consequences and protection of wilderness, stewardship of environmental resources, and cultivation of various attachments to nature, the land or the wild.*
>
> (*Ibid*, p. 257)

Now, although it is presented as an obvious fact in the A21c, the causality established between culture and the environment remains to be demonstrated. If we consider all social behaviours to be 'cultural', culture can, of course, contribute (or, conversely and logically, be detrimental) to sustainable development since our collective actions obviously have an impact on societies and nature. But is culture fundamentally good for nature or for sustainable development? (for example, we know that the Ganges in India is one of the most polluted rivers in the world, but the pollution of the Ganges is notably the result of ritualistic practices). Inevitably, thus, a policy proposal oriented towards sustainable development will have to define and normalise the 'good practices' or 'good behaviours'. What kind of culture will now be deemed good for the environment and the sustainability of societies? Following this logic to the extreme could lead one to forbid the maintenance of specific cultural traditions or ban works of art that use toxic material, such as oil painting. It would certainly be interesting to investigate further on the consequences of the introduction of this green worth in cultural policy proposals and analyse how it affects the realm of culture. Arguably, a further analysis of the A21c that took into account this new worth would indeed provide new insights.

The very 'form' given to this policy proposal should also, in our view, be the object of a more scrupulous examination as it is unclear whether the A21c is a policy proposal or not.

In effect, none of its objectives constitutes a promise of concrete action from the MCCCQ (or from any other department). In fact, the government does not intend to set up any measures to reach its goal as others are expected to do so. Thus, according to the document the objectives of the A21c will be reached thanks to

> *the efforts of social actors seeking to contribute to sustainable development objectives by taking culture into account in their own actions, be they individuals, civil society organizations, businesses, or government ministries and organizations.*
>
> (Québec 2012a, p. 10)

Neither does the government suggest any means or ways to materialise its ideal (and vague) project: its 'implementation [undertaken by those adhering to the A21c] will involve a multitude of actions that reflect the [government's] 21 objectives', we are simply told (*Idem*). Besides, in an interview given on the occasion of the official launch of the A21c, the minister of the MCCCQ, Christine St-Pierre, confirmed that 'no budget [was] planned to ensure the predominance of this vision within the governmental apparatus' and she maintained that 'the Agenda 21 for culture mainly aimed at spurring a drive, a willingness'[281] (St-Pierre cited in Paré 2011, our translation). Contrary to other policy statements thus, the A21c does not come with any financial means nor is it legally binding for anybody as no laws or other types of regulatory mechanisms exist to help 'social actors' reach any single objective stated in the document. On the other hand, the MCCQ has used, as one can imagine, significant financial and human resources to elaborate and promote the aforesaid 'vision'. The Quebecois state thus seeks to exercise a moral power to an extent never yet seen but the absence of concrete measures to reach these objectives certainly raises questions as to why and how the state came to reduce its intervention to

[281] *'Même si aucun budget spécifique n'est prévu pour assurer la prédominance de cette vision dans l'appareil gouvernemental, la ministre St-Pierre assure que l'Agenda 21 vise d'abord à susciter «une pulsion, une volonté».'*

simply that of a discourse (no other action has been planned by the government). This state of affairs is certainly worth further analysis.

Here again, the most recent developments of the EW model could help us better understand this new approach to politics. Indeed, sociologist Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello, a French management specialist and sociologist, have identified in their book *Le Nouvel esprit du capitalisme* (1999) (which was published in English in 2005 for the first time under the title *The New Spirit of Capitalism*) another polity which could help us understand the evolution of the state's role in these matters: [w]e have dubbed this new 'city' the *projective city*, the authors assert (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007, p. 92, emphasis in the original). Conceding that the term 'projective city' is 'unwieldy' and 'rather unclear', the authors explain that

> *[i]t is in fact modelled on a term that frequently crops up in management literature: project organization. This refers to a firm whose structure comprises a multiplicity of projects associating a variety of people […].* ***By analogy we shall refer to a social structure in project form or a general organization of society in project form****.*
>
> (*Ibid*, p. 105)

To better understand how this new polity could enlighten our understanding of the recent governmental proposal, let us present further Boltanski and Chiapello's work, without however entering too deeply in the details of this voluminous and dense book.

By writing this book Boltanski and Chiapello's main aim was to understand the 'ideological changes that have accompanied recent transformations in capitalism' (*Ibid,* p. 3). According to them, capitalism is intrinsically 'amoral' (*Ibid,* p. 35) as it basically follows 'an imperative to unlimited accumulation of capital by formally peaceful means' (*Ibid,* p. 4). However, 'if it is to succeed in engaging people who are indispensable to the pursuit of accumulation' (*Ibid,* p. 24), capitalism is 'obliged'

> *to incorporate a spirit that can provide attractive, exciting life prospects, while supplying guarantees of security* ***and moral reasons for people to do what they do****. […] The spirit of capitalism must meet a demand for self-justification […]; and* ***this involves reference to conventions of general validity as to what is just or unjust****.*
>
> (*Ibid*, pp. 24-25, emphasis added)

In other words, the 'spirit of capitalism' gives capitalism a moral legitimacy that the 'principle of accumulation alone' (p. 20) cannot provide. Boltanski and Chiapello have thus analysed the French management literature of the 1960s and the 1990s so as to identify the different forms the spirit of capitalism take (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007, p. 164). Their analysis has notably enabled them to highlight the main features of neo-management which encapsulates the most recent manifestation of the 'spirit of capitalism' (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007, p. 92). Without attempting to give a full account of the results of their research let us simply quote one passage that will feed our own reflection and which describes some characteristics of neo-management that are of significance to us:

> *The 1990s authors [also] entrust leaders and the power of their vision with responsibility for helping human beings to advance themselves. What is equally attractive in neo-management is the prospect of working on an interesting project, which is 'worth the effort', led by an 'exceptional' person whose 'dream' one is going to 'share'. And since management literature urges everyone, and especially* cadres*, to be 'charismatic leaders' and 'visionaries' who give meaning to people's lives, the implicit suggestion is that those to whom these proposals are addressed — the readers — could themselves — why not? — very well be among those who, with the help of their firms, will realize their dreams and share them with others.*
>
> (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007, p. 91, emphasis in the original)

In our view, there is a clear analogy to be made between neo-management practices and the policy process currently underway. The figure of the leader depicted here reminds us of

the role the Minister for Culture Christine St-Pierre played to gain wide public support but also their commitment to her project or 'vision'. The act of signing up the Charter actually reflects the engagement of those whom she seeks to reach; their moral adhesion is thus sanctioned and constitutes a promise to promote and defend the government's vision. It is indeed quite striking to observe that a great number of cultural organisations in Québec, including the most prestigious ones, have adhered to the Charter. Since none of them will concretely benefit of this (no money for artists to adapt their work to the new expectations of the government, no laws helping organisations to promote or develop sustainable development initiatives, etc.), their motivation becomes simply moral, which is quite unusual. Such 'democratic participation' to the Agenda 21 would thus not be an expression of the civic worth; in fact, it would be a distortion of this principle to the benefit of the projective logic. To refine our analysis it would be necessary to better understand the nature of the projective city so and the reasons that lead some social actors to rally to a project that does not offer any tangible advantages. By this example we essentially sought to show why we believe the EW model could be useful to explain the recent development in cultural policy making.

As we have seen in this last section of our conclusion, the most recent cultural policy proposal in Québec, the *Agenda 21c*, uses a language that reflects the emergence of new preoccupations and suggests that another 'compromise' might be forthcoming. Indeed, the objectives of the A21c are more far-reaching and complex than the ones that we found in the 1992 cultural policy, which essentially involved the artistic field. The very ambiguity of the term 'culture' and the introduction of new ambiguous notions, such as 'creativity or 'intangible' heritage, actually enables the government to diverge from its previous policy orientations and to bring to the fore issues unrelated to the arts sector without however having to drastically change its vocabulary. In fact, the extension of the notion of culture as it is presented in the A21c is such that one wonders what aim such

cultural policy now pursues: its goal is as unclear as the means destined to reach it. Moreover, the A21c uses culture to defend a 'greater' common good, i.e. sustainable development, as if 'culture' was no longer a common good worth pursuing per se. Surprisingly, representatives of the cultural sector show their agreement with the government's new priorities by adhering to the 'charter' and, this, despite the fact that the A21c comes without any tangible support for them to materialise this vision (whereas the elaboration of the A21c, which is almost a reproduction of the UCLG's document, involved an important deployment of resources). This state of affairs is certainly worth the attention of researchers.

The introduction of the environmental discourse is also a significant feature of the A21c. It is one thing to sensibilise the population to environmental issues and another to argue that culture, in all its facets, must serve sustainable development or the environmental cause. Is it the aim of a cultural policy to be at the very service of sustainable development? To what extent will cultural workers and artists change their practice to respond to the new exigencies of the state in matters of sustainable development? Finally, to use Boltanski and Thévenot's concepts, these changes leave the question of the 'artistic worth' uncertain, as it seems to be, once again, marginalised to the benefit of other 'principles of equivalence'. Will the traditional arts be the great losers of this new configuration in cultural policy matters? In many respects, the A21c is a vague society 'project' that raises more questions than it provides answers.

In sum, despite some weaknesses, the EW model constitutes a germane heuristic device for cultural policy analysis. The advantages it has offered for the purposes of this study are several: it has enabled us to better grasp the complexity of policy proposals as well as the multiplicity of the objections they raised. It has given us a standpoint from where to observe the interplay between different principles that often clash against one another and the challenge that their coexistence poses. These observations have helped us

better understand why cultural policies hardly achieve consensus and are in fact prone to incensed debate. Interestingly, the latest developments of the EW model also seem to be pertinent and useful to the understanding the most recent cultural policy initiatives, opening up opportunities for future research.

5.4 The peculiarity of Québec's cultural policy: beyond the model

We have explained that situating the context from which the policy statements emerged and retracing the origins of the ideas they put forward was a means for us to provide a richer discussion of the main cultural policy proposals of Québec. On the one hand, this enabled us to understand why some 'worlds' prevail at a given time but, on the other hand, this work brought out the originality of the Quebecois model. This analysis also enabled us to better understand the evolution of Québec's policy, an evolution that has not always been linear or consistent but marked by breaking points, notably on the question of the national cause. Québec's cultural policy was also deeply influenced by powerful local and global ideological trends which determined its orientation. We will briefly recall the main features that thus characterise its evolution.

5.4.1 A cultural policy at the service of the national cause

Despite the similarities of Québec's cultural policy with that of other countries — particularly with the French model that was until the 1990s its main source of reference — a more detailed analysis of the ideas on which each cultural policy proposal was based has enabled us to highlight the specificity of the Quebecois approach, a work that so far had not been made. And one of the most striking features of Québec's cultural policy is that it was often used as a means to formulate a coherent and comprehensive society project that went beyond the limited field of the arts.

We have indeed seen that even though the architect of the first ministry for Cultural Affairs, Georges-Émile Lapalme, said that he was inspired by Malraux's own ministry, an original aspect of his policy proposal actually resided in the fact that it defined culture more widely: the 'French presence' Lapalme sought to preserve meant the defence of French language, the preservation of French architectural features, the implementation of urbanistic norms (that would keep in the Americanisation of building methods), the control of immigration so as to encourage arrivals from francophone countries, etc. Originally, support to the arts was far from being Lapalme's main preoccupation, contrary to Malraux's policy; the ministry for Cultural Affairs in Québec rather sought raise the profile of the French Canadian nation — and thus ensure its survival — by 'refrenchifying' it.

In the 1970s, France remained the reference point for many Quebecois politicians and intellectuals. The movement of democratisation of May 68 influenced some of Québec's elite, notably the thinkers of 'cultural development'. Interestingly though, the concept was reinterpreted to fit specific goals: Québec's 'cultural development' did not focus in questioning the efficiency of the state's cultural action in the arts as it was the case in France, and nor did it seek to challenge a cultural elite who needed to acknowledge the existence and the value of the culture of the masses. In Québec, the idea of cultural development rather consisted in imagining ways to give the Quebecois new means to assert their cultural difference and to reinforce their desire to become an independent and sovereign nation. In effect, the process of cultural development in Québec aimed at 1) transforming the collective cultural behaviours or perceived old 'patterns' (submissiveness, dependency, lack of pride) that were seen as detrimental to the progress of the francophone group by delaying their entry in the post-industrial era; 2) restoring the pride of the Quebecois of French origin, who were becoming aware of the inequities that separated them from their Anglophone counterparts, by giving them the means to

overcome their status of lower class citizens. Again, the objective of Québec's cultural policy went largely beyond the field of art and concerned the survival of a nation resisting assimilation.

Notable is the fact that, in 1992, the government largely contented itself with borrowing ideas that had shaped the cultural intervention of the federal government. For the first time, the designers of the cultural policy indeed largely followed the English Canadian example by introducing the arm's length model, but also by introducing the language of management in cultural policy discourses, that was actually permeated by the hegemonic neo-liberal ideology. The 1992 cultural policy was also less ambitious than the previous cultural policy proposals as it adopted a more restricted conception of culture and mainly aimed at encouraging professional artistic creativity. Of course, the 1992 policy did not completely put aside its desire to assert the Quebecois cultural specificity, widely speaking, evidence being that a section of the document advocated the defence of French language. However, Québec's cultural policy no longer consisted in formulating a comprehensive society project destined to 'save' the nation of the French Canadians. And this development, as we have seen, effectively corresponded to the end of the Francophones' claim for recognition of their cultural specificity within Canada. Weakened by the failure of the constitutional negotiations, Bourassa's government indeed decided to bury the issue. In cultural policy matters, this political stance translated into giving up the project of cultural sovereignty: Frulla-Hébert put aside all will to repatriate powers in cultural matters from the federal government, and she elaborated a cultural policy that essentially sought to attain more purely artistic (and managerial) objectives, as mentioned above, leaving behind the nationalist claims. Again, the fact that the most important battleground uniting both liberal nationalists and independentists was secured, i.e. the protection of French language (with all that it entailed), enabled the Department of Culture to put aside probably what so far had constituted the most original (but also the most

controversial) aspect of Québec's cultural policy. From then on, Québec's cultural policy started to resemble that of other Western countries.

The question of the cultural identity/cultural specificity of French Canadians has thus been at the core of Québec's cultural policy since the early 1960s until the failure of the national referendum in 1992, which sought to resolve the conflict over the distribution of jurisdictional powers between the federal and provincial governments). This latter event indeed had a drastic impact on the nationalist movement, whether separatist or not, and it certainly marked a breaking point in cultural policy making, although the emergence of different ideologies also deeply influenced the trajectory of Québec's cultural policy. We will now recall the impact of these ideologies: *survivance*, post-colonialism, and neo-liberalism.

5.4.2 Major ideological trends permeating Québec's cultural policy

Retracing the origin of the ideas put forward in each policy proposal has enabled us to better render account of the intellectual contribution of several French Canadian thinkers who were indirectly or directly involved in the elaboration of cultural policy statements. We have thus showed that Edmond de Nevers and Édouard Montpetit's respective cultural visions largely influenced Lapalme. The work of these thinkers were marked by the ideology of ***survivance***, a French Canadian neologism which expressed, by itself, a social vision peculiar to French Canada: behind this expression conveying a strong national feeling lay the idea that the French Canadian nation was a 'community of language, religion, laws, customs and traditions that [was] threatened and [had] to be defended'[282] (Beaudry 2012). And for both Nevers and Montpetit, the nation's ability to survive was dependent upon its ability to preserve what rendered it different and unique: its French character. According to them, the cultural originality of the French Canadian nation, more than anything else, could

[282] '*une communauté de langue, de religion, de lois, de coutumes et de traditions qui est menacée et qu'il faut défendre. Ainsi s'amorce la conception de la nation comme une communauté socioculturelle à sauvegarder au Canada.*'

guarantee the survival and the cohesion of the nation. Inspired by these two intellectuals, Lapalme believed that the provincial state not only had to be endowed with a strong cultural mission but he wanted this mission to become the government's most important one.

In the late 1960s and 1970s, Marcel Rioux and Fernand Dumont were also concerned by the future of the 'Quebecois of French origin'. They attempted to propose a society project aiming at liberating this people from the cultural domination of Americans and English Canadians. Although the fear of being assimilated dated back to the British Conquest, the nationalist discourse of the 1970s was deeply influenced by **post-colonialist ideas** and asserted that it was only through emancipation that the Francophones could survive. The neo-nationalist movement thus sought to transform the Quebecois society from within by encouraging behaviours that could favour the emergence of a new consciousness. For Dumont and Rioux, culture was a means to achieve such end, and both have developed the reflections on the very concept of 'culture' — with the notions of 'primary' and 'secondary' culture for Dumont or those of '*culture-code*' and '*culture ouverte*' for Rioux. Although their theory on culture slightly diverged, 'culture' was, for both of them, a crucial dimension of the nation's development, a means to instil a desire for self-assertion and to empower Francophones to such an extent that sovereignty would appear to them as the only viable solution.

The 1992 cultural policy, for its part, again distinguished itself from previous proposals by asking for the contribution not of intellectuals but of managing consultants (managing firm Samson Deloitte & Touche and director of the Musée de la civilisation Arpin were called in to draft the policy document), and this certainly contributed to the policy's lack of intellectual originality. But this does not mean that the policy statement was by any means deprived of philosophical reasoning: despite the fact that it was driven by pragmatic objectives, it nonetheless implicitly lay on a **liberal conception of the world** which

recognises and defends pluralism and multiculturalism, a conception that has largely shaped contemporary western democracies. As British Professor of politics Richard Bellamy explains,

> *Liberalism accommodates difference by protecting each person's capacity to pursue his own good in his own way to the extent that is compatible with the similar pursuit of others. […] Liberalism's philosophical commitment to individual autonomy draws support from an historicist faith in the progress of society. This argument holds that the very complexity of modern societies sustains the liberal account of human agency and flourishing. It supplies the plurality of options needed for an ethos of self-definition through choice. Meanwhile, an invisible hand combines the heterogeneous ends pursued by different autonomous agents in mutually supportive ways. In the economic market and the market of ideas alike, competition enriches both participants and the collectivity, albeit to varying degrees. Liberalism and pluralism go hand in hand, therefore.*
>
> (Bellamy 1999, pp. 1-2)

In other words, States that do endorse the liberal ideology would not only encourage the free circulation of goods but also that of values, bearing thus an (apparent) neutral stance towards all 'competing' beliefs and moral engagements. Similarly, we could say that by distancing itself from the Francophones' national cause, Québec's cultural policy sought to show itself more impartial than it had ever been. The distancing from the nationalist cause by the Québec government (and the parallel embracing of multiculturalism) is the outcome of its subscription to a liberal ideology, so that an understanding of the way in which the latter has taken hold in the West and had, by the late 1980s, become dominant is the necessary context and background that needs to be factored in if we are to understand how key changes in cultural policy discourse have happened. From then on, the Quebecois state did not solely represent the French Canadians but defended the interests of all ethnic

groups, which, stated the government, equally contributed to the development of the society. However, by giving up the 'national cause', the government also chose to ignore the historical conditions that had justified another kind of intervention in the past. Historically, the provincial state had always defended the interests of the Francophones first and foremost as it was the most important political level that French Canadians possessed to resist English domination. But the 1992 cultural policy rather implied that the Francophones were no longer suffering from any discrimination or domination. The threat was now coming from the globalisation of markets. Yet the repeated failures to achieve recognition for the cultural specificity of the Quebecois society from the rest of Canada certainly raises doubts as to whether the Francophones have truly been able to overcome their state of dominated people.

Besides, it is interesting to note that according to Bellamy there exists a direct correlation between the diversity of ideas, values and ways of living and the existence of a free market, as if the circulation of ideas followed the same logic as the circulation of goods. Although this view can certainly be challenged — but it is not the aim of this chapter — the liberal ideology nonetheless suggests that individual liberties are also best defended in a liberal economic market. Similarly, the policy statements of the 1980s and 1990s implied that state support could be detrimental to the arts: the preservation of the artistic organisations' autonomy and freedom of action were said to be guaranteed through the diversification of their sources of revenues.

Overall, this thesis thus has sought to contribute to the understanding of Québec's cultural policy by bringing to light the rationale for state intervention in cultural matters since the creation, in 1961, of its main instrument of intervention, the Department for Cultural Affairs, until the adoption of an official cultural policy in 1992. Our thesis has provided a new understanding of three main policy statements by situating them in a historical perspective and by providing a substantial analysis of the ideas they convey. More

generally, this thesis contributed to cultural policy studies by exploring the hermeneutic and heuristic value of the *Economies of Worth*, an interpretive device which had never been used before in the field. Our thesis has shown that the model can assist in revealing the complexity and the fragility of cultural policies which attempt to reconcile competing, if not antagonistic, values and ideals, and which for that reason suffer from a legitimacy deficit. The model has also enabled us to bring out the peculiarity and the originality of Québec's cultural policy, and as such was indicative of the socio-cultural specificities of the society under study, confirming further its relevance.

Annex 1

1. **1956**: *Rapport de la Commission royale d'enquête sur les problèmes constitutionnels* (Commission royale d'enquête sur les problèmes constitutionnels chaired by Thomas Tremblay)
2. **1959:** *Pour une politique* (Georges-Émile Lapalme)
3. **1965**: *Livre blanc de la culture* (*Ministère des Affaires culturelles*)
4. **1968:** *Rapport de la Commission royale d'enquête sur l'enseignement des arts dans la province de Québec* (Commission royale d'enquête sur l'enseignement des arts dans la province de Québec chaired by Marcel Rioux)
5. **1976**: *Pour l'évolution de la politique culturelle* (*Ministère des Affaires culturelles*)
6. **1977**: *La politique québécoise de la langue française* (*Comité ministériel permanent du développement culturel*)
7. **1978**: *La politique québécoise du développement culturel* (*Comité ministériel permanent du développement culturel*)
8. **1979**: *Pour une politique québécoise de la recherche scientifique* (*Comité ministériel permanent du développement culturel*)
9. **1980**: *La juste part des créateurs. Pour une amélioration du statut socio-économique des créateurs québécois* (*Comité ministériel permanent du développement culturel et scientifique*)
10. **1982**: *Rapport de la consultation du ministère des Affaires culturelles* (Claude Lamonde for the *Ministère des Affaires culturelles*)
11. **1983**: *Des actions culturelles pour aujourd'hui: programme d'action du Ministère des affaires culturelles* (*Ministère des Affaires culturelles*)
12. **1988**: *Bilan-actions-avenir* (*Ministère des Affaires culturelles*)
13. **1990:** *Rapport sur le financement des arts au Québec* (Samson, Bélair/Deloitte & Touche for the *Ministère des Affaires culturelles*)
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15. **1992**: *La politique culturelle du Québec. Notre culture, notre avenir* (*Ministère des Affaires culturelles*)
16. **1996:** *Politique d'intégration des arts à l'architecture et à l'environnement des bâtiments et des sites gouvernementaux et publics* (Québec Government)
17. **1996:** *Remettre l'Art au monde (Politique de diffusion des arts de la scène)* (*Ministère de la Culture et des Communications*)

18. **1998:** *Politique de la lecture et du livre - Le temps de lire, un art de vivre* (*Ministère de la Culture et des Communications*)

19. **1998:** *Politique de la lecture et du livre - Le temps de lire, un art de vivre (Tiré à part : Les bibliothèques publiques)* (*Ministère de la Culture et des Communications*)

20. **2000:** *Politique muséale - Vivre autrement... la ligne du temps* (*Ministère de la Culture et des Communications*)

21. **2000:** *Notre patrimoine, un présent du passé (Rapport Arpin)* (*Groupe-conseil sur la Politique du patrimoine culturel du Québec*)

22. **2002***: Agir pour la lecture. Politique de la lecture et du livre : des constats après trois ans* (*Groupe de travail sur la lecture*)

23. **2002:** *Pour une politique québécoise du cinéma et de la production audiovisuelle : document de consultation* (*Ministère de la Culture et des Communications*)

24. **2003:** *Politique québécoise du cinéma et de la production audiovisuelle : Pour mieux porter le Québec à l'écran* (*Ministère de la Culture et des Communications*)

25. **2011**: *Agenda 21 de la culture du Québec: Culture aujourd'hui demain* (*Ministère de la Culture, des Communications et de la Condition féminine*)

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