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The dynamics and communication of concepts
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Prosser, Simon James (2001) The dynamics and communication of concepts. PhD thesis, University of Warwick.
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Official URL: http://webcat.warwick.ac.uk/record=b1379733~S1
Abstract
The central claim of this thesis is that concepts, the components from which
cognitively significant truth evaluable content (thought) is composed, are unstructured
entities an account of whose individuation makes no essential reference to other
concepts in the possession of the thinking subject or to any particular means by which
the reference of the concept is identified by the thinking subject. This position is called
Conceptual Atomism and contrasts with Inferential Role Semantics, according to
which concepts are individuated by their inferential roles or their conditions of
warranted application.
The structure of the argument is as follows. Firstly, a principle called the
Transparency Principle is developed. This places constraints on the individuation of
concepts across differing contexts. The Transparency Principle is then used to show
that Inferential Role Semantics is false because it cannot provide a satisfactory account
of cognitive dynamics; that is, of the conditions under which a concept is retained
through changes in the epistemic state of the subject over a period of time. A version
of Conceptual Atomism is then defended and it is shown that this theory yields the
correct individuation of concepts. According to this theory the concepts of an
individual subject are individuated in terms of referential episodes, episodes of
ongoing reference to an object or property during which it is diachronically transparent
to the subject that the same thing is being referred to. The more general notion of a
referential practice is then used to account for the sharing of concepts by more than
one person. Finally, a novel account of the thoughts expressed using indexical terms is
defended in order to show that indexicals present no counterexample to Conceptual
Atomism. This account of indexical thoughts is of some consequence in its own right.
Item Type: | Thesis (PhD) |
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Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | Concepts, Atomism, Philosophy |
Official Date: | November 2001 |
Institution: | University of Warwick |
Theses Department: | Department of Philosophy |
Thesis Type: | PhD |
Publication Status: | Unpublished |
Supervisor(s)/Advisor: | Luntley, Michael |
Sponsors: | Arts and Humanities Research Board (Great Britain) |
Extent: | v, 211 leaves |
Language: | eng |
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