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**THE TRANSFORMATION OF MODERN CITIZENSHIP
ETHNIC MINORITIES AND THE POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP IN GERMANY**

Birgit Brandt



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ORIGINAL**

To my mother

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DECLARATION

Some information and arguments in chapters three and four have already been used in a report for the European Union Human Capital and Mobility Program on citizenship policies in Germany (Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations, University of Warwick, July 1994) as well as in two publications: a) 'The Politics of Exclusion. The German Concept of Citizenship', in: *Migration*, 37/1996; and b) 'Yurtaslik ve Uluslararası Göç: Almanya Deneyimi', in: S. Kut et al (eds.) (1996) *Ulus, Devlet, ve Yuratasi Yeniden Tanımlarken* (Istanbul). In addition, arguments of this thesis have been incorporated into a research proposal for the ESRC's *Transnational Communities Programme* ('Transnational Communities and the Transformation of Citizenship') that was formulated together with Professor Zig Layton-Henry.

SUMMARY

This study examines through a case study of Germany and its politics of citizenship vis-à-vis members of ethnic minorities a) the deficiencies of a nationally bound concept of citizenship in countries of immigration; b) the transformation of citizenship into a concept that is increasingly oblivious to national borders as a result of international migration and ethnic heterogeneity. This is a development that takes place despite strenuous efforts by the nation state to maintain a nationally bounded notion of citizenship; c) finally, the role of members of ethnic minorities in inducing this transformation will be analysed by focussing on the case of Berliners of Turkish origin.

The thesis is an original contribution to the development of sociological accounts of citizenship for three reasons: First, it integrates three central debates around citizenship - as regards legal status, rights and participation. Second, it contributes to the development of a new dimension to citizenship studies by analysing the social construction of citizenship from below. Finally, it provides important empirical findings that illuminate current debates on citizenship which have so far been highly abstract and theoretical.

The thesis is based on empirical research that was carried out in Berlin in October/November 1996, from April to June 1997 and in May 1998. In this context, I conducted interviews with civil servants, officials and politicians at the national and city level; with members/employees of social initiatives, academics and journalists. Furthermore, I carried out qualitative, semi-structured interviews with a) young Berliners of Turkish origin, and with persons of the same background who are b) active members of German political parties and trade unions; c) active in immigrant organisations.

ABBREVIATIONS

AuslG	Ausländergesetz (Aliens Act – policy and law concerning ‘foreigners’)
BTKB	Türkischer Frauenverein in Berlin (Turkish Women’s Association Berlin)
BVV	Bezirksverordnetenversammlung (similar to the local council)
CDU	Christlich Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union)
CSU	Christlich Soziale Union (Christian Social Union)
EbRI	Einbürgerungsrichtlinien (administrative rules regulating naturalisation)
FDP	Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party)
LTD	Libérale Türkisch-Deutsche Vereinigung (Liberal Turkish German Union)
MdA	Mitglied des Abgeordnetenhauses (Member of the Berlin Parliament)
MdB	Mitglied des Bundestages (Member of the German Parliament, MP)
PDS	Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (Party of Democratic Socialism; this is the successor party to the former German Democratic Republic’s Socialist United Party of Germany - SED)
RuStaG	Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz (law concerning the attribution of citizenship)
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany)
StaReG	Gesetz zur Regelung von Fragen der Staatsangehörigkeit (law regulating questions regarding nationality)
TBB	Türkischer Bund in Berlin-Brandenburg (Turkish Union in Berlin-Brandenburg)
TGB	Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin (Turkish Community of Berlin)

GLOSSARY

Abitur	Baccalaureate
Abgeordnetenhaus (Berlin)	Berlin's parliament
Aufenthaltsbefugnis	Residence Title for Exceptional Circumstances
Aufenthaltsberechtigung	Unlimited Residence Permit
Aufenthaltsbewilligung	Residence Title for Specific Purposes
Aufenthaltserlaubnis & Unbefristete Aufenthaltserlaubnis	Residence Permit & Limited Residence Permit
Ausländerbeauftragte (or Beauftragte für die Belange der Ausländer; or Beauftragte für Ausländerfragen)	Commissioner for Foreigners' Affairs (located on the local, regional and the national level)
Ausländergesetz	See AuslG
Ausländerpolitik	Politics regarding foreigners
Aussiedler	The official definition is: "Citizens or members of the German ethnic community who before the 8th May 1945 lived in those German Eastern territories that are currently under foreign administration, or lived in Poland, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Danzig, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Albania, or China, and who have left or are still leaving these countries after the conclusion of the general measures of expulsion."
Bezirksverordneten- versammlung	See BVV
Bundesland (plural: Bundesländer)	Land of the Federal Republic of Germany
Bundesrat	The upper house of the German parliament, consisting of representatives of the <i>Länder</i> governments
Bundestag	German parliament
Duldung	Temporary Leave
Einbürgerungsrichtlinien	See EbRI
Einbürgerungs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz	Law regulating access to formal citizenship and naturalisation
Erweiterter Hauptschulabschluß	Extended lower secondary degree
Fachabitur	Specialised baccalaureate
Fachhochschule	Polytechnic, or university of applied science

Flüchtlinge	A particular group of refugees defined as "Germans from the Soviet-occupied zone who came after the end of the war from the Soviet zone or the Soviet sector of Berlin to West German territory, including West Berlin, and their children"
Gesamtschule	Comprehensive school
Gesetz zur Änderung asylverfahrens-, ausländer- und staatsangehörigkeits-rechtlicher Vorschriften	Law Amending Asylum Procedure, Aliens and Nationality Provisions
Die GRÜNEN/Bündnis 90	The Green Party
Gymnasium	Upper secondary school
Hauptschulabschluß	Lower secondary degree
Hauptschule	Lower secondary school
Oberstufenzentrum	Vocationally orientated upper secondary school
Realschule	Middle secondary school
Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz	See RuStaG
Staatsangehöriger	National
Staatsbürger	Citizen
Sonderschule	Special needs school, or special school
Übersiedler	Persons from the former GDR who moved through legal means to West Germany until re-unification in October 1990
Vertriebene	Expellees are officially defined as "those Germans who have lost their homes in German territory in the East (as defined by the borders of 31.12.1937) that are currently under foreign administration, or had homes in foreign territory and lost them as a result of expulsion caused by the Second World War"

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Citizenship is being smothered by the national embrace. What was in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries a liberating and emancipatory relationship has turned sour. As is the experience of many unhappy couples, one has moved on and demands changes or even divorce, while the other desperately tries to hold on to the status quo. One particular arena where problems in the relationship between citizenship and the nation-state have unfolded forms the topic of this thesis: namely Germany and its politics of citizenship vis-à-vis members of ethnic minorities. The principle aim of this study is to examine through a case study of Germany

- a) the deficiencies of a nationally bound concept of citizenship in immigration countries;
- b) the transformation of citizenship into a concept that is increasingly oblivious to national borders as a result of international migration and ethnic heterogeneity. This is a development that takes place despite strenuous efforts by the nation state to maintain a nationally bounded notion of citizenship;
- c) finally, the role of members of ethnic minorities in inducing this transformation will be analysed by focussing on the case of Berliners of Turkish origin.

THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

The nation state has been the primary reference point for both the politics and the study of citizenship. We may identify two lines of arguments put forward in accounts that conceptually tie the concept of citizenship to the nation state: Firstly, the nation state is seen as the principal administrative and political unit in world politics and is thus understood to be the ultimate source of decision-making and sovereignty. Its territory is regarded as the stage where citizenship is practised and its institutions are seen as prerequisites to guarantee and to maintain the rights and privileges embedded in the concept of citizenship. Secondly, the 'national community' - distinguished by a unique blend of shared values and collective loyalties, language, and common history - is perceived to be the wider community the citizen belongs to, and identifies with. The individual 'matures' into a citizen by transcending particularistic interests and loyalties and by identifying with, and participating in the affairs of, the wider national community. In this context citizenship is seen as both based upon, and an expression of, a national culture or a national identity (*Smith 1995*).

The national closure of citizenship is however being increasingly challenged. The nation state has on the one hand no longer absolute power to determine its domestic or international affairs, including important decisions about social and even political rights. Increasingly it has to seek solutions in negotiation with a large and growing array of

additional 'power-containers' (see *Giddens 1985*) located on multiple levels of politics (*McGrew 1992*).¹ On the other hand, international migration movements continue to transform the composition of contemporary societies into a complex and heterogeneous mixture of people with diverse affiliations and identities. More and more residents of contemporary nation states are non-nationals or hold multiple citizenships. Many 'aliens' have gained access to rights previously reserved for nationals, and a high proportion of ethnic minority members – regardless of their citizen status – experience exclusion and discrimination and are treated as outsiders or 'second class citizens'. As *Ruth Lister* has pointed out with characteristic clarity, a crucial question for academic and political debates on citizenship is: "how useful is a concept associated with the nation-state at a time when the nation-state is becoming less pivotal economically and politically and when migration and asylum-seeking are on the increase? (*Lister 1995, p. 1*)

Some scholars, such as *Jacobson* and *Soysal*, have already concluded that citizenship is an obsolete concept. For them the days of citizenship are numbered and they claim that "national citizenship is losing ground to a more universal model of membership, anchored in deterritorialized notions of persons' rights" (*Soysal 1994, p. 3, Jacobson 1996*). I remain sceptical about such an assumption.² Although we can undoubtedly observe a transformation of citizenship, I do not agree that this transformation will - or should - inevitably result in the disintegration of citizenship and its replacement by a body of rights that are defined and

legitimised at the international or supranational level in increasingly abstract terms. My scepticism is based on the following three arguments: Firstly, citizenship is a contested concept that has so far not been clearly defined. To focus the discussion purely on the granting and institutionalisation of rights leaves out a whole array of other questions commonly associated with citizenship, most notably those articulated in the context of the republican and feminist debates where citizenship is seen as a form of active participation and civic engagement which helps to engender solidarity and co-operation between members of a society.³ Secondly, approaches that presuppose a decline of citizenship highlight almost exclusively the importance of civil and social rights that are enjoyed by an increasing number of persons regardless of their legal citizenship. These authors downplay the importance of political rights which are in their entirety still inaccessible to non-citizens as these are deemed to be nonessential (*Martiniello 1997, p. 640*). The importance of the political dimension of citizenship should not be underestimated. It has been amply demonstrated this century. The struggle for female suffrage was an important step on the march towards gender equality.⁴ The colonial subjects of European powers only achieved full citizenship rights after fierce struggles for independence and the creation of new sovereign states. In South-Africa non-whites only gained (or regained) political rights in the 1990s and this led immediately to the ending of white supremacy and the transfer of political leadership to the black majority. Finally, the great majority of studies that celebrate the advent of 'post-national' membership and the prevalence of international human rights do not pay

enough attention to the – albeit changing - role of the nation state. Although challenged, the nation state is striving to hold on to its political power and to maintain the allegiance of its citizens and its control over them. Its institutions and politics forcefully shape the living conditions of its population and its territory remains an important arena where the struggles around citizenship are acted out.

The central aim of this study is to understand those processes which induce antagonism between a national enclosure of citizenship on the one hand and the concept's emancipatory objective on the other. Despite attempts by some scholars to argue that citizenship is no longer a useful notion, I will argue that contemporary scholarship does not have to jettison the concept of citizenship, nor should it render the nation state obsolete in the course of its analysis. In doing so, I will seek to contribute to the study of citizenship on three accounts: Firstly, an attempt is made to add to the focus on 'rights' that characterises critical approaches to modern citizenship in multi-ethnic countries, by bringing together or integrating three main dimensions of citizenship - citizenship as a legal status, citizenship as a set of rights, and citizenship as participation. Secondly, and directly related, I will go beyond an approach which defines and discusses citizenship predominantly within the context of state policies and legislation and will contribute an analysis of the social construction of citizenship 'from below'.⁵ Thirdly, I apply an – admittedly old-fashioned and in many respects analytically limited – approach and focus on one national setting. I have chosen Germany as my critical case

study. This is partly because of my knowledge of German and German debates, but also because Germany provides an excellent example of an arena where the battle between traditional nation-state definitions of citizenship on the one hand and a more broadly defined concept of citizenship on the other is being fought. This case study will provide detailed empirical findings that can illuminate current debates on citizenship which have so far been rather general and highly abstract.⁶

THE GERMAN SETTING

Today, about 7.5 million ‘foreigners’ live in Germany, constituting nine per cent of the German population. People of Turkish origin comprise the largest group with more than two million, the majority of whom have been resident in Germany for more than ten years, or have been born and brought up there. It is well known in the academic literature that the German concept of citizenship is characterised by an exclusionary approach towards those immigrants and their offspring who are not of ethnic German origin. As a result only few are holders of a German passport and, although most members of ethnic minorities have access to substantial social rights, they are denied – with European citizens constituting a special case - formal rights of political participation, that is they cannot vote or stand for elections on the national, regional or local levels. Furthermore, the well known mantra of Germany’s conservative political establishment that ‘Germany is not a country of immigration’ in

conjunction with laws that manifest exclusion as a legal norm have both generated and reinforced ideas of 'belonging' and 'otherness'. Just how much the notion that an '*Ausländer* remains an *Ausländer*...' dominates the German discussion was made transparent to me at an international conference a few years ago in the USA. A well-known German demographer produced statistics regarding demographic developments in Germany during the next two decades. He came to the conclusion that given a decrease in the German birth-rate, continuous immigration flows and a comparatively higher birth-rate amongst the 'foreign' population in Germany, the 'foreign' population will constitute 15 per cent in the year 2010. His presentation caused criticism and concern amongst the Americans. One American demographer commented poignantly that clearly, such a result could only occur by assuming that all 'foreigners' and their offspring will permanently remain 'foreigners' and that it simply ignores the possibility of naturalisation or, to go one step further, the inclusion of a *ius soli* element in Germany's citizenship legislation.

This German demographer may be re-calculating his statistics, as German citizenship have become more inclusive after all. The first step in this direction was already made by the former German Minister for the Interior *Wolfgang Schäuble* (Christian Democratic Union) who introduced in 1991 changes in Germany's naturalisation law (which came into force in their current form in 1993). Accordingly, for the first time two groups of 'foreigners' were given the right to become naturalised. On the one hand adults who have been living in Germany for at least 15 years; on the other

young people between 16 and 23 years of age who have been resident in Germany for more than eight years. *Schäuble's* legal changes are seen by the majority of German academics as the first important change in seeking to establish a more inclusive politics of citizenship (see *Klingst, Die Zeit*, 14.1.1999).

This first development has been largely ignored in the international – and in particular in the Anglo-Saxon - academic literature. Here, the German concept of citizenship is generally defined as being based on 'blood' ('*Blutrecht*') and as being the antithesis to the French model that is regarded as a clear example for a territorially based notion of citizenship (*Brubacker 1992*). In this context one argument identifies as "[t]he central problem in German nationality law ... the emergence of multiple generations of alien residents as a consequence of the *jus sanguinis* rule" (*Neumann 1995, p. 22*). Furthermore, explanations of the ethnic exclusiveness of German citizenship are primarily of a historical nature and identify the German history of a "*Volk-centred*" process of nationbuilding as its main cause (*Brubacker 1992*).

Both a simplified condemnation of the *ius sanguinis* principle and the application of an exclusively historical framework of analysis have from my point of view led in the past to a rather distorted understanding of German citizenship politics. On the one hand the granting of citizenship on the basis of *ius sanguinis* is by no means a German peculiarity but a widely, if not universally, applied principle (see *Hagedorn 1998, p. 16*). As

a general rule, nation states grant formal citizenship to the offspring of their nationals regardless of their place of birth. Rather than identifying the *ius sanguinis* principle as the main reason for the passing on of foreigner status over several generations, I will argue that a) the absence of *ius soli* as an additional element in Germany's citizenship legislation; b) obstacles established in the naturalisation process; and c) long-drawn out bureaucratic procedures appear to be the primary causes. Secondly, I think it is necessary to highlight the limits of a historical analysis as offered by *Brubaker* (1992) whose work has informed much of the international debate on German citizenship. Influenced by *Barth's* criticism of a 'historical mode of explanation' I remain doubtful of a historical perspective that seeks to analyse contemporary social facts and structures essentially as a linear continuum of past events (*see Barth 1981, p. 6*). Such an analytical framework risks the danger of omitting, neglecting or misinterpreting contemporary processes that may challenge both an assumed developmental sequence, or the actual present significance of a historical event. Furthermore; by using a rather inflexible analytical framework it also fixes certain aspects of German politics as essential features, that may be modified but that - like their historical root-causes - do not vanish.

Today, Germany has reached a critical turning point regarding its formal citizenship politics. The new German government, a coalition of the Social Democratic Party and the Green Party intends to introduce new citizenship legislation. This would allow: 1) adult 'foreigners' to be granted

the right to become naturalised after eight years, minors after five years and 'foreign' spouses after three years residence. 2) Dual citizenship for newly naturalised Germans will be tolerated officially. 3) The new government will introduce an element of *ius soli* by granting German citizenship at birth to those children, whose parents have been born in Germany or who have migrated to Germany as minors. As the new German government coalition has only come into power in September of last year, and as the new law is being strongly resisted by the opposition and it is unclear whether it will pass in its current form,⁷ a discussion of the latest proposals for change is not provided in this thesis. In my analysis of the legal aspects of citizenship I will exclusively focus on the current law.

The restrictive nature of German citizenship legislation is only one – yet the most obvious and arguably the most consequential – manifestation of the exclusion experienced by most members of ethnic minorities in Germany.⁸ The political assumption underlying German 'immigration policies', namely that immigration has not taken place and that former 'Gastarbeiter' and their offspring who reside in Germany are not really part of the German population, has also resulted in their being ignored as regards the design of social, economic and cultural policies. Although it is correct to state that hardly anyone "can legally enter the Federal Republic without immediately being endowed with nearly the full range of social rights" (Radtke 1994, p. 33) I argue that, due to their marginal or second class status, members of ethnic minorities cannot access these social

rights to their full extent. For example, in comparison with the German population, ethnic minority members have a higher unemployment rate, particularly regarding long-term and youth unemployment. As a consequence of their marginal position in the labour market, minority households have in general less income at their disposal than those of Germans. Children and young persons of minority background perform far worse in school than their German counterparts, and members of ethnic minorities are more likely to live in urban districts with a low tax base and consequently 'enjoy' poorer quality social facilities. Access to social rights does not automatically go hand in hand with an actual enjoyment of these rights, if the underlying policies – as is the case in Germany - fail to meet particular needs of members of ethnic minorities and neglect their disadvantaged standing in society. Clearly, such a negligent treatment is less likely to have adverse consequences for policy makers in a situation where those affected are not able to express their dissatisfaction at the ballot box.

Citizenship's ultimate link to the problem of unequal distribution of resources in society leads us to the third dimension of citizenship to be discussed in the analysis of the German case study. This is the question of engagement and participation or, to use a popular catch-phrase, 'citizenship from below'. What strategies do members of ethnic minorities apply in order to establish themselves as equal members of German society, both despite, and in light of, their exclusion from formal and substantial citizenship? Furthermore, what additional 'practices', for

example as regards religion, do they want to have recognised and tolerated by the state as complementary and accepted features of German society? Finally, to what extent do members of ethnic minorities contribute to, or even induce, a transformation of citizenship in their endeavour to articulate and to realise their interests?

In order to discuss these questions it is important to carry out the analysis on two levels. Firstly on the level of 'organised' articulation of interests and secondly the development of strategies on an every day level. Regarding the former it becomes apparent that thus far only a marginal, but currently increasing, number of ethnic minority members have chosen to further their interests by joining political parties. Outside the 'political mainstream' however, a plethora of immigrant organisations – according to the Berlin Institute of Comparative Social Research there are around 800 to 1,000 such organisations just in Berlin – seek to advance the interests of minority members in primarily two ways: a) by providing crucial social and cultural services that are neglected or ignored by mainstream society; and b) by trying to incorporate 'minority politics' onto the agenda of political parties and policy makers. An analysis on the every day level should capture the attitudes of 'unorganised' members of ethnic minorities towards, and their practical strategies with regard to, the German politics of citizenship. What for example are the reasons for applications for naturalisation, and what are the barriers to undertake this step? To what extent is the rejection of dual nationality an important issue for ethnic minorities in Germany?

OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS

This dissertation is divided into three main parts: firstly an analysis of theoretical and methodological issues; secondly an analysis of citizenship as enforced and administered by the state; and finally an analysis of citizenship demands and strategies adopted by members of the ethnic minorities in Germany.

In the following chapter I will outline the underlying methodology and applied methods for carrying out this research. Chapter three is concerned with challenges to citizenship that occur in countries of immigration. In order to discuss the value of citizenship at a time when the nation state is starting to lose some of its supremacy it seems logical to first pose the question: to what extent citizenship is actually tied to the nation state? This discussion is followed by an outline of those elements that are commonly attributed to modern citizenship and a summary of the concept's conceptualisation in modern political thought. Third, I will discuss problems that occur between three main tenets of modern citizenship on the one hand (namely the insistence on the concept's national enclosure, its claim of universality, and its traditional location in a narrowly defined public realm) and the needs of immigration countries on the other.

In chapters four and five I will provide detailed information on citizenship legislation and policies on both the national and the local level (Germany,

Berlin and one city district, Kreuzberg). Both chapters aim at describing the context in which the struggles around citizenship takes place. The main concern of chapter four is to provide an overview of immigration flows into Germany, to outline the fundamental principals guiding governmental reaction to migratory movements and to analyse in detail both the legal framework for the allocation of citizenship in Germany as well as recent data on naturalisation. Given the current political debate, particular focus is given to the question of dual citizenship. Chapter five will deal with the politics of citizenship on the *Länder* level (Berlin) and the local level (Kreuzberg). I have chosen to narrow the scope of analysis to the *Länder*/urban level for a number of reasons. Most importantly, elements of citizenship policies both regarding its formal attribution (for example, toleration of dual citizenship, discretionary allocation of citizenship), and its social dimension (for example education) fall under the competence of German *Länder*. Furthermore, conflicts around unequal distribution of resources are often fought and conditioned by urban/local conditions.

In chapters six, seven and eight I will analyse the strategies of Berliners of Turkish origin in order to establish themselves as equal members of German society. Chapter six is based on interviews with young Berliners of Turkish origin. These interviews provide rare insights into young people's attitudes towards, and actually applied strategies with regard to, formal citizenship. Although I argue that they actively contribute to the transformation of citizenship on an every-day level, I will however

emphasise at the same time the limits of their agency. This is particularly constrained by their disadvantaged position in the area of education. Chapters seven and eight are concerned with forms and content of political organisation of Berliners of Turkish origin. In this context, I have carried out interviews with individuals who are involved in mainstream German party politics and those working in immigrant organisations. Focus is given to those aspects of their political involvement that transcend the scope of what is traditionally perceived as 'national political affairs'. In chapter seven I will a) analyse the motives for the involvement of Berliners of Turkish origin in political parties, i.e. the *CDU*, *FDP*, *DIE GRÜNEN*, *PDS* and the *SPD*, b) discuss their political concerns and c) the ways in which they seek to articulate their interests within the party framework and the problems they encounter by seeking to put their interests onto the parties' agenda. In chapter nine I will first provide an overview of central aspects concerning the emergence of organisations of Berliners of Turkish origin. Second the content and form of the work of three immigrant organisations will be discussed, these are the *Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin (TGB)*, the *Türkischer Bund Berlin-Brandenburg (TBB)* and the *Türkischer Frauenverein in Berlin (BTKB)*. The main argument in these chapters is that – within the limits of restrictive structural conditions – Berliners of Turkish origin mediate and enforce the transformation of modern citizenship.

Chapter nine will summarise the main findings. They will be discussed in the context of *Ruth Lister's* question posed at the beginning as to whether the concept of citizenship retains any value in contemporary societies.

ENDNOTES CHAPTER 1

¹ The dispersion of national power changes the politics of citizenship: On the one hand, it is increasingly difficult for national governments to determine and to guarantee citizens' rights independently from other political forces. In this context, not only external influences (e.g. European legislation to be adopted by member states of the EU are encoded and enforced by such bodies as the International Court and the European Court of Justice) can be decisive, but also challenges from within, for example by city or regional governments. On the other hand, participation and even representation in the polity are increasingly matters beyond the jurisdiction of national governments and nation states. A good example for this is the attempt by the European Union to create a European citizenship and to define the political rights of European citizens with the member states by granting local and European voting rights (*Meehan 1993*).

² For an interesting critical discussion of an assumed expansion of human rights cross-nationally, see *Sterett (forthcoming)*.

³ See for example *Ruth Lister 1997; Carol Pateman 1970; Henry Tam 1998; Michael Walzer 1983, 1992*.

⁴ It is also surprisingly recent, so that in Switzerland female suffrage was only achieved in 1970.

⁵ In this context *Ruth Lister's* work has greatly influenced my ideas. She seeks to establish a "synthesising thread" between the two main traditions of citizenship, civic republicanism and liberal rights, via the idea of human agency (*Lister 1997*).

⁶ An attempt in this direction was made by *Soysal*, however she tries to analyse "cross-national patterns of incorporation" of "Turkish guestworkers" in six European countries (Germany, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK) and – due to the scope of study – is not able to provide detailed empirical analyses.

⁷ Currently the CDU/CSU collects signatures against a formal toleration of dual citizenship as a matter of law and demands the holding of a referendum on this topic (see a discussion in *Der Spiegel*, 11.1.1999). In February 1999, the new government seems to backing out of its proposals regarding dual citizenship. After it lost the regional election in Hesse at the 8th of February – with significant consequences regarding the Red/Green majority in Germany's upper house, the *Bundesrat*, voices from within the upper echelons of the SPD already point out that "one should find a consensus in this question" (*Oskar Lafontaine, SPD Finance Minister (chancellor) and head of party, Frankfurter Rundschau 9.2.1999*).

⁸ The special case of EU citizens residing in Germany will be discussed in the course of the thesis.

Chapter 2

METHODS AND METHODOLOGY

This thesis is based on empirical research that was carried out in Berlin in October/November 1996, from April to June 1997 and in May 1998. During this fieldwork, I have collected primary and secondary literature and data sources that are of relevance for the German case study. This collection of material was supplemented through interviews with a small number of a) civil servants, officials and politicians at the city level; and b) with members/employees of social initiatives. Additional essential background information was collected in meetings with academics and journalists. Furthermore, I conducted qualitative, semi-structured interviews with a) young Berliners of Turkish origin, and with persons of the same background who are b) active members of German political parties and trade unions; c) active in immigrant organisations.¹

The empirical material is used as a means to contribute to and develop the theory of citizenship. By seeking to analyse the concept of citizenship on the basis of qualitative data, this thesis represents what *Schatzman* and *Strauss* categorise as an 'analytical description' (1973).

THREE METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

A crucial first step in any form of sociological/scientific inquiry is that of defining clearly the phenomenon under investigation (*Snizek et al 1979, p. 81*). What exactly are we looking at and why do we think that our chosen focus will provide valuable sociological insights, that is knowledge about society and the individuals therein. This thesis, as has been pointed out before, aims at a) examining the limits of modern citizenship in immigration countries, b) identifying those processes that induce a transformation of citizenship; and c) analysing the role played by members of ethnic minorities in bringing about this transformation. In doing so I seek to add insight to three questions that are at the heart of the study of sociology. First, what are the causes for, and the effects of, social exclusion? Second, what strategies are, or can be employed, to overcome social exclusion? Finally, how do individual and or group actions relate to structural conditions and vice versa?

It is of course stating the obvious, that the process of identifying and formulating the research problem does not start from point zero. Rather, it is influenced by certain sociological traditions, or more generally, by approaches that exist in the wider field of social science. The employment of such approaches, as *Treibel* has pointed out, is not always an entirely conscious decision, but can at the same time be a more indistinct process as our analytical perception is influenced by arguments that are almost automatically applied (*see Treibel 1993, p. 10*).

1) This thesis is in general orientated towards those approaches that seek to overcome the dualism between micro- and macroscopic sociology, i.e. that focus on the interrelationship between state, society and individuals and/or groups. *Juckes* and *Barresi* have pointed out that difficulties that arise in developing a perspective of the “individual society connection” have resulted from “theorists’ attempting to *reduce* society to (a mass of) individual action, or individuals to (functionaries in a constituting and coercing) society.” (*Juckes and Barresi 1993, p. 197*). The discussion against the reductionism of either of the two approaches has led some theorists to attempt a combination of both. *Simmel* for example, suggests that each can be relevant in order to obtain different, but equally important, perspectives into the object under investigation

We obtain different pictures ... when we see it at a distance of two, or of five, or of ten yards. At each distance ... however, the picture is “correct” in its particular way ... a view gained at any distance whatever has its own justification. It cannot be replaced or corrected by any other view emerging at another distance. In a similar way, when we look at human life from a certain distance, we see each individual in his precise differentiation from all other. But if we increase our distance, the single individual disappears, and there emerges, instead, the picture of a “society” with its own forms and colors. (*Simmel 1970, quoted in Bealer 1979, p. 90*)

Others seek to establish a single model in which both approaches are combined. This thesis largely conforms to this perspective. In my analysis, I do not only focus on the politics of citizenship as enforced and administered by the German state and its exclusionary outcome, but I try at the same time to conceptualise citizenship as a process that is altered by 'semiautonomous' individuals (*see Elias 1970, p. 11*), in this case Berliners of Turkish origin. In particular the concept of 'agency' has informed my approach. Agency can be broadly defined as "the ability to engage in intentional, goal-directed action" (*Juckes and Barresi 1993, p. 202*)² This action however does not take place in a vacuum, but is both embedded in social relations (*Gould 1988*) and affected by social structures (*Giddens 1988*).

2) Furthermore, some scholars have applied the concept of 'agency' as the "synthesising thread" between the two historical traditions of citizenship, the republican and the liberal debate (*see in particular Lister 1997, but also Turner 1993*). *Lister's* adoption of a critical synthetic approach holds two benefits. First, citizenship emerges as a dynamic concept in which "process and outcome stand in dialectical relationship to each other" (*Lister 1997. P. 36*). Second, it establishes a dialogue between the main approaches of citizenship that is generally regarded as crucial for the advancement of citizenship studies (*Dagger 1997*). By interlinking three dimensions of citizenship, that of citizenship as a status, citizenship as a system of rights, and citizenship as a form of participation,

I have adopted the central elements of this discussion, while at the same time contributing to it.

3) Citizenship studies are in need of an empirical dimension. To date, there has been little empirical investigation within citizenship studies in general, and in those that are concerned with the transformation of citizenship in particular. Accounts of multi-cultural, transnational, or global citizenship (*Kymlicka 1995, Bauböck 1994, Turner 1993*), post-national membership (*Soysal 1994*), or multi-layered feminist perspectives on citizenship (*Lister 1997*) are largely formulated by applying ideas from an 'established formal theory' (*Glaser and Strauss 1967, p. 33*). Only a few, such as *Ireland's* (1994) empirical study on political participation, or case studies dealing with 'citizenship construction' at the city level have sought to base their theoretical discussion on empirical material (see *Environment and Planning 1994, vol. 26*). The qualitative research that I have carried out in Berlin will illuminate what have thus far been predominantly abstract and theoretical accounts of citizenship.

METHODS

Before describing the actual techniques of how the empirical material of this thesis was collected, I would first like to explain my choice of geographical focus (Germany and Berlin/Kreuzberg). I have chosen Germany as my critical case study; partly because of my knowledge of the

German language, German debates and existing academic contacts in Germany. However, over and above this, Germany provides – as has been argued before - an excellent example of an arena where conflicts have arisen between the national enclosure of citizenship and the struggle for a more broadly and inclusively defined concept. The analysis has been narrowed down further to the level of Berlin and one of its districts, Kreuzberg, for a number of reasons: a) I had to make the empirical investigation of this study manageable and realistic; b) every capital city has perhaps a greater symbolic presence in the 'nation's' self-image than that of other cities; c) some aspects of formal and social citizenship fall under the authority of Germany's *Bundesländer* (Berlin is one) and not under that of the national government; d) the notion of the city is implicit in many discussions on citizenship; e) conflicts around social rights are often fought over and conditioned by urban/local conditions; f) strategies by individual members of ethnic minorities to establish themselves as equal members of German society are largely directed at their immediate environment and social relations; g) the political involvement of members of ethnic minorities tends to be located at the local/city level, owing to their general exclusion and underrepresentation at the national political level (*Holston and Appadurai 1996; Pincetl 1994*).

Furthermore, I have chosen to focus on one minority group, namely Berliners of Turkish origin. The reason for choosing this particular group is threefold. On the one hand, Berliners of Turkish origin constitute the largest minority group in Germany/Berlin. On the other, people of Turkish

origin are the main reference point in the debate around citizenship in Germany and are themselves most actively involved in this debate. Finally, as regards political participation, Berliners of Turkish origin are involved in mainstream German parties and have set up a plethora of immigrant organisations that are concerned with a wide variety of issues. People of Turkish origin are of fundamental importance to German politics and provide a litmus test in the national debate around citizenship and integration policy.

A variety of methods were used in the course of this thesis. In addition to an extensive and detailed critical review of secondary literature on citizenship, I have collected and analysed primary and secondary source materials on German/Berlin citizenship policies. The focus here was on the attribution of rights, the emergence of dual citizenship, policies regarding naturalisation and access to citizenship as well as the socio-economic position of Berliners of Turkish origin in Berlin and in the district of Kreuzberg. Furthermore, academic literature dealing with German immigration policies was critically analysed and incorporated.

The data collection through primary and secondary literature and data sources was supplemented and extended through six sets of semi-structured interviews. At this stage it is important to emphasise that I had lived in Berlin for many years prior to migrating to the UK and have worked on related issues at the *Berliner Institut für Vergleichende Sozialforschung* (BIVS - Berlin Institute for Contemporary Social Studies).

In addition, I had conducted a short study on German citizenship policies for the European Union Human Capital and Mobility Programme. This background provided me with ample personal and professional contacts that were invaluable for conducting the qualitative research in Berlin. For the establishment of new contacts, particularly those with young Berliners of Turkish origin and those who work in immigrant organisations, it was however beneficial that I no longer live and work in Berlin. I frequently discovered that it was a positive asset to be affiliated to an English, as opposed to a German university, and the fact that I live in London was credited by the youngsters.

The first set of interviews included employees of the offices of the *Ausländerbeauftragten* at the national (one branch is located in Berlin rather than Bonn), *Landes*-, and local level. These interviews were beneficial in getting up-to-date information on, and improved understanding of, governmental policies and discussions as regards citizenship. In order to obtain a better insight into the wider social context of the city, and in particular into the distinct situation in Kreuzberg, I conducted a second set of interviews with members/employees of social and anti-racist initiatives in this district. Additional and essential background information was thirdly collected in meetings/interviews with academics and journalists.

Access to Berliners of Turkish origin who are active members in German political parties and trade unions was unproblematic. Members of the

Abgeordnetenhaus were contacted directly. There were extremely open and spent much time in discussing their views and aspects of their work. These interviews provided further contact to other Berliners of Turkish origin who are actively involved in political parties and trade unions and with whom I conducted interviews subsequently.

A fifth set of semi-structured interviews was carried out with Berliners of Turkish origin who were organised in immigrant organisations. These were a) two umbrella organisations that are primarily concerned with immigration politics, i.e. that focus on the improvement of the political and socio-economic situation of people of Turkish origin in Germany, or more specifically in Berlin (the *Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin (TGB)* and the *Türkischer Bund Berlin-Brandenburg (TBB)*); b) organisations of Berliners of Turkish origin that represent the interests of particular groups within the 'Turkish' population in Berlin, these were the students' organisation *Türkisches Wissenschafts- und Technologiezentrum (BTBTM)* and the women's association *Türkischer Frauenverein in Berlin (BTKB)*; the *Kurdistan Kultur- und Hilfsverein e.V.* and the *Kulturzentrum Anatolischer Alewiten*, c) organisations with a primarily Islamic orientation, these were the *Milli Görüs* and the *Verein Vergessene Jugend e.V.* (the Association of Forgotten Youth). Key questions in the interviews concerned the focus of their work, their co-operation with other groups, the form of their activities, established contacts with policy-makers and bureaucrats, and their demands vis-à-vis formal German citizenship policies.

The organisations were chosen with the help of computerised data and address lists at the Berlin Institute for Comparative Social Research along with expert advice (academics, journalists, politicians/bureaucrats) regarding relevance and access. With the exception of Islamic organisations, it was unproblematic to set up interviews. In the case of the *Milli Görüs* and the *Verein Vergessene Jugend e.V.* the situation was more complicated. This was not however due to the fact that these groups were less open or less willing to give interviews in principle. Rather, the extremely negative media coverage on the 'danger of Islamic Fundamentalism' at the time (Spring and Summer 1997), in particular regarding the work of the *Milli Görüs*, caused great concern amongst the organisation's leadership and understandably resulted in their hesitance to make themselves available for further interviews. I remained in contact with both organisations throughout Autumn and Winter 1997 and was able to conduct interviews in May 1998.

However, in the course of analysing my qualitative material, I finally decided to focus on the work of just three out of a total of eight organisations, namely on the work of the two umbrella organisations and the women's organisation. An inclusion of all associations would have gone beyond the scope of this thesis. Furthermore, regarding an adequate analysis of the work of the Kurdish and Alevi organisations as well as of the *Milli Görüs*, a more detailed understanding and analysis of Turkish politics is necessary. This is not to say that these organisations are primarily involved in what is generally referred to as 'home-orientated'

politics, but their interconnections with conflicts (and institutions) in Turkey, that in many respects influence their work in Germany, are complex and require a well informed and clearly focused investigation.

Finally, I conducted semi-structured interviews with 25 (13 male, 12 female) young persons of Turkish origin aged 16 to 24. The content of the interviews concerned primarily the attitudes and interests of young people vis-à-vis the question of formal citizenship, their perception of their acceptance by wider German society, experiences of discrimination, and their future prospects. Access was established a) through three schools in Kreuzberg, including a *Haupt-*, *Real-*, and *Gesamtschule* (in 13 cases); b) one girls' group in Kreuzberg (in 4 cases); and two immigrant organisations (in 8 cases). Although the interviews are exclusively used as illustrations and – given the small sample - not as representative material, I have conducted interviews with equal numbers of young women and men. Furthermore, I have sought to include young people from a variety of social, ethnic and religious backgrounds. The possibility of achieving this aim was increased by accessing young persons through different school forms and immigrant organisations.

Before conducting the interviews with young people, I met with teachers, headteachers and social workers in order to guarantee their consent. Furthermore, these professionals were important in establishing contact and facilitating the interviews. The headteachers and teachers of the three schools granted their pupils leave from lessons for the duration of

the interview and gave me permission to conduct the interviews within school premises. Beforehand I had to secure the permission of the Department of Education of the Berlin Senate. The interviews with girls from the girls' group and young persons affiliated to immigrant organisations were also conducted within the premises of these centres/organisations. Only one interview was carried out in a private flat.

For the atmosphere during the interviews it was important to meet the young persons 'on their turf' and furthermore, to meet them in groups. I only made appointments in three cases to meet young persons individually. These three were a little older (18-24) and felt more comfortable in meeting me on their own. However, as I spent whole mornings or afternoons in the company of the groups, and as we did not only sit in one room in a rather strict interview situation, it was also possible to speak to the young people individually, or in groups of two.

During the fieldwork, care was taken to explain the nature and intent of the research and to secure the consent of the interviewees. Participants were asked beforehand, whether they agreed to the interview being recorded. In most cases the interviewees agreed. All the interviews with young people were recorded and they were assured that their anonymity was preserved. During those interviews where I could not use the tape-recorder, I took extensive notes which were written up in the form of a report immediately after the interview, or – depending on circumstances –

later the same day. Recorded interviews were transcribed, and the original transcription was later organised according to sub-headings.

A note on the translation of German material: My translation of quoted text from German sources (publications or reports) is indicated in the text. I have not indicated the translation of quotes taken from interviews, which were all conducted in German, and have been translated by me. In this context it is important to point out one factor that characterises the translated quotes of young people. The quality of their German was, at times, rather poor. However, given the fact that the content of their statements is being analysed, it was from my point of view more beneficial to focus in the translation on content rather than form. As a result the translation is in some cases more articulate than the original.

A note on terminology: “‘Gastarbeiter’ is a word I love. When I encounter it I always picture two people: one is just sitting there as a guest, and the other is working” (*Emine Sevgi Özdamar*)³ Writing about the situation of ethnic minorities in Germany bears a whole array of difficulties with regard to terminology. Terms like ‘Gastarbeiter’, ‘foreigner’ or ‘migrants’ are still used, but have been avoided in this thesis (or put into inverted commas). They contain assumptions about temporariness or recent arrival that do not capture the experience of settled ethnic minority groups. Furthermore, they add to the construction of ethnic minorities as ‘outsiders’ and not as full members of German society. The application of the term ‘immigrant’ also contains difficulties as a large proportion of the second generation

was born in Germany and did not immigrate. When using the term 'immigrant' in this thesis, I refer to the first generation, otherwise I will refer to 'immigrants and their offspring', or more generally 'ethnic minorities'.

However, when referring to statistical data, using the term 'ethnic minorities' includes some inconsistencies. German statistics are exclusively based on categories reflecting the Individual's nationality and not his or her ethnic background. That means for example that the number of 'Turkish' residents in Berlin is not congruent with the number of people of Turkish origin as some have become naturalised. With an increase of naturalisation rates and the possible introduction of elements of the *ius soli* principle, it is likely that debates similar to those around the census in Britain are also going to take place in Germany. The term 'people' or 'Berliners of Turkish origin' as used throughout this thesis does not refer to an ethnic background, but to the country of origin, as it also includes for example, Kurds or Alevis.

ENDNOTES CHAPTER 2

- ¹ A list of interviews can be found in the Annex.
- ² For a discussion on 'agency' see: *Bhaskar 1979, Giddens 1991, James 1984*.
- ³ *Emine Sevgi Özdamar* is an actress and author who writes and publishes her work in German. She was quoted in *Horrocks and Kolinsky 1996*.

Chapter 3

CITIZENSHIP: THE CHALLENGE OF DIVERSITY

"The urge forward along the path [towards an ideal of citizenship] ... is an urge towards a fuller measure of equality, an enrichment of the stuff of which the status is made and an increase in the number of those on whom the status is bestowed." (T.H. Marshall 1950).

Citizenship is a contested concept. Looking at the endless list of publications dealing with this subject, any commentator is left somewhat puzzled and confused regarding the variety of foci that are discussed. There is no one accepted theory of citizenship that can be easily applied as the wider analytical frame for academic investigation (see *Kymlicka and Norman 1994; Martiniello 1997*). Consequently, attempts that deal with contemporary challenges for, and the transformation of, citizenship – as does this thesis – are based on different starting points and come to conclusions that often appear to be unconnected, conflicting or even mutually exclusive.

The central task for the advance of citizenship studies is to initiate a dialogue between distinct discourses. This – as has been pointed out before – is attempted in this study. The first step along this difficult path will be undertaken in this chapter: I will try to incorporate three debates concerning the subject of citizenship, namely those that emphasise the

formal aspects of citizenship, its perception as a set of rights, and its participatory dimensions. Such an approach will throw light from different abstract angles upon the central questions of this chapter: Why is a nationally based concept of citizenship inadequate for meeting the needs of immigration countries? At what points can we observe citizenship becoming increasingly oblivious to national boundaries?

The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, I will discuss the issue of whether citizenship is inextricably linked to the nation state. Second, those elements that are commonly attributed to modern citizenship shall be elucidated and its conceptualisation in modern political thought outlined. Finally, I will analyse the benefits, limits and fallacies of this concept in the context of immigration countries.

CITIZENSHIP AND THE NATION STATE

A reasonable starting point for a discussion about the value of citizenship at a time when a) the role of the nation state appears to have become less pivotal and b) ethnically heterogeneous societies challenge a traditional perception of 'national communities', is the question of whether citizenship is inextricably linked to nationalism, national identity and the nation-state. If this is the case, any attempt to transform it into a concept that is sensitive towards the needs of contemporary societies would by definition be doomed from the start.

Bryan Turner contends that contemporary ideas on citizenship are essentially modern and emerged as a result of the French and Industrial Revolutions. His claim to citizenship's modernity is based on the assumption:

...that the evolution of citizenship participation is founded on a number of structural and cultural preconditions: a city culture, secularization, the decline of particularistic values, the emergence of the idea of a public realm, the erosion of particularistic commitments and the administrative framework of the nation-state. (*Turner 1993, p. i*)

What has to be stressed here is one rather crucial and obvious element of citizenship that is implied in *Turner's* approach, but one that is all too often neglected - namely the fact that citizenship depends on structural conditions. As *Turner* points out, modern citizenship is a distinct form of citizenship that differs fundamentally from classical, Roman, or medieval concepts. It could only arise on the basis of certain structural conditions that had developed over time. Both the form and the content of citizenship are thus not static or fixed but they have changed and shifted according to transformations of the structural conditions that gave rise to the concept's principal elements in the first place. A prerequisite of, and the motor for, these transformations and for changes in the concept of citizenship are - as *Turner* has argued - ruptures in class relations (*Turner 1986, 1993*).

“[T]he political, legal, territorial and moral boundaries of citizenship *change* only when the existing class relations are threatened by the emergence of new forces” (*Isin 1997, p. 118*). Citizenship is thus essentially a reflection and an outcome of struggles over resources and privileges in society. The perception of citizenship as such a ‘mirror image’ and an emphasis on its conditions rather than on its particular content (*Isin 1997*) is a useful way to theorise its transformational potential.

The work of *Turner (1986, 1990)* *Mann (1986, 1987)* and more recent contributions by scholars such as *Engin F. Isin (1997)* have helped to understand the shifting nature of citizenship, both with regard to time and place. *Isin* - basing his argument on *Mann’s* exposition in *The Sources of Social Power (1986)* - seeks to establish a theoretical and empirical framework toward a genealogy of the citizen and highlights the episodic nature of the concept of citizenship. He describes class, territory and capital as conditions of citizenship and he outlines significant historical episodes “in which these conditions created different ideal types of citizen: warrior-citizen, peasant-citizens, patrician-citizen, plebeian-citizen, artisan-citizen, bourgeois-citizen, and worker-citizen.” (*Isin 1997, p. 115*)

Isin defines classes in the *Weberian* sense as a group of individual people who are in a similar market situation by sharing similar access to resources or forms of capital.¹ The access to different forms of capital

(means of warfare, property, cultural capital/knowledge) conditions the power that classes have at their disposal. A class can only effectively challenge established power relations when it gains new or increased access to forms of capital. Resulting demands that are formulated to ensure access to political and economic privileges and resources, transform the content and the form of citizenship.

A second structural condition is - according to *Isin* - the territory. He defines citizenship as a 'territorial institution' and states that struggles over privileges and rights have taken place within territorial boundaries which were the physical reflection of socio-economic and political interdependencies and power relations. "As citizenship embodies political, legal and moral boundaries within which a political practice becomes possible, it also defines territorial boundaries within which other boundaries gain content" (*Isin 1997, p. 119*). For most of its existence, the principal territory for the practice of citizenship has been the city and "[i]t was only in modernity that the territorial boundaries of citizenship moved beyond the city and gained content at the level of the nation-state" (*Isin 1997, p. 119*).

It might be useful at this stage to point to three pre-modern developments which were both decisive for this transformation and which illustrate the relationship between territory and power relations²: First, with the rise of absolute monarchies after the 16th century, the medieval pattern of political life - i.e. the supremacy of autonomous jurisdictions - was

destroyed and replaced by the concentration of power in the hands of the king; hence the centre of power was transferred from the city to the central administration of territorial states. *Bendix*, adopting *Tocqueville's* analysis formulated in *The Old Regime and the Revolution*, describes how the corporate identity of these autonomous jurisdictions has been fully eradicated by the *ancien régime*. The granting of privileges (e.g. tax exemptions) to the urban nobility procured their consent to royal absolutism and although the city merchants as a result harboured a substantial degree of anti-aristocratic sentiment they conceded in order to guarantee preferential treatment for themselves. "[N]othing had been left that could obstruct the central government, but, by the same token, nothing could shore it up" (*Tocqueville, quoted in Bendix 1977, p. 58*). Second, in medieval political life the participation in the struggles over resources and privileges depended on hereditary privilege or institutional immunity as in the case of the Church or municipal corporations. Rights and liberties were not granted to individuals but to corporations or estates who demanded recognition of new and autonomous jurisdictions. Peasants, workmen or artisans were only indirectly - in their role as subjects of an autonomous sovereign, i.e. as fiefs of a lord or members of a guild or town - involved in political action. With the rise of absolute monarchies "a new pattern of class relations emerges, replacing the earlier traditional one by an individualistic authority relationship" (*Bendix 1977, p. 67*). Third, this new pattern of class relations resulted in new forms of conflict and the emergence of a new set of ideas vis-à-vis the status of individuals. According to *Bendix*,

[t]he appeals of populist legitimism and the claim ... to be 'fathers of their people' and 'first servants of the state' are harbingers of equalitarianism and the nation-state in societies marked by hereditary privilege and great differences in rank. Where all people have rights, where all are the subjects of one king, where the king in turn exercises supreme authority over everyone - we get a first intimation of 'national citizenship' (*Bendix 1977, p. 57*).³

However, citizenship's relationship with, and its subsequent transformation within, the borders of the nation state has not resulted in the emergence of one single concept. Similar to the differences that appear in the concept of citizenship over time, significant differences also occur within specific national settings. In this context, it was *Mann (1987)* who provided first systematic arguments. Criticising the *Marshallian* account of citizenship as one that exclusively describes the British (or even English) situation, *Mann* develops a comparative framework that distinguishes five 'strategies of citizenship' that have been pursued by different advanced industrial countries: liberal (the United States and Switzerland), reformist (Britain⁴) authoritarian monarchist (18/19th century Germany, Russia, Austria), fascist (Nazi Germany) and authoritarian socialist strategies (Soviet Union) (*Mann 1987*).

The introduction of a comparative angle as proposed by *Mann* is perceived as a major theoretical contribution towards "the understanding

of the historical processes of citizenship formation” (*Turner 1990, p. 197*). Yet, I disagree with two assumptions that underlie *Mann’s* argument: *Mann’s* understanding of national ‘citizenship strategies’ is based on the assumption that citizenship is a process handed down from above, i.e. he regards citizenship as a ruling class strategy. Furthermore, *Mann* focuses exclusively on class relations and does not consider the impact of other conflicts in the transformation of citizenship, that for example occur along the lines of gender or ethnicity (*Turner 1990 pp. 197-201*). In doing so “*Mann’s* analytical framework appears to preclude any ... consideration of the impact of new social movements on the expansion of citizenship from below” (*Turner 1990, p. 200*). This however is precisely what I will seek to argue with the example of ethnic minorities in Germany.

So far, I have sought to highlight the dependency of the concept of citizenship on structural conditions and accordingly to delineate citizenship as a flexible and constantly changing concept. The nation-state has not given birth to citizenship per se, but to particular forms of citizenship. These forms are currently challenged by, and in tension with, developments that undermine the integrity and supremacy of the nation-state and notions of a national community.

CITIZENSHIP IN MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT

In order to identify those elements of modern citizenship that are incompatible or stand in tension with the social and political reality of immigration countries, it is important firstly to outline the concept's conceptualisation in modern political thought. As pointed out above, citizenship is a contested concept and a clear and exhaustive definition of its main principles have not been elaborated. For the sake of simplicity and relevance to this thesis, I will restrict myself to three main elements that are commonly referred to in the literature: citizenship as membership, as a set of rights and duties, and as a form of political participation and engagement.

(1) Citizenship as the formal membership of a state, or nominal citizenship (Bauböck 1994), determines "those who are, and who are not, members of a common society" (Barbalet 1988, p.1). In this context citizenship serves two functions: firstly, in international law it is a means to associate a person to the authority of one state, and thus establishes the sovereignty of a particular state over individuals. Secondly, on the national level, citizenship functions as a means to draw the line between the "indigenous" and the "foreign" population of a particular state (Preuß 1993).

(2) Being a formal member of a state recognised in international law means having access to a full set of rights. According to the *Marshallian*

distinction, these are civil, political and social rights. They are, in principle, provided for every formal member of any given society and go beyond human rights (for example participation in national elections, access to national welfare provisions). The provision of, and access to, rights - particularly social rights - is regarded as a means of achieving greater social and economic equality within society.

The common starting point in sociological discussions about citizen's rights is the work of *T.H. Marshall*. Describing modern citizenship as a system of rights which both emerged from market relations and supported them, *Marshall* puts at the heart of his analysis the constant tension between the inequalities of the class system and the unaccountability of the marketplace on the one hand and the liberal demand for social and political equality on the other (*Barbalet, 1993, pp. 37-38*). Citizenship is seen as a "buffer" and thus as a means of guaranteeing the equality for members of the national society. *Marshall* is in particular concerned with social rights and sees the role of the welfare system as enabling disadvantaged citizens to exercise civil and political rights fully by providing basic needs. Thus, social citizenship is regarded as the "principal political means for resolving, or at least containing, those contradictions" (*Turner, 1990, p. 191*).

For *Marshall*, "citizenship in general involves an equality of membership status and of ability to participate in a society" (*Roche 1992, p. 19*). It is important to highlight that *Marshall* stresses that for him "[e]quality of

status is more important than equality of income" (*Marshall 1950, p. 56*). In his view a manual worker might accept that he (sic) earns less money than a clerk, as long as he possesses - via the status as equal citizen - the same access to social rights (education, health etc.) (*Marshall 1950, p. 82*). From my point of view *Marshall's* account of social rights can be best understood with a metaphor he applies himself: in his discussion of whether "there are natural limits to the ... drive towards greater social and economic equality" (*Marshall 1950, p. 48*) *Marshall* poses the question as to whether it is possible to convert the design of society from that of a skyscraper to that of a bungalow (*Marshall 1950, p. 47*). He draws the conclusion that the answer has to be no. The structure of modern society is set by capitalism and is thus by definition characterised by a hierarchy of social classes. The transformation of the skyscraper into a bungalow could only be achieved by the dismantlement of capitalist structures - and thus the cradle of modern citizenship and the financial source of the modern welfare system. This certainly is a scenario which contradicts both *Marshall's* theoretical considerations and his political convictions. Remaining with his metaphor, *Marshall's* idea of social citizenship does not pull down the skyscraper, but equips it with a sufficient number of stairs and lifts which guarantee access to the upper floors and provide equal services for all stories of the building.

(3) The rights debate which is particularly prominent in Britain is challenged by a variety of approaches that emphasise the duties, responsibilities⁵ and virtues of citizenship. Without discussing the duties

discourse⁶ let me outline the main ideas within these approaches that emphasise political participation and civic engagement - as this will be of crucial importance later. Generally referred to as the republican tradition, the emphasis here is on “the public community and political participation therein”⁷ (*Lister 1995, p.6*). The citizen is primarily regarded as an active and responsible participant and contributor to the ‘common good’. It is argued that an exclusive focus on the citizen as bearer of certain rights promotes first of all self-interest and thus carries the danger of ‘blinding’ the individual to the wider needs of the community (*Dagger 1997, p. 3*). Responsible activity can either involve the fulfilment of citizen’s duties - such as voting, paying taxes or acting as a juror - or forms of political involvement and political participation (other than voting). An activity becomes responsible and turns into a citizen’s activity if a) it is an activity carried out in the public domain; and b) it goes beyond self-interest and serves a general public good.

I will argue below that these three traditional perceptions of modern citizenship - citizenship as membership of a national community, equality of status as guarantor of equality of opportunity, and citizenship as a form of political participation that transcends particularity in order to secure a common good - stand in tension to the realities and needs of poly-ethnic societies.

CHALLENGES TO MODERN CITIZENSHIP

T.H. Marshall regarded the advent of social citizenship as the end of the long chapter of Europe's history of inequality - not a surprising view for his time. However, many of the *post-Marshallian* developments, most importantly large scale post-war migration and the transformation of European states into increasingly heterogeneous societies as well as the 'de-centred character of politics' (*McGrew 1992*) and the profound dismantling of the *Marshallian* 'buffer' - the welfare state - open new chapters.

For the protagonists of one of these *post-Marshallian* chapters - migrants and ethnic minorities - national modern citizenship presents itself in many respects not as an emancipatory and inclusive concept but rather as a means for, and a signifier of, their exclusion from 'mainstream' society. However, the inability of modern national citizenship to function as an inclusive concept in societies that are characterised by diversity - and thus to adequately react to the needs of today's societies - at the same time undermines citizenship's existing form and therefore poses a challenge to the legal and political framework according to which, citizenship is implemented by the apparatus of the modern nation-state. This challenge can be identified on three levels.

First - with regard to formal citizenship - contemporary societies no longer consist exclusively of formal citizens, but also - and increasingly - of

'resident aliens' (*Hammar 1990; Layton Henry 1990*). In this context the question arises as to whether the granting of citizens' rights is conceptually tied to formal membership of the nation state. Many authors such as *Hammar* (1990) have argued that international labour migration and the development of large settled foreign populations has caused advanced industrial states to erode the distinction between citizens and 'aliens'. As a result a significant number of 'non-citizens' have gained access to a variety of rights - such as social rights and limited political rights - initially reserved for citizens and have also accepted many citizens' obligations. Some of these are enjoyed by all aliens and sometimes they are enshrined in bilateral agreements between states. A simplified categorisation of the population of the EU in terms of their legal status and their resulting access to rights makes the following distinctions (see *Wrench 1996*):

- Citizens living and working within their own country;
- Citizens of an EU Member State who reside in another country within the Union;
- Third country nationals who have full rights of residency and work in a Member State - so called "denizens";
- Political refugees;
- Third country nationals who have leave to stay on the basis of a revocable work permit for a fixed period of time;
- Asylum seekers;

- Undocumented or “illegal” migrants.

The hierarchy illustrates that the question of formal citizenship, or in other words the possession of an appropriate passport, is no longer the all-decisive factor determining access to rights whereas status, in comparison, is crucial (see *Soysal 1994*). Some policies/policy proposals developed in the past demonstrate that both in academic and political discussions it is not regarded as an imperative to link access to full rights in a particular society to the question of formal citizenship. The most obvious example are EU law and the agreements that secure access to rights for EU citizens Europe wide. Other considerable developments in this direction are ongoing discussions about the right of third-country-nationals to vote and stand in local elections and academic work in developing the concept of ‘denizenship’ (*Cohen 1987; Hammar 1990*).

In addition, many people are holders of dual or (more rarely) multiple citizenship, a development that adds to the blurring of the boundary between citizens and non-citizens. Many labour migrants and their families respond to settlement abroad by acquiring the citizenship of their new country but retain the citizenship of their country of birth. Furthermore, an increasing number of children born to parents with different nationalities gain both parental nationalities at birth as a result of the competing citizenship allocations of different sovereign nation states (*Hailbronner 1992*). Dual nationality was traditionally regarded as unusual and unwelcome, something that should be discouraged. Citizens were not

meant to have multiple loyalties and multiple duties which contradicted the traditional view that citizenship and nationality were identical and that the nation-state had the exclusive right to represent its nationals and demand their loyalty.

Secondly, formal membership and equal status as a citizen do not necessarily mean that every citizen actually enjoys, or has access to, the full meaning of citizens' rights. From the beginning of citizenship's modern existence, the group of the nominal citizens has not been congruent with the group who enjoys full rights. The poor, the young, women and black people have been excluded from civil and political rights and have had to fight and struggle against barriers denying them the formal equality up until – as pointed out in the introduction - very recently in certain cases. The common justification for their exclusion was linked either to dependency and the inability to make free decisions (women and the property-less classes) or to undeservedness and 'fitness' (slaves, paupers, non-white South-Africans, African-Americans) (see *Bauböck, 1992, p. 18; Vogel 1991*).

Today, full citizenship rights have been formally extended to nearly all nationals in liberal capitalist societies (with the exception of minors, the mentally ill and prisoners). However, citizens clearly differ with regard to their status, their economic means, and their influence over political decision-making etc. - "some", in the Orwellian formulation, "are still more equal than others". Many scholars - particularly those who argue from a

‘cultural pluralist’ and a ‘gender’ perspective - put at the heart of their analysis of social cleavages and existing inequalities, citizenship’s intrinsic claim to universality. “Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to rights and duties with which the status is endowed” (*Marshall 1950, pp. 28-29*).

In particular much of the feminist literature has sought to lift “the veil of universalism” (*Lister 1997*) and has pointed out that many women still have only limited access to social rights because social rights provisions are in many respects linked to economic activity (such as pensions based on a contributory principle). In a situation where women are predominantly employed in lower paid or part-time jobs and against the background that many women are ‘economically active’ in the so called domestic sphere, the notion of ‘equal treatment’ for ‘equal citizens’ shows inconsistencies. Extending the claim of ‘false universalism’ beyond the category of women *Iris Marion Young (1989)* argues:

... where differences in capacities, values, and behavioural or cognitive styles exist, equal treatment in the allocation of reward according to rules of merit composition will reinforce and perpetuate disadvantage. Equal treatment requires everyone to be measured according to the same norms, but in fact there are no “neutral” norms of behaviour and performance. Where some groups are privileged and others oppressed, the formulation of law, policy and the rules of private institutions tend to be biased in favour of the

privileged groups, because their particular experience implicitly sets the norm. Thus where there are group differences, only attending to such differences can enable the inclusion and participation of all groups in political and economic institutions. This implies that instead of always formulating rights and rules in universal terms, which are blind to difference, some groups sometimes deserve special rights (*Young 1989, p. 269*).

However, although *Marshall's* theoretical account of citizenship implies the formulation of rights in universal terms, he embraces and bases his argument essentially upon the necessity to recognise difference - and I mean here difference that results from hierarchies and structural disadvantage: *Marshall* sees social citizenship - implemented in the form of a universal welfare state - as a means of enabling disadvantaged citizens to fully exercise their citizens' rights and to achieve a higher degree of equality within a particular society ("...indeed the very notion of political equality implies differences to be discounted so that, despite them, people are treated as equals for a specific purpose." *Lister 1995, p. 15*). In this context two questions have to remain open: is citizenship in need of additional rights in order to adequately respond to the exclusion of ethnic minority groups? And should these rights be formulated in universal or particularistic terms. From my point of view, the latter question does not necessarily have to be discussed in mutually exclusive terms. For instance, it may be feasible to think of the implementation of rights that are universally available but that are in fact targeted to overcome the disadvantage of a particular group. The system of 'parental

leave' in Germany, that grants either the mother or the father the right to remain at home, is an example. Such policies avoid the danger of turning a 'difference' that results out of a situation of disadvantage into a difference that is 'characteristic' of certain groups.

Furthermore, the traditionally articulated assumption that citizenship is both based upon, and an expression of, a national culture and a national identity is contested in societies whose members come from diverse ethnic backgrounds. Many minority groups claim - often against the background of their experiences of exclusion and discrimination - the 'right to be different' and demand policies that allow them to express their cultural particularity - for example with regard to language or religion. Clearly, modern societies allow space for expressions of cultural particularity, but this space is restricted to the 'private' domain – as opposed to the public sphere where citizenship is located. Thus conflicts arise in situations where minority groups claim for example public support for bilingual education or their exemption from regulations that hinder their exercise of certain professions due to religious customs – as in the case of young Turkish women in Berlin who would like to join the police force on condition that they can wear a headscarf.⁸ It is in these moments when the expression of cultural particularity enters the 'public' domain that claims for recognition of diversity are regarded as diametrically opposed to the integrative function of citizenship.

Apart from the fact that the perception of the public domain as a 'neutral' and impartial political space that is free from particularity is highly contested⁹, it is also questionable whether special rights for minority groups inevitably contradict the aim of integration. *Will Kymlicka (1995)* for example has argued that special rights for minority groups - both with regard to overcoming inequality and expressing diversity - are in most cases a means of integration and do not necessarily 'pull society apart'.

Thirdly, as mentioned above, citizens' participation is in general defined as an activity that transcends particularity and is directed at the common good of society. Most members of ethnic minorities are however predominantly involved in 'particularistic' politics. The reasons for this can be identified on three levels: a) ethnic minorities are excluded from the formal national political level. Only recently have political parties for example in Britain and in Germany made significant efforts to encourage membership of ethnic minorities; b) particularistic politics reflect the position of ethnic minorities in societies and can be regarded both as a struggle against discrimination and disadvantage and as a strategy to protect their immediate interests. In many cases crucial services - such as employment schemes for ethnic minority youth, health provision for women or refuges for battered women - are not, or only poorly, provided by the mainstream, owing to negligence or ignorance. As a result particularistic engagement is made necessary either by demanding these services or by taking the initiative and by establishing and providing the services by the groups themselves. The refusal to call such activities

'citizens' activities' perpetuates the exclusion of minorities by defining their interests as inessential for the wider community; c) political engagement is not in all cases directed at the situation of the country of residence. Members of minority groups are in many cases involved in, and support a political project in their country of origin or with their originating community - such as the Kurdish diaspora.

SUMMARY

I have sought to show that various forms of citizenship have existed over time and that the content of each form that citizenship has acquired, depends on distinct structural conditions. The emergence of the nation state therefore gave rise to particular forms of citizenship but is not the place of birth of citizenship per se. As citizenship started to move beyond city borders some five hundred years ago, it is unlikely that national borders will remain its last 'container'.

An analysis that focuses on the content of a modern, nationally bounded, concept of citizenship and its application in poly-ethnic societies comes to the conclusion that its main elements - in particular citizenship's link to membership in a national community, its claim that equality of status is a guarantor of equality of opportunity, and its perception as a form of political participation that transcends particularity in order to secure a common good - stand in tension with the realities and needs of societies

that are characterised by a heterogeneous ethnic mix. As a result, such a conception of citizenship leads to the exclusion of minority groups and migrants.

However, an analysis of citizenship should not stop at this point. By also giving analytical focus to the structural conditions of citizenship and by conceptualising citizenship as a flexible and shifting concept, it is possible to discuss the shortcomings of modern citizenship in immigration countries not only with regard to their exclusionary outcome, but at the same time to identify them as a motor for possible changes in the concept of citizenship. It is against this background that I argue that first, the multi-layered character of politics and international migration movements result in a crucial transformation of the concept of citizenship; and that second, this transformation is both mediated and enforced by political actors - i.e. ethnic minorities - whose agendas and activities both cross territorial boundaries and challenge the notion of a national-community.

Finally, a synthesis of liberal and republican traditions of citizenship provides an analytical tool with which to critically discuss those accounts that render citizenship obsolete and that state that citizenship is going to be overtaken by rights that are defined at the international or the supranational level (*Jacobson 1996; Soysal 1994*). As we have seen, rights are only one aspect of citizenship. An analysis that is exclusively based on 'rights', neglects the 'active' dimension of citizenship that allows us to incorporate the role played by members of ethnic minorities in

transforming the concept of citizenship. Furthermore, it underestimates the importance of a 'spatial notion' of citizenship, i.e. the national or local political arenas, that still shape both the living conditions of ethnic minorities and their subsequent struggles for equality. These points will be central to the following discussion on ethnic minorities and citizenship policies in Germany.

ENDNOTES CHAPTER 3

¹ For Weber's definition of class and class situation see: *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 181-182.

² For the following account see *Bendix 1977*, pp. 39-89. For a historical analysis of the transformation of citizenship into a nationally based concept see *Gellner 1983*; *Hobsbawm 1990*; *Mann 1986*; *Marshall 1950*; *Turner 1986*.

³ *Bendix* suggests here that "the idea of a political community involving the people as citizens emerged during the eighteenth century not only in opposition to the *ancien régime* but also to some extent as a part of the ideology of autocratic paternalism" (see *Bendix 1977*, chapter 2, fn 22).

⁴ *Mann* uses British citizenship as an example of both liberal and reformist strategy. According to him, the British strategy turned into a reformist one under the influence of trade union struggles and class conflict (see *Turner 1990*, p. 196).

⁵ However, also proponents of the rights discourse stress that a pre-requisite for guaranteeing individual rights is a sense of responsibility towards the welfare of the community (*Marshall 1950*, p. 70) and that "[e]very right to receive involves an obligation to give" (*Marshall in Roche 1992*, p. 30).

⁶ For a detailed account see *Roche 1992*.

⁷ Debates about rights and duties are in many respects closely linked to debates about participation. Voting for example reflects the interdependence of rights, duties and participation: to go to the polls means on the one hand to exercise an individual right, but at the same time to fulfil the role of the 'good' and 'responsible' citizen and to participate in the wider affairs of society. To attend school does not only mean to enjoy one's social right to education, or to comply with compulsory school attendance, but moreover to learn those basic skills which are regarded as prerequisites for participating in the polity as a competent member.

⁸ Interviews with members of a Turkish girls' group, Berlin, June 1997.

⁹ See for example Bacchi, C. (1990) *Same Difference* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin); Dietz, M. (1991), 'Context is all: feminism and theories of citizenship', in *Daedalus* 116(4), pp. 1-24; Pateman, C. (1989) *The Disorder of Women* (Cambridge, Polity Press); Phillips, A. (1993) *Democracy & Difference* (Cambridge, Polity Press).

Chapter 4

IMMIGRATION AND THE POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP IN GERMANY

"Cynically you may want to say that Germany produces its foreigners itself. Well, a large part of them. And the fact that the children march with a foreigners' status through the nurseries and schools, that is preposterous, that is hostile to integration to the utmost" (Interview with Eckhardt Barthel, 30.4.1997, author's translation)

It is well known that German immigration and citizenship politics are dominated by the proclamation and repetition of a series of myths which are permanently contradicted by reality, most importantly that 'Germany is not a country of immigration', or that its population is 'ethnically homogeneous'. As a consequence of such 'politics of repression' both the settlement of immigrants and continuous migration flows into Germany have, by definition, not become central fields for political intervention.

The espousal of a "counterfactual ideology" in the German partisan discourse on immigration and settlement (see *Faist 1994a*) led in 1991 to the stepping down of *Liselotte Funcke* from her office as the *Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für die Belange der Ausländer*. Although seven years have gone by since her resignation the explosive force of the wording of her press release at that time continues to remain relevant as it is both a telling account of government and party politics vis-à-vis ethnic

minorities in the late 80s and early 90s and as - in the absence of fundamental shifts in this area since its publication - it emphasises most forcefully where urgent action has to be taken up by the new German government:

In particular the lack of support both on the part of the government and the political parties make the work of my office more difficult. In their endeavours for the integration of the foreign population and the tackling of xenophobia, the *Ausländerbeauftragten* on the national, regional and local level as well as those who work in various associations and interest groups ... towards a peaceful social existence, feel themselves abandoned by official institutions. ... An encouragement to promote integration is hardly recognisable, the same can be said as regards effective measures against, and sufficient protection from, xenophobic youth gangs. ... Despite all efforts, an *Ausländerbeauftragte* of the government who is hardly in contact with the government and who is not involved in governmental decisions cannot meet the demands that are requested of her office ... by the German and the foreign population or by interlocutors from abroad..." (*official press release, Bonn, 19.6.1991, quoted in Nirumand 1992, pp. 214-215 - author's translation*)

What is most strikingly conveyed in this statement is the utter disinterest in matters concerning immigration on the part of the government and main political parties and the fact that the *Ausländerbeauftragte*, by her own admission, has had little support by the political establishment on all

levels of German politics and enjoys only a very peripheral, if not negligible, role in the political decision-making process.

This chapter deals with one crucial aspect of immigration policies and - to use *Funcke's* expression - a possible tool to assist "the peaceful social existence" of Germany's heterogeneous population, namely the country's politics of citizenship. These are characterised by highly restrictive approaches regarding the acquisition of citizenship by birth and, until the beginning of the 1990s, through naturalisation. The central part of the following analysis consists of a discussion of fundamental principles guiding German citizenship policies. In this context, first I will summarise Germany's main immigration flows and provide some basic data concerning the country's ethnic minority residents, including a brief discussion of the legal ramifications that result from their status as *Ausländer*. Second, the legal framework for the allocation of citizenship in Germany will be outlined. Here, the naturalisation procedure shall be explained and recent data presented. Against the background that in particular the question of dual or multiple citizenship has become crucially relevant in Germany, I will thirdly discuss both legal and political aspects regarding this issue.

POST-WAR IMMIGRATION TO GERMANY
BASIC DATA AND A BRIEF OUTLINE OF KEY POLITICAL
PRINCIPLES

Since the end of the Second World War Germany has experienced significant immigration - indeed with an intake of more than 20 million people between 1945 and 1992 it has by far the largest number of migrants in Europe (*Faßmann 1992, p. 473*). In a very simplified manner, we may distinguish five distinct immigration cycles: 1) the immigration of approximately 12 million 'ethnic German' *Vertriebene* and *Flüchtlinge*, which lasted until 1961; 2) the recruitment of contract workers, predominantly from Europe's periphery during the economic boom of the 1960s and their transformation from a rotatable workforce into immigrant communities following the halting of recruitment in 1973; 3) the influx of asylum seekers - a migratory flow which started to display significant changes in its causes, countries of origin and numbers in the 1980s; 4) the immigration of 'ethnic German' *Aussiedler* and *Übersiedler*, a perpetual feature in Germany's immigration history; and 5) the new intake of short-term contract workers as well as undocumented workers predominantly from countries of the former Eastern Bloc.

Table 1: 'Foreign' Population (in total and selected countries) living in Germany at 31.12.1996

Nationality	Total Number	Per cent
All EU Nationals	1,839,851	25.2
Austria	184,933	2.5
Greece	362,539	5.0
Italy	599,492	8.2
Portugal	130,842	1.8
Spain	132,457	1.8
All Third Country Nationals	5,474,195	74.8
Bosnia-Herzegovina	340,526	4.7
Croatia	201,923	2.8
Iran	111,084	1.5
Morocco	82,927	1.1
Poland	283,356	3.9
Romania	100,696	1.4
Turkey	2,049,060	28.0
Vietnam	92,291	1.3
Yugoslavia ¹	754,311	10.3
All nationalities	7,314,046	100.0

Source: *Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen 1997, p. 50*

In December 1996 approximately 7.3 million 'non-Germans' were resident in Germany, constituting 8.9 per cent of the population. A quarter of this segment of the population are EU citizens. People of Turkish origin comprise the largest ethnic minority group with 2.05 million (28 per cent), followed by - if the numbers are added together - those immigrants/refugees who originated in countries of the former Yugoslavia (1,3 million; 17.7 per cent) (*Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen 1997, p. 50*).

In 1992, approximately 40 per cent of the 'non-German' population were younger than 25 years old, more than 70 per cent were of 'working age' (18-65 years).² Two-thirds of all children of 'non-German' parents were born in Germany and will be brought up there (*Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für die Belange der Ausländer 1995, p. 16*). In 1995, they constituted 13.1 per cent (99,714) of all children born in Germany. This figure does not include the offspring of mixed parentage (*Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen 1997, p.23 and p.27*).³ At the end of 1996 more than 50 per cent of all 'non-German' residents had been living in Germany for at least 10 years, and nearly one third (29.2. per cent) for more than 20 years. However, it is important to note that these numbers are affected as they a) simply include the age of 'non-German' children born in Germany as 'duration of residence' which is obviously misleading; b) also reflect more recent migratory flows into Germany consisting of asylum-seekers, refugees from the former Yugoslavia, and short-term contract workers who have been living in Germany for a maximum of four years (23.8 per cent). Regarding more specific numbers, i.e. those of former migrants from Turkey and their offspring, it becomes clear that nearly two-thirds of all persons of Turkish origin have been resident in Germany for more than 10 years, or were born in Germany and are older than ten (1,271,183). (*Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen 1997, pp. 83-87*).

The fundamental principal guiding governmental reaction to migratory movements is the differentiation between those migrants who are 'ethnic

Germans⁴ and those who are not, or - to be more precise who originated outside the European Union. On the level of domestic integration policy as well as with regard to border policies there has been a clear division of strategy between policies directed towards 'ethnic peers', and those towards 'non-Germans' - an emphatic integrative concept versus an exclusionist head-in-the-sand approach and an open-door policy versus a fortress mentality.⁵

Ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe are officially not perceived as immigrants because they belong by definition to the German '*Volksgemeinschaft*', and by migrating are simply rejoining their 'natural' community. This view is best expressed in the words of *Alfred Dregger* (*Christlich Demokratische Union - CDU*): "Germany is the *Heimat* of all persecuted and oppressed Germans" (quoted in *Tichy 1993, p. 34 - author's translation*). Although this doctrine - combining the concepts of *Volksgemeinschaft* and diaspora - is constitutionally institutionalised, it is nevertheless regarded sceptically by the bulk of the affluent German population.⁶ The policy implication of this doctrine is and remains - albeit after the end of the Cold War increasingly reluctantly - the provision of a comprehensive support system to guarantee a smooth and quick integration of 'ethnic German immigrants' coming from the East. By definition they have the right to claim German citizenship and therefore receive automatic access to various state support and integration programmes.

For those migrants 'lacking German roots' the situation is rather more complex. Clearly, former '*Gastarbeiter*' from EU Member States, their offspring and new EU immigrants have over time benefited from EU cohesion processes. They have both a secure right of residence and can access most citizens' rights (with the exception of taking up employment as a civil servant and voting in national elections). The impact of EU co-operation and cohesion upon the situation of this particular group of immigrants goes however beyond such mere legal aspects: by belonging to a wider European project they are increasingly portrayed and perceived as 'insiders' who in their values, religion, looks or socialisation share an imagined European heritage and future outlook. Thus, in the case of EU nationals previously established borders between 'us' (in this case the Germans) and 'them' have started to become blurred.⁷

Looking at the situation of ethnic minorities, migrants and refugees who are not holders of a European passport, policies are essentially exclusionary, either internally in the form of their legal status and the absence of measures accommodating their specific situation or externally, by implementing sophisticated means to close Germany's borders. Clearly, as mentioned in the previous chapter, non-EU immigrants and refugees cannot be treated as a 'homogenous' group but they differ significantly as regards their legal status (e.g. Third-Country-Nationals, refugees, asylum seekers, undocumented migrants) and their experiences with the wider German society. In this context differences may occur for example on the basis of the individual's profession, educational

background, his/her country of origin, or for example their physical appearance.

Those residents in Germany who are of Turkish origin have in general a rather secure residence status and have gained access to a whole range of rights that were previously reserved for formal German citizens (for example social rights). Against the background that their legal status - like that of EU nationals - is nearly congruent with the formal citizen status some scholars, in particular *Yasemin Soysal* (1994), have argued that *Staatsangehörigkeit* has therefore lost its importance for former 'guestworkers'. From my point of view such a conclusion can be criticised on several accounts: On the one hand it does not reflect current trends in the actual numbers of applications for naturalisation which show that in particular persons of Turkish origin are increasingly interested in taking up German citizenship (relevant data, both quantitative and qualitative will be provided in the course of this and the following chapters). On the other hand, a discussion of citizenship policies should not only consider the question of whether a particular group may benefit from having access to formal citizenship or not. In particular in the academic fields of social theory and political sociology issues of a more fundamental nature have to be addressed at the same time: these concern first of all a) the current gross democratic abuse of denying the franchise to a significant group of Germany's population and b) the country's official definition of 'who constitutes its people' that is based on ethnicity and that is thus repressing its heterogeneous reality. Currently, an ideology of exclusion

has been incorporated in law that in turn reinforces ideas of 'belonging' and 'otherness'. Both in Germany's citizenship policies and in its *Ausländergesetzgebung* "... ist die Ausgrenzung zur Rechtsform geronnen" ("... exclusion has developed into a legal norm", Söllner 1994, p. 307 - author's translation) and violates the principles of the democratic basic order (*demokratische Grundordnung*).

Before going into the more specific debate around citizenship, I would like to briefly outline the remaining crucial material differences between the formal status of a citizen and that of an '*Ausländer*' - again with the exception of EU citizens. This short exposition will help to understand why - contrary to Soysal's hypothesis - formal citizenship still seems to matter for a large number of Germany's ethnic minorities.

The legal status of an '*Ausländer*' is regulated primarily in the German *Ausländergesetz*, which was revised in 1990. This law regulates questions concerning the granting of residence permits to, and expulsion of, 'foreigners' (with the exception of EU citizens). It is also a means of controlling the influx of new migrants - both by defining visa policies and regulations concerning family reunions, and by providing some exceptions to the general suspension of *Gastarbeiter* recruitment. The disadvantages or even threats that result from the *Ausländerstatus* can be identified on two important levels:

Firstly, as mentioned already, some rights are restricted to German nationals, most importantly the right to vote or to stand for election; becoming a civil servant; or the unconditional right to remain, leave and return to Germany. Furthermore, with regard to the establishment of the European Union and the abolition of internal borders, non EU-citizens living in Germany also face restrictions to their right of free movement within the EU as well as in their ability to take up employment in any of the member states of the European Union.

Secondly, the *Ausländerstatus* goes hand in hand with the formal necessity of applying for, or extending permits to stay in Germany. This can entail exposure to rather long-winded and often irritating or even humiliating bureaucratic procedures: each 'visit' to the *Ausländerbehörde* becomes a clear manifestation and a vivid experience of not being a fully accepted member of German society. Over and above this, as long as a person is officially defined as an *Ausländer* he or she can in extreme cases be expelled - this threat even applies for children of former 'guestworkers' who were born in Germany. According to the *Ausländergesetz*, the denial of a residence permit, rejection of an application for a more secure status, or, in the extreme, authorisation for expulsion can be based on the following: political activities in contradiction to Germany's constitution; participation in violent political activities; appeals for, or threats of, violence in realising political aims; serious offences; dependency on social welfare. The safest residence status is the *Aufenthaltsberechtigung* according to Paragraph 27 *AuslG*.

As a general rule the *Aufenthaltsberechtigung* is granted after eight years of legal residence.⁸ Additional requirements are that the person who applies for such a status is not dependent on welfare; that he or she has contributed over 60 months to the state pension scheme; and that he or she has not committed a serious crime during the past three years before applying. In December 1994, 536,112 persons of Turkish origin, approximately one quarter of the 'Turkish' population resident in Germany, held this status (*Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen 1997, pp. 88-91*). Those immigrants who have an *Aufenthaltsberechtigung* are in a relatively secure position and cannot be expelled for minor legal offences. However, people with more insecure and often shorter-term residence permits (holders of an *Aufenthaltserlaubnis* according to Paragraphs 15 and 17 of the *AuslG* - these are particularly young persons of ethnic minority origin - de-facto refugees, or asylum seekers), who have to renew the right to stay, are in a more tenuous situation. Theoretically, they can for example be victims of expulsion if they are long-term homeless.

Until recently (15th of January 1997) children of parents who originated in Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, or the former Yugoslavia (the non EU 'economic boom' recruitment countries) were in principle exempt from applying for any kind of residence permit. However this exemption was annulled by the previous conservative government and since then even children who were born in Germany have to apply for an *Aufenthaltserlaubnis*.

Although many sources insist that various types of long term residence permits effectively provide equivalent rights and protections to those of the formal citizen's status - at least insofar as residence and crucial social rights are concerned - a sceptic may well be prompted to ask why in that case there is such an evident reluctance on the part of the German state to legislate to formalise that parity. A good example of the practical limits in the absence of any such parity and therefore of the scope for extreme decisions that are still at the discretion of local and regional bureaucracies, is the recent expulsion of a fourteen year old male teenager of Turkish origin undertaken by the Bavarian government in November 1998. His parents have lived in Germany for more than thirty years, and he himself was born there. Muhlis (Mehmet) A. committed 62 criminal offences and initially the Bavarian government intended to expel not only him but also his parents for "gross violation" of parental responsibility. This was prohibited by the Administrative Court. At the time of writing the teenager who hardly speaks Turkish lived in a hostel in Istanbul as his relatives were reluctant to accommodate him (*Der Spiegel*, 23.11.98, pp. 28-29).

I would rather do time in Germany than being free in Turkey
... I have been born and brought up in Germany. I don't know
anything else (*Muhlis (Mehmet) A. quoted in Der Spiegel*,
23.11.98, p. 29 - author's translations).

In Mehmet's case the Bavarian government consequently followed the approach of defining 'foreigners' in principle as 'guests', regardless of their place of birth or the length of their residence in Germany. These 'guests' are told to leave the moment they trespass the 'unwritten laws of hospitality'. In a report published in 1993, the *Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für die Belange der Ausländer* highlights this problem:

In the case of foreigners who have become criminal offenders and who are long term residents in Germany and particularly in the case of those who have been born or brought up here, expulsion ought not be considered an applicable measure, because it would amount to their banishment. Young criminal foreigners have to be dealt with appropriately. But they are - so to say - "our" criminals. An expulsion of the problem by expelling the people ought to be prohibited (*Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für die Belange der Ausländer 1993, p. 21- author's translation*)

However, as long as a statement like this can only be made by using the subjunctive, a legally established right to reside in Germany that is equivalent to that of German citizens is wanting.⁹

THE CURRENT LEGAL BASIS REGULATING CITIZENSHIP AND NATURALISATION

The bone of contention in the German discussion about the integration of already settled migrants has been and still is the question of citizenship. In principal, we can distinguish two diametrically opposed views. The first, held by the dominant parties of the previous government coalition (*CDU and CSU*), views the granting of citizenship as the formal manifestation of an already accomplished integration process – that is to say its crowning achievement. The second, which is represented by both parties forming the new government as well as by the *FDP* and the *PDS*, sees the process reversed - here, citizenship is perceived as a prerequisite for the process of integration.

In terms of international comparison the German concept of citizenship is exceptional in four respects: First, the attribution of citizenship is still exclusively based on descent (*ius sanguinis*); the German approach is not combined with the principle of *ius soli* as is the case for example in Britain. This legal provision turns the offspring of 'non-German' residents - the second and third generation - automatically into 'foreigners' and can be regarded in many respects as racist because it confers a hereditary character to a legal status (see *Neuman 1995, p. 33*). Second, Article 116 of the German constitution defines who is German on the basis of ethnic affiliation, and accords to ethnic Germans the automatic right to become German citizens. Third, until the beginning of the 1990s naturalisation

procedures have been extremely restrictive and as a result the number of naturalisations of persons who lack German 'blood' remained low. Fourth, of the Member States of the Council of Europe which ratified an agreement to avoid multiple citizenship in 1963, only Germany, Austria and Luxembourg still proclaim this principle as a matter of law (*Hailbronner 1992*).

The principles of the German approach to citizenship are regulated by different segments of law, the *Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz (RuStaG)* and the *Ausländergesetz* as well as a sophisticated corpus of administrative rules (*Einbürgerungsrichtlinien - EbRI*). By definition we have to distinguish between the acquisition of citizenship by birth and its acquisition via naturalisation. A central legal source for citizenship is the *RuStaG* from July 1913 (in its current version from June 1993). According to paragraph 4(1) of the *RuStaG*, the attribution of citizenship is, as mentioned above, purely based on the *ius sanguinis*. This means that only those persons who have at least one German parent automatically become Germans by birth. Since 1993 children who have been born out of wedlock are treated equally.¹⁰

With regard to naturalisation, the German citizenship law distinguishes between two kinds - naturalisation on the basis of a legal claim and on the basis of discretion. The former case applied until 1993 almost exclusively to those persons who are Germans according to Article 116 of the German constitution without holding German citizenship.¹¹ According to

Paragraph 6 of the *Gesetz zur Regelung von Fragen der Staatsangehörigkeit (StaReG - Law of the Regulation of Questions Regarding Citizenship)* a 'German' without German citizenship has the right to be naturalised unless he or she is considered to be a threat to German security (*Fleischer 1990, p. 320*). The number of naturalisations on the basis of a legal claim accounted to 80 per cent of the total number of naturalisations in 1990 (81,140 out of 101,377). Persons who have been naturalised in this way came predominantly from the former Soviet Union, Romania and Poland. During the years 1991 to 1993 - a period during which data on the kind of naturalisation contains some inconsistencies and changes (*see Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen 1997, p. 60, fn 1*) - the number of persons who originated in these three countries and who were naturalised on the basis of a legal claim amounted to 109,063 (77 per cent of all naturalisations) in 1991; 137,314 (76 per cent) in 1992; and 145,285 (72 per cent) in 1993.

Until 1993 non 'ethnic German' immigrants - apart from marginal exceptions - could only be naturalised on the basis of discretion. According to Paragraph 8 of the *RuStaG*, 'foreigners' who settled permanently in Germany can be naturalised if they meet the following conditions: 1. legal competence according to the laws of the country of origin and to those in Germany; 2. good reputation; 3. ability to finance him- or herself as well as dependent family members; 4. evidence of accommodation. In comparison with Paragraph 9 of the *RuStaG* which regulates the naturalisation of the foreign spouse of a German citizen,

Paragraph 8 does include the legal requirement to give up the original citizenship in those cases where the applicant does not lose it automatically by becoming German.¹² In addition to the above mentioned laws, further rules to grant citizenship on the basis of discretion are laid out in the more complex *Einbürgerungsrichtlinien* from 1977.¹³ In principle, the decision of the authorities to grant or to deny citizenship has to be made in terms of whether a naturalisation is of public interest; the interest of the applicant is not of importance for the decision (*Hailbronner 1992, p.12*). Some crucial points of the *Einbürgerungsrichtlinien* are: a) the granting of dual (multiple) citizenship shall be avoided in principle, although exceptions can be made, b) residence in Germany for approximately 10 years (this period can be shorter for spouses of German citizens or for political refugees), c) evidence of 'sufficient' accommodation, d) good reputation, e) financial independence and f) a high degree of integration (attachment to Germany). Attachment to Germany is not necessarily only related to matters such as residence, language, economic security etc., but can also embrace questions of political and cultural orientation (*see Hoffmann 1990*). The regulations of the *Einbürgerungsrichtlinien* are subject to the interpretations, political considerations and levels of goodwill of the various highly autonomous state (*Land*) authorities (*see Hagedorn 1998, pp. 53-55*).¹⁴

Table 2: Naturalisations from 1974 to 1990

Year	Naturalisation	
	total	by discretion ¹⁵
1974	24,744	12,488 (0.3)
1975	24,925	10,727 (0.3)
1976	29,481	13,134 (0.3)
1977	31,632	13,535 (0.3)
1978	32,710	14,075 (0.4)
1979	34,952	15,172 (0.4)
1980	37,003	14,969 (0.3)
1981	35,878	13,643 (0.3)
1982	39,280	13,266 (0.3)
1983	39,485	14,334 (0.3)
1984	38,046	14,695 (0.3)
1985	34,913	13,894 (0.3)
1986	36,646	14,030 (0.3)
1987	37,810	14,029 (0.3)
1988	46,783	16,660 (0.4)
1989	68,526	17,742 (0.4)
1990	101,377	20,237 (0.4)

Source: Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen 1997, p. 60

At the end of 1990 only 0.4 per cent of the total 'non-German' population resident in the country had been naturalised which does not stand in any relation to the number of people who - at that time - have lived in Germany for ten years or longer and who therefore fulfilled the major formal requirement of length of stay. For residents in Germany who are of Turkish origin the following picture emerges:

Table 3: Naturalisations of Residents of Turkish origin (1981 to 1990)

Year	Total number of residents of Turkish origin	Naturalisations		
		total number	legal claim	discretion
1981	1,546,280	534	4	530
1982	1,580,671	580	12	568
1983	1,552,328	853	7	846
1984	1,425,798	1,053	11	1,042
1985	1,401,932	1,310	7	1,303
1986	1,434,255	1,492	15	1,477
1987	1,453,708	1,184	9	1,175
1988	1,523,678	1,243	18	1,225
1989	1,612,623	1,713	16	1,697
1990	1,694,649	2,034	18	2,016

Source: *Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen 1997, pp. 48-50, p. 65*

By 1990, only about 1,6 per cent per cent of all persons of Turkish origin residing in Germany (approximately 28,000 since 1970) gained German citizenship, compared to more than 60 per cent who would have fulfilled the condition of a minimum of 10 years residence in Germany. Looking at a survey that was carried out in 1986, 6.2 per cent of Germany's immigrants from former recruitment countries (eight per cent of persons of Turkish origin) were interested to become Germans. As *Thränhardt* points out, this figure is both higher than the actual number of naturalisations but at the same time it "is only a small minority of those who in reality are settling down in Germany" (*Thränhardt 1992a, p. 176*).

What were the reasons for the low interest in applying for German citizenship at that time? In the absence of adequate representative studies that combine qualitative and quantitative methods any such analysis has to remain speculative. I would argue that against the background of very restrictive - and expensive - naturalisation procedures until 1990 most members of ethnic minority origin did not contemplate naturalisation because a) they could not consider it to be a realistic and accessible alternative to their '*Ausländerstatus*'; b) given the fact that naturalisation includes in general the legal necessity to give up the original formal citizenship - a point that will be discussed below - they did not want to become exclusively a formal member of a society whose political establishment so obviously discriminates against them and does not consider them as full and welcomed members;¹⁶ c) in particular the first generation of immigrants were afraid of losing essential rights in their country of origin by giving up their previous nationality; d) in the light of their exclusion in Germany, formal links to their country of origin - most obviously symbolised in the form of a passport - were considered as an important part of personal identity; e) for those immigrants who had a secure residence permit the formal status as a German citizen was not considered to bring about essential advantages in everyday life.¹⁷

In the early 1990s the previous conservative/liberal government introduced legal changes which brought about significant changes both as regards the accessibility of the naturalisation process and the attitude of ethnic minority members towards citizenship. It would be an exaggeration

to describe this move as a watershed in German citizenship policies - the use of this idiom will hopefully become appropriate in future discussions of relevant legislation to be introduced by the new government - but so far the international debate has tended to neglect these developments uninhibitedly.

At that time two 'gates' were established which give former 'guestworkers' and their offspring for the first time the right to claim citizenship. According to the new *Ausländergesetz* (1991) and the *Gesetz zur Änderung asylverfahrens-, ausländer- und staatsangehörigkeitsrechtlicher Vorschriften* which came into force July 1st 1993, two groups of 'foreigners' are legally entitled to naturalisation (paragraphs 85 and 86 of the *Ausländergesetz*); in both cases, the fee for naturalisation is minimal - it amounts to 100 DM.

a) Paragraph 85 is in particular designed to facilitate access to citizenship for the children of immigrants, i.e. the second and third generation. Accordingly those young persons between 16 and 23 who have been resident in Germany for more than eight years, attended a school in Germany for at least six years and who have not been convicted of serious offences have the right to be naturalised. If an applicant was convicted for minor offences and has been sentenced by a juvenile court to detention, community work or fines up to a certain maximum amount as well as suspended sentences up to six months, these do not have an

impact. In the case of more serious charges, the decision is made on an individual basis.

b) Paragraph 86 - or rather 86(1) introduces the right of naturalisation for those immigrants who have been resident in Germany for at least 15 years, and who possess a residence permit (*Aufenthaltserlaubnis* or *Aufenthaltsberechtigung*) with the provision that the following two requirements are fulfilled:

1. Absence of a conviction for a serious criminal offence;
2. Financial independence of the applicant, which also guarantees sufficient financial means for family-members who are entitled to maintenance.

The claim to naturalisation is an individual right of the applicant. Minor children under 16 and spouses who have been living in Germany for less than 15 years are not automatically granted German citizenship. If they wish to become German citizens but do not fulfil the requirements of paragraphs 85 or 86 *Aus/G*, they can become naturalised on the basis of discretion according to Paragraph 86(2) *Aus/G*: For the naturalisation of the spouse it is generally sufficient that she/he has lived in Germany for five years, provided that the partners have been married for at least two years. The period of five years may be reduced by one year if the marriage has lasted four years, the partner has lived in Germany legally during this time and holds an independent residence permit. Minor children are naturalised if both parents (or a single parent) become

German. If only one parent has been naturalised, and the other does not live with the children in Germany, the minor child who shall be considered for naturalisation has to have lived in Germany at least half of his/her lifetime. In this case, the law provides that all children living in Germany shall be naturalised.

A look at the latest data that reflects the naturalisation of persons on the basis of Paragraphs 85 and 86 of the *Ausländergesetz* shows that a) formal citizenship politics in Germany are at long last getting ready to move towards a more inclusive concept and b) that members of ethnic minorities, particularly of non-European origin, take advantage of their right to naturalise. In 1994 nearly 43,000 persons were naturalised according to Paragraphs 85 and 86 (10,419 Paragraph 85, 24,995 Paragraph 86(1) and 7,570 Paragraph 86(2)). In 1995 the numbers of individuals who took up German citizenship and made use of this particular legal path amounted to 53,383 in total (12,141 Paragraph 85; 27,952 Paragraph 86(1); 13,290 Paragraph 86(2)) (*Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen 1997, p. 68*). In the case of persons of Turkish origin we can see that in 1995 nearly 20,000 persons were naturalised on the basis of a legal claim (this includes Paragraphs 85 and 86(1)) compared with 18 individuals in 1990. 10,898 people gained German citizenship on the basis of discretion (this includes those who have become naturalised according to Paragraph 86(2)) which when compared with the numbers in 1990 is an increase of approximately 500 per cent (*Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen 1977, p.*

72). In 1995 43 per cent of all naturalisations on the basis of paragraphs 85 and 86 consisted of persons of Turkish origin. In comparison, European citizens living in Germany are far less interested in taking up German citizenship. In the same year, for example only two per cent of all persons naturalised under the above mentioned legal clause were of Italian origin (*Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen* 1977, p. 72).

THE QUESTION OF DUAL OR MULTIPLE CITIZENSHIP

Both Paragraphs 85 and 86 require the applicant to give up his/her previous citizenship. This point - together with the absence of an additional *ius soli* rule - can be identified as an important political issue in the current German debate. In order to justify its reluctance to accommodate dual citizenship, the German government both emphasises its objections to the principle (i.e. questions of loyalty, diplomatic protections, liability to tax, conscription, or extradition; see *Löwer 1989*) and refers to national¹⁸ and international law, in particular to the 'Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality' passed by the Council of Europe in May 1963. This convention includes as its most important clause the following: that citizens of one of the contracting nation states who gain the citizenship of another signatory country are not allowed to hold more than one of the contracting nations citizenships if they are older

than 18 (in special cases this regulation is also applicable for minors) (see Article 1 of the treaty). The treaty was ratified by Belgium, the FRG, France, Italy, Sweden, Norway, Luxembourg, Denmark, Austria and the Netherlands. Britain, Spain and Ireland signed only the second part of the Treaty which regulates the conscription of persons holding multiple citizenship (*Hailbronner 1992, p. 24*). The application of the treaty is unambiguously limited to those countries which are signatory states: thus according to international legal definition it would not be a matter of violating law to grant German citizenship to citizens of the former Yugoslavia or Turkey in addition to their original citizenship (*Hailbronner 1992, p. 28*). As we have seen above, Yugoslavia and Turkey were the most important non-EC recruitment countries, and their citizens comprise the majority of long-term 'foreign' residents in Germany.

The convention does not rule out the retaining of the original citizenship in the course of naturalisation per se, but allows exceptions. Furthermore, the convention was not meant to rule out multiple/dual citizenship by birth, as a result of the juxtaposition of the *ius sanguinis* and the *ius soli* (*Hailbronner 1992, pp. 24-29*). In this context it is important to point out that due to migratory movements and international relationships/marriages, multiple citizenship occurs to an increasing degree as a result of the competing citizenship allocations of different sovereign nation states, causing multiple citizenship in the millions. German law does not take account of dual citizenship achieved by birth: thus, in many cases children of mixed parentage automatically acquire

two citizenships. Moreover, it is of no importance for the attribution of citizenship by birth if a second citizenship is gained on the basis of *ius soli* at the same time.

A brief look at the numbers of marriages between a German and a non-German partner as well as of children of mixed German/non-German parentage in just one year may illude to the potential scale of children with dual citizenship. In 1994 for example more than 50,000 Germans married a partner with a foreign passport (in Germany).¹⁹ Of these 3,992 Germans married partners of Turkish origin. In the same year approximately 44,000 children were born to a married couple consisting of a German and a non-German partner. These constituted nearly eight per cent of all children born to married couples in Germany in the course of that year (*Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen 1997, p. 31*). Furthermore, if we look at the marriages between Germans and non-Germans over four decades, we can see that between 1950 to 1990 approximately 1 million international marriages have been consummated. (*Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für die Belange der Ausländer 1995, p. 106*). Multiplied by today's birth-rate the number of children born in this period who might potentially be holders of two passports would account to 1.8 million

In addition to the 'natural' emergence of dual citizenship, a second source lies in the fact that dual citizenship is allowed in many cases in the course of naturalisation. For instance 'ethnic German' immigrants who hold a

legal claim to citizenship do not have to give up their original citizenship, and as *Hailbronner* has pointed out, it can be assumed that most of them retain this in addition to their German citizenship and pass it on to their children (see *Hailbronner 1992, p. 17*). Between 1973 and 1993 more than 800,000 naturalisations on the basis of a legal claim (almost all ethnic Germans) have been carried out (*Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen 1997, p. 60*).

Regarding naturalisations granted discretionarily, as well as according to Paragraphs 85 and 86 of the *Ausländergesetz*, again there are many exceptions that might lead to the tolerance of dual citizenship of the naturalised 'new member'. In general, dual citizenship is tolerated if the law of the country of origin denies the right of giving up citizenship, if it regularly causes insurmountable hindrances in doing so, if the surrender of the original citizenship causes unreasonable hardship (see for details *Einbürgerungsrichtlinien 5(3)*) and/or if there is a special public interest in naturalising a certain person (sportspersons are particularly eligible under this clause, even more so shortly before the World Cup and the Olympic Games). According to paragraph 5(3)3 of the *Einbürgerungsrichtlinien* 'unreasonable hardship' does not for example, include economic disadvantages in the country of origin (e.g. the loss of the right to hold/purchase property or the right of inheritance) and the rules demand that "[t]he naturalisation applicant must be prepared to bear such consequences of a change of citizenship, insofar as the attainment of

German citizenship can also frequently be economically advantageous."

(see *Einbürgerungsrichtlinien* - author's translation)

In 1994 of the 13,404 naturalisations of persons of Turkish origin that were carried out on the basis of a legal claim in more than 40 per cent of the cases dual citizenship was tolerated (see *Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen* 1997, p. 65 and p. 73). However, the decision of whether and to what extent, dual citizenship is tolerated is again subject to wide interpretation and varies tremendously from *Bundesland* to *Bundesland*. In particular Berlin has adopted a comparatively tolerant approach as regards dual citizenship (see *Ausländerbeauftragte des Senats von Berlin* 1994, p. 14)

In addition, amongst persons of Turkish origin it is very common to hold on to their original citizenship by exploiting loopholes in the existing legal regulations. In general Turkish applicants for German citizenship re-apply immediately after their German naturalisation for their - temporarily - 'lost' Turkish citizenship. Turkey allows dual citizenship and the procedure is more or less a formality once the question of the military service has been resolved. This practice is well known and the official German side maintains a diplomatic silence in the face of it.

There are no official statistics regarding the number of persons who live in Germany and who hold two or more citizenships. The latest publication of the *Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen* estimates that

their number amounts to 2 to 2.5 million persons - which from my point of view may well be a rather conservative estimate (*Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen 1997, p. 57*). However, even in the absence of an exact quantification I have tried to demonstrate that the stated policy of the previous German government to avoid, or to deny the legal validity of, multiple citizenship does not reflect the reality of multiple citizenship. It is tolerated *de facto* as a result of mixed relationships and the juxtaposition of *ius sanguinis* and *ius soli*, as well as the large-scale naturalisation of ethnic Germans and - on a far smaller scale - exceptions are allowed in the naturalisation of 'foreigners'. In this last case however, dual citizenship is contingent upon the 'generosity' or rigidity of the authorities in charge. I would argue that, despite their claims to the contrary, the previous government did not see the 'problem' of multiple citizenship as one of principle and international law but rather imposed it as a politically-inspired hurdle to the naturalisation of permanently settled migrants.

But how crucial is it for members of ethnic minorities, in particular for those of Turkish origin, to retain their citizenship of origin, or in other words, how effective is the official rejection to tolerate dual citizenship in preventing individuals from making use of their right to naturalisation? We have seen that since the introduction of legal changes in 1991 and 1993 the numbers of applications for naturalisation have increased significantly but are still far lower than the number of persons who are legally entitled to apply. This phenomenon is in general put down to the formal rejection

to tolerate dual citizenship as a matter of principle. In addition to the statistics the focus of most immigrant associations in their proposals to reform the German citizenship law on the question of dual citizenship rather than *ius soli* is seen as an indication of the exclusive importance of dual citizenship amongst residents of Turkish origin.²⁰

However, in my interviews with various immigrant organisations in Berlin as well as members of political parties or trade unions it became clear that the focus has shifted somewhat in the past three years. Clearly, dual citizenship is - as a matter of principle - still considered to be an important issue because it signifies multiple identifications of, and interests amongst the ethnic minority population that transcend national borders. Its official toleration is seen as an important statement suggesting the respect and tolerance of these developments as features of Germany's social reality. But on a daily level, and here I mean on the level of individual/familial strategies to improve conditions in the country of residence or birth, the political demand for dual citizenship appears to be of lesser concern. On the one hand, as *Mehmet Daimagüler (FDP)* points out, most Berliners of Turkish origin have dual citizenship either officially or unofficially (see above) and in their case "... reality has long overtaken the discussion." (*Interview with Mehmet Daimagüler, 29.5.1997*). On the other hand, over the past years Turkey has introduced important legislation that guarantees naturalised Germans of Turkish origin the possibility to retain crucial rights in Turkey (such as the right to re-migrate or to resettle, or inheritance rights) and opting for German citizenship no longer goes hand

in hand with a legally disadvantaged situation in Turkey. According to *Kenan Kolat* from the *Türkischer Bund Berlin-Brandenburg* (TBB - Turkish Association of Berlin and Brandenburg) the passing of this legislation has made it easier for Berliners of Turkish origin to opt for German citizenship. (*Interview with Kenan Kolat, 25.4.1997*) An analysis of recent Berlin data and qualitative interview material in the following two chapters will provide more detailed insights and illustrations regarding this matter.

SUMMARY

After the Second World War Germany experienced immigration flows that have led over time to a crucial and irreversible change in the composition of its population. Many of these immigrants, namely ethnic Germans 'who came in from the Cold' were greeted by effective state intervention in the form of comprehensive support schemes (on the legal, economical and social level). In comparison, 'non-German' immigrants, with EU-citizens constituting a special case, have been confronted with an exclusionary approach which has shifted and evolved (often on an ad hoc basis) to serve the political and economic climate of the day (*Blaschke 1993, p. 8*). The polity's repression of de facto immigration and Germany's poly-ethnic reality is most clearly manifested in the legal and political approach towards formal citizenship.

I have argued that more accessible citizenship policies, both regarding the acquisition of citizenship by birth and naturalisation procedures, are an essential step towards improving the situation of already-settled ethnic minorities in Germany. Clearly, as has been demonstrated by classical countries of immigration, such as the USA, the granting of formal citizenship to immigrants and their offspring is by no means the *Königsweg* (ideal way) of finding a political solution for societies that are divided along ethnic/racial lines. The apparent limits of the modern concept of citizenship in bringing about social equality - as discussed in the previous chapter - can however not be employed as a justification for denying full legal and political rights to particular groups of a country's population. Not only are further changes in German governmental approaches towards formal citizenship long overdue but they are urgently needed to rectify current democratic abuses by incorporating ethnic communities politically and legally on an equal basis. Such reforms are also a necessary symbolic step: an ideology of exclusion which is incorporated in law reinforces ideas of 'otherness' versus 'belonging'. In this respect, access to citizenship for permanently settled former immigrants and their offspring can help to stimulate the design of new policies which more adequately responds to the challenges of poly-ethnic societies. Via citizenship, ethnic minorities are formally recognised as permanent and full members of German society, and are equipped with a complete set of formal political rights to shape political agendas of the future. Furthermore, a relaxation of restrictive citizenship legislation may help to erode the pervasive national stereotype of what constitutes

'Germanness' - thus far a static notion, which contradicts the actual heterogeneity of Germany's population.

After this general introduction into German politics of citizenship I will now turn to policies adopted on the *Länder* (Berlin) and the local (Kreuzberg) level. In chapters six, seven and eight the analytical perspective will then change from one that focuses on 'citizenship from above', i.e. governmental approaches, to 'citizenship from below', namely the interests in, and attitudes towards, citizenship of Berliners of Turkish origin.

ENDNOTES CHAPTER 4

¹ From 1993 onwards Yugoslavian nationals consist of persons from Serbia and Macedonia (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen 1997, p. 51, fn 8).

² These numbers apply only to the 'old *Bundesländer*', i.e. West-Germany.

³ Here, I mean children of a German and a 'non-German' parent as they are automatically granted German citizenship (since 1993 in the case of children born out of wedlock to a German father and a 'non-German' mother).

⁴ These consist of expellees (*Vertriebene*) in the aftermath of World War II, refugees (*Flüchtlinge*) and migrants (*Übersiedler*) from the former East Germany and ethnic German resettlers (*Aussiedler*) from Eastern European countries.

⁵ Efforts to further the integration of ethnic German immigrants should not only however be regarded as an expression of 'ethnic preferences' but must be placed at the same time within the political context of the Cold War era. When applying such an extended analytical framework it does not for example come as a surprise that the conservative German government started to limit financial aid for ethnic German *Aussiedler* in the early 1990s, introduced an immigration quota for this group, and requested the passing of a basic German language test as a prerequisite for the immigration for ethnic Germans who live in Eastern Europe. In addition, integration measures that were implemented for *Flüchtlinge* and *Vertriebene* who came in the aftermath of the Second World War were also facilitated by the intervention of the Allied Forces in Germany.

⁶ Rather than embracing their 'ethnic fellows' warm-heartedly, the 'indigenous' German population reacts with strong resentment against the arrival of *Aussiedler* who come predominantly from the former Soviet Union, Poland and Romania. They are often perceived as, in effect, the 'welfare scroungers' of an affluent society to which they did not contribute. This popular tendency can even be extended to the case of East Germans (*Ossis*), viewed by Western German popular opinion as constantly whining people who are unable to take the initiative to improve their life but nurse their feelings of being 'betrayed' and 'colonised' by the West.

⁷ However, those EU citizens who differ from a perceived European 'norm' (white, Christian) are in many cases still constructed as outsiders on the basis of their physical appearance, their language, or religion.

⁸ For spouses of German citizens, or for political refugees for example, it is possible to gain an *Aufenthaltserlaubnis* after five years of residence.

⁹ More critical examples with regard to the insecurity of residence are outlined in *Mitteilungen der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung für die Belange der Ausländer, In der Diskussion: Das Ausländergesetz. Erfahrungen nach drei Jahren, Bonn, May 1994* (for example, authorities do not provide sufficient information about the potential residence

status that non-Germans would - on application - be entitled to; problems regarding the question of residence permits for young minority members or for the elderly who would like to spend time in both their country of origin and Germany).

¹⁰ Until July 1st 1993 children born out of wedlock of a German father had to apply for German citizenship according to Paragraph 10 RuStAG. Since 1993 children born out of wedlock of German mothers or fathers are treated equally - Principle of the *Gleichbehandlung nichtehelicher Kinder*.

¹¹ Art. 116(1) of the German constitution states that Germans are those persons who either possess German citizenship or who are *Flüchtlinge* and *Vertriebene* of German origin (including their spouses and offspring).

¹² However, against the background that according to the *Einbürgerungsrichtlinien* multiple citizenship should be avoided in principle (*EbRI* No. 5.3) also the 'foreign' spouse is expected to give up his or her citizenship of origin in the process of naturalisation. See for a comparison of Paragraphs 8 and 9 *RuStAG*, *Renner 1993*.

¹³ These administrative rules had to be introduced in order to co-ordinate the praxis of naturalisation in the different German *Länder*. The latest version of the *EbRI* is from 20.1.1987.

¹⁴ Differences regarding the numbers of naturalisation are not necessarily exclusively a reflection of attitudes of the various *Länderregierungen* vis-à-vis naturalisation. Other factors - that may have an additional impact - are linked to the seize, the country of origin, or the length of stay of minority populations in one of (West) Germany's *Länder*. Furthermore, *Thränhardt* points out that although regional differences exist it is surprising "that by and large Bundesländer do not make full use of their constitutional rights and they do not implement naturalisation policies ... that they think would be right". In this context *Thränhardt* also emphasises that party differences towards citizenship and naturalisation that are stated on the national level are only partly reflected in governmental decisions on the regional level (*Thränhardt 1998a, p. 10*).

¹⁵ As per cent of the 'non-German' population.

¹⁶ In a parliamentary speech in favour of dual citizenship, *Burkhard Hirsch* (FDP) summarised this point: "Do we accept a person fully and without reservations as German if he is called Öztürk and can be recognised by his physical features as an Anatolian, once he gave up his Turkish citizenship and dares to see his future exclusively in Germany? It is hypocritical of us to demand this decision from a foreigner as long as we ourselves are not open enough." (*Burkhard Hirsch (FDP), minutes of the German parliament, 225th sitting, April 28, 1994, protocol 12/225, p. 19409, author's translation*)

¹⁷ In chapter 6, I will provide some empirical illustrations of these reasons.

¹⁸ The legal basis for excluding the option of dual citizenship is expressed in paragraphs 9(1) and 25(1) of the *RuStAG*. Furthermore, it is written down in item 5.3. of the *Einbürgerungsrichtlinien* (*Hailbronner 1992, pp. 13-14*).

¹⁹ Looking at the overall numbers of marriages between Germans and non-Germans in 1994 we can see that as many German men marry a 'foreign' partner as German women. However, this varies considerably when we regard more specific numbers. For example, during that year 864 German men married a woman of Turkish origin, compared to 3,128 German woman who married a 'Turkish' partner (*Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen 1997, p. 34*).

²⁰ This emphasis was for example reflected in the petition for a *Referendum Doppelte Staatsbürgerschaft* (referendum on dual citizenship) which enjoyed the strong support of main immigrant associations. Within eight months, more than one million signatures were collected supporting the passing of legislation to officially allow dual citizenship in Germany. The signature lists were for a while displayed in a glass container in front of the *Reichstag* in Berlin.

Chapter 5

BERLIN: NATIONAL CAPITAL OR MULTICULTURAL METROPOLIS?

*“Wir können einer Nation, die sich selbst sucht, als Hauptstadt Halt geben.”
 (“As the capital we can reassure a nation that is in search of itself.” Jörg Schönbohm, Berlin’s Minister of the Interior, author’s translation)*

Like other world metropolises Berlin’s cityscape is both the product and the reflection of international migration movements. The slogan *“Immigranten schaffen eine Metropole”* (“Immigrants build a Metropolis”¹) takes concrete form in nearly every sphere of Berlin’s city life. Its most recent - and most literal - expression can be observed at ‘Europe’s biggest construction site’, the *Potsdamer Platz*. Here, Irish, Italian, Polish and Turkish workers rebuild the new - and old - city centre of a unified Berlin. What was formerly a deserted ‘cold-war’ zone adjacent to the Berlin Wall has now become a site that both symbolises the reconciliation between East and West and exhibits most powerfully Berlin’s attempt to present itself as a global European metropolis. Critics of the architectural design around the *Potsdamer Platz* argue that it’s foremost intention is to provide a certain image of Berlin - namely that of a highly evolved, global, dynamic, safe and immaculate city for the next millennium - rather than meeting the needs of, and providing urban space for, its population. For

them the new *Potsdamer Platz* is the architectural manifestation of the 'two-thirds society', excluding those who are either not considered, not able, or who do not want to be, part of Berlin's newly promoted image (*Rada 1997, p. 13*).

The question, whether or to what extent Berlin's ethnic minorities - particularly those who came from Turkey and their offspring - are part of the city's officially promoted image is the central concern of this chapter. Currently, more than 200 different ethnic minorities live in Germany's new capital. Contrary to the widespread Anglo-Saxon cliché about ethnic relations in Germany, on a daily level the presence of ethnic minorities is an accepted and common fact for Berlin's 'ethnic German'² population. This acceptance can hardly be described as a form of 'living together' let alone as genuine tolerance, but after nearly 40 years of every-day experience the co-existence with former migrants from Greece, Italy, Yugoslavia and also Turkey is for most German Berliners a prosaic matter-of-fact.³ To quote one of the young persons with whom I conducted an interview: "If you live in Kreuzberg, the living together with foreigners is a part of you" (*Interview with F., 9.5.1997*). However, this matter-of-fact, i.e. the city's poly-ethnic character, seems to be overlooked - or repressed - by Berlin's political establishment. Like its national counterpart, the city government - a coalition of Christian and Social Democrats with *Eberhard Diepgen* (CDU) as the city mayor - perceives Berlin exclusively as the 'capital of the Germans', that is of those who were born German. As a result, on the level of city-politics those matters that are both of crucial

concern for ethnic minorities and incisive for developing political strategies that adequately respond to the needs of a poly-ethnic city are assigned to the periphery. Indeed, one cannot help thinking that a particular poster billboard campaign initiated by the Berlin *Ausländerbeauftragte* (Barbara John) during the early nineties was somewhat dislocated: These posters were designed to promote multiculturalism in Berlin and had slogans such as “*Miteinander leben in Berlin*” (“Living Together in Berlin”) or “*Wir sind Berlin: Wir sind helle und Dunkle*” (“We are Berlin: We are Light and Dark”). Rather than showing them in tube stations, so that a wide spectrum of ‘common’ Berliners were exposed to and could learn from them, it might have been more useful to adopt a more targeted approach and to display the posters prominently in various buildings of the city-government.

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the significance of immigration for the city’s demographic development, its post-war immigration history, the socio-economic position of immigrants, and political responses to immigration. Beyond the sheer provision of basic data this analysis is crucial for an understanding of the local context (that of the city of Berlin together with one of its districts - Kreuzberg - where more than 20 percent of all Berliners of Turkish origin live) which - as I will argue - plays a crucial role in shaping the interests and identifications of Berliners of Turkish origin and in influencing the direction of their social and political activities. What will become clear in the course of this chapter is that with regard to its poly-ethnic reality Berlin remains a ‘divided city’: Its

government holds on to the principle of the primacy of the nation and – as reflected in the opening quote – perceives Berlin as the urban epitome of an ethnically defined German nation. In contrast, parts of its population and sections of its bureaucracy – in particular the *Ausländerbeauftragten* on the city and local level – seek to develop arrangements that both reflect and can cope with the reality of immigration.

POST WAR IMMIGRATION TO BERLIN

Historically, Berlin has been predominantly the destination for migrants from Eastern Europe.⁴ According to *Jürgen Fijalkowsky*, the city gained its “central-European multicultural character” immediately after the foundation of the *German Reich* (1871) with the immigration of a high number of workers from Silesia and the Prussian part of Poland (*Fijalkowsky 1994, p. 422*). Between 1871 (when Berlin became the capital of the *German Reich*) and 1919, its population increased from 900,000 to 3.7 million people.⁵ By 1910, more than 80,000 Berliners spoke Polish as their first language (most of them however had German citizenship) and constituted the city’s largest minority (*Pfleghar 1993, p. 10*). During the *Weimar Republic* groups of Russian émigrés who fled Bolshevik rule, a significant number of Eastern European Jews and groups of other Eastern European minorities settled in Berlin.⁶ The brutal end to this period of the city’s poly-ethnicity came after 1933 when nearly all members of the city’s minority population had to flee, were deported or

were executed in concentration camps. At the same time, the Nazi regime exploited masses of forced labourers in its gigantic war industry and by the end of 1943 approximately 345,000 forced labourers - mainly prisoners of war from the Soviet Union - worked in Berlin (*Pfleggar 1993, p. 11*).

After the war, these workers were - as *Displaced Persons* - returned in large numbers to their countries of origin; some emigrated to third countries and only a few remained in the city. Between 1945 and the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 Berlin's population remained - with the exception of the presence of allied troops and their families - more or less exclusively 'German'. During the immediate post-war years and until 1961, the great majority of Berlin's immigrants were German refugees (*Vertriebene*) from formerly occupied territories of Nazi Germany - most of them from Poland - and refugees (*Flüchtlinge*) from the 'Soviet Occupied Zone' (later the German Democratic Republic - GDR).⁷ In addition, a number of West-Germans who were attracted by higher wages and state-subsidies migrated to Berlin. Against the background that Berlin had initially no shortage of immigrants, but also because the city's economy was - due to its isolation - an economic latecomer in joining the German '*Wirtschaftswunder*', it was only after the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 that Berlin followed the West-German example and called on labour from the European periphery. Given the city's late adoption of the '*Gastarbeitersystem*' the workers who came to Berlin were migrants from those countries with whom the German government had concluded

recruitment treaties during the 1960s. These countries were in particular Turkey (1961) and Yugoslavia (1968).⁸ From the very beginning labour migrants from Turkey constituted the largest group of migrants: In 1965 approximately 3,000 workers from Turkey had joined Berlin's workforce. In 1969 their number had increased to 24,000, and to 79,000 by 1973 (*Wilpert & Gitmez 1994, p. 342*).

Migrant workers initially lived in special workers' accommodation and were by definition - as they were seen as a rotating workforce - not offered services such as language classes or training schemes with a long-term perspective of integration. Unlike in other West-German cities where mostly male, young and single migrants worked as unskilled labour in the mining and steel industry and in construction (*see Cohn-Bendit & Schmidt 1992, p. 122-128*), Berlin's textile and precision engineering industry hired a high number of female contract workers who were considered more suitable for this type of work. Given the high proportion of female migrants, in comparison to their counterparts in West-Germany, contract workers in Berlin started families at a very early stage and moved quickly from workers' hostels into cheap flats in inner-city areas (*Blaschke, unpublished manuscript, pp. 1-2*). In 1973 more than 40 per cent of migrant labour from Turkey was female and at the same time at least three quarters of married Turkish nationals lived with their spouses in rented flats in West-Berlin, particularly in the district of *Kreuzberg* (*Wilpert & Gitmez 1994, p. 342; Stahr 1993, p. 52*).⁹

Following the halting of recruitment in 1973 and the increased immigration of family members that was permitted by family unification laws, migrant labour became increasingly settled in Berlin. The transformation from a thus far 'temporary' workforce into a community of immigrants is reflected in various areas such as demographic shifts and the emergence of community structures. Furthermore, an increasing trend towards social stratification among immigrants from Turkey can be observed in the period following: they were no longer exclusively employed as unskilled and semi-skilled workers but started their own small and medium sized enterprises and became teachers, social workers, doctors or other middle class professionals.

It is important to highlight at this stage the remarkable diversity of what is often - and inadequately - referred to as 'the Turkish community' in Berlin. Apart from age (i.e. first, second and third generation), class and gender differences, questions of ethnic, political and religious affiliation and resulting differences in attitudes towards politics both in Turkey and in Germany, all call the analytical value of such generalisations into question. Apparent boundaries within the 'Turkish community' are drawn for example between members of the Kurdish minority and Turks, '*Kemalists*' who support a clear division between state and Islam and non-secular Muslims, or between Sunnis and Alevis. These divisions reflect key problem areas both within Turkish politics - namely the relationship between state and religion, Turkey's minority politics and tensions between conservative and liberal forces - and show the significance of

'Turkish' conflicts beyond national boundaries as they affect identifications and interests of Turkish nationals abroad.

At the same time when former *Gastarbeiter* and their families gradually completed their settlement process, Berlin began to experience a radical change in its immigration flows: During the 1980s the city became the destination for refugees and asylum seekers. This development was in many respects related to West Berlin's geographical location and its special status. Equipped with transit visas for East-Germany, refugees arrived at East-Berlin's airport *Schönefeld* and were then able to enter West-Berlin by using the suburban rail and subway network that was not controlled by West-Berlin border police and that connected the Eastern and Western parts of the city. Between 1985 and 1989 approximately 75,000 asylum seekers arrived in Berlin (predominantly from India, Iran, Lebanon, Poland and Sri Lanka). According to a fixed distribution quota, most of them were then sent further to one of the other *Länder* and approximately 9,000 remained in Berlin (*Ausländerbeauftragte Berlin 1995, p. 52*). Despite substantial constitutional changes restricting the right of asylum on the national level, between 1990 and 1995 nearly 100,000 persons applied for asylum in Germany's new capital, most of them now came from Bulgaria, Romania, the former Soviet Union, former Yugoslavia and Vietnam (*Ausländerbeauftragte Berlin 1997*).

In comparison, immigration played a negligible role in the GDR and in East Berlin. In 1971/1972 the first 1,000 contract-workers were hired from

Poland. Starting in the mid-seventies the GDR government concluded government agreements with Algeria, Angola, China, Cuba, Mozambique, Mongolia and North Korea. Until the 1980s many of these contracts were defined as vocational training and as such regarded as a special form of development aid. However, one can say that - as in the capitalist West - contract workers were mainly employed in jobs which were both 'deserted' by the indigenous population and vital for the production of main supplies - on the national level two thirds worked for example as shift workers in the textile, car and chemical industry. Conditions written down in their contracts reflect the official pseudo-commitment of international solidarity and understanding, a good example here is the 'pregnancy prohibition' for Vietnamese women: "Vietnamese women who do not take advantage of the possibilities of contraception or abortion, will return home earlier" (agreement between Vietnam and the GDR, 1987, quoted in *Tichy 1993, pp. 157-158, author's translation*). Contract workers were subjects to a strict rotation system and control by the East-German government; they normally lived in total isolation from the indigenous East Berlin population and were put up in ghettoised worker accommodation. By 1987 the biggest group of contract workers in East-Berlin were Vietnamese, in 1989 more than 10,000 '*ausländische Werktätige*' (the equivalent to the West-German *Gastarbeiter*) and a further 3,000 employees of foreign firms who worked in East-Germany on the basis of various foreign trade agreements were resident in East-Berlin (*Pfleggar 1993, p. 17*). After 1989 the situation of former contract-workers and the question of whether they should be allowed to stay on in unified Germany became a fiercely

debated issue and was accompanied by a stream of violent racist attacks in the East. Instead of offering the possibility of settlement - this certainly would have been diametrically opposed to the principles of German 'immigration' policies - the government remained in the best tradition of exclusionist and ad-hoc policies. According to what was called the 'humanitarian response' (*humanitäre Lösung*) only those workers who were able to secure a permanent job were allowed to stay beyond the duration of their contract, all others were expected to leave. As reflected in the latest figures of asylum applications (see above) many Vietnamese workers attempted to avoid deportation by applying for political asylum; in addition Cubans and North Koreans were called back by their respective governments (*Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung, Umweltschutz und Technologie Berlin 1995, p. 16*). In 1995 approximately 4,000 former contract-workers lived in Berlin, of these 3,500 were from Vietnam. According to the Berlin *Ausländerbeauftragte* 2,200 Vietnamese and about 100 Angolan and Mozambican persons were able to secure a particular form of residence permit (*Aufenthaltsbefugnis*) (*Ausländerbeauftragte Berlin 1995, p. 18*).

Before and after the 'Wende' in 1989, Berlin continued to experience a significant inflow of German immigrants. *Jochen Blaschke* points out that in the case of ethnic German diaspora immigrants from Eastern Europe, Berlin was merely a "transit lounge" and few German *Aussiedler* actually settled in Berlin but moved to West-Germany (*Blaschke, unpublished manuscript, p. 4*) However, the author highlights in the same paper that

West-Berlin was the main destination for many East-Berliners and the intellectual GDR elite who either emigrated or fled after the construction of the Wall in 1961 or who were expelled as political opponents. The fierce and emotional debate about the role of East-German literati and the dissentient 'aesthetic avant-garde' as informers for the East-German *Staatssicherheitsdienst* (state security service) that involved primarily East-German artists and intellectuals who had settled in West-Berlin displayed the city's significance as a 'bohemian escape'.¹⁰

During the 1990s at least four new groups of immigrants can be identified:

- a) On the one hand illegal or undocumented workers who work mainly in construction and in the service sector as well as providing domestic services;
- b) On the other hand short-term contract workers predominantly from countries of the former Eastern Bloc are hired for employment for up to 18 months. Potential employees have to be skilled and between 18 and 40 years old. In addition, for seasonal employment, workers from Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and the former Yugoslavia can be hired for up to three months;
- c) In 1995 approximately 32,000 refugees from the former Yugoslavia lived in Berlin on the basis of an insecure residence status (*Duldung*). Most of these refugees originate from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo. These refugees are in an extremely precarious situation, as most of them do not hold an entitlement to work and in particular young persons over the age of 16 have almost no chance of finding a vocational training place. According to the office of the *Ausländerbeauftragte* several thousand young adults are affected by this

situation (*Ausländerbeauftragte Berlin 1995, p. 20*); d) Berlin has become an important centre for the reception of Jewish quota refugees. By May 1997, more than 72,000 Jewish persons from the (former) Soviet Union were allowed to immigrate to Germany. Of these approximately 8,000 live in Berlin (*Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen 1997, p. 307; Ausländerbeauftragte Berlin 1997*).¹¹

IMMIGRANTS IN BERLIN - A PROFILE

Today, approximately 3.5 million people live in both parts of Berlin (2.2 million in the West and 1.3 million in the East). Of these, in June 1996, 439,795 were 'non-Germans' constituting 12.8 per cent of the population. The great majority of them live in the former West Berlin (369,518 or 17.2 per cent of the population in the West) and only 70,277 were registered in the Eastern districts of the city. Compared with other main German cities Berlin has the eleventh highest percentage of ethnic minority residents (27.9 per cent in Frankfurt, 23.3 per cent in Stuttgart and 22.3 per cent in Munich). Persons of Turkish origin comprise the largest group with 137,674 (31.3 per cent), followed by people from the former Yugoslavia with 78,620 (17.9 per cent) and from Poland (29,606, 6.7 per cent).

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Table 4: 'Non-German' Berliners (in Total and Selected Nationalities) (1991 to 1996)


Year	Total	Turkey	%	former Yugoslavia	%	Poland	%	Italy	%	Greece	%
1991	355,356	137,592	38.7	42,174	11.9	26,600	7.5	8,824	2.5	9,429	2.7
1992	385,911	138,738	36.0	55,183	14.3	29,013	7.5	9,017	2.3	9,595	2.5
1993	406,637	138,457	34.0	70,346	17.3	26,024	6.4	9,454	2.3	9,914	2.4
1994	419,202	138,959	33.1	73,053	17.4	27,627	6.6	9,737	2.3	9,971	2.4
1995	435,698	137,889	31.6	78,992	18.1	30,029	6.9	11,034	2.5	10,201	2.3
1996	439,795	137,674	31.3	78,620	17.9	29,606	6.7	11,852	2.7	10,337	2.4
West	369,518	134,558	36.4	61,960	16.8	21,175	5.7	10,332	2.8	9,823	2.7
East	70,277	3,116	4.4	16,660	23.7	8,431	12.0	1,520	2.2	514	0.7

Source: Ausländerbeauftragte Berlin 1997¹²

Residence Status And Naturalisations

Berliners of Turkish origin in general show both the longest periods of residence and the highest percentage of persons who were born in Berlin.

Figure 1: Length of Residence of 'Turkish' Berliners and Number of Persons of Turkish Origin Born in Berlin (31.12.1995)



Source: *Ausländerbeauftragte Berlin 1997*

Unlike the data that is available on the national level, Berlin's authorities do not simply include 'non-German' children who were born in Berlin into the statistics on 'length of stay' (see previous chapter) but list them in a special category. Hence, looking at this Berlin graph the striking fact becomes explicit that nearly one third of 'Turkish' Berliners were born in Berlin (40,043)¹³. In addition a further 43 per cent (59,514) have been living in the city for more than 10 years, and another 13 per cent (17,925) for 5 to 10 years. This leaves just 15 per cent of Berliners of Turkish origin with a shorter-term residence of less than 5 years.

In 1995 34,819 Berliners of Turkish origin held the *unbefristete Aufenthaltserlaubnis*, and 39,723 were holders of an *Aufenthaltsberechtigung*. In comparison with other German *Länder*, the proportion of minority members in Berlin, particularly those of Turkish origin and from the former Yugoslavia, who hold a secure residence permit is the highest (see *Ausländerbeauftragte Berlin 1994, p. 13*)

As I have argued in the previous chapter, the fact that Berliners of Turkish origin hold in general a rather secure residence permit should - as a matter of principle - not serve as an excuse or academic rationalisation that renders the acquisition of formal German citizenship obsolete. If we move beyond the simple day to day practicalities of life - where the residence status may well be sufficient for the individual to get on with life or even to prosper - and enter a discussion of essential principles in democratic societies we are faced with serious objections. First, as pointed out before, there is no legal parity between a secure residence status and that of a citizen. The difference manifests itself in the absence of particular rights for Germany's ethnic minority population (especially for those who are not EU-citizens) and, in the extreme, in the threat of being expelled from Germany. Second, an absence of *ius soli* elements in citizenship laws and the legally endorsed inheritance of a 'foreigners' status' as well as bureaucratic hurdles in the context of the naturalisation process imply the danger of defining members of the population in certain national boundaries as insiders or outsiders along ethnic lines.

Looking for example at the recent implementation of *'Regelungen zum Aufenthaltsrecht für minderjährige Kinder aus der Türkei, Marokko, Tunesien und Ex-Jugoslawien'* (Regulations of Residence for Minors from Turkey, Tunisia and former Yugoslavia) formulated in January 1997, we can see how, for ethnic minority members in Berlin, such a manifestation of exclusion has become an offensive experience. According to these regulations parents who originated from these three countries have to apply for a residence permit for their children, even if these were born in Germany; such a permit was not necessary before. Without debating the motives that led to the implementation of these regulations, I would briefly like to pay attention to the bureaucratic practice – as chosen by the Berlin Senate - according to which Berliners of Turkish origin actually acquired this permit.

Let me start with a scenario that the Berlin Senate could have adopted had it wished to mitigate the effects of the new regulations and to reassure members of ethnic minorities of their unconditional acceptance as *'echte Berliner'* ('real Berliners'). Germany has an extended system of registration policies that apply nationally. Every resident - German or non-German, short-term or long-term, regardless of age - has to be registered at his or her current address with the police, and the authorities have to be informed within a few weeks about any change of address (a German bureaucrat would be dumbfounded if he or she found out that this form of registration is unheard of in Britain). Against the background of this

sophisticated system of compulsory registration the Berlin authorities could have automatically sent resident permits for minors - without any application procedure - to the families in question. However, instead of choosing this bureaucratically uncomplicated option, the Berlin Senate informed persons who were affected by these regulations in writing and by public announcement and asked them to call at the Berlin authority for foreigners to acquire such a permit.¹⁴ As a result thousands had to start queuing in the early morning hours in order to acquire a permit for their children and were once again reminded that even being born and brought up in Germany, or in this case in Berlin, does not go hand in hand with being an accepted and full member of society by law.

With this one, they show us again that we don't belong to them. Now my boy keeps asking me whether they'll send him away. ... Damn! Why don't they just - at least - *send* us that thing: 'Sorry folks - Kohl makes us do this but we'll make it as easy as possible for you'. (*Interview with M. 26.5.1997*)¹⁵

With regard to citizenship, until 1995 Berlin has been the *Bundesland* with the highest number of naturalisation on the basis of discretion compared to the national average (*Hagedorn 1998, p. 53*).¹⁶ In addition, it has - again compared to other German *Länder* - the most generous practice vis-à-vis tolerating dual citizenship and has most effectively encouraged Berliners of minority origin to use their right to naturalise according to Paragraphs 85 and 86 of the *Ausländergesetz*. However, before providing some recent data, let me point out at this stage that the practice of

relatively positive citizenship policies in Berlin is largely due to the persistence and commitment of Berlin's *Ausländerbeauftragte* (*Barbara John*), her office and many of the *Ausländerbeauftragte* on the municipal level. Looking at some activities of the Senate - and in particular the Senate of the Interior - we can see that attempts to promote naturalisation were not necessarily on everyone's mind.

Take the case of Berlin Kreuzberg in 1993/94. On the initiative of its mayor the municipality started an advertising campaign to inform people of the regulatory framework introduced by Paragraphs 85 and 86 of the *Ausländergesetz*. The naturalisation office initiated a direct mailing campaign, including both an information pamphlet as well as the official citizenship application form to Kreuzberg's ethnic minority residents who fulfilled the official requirements for claiming a right for naturalisation. The immediate return, i.e. completed application forms - although low in real terms - nevertheless exceeded the number of applications for the months before by 300 percent (183 and 161 in January/February 1994 compared with 60 and 64 in November/December 1993 according to the internal statistics of the *Bezirksamt Kreuzberg Berlin*). Rather than perceiving the increase in the interest in German citizenship as a welcome development, the Berlin Ministry of the Interior intervened immediately to reprimand Kreuzberg's mayor and to inform him that sending an application form by letter without individual counselling was illegal.

Since the legal changes introduced in 1991 and 1993 (when for the first time two groups of ‘foreigners’ became legally entitled to naturalise, see chapter 4) Berlin has seen a significant increase in the number of naturalisations.

Table 5: *Naturalisations in Berlin by Discretion and According to Paragraphs 85, 86 Ausländergesetz (1990 to 1995)*

Year	Total numbers of naturalisations by discretion and according to §§ 85, 86 in Berlin	From Turkey
1990	3,123 ¹⁷	554
1991	5,671	1,354
1992	8,767	3,326
1993	7,976	4,102
1994	6,620	3,330
1995	7,710	5,196

Source: *Ausländerbeauftragte Berlin 1997*

Of these in 1995, 1,446 (19 per cent) were naturalisations of Kreuzberg’s minority population. At first glance this increase may seem to be rather insignificant because the number of naturalised ‘Turkish Berliners’ is still low in comparison with the total number of Turkish Berliners as only approximately nine per cent of those who were eligible, i.e. who lived in Berlin for at least 10 years –acquired the German passport. However, apart from the fact that one should interpret these figures as significant

trend shifts, it is important to point out that the number of completed naturalisations does not reflect the number of naturalisation applications that are currently with the local registry offices. Many observers assume that this number is so high that in return it creates a delay in processing the claims. According to *Eckhardt Barthel (SPD)* - a member of the Berlin Senate - currently it takes 9-10 months to process an application (*Interview with Eckhardt Barthel 30.4.1997*). Most applications are based on Paragraphs 85 and 86 *AuslG* which give the applicant the right to naturalise, and on this basis one might expect a far more exceptional increase in the numbers of naturalisations during the next years. In fact *Riza Baran*, member of the Berlin parliament estimates that two thirds of Turkish Berliners will become naturalised within the next 10 years (*Riza Baran, unpublished manuscript*); the former chairman of the *Türkische Gemeinde Berlin*, *Mustafa Çakmakoglu*, anticipates that within the next three to five years approximately 70-80 per cent of Turkish Berliners will be naturalised (*Interview 24.4.1997*).

Aysin Inan of the Turkish Women's Association put an example to me that may illustrate the extensive interests of Berliners of Turkish origin in their new right to take up German citizenship:

On one occasion I was really taken by surprise. And actually I was a little angry with myself because I had not got my act together then [to apply for citizenship]. Well, there was this woman who comes here. She can't read and she can't write, but she was committed to getting this passport and she

asked us to fill in the forms. Well I did that and sent her back to Yorkstraße [location of Kreuzberg's registry office]. And she came back with a polite note written by one of the employees regarding those things that were missing. Very simple. I was so embarrassed, why had I not thought of that. Well this woman, like many elderly, considers naturalisation when she becomes a pensioner. (*Interview with Aysin Inan, Türkischer Frauenverein, 12.5.1997*)


I have argued in the past (*Brandt 1994*) that due to exclusionary German politics the interest on the part of 'migrants' in applying for naturalisation has remained very low, especially because of the necessity of giving up their citizenship of origin. Clearly, the sharp increase in applications for naturalisations contradicts such a point of view and I will explain differences in attitudes in more detail in the next two chapters. In addition, it appears that a growing number of Turkish Berliners no longer insist on holding on to their Turkish nationality. Nationality seems to become more and more instrumental, i.e. used as a means to gain access to rights. In this context the recent introduction of the so called '*Rosa Karte*' ('Pink Card') by the Berlin Senate that - as a result of bilateral agreements between Germany and Turkey - guarantees naturalised Germans of Turkish origin crucial rights in Turkey (such as the right to return, the right to work, the right to own land, the right of inheritance etc.) may well play a significant role in decreasing the interest in holding the Turkish passport. Certainly for Kurds in Berlin, who by definition did not positively identify with their Turkish passport, the *Rosa Karte* might prove to be an incentive to become exclusively German on paper:

I too have now applied for the *Rosa Karte*. Then I won't need my Turkish passport. As a Kurdish woman I have anyway never been proud of this passport. Each time I fly to Turkey I am a little afraid. You know my political views and my work. As a Turkish national they could have caused me trouble at anytime. If you are a holder of dual nationality, [once in Turkey] you cannot get the protection of the German embassy (*Interview with G., female, 21.5.1998*).

Spatial Distribution and the Situation in Kreuzberg

Regarding the spatial pattern of minority settlement, city districts with more than 10 per cent non-German residents are Tiergarten, Wedding, Kreuzberg, Charlottenburg, Spandau, Wilmersdorf, Schöneberg, and Neukölln.

Figure 2: German and 'Non German' Residents in Selected Districts of West-Berlin (30.6.1996)



In each of these districts the largest group of 'non-Germans' consists of residents holding a Turkish passport. The percentage of ethnic minorities in Tiergarten is 26.1 per cent (24,320 in absolute numbers of which 8,623 - or 35 per cent - are persons of Turkish origin), Wedding 28.8 per cent (47,341/24,332 – 51 per cent), Kreuzberg 33.6 per cent (51,990/28,913 – 56 per cent), Charlottenburg 18.6 per cent (33,412/7,547 – 23 per cent), Spandau 11.8 per cent (25,762/8,829 – 34 per cent), Wilmersdorf (18,824/2,176 - 11.6 per cent) Schöneberg 22.6 per cent (34,119/12,051 – 35 per cent) and in Neukölln 19.5 per cent (61,044/26,904 – 44 per cent).

These figures mirror both the spatial pattern of settlement starting in the 1970s and the process of social stratification amongst Berliners of Turkish origin and their distribution through the city thereafter. As mentioned above, in the late 1960s and early 1970s most 'guestworkers' who started to have families and to settle down in Berlin moved from workers' accommodation to inner-city redevelopment areas. It was not however simply the search for affordable rents that caused the original settlement of 'guestworkers' in areas like Kreuzberg, Wedding, Tiergarten and Neukölln but rather a conglomerate of reasons: the Berlin politics of redevelopment during the sixties and seventies were characterised by extreme measures. Once redevelopment areas were identified, the houses in these areas were basically left to deteriorate. As a result affluent tenants moved into districts that guaranteed a higher quality of

living space, others, like elderly people or low-income households who legally could not be forced to move, stayed on. Consequently, until the houses became empty and could be demolished, many of them were left half-unoccupied for a long period of time. In this situation the interests of the *Sanierungsgesellschaften* (redevelopment companies) on the one hand and the needs of migrants on the other overlapped. In order to acquire rental income for houses that were to be demolished, *Sanierungsgesellschaften* needed tenants who could not afford to be fussy about the quality of their accommodation and who showed a high degree of 'flexibility' in moving at short notice from one flat that was to be demolished to the next. Their interest was met, though by lack of choice, by the needs of many 'guestworker' families, who were a) looking for cheap accommodation, b) still considered returning to their countries of origin in the foreseeable future, and c) who had already experienced discrimination during their search for flats on the private market (*Stahr 1993, pp. 52-56*).

According to *Stahr* (1993) the move of 'guestworkers' into quarters with a high percentage of old and run-down buildings took place in a very short period of time. Within two years (from 1969 to 1971) the percentage of non-German residents in some areas of the districts of Kreuzberg and Wedding increased from 15 per cent to 30 per cent and from 15 per cent to 28 per cent respectively (*Stahr 1993, p. 53*). Alarmed by the spatial concentration of minorities in certain areas, in 1975 the Senate of Berlin introduced a ban against further settlement of non-European minorities in

Kreuzberg and in Wedding (*Zuzugssperre*). According to this ban only children and teenagers under the age of 17 were allowed to join their parents which caused “grotesque situations” in the cases of spouses and of children who were older than 16 who wanted to join their families (*Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung, Umweltschutz und Technologie Berlin 1995, p. 28*).¹⁸

The ban was modified in 1977 and repealed in 1990. Opinions regarding the ‘success’ of this policy are - with the exception of official reports - unified in their assessment. Minority members who were still in need of moderate rental accommodation either moved into other districts with old and derelict housing (e.g. Schöneberg and Neukölln) or were forced to deceive the authorities by officially registering in districts that were not affected by the ban and to move illegally into flats in Kreuzberg and Wedding.

What remained for many was the realisation of being second class citizens who were not allowed to live where they wanted to - a constitutionally attested right for all Germans (*Stahr 1993, p. 55, author’s translation*)

Strolling through parts of Kreuzberg today, any observer realises that immigration from Turkey has left its mark on the district. This is particularly true for some areas around Kottbusser Tor, Görlitzer Bahnhof and Schlesisches Tor (the former Kreuzberg 36¹⁹). Clearly, although it is as much a cliché as it is inadequate to equal the atmosphere in some of

Kreuzberg's streets to that of Turkish cities, as a first impression this comparison comes to mind easily. Some streets are lined with retail shops and offices whose owners are exclusively of Turkish origin. Next to grocer's shops and *Döner Kebab* stalls are Turkish banks and insurance companies, travel agents who advertise cheap flights to Istanbul, Izmir, Marmaris and Ankara, import-export businesses, Turkish teahouses with groups of men playing backgammon or cards, and undertakers offering Muslim funerals in Berlin or Turkey. Many residents and shoppers converse in Turkish, the graffiti on the walls display Turkish slogans that advocate anti-imperialist and Marxist struggles, the murder of Kurds, Kurdish autonomy, or support for the Grey Wolves. "You can do everything the Turkish way from birth to death" (*Interview with Ms Josten, Kreuzberg's Ausländerbeauftragte, 13.5.1997*).

Yet, it would be wrong - as *Blaschke* has pointed out - to define Kreuzberg on this impressionistic glance as a 'Turkish' ghetto. Berlin's population of Turkish origin is "differentiated not only in social terms but also with regard to its distribution through the city. Berlin has always been covered by a network of familial and social relations of the immigrants." (*Blaschke, unpublished manuscript, p. 2*). Figure 2 shows that a significant proportion of Turkish Berliners live in 7 out of the 12 West Berlin city-districts rather than being concentrated in just one or two districts.²⁰ Furthermore, the application of the term ghetto in general goes hand in hand with the description of its population as an 'underclass' which - using *Wilson's* (1987) definition - would be an inappropriate representation of

Kreuzberg's population as many areas of Kreuzberg are still socially and ethnically mixed. In addition, the German welfare state offers - in contrast to the USA - a substantial social safety net and has for a long time financed a number of local autonomous minority initiatives and projects that offer crucial services to the minority population.

However, today there is a genuine fear that this mixing is currently in danger of vanishing as the middle class - particularly of German origin but also minority residents – are moving out of the district in growing numbers (many middle-class Berliners of Turkish origin for example move to Charlottenburg, a largely affluent and central district in the West of Berlin). Many areas of Kreuzberg and its population appear to be caught in a vicious circle consisting of high long term unemployment, the erosion of the local tax base, cuts in financing social facilities (such as youth centres, kindergartens, advice centres, etc.), decline in school standards, loss of the middle class population and the influx of disadvantaged, low skilled new immigrants. Recent facts about the social situation in Kreuzberg speak for themselves: at the beginning of 1997 the unemployment rate in Kreuzberg was 28,1 per cent, 35 per cent for the minority population; by the end of February 1997 one third of Kreuzberg's unemployed members of ethnic minority groups had been without a job for more than a year (half of those persons who were 50 years and older were long-term unemployed). In Germany, Kreuzberg (together with Berlin's district Tiergarten) has the highest percentage of residents who require forms of social benefits (15.8 per cent); of these nearly 50 per cent

are long-term unemployed and 45 per cent are members of ethnic minorities. Kreuzberg has the lowest monthly per-capita income in Berlin with 1,158 DM (approximately £400) and its average household income is 2,200 DM (£750). Between 30th June 1994 and 30th November 1995 564 non-German persons (from outside Berlin) took up residence in Kreuzberg, at the same time 1,424 Germans decided to move out. Nearly 60 per cent of all children in state kindergartens are of minority origin. On average 44.6 per cent of all pupils in Kreuzberg are 'non-Germans', in some schools their percentage is as high as 70 per cent, some classes consist exclusively of pupils of minority background. "By taking a look at Kreuzberg, and by walking through the district, I am surprised that Kreuzberg can still function the way it does." (*Interview with Ms Josten, Kreuzberg's Ausländerbeauftragte, 13.5.1997*)²¹

Plainly the concentration of on the one hand ethnic minorities and on the other of low- and semi-skilled workers has meant that Kreuzberg has been comparatively worse hit by a crisis in Berlin's manufacturing industry and the relative shift to services. In addition some bigger local Kreuzberg companies - for example *Bosse* an electrical goods producer - moved out of Kreuzberg after the fall of the Berlin Wall. For various reasons it was easier and cheaper for them to relocate their production to Berlin's surrounding countryside in the former East-Germany: a) initially the wages were lower than in the West; b) companies did not have to meet certain production conditions - e.g. with regard to noise pollution - that


exist in central city areas; c) they could benefit from state subsidies allocated to companies producing in one of the *neue Bundesländer*.

The local Kreuzberg councillor (member of the *Bezirksverordnetenversammlung*) *Özcan Mutlu* posed some parliamentary questions in December 1996 to Kreuzberg's mayor. Answering his question concerning the reasons for unemployment amongst Kreuzberg's minority population, *Franz Schulz* (Kreuzberg's mayor) mentioned as explanation for the disproportional high unemployment rate of 'non-Germans': a) relocation of production (see above example), b) closure of companies/factories, c) lack of educational and vocational skills, d) comparatively less regional mobility²², e) limited access to further education, and f) replacement of Turkish employees by East-Berlin Germans.²³

The Labour Market

A brief look at the West-Berlin labour market - where 90 per cent minority employees work - shows the following: In June 1996 80,849 'non-Germans' were employees covered by social security (*sozialversicherungspflichtig beschäftigte Arbeitnehmer* - approximately ten per cent of the workforce). Of these 34,615 (43 per cent) were Berliners of Turkish origin.

Figure 3: German and 'Non-German' Employees in Selected Sectors of West-Berlin's Economy (30.6.1996)



Source: *Bezirkbürgermeister von Berlin-Kreuzberg 1997*

In 1996 more than 40 per cent of all 'non-German' employees worked in the service sector (33,537 in absolute numbers, these are 11.8 per cent of the total workforce in this sector). They were in particular employed in cleaning services and in the restaurant business. Of the 'non-German' service sector workforce, 36.3 per cent were of Turkish origin; of these approximately 40 per cent worked as cleaners. Looking at manufacturing – where about one quarter of ethnic minority employees were employed in 1996 - we can see that 55 per cent of the 'non-German' manufacturing employees are of Turkish origin, who worked in particular in the food processing, electronic and synthetic industry. Twelve per cent of all officially employed minority members found work in construction; again of these more than 40 per cent consist of immigrants from Turkey and their offspring. The fourth most important economic sector for ethnic minority employees is commerce, where eight per cent were employed –

constituting six per cent of the total workforce in this sector, of these 42 per cent are Berliners of Turkish origin (*Bezirksbürgermeister von Berlin-Kreuzberg 1997*).

Thirty-nine per cent of non-German employees were ethnic minority women (31,331, of these 13,846 – 44 per cent - were Turkish nationals). Like their male counterparts, women work predominantly in the service sector, in manufacturing and in commerce. Their numbers are particularly high in electrical goods manufacturing, health care, cleaning services and in the hotel and restaurant business. Most Turkish women for example - nearly 30 per cent - work in cleaning services (3,991 in absolute numbers).

The number of employed members of West-Berlin's minority population has been decreasing since 1990 and - as expected - their unemployment rate is both considerably higher than that of their German counterparts and it increases more rapidly. In September 1996, 28.8 per cent non-German residents were unemployed compared to 16 per cent of Germans seeking employment (*Bezirksbürgermeister von Berlin-Kreuzberg 1997*). In September 1995, 38 per cent of unemployed minority members in the Western districts of Berlin were women (11,901). Furthermore, the disproportional increase in unemployment does not affect all age groups in the same way. In particular young minority members who are between 20 and 25 years old are unsuccessful in finding jobs (*Ausländerbeauftragte Berlin 1997*).²⁴

The information provided so far about the general legal and socio-economic situation of minority Berliners, particularly of Turkish origin, has sought to capture some important facets of their experiences and circumstances in Berlin. In the next part I would like to turn to the content and the extent of official responses that deal with multi-ethnic urban realities.

THE OFFICIAL RESPONSE

Berlin both prides itself and is often singled out for its degree of institutionalised 'multi-culturalism' (see for example Vertovec 1996; or Lorbeer 1993) as part of the city's 'public sphere'. Shining examples of such institutions are the *Haus der Kulturen der Welt*, *Werkstatt der Kulturen*, *Radio MultiKulti* and a new Turkish-German radio station – its producers are still searching for a name - that will be 'on air' in April 1999, *AYPA-TV*, the Berlin Carnival or the German-Turkish *Europaschule* in Kreuzberg.²⁵ At the official level, the best known institution that seeks to represent and to promote multi-culturalism is the office of Berlin's *Ausländerbeauftragte*. In the following I will first outline the work of this office. However, without any intention of belittling or diminishing the importance of the Commissioner's work, an analysis of the official response to immigration cannot just focus on official institutions of multi-culturalism that promote – by definition – a positive image of the city's

heterogeneity. In order to get a more comprehensive picture, we need to use a wide-angle perspective that does not only depict the idyllic components of the landscape but also potential waste disposal or construction sites that may expose a less favourable image. In order to do so, I will secondly examine the official handling of one conflict that has arisen between the government and a number of ethnic minority organisations, namely the question of religious education in Berlin's primary and secondary schools.

Representing Immigration: The Office of the Commissioner for Foreigners' Affairs

After the election victory of the Christian-Liberal coalition in 1980, Berlin was the first *Bundesland* that set up its own position of an *Ausländerbeauftragte* in 1981. At the national level this post had been established in 1979 (*Fijalkowsky 1994, p. 432*). According to *Thomas Schwarz*, the introduction of this post - which has been filled since its establishment in Berlin by *Barbara John* - represents a shift from "*Ausländerpolitik als Problem staatlicher Planung*" ("foreigner politics as a problem of governmental planning") to that of "*Beauftragtenpolitik*" ("politics of representation") (*Schwarz 1992, pp. 121-130*). The framework of the *Beauftragtenpolitik* envisages to a certain degree an official institutionalisation of representing the interests of migrants and minorities.²⁶

The office of the Berlin *Ausländerbeauftragte* is part of Berlin's administration, and is currently assigned to the Senate Administration for Social Affairs, hence the Commissioner's position is not a political but an administrative one. Starting off as a mediator between the city government on the one hand and minority organisations on the other, *Barbara John's* office attempted initially to establish and intensify contacts with minority organisations in Berlin. It is important at this point to explain briefly the wider political situation in which this shift to the *Beauftragtenpolitik* took place. At the beginning of the 1980s the Berlin government introduced significant changes regarding the financing and structure of its welfare policies. In this context it started to finance numerous self-help organisations in order to delegate some sections of welfare provision in the form of social services from the state to the private level. As *Blaschke* has pointed out, this form of welfare politics has to be seen as part of the overall conservative-liberal strategy of deregulation that became the economic canon at the same time (*Blaschke, without year*). As a result of this strategy existing immigrant organisations received financial institutional support for providing special services to Berlin's ethnic minority population – such as language classes, youth centres, or various advice bureaux – and new local organisations were established with the same purpose (I will discuss the formation and the work of immigrant organisations in greater detail in chapter 8). Against the background that an increasing number of ethnic minority organisations became actively involved in social affairs - and hence in the politics - on the local and the city level, the office of the *Ausländerbeauftragte* was the designated

“buffer” between the interests and demands of minority organisations on the one hand and those of the city government on the other (*Blaschke, without year*).

During the brief government of the Social Democratic-Green coalition from 1989 to 1991 a new work-dimension was introduced. As *Schwartz and Vertovec* have pointed out, in particular some members of the Green Party were influenced by British, and especially Dutch concepts of anti-racism and multi-culturalism and the Green coalition partner envisaged the application of similar approaches in Berlin (*Vertovec 1996, p. 388*).²⁷ However, by the end of this coalition in 1991, such concepts had not developed beyond the articulation of rudimentary ideas and were only partially integrated into the work of the office of the *Ausländerbeauftragte*.

This original function of the Commissioner’s office – its role as mediator - has remained an important facet of its work. Currently 25 ethnic minority groups are consulted regularly on local issues (*Anhörung der Ausländerverbände*). In addition, the Commissioner’s office continues to grant financial subsidies to a number of projects. For example in 1994, nearly 60 ethnic minority projects received financial support which amounted to a total of 6.55 million German marks. These consisted of 14 social service stations, 15 consultation projects, 6 education projects, 17 social and cultural projects, 5 neighbourhood projects, and one youth project. A further 36 projects that focused primarily on the support of young members of ethnic minorities, on “intercultural encounters” and on

anti-discrimination policies, but that were not necessarily provided by ethnic minority organisations, were financed (*Ausländerbeauftragte 1995a*).²⁸

Apart from these tasks the role of the *Ausländerbeauftragte* also includes the development of measures against racism. In this context *Barbara John's* office seeks to promote approaches to tackle racism in "everyday situations", i.e. unequal treatment or confrontation with racist insults or threats in the areas of work, education, vocational training and in community services and leisure establishments (such as discotheques and restaurants) (*Barbara John 1994, p. 257*). In this context her office has founded the *Arbeitsgruppe zur gewaltfreien kulturübergreifenden Verständigung* (Project for Non-Violent Intercultural Understanding). Amongst other things, this project advises and documents individual cases of ethnic discrimination; it sets up arbitration talks in conflict situations; it holds discussions for example with public housing authorities (in order to improve the access of ethnic minorities to adequate rented accommodation), with discotheque owners (about young men of Turkish origin who are not allowed into a number of these establishments) and representatives of the Berlin administration; it offers 'Training Courses Against Discrimination and Violence' for juvenile offenders; it liaises with the *Unabhängige Kommission zur Verhinderung und Bekämpfung von Gewalt in Berlin* (Independent Commission for the Opposition and Prevention of Violence in Berlin); and it seeks to raise awareness and tolerance via information and public relations work (*Barbara John 1994, p.*

261). Information and public relations work includes the publication of a monthly magazine (*Top Berlin International – Ein Informationsforum*) that informs both about legal and political developments regarding the situation of 'non-German' Berliners and about social and cultural events. Furthermore, *Barbara John's* office produces and distributes educational videos and information pamphlets about single minority groups in Berlin, or about access to naturalisation, educational services etc. She publishes information letters in various languages on family planning, Aids or other, more general, health care provisions.

As *Steve Vertovec* (1996) has described in his article 'Berlin Multikulti; Germany, "Foreigners" and "World-Openness"', the office of the *Ausländerbeauftragte* ran various poster-billboard campaigns in order to promote multi-culturalism amongst Berlin's population. *Vertovec* calls this the "space-changing multi-culturalism" of the office "that has sought to change the space between peoples' ears – their fundamental thoughts about social categories and processes affecting their city." (*Vertovec 1996, p. 391*). In order to change "the space between officials' ears" which - as I would argue - seems to be a much more difficult enterprise, the office commissions academic studies on particular issues concerning the situation of ethnic minority Berliners. With this it attempts to highlight the need for the development of policies targeted at Berliners of ethnic minority background and to inform their shape and content.

The work of *Barbara John's* office— who is a member of the *CDU* – regarding the integration of ethnic minorities is not undisputed amongst her party-colleagues who are currently the dominant partner in Berlin's coalition government. During a party day held by the *CDU* Berlin some members who are more on the right of the party's political spectrum, criticised Ms John for the promotion of an "*identitätslose Multikultur*" (a multi-ethnic culture without identity) (*die tageszeitung*, 4.6.1997). The most forceful and effective way to express their misgivings is clearly the introduction of financial cuts of John's already extremely meagre budget: Let us look at an official statement of the *Ausländerbeauftragte* where she points out that:

"...substantial subsidies for welfare institutions and self-help organisations are an effective and long-term device for the integration of foreigners and ethnic minorities short of full equality under the law." (*Ausländerbeauftragte Berlin 1995a*).

Yet, since 1994 the budget of *Barbara John's* office has been the object of financial cuts. Currently her office receives eleven million German marks (a little less than four million pounds - a decrease of nearly one third compared to the budget in 1994) and was even threatened of being closed down in Summer 1997 (*die tageszeitung*, 4.6.1997). Clearly, these cuts are not exclusively an attack on the Commissioner's office but have also affected other parts of Berlin's administration (in particular the areas of education and special programmes for women). However, the size or

amount of means and resources that are provided for the implementation of particular policies are in general rather telling reminders of what governmental priorities are.

Repressing Immigration – Views Expressed by the Berlin Government

In April 1997 Berlin's Minister for the Interior (*Jörg Schönbohm* - CDU) published an article in the newspaper *Berliner Morgenpost* that – from my point of view - summarises succinctly the official approach of the Berlin government vis-à-vis integration policies.²⁹ Under the title: “*Integration ist keine Einbahnstraße*” (“Integration is not a one way street” - *Berliner Morgenpost*, 25.4.1997) *Schönbohm* accused “groups of foreigners” of keeping themselves in isolation from the German majority population and thus of establishing themselves permanently as “alien elements”. According to him, “migrants” should instead “be prepared to adjust to the local conditions and way of life.” Furthermore, the desire to retain particular identities should not be used as a pretext “for cutting themselves off from German culture and customs in a self-isolating manner”. He concludes:

The capability of societies to integrate is limited. The higher the percentage of foreigners the more difficult it becomes to integrate them. If the German society feels overstrained, its willingness to open up and to show tolerance cannot be secured. Rapidly increasing numbers of foreigners can cause

fears of being threatened and swamped (*Berliner Morgenpost*, 25.4.1997, author's translation).

Or in other words: the capability of constructing any society as an ethnically homogeneous entity is limited. The higher the percentage of immigrants the more difficult it is to promote an ethnically defined notion of a nation state population. As long as 'the primacy of the nation' – as expressed in *Schönbohm's* statement - is the underlying rationale for governmental politics, the reality of immigration and the development of corresponding strategies are by definition repressed and societal conflicts become preconditioned.

This repression manifests itself in crucial areas of political decision-making that in turn shape access to full citizenship by Berlin's ethnic minority population. Take the example of Kreuzberg: as described above, the district is in urgent need of substantial financial support to improve the educational and employment opportunities of its population and also to provide targeted social services. Yet, despite an aggravation of Kreuzberg's overall socio-economic situation, we have seen that the budget for financing various self-help organisations, that have thus far provided crucial services, has been cut substantially over the past years. The negative impact of these cuts is particularly acute in the former Kreuzberg 36 with a high proportion of 'non-German' residents who can't express their dissatisfaction with governmental priorities at the ballot box.³⁰

The conflict that has arisen around the subject of Islamic education in Berlin's schools may illustrate the static thinking of the city's current government. As secularisation in Germany – in comparison to other European nation states - took place at a rather late stage, the Protestant and the Catholic Churches are still closely interlinked with the state system and the distribution of resources. In most German *Bundesländer* – apart from Berlin and another city-state, Bremen – religion is a compulsory subject in school. This is not the case in Berlin (and Bremen). However both *Bundesländer* have concluded a contract with the Catholic and the Protestant Churches that allows them to offer religious education on a voluntary basis.

This principle has not been extended to the study of Islam at Berlin's schools, whose instruction is confined to mosques and their Koran schools. During the past years in particular organisations of Berliners of Turkish origin, have criticised this practise as an unequal treatment towards different religions and have demanded a re-examination of the current situation. According to the government the problem that has to be dealt with, is of a legal nature – in order to allow Islamic studies at schools, the government needs the equivalent of a 'church' to complete a contract. Against the background that in Islam no such equivalent exists, the discussion has reached "an unfortunate stoppage" (*Interview with Eckhardt Barthel, 30.4.1997*). Currently, there are three options that are contemplated:

- The government could assign the monopoly of Islamic education to one of the many Islamic groups that exist in Berlin (or even to one of the two secular immigrant organisations that have articulated their interest). Such a step will however undoubtedly cause tremendous conflict not only amongst these organisations but also between them and the city government;
- Religious education could be made compulsory which allows the state to control the training and selection of the teachers as well as the curriculum. Such an option is strictly rejected by the Social Democratic coalition partner as a matter of principle;
- Religious education that is divided along confessional lines and teaches the respective dogmas could be substituted by a more general educational option that may for example focus on the history and philosophy of religion. This option would constitute the most fundamental shift as it questions the established relationship between church and state in Germany and also involves significant changes regarding for example the teacher training programmes. It is rejected by both the *CDU* and the *SPD* (partly again as a matter of party principles and in light of the assumed outrage that would be shown by the Christian churches) as well as by Islamic groups such as the *Milli Görüs*.

Clearly, I am not suggesting that there is an easy solution to this particular conflict of interests. However, from my point of view this example shows

the following: both coalition partners, the *CDU* as well as the *SPD* exclusively contemplate a settlement of this situation within the parameters of their traditional party doctrines and interests. Rather than regarding it as a priority to bring about a change that ends the unequal treatment towards different religions in Germany and will also institutionalise cultural heterogeneity in Berlin's schools, for both parties their most vital interest is the preservation of existing party principles – in which ethnic minorities hardly play a prominent role.

SUMMARY

In this chapter I have provided basic information regarding Berlin's immigration record as well as the legal and socio-economic position of Berliners of Turkish origin with the objective of giving an understanding of the local Berlin context. An outline of their disadvantaged position is necessary for grasping attitudes of Berliners of Turkish origin vis-à-vis German citizenship. As we have seen, a growing number have already opted or applied for German citizenship because they regard– as I will seek to illustrate in the following chapter – access to formal citizenship as an effective strategy to improve their living conditions and their standing in German society.

Regarding the question posed in this chapter's title – 'Berlin: National Capital or Multicultural Metropolis' – the answer has to remain at least

ambiguous: Immigration has undoubtedly transcended Berlin's appearance and social life beyond a 'national' image. Apart from obvious manifestations that can be observed in the city's demography or its street scenes, various institutions of multi-culturalism have emerged both at the unofficial and the official level: So far, my focus has been on the latter and official responses that deal with poly-ethnic structures can be categorised as follows: first there is the 'policy of representation' in the form of the office of the Berlin *Ausländerbeauftragte* and its counterparts at district level. Second, since the 1980s Berlin has adopted an approach to support and promote 'self-help initiatives' that benefited the establishment of minority organisations. Thirdly, Berlin is supporting various cultural events and institutions that aim to reflect the city's multi-cultural character.

However, the effectiveness of an official institution of multi-culturalism such as the Commissioner's office is conditional upon the political will of the city government. This – as we have seen – in general represses the fact that Berlin continues to be a city of immigration and does not alter its political priorities accordingly. Looking at some 'hard' governmental choices, i.e. the provision of means and resources for the implementation of Barbara John's working agenda, or, as pointed out in the example of religious education, when confronted with a conflict that challenges established national tenets, the lack of a commitment to multi-culturalism, defined here as a strategy "to overcome nation-state traditions in the context of ongoing immigration (Blaschke 1993, p. 12), becomes indisputable.

Up to now I have outlined primarily the governmental response to immigration, both at the national and the *Länder*-level. In the following chapters I will turn to the strategies applied by Berliners of Turkish origin to cope with and to alter the given political framework.

ENDNOTES CHAPTER 5

¹ This slogan was taken up as a book title by the *Berliner Institut für Vergleichende Sozialforschung* 1994.

² Here, the term 'ethnic German' does not, as in the previous chapter, refer to 'ethnic German immigrants' but to those residents in Berlin who have acquired German citizenship by birth.

³ This statement needs however some modification as it a) applies primarily to West Berlin's 'ethnic German' population. The situation in East-Berlin, where after 1945 immigration was by comparison insignificant and where a settlement of migrants has taken place only marginally, is clearly different; b) this acceptance is exclusively limited to former *Gastarbeiter* and their offspring and does not include migrants who arrived more recently, for example asylum seekers and refugees, short term contract labour from the former Eastern Bloc, undocumented immigrants or Romanies.

⁴ Already before the establishment of the *German Reich*, Berlin had been at particular stages of its history a poly-ethnic city. After the Thirty Years' War, the Prussian government started to promote immigration ('*Peuplierung*'); for example, Dutch skilled workers were recruited to build the city canals. After 1671 Berlin experienced an increased immigration of Jewish families; in 1685 (after the *Potsdamer Edict* of 29.11.1685) Huguenots who had to flee France found asylum. Around 1700 approximately thirty per cent of Berlin's population consisted of Huguenots.

⁵ This increase reflects in particular the immigration of the impoverished rural population.

⁶ In 1928 approximately 130,000 people who were not holders of a German passport lived in Berlin (*Pfleghar* 1993, p. 11).

⁷ After 1945 tens of thousands of German refugees arrived in Berlin every month; even between 1949 and 1961 more than 1.6 million refugees came to West Berlin. Most of them were - according to a quota system - distributed to other areas of West Germany (*Pfleghar* 1993, p. 12).

⁸ For example migrants from Italy, with whom Germany had concluded a recruitment treaty in 1955, were in comparison to their numbers in West Germany a minority in Berlin.

⁹ According to a publication by the *Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung, Umweltschutz und Technologie Berlin* (1995), in 1974 only 7.4 per cent of Berlin's Turkish population still lived in workers' accommodation (p. 26).

¹⁰ See for example Dietze, G. (1993) 'Die hilflose Wiedervereinigung. Systematische Mißverständnisse west- und ostdeutscher Intelligenz im Fokus der Dichter-Spitzel-Anderson-Debatte', in: Böthig, P. and Michael, Klaus (eds.) *MachtSpiele. Literatur und Staatssicherheit* (Leipzig, Reclam), pp. 28-36.

¹¹ For further information on Jewish immigration into Germany see: Harris, P. (1997) 'Jewish Migration to the New Germany: The Policy Making Process Leading to the Adaption [sic] of the 1991 Quota Refugee Law', in: Thränhardt, pp. 105-147.

¹² For the years 1991 until 1995 the data was taken at 31st of December of each year; in 1996 at the 30th of June.

¹³ In 1996, more than 16 per cent of children under 15 years were from an ethnic minority background, of these 44 per cent were of Turkish origin; in contrast, at the same time only 3.7 per cent of Berlin's elderly population (60 years and older) did not hold a German passport (of these 26 per cent were of Turkish origin) (*Ausländerbeauftragte Berlin 1997*).

¹⁴ See 'Messages of the Ausländerbeauftragte' in *Top. Berlin International*, No. 4, 1997 (Berlin, Senat Berlin).

¹⁵ More critical examples with regard to the insecurity of residence are outlined in *Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für die Belange der Ausländer (1994) Mitteilungen der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung für die Belange der Ausländer, In der Diskussion: Das Ausländergesetz. Erfahrungen nach drei Jahren*, May (Bonn) (e.g. authorities do not provide sufficient information about the potential residence status that 'non-Germans' would - on application - be entitled to).

¹⁶ Since 1996 Hamburg has become the Land with the highest naturalisation rate (*Thränhardt 1998a, p. 10*).

¹⁷ In 1990, these naturalisations are all on the basis of discretion.

¹⁸ Non-Germans who were holders of an *unbefristete Aufenthaltserlaubnis* were not affected. However, against the background that most non-European migrants had only arrived in Berlin by the end of the 1960s only very few Turkish Berliners – due to their shorter residence and, correspondingly, their different residence status - were for example able to benefit from this exemption (*Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung, Umweltschutz und Technologie Berlin 1995, p. 28*).

¹⁹ Until recently Kreuzberg was divided into two postal areas, Kreuzberg 36 and 61, with the former being by comparison the poorer district with a higher proportion of ethnic minority residents.

²⁰ Here, I have left out the district of Wilmersdorf that is included in Figure 2, as only 1.5 per cent of all Turkish Berliners live there.

²¹ Some of the above mentioned data on Kreuzberg has been presented during the course of this interview. Other facts have been collected from a) a note of the *Bezirksamt Kreuzberg* to the *Ausländerbeauftragte Kreuzberg* from 3.4.1997; b) a written answer by Kreuzberg's mayor (26.3.1997) to the parliamentary question no. 73 of the Kreuzberg local councillor *Özcan Mutlu* from 16.12.1996.

²² *Ms Josten*, Kreuzberg's *Ausländerbeauftragte*, mentioned in the interview that I conducted with her in May 1997 that many of Kreuzberg's minority residents are for

example reluctant to move to East-Berlin or to East-German areas in close proximity to Berlin, because of fear of racist attacks. However, looking at the establishment of ethnic businesses in Berlin's Eastern part (e.g. food stalls, restaurants, grocer's etc.) the mobility of minority small entrepreneurs appears to be higher than of Germans (see Blaschke, unpublished manuscript, pp. 9-10).

²³ Written answer by Kreuzberg's mayor (26.3.1997) to the parliamentary question no. 73 of the Kreuzberg local councillor *Özcan Mutlu* from 16.12.1996.

²⁴ I will discuss the situation of young Berliners of Turkish origin in more detail in the following chapter.

²⁵ a) The *Haus der Kulturen der Welt* is located in Berlin's former congress hall (due to its architectural design commonly referred to as the 'pregnant oyster') and is a venue for conferences, exhibitions and performances; b) a similar programme is offered by the *Werkstatt der Kulturen der Welt* in Berlin's district Neukölln; c) *Radio MultiKulti* has been in existence since 1994 and is the first public radio station to broadcast in 16 languages with programmes made by and for (mostly) members of ethnic minorities; d) this new radio station that has just received its licence has been founded by young ('second generation') journalists of Turkish origin. e) *AYPA-TV* is a small TV channel (run by two dedicated journalists) that broadcasts local 'multi-cultural affairs' for 400 minutes per week. f) the Berlin Carnival was launched in 1996 and has been promoted as *the* multi-cultural happening in the city. It takes place in Kreuzberg, but – and this may not come as a surprise – does not really raise the interest or support of Kreuzberg's population of Turkish origin; g) the *Deutsch-Türkische Europaschule* in Kreuzberg opened in 1996 and offers education in German and Turkish. (see for further information *Lorbeer 1993, Seidel-Pielen 1995, Vertovec 1996*)

²⁶ In addition – as pointed out before - nearly all of Berlin's city districts have their own local *Ausländerbeauftragte*.

²⁷ A central figure in this context was - among others - *Peter Finger* who established Berlin's first anti-racist telephone helpline. *Finger* - who had lived and worked in the Netherlands - was strongly influenced by Dutch anti-racist discourses.

²⁸ Furthermore, in the same year the Senate Administration for Youth and Family Affairs supported approximately 35 initiatives for children, young persons and women; the Senate Administration for Labour and Women financed about 25 projects targeted at vocational training, educational and leisure activities (*Ausländerbeauftragte Berlin 1995a*).

²⁹ The motive for Schönbohm's article was provided by a demographic forecast on the number of 'foreigners' in Berlin undertaken by the Senate of Berlin. According to this forecast – whose underlying premises do not contemplate the possibility of naturalisation – by 2010 approximately 17.4 per cent of Berlin's population will be constituted of 'foreigners' (*Rada 1997, p. 205*).

The gaps that are created by the withdrawal of public funding are partially filled by activities of organisations that are – for a complex set of reasons – independent from (German/Berlin) governmental subsidies. One of these organisations is the *Milli Görüs*, which is closely linked to the former Islamic Turkish Welfare Party. Over the past years the *Milli Görüs* has established numerous social institutions, such as kindergartens, women's' health centres, youth training and employment schemes etc. which have proved to be popular amongst Kreuzberg's population of Turkish origin. The activities of the *Milli Görüs* are closely monitored by both the *Landesamt* and the *Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz* (internal intelligence agencies on the *Länder* and the national level – equivalent to MI5)) which classify the *Milli Görüs* as an Islamic fundamentalist organisation and thus as a potential threat to Germany's democratic constitution (*Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz 1994*). The increasing popularity of the *Milli Görüs* is seen as evidence that a high number of Berliners of Turkish origin actively support and believe in fundamentalist Islamic ideas and that they not only turn away from German society but even threaten it. Clearly, such an interpretation – that is articulated across the political left/right divide – strengthens an image of Berliners of Turkish origin as 'different' and 'not belonging to the German mainstream'.

Chapter 6

AGENTS OF CHANGE: YOUNG BERLINERS OF TURKISH ORIGIN AND THE POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP

*"Es ist nicht in unserer Hand, daß wir Ausländer sind."
("It is not up to us that we are foreigners", Interview
with young women of Turkish origin, 14.5.1997)*

PRELIMINARIES

"Dangerously Different - The Failure of the Multi-Cultural Society" - so the headline of the weekly German magazine *Der Spiegel* on the 14th of April 1997. The triptych style cover pictures at its centre a young woman furiously waving the Turkish flag (similar to the French 'Marianne' but, unlike her, with a clear negative connotation), to her right a group of pubescent males who hold knives and clubs, to her left girls with headscarves fully absorbed with the reading of the Koran. The message is clear, Turkish youth is nationalistic, violent and prone to religious fundamentalism. Furthermore, although Germany has attempted to integrate them into its society, they are both too different and too unwilling to make such venture a successful undertaking. "Years of effort to further integration have apparently come to naught." (*Focus*, no. 31, 28.7.1997, p. 26)

The media portrayal of young persons of Turkish origin as 'assassins of multi-culturalism' is - besides being undoubtedly beneficial for circulation figures - a convenient way to pass over any shortcomings and inadequacies of German integration policies. It is not 'us', the majority population and its political establishment, that can be held responsible, but 'them' who abuse 'our' hospitality. Furthermore, it constructs these young people as threats to individual safety,

Currently, youth gangs terrorise Berlin's trendy discos and its upmarket restaurants. The offenders speak with a Berlin accent ... The investigators suspect that the gangs consist of young foreigners who have been brought up in Berlin.
(*Focus*, no. 31, 1997, p. 24 - author's translation)

and - over and above this - as a 'menace to society' on the whole by endangering democratic principles with so called fundamentalist Islamic ideas. The latter point is central to *Wilhelm Heitmeyer's* study *Verlockender Fundamentalismus* (Seductive Fundamentalism, 1997¹) in which he examines the situation of young people of Turkish origin in Germany.

His main hypothesis is that this group asserts the superiority of Islam and displays a severe and dangerous potential for religious violence. Both characteristics reflect - according to *Heitmeyer* - hostile attitudes towards integration and democracy and can be put down to a complex set of

factors: xenophobic violence; experiences with discrimination in private life; negative consequences of societal modernisation processes; retreat into ethnic enclaves; rejection of modern educational values; and a vast potential for family conflicts (*Heitmeyer 1997, pp. 183-184*).

Heitmeyer's study may be regarded in part as a valuable contribution to the academic and political debate around issues concerning minority youth as it exposes the degree of discrimination and exclusion encountered by persons of Turkish origin. However, from my point of view this line of argument merely gives a veneer of liberal progressiveness to an infamous example of islamophobic alarmism disguised as 'objective' scholarly work.² On the one hand, the analysis is based on the unquestioned assumption that an Islamic orientation is anti-modern and by definition diametrically opposed to democratic principles; on the other, the study displays a breathtaking selectivity in the usage of its own empirical findings. Examining for example the political orientation of young people of Turkish origin, one survey question lists three main German political parties (*CDU, SPD, DIE GRÜNEN*), trade unions³ and various Islamic or Islamic-nationalistic organisations (such as the *Milli Görüs* and the Grey Wolves⁴). The teenagers and young adults are asked to indicate the extent to which these groups represent their interests and are given the possibility of selecting more than one group. Looking at the results, the Social Democratic Party proves to be most popular (44.1 per cent think that the *SPD* represents their interests either well or partly), followed by the Grey Wolves (35.7 per cent); the Green Party (34.4 per cent) and

the *Milli Görüs* (33.4 per cent) (*Heitmeyer 1997, pp. 276-276*). Astonishingly however, *Heitmeyer* and his co-authors choose to focus exclusively upon the popularity of the Islamic/nationalistic organisations - rather than analysing the wide spectrum of answers - and come to the conclusion:

[t]he fact that particularly organisations such as the *Milli Görüs* and the “Grey Wolves” meet the approval of young persons is without doubt a further indicator for the readiness of Turkish youth to turn to Islamic-fundamentalist positions. It remains however unclear how firm or infirm this orientation is. (*Heitmeyer 1997, pp. 140-141 - author’s translation*)

That young persons were at least similarly approving of two mainstream German parties neither enters the text nor the analysis and remains hidden in the annex (see *Heitmeyer 1997, pp. 132-142 and annex 3*). This - as *Birgit Rommelspacher* points out - not only distorts the actual empirical findings, it also fails to ask important questions that might have elucidated the interests, experiences and expectations of young persons of Turkish origin in a more detailed and accurate way (*Rommelspacher, die tageszeitung, 29.4.1997*).⁵

As indicated in the title, this chapter does not focus on Islamic orientations amongst young Berliners of Turkish origin, nor is it a critical analysis of their depiction in journalistic or academic work. Rather, it seeks to discuss both the politics and the transformation of citizenship through an analysis

of the situation and attitudes of these young people. The question may arise, how relevant the introductory remarks are for the rest of this chapter, or if they are at all. There are two reasons for choosing this particular 'overture': First, it is necessary to emphasise the alarmist tone of the current public debate. Clearly, such blatant work is not representative for the respective academic discussion in general,⁶ but ideas - like those proposed by *Heitmeyer* - that equate Islam with violence and that identify young people of Turkish origin as protagonists of religious violence, make it onto the front-pages of newspapers and are crucial for shaping, or rather manipulating, public opinion. They in turn not only influence policy makers but also - and this may be in many respects of more relevance to young Berliners of Turkish origin on a daily level - teachers, potential employers, classmates, social workers etc. and condition the social context that young people encounter and in which they act.

Second, in particular Heitmeyer's analysis is of relevance as it integrates two widespread images of 'Turkish' residents in Germany, namely as victim and as aggressor. The first is the portrayal of ethnic minorities as being *passive* and suffering from discrimination and exclusion (or - in the case of Turkish or Muslim women in general - as being oppressed by traditional patriarchal structures). The second - the image of the *active* aggressor - perceives *activity* exclusively in negative terms, as 'dangerous', 'violent', 'fundamentalist', 'anti-modern' or 'anti-democratic' conduct.⁷ Discussions that are caught in the simple dichotomy of "pity and

contempt" (*Horrocks and Kolinsky 1996*)⁸ reflect the common assumption that German residents of Turkish origin lack any positive potency to shape both their individual lives as well as to transform social reality in Germany in a way that is of value for the whole society.

In this chapter I will seek to challenge this dichotomy. My main argument is that young people of Turkish origin - rather than being anti-modern protagonists - mediate and enforce the transformation of one of modernity's central projects, namely citizenship. Correspondingly the chapter is mainly concerned with young people's attitudes towards, and actually applied strategies with regard to, formal citizenship. However, although being agents, these young people do not act in a vacuum but within a concrete context of material conditions and social relations. Here, limits to their actual enjoyment of substantial citizenship, in particular in the area of education, are crucial for both the direction and the scope or effectiveness of their agency. This issue will be touched upon before concluding this chapter.

YOUNG BERLINERS OF TURKISH ORIGIN AS AGENTS OF CHANGE

In 1996, more than 150,000 Berliners who were younger than 25 years old did not have a German passport (17.3 per cent), of these 42 per cent were of Turkish origin.

Table 6: Young Berliners under 25 According to Age Groups and Nationality (30.6.1996)⁹

Age Group	All Nationalities	Germans		Ethnic Minorities		of Turkish origin	
Younger than 5	140,460	111,201	79.2%	29,259	20.8%	12,699	9.0%
5-10	185,482	156,521	84.4%	28,961	15.6%	13,588	7.3%
10-15	185,065	160,466	86.7%	24,599	13.3%	10,538	5.7%
15-20	178,237	150,345	84.4%	27,892	15.6%	12,450	7.0%
20-25	190,885	149,349	78.2%	41,536	21.8%	13,967	7.3%
Total of under 25	880,129	727,882	82.7%	152,247	17.3%	63,242	7.2%
all age groups	3,438,838	2,999,043	87.2%	439,795	12.8%	137,674	4.0%

Source: *Ausländerbeauftragte Berlin 1997*

As will be illustrated in the following, tables like this that distinguish Germany's population according to their nationality will in the medium and long-term become a thing of the past, as the number of persons of minority origin who take up German citizenship is steadily increasing and this is particularly the case for young people of Turkish origin.¹⁰

F. is one of those young Berliners who has opted for German citizenship. He is an 18-year-old Kurdish man who - at the time of the interview - was in the 12th year of a *Gymnasium* in Kreuzberg.¹¹ Just one year of school ahead of him, he is busily drawing up future plans. He would like to study political science, economics and law - a combination that is possible in the German university system - and, like most ambitious future students,

he wants to spend at least one year of his studies in England or the USA. F. is an only child and was born in Germany. His parents are Kurdish, his mother migrated to Germany in 1972 and his father came as a student six years later. Currently his father works part-time for an insurance company as well as being self-employed, while his mother works as a housewife.

F's main desire is to become a successful politician. After having been active in various Alevi and Kurdish organisations he decided 'to go mainstream' because he thought the former organisations too "home-orientated" (*heimatorientiert*).

I stopped working with these organisations because I realised that it was not my thing. They are rather home-oriented and I want to change something in Berlin. ... Well, I have been born here ... I don't think of Turkey primarily, but of Germany. (*Interview with F., 9.5.1997*)

Now he participates in meetings of the Social Democratic Party in Berlin's district Schöneberg and intends to become a full party member soon. Questioned whether the *SPD* is the only party he could imagine himself working with, F. admits that he may as well be a member of the Green Party but that the Social Democrats offer - from his point of view - better career prospects as they have not yet attracted as many active members of ethnic minority origin as the Green Party.

If you look at the SPD now, you won't find a foreigner who has really made it ... however, it is beneficial to have a Muslim who does not believe, and on top I am Kurdish. There aren't many Kurds in the SPD. Most join the PDS or the Greens. That might be a reason, well my advantage, that they [SPD] let me go to the top. ... I have all these advantages. If I use them properly, then, may be I am able to make it. (*Interview with F., 9.5.1997*)

Though being very career orientated, F. rejects emphatically any suggestion that he may just want to use politics to further his own achievements. For him it is crystal-clear that he wants to get involved because he wants to change politics in Germany and - to some extent - in Turkey. But at the same time he is not interested in being just a token bystander in any political party, but - being very confident and ambitious - he wants to lead from the front. F. is passionate about politics - he is already elected as vice-student representative of his school - and despises politicians who do not act according to principle but because they just want to remain in power. This - according to F. - is not only a malaise of politicians who are members of the majority population but it applies at the same time to the few elected members of the *Berliner Abgeordnetenhaus* (the Berlin parliament) who are Germans of Turkish origin. Asked whether he models himself on one of these three, F. just shakes his head:

Oh no, absolutely not. I don't like their politics ... because they are two-faced. They present themselves very differently

in public than what they really are. For example Ismail Kosan [Green Party] defends the Alevis and says he will change this and that for them. But in reality he does not want to do that, he is only interested in their votes [once they can vote]. Most politicians conduct politics, well, how did Weber put it again? Well, most politicians live off politics and not for politics... that's just not me, that's why I want to have a job as well.

F. and his whole extended family applied for German citizenship very shortly after the legal changes were introduced in the early 1990s. For several years now, F is holder of a German passport but is not quite sure whether he would call himself 'German' - "may be a Kurd with German citizenship?" The decision to apply for citizenship was easy for him. His parents, who clearly want to retire in Germany, thought it may be beneficial for the family and F. regards it as a technical requirement. Apart from being a prerequisite to enter parliamentary politics, he enjoys travelling in Europe without having to apply for visas for the non-Schengen countries and looks forward to being a first-time-voter.

Like F. and his family, in the recent past many Berliners of Turkish origin have made the decision to apply for a German passport. As pointed out in chapter 4, Germany has seen quite a startling - though in the international debate much neglected - shift regarding the attitudes of minority members of Turkish origin towards German citizenship. This shift is particularly apparent in Berlin where citizenship policies have been more accessible than in most other German *Bundesländer* (with the exception of

Hamburg). According to a survey conducted in 1993 in Berlin, 66.3 per cent of young Berliners of Turkish origin (18-25 years) had already applied, intended to apply or were thinking of applying for German citizenship (*Ausländerbeauftragte Berlin 1994*). Such a development would have been unimaginable ten years ago¹² and the obvious question to ask concerns the reasons for this shift which, as I will attempt to illustrate in the following, is influenced by a multitude of factors.

The increase in both the interest in, and the actual numbers of applications for, German citizenship, mirrors three crucial developments: a) the transformation of initially temporary migrants into immigrants; b) legal changes in Germany that make formal citizenship more accessible, and c) bilateral agreements between Turkey and Germany as well as decisions taken by the Turkish government that regulate or guarantee rights for the Turkish diaspora in Turkey. Furthermore, it reflects actual or perceived differences regarding the rights formal citizens enjoy in comparison with residents that are not holders of the country's passport they live in. The example of EU-citizens residing in Germany demonstrates that the smaller these differences are, the lower is the interest in applying for naturalisation (see chapter 4).

When the government introduced changes in the *Einbürgerungs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht* that gave two groups of so called foreigners the right to become naturalised, a rudimentary - alas still restrictive - framework to make citizenship more accessible was provided. Yet, the

response from people of minority origin was initially indifferent and interest in German citizenship remained low. As pointed out before, many commentators, including myself, put this response down to the rejection of the German government to formally - apart from a few exceptions - tolerate dual citizenship (see *Brandt 1994*).

However, with the advantage of hindsight, this single cause explanation needs some modification. This is particularly the case in attempting to analyse the attitudes of young people: dual citizenship is on the one hand a means to retain access to rights in Turkey. At the time when the new naturalisation rules were implemented, Turkey had not yet fully introduced important legislation that guaranteed naturalised Germans of Turkish origin the possibility to retain crucial rights in Turkey (such as the right to re-migrate or to resettle). Therefore, to become exclusively German meant to opt for a legally uncertain status in Turkey. Yet citizens' rights in Turkey are - on a practical and material level - only of importance if individuals intend to make use of these rights by living for longer periods in Turkey. This, as has been pointed out by numerous studies, does not apply for the great majority of young people of Turkish origin who only intend to go to Turkey for short holidays.

Ü. (16, female) and T. (16, male) for instance both go to a *Gesamtschule* in Kreuzberg and cannot imagine living in Turkey. T. thinks that Turkey is too old-fashioned for him. Wanting to become a computer programmer, he would rather go to England, "... they are more advanced there". In

addition, his Turkish is - according to himself - not sufficient to pursue a professional career in Turkey. Although the same can be said about his English, T. is convinced that it makes more sense to invest time to learning English than to improve his Turkish (*Interview with T., 29.5.1997*). Ü. in comparison is frustrated about being depicted as a German, or as someone who 'does not belong', when she is in Turkey. This in many respects parallels the experiences she makes in Germany. Her rather negative and superficial impressions do not turn Turkey into a country she wishes to reside in on a permanent basis:

Well in Turkey it is like this, 'she is from Germany, so she is German, she does not belong to us' ... that hurts! Well in my case, when I was in Turkey one time, and walked around [they said] 'ugh, look at her, she isn't a Turk of pure race ... And I think that is totally stupid, what kind of an attitude is that that they have over there. ... I just couldn't live there. I am used to a totally different world. I only experience Turkey in summer, on holidays, and I never see the real Turkey. If I was to move there all of a sudden, I just couldn't cope with that. ... (*Interview with Ü., 29.5.1997*)

B., a 22-year-old young man, who is Alevi and was born in Berlin, articulates the same attitude. He is currently unemployed and wants to get into a further education course for social work. B. has lived for four years in Turkey - between 1985 and 1989 - and has made up his mind. Although not being happy with his situation in Germany, he does not contemplate giving Turkey a second chance:

Well, I have lived for four years in Turkey. I couldn't take it any longer and came back with my parents to Germany. You know [in Turkey], firstly I couldn't cope with the language, secondly ... well let me say with the culture. For example, here [in Germany] I have been in a class with 12 persons. There, all of a sudden I was in a class with 65. And then these uniforms and the strict discipline. That was just too much for me. Well, that was just beyond the bounds, so much that I couldn't stand it. (*Interview with B.*, 6.6.1997)

From my point of view, in particular the initial indifference of young Berliners of Turkish origin to make use of their right to become naturalised cannot be easily put down to their attachment to, or interests in, Turkey. Rather it has to be analysed within the context of their experiences, and those of their parents, in Germany. Let me outline two arguments:

First, young people of Turkish origin grew up in a political climate that - putting it euphemistically - neither 'welcomed' them nor their parents as rightful and equal members of the German society. As a result, for some Berliners of Turkish origin, a 'symbolic distance' or undesirability regarding the acquisition of German citizenship emerged and the call for dual citizenship became a symbol of asserting diversity and rejecting French style assimilationist models of integration. In this context, some young Berliners of Turkish origin regarded naturalisation and the giving up of the Turkish passport as an act of subordination or even betrayal. N. for example is a seventeen-year-old female teenager. Nearly every day

after school (she is a pupil of a *Hauptschule*), N. goes to a girls' group in the heart of Kreuzberg, near the tube station *Görlitzer Bahnhof*. During the interview she mentioned the difficulties she had initially when her parents told her that the whole family should apply for German citizenship.

Well, I didn't want to be the only one to become German. ... You know citizenship doesn't really matter to me. May be later. ... When my parents told me that we should all apply, well, I didn't know. ... If I had told [my friends] that I got German citizenship, and not the Turkish, I am German now, they would have called me an ass-kisser. (*Interview with N.*, 27.5.1997)

Second, however there is a more pragmatic argument to be made: The exclusionist ideology ruling Germany's *Ausländerpolitik* found its legal manifestation in formal citizenship and naturalisation policies which - as demonstrated before - were for nearly four decades of Germany's post-war immigration history an insurmountable hurdle for non-German immigrants and their offspring. In the absence of any viable option to become naturalised Germans, the idea to apply for a German passport did by definition not occur to most Berliners of Turkish origin - it was too remote to become a realistic strategy.¹³ A twenty-six year old male Berliner of Turkish origin who works part-time in one of Berlin's cafes explains:

I don't know, I have never thought about having a German passport. ... I really thought it was impossible. ... Well you

know, I just I didn't know a Turk who had done that [become naturalised]. My parents never mentioned it. ... It was just, well how can I put it, it was just normal to be a Turk, I mean to have a Turkish passport and not a German. (*Interview with D., 3.6.1997*)

Thus when the changes regarding naturalisation were introduced, the long established 'legal normality' that citizenship was practically unavailable had to be offset over time. This was done on the one hand by various campaigns initiated by the Berlin *Ausländerbeauftragte* and her local counterparts that both inform in detail about the changes and emphasise the benefits of formal citizenship. Yet for German citizenship to become a common everyday component for Berliners of Turkish origin a 'critical mass' of applicants is needed, who as neighbours, friends, relatives or colleagues demonstrate and communicate the availability and the benefits of formal citizenship and who thus initiate a 'domino-effect'.

As more and more people take up German citizenship because they a) recognise the benefits of the formal German citizen status compared to that of a Third-Country-National; and b) because - and this may have been important for the parents of the second/third generation - crucial rights can now be retained in Turkey regardless of nationality, negative connotations regarding German citizenship become less potent and naturalisation is actually in the process of being redefined as a strategy by which people of Turkish origin can establish their place within wider German society.

A closer look at the attitudes towards citizenship and dual citizenship that is articulated by young Berliners of Turkish origin today, will help to illustrate this particular transformation of German citizenship that is mediated by former migrants and their offspring from Turkey. Let us first have a look at the decision-making process that leads young people to apply for German citizenship, or to consider applying. In this context two questions occur: Who made the decision and why?

As in F's case, who was quoted at the beginning of this section, I would argue that in most cases it is not the 16-year-old teenager but rather his or her parents, or other older relatives who take the initiative. Many of the young people whom I interviewed - particularly those who had not yet reached majority age - made the point that it was their parents who decided for the whole family to become naturalised. Even if the parents themselves are not interested in applying for German citizenship, they support the naturalisation of their children for a variety of reasons, as is illustrated in S's case. He is a 17-year-old male pupil of a *Realschule* in Kreuzberg. His parents are both already pensioners and would like to spend half their time in Turkey and half in Germany. S. told me that his parents do not intend to apply for a German passport, because they feel too old for such a change. However, they support his application because they welcome and understand that he wants to stay in Germany and they are convinced that long-term his chances in Germany will be improved by having a German passport. Furthermore, they see his application as part

of a 'family strategy', i.e. as a way to secure their own rights in Germany via the nationality of their son (*Interview with S., 3.6.1997*).

Clearly, not in all cases do families apply together for naturalisation, nor should parental support for attaining the German passport be taken for granted. Some parents may well regard the acquisition of German citizenship by their children as a threat to family unity or as a potential loss of parental control. M. (female, 16 years old) for example would like to apply for German citizenship but her father does not approve of this step. She explains that she will wait until she is 18 years old and is prepared to face the anticipated conflict with her father.

No, my father does not allow that... I don't know why, but somehow he does not want it. I think he is afraid that I will change and that he might loose me. ... You know, he says 'how would that look like, if we go through the passport control [at the airport] and you show your German passport and I show my Turkish passport. How can I prove that you are my daughter?' ... Well, and he does not trust me. He does not believe that I won't change. He thinks that I will turn into a German, go to discos, come back at four in the morning. (*Interview with M., 3.6.1997*)

Regarding the reasons why young people agree to become naturalised - or even initiated the naturalisation process themselves - I would argue that in general they attach greater importance to their access to effective rights and that they regard citizenship more in an instrumental way than

as an expression of identity. Being firmly positioned in Germany, young persons seek to take up the advantages of formal citizen status. "Well anyway, we have been born here. I want to stay here, I don't want to go to Turkey. That's why I want the German passport. It is better for me." (*Interview with S.*, 18 years, male, 6.6.1997). Young people regard the German passport as particularly beneficial in the areas of employment, political participation, freedom of movement in the EU, and as a welcomed respite from bureaucratic procedures that only apply to so called foreigners. Ü., who was quoted earlier, regards citizenship as something entirely positive because it is of practical value and importance in Germany. For her the right to vote and to participate in political decisions is crucial:

I think it [German passport] gives me more possibilities than Turkish citizenship.... I think I can vote then. I will have something to say. But with the Turkish citizenship, I can't do that. ... I want to have a say in the matters that are going on in the country where I live. I mean, I don't just want to be an onlooker, 'oh they have elected such and such', and I have to be happy with that. No, I want to participate, I want to decide what is going on. (*Interview with Ü.*, 29.5.1997)

The reasons for M. - a 16-year-old female teenager - to apply for the passport are much more personal, and are closely linked to the violent death of her brother who was killed in a racist attack a few years ago in Berlin.¹⁴ M. - contrary to *Heitmeyer's* general assumption that experiences of "xenophobic violence" inevitably lead to a "retreat into ethnic enclaves"

- intends to forcefully assert her presence in Germany, and in doing this she regards the formal citizenship as a prerequisite.

Well, my mom has done that for herself and for my sister, and well, then I said ok. too. It is just like that in Germany, if you don't have it [the German passport], then you are not treated like a human being. That's just how they see the situation. But I do not find that logical. Why do I need the citizenship, if I have it, I am still considered Turkish. But they this government there, they just can't think. They have their own ideas. ... If you want to have rights, you got to have it [the passport], otherwise you will never, never have rights.
(*Interview with M., 27.5.1997*)

M. even goes a step further. Not only does she want to have the rights of a formal citizen but she also intends to protect these rights by becoming part of Germany's executive:

As for employment, you need citizenship. [Employers say] 'No, we don't take foreigners, first we take Germans and then may be those [non-Germans]...' And you know, I want to become a policewoman. You cannot do that, if you do not have German citizenship. (*Interview with M., 27.5.1997*)

Furthermore, the German passport is not only a means to improve employment chances in the German labour market, but guarantees the possibility of taking up employment in any country of the European Union.

Well, in my case it was, I thought, because of the possibility to travel. And in the future you have the opportunity to work in other EU countries. That makes a big difference ... may be I want to go and live outside Germany. And then it can be decisive for your professional life (*Interview with B. male, 22, 6.6.1997*)

An additional incentive to become 'German' - and one that should not be underestimated given the slow and often adverse workings of German bureaucracy - is the opportunity to escape bureaucratic procedures and to make time-wasting and often humiliating activities like queuing at the *Ausländerbehörde* in order to renew a residence permit, or applying for travel-visas for non-Schengen countries, a thing of the past. "The bumf and so on. If I go away now, I no longer need a visa. It has become more easy." (*F., female 17 years, 17, 3.6.97*). An explicit example for wanting to leave the hassle and distinct 'logic' of the German bureaucracy behind is S's statement. She is a young Kurdish woman (24 years) who currently studies economics in Berlin. S. got her passport in 1996 and asked why she initially applied for a German passport she states:

Well, you know to be perfectly honest, it was pure convenience. Well, because I have spend two and a half years in Turkey [after having been to primary school in Germany] ... I did not get an *Aufenthaltsberechtigung*, but the whole time only an *Aufenthaltserlaubnis* that had to be renewed every two years. And finally they told me, well because you are in vocational training, and you don't have a regular income, we cannot give you an *unbefristete*

Aufenthaltserlaubnis. And then I really had had enough. But imagine, the German citizenship I just got like that, no problems. That was totally ridiculous. But well ... Well that was the reason, why I have done it. (*Interview with S., 26.5.1997*)

Yet S. offers a second explanation for her decision to get the German passport. "As a Kurdish woman," she says "I did not feel comfortable with Turkish citizenship." It is estimated that approximately 40 per cent of Berliners of Turkish origin are Kurds and/or Alevis. Compared to other West-German cities this is a very high proportion and it may play a role in explaining both the higher interest in German citizenship in Berlin and a less forceful insistence on dual citizenship. All teenagers and young adults of Kurdish or Alevi background to whom I talked raised arguments why - as being members of groups that are discriminated against and even persecuted in Turkey - they do not regard it as important to have the Turkish passport as a matter of principle. Yet again, also more practical considerations play a role. During meetings with four Alevi male youngsters, they - like S. - expressed their dispassion to hold on to Turkish citizenship. Being male and around 18 years old they are however also liable for military service. By having the German passport they can choose to do their military service in Germany, or - and all boys wanted to do that - to do the German community service as an alternative option.

Looking at the reasoning of youngsters of Kurdish background one may point out that such reasoning argues somewhat against my point of view,

i.e. that German citizenship is perceived as a positive choice. In their case it is possible that the German passport is regarded as the preferable alternative to Turkish citizenship and that – if there were a Kurdistan – some of these young persons might want to opt for Kurdish citizenship. Although I regard such a hypothetical consideration as conceivable, I would nevertheless – against the background of their firm positioning in Germany – raise my doubts that these young men and women would select a Kurdish passport instead of a German one.

A certain disinterest in Turkish citizenship is not an attitude exclusively voiced by young Kurdish or Alevi Berliners, but for reasons that have been pointed out above it appears to be a widespread perspective. Nevertheless this does not mean that young Berliners of Turkish origin reject the possibility of having two passports as a matter of principle, rather, when confronted with the requirement to opt for one citizenship, they decide to choose the passport of their country of residence. Being questioned whether she would like to have dual citizenship, F.(17) says “Sure, if it was possible, but if not then I will decide in favour of the German, ... because I live here.” (*Interview with F., 3..6.1997*)¹⁵

For the minority of youngsters who contemplate going to Turkey for more than just a holiday visit, the Turkish passport seems to retain its relevance despite legal guarantees by the Turkish government for naturalised Germans of Turkish origin. B. (female, born in Berlin, 16 years) has not applied for German citizenship as she plans to live in Turkey for some

years after having completed her *erweiterter Hauptschulabschluß* in Germany. She wants to go for one or two years (depending on her marks) to a school for 'German-Turkish' (*almancis*) teenagers in Izmir. After successful completion she will be able to enrol in a Turkish university (in comparison, to gain a degree that allows her to study in Germany would be a very lengthy and complicated, if not an impossible process). B. is concerned about her rights in Turkey, but also about being accepted as a Turkish woman:

Yes, well for me it is [important to have the Turkish passport]. Well, that is my passport. I am Turkish and this proves it. And if I have the German, well, of course I feel I am Turkish, but people in Turkey won't think that I am Turkish, because I have a German passport. (*Interview with B., 29.5.97*)

These examples have illustrated that the young people who have participated in the interviews apply citizenship primarily in an instrumental way. I would argue that in their individual strategies these young people actually both carry out and induce a transformation of citizenship, that has become – at an abstract level - a major objective of academic debates around citizenship. Namely, the disengagement or disentanglement of citizenship and national identity. On the one hand young Berliners of Turkish origin regard citizenship as a means to gain access to rights and to improve their life chances in their country of residence. By doing so they apply citizenship in a way that corresponds with the concept's basic

meaning, i.e. as an emancipatory tool. On the other hand, as will be illustrated in the following, matters or expressions of identification are held apart from, or rather are not blended with, the colour of the passport.¹⁶

Firstly, all interviewed youngsters assume that for their ethnic German counterparts they will remain 'Turks' regardless which passport they are holding. "Oh well, I am aware that even if I have a German passport, if I have a fight with a Nazi for example, he won't be looking at my passport but at the colour of my hair." (*Interview with S., 18, male, 6.6.1997*). In addition, leaving aside the question whether it is an autonomous or a heteronomous definition (*eigendefiniert* or *fremddefiniert*), most children and teenagers who are German citizens also refer to themselves as Turkish¹⁷, or more specifically as Kurdish¹⁸ or Alevi rather than as German.

You mean to say that I am a German? No, I wouldn't. Look [he rolls up his sleeve and points to his upper arm] I just got this tattoo [an Alevi sword] ... told my mother that it will wash off. ... One wants to present one's identity with pride. Here, I am an Alevi. (*Interview with U., male, 20 years old, 6.6.1997*)

Young Berliners of Turkish origin denote their language, their family's origin, their religions, their names, their looks, their 'different upbringing' or their relationships with their parents as markers of them being different from their ethnic German peers. They get angry when being in Turkey and they are not accepted as Turks by the indigenous population "You know,

who says that I have to live in Turkey in order to be a Turk?" (*Interview with Y., 16, female, 14.5.1997*). In Germany, they have always been called 'Turkish kids' and find the very idea of labelling themselves as Germans, quite bizarre. Clearly, their multiple links, interests and affiliations can become ambiguous in a situation when confronted with exclusion:

We are caught in no-man's-land. You can't decide whether you belong here or there. That is somewhat stupid. ... In Turkey it is like this now, for example when I am there, they do not accept me as Turkish. They say, 'oh you are a German and you will remain a German'. What shall I say against that? And here [in Germany] they don't accept me either, ... as a German. Then I feel as if I don't belong anywhere. Do you know what I mean? Well, I do not necessarily need the Turkish passport, or the German one, for me it pretty much doesn't matter what I am. The main thing is that the people who like me accept me the way I am. I don't need to show any sort of proof that I am Turkish or German. (*Interview with Ü., 29.5.97*).

But in general these multiple commitments and interests are part of young persons every-day life and to be a German citizen and - at the same time - to refer to oneself for example as Turkish just reflects this reality. These young people in many respects live diversity without taking sides. And that is exactly what they expect German society as a whole to tolerate.

So far, I have tried to illustrate that young persons of Turkish origin have - contrary to the discourse of 'pity and contempt' - sought to apply citizenship as a strategy to improve their situation and as part of this process are actively transforming the concept. However, it would be quite inadequate to exaggerate their agency and not to point out its limits. A major restraint is certainly the disadvantaged position of young Berliners of Turkish origin in the area of education, a topic that I will briefly discuss in the following.

THE LIMITS OF AGENCY - EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR YOUNG BERLINERS OF TURKISH ORIGIN

Young Berliners of Turkish origin regard the acquisition of a German passport as an important step to overcome their disadvantaged socio-economic position. However, by looking at the situation of for example Afro-Caribbean youngsters in Britain, or Mexican- and African-American young persons in the USA, who hold the citizenship of the countries they reside in, the confines of a given legal parity that is not accompanied by a commitment to social equality become distressingly apparent (*see for example Wrench and Hassan 1996; Faist 1995*). Equal citizenship - as has been pointed out amongst others by *Bhikhu Parekh* - does not consist only of a formal dimension but is also concerned with equality of opportunity, elimination of discrimination, equal respect, "public acceptance of immigrants as a legitimate and valued part of society" and

tolerance for norms and values that differ from the 'mainstream' (*Parekh 1997, pp. lv-x*).

One of the main areas determining the level of social equality and access to substantial citizenship in modern, knowledge based societies is education, or the ownership of knowledge and its accumulation as cultural capital (*Bourdieu 1984*). High standards of education are both in the interest of a) the state (and industry) in order to be able to compete internationally and b) the individual, as it is nearly impossible to occupy jobs with a promising future without successful acquisition of knowledge in schools, colleges, specialised training schemes and universities. Furthermore, beyond being an instrument for the individual's advancement, education also improves his or her standing and acceptance in the wider society. In a situation where the state (in this case Germany) ignores or renounces the societal value of one or more segments of its society (here, persons of Turkish origin), it will as a consequence not show much concern for the advancement of this group and will ignore the possible need for policies necessary to improve the educational performance of members of this group. As a result of educational underperformance, the ability of the individual (or of the group) to participate competently and fully in German society is restricted and equal citizenship is wanting.

Exactly this problem unfolds when we look at the performance of children and young Berliners of Turkish origin in education. Clearly, compared with

the quality of education that is provided and that is accessible to young members of the above mentioned minority groups in the US or the UK, I would argue that – due to the structure of the German welfare system - adolescent ‘non-Germans’ are in general better off, as they benefit from a mass rather than an elitist approach to education that offers in principle better access to all segments of society (see *Faist 1995*). However this (obviously debatable) argument does not help to overcome disadvantages that occur within the national context.

The data that is provided in the following will – unfortunately – not include specific figures that reflect on the situation of young Berliners of Turkish origin. Yet, various reports of both the *Ausländerbeauftragte* on the national level and on that of the *Land* Berlin have pointed out that they perform particularly badly in school. *Barbara John* for example states that mostly young people of Turkish and Arabic background go to the lowest form of secondary school, the *Hauptschule* (see endnote 11 of this chapter), whereas those pupils who, or whose parents, originated in Greece, Italy, Iran and Poland constitute by far the majority of non-German pupils who leave school with a baccalaureate (*Ausländerbeauftragte Berlin 1994, p. 18*). Thus, the picture that is drawn in the following does not reflect but can only indicate the educational abyss as experienced by young Berliners of Turkish origin.

Table 7: 'Non-German' Pupils in Primary and Secondary Schools in Berlin (Academic Year 1995/96)

Type of School	Berlin-West			Berlin (West and East)		
	Total number of pupils	'Non-German' pupils	% of non-German pupils	Total number of pupils	Non-German pupils	% of non-German pupils
Primary School	109,152	27,489	25.2	209,341	30,572	14.6
Hauptschule	10,202	4,505	44.2	14,039	4,670	33.3
Realschule	14,596	3,325	22.8	29,928	3,461	11.6
Gymnasium	42,816	4,981	11.6	80,882	5,306	6.6
Gesamtschule	25,512	5,533	21.7	51,559	6,290	12.2
Sonderschule	5,434	1,592	29.3	12,647	1,677	13.3
Total	207,712	47,425	22.8	398,396	51,976	13.0

Source: *Ausländerbeauftragte Berlin 1997*

We can see that of all non-German pupils who – during the academic year 1995/96 - went to a secondary school in Berlin,¹⁹ nearly 25 per cent were *Hauptschüler* (compared with 14 per cent of their German counterparts); 18 per cent went to a *Realschule* (21 per cent of all German pupils attended this kind of secondary school); 27 per cent were at a *Gymnasium* (compared with more than half of all German youngsters – 57 per cent); and 30 per cent were pupils of one of Berlin's comprehensive schools (about 34 per cent of all Germans).

Although the integration into the German educational system of young people from an ethnic minority background has improved somewhat over the past years, their educational performance is still significantly lower

than that of their ethnic German counterparts. This becomes particularly obvious by looking at the school-degrees of ethnic minority pupils:

Table 8: School-Degrees of ‘Non-German’ School-Leavers in Berlin

	1980/1981	1983/84	1986/87	1990/91	1994/95
School-leavers without degree	39%	35%	30%	24%	20%
Hauptschulabschluß	10%	11%	11%	10%	9%
Erweiterter Hauptschulabschluß	23%	28%	23%	26%	26%
Realschulabschluß	22%	23%	29%	28%	32%
Baccalaureate	6%	4%	8%	12%	13%


Source: *Ausländerbeauftragte Berlin 1994 and 1997*²⁰

Nearly one third of all ‘non-German’ pupils leave school with no, or a rather ineffective school degree. Another quarter acquires the *erweiterter Hauptschulabschluß* which – as pointed out in endnote number 11 of this chapter - allows them to continue education. However, from the data that is available, it remains unclear how many pupils make use of this opportunity. In 1995 only 13 per cent left school with the baccalaureate. In actual numbers this means that in 1995 only 473 pupils of ethnic minority origin (out of a total of 3,590) were able to go on to University, whereas 34 per cent of all German students achieved this qualification at the end of the same academic year (*Ausländerbeauftragte Berlin 1997*).

Looking at the situation in Kreuzberg, the picture – both for German and non-German pupils – becomes more depressed, which is one of the

reasons why members of the middle class - as explained in the previous chapter - seek to move out of Kreuzberg.

Figure 4: German Pupils and Pupils of Ethnic Minority Origin in Secondary Schools in Kreuzberg (Academic Year 1996/1997)²¹



Source: Bezirksamt Kreuzberg, Abteilung Jugend, Bildung und Kultur 1997

If we ask for the reasons for the educational disadvantage of young Berliners of Turkish origin a complex set of explanations has to be taken into account. In the following I will briefly outline three of the most important factors:

First, as *Gülestan Gürbay*, the author of the last report of the national *Ausländerbeauftragte* on the educational/vocational situation of 'non-German' adolescents has pointed out, German schools in general are still characterised by a "*monokulturelle Verfaßtheit*" (monocultural orientation) which manifests itself in the schools' structure, their curricula and their applied teaching methods: a) teachers, of whom most are civil servants, are predominantly ethnic Germans; b) proposals for 'inter-' or 'multi-cultural' education are only considered as additional or specific tools, but – if put to use at all – are not seen as approaches that should be applied as a matter of course; c) the bi- or multi-lingual abilities of ethnic minority pupils are not regarded as valuable assets and are not fostered by the syllabus (*Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für die Belange der Ausländer* 1997, pp. 17-18).

Policies regarding education – like naturalisation policies - fall under the sovereignty of the *Bundesländer*. Therefore, the Berlin government can introduce comprehensive regulations and policies that depart from the national dictum. An important legal change in this direction was implemented in 1996 with an amendment of Berlin's *Schulgesetz* (law regulating school education). At that time, a paragraph was introduced stating that the offers of bilingual education should be made available in Berlin's schools, provided that it is financially feasible. So far however, only a few measures are available:

a) Since the academic year 1992/93, the Berlin government supports three school models (primary schools) that make children of Turkish origin literate in both German and Turkish. Another 14 primary schools were authorised to use bi-lingual teaching material. However, in some schools, as was highlighted by young people in the course of the interviews, teachers and headmasters/mistresses not only disregard measures to promote bi-lingual education but disapprove of their pupils speaking to each other in Turkish or Kurdish even during the breaks:

What I really don't like is that we are not allowed to speak Turkish in school. ... Not even during the breaks ... The teachers don't like it. They always start shouting at us and threaten us (*Interview with M., female, 16 years, 3.6.1997*).

Ok, I don't have to speak Turkish to my friend in class, but if it is only one word? The teacher tells me I will get bad marks for it ... that she has to understand everything that we say. But why does she have to? And why can't I talk Turkish to my friend outside class? (*Interview with A., female, 15 years, 27.5.1997*).

b) In 1996 a new *Europaschule* was opened in Kreuzberg which offers German-Turkish education (other existing international schools offer education in German and English, French and Spanish).²² According to *Özcan Mutlu*, a local councillor in Kreuzberg, the founding of this *Deutsch-Türkische Europaschule* was however met with resistance by the government:

Until that school was founded, we had to fight for two long years. Because of the Senate. The Senat wanted to keep its elite schools as elite schools, and as schools for European languages, and Turkish didn't fit in with their plans at all. Well, but we have got it running now ... with the support of parents. One argument [made by the senate] was for example 'you will never find enough German parents who want to send their children to a German-Turkish school, where they will learn Turkish.' The fact was, that more German parents were interested than Turkish (*Interview with Özcan Mutlu, 4.6.1997*).

The topic of the availability of bi-lingual, or multi-lingual education leads to the second explanation of the educational underperformance of young Berliners of Turkish origin, namely their generally poor language competence. Many of these young people, or more precisely, those who are not of a middle class background, are not fully literate in either of the languages that they speak. Due to the lack of "social capital", i.e. numerous and effective "contacts and connections outside the Turkish migrant community" (*Caglar 1995*) young Berliners of Turkish origin often do not speak German as a daily language before they enter school at the age of five or six. Furthermore, in the district of Kreuzberg, the use of the German language is often confined to the classroom as a high percentage of pupils, are of 'non-German'/Turkish origin and converse with each other – with or without teachers' permission – in a mix of German, Turkish, Kurdish or other languages. In three primary schools in Kreuzberg for example 'non-German' pupils constituted more than 70 per cent of all

pupils during the academic year 1996/97 (*Bezirksamt Kreuzberg von Berlin 1997*). At home, they often speak Turkish – in most cases exclusively with their parents and older relatives - at a colloquial level (the situation is even more complicated for children and teenagers of Kurdish origin) and with their siblings – as with their friends - a mix of languages:

Well, you know in a way we only speak *Umgangssprache* [colloquial language] at home. My parents don't know German very well, and with me they, well they don't talk to me in high or perfect Turkish. They think that I cannot understand that. They just talk in a way that is simpler. (*Interview with S., male, 17 years, 3.6.1997*).

In foreign language [sic] I only know what my father says, what he says on a daily level. Nothing else. (*Interview with M., 3.6.1997*)

To make matters worse, many non-German primary and secondary pupils - almost exclusively of Turkish origin – were taught until recently in so called *Ausländerregelklassen* (classes exclusively for 'foreigners'). The Berlin *Schulgesetz* incorporated a so called 'quota regulation' according to which schools were not allowed to have mixed (i.e. German/non-German) classes with more than 50 percent 'foreigners'. In order to 'protect' German pupils and to guarantee their quality of education, schools were in this case requested by law to form classes exclusively for 'foreigners' in order to comply with the quota (*Berliner Schulgesetz, paragraph 35 (2), Ausländerbeauftragte Berlin 1994, p. 19*). This regulation has now been

abolished and the last pupils who were taught in such classes left school at the end of the academic year 1996/97.

In addition to the monocultural orientation of the school system and the poor level of language competence amongst young Berliners of Turkish origin, a third reason for their disadvantaged educational position is related to existent negative stereotypes and their exposure to direct discrimination by teachers. During my interviews with young people, I got the impression that experiences of discrimination did not seem to be widespread, but the teenagers repeatedly pointed to more 'subtle' incidents that are difficult to pinpoint, but that leave them nevertheless with an impression of being treated differently by their teachers than their German counterparts.

I don't want to say that all teachers are against Ausländer. But I do think that there are a few at our school. Well I can feel that. They laugh with the Germans, they are friendly, they behave totally differently with them. They don't shout that much when the Germans don't make their homework, or when they are late. They don't make as many jokes about them in front of the others. ... With us they have a certain prejudice, because some Turkish youngsters really mess up, and don't have manners. And they think we are all like that. I mean, I totally feel that (*Interview with E., female, 15 years, 4.6.1997*).

In one particular school the situation was however more obvious. This was already transparent at my first meeting with the headmaster, with whom I discussed the purpose and content of the interviews. He was astonishingly plain and made it very clear, that from his point of view, the male “Turkish Youngsters” were all troublemakers and should be kept away from more naïve and vulnerable German children and teenager. The youngsters themselves (all pupils of an *Ausländerregelklasse*) pointed out that they had to “put up” with his remarks nearly every day.

It is as if he has fits in class. Then he just does not stop shouting. When we come up with the phrase, ‘I don’t know that’ then he will always tell us, well that is lazy, that is typically Turkish, what are you doing here? Well what is this man doing in Kreuzberg? Why doesn’t he go? (*Interview with X, female, 16 years, June 1997*)

SUMMARY

Young Berliners of Turkish origin are in the process of establishing their place within the wider German society. One area of their ‘agency’ concerns the politics of citizenship. Realising the advantages of ‘formal citizenship’, they increasingly apply citizenship in an instrumental way as a tool to improve their situation in Germany. For them the colour of their passport is not and cannot be an expression of their identity. Their multiple links, interests, needs and identifications cross national

boundaries and can by definition not be encapsulated by a printed document that establishes a formal link between an individual and one state.

However, although one can regard young Berliners of Turkish origin as agents who challenge the traditional link between citizenship and national identity in their applied strategies, it has to be emphasised that they do suffer at the same time from significant disadvantages that result from a national paradigm that still dominates the 'content of citizenship'. Hence - as the brief discussion on educational opportunities has demonstrated - many youngsters who have opted for German citizenship, because they hope to improve for example their chances in the labour market, will inevitably be disillusioned when they realise that the acquisition of formal citizenship cannot be equated with equal access to substantial citizenship.

These young persons were able to opt for German citizenship and to apply it as a strategy when legal changes were implemented by the German government which led to a more inclusive citizenship legislation. Their future will very much depend on how quickly and committedly German politics will react to their needs which go beyond the question of legal equality. In this context the participation of members of ethnic minorities at the various levels of politics - the subject of the following chapters - can be a crucial motor for bringing about further change

ENDNOTES CHAPTER 6

¹ This study was carried out in 1995. A total of 1,221 pupils of Turkish origin from 63 schools in seven cities in North-Rhine-Westphalia filled out standardised questionnaires. The young persons were at the time between 15 to 21 years old (Heitmeyer 1997, pp. 45-46).

² See critical book reviews by a) Birgit Rommelspacher, b) Wolf-D. Bukow & Erol Yildiz, both in *die tageszeitung*, 29.4.1997; c) Carl Ehrig-Eggert, *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 2.4.1997.

³ In this question the term 'trade unions' (*Gewerkschaften*) is used as a general description of the trade union movement and does not refer to specific German trade unions or the German trade union umbrella organisation (*Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund*).

⁴ The *Milli Görüs* is a Europe-wide Islamic organisation with close links to the former Turkish Welfare Party. The Grey Wolves are directly connected to *Alparslan Türkeş*' extreme right-wing Party of the Nationalistic Movement (*MHP*).

⁵ For example, by naming multiple and very different organisations that represent their interests, many young people are evidently of the opinion that the Social-Democrats, the Green Party, the *Milli Görüs* and the Grey Wolves overlap as regards content in several respects. A logical follow up question could have been to ask the young people with which aspects or activities of the *Milli Görüs* or the Grey Wolves they agree in particular (Rommelspacher, *die tageszeitung*, 29.4.1997). Such an inquiry might have found out that the respondents were not attracted to these organisations for their so-called Islamic-fundamentalist or nationalistic orientations but for very different reasons, such as the organisations' social welfare activities on the local level (help with homework, youth centres, computer classes, etc.). Furthermore, the following questions are left open: To what extent do the respondents actually know the aims and objectives of these groups? How firm is their support? Are the respondents likely to retain their views as adults? Which actual 'form' does such an identification with a political or religious group take? Do these young people go to meetings, or demonstrations? Are they actively involved in the work of these groups? Does an active involvement with - for example - the *Milli Görüs* go hand in hand with the development of a violent religious potential in the first place?

⁶ See for example the work by Bielefeld, U. (1988) *Inländische Ausländer. Zum gesellschaftlichen Bewußtsein türkischer Jugendlicher in der Bundesrepublik* (Frankfurt); Boss-Nünning, U. and Schwarz, T. (forthcoming) 'Public Integration of Migrants in the Federal Republic. Exemplified in Educational and Social Policy' in: *Migration*.

⁷ To equate the *activity* of persons of Turkish origin - or immigrants in general - with 'danger' is clearly not a new development but corresponds with existing portrayals of

'Turks' for example as 'criminals', or of immigrants as 'natural catastrophes' who threaten Europe and Germany in the form of floods and waves.

⁸ Two further popular depictions are a) that of the generally 'unthreatening exotic oriental' Turk; or b) the 'Turkish posterboy' who is displayed as an example of the nice, secular and professional Turk who has just become like 'us' (see for more examples the *ironical glossary put forward by Eberhardt Seidel-Pielen 1995, pp. 41-44*).

⁹ In Kreuzberg, at the end of 1996, 34 per cent of residents under 25 years of age did not hold a German passport (*Bezirksbürgermeister Kreuzberg, 26.3.1997, answers to questions posed by the local counsellor Özcan Mutlu (Green Party)*).

¹⁰ Furthermore, we can anticipate significant changes in the German citizenship law to be introduced by the new German government (a coalition of the Social Democratic and the Green Party). One topic of the *Koalitionsverhandlungen* (negotiations between the parties that aim to form a government coalition before the new chancellor takes up office) was the acquisition and granting of formal citizenship to immigrants. The new German government intends to introduce *ius soli*, formal toleration of dual/multiple citizenship and proposes to grant immigrants the right to become naturalised after 8 years of residence (*Guardian, 16.10.1997*).

¹¹ Let me try to summarise some important details of the German educational system: In Berlin, primary school ends after 6 years (this is different to most other German *Länder* where primary school ends after 4 years). At the age of approximately 12, pupils will either enter the *dreigliedrige Schulsystem* (trinominal system) and be sent to one of the three following schools: a) the *Hauptschule* - this is a lower secondary school for pupils who leave primary school with rather low grades. They attend *Hauptschule* for an additional 3-4 years and can attain a normal *Hauptschulabschluss* (lower secondary degree), or an *erweiterter Hauptschulabschluss* (extended lower secondary degree) that will enable them to continue education; b) the *Realschule* - middle secondary school for pupils with average grades. After successful completion of the *Realschule* (after four years) pupils may continue education for a further two to three years; c) the *Gymnasium* - a secondary school similar to the British grammar school that will directly lead to the baccalaureate, which in turn gives unrestricted access to the university system.

The German *dreigliedrige Schulsystem* is based upon the traditional assumption that young persons' abilities can be easily classified as manual, clerical or academic. In theory, it is possible for very good pupils from the *Haupt-* and *Realschule* to switch to the *Gymnasium* at any time. This however remains the exception to the rule as pupils do not only have to overcome major differences with regard to syllabus and curriculum but also stereotypical assumptions regarding their intelligence and academic abilities, this is particularly true for *Hauptschüler*.

After the *Bildungsreform* in the 1970s a new school type was introduced representing an alternative to the *dreigliedrige Schulsystem*, the *integrierte Gesamtschule* or comprehensive school. Unlike in Britain, German comprehensives allow a certain degree of 'streaming'.

In addition to these four main types of schools, at least two more are worth mentioning, as they will appear in the text: On the one hand the *Sonderschule* (special school) for pupils with actual or assumed learning difficulties. Children and teenagers may be sent to a *Sonderschule* at any time, most join a *Sonderschule* from the beginning or after leaving primary school. On the other hand the *Oberstufenzentrum* (again a special form of secondary school with focus on vocational skills) where in particular pupils from *Haupt-* and *Realschule* can attain the *Fachabitur* (specialised baccalaureate) that provides access to a *Fachhochschule* (German polytechnic or university for applied science).

¹² In comparison, in a small survey (n=430) carried out on the national level in 1980, only 5.6 per cent of young people of Turkish origin declared that they intended to apply for a German passport (11.4 per cent were undecided, and 83 per cent rejected the idea (*Mehrländer 1983, p. 162*). Another survey carried out in 1980 (with minority members of all age groups) by *Socialdata* found that only 10 per cent of minority members of Turkish origin were interested in applying for German citizenship, however nearly 80 per cent wanted to settle permanently in Germany (see *Stüwe 1992, pp. 52-53*).

¹³ Furthermore, as pointed out before, given the comparatively secure residence status that most Turks enjoy, there was also not an urgent pressure from their point of view to demand or to try naturalisation.

¹⁴ More details about her brother's death cannot be provided as this may reveal her identity.

¹⁵ In addition, as pointed out in chapter 4, many Berliners of Turkish origin also take advantage of a well known and tolerated existing legal loophole, that allows them to regain their Turkish citizenship after the naturalisation process.

¹⁶ Unless - as the last quote has illustrated - they regard the Turkish passport as a tool in Turkey to prove their Turkishness.

¹⁷ "But you know inside, it doesn't really change ... We are anyway Turks. We think Turkish. With a piece of paper I cannot change my life" (*Interview with U., 16, male, 29.5.97*)

¹⁸ "No, I wouldn't say that I am German. Well, I would say ... I am a Kurdish woman with German nationality. That's just saying how it is. The Germans don't accept you as 'German' just because you've got a German passport. That isn't the case at all. If they don't do it, why should I?" (*Interview with S., female, 24, 26.5.1997*)

¹⁹ I have excluded here the numbers of pupils going to a *Sonderschule*, as this category does not make a distinction between primary (up to class 6) and secondary school.

²⁰ A comparison with data that was available to me on the national level is difficult, as different categories (regarding the schools degrees) were applied and presumably variances in the underlying calculations occur. Looking at the data on the national level it appears that ethnic minority pupils in Berlin perform better than on the national level. For example according to the *Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen 1997*, 44 per cent of all non German pupils leave school with one of the two kinds of *Hauptschulabschluß* (compared with 36 per cent in Berlin); and 20 per cent do not have any degree when leaving school (this equals the Berlin data). The difference regarding the former figure might occur due to the following difference: The data that I have used for Berlin does not include the educational degrees of young ethnic minority people in so called *Eingliederungs-* and *Vorbereitungslehrgänge*. These are special courses for 'non-German' youngsters who have moved to Berlin at the age of 14 or 15. Against the background that only very few young Berliners of Turkish origin came to Berlin at this later stage in their life, it does not seem relevant to incorporate these figures. However, if one does, a picture that is worse than the national average occurs: accordingly, for example 32 per cent of 'non-German' pupils leave school without any degree (*Ausländerbeauftragte Berlin 1997*).

²¹ Including those pupils who are in the 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th year of Kreuzberg's *Sonderschulen*.

²² Information was gathered in interviews with a) *Fanem Kleff*, chairwoman of both the national and the *Land* Committee for Multi-cultural Affairs of the *Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft* (GEW – Trade Union for Education and Science) (12.5.1997); b) *Özcan Mutlu*, member of the Green Party and local councillor in Kreuzberg (4.6.1997); c) *Ausländerbeauftragte Berlin 1994 and 1995*.

Chapter 7

TRANSCENDING NATIONAL POLITICS (I): POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF BERLINERS OF TURKISH ORIGIN IN GERMAN PARTIES

“Alle Staatsgewalt geht vom Volke aus. Sie wird vom Volke in Wahlen und Abstimmungen und durch besondere Organe der Gesetzgebung, der vollziehenden Gewalt und der Rechtsprechung ausgeübt.” (Article 20, Section 2, German Basic Law)

Article 20, section 2 of the German constitution defines the German people as representatives of the authority of the state (*Träger der Staatsgewalt*) and thus constitutionally establishes the principle of the ‘sovereignty of the people’ (*Volkssouveränität*) - “All state authority emanates from the people”. As the political system’s democratic legitimacy derives essentially from the adherence to and the preservation of this principle, the definition of who constitutes the people and who is a full member of the democratic polity is of central concern.

The German political establishment as well as the constitutional court have so far adopted an exclusive and ethnically defined interpretation: First of all ‘the people’ are equated with ‘the nationals’¹; secondly, to become a national has been obstructed by way of restrictive citizenship politics. As a result, so called ‘*ausländische Mitbürger*’ (foreign co-citizens

or compatriots) are disenfranchised and are almost completely excluded from the macro-level of political participation, i.e. from the Executive, the Judicative and the Legislature of the state system. "Nearly eight million people are not allowed to participate in democratic decisions, that is a democratic deficit, a statement that the German political establishment does not like to hear." (*Interview with Mehmet Daimagüler, FDP, 29.5.1997*)²

In the medium and long-term, i.e. within the next five to twenty years, this democratic deficit is likely to be rectified as a) more and more 'Third-country-nationals' become naturalised and b) set against the background of the new German government stating its intention to introduce elements of *ius soli* into the German citizenship legislation and to tolerate multiple nationality. However thus far, only few exceptions to the general rule of formal political exclusion can be found. Apart from those Berliners of Turkish origin who have already become naturalised and are allowed to vote, there are for example a small number of naturalised parliamentarians of minority origin who have been elected on the local, *Länder*- and the *Bundes*-level over the past few years. In Berlin, currently three members of the *Abgeordnetenhaus* (the Berlin parliament) are naturalised Germans. Despite these exceptions however, 'participatory channels' (*Ireland 1994*) that are open to ethnic minorities - with EU citizens as a special case - are on the whole located on the meso- and micro-level of politics (*see Uehlinger 1988*), i.e. third-country-nationals are

allowed to become members of German political parties,³ they can take part in assemblies and demonstrations and they can form their own associations.⁴

In the following two chapters I will seek to discuss the types and content of political participation of Berliners of Turkish origin on two levels: In this chapter I will outline the involvement of Berliners of Turkish origin in main political German parties, i.e. the *CDU*, *FDP*, *DIE GRÜNEN*, *PDS*, and the *SPD*. Here, particular focus is given to the individual's motive to choose party politics as a utilitarian form of participation to promote their interests, and to identify those constituents that transcend German party politics beyond the traditional perception of 'national' affairs. In the directly related following chapter, I will turn to the work and political demands of self-organisations of Berliner of Turkish origin.

It should be noted that I do not attempt to provide a detailed analysis of the evolution of immigrant politics in Germany or Berlin - like *Patrick Ireland* has done for France and Switzerland (*Ireland 1994*). Such an analysis - which is clearly of major concern - would have required both a different methodology and focus. For the purpose of this study I will merely concentrate on the motives of political participation - defined here as all voluntary action by individuals or groups that is intended "to influence either directly or indirectly political choices at various levels of the political system" (see *Uehlinger 1988, p.3*) - of members of ethnic minorities, their demands and ways to influence German politics.

Particular focus is given to those aspects and activities that surpass the traditional national conceptualisation of citizens' activities and demands.

BERLINERS OF TURKISH ORIGIN IN GERMAN POLITICAL PARTIES

Since an increasing number of ethnic minority members, and in particular people of Turkish origin, have started to take up German citizenship, political parties across the ideological divide have begun to turn their attention to this group of potential new voters. Their vote could become significant as approximately 1.4 million Germans of Turkish origin are 18 years old and above and could, by opting for naturalisation, cast their vote in future elections. The parties' tentative attempts to 'court' minorities do not remain 'unrequited' as - though still small in numbers - people of Turkish origin join political parties and may act as mediators who bridge the instituted distance between German political parties and Germany's ethnic minority population, both regarding the parties' political programme and their membership composition. In addition to the individual interests of Berliners of Turkish origin to participate in party politics, many associations - for example the *Türkischer Bund in Berlin Brandenburg* or the *Milli Görüs* - actively encourage their members and sympathisers to undertake this step (see chapter 9).

The reasons for the interests of Berliners of Turkish origin to join political parties, or for their associations to support such a membership are

complex and include: a) the membership and active involvement in a political party is regarded as an effective way to demand changes for, and to improve the situation of ethnic minorities in Germany; b) party involvement - as some observers argue - can constitute a potent means to influence German politics vis-à-vis Turkey, either in order to advocate or to support Turkish government objectives, or as a way to form strong political alliances against politics in Turkey, in particular against human rights abuses; c) the political participation of Berliners of Turkish origin should not only be seen and understood in a mono-political context, that comprehends their activities exclusively on the basis of ethnic or national affiliation (i.e. regarding integration and citizenship politics or as political interests vis-à-vis Turkey). Like for any member of the majority population, party politics are at the same time an expression of a broader and more general political agenda and preferences.⁵ *Mehmet Daimagüler* of the *FDP* for example expresses this as follows:

I think the same reason why I am a member of the *FDP* goes for many other migrants. We are not only politicised around one subject. If that was the case, I could be a Social Democrat or a Green politician. Regarding the issues of citizenship and foreigners, there are no crucial differences. But - and I say this deliberately - as a German citizen I am interested in many areas of politics, for example foreign politics and security. I could never get to like the economic policy of the Green Party, or the Social Democrats for that matter. ... As a member of the party I do not want to deal and

be confronted with one single subject - foreigners.”

(Interview with Mehmet Daimagüler, 29.5.1997)⁶

In the following I will outline the main reasons Berliners of Turkish origin actively participate in party politics, their level of involvement, political agenda and the problems they encounter as ethnic minority members in a predominantly ethnic German party environment. A focus on the experiences and interests of central individual party members of Turkish origin has - as explained in chapter 2 - the advantage of gaining empirical insights about their motives and attempts to alter German party agendas, which have been neglected in studies and reports that adopt a ‘top down’ approach and that examine exclusively, official party politics in areas such as immigration and integration. Each party shall be discussed separately and a summary and discussion of more general aspects is provided at the end of this section. It should be pointed out at this stage that none of the parties have statistics recording the ethnic affiliation of their members. Thus it is impossible to provide ‘hard data’ on the actual numbers of Berliners of Turkish origin who are members of political parties.

DIE GRÜNEN

DIE GRÜNEN has been for a long time the only party in Germany that campaigned strongly for a fundamental transformation of both Germany's immigration/asylum and its integration politics, examples have included the party's commitment to ‘open borders’, as well as their parliamentary proposals to introduce voting rights for ‘foreigners’ (*Ausländerwahlrecht*)

and major changes in Germany's citizenship laws. However, for specific reasons the Green party has so far - particularly at its grassroots levels - not proven to be popular with Berliners of Turkish origin. These reasons are related to a) the party's history and its membership composition: as a child of the 1968 movement the *GRÜNEN* have traditionally attracted predominantly left-wing middle class professionals and intellectuals⁷; b) its 'open border policies': like their German counterparts many Berliners of Turkish origin regard new immigrants and asylum-seekers as threats to their economical well-being; and c) its critical position against human rights abuses in Turkey.

In comparison with other German parties, the *GRÜNEN* do have however the highest number of elected representatives in the various local councils in Berlin (*Bezirksverordnetenversammlung*) as well as in the *Berliner Abgeordnetenhaus*, the city's (*Länder*) parliament. One factor that supported the comparatively higher number of elected Green representatives is the introduction of a quota system for ethnic minority members in the late 1980s. At the local level in Kreuzberg for example, four of the six minority members of the *Bezirksverordnetenversammlung* (*BVV* - similar to the local council) are *Grüne*: *Özcan Ayanoglu*, *Ümit Bayam*, *Bilkayis Erikli* and *Özcan Mutlu*. At the *Länder*-level two of the three parliamentarians of the *Berliner Abgeordnetenhaus* who were born in Turkey belong to the Green party - *Riza Baran* and *Ismail Kosan*. And most recently, at the national political level, the Green party is the only party who has two MPs in the newly elected *Bundestag* who are of

Turkish origin: these are *Cem Özdemir*, who has already been *MdB* (*Mitglied des Bundestags*, MP) during the last parliamentary term, and the newly elected *Ekin Deligöz*. Both were nominated on the regional lists (Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria respectively) of parliamentary candidates under the proportional representation system.

At the local level (Kreuzberg) of Green party politics approximately thirty immigrants - of whom the majority are of Turkish origin - actively lend their support to the political work of the Green party. *Özcan Mutlu* is the longest serving Green *BVV* member. He is of Kurdish/Alevi origin and migrated with his parents to Kreuzberg at the age of five. Shortly after the amendment of citizenship legislation in 1990, he successfully applied for a German passport. He is now thirty years old and has been a member of the *BVV* Kreuzberg since 1992.⁸

Mutlu's motivation to become involved in local politics is based on his firm conviction that "one can't just moan and hold others responsible for a deplorable state of affairs. One is under the obligation to take over responsibility. Be it by way of joining a political party or in any other form of involvement." Being a local councillor, he is by definition concerned about the socio-economic situation in Kreuzberg, in particular about its effects on the local minority population. When he was elected in 1992 he realised that

... the reality of the district was not reflected in the work of the local council. Although one was aware of the fact, that a third of the local population is of non-German origin, predominantly Turkish, there was nevertheless no implementation of policies directed at this group. And we wanted to change that. (*Interview with Özcan Mutlu, 4.6.1997*)

Over the past six years *Mutlu* and his three colleagues - sometimes referred to as the 'town hall quadriga' (*Der Tagesspiegel, 11.7.1997*) - have predominantly focused on issues of integration of, and service provision for, the district's ethnic minority population. Amongst other things the Green minority councillors have committed themselves to the following: a) they campaigned for the provision of both sufficient and adequate places for ethnic minority members in local old people's homes; b) they are actively involved in the planning of the establishment of an 'ethno-medical centre' (*Ethno-medizinisches Zentrum Berlin*) that shall adequately address health needs of ethnic minorities (e.g. by providing training courses for doctors and nurses, or translation/interpretation services). c) they successfully demanded the distribution of multi-language information packages on various welfare provisions like for example social benefits, unemployment money, or pension rights; d) they proposed a model of collaboration with primary schools in neighbouring districts in East-Berlin regarding problems that are specifically linked to the catchment areas of the schools. As pointed out in chapter 5, in many of the primary schools in Kreuzberg 60 - 80 per cent of the pupils are of

ethnic minority origin. In comparison, pupils who go to primary schools in Kreuzberg's neighbouring Eastern districts are almost exclusively 'ethnic Germans'. "Why don't we co-operate with these German schools and send a few Turkish kids [from Kreuzberg] to their classes and in return some German kids can go to school here? That might help to achieve a balance." (*Interview with Özcan Mutlu, 4.6.1998*); e) they successfully campaigned for the founding of the *Europaschule* (European school) in Kreuzberg with bilingual education in German and Turkish (see chapter 5); f) they criticised the exclusion of young Berliners of ethnic minority origin from apprenticeships/training programmes offered by the local administration itself. In 1992 of the 80 trainees only 2 were of non-German origin.⁹; g) a twin-city project was initiated between Berlin-Kreuzberg and Istanbul-Kadiköy;¹⁰ h) currently, *Mutlu* and his colleagues support the establishment of a vocational training centre with 300 places in Kreuzberg. In this context the district is in negotiations with corporations and the Chamber of Industry and Commerce (*Industrie- und Handelskammer*).

Although *Özcan Mutlu* and the three other local councillors' work almost exclusively in the area of immigration and integration politics they regard this focus as a matter of necessity rather than as one of choice: "This limitation [on questions regarding immigration and integration] is inevitable, we always experience it. ... As long as we are regarded as exotic foreigners, this won't change. And currently we still are exotic foreigners." (*Interview with Özcan Mutlu, 4.6.1997*) Their "exotic"

depiction, i.e. their exclusion both as politicians and regarding political content from 'mainstream politics', is however not only the case in the context of their work in Kreuzberg's *Bezirksverordnetenversammlung*. Also the Green party is - according to *Mutlu* - still somewhat reluctant to define 'migration politics' as a central political issue throughout its programme.

I tell you one thing, also the Greens had to learn a lot, and in many respects they have done so during the past years. The Greens are probably the party where migrants have - in comparison - little problems. But when push comes to shove, then you are sometimes under the impression that it doesn't matter whether you try to convince the Social Democrats, the Conservatives or the Greens. ... For example, we have criticised very strongly the 'outline of the government programme' [*Regierungseckpunkteprogramm*] because the topic of migration and integration politics is not mentioned under a specific heading. Such criticism is always articulated by immigrants. Well, please tell me who else would take it up? ... They tell me that such issues are dealt with within the context of other, more general areas [such as social policy, education etc.], but look at those, nothing is mentioned. Only when migration has become a truly interdisciplinary political issue, then they can tell me 'oh well its you again with your old arguments'. As long as that is not achieved, we will make respective demands. (*Interview with Özcan Mutlu, 4.6.1997*)

For many younger Green politicians or activists who are members of ethnic minorities, an effective means to integrate their specific demands

into the general party programme is the organisation *Immi-Grün*. *Immi-Grün* emerged around 1992/93 as a critical successor to a group called *Yesilleer*.¹¹ It is an independent organisation, closely associated to the Green party and - unlike *Yesilleer* - open to members of all ethnic groups. *Immi-Grün* is very much a project of the second generation who - and I will come back to this point - in many respects seek to stand out against the first generation on three main accounts: they show less support for forms of political organisation on the grounds of ethnic affiliation; they argue that the problems they are confronted with in Germany differ substantially from those of the first generation; and connected to this, they refuse what constitutes from their point of view the often paternalistic and patronising behaviour of first generation political activists who claim to speak for all Turks.¹²

Immi-Grün already exists in some West-German *Länder* and a small group of young Berliners - so far a core of 15 persons, most of whom are political science students - sought to set up a local group in summer 1997. For them, *Immi-Grün* not only represents a way that helps to articulate their demands more forcefully within the Green party, but it is at the same time a forum where interested individuals, who may not necessarily want to become involved in party politics in general, or Green party politics in particular, are able to participate. The direct link to a political party is nevertheless regarded both as a general political statement and as a prerequisite for political efficiency. Furthermore it serves as regards

content as a marker that distinguishes *Immi-Grün* from many other immigrant organisations:

I just say one thing: These so-called migrant organisations have had their day. Perhaps that is also a generation conflict. I don't know. However, if I look back, they have already existed for twenty or thirty years. What have they achieved? ... Why are these organisations still ethnically based? Turks, Italians, Spaniards - why don't they work together? These organisations are not effective. ... There are so many problems in this country, so many problems that directly affect us. And rather than joining forces, regardless of ethnic origin, they fight each other, the Turks fight amongst themselves. ... If we want to bring about changes in this society, then we can achieve those changes most likely by being involved in party politics." (*Interview with Özcan Mutlu, 4.6.1997*)¹³

A similar attitude is expressed by the two 'Länder' Greens', namely *Riza Baran* and *Ismail Kosa*, who are members of the *Berliner Abgeordnetenhaus*. On the *Länder*-level in particular two issues constitute priorities in the work of these two *MdAs* (*Mitglied des Abgeordnetenhauses* - Member of the Berlin Parliament) and at the same time reflect the main topics of Green discussions in general regarding immigration and ethnic relations. On the one hand the question of citizenship (both the introduction of *ius soli* and formal tolerance of multiple citizenship) and on the other further immigration, refugee and visa policies. "When dealing with the issues of foreigners and integration,

also amongst the Greens, we only have a very selective and superficial discussion. It concerns either immigration or dual citizenship, nothing else.” (*Interview with Ismail Kosan, 28.4.1997*)

Ismail Kosan - who is a first generation Kurdish immigrant - is a long time member of the Green party and became elected via the Green party list, i.e. there is no constituency whose direct interests he has to take into account. *Kosan* belongs to the left wing of the party that is commonly referred to as the *Fundis* (Fundamentalists), declares himself as a “pukka communist and a 1968 fellow”. For him, two issues are of crucial importance. On the one hand, he is concerned that certain political principles of the Green party may become neglected, if not given up, in order to attract the “Turkish” vote:

Efforts are made for example to attract Turks as party members, or other nationalities. However, we face the following problem: if you want to attract these people, then you have to offer them something. And I don't like the offering bit. If they accept our party and want to become involved, well then so they should. I won't make any compromises regarding our political principles. I don't want to establish an ethnic organisation. I also don't want to further my party career by attracting Turks to the party, that is fatal. ... I don't want to hear any demands that we should change our politics vis-à-vis Turkey. We don't do that. I don't do that. If foreign groups want to pressurise us by offering their votes under certain circumstances, then I am of the

opinion to do without their votes. (*Interview with Ismail Kosan, 28.4.1997*)

On the other hand, and directly related, he sees the danger that Berliners of Turkish origin retreat increasingly into ethnic enclaves. Here, he mentions the 'Turkish connections' of immigrant organisations such as the *Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin* or the *Türkische Bund Berlin-Brandenburg* who - as he claims - actively seek the support of the Turkish government in order to demand rights in Germany:

They negotiate with ministers in Ankara, even conservative ones, and they want their rights [in Germany] and wish that the Turkish state gets involved. ... None of them turns to German politicians. They regard themselves as a part of the Turkish society, although they live here. That is a contradiction. (*Interview with Ismail Kosan, 28.4.1997*)

Two other factors that support the intensification of ethnic boundaries are linked - according to *Kosan* - to the increasing interest of young minority members to Islamic or nationalistic organisations such as the *Grey Wolves* and the *Milli Görüs* due to their exclusion from German society - here he fully supports the findings of the *Heitmeyer* study (see chapter 6). He sees as a further contributing factor the phenomenon that the debates on both "the political interests of Turks in Germany" and migration policies in general, are characterised by an inappropriate focus. For once, regarding the reporting in both the German and Turkish media on political interests and involvement of Berliners of Turkish origin, 'newsworthy'

events are almost exclusively concerned with what is commonly perceived as 'Turkish politics', e.g. Kurdish demonstrations when the *PKK* (*Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan* - The Kurdistan Workers' Party) was banned; the establishment of a Turkish party in Frankfurt; conflicts within and between Turkish migrant organisations;¹⁴ connections between the former Turkish Welfare party to Islamic organisations in Germany etc. In addition, rather than highlighting the needs and interests that minority and majority populations have in common, emphasis is given to differences as reflected for example in the debate around religious education in Berlin. *Kosan* is in principle against the integration of religion into the public sphere and opposes religious education of any kind in Berlin's schools.

It is always argued that if we don't offer religious Islamic education in schools, and control it that way, then the fundamentalists will do this job. ... But why can't people get involved with other issues, why does it always have to do with religion and other conservative moral principles? ... Instead of building churches and mosques we need kindergartens, we need education... (*Interview with Ismail Kosan, 28.4.1997*)

Riza Baran who came to Germany as a student in 1963 and moved to Berlin in 1971 adopts a slightly different approach on religious education. In the 1970s *Baran* was a founding member of the first *Ausländerbeirat* in Berlin (in Kreuzberg) and later became - like *Mutlu* in 1992 - a local Kreuzberg councillor (*Baran* was at this time not a formal member of the Green party but stood as their candidate). In 1995, *Baran* won the direct

mandate in a Kreuzberg constituency¹⁵ and is now one of the three members of the *Berliner Abgeordnetenhaus* who was born in Turkey. He ran his election campaign primarily on issues around unemployment, housing and education and in addition on integration and refugee policies.

Baran's constituency is located in the heart of Kreuzberg 36 where approximately forty per cent of the population is of ethnic minority origin, with Berliners of Turkish origin being the largest group. It is - as many observers would state - very much the *Milli Görüs* 'heartland' where religion in general, and religious education in particular, represent crucial matters. Regarding religious education, for *Baran* the matter of principle does not - like it is the case for *Kosan* - relate to the question of whether religion is supported in the public sphere or rendered to the private, but it concerns the equal treatment of various religious faiths:

I am not a religious person myself, ... but if we [the Green party] are in favour of equal treatment and equality, then we cannot say this religion [Christianity] is treated one way and Islam another ... The Green party has many active and critical Christians. And I just can't understand when people claim they do not want to have anything to do with other religions. Like for example Islam. I know that this is a difficult issue, but we have to deal with it. We don't only live in a multi-cultural but also in a multi-religious society. And we have to confront these questions. Like what do we do with Islamic education in Berlin? ... We can't go on telling the third and the fourth generation, well we don't have a representative [for Islam – see chapter 5] and therefore

forget about the whole thing. (*Interview with Riza Baran, 30.4.1997*)

Baran does not put forward a uniform plan himself as a model for religious education in Berlin. For him it is important to discuss these issues within the party and to achieve a new consensus that builds the base for future pragmatic solutions. And according to him, the Green party, at least in Berlin, does show its willingness to rethink and to reconsider the question of religious education in schools, as reflected in their parliamentary question on this topic dealt with by the *Abgeordnetenhaus* in spring 1997.

In the run up to the elections *Baran* encountered serious problems concerning his candidacy. These however were not presented - as some people had warned him - by Green party members who may have disliked the idea of a 'Turk' standing for a winnable direct mandate. Rather, it was the Turkish media (as well as activists from other migrant organisations) that showed no enthusiasm for the candidacy of a member of 'the Turkish community in Berlin', for the simple reason that *Baran* is Kurdish and moreover, he had been active in Kurdish politics for many years. *Baran* was a founding member of the *KOMKAR* (*Verband der Vereine aus Kurdistan e.V.* - Association of Organisations from Kurdistan) but had left the group when his political agenda shifted more towards affairs in Germany.¹⁶

Yes, I had difficulties [in the run up to the elections]. I had founded the KOMKAR, and I was one of the first who had done something for Kurds here, and who stood up for Kurds ... Certainly, there were voices against me. On TD1 [Turkish satellite TV channel] there was for example a ban on me. They invited all of Kreuzberg's candidates, apart from me. Now that I am elected they invite me, but I am not allowed to say that I am Kurdish - that wouldn't be the first thing on my mind anyway. ... For example, shortly before the election, the *Hürriyet* published an article saying that I am a Kurd, that I was a KOMKAR member, that I am against Turkey etc. ... After the election, the president of the *Türkische Gemeinde* announced in TD1 that the Turks have elected Turkey's enemy. (*Interview with Riza Baran, 30.4.1997*)

Riza Baran - like his party colleagues - regards a formal party affinity as a beneficial way to further the demands and interests of immigrants.¹⁷ He points out that the political participation of immigrants has to be regarded as a process rather than as an already existent and fixed idea when Turkish migrants first came in the 1960s. "We didn't arrive here with the idea that we have to get politically involved in one form or another." (*Interview with Riza Baran, 30.4.1997*). From his point of view however, the form of political participation of Berliners of Turkish origin should at this stage, i.e. as an expression of permanent settlement, be directed at the political system and the political institutions in Germany in order to progress:

We have always been home-orientated. To the extent that we did not progress in our cultural development. By living in a different place we have to develop different skills and strategies. How can I ensure that my children get better degrees? If I want that, I have to deal with the education system here. And I have to do it via the institutions that are important here. It is madness to expect that the Turkish minister for education can help. (*Interview with Riza Baran, 30.4.1997*)

With his last remark, *Baran* criticises part of the supposed approach of migrant organisations such as the *Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin* or the *Türkische Bund in Berlin Brandenburg* who - and I will discuss this point later - are said to attempt to employ their networks with the Turkish political parties and/or government officials in order to strengthen their political impact in Germany.

Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus - PDS

The *PDS* is the successor party to the former GDR's *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED)*. Although a national party, the *PDS* is very much a regional force in the five new Eastern *Bundesländer* and in East Berlin. Its political programme is primarily directed at the social and economic problems in the East that emerged during the process of German unification. In a simplified manner members of the *SED* can be divided into two groups: the vast majority are old¹⁸ former *SED* people for whom the *PDS* represents traditional socialist values in post-communist times. In addition however, the *PDS* has attracted a small - but publicity

effective - number of West-German and in particular West-Berlin left-wing activists. For this group, the party represents a left alternative to the *GRÜNEN* who - as it is argued - have lost their progressive edge by taking over government responsibility at the regional and, since September of this year, also at the national level. From my point of view, primarily owing to the membership of individuals who belong to West-Germany's or West-Berlin's 'alternative-left scene' and/or of the few members of ethnic minorities, questions concerning immigration, integration and citizenship have been taken up by the party.

Currently, the *PDS* in Berlin has one *AG International* (international group) at the local level in Kreuzberg with approximately 30 members, and on the *Länderlevel* with the same number of people. According to *Giyassetten Sayan*, who since 1995 has been a *PDS* member of the *Abgeordnetenhaus*, these groups work within the party on 'virgin land' when it comes to questions of integration and citizenship:

It really is like this: One does not really think a lot about the problems of migrants. The *PDS* accepts the demands of migrants straight away. No debate, nothing. ... But if you start talking about it, you will find a certain circle of people who become interested. Those who like to learn. ... [The *PDS*] is inclined to accept everything that is articulated by migrants. (*Interview with Giyassetten Sayan, 7.5.1997*)

Having - thus far - a 'card blanche' when it comes to immigration and integration politics at the *Länder*- or the national level, is certainly an attraction to any politician who agrees with the wider political principles of the *PDS*. However whether this is a reflection of the party's tolerance and inclusive dedication vis-à-vis ethnic minorities, or - for the time being - just a side effect of its political priorities remains open. Certainly, *Sayan* expresses "xenophobia" as a serious problem on both the *PDS*'s grassroots level as well as within the party's higher echelons. Regarding the party's ability and willingness to deal with "xenophobic" attitudes, *Sayan* is however optimistic. One reason for his optimism has to do with experiences of exclusion that both East-Germans and ethnic minorities encounter:

There is a certain similarity between the sense of East-German nostalgia, East-German affectedness that is negated or ignored by the West-Germans on the one hand and migrants, who are culturally not accepted by this society, on the other hand. Migrants and East-Germans are similarly affected. (*Interview with Giyassetten Sayan, 7.5.1997*)

Furthermore, he also sees the party's traditional focus on international solidarity as a positive starting point for promoting both tolerance within the party and adequate integration and immigration policies in the party programme - with a focus on multiple citizenship and the introduction of *ius soli*.

The question of 'International solidarity' played an important role in the election of *Giyassetten Sayan* as a member of the *Abgeordnetenhaus* for the *PDS*. A former Green party member for fourteen years, he won a direct mandate in the East-Berlin constituency of Lichtenberg during the (*Land*) parliament elections of 1995 with nearly 40 per cent of the vote. During his involvement with the *GRÜNEN* his political focus was on internationalism, a topic to which he still remains committed. Like many other Green party members, *Sayan* could not really acquire the taste for the transformation process of the Green party that changed over time from a grassroots movement to a party in opposition and finally into a party with government responsibility. "It was this form of power-oriented politics, that I did not like. The Green party has changed a lot while in opposition - feminism, ecology - but not as a party that shares government responsibility." (*Interview with Giyassetten Sayan, 7.5.1997*)

Regarding the *PDS* as a "real force of the opposition" *Sayan* decided - like other former Greens - to make the *SED*'s successor his new political home. In the run-up to the election *Sayan* was tenth place on the *PDS Landesliste* (nomination on the party list of candidates under the proportional representation system) but was at the same time approached at a party day by Lichtenberg's delegates who asked him to compete in the election to become the *PDS* direct candidate in their ward. Beating two other - ethnic German - comrades-in-arms, *Sayan* was elected as the direct *PDS* candidate for this constituency in the second ballot.

At first glance it may seem both surprising that a West-Berliner of Turkish origin is asked by an East-Berlin local party section to stand as their direct candidate, and furthermore, that he is able to win with a safe majority. A closer look at Lichtenberg may help to explain this apparent contradiction. Firstly, in various elections since 1990, the *PDS* has proven to be the most popular party in this district, it is so to say a 'safe seat'. In the recent national elections for example the *PDS* won the direct mandate in Lichtenberg with 42 per cent of the vote. Secondly, Lichtenberg is a district with a high proportion of residents belonging to the former GDR's and East-Berlin's intelligentsia for whom the debate around 'international solidarity' has traditionally been a central topic. According to *Sayan*, the local *PDS* section was searching for a *Betroffenen* (a person affected) in order to symbolise their commitment to international solidarity according to the concept's traditional socialist meaning - rather than as an indication of their solidarity and support of immigrants in Germany. *Sayan* designed his election campaign accordingly: "The election campaign was difficult. I have hardly mentioned issues of migration and integration. I primarily discussed international problems: Israel, Palestine, East-European countries, the Kurdish question, the Armenian question." (*Interview with Giyassetten Sayan, 7.5.1997*)

Sayan describes himself as a "politician concerned with migration politics" rather than being "home-orientated"¹⁹ and does not see a contradiction between this statement and his political concerns when it comes to Kurdish questions. In particular Kurdish politics have become, from

Sayan's point of view, a German political issue, not only at the level of international relations and Germany's foreign policies but also "because a part of the German population is now Kurdish and there is a link." (*Interview with Giyassetten Sayan, 7.5.1997*) During his parliamentary term, Sayan has put various parliamentary questions to the *Abgeordnetenhaus* concerning for example, attacks on Kurdish groups in 1995 that were carried out by the *Grey Wolves*, or more generally on human rights abuses in Turkey.

An important part of his party work for Sayan lies in the recruitment of more ethnic minority members for the Berlin *PDS*. However, he is convinced that such recruitment cannot be successful merely on the basis of a political programme. Against the background that parties have for such a long time ignored and neglected politically interested or already active minority members, for example, those who participate in migrant organisations, the establishment of effective direct social networks is a prerequisite to "bridge the cleft".

Well, those migrants, particularly the first generation, they really have a totally different political culture and the structure of political parties have not been adjusted to that. So they do not attract these people ... For many years, political parties excluded immigrant organisations. So they attempted to establish self-defence organisations And this clubbability is wide spread. The organisations are small oasis for migrants, and political parties are not willing to approach them, not even in their programme ... You have

to put your whole heart into it, you have to approach them directly, you have to be there and you have to participate. Otherwise you cannot organise these people. (*Interview with Giyassetten Sayan, 7.5.1997*)

Sayan himself is actively involved in one of the Kurdish associations in Berlin. From his point of view, Kurdish people who live in Berlin are in many respects more integrated than their Turkish counterparts: "Yes, there is racism and there are many other problems, but this is not as bad as what is happening in Turkey. For this reason, the tendency of Kurds in Germany to integrate is very, very strong." (*Interview with Giyassetten Sayan, 7.5.1997*).

Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands - SPD

Although being traditionally the political home for some former migrants from Turkey who became involved in *SPD* politics via their links with trade unions, today the Social-Democrats still have very few ethnic minority members, a marginal number of *BVV* members (since 1995 *Ali Aydin* in Kreuzberg and *Bilek Kolat* in Schöneberg), no elected minority members in the *Berliner Abgeordnetenhaus*, nor in the *Bundestag*. Part of the *SPD*'s problem may well be linked to its political stand against human rights abuses in Turkey and its resulting negative image in the Turkish press.²⁰ However, in addition to an overall decrease in the numbers of party members, the *SPD* clearly fails to attract Berliners of Turkish origin owing to its disregard of integration policies as a central political issue.

Kenan Kolat - *Bilek Kolat's* husband - who is both a member of the *SPD* and who is at the same time involved in various immigrant organisations that will be discussed later (such as the *TBB*) estimates that in Berlin currently, no more than 500 party members are of ethnic minority origin, of these approximately twenty to thirty persons are actively involved (*Interview with Kenan Kolat, 25.4.1997*)

As is the case with other German parties, the *SPD* party programme does not identify integration and immigration politics as a crucial political issue and fails to attract the interest of Berliners of minority, or more specifically of Turkish, origin on this topic. *Eckhardt Barthel* - who is the *SPD's* *ausländerpolitischer Sprecher* (spokesman on 'foreigner policies') - describes the - well known - 'populist dilemma' of *Volksparteien* (people's parties) when it comes to the question of how to formulate a political programme that could on the one hand attract the vote of potentially 1.4 million Germans of Turkish origin and not 'alienate' the 'ethnic German' vote on the other:

When we achieved in 1987 the inclusion of the demand for a local 'foreigners vote' into the Berlin party programme, and I tell you we had to slog away for that, I remember clearly one person, of whom I have always had a high opinion, told me: 'You know Eckhardt, you are right, and you also point out that these people are politically close to the SPD' ... 'But', he said, 'on the other hand you have to take a look at the number of Germans who are not going to vote for us for this particular reason. And who is the majority?' That was a

typical argument. And he was not a malicious person, but his considerations do still play a role. (*Interview with Eckhardt Barthel, 30.4.1997*)

Kenan Kolat emphasises this point, too. For example in 1997, the *SPD* Berlin had drawn up a party paper on education policies. Here, apart from a half sentence, no reference was made to the specific situation of Berlin's ethnic minority pupils. For *Kolat* this reflects the attitude of the *SPD* to render the interests of non-German Berliners to the periphery of its political agenda. In order to give it a more central and prominent role, *Kolat* and other *SPD* members, predominantly of Turkish origin, started in summer 1997 the process of founding a formal *SPD* organisation with the name *Deutsch-Plus*. Approximately 20 people were involved in its foundation with the intention of establishing an *SPD* platform that allowed a) the party's programme to be altered to include the specific interests of ethnic minority members more centrally; and b) a change to the way *SPD* candidates were (and still are) selected.

Regarding the specific interest of Berliners of ethnic minority origin, *Kolat* and his colleagues' foremost demand concerns 'legal equality', i.e. the introduction of changes in German citizenship laws, in particular the introduction of *ius soli* and inclusive naturalisation policies. The question of dual citizenship is - according to *Kolat* - no longer of primary concern as the legal changes in Turkey guarantee extensive rights to naturalised Germans of Turkish origin. Clearly, referring to experiences in the UK or

the United States, citizenship can only be the first step to promote 'equality'. But - so *Kolat* believes - it would be fatal at this stage, when legal equality has not been achieved, "to try to run before one can walk" and to focus on issues such as anti-discrimination laws, quota systems, etc. As long as German society does not accept both formally and ideologically that

...compatriots of non-German origin are part of the society, as long as for example educational problems of youth are defined as a Turkish problem and not as a German problem, as long as the state categorises everything as a foreigners' problem, than it is just incredibly difficult to come up with, and to implement, proper means to tackle [the situation], simply for the fact that the problem is kept apart. (*Interview with Kenan Kolat, 25.4.1997*)

In addition, supporters of *Deutsch-Plus* are concerned with one crucial aspect of the selection process of *SPD* candidates who wish to stand for election at the *Länderlevel* - namely the absence of a *Landesliste* in Berlin's *SPD* - that is a regional list of parliamentary candidates for election to the *Abgeordnetenhaus*. Unlike for example, the procedure adopted by the Green party, within the *SPD* structure each constituency draws up its own list of candidates. This poses a serious obstacle for the chances of ethnic minority members to become candidates for election to the *Abgeordnetenhaus*. On the one hand they are only marginally involved at the grass-roots level, and by definition ethnic German local activists become elected. Even in the *SPD* *Schöneberg*, a local party

group that appears to include most of the active *SPD* members who are of Turkish origin (who are at the same time organised in the various organisations of the *TBB*) only about ten per cent of active members come from an ethnic minority background. On the other hand, there is clearly a scepticism in local party groups as to whether it is tactically sensible to nominate a non-German candidate, or they may just show outright hostility. Some members of the *SPD* - such as people involved in *Deutsch-Plus* or *Eckhardt Barthel* who is the 'spokesman on foreigner politics' (*ausländerpolitischer Sprecher*) of the *SPD* in the Berlin parliament - campaign vehemently for the introduction of an *SPD-Landesliste* in Berlin.

The foundation of *Deutsch-Plus* and the group's attempt to become a formal *Arbeitsgemeinschaft* (organisation) of the *SPD* in Berlin has created quite a stir within the party. Some members in particular fear fragmentation of the group of people within the party who have campaigned for the integration of 'migration politics' as a central political topic within the party's agenda. *Eckhardt Barthel* for example who tends to oppose the idea of *Deutsch-Plus*, although he can see the reasons for its establishment, is concerned that the establishment of a new minority organisation within the party, will result in the "withering away" of those already instituted groups where 'ethnic Germans' and minority members work together.

Now we have this one platform, the Fachausschuß [special group working on migration politics], where Germans and non-Germans work together. Certainly, its work can be criticised. ... And then we get Deutsch-Plus at the same time. How shall that work? Already not many people come to the Fachausschuß, and I also see how few of the migrants, who are [SPD] members, actually come to its meetings. If there is going to be a migrants' group then all migrants will probably go to their meetings - the Germans will be amongst themselves, the migrants as well, how shall we work together? (*Interview with Eckhardt Barthel, 30.4.1997*)

This however does not convince the supporters of *Deutsch-Plus*. The *SPD* recognises the necessity for young people and women to organise in specific subgroups, without defining such groups as a danger to the effectiveness of the party's work. The same - from *Kolat's* point of view - should apply for members of ethnic minorities.

Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP)

The Free Democratic Party has been a party in crisis for the past years and has been struggling with the five per cent hurdle that is necessary to become elected at the national and *Länder* level. Part of the *FDP's* crisis resulted from the party's role in the national German government. As the 'weak' partner in the government coalition, it was unable and/or unwilling (because it wanted to maintain the coalition government) to choose a 'confrontational' course with the *CDU/CSU* in order to remain firm in its main political principles. One example for the *FDP's* determination to

avoid a coalition crisis - or even a possible break in the coalition - took place in April 1994 (shortly before elections to the German *Bundestag*). At that time, the *Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für die Belange der Ausländer* - this was until September 1998 *Cornelia Schmalz-Jacobsen*, a member of the *FDP* - intended to propose a parliamentary bill that aimed at establishing firmly the *ius soli* for 'third generation' immigrants and the official toleration of dual citizenship, demands that were (and still are) strongly opposed by the *CDU/CSU*. The *FDP* denied *Schmalz-Jacobsen* bringing the bill to parliament. Furthermore, *FDP* parliamentarians voted against a more or less identical bill that was put forward by the *Bundesrat* in the 225th sitting of the German Parliament in April of that year.

Clearly, one problem for the party is that, although we have a proper agenda, our faction in the *Bundestag* [*Bundestagsfraktion*] does not push this through in the government coalition. But anyway, none of us is so naive as to assume that any government coalition in Germany might collapse because of foreigners' policies. (*Interview with Mehmet Daimagüler, 29.5.1997*)

Mehmet Daimagüler who is a lawyer and - like *Özcan Mutlu* - a second generation Berliner of Turkish origin set up in 1997 the Berlin group of the *Liberale Türkisch Deutsche Vereinigung* (*LTD* - Liberal Turkish German Union). The *LTD* has existed nationally since 1993 and consists of both ethnic Germans and Germans of Turkish origin. Like *Immi-Grün* the *LTD* is not a formal *FDP* association but an organisation with definite and

articulated Liberal leanings. It remains unclear how many members the *LTD* has in general, but in Berlin the group consists of approximately 10 members (the Berlin *FDP* has according to *Daimagüler* only 10 or 15 members who are of Turkish origin). The *LTD* is closely connected to the party executive and counts several high-ranking *FDP* politicians as its members, for example the former foreign secretary *Klaus Kinkel* and *Cornelia Schmalz-Jacobsen*.

The reasons for founding the *LTD* group in Berlin are very similar to those that led to the establishment of like organisations in other parties. It is seen as a forum to attract Berliners of Turkish origin to the *FDP*, to promote an exchange between them and ethnic Germans, and to establish a more effective way of advancing questions concerning integration within the wider party context.²¹ Political participation is from *Daimagüler's* point of view an urgent requirement for Berliners of Turkish origin:

It is just fatal for immigrants if they don't participate in politics. If they fail to articulate their own interests, who would do it? Certainly not the majority population by itself. ... We try to make it clear to them [immigrants] that they need to take the initiative. But this implies at the same time the criticism that - and we say this openly - they can't moan about German politics if they are not willing to do something. (*Interview with Mehmet Daimagüler, 29.5.1997*)

For the founder of the *LTD* Berlin, political work and the “engagement in Turkish organisations is important” but he strongly emphasises that it is even more essential to attract Berliners of Turkish origin to mainstream party politics in order to avoid the emergence of “two societies that exist side by side.” In particular, current debates about the establishment of a Turkish parliament in Berlin, which is amongst others proposed by some *CDU* members of Turkish origin, or the emergence of the *Türkische Demokratie Partei* (Turkish Democracy Party) in Frankfurt/Main are - from his point of view - unfortunate developments with potentially disastrous consequences for the welfare of a multi-ethnic society. Such organisations would only reinforce the popular image of politically active “Turks” in Germany as “Turkey’s fifth column”. In addition he regards such enterprises in many respects as the “consummation of an ego-trip” that are merely beneficial for the individual achievements and status of leading activists. However, he does point out that for example, the representation of the Turkish Democracy Party in the Turkish press is that of a serious and significant player in German politics, when in reality “they have less influence in Bonn than the local train spotters’ association.” (*Interview with Daimagüler, 29.5.1997*)

The *LTD* regards access to German citizenship as the first step towards equality and has put it on the top of its agenda. “But”, says *Daimagüler*, “it can’t stop there.” In order to go beyond formal citizenship and implement a legal framework that can bring about social equality, he proposes to adopt the same principles that have guided the *Bundesvertriebenengesetz*

(*BVFG*), the judicial apparatus for the integration of *Vertriebene* after the Second World War. The *BVFG*, introduced in 1953, is an elaborate blueprint that includes for example special services and assistance in areas such as education and vocational training. For the members of the Berliner *LTD* - who are predominantly students – it is exactly these areas which are the ‘domains à clef’ for the future performance of Berliners of Turkish origin.

Another important issue is the question of religious education and freedom of worship. *Daimagüler* himself is not a religious person, but he regards religion as an important part of cultural identity and strongly opposes the differential treatment of different faiths in Germany.

We lawyers always say, why don't you have a look at the law, it might help in solving a legal issue. For years, the German government has shoved the constitution right under the Muslims' nose and have told them: 'This is our system of values and you have to follow it.' Now Muslims, and not only fundamentalists, say: 'Fine, these are the rules, great, it says freedom of worship and we will take advantage of it.' When that happens, the same people who flaunted the constitution in the first place start to differentiate ... All of a sudden freedom of worship means freedom of Christian worship ... But the word Christianity is never even mentioned in the constitution. (*Interview with Mehmet Daimagüler, 29.5.1997*)

Although he would rather not have religious education in German schools at all, he supports those proposals that demand the right to teach Islam to

Berlin's' pupils. This includes - according to *Daimagüler* - the advantage that Islam is not just taught in mosques where religious education can't be controlled by the state, but also in schools, preferably by German Muslims who have been trained in German universities.

Against the background that the *LTD* Berlin has just begun to operate in 1997, as a first step it attempts to become known and to establish a certain profile. In this context, its current main focus lies in the organisation of seminars and public debates. Here, they do co-operate on selective issues in particular with *Immi-Grün* but also intend to work with other organisations, predominantly associations of Turkish professionals, such as, the Turkish-German Lawyers Association, the Union of Doctors, the Turkish Association of Entrepreneurs/Employers, or the Turkish Association of Parents.

Once the *FDP* has attracted more members of Turkish origin, *Daimagüler* emphasises the urgency that these members soon have to become represented in various party committees, become delegates and election candidates for local, *Länder* and national elections.

I have been to the last national party conference, there were 620 or 630 delegates and just one Turk amongst them. Well, in the future, that is not on! You can't have a marvellous political agenda and at the same time you don't elect the people [Turks]. (*Interview with Mehmet Daimagüler, 29.5.1997*)

For the *FDP* - being a small party - the 'ethnic vote' might be of more crucial importance than for major '*Volksparteien*' such as the *CDU* and the *SPD*, since a few thousand votes can be critical in pushing the party beyond the five per cent hurdle. In this context, the *FDP* has been the most active party vis-à-vis its advertising campaigns. During the last elections the Free Democratic Party was the first German party that ran three week advertisements in a number of Turkish newspapers - both liberal and conservative. In addition, before the *Bundestag*selection they started a poster campaign in Kreuzberg with *FDP* slogans in the Turkish language.

***Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU)*²²**

One assumes that the exclusive politics vis-à-vis citizenship and integration that are represented by the *CDU* do not make the party the first choice for many Berliners of Turkish origin. Yet, *Özcan Mutlu* who sits in Kreuzberg's *Bezirksverordnetenversammlung* for the Green party admits grudgingly that the *CDU* in Kreuzberg has both more members/activists and voters who are from an ethnic minority background than his own party (*Der Tagesspiegel*, 11.7.1997)²³

Berliners of Turkish origin might regard the Christian Democrats as an agreeable political choice for four main reasons: a) the *CDU* proposes conservative moral politics (*konservative Wertpolitik*) with an emphasis on

traditional family values (comparable with the Conservatives' 'Back to Basics' agenda) and religion; b) furthermore, its economic policies are regarded as favourable for small- and medium sized enterprises; c) in its public statements it endorses restrictive policies that seek to curtail new immigration and in particular, the arrival of asylum-seekers. Both are popular proposals in the eyes of many Turkish Berliners who - like their German counterparts - consider new immigration movements as a threat to their economic well-being; d) finally, although the *CDU* has declared itself against the possibility of Turkey becoming an EU Member State, in particular, its silence on human rights abuses in Turkey, both against Kurds, and/or political prisoners, as well as the ban of the *PKK* in Germany which was implemented under the *Kohl*-government, have gained the party in general, a more 'Turkey friendly' image than that of the *GRÜNEN* or the *SPD*.²⁴

Some activists of immigrant organisations are (or have been and I will explain my choice of the past tense shortly) *CDU* members. These include amongst others the former president of the *Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin* (Turkish Association of Berlin), *Mustafa Cakmakoglu*; the *TBB* committee representative *Emine Demirbüken* and the *Milli Görüş* activist *Erdan Taskiran*. In 1996 *Ertugrul Uzun* (*CDU*) founded the *Deutsch Türkische Union* (*DTU* - German Turkish Union). *Uzun* was previously the first secretary of the *Europäische Vereinigung Türkischer Akademiker* (*EATA* - European Association of Turkish Academics), an organisation that was founded in 1992 with financial support from the government in Ankara.

According to *Riza Baran*, the *EATA* seeks to lobby on behalf of Turkey by offering seminars, organising visits to Turkey and by extending political contacts between Germany and Turkey (*Baran, without year*). The *DTU* is independent from the Christian Democratic Party, but it exclusively admits *CDU* members and attempts to become a formal *CDU* association (which would allow them to propose motions at party conferences)

The emergence of the *DTU* and its aspiration to become formally acknowledged by the *CDU* is not undisputed. Some of the old-established Turkish *CDU* activists - like *Çakmakoglu* for example - distance themselves actively from *Uzun* by opposing a formal *DTU* inclusion within the party framework. They also regard his initiative as a 'one-man-show' with a single purpose, namely the advancement of his own interests and career (*Interview with Mustafa Çakmakoglu, 24.4.1997*). Without discussing it at this point, the 'trench warfare' between many political groups or politically active individuals is often not so much about ideas or ideologies but rather, or in addition, about competition for status and influence.

According to *Ertugrul Uzun*, in 1997 the *DTU* had approximately 100 members in Berlin, of which 25 were 'ethnic German'. The *DTU* sees itself as a 'bridging organisation' or a mediator who both lobbies for the *CDU* amongst "Turks" in Berlin and who articulates "Turkish matters" within the party. In addition, the organisation wishes to be a forum for close contacts "between Turks and *CDU* officials." Questioned over what "Turkish

matters" exactly includes, *Uzun* refers on the one hand to topics that concern the situation of ethnic minorities in Germany, e.g. urgent changes to Germany's ethnically defined citizenship policies, or the improvement of the situation of young Berliners of Turkish origin in the area of education. *Uzun* rejects proposals such as the introduction of quotas, and positive or affirmative action. From his point of view "Turks are confident" and not in need of a special approach to advance their equal standing in German society. He supports the idea of founding a "Berlin Parliament for Turks" which - in the absence of any really representative umbrella organisation - would allow "Turks to formulate common policy recommendations that would be achieved in a democratic process." (*Interview with Ertugrul Uzun, 27.5.1997*)

On the other hand, *Uzun* highlights the necessity to both improve and intensify German-Turkish bilateral relations and to further Turkey's integration into the European Union. In this context the *DTU* organises conferences and seminars "to promote a relevant and critical dialogue and to set up networks that help to achieve this aim". In his opinion "so called human rights abuses" must not serve as a justification to criticise Turkey or to exclude the country from political and economic co-operation.

In addition to the few 'old-established' *CDU* members like *Cakmakoglu*, or *Uzun's* new *DTU* (also *Emine Demirbüken* of the *TBB* is a member of the *DTU*), also members of the *Milli Görüş* intend to - or have already become - formally involved with the Christian-Democrats. In the Autumn of 1996

one case was picked up by the press, that of *Erdan Taskiran* who was immediately excluded from the *CDU* after his *Milli Görüs* affiliation became publicly known. The *CDU* argued that the *Milli Görüs* is in principle an anti-constitutional force and that his exclusion was a means to prevent an 'Islamic infiltration' of the party (see *die tageszeitung* 10.10.1996, 26.10.1996)

SUMMARY

Berliners of Turkish origin have thus far been excluded from the German concept of the people and hence from the macro-level of politics. As a result, their political engagement in political parties – which they are not allowed to elect and for whom they cannot run for office - is marginal as is the parties' interest to become more inclusive regarding both content and membership. Against the background of an increase in naturalisation numbers and an assumed fundamental change in Germany's citizenship legislation, the parties' disposition to fully exclude Berliners of Turkish origin from their agenda may however change.

A very small number of Berliners of Turkish origin have started to become involved in party politics and thereby are seeking to break this cycle. In many ways they intend to function as 'brokers' between the ethnic minority population on the one hand and main stream political parties on the other. For the time being, all politicians of Turkish origin are restrained to one

particular political topic, namely the politics of immigration and integration, or - as is the case for the *PDS* politician *Ismail Kosan* - international solidarity. The reasons for being both 'pigeon-holed' in such a way and their hesitant acceptance of this placement are twofold: within the parties' structure they are not accepted as 'regular' but as 'exotic' components, and as a result they are perceived as 'natural' representatives of 'particularistic' interests and assigned for respective tasks and positions. At the same time the peripheral conceptualisation of questions concerning ethnic relations and equality for German residents of minority origin has clearly been an important motive for 'minority politicians' in becoming party members. From their point of view an engagement in mainstream parties is the most effective way to call for a more central place for these topics in the German political system. In all parties their strategy for achieving this aim has included the establishment of specific organisations or working groups. It is at this point where we can identify the first surpassing of traditional conceptualisations of national politics.

A second element of this process can be identified in the following: the reasons for joining or for supporting a German political party do not stem entirely from the parties' national agenda, but are at the same time effected by the parties' attitudes towards politics in Turkey²⁵ Here, I have sought to illustrate that Berliners of Turkish origin do not shape their political interests only in negotiation with, or as a result of, policies concerning their country of settlement, but at the same time in direct

response to the politics of the country they, or their parents and/or grandparents have been born.

In this context I would like to summarise two further observations. First, it is noticeable that all minority members of the Berlin parliament are of Kurdish origin. Clearly, this is such a small number that any attempt to generalise its significance would be misplaced. However, at the level of speculation I would like to bring the subsequent comments up for discussion: a higher interest by people of Kurdish origin or Alevis in German mainstream politics might be conceivable for four reasons: a) members of these groups display in general, a more 'integrationist' perspective as their freedom in Germany is incomparable with that in Turkey; b) the (stated) critical stance of some German parties vis-à-vis Turkey's Human Rights abuses does not constitute a hurdle or an area of conflict, but is an incentive to join a party like for example the Greens; c) people of Kurdish origin or Alevis do not have an effective network within the Turkish political establishment at their disposal which may further their interests in Germany; d) people of this background have less interest in a possible political career in Turkey (which some Turkish politicians envisage).

Second, it appears that in particular, members of the second generation seek to break with the tradition of forming separate migrant organisations. Their interest in becoming members of German parties – from my point of view - not only reflects their different perspectives towards Germany (and

Turkey for that matter) but is at the same time an indicator of the emergence of a new elite who have less networking capacity in Turkey and less interest in 'home-oriented' politics.

Having so far discussed the political participation of Berliners of Turkish origin in German political parties, I would now like to turn to those political organisations outside the mainstream.

ENDNOTES CHAPTER 7

¹ Attempts in the 1990s to introduce the 'foreigners' vote' at the local level were declared invalid by the German constitutional court (31.10.1990), arguing that the German constitution does not allow an interpretation of the term 'the people' in a way that includes 'non-Germans'.

² EU citizens residing in Germany constitute a special case (twenty-five per cent of Germany's and eleven per cent of Berlin's 'non-German' population are EU nationals), as they have important direct and indirect ways of participating in the political process. A central political right that they are denied is to participate in the national elections. However, against the background of EU politics one might argue that this national vote becomes increasingly insignificant. There are three reasons that can support such an argument: First, the emerging EU citizenship guarantees EU citizens almost full citizens' rights in all EU countries. Second, EU citizens are allowed to participate in the local and European Parliament elections in Germany and can thus directly participate on specific levels of the political process. Third, EU citizens can indirectly influence the politics in Germany by participating in the national elections of their country of origin: on the one hand, the elected national government is actively involved in shaping EU politics that are decisive for all EU-Member States; on the other hand, many political decisions that are taken in one EU country have ceased to be exclusively relevant within its national borders, but affect at the same time other EU countries.

³ 'Ausländer' were allowed in 1967 to become members of political parties. As Tomas Hammar points out, parties could however reject the admission of 'foreigners' and this decision was taken by the Bavarian CSU - the Christian Socialist Party (Hammar 1990a, p. 79).

⁴ Non-Germans are in general however not allowed to form their own parties and the activities of their associations are subject to strict controls. In addition, ethnic minorities can vote and stand for election in universities and in the context of the Workplace Labour Relations Acts (*Betriebsverfassungsgesetz*) and the Co-determination Act (*Mitbestimmungsgesetz*). They are eligible to vote in *Sozialwahlen* (elections in the context of self-government/autonomy of social security agencies).

⁵ Clearly, the three reasons that have been mentioned here do not necessarily exclude each other. As will be shown in the text, in most cases a number of reasons apply at the same time and form the political interest of individuals and/or groups in party politics.

⁶ Furthermore, as expressed by one young interviewee who was quoted in the last chapter, the motive to join a political party might at the same be based upon the intention to make a political career - a common and international feature amongst many of today's politicians.

⁷ Rıza Baran, a directly elected parliamentarian for the Green party, describes the common stereotype of a 'typical' Green politician amongst Kreuzbergers of Turkish origin: "When I am walking around in Kreuzberg many of my compatriots tell me 'oh, you know, you don't fit the Greens, you are different'. I don't know what their image of a proper Greeny is, probably long hair and *Birkenstock* sandals." In addition, he remembers that after his election victory in 1995 a few Kreuzbergers of Turkish origin started to come to Green party meetings, but only once or twice as they were to some extent "scared off by the intellectuals" (*Interview, 30.4.1997*).

⁸ The first Green local councillor of Turkish origin was elected in 1989. In 1992, three Berliners of Turkish origin became Green local councillors.

⁹ Mutlu describes the discussion with the local administration as such: "We asked them whether they think that it makes sense to hire all these interpreters and translators. Isn't it more rational to fully employ people as officials in charge who speak at least two languages? ... They behaved as if this was a really new idea. I mean, it doesn't take much thinking to come to this conclusion, does it? Well, we then demanded to fill all those training places that do not require the trainee to be a German citizen with non-Germans." (*interview with Özcan Mutlu, 4.6.1997*) In 1997, 12 young Berliners of minority origin had become trainees employed by the local administration in Kreuzberg.

¹⁰ Kadıköy is a district in Istanbul which was an intermediate stop for many rural Turkish migrants who came to Germany in the 1960s.

¹¹ This was a project of first-generation Turkish immigrants that disintegrated very quickly due to insurmountable differences between its members, both regarding their attitudes towards Turkish politics and individual career ambitions. "Well, it was a total flop, because it was an ethnically based affair. Just Turks. It was run predominantly by the first generation and consequently they had their eyes on some sort of a career. They indulged in trench-war-fare and the whole matter was sentenced to death." (*Interview with Özcan Mutlu, 4.6.1997*).

¹² "Well, the good thing about Immi-Grün is that its activists are members of the second generation. Thus persons who have been born or brought up here and who have encountered problems that are different from those of the first generation or of that clique of academics that came at that time." (*Interview with Özcan Mutlu, 4.6.1997*)

¹³ He continued: "Another area where it is possible to change and to achieve something, is the media. It is pleasing [to see that] recently more and more young people of the second generation are media people. So far predominantly in the print-media and radio, but it won't take long and we will see them on TV as well." (*Interview with Özcan Mutlu, 4.6.1997*)

¹⁴ A 'media feast' was for example the intervention of the Turkish consul in Berlin when conflicts occurred in the *Türkische Gemeinde Berlin* between secular Kemalists and religious activists (*see die tageszeitung and Hürriyet, 21.4.1997*)

¹⁵ *Wahlkreis 3* is in the former Kreuzberg 36, and stretches from *Schlesisches Tor, Görlitzer Bahnhof, Skalitzer Straße* to *Wassertorstraße*.

¹⁶ "I said, well we live here, we work here and the centre of our life is here, and for this reason we need to have a critical look at this society. For our political orientation we need to know what the political parties actually stand for, who supports us, who is against us ... And most importantly, we have to be able to change, a change in our outlook. Those who are unable to undergo this process, are also unable to change a society. .. And they [various Kurdish organisations] called me a betrayer. Well, I still work in support of the Kurds, but differently. I don't want to be a boat that brings goods from there to here, I live here and I want to contribute, participate here." (*Interview with Riza Baran, 30.4.1997*)

¹⁷ He too, would in principle prefer to work on a wider variety of political issues, rather than being pigeonholed as the person responsible for 'migrant politics'. However, he sees the necessity to focus his energies in this area as long as there is no parity as regards content within the party's agenda.

¹⁸ Also in the actual sense of the word, as two thirds of the PDS members are older than 60 years old (*Der Spiegel* 41/1998, p. 46).

¹⁹ "You have to differentiate between [political] motives that are concerned with migration politics and those that are home-orientated ... home-orientated politicians use the parties for their Turkish interests, but politicians concerned with migration want to improve the situation in the country they reside in." (*Interview with Giyassetten Sayan, 7.5.1997*)

²⁰ In March 1997, the Turkish newspaper *Hürriyet* for example described the SPD as 'Social Terrorists' rather than 'Social Democrats' (*Hürriyet* 4.3.1997). In general the conservative Turkish press presents the SPD's (as well as the Green party's) 'Turkey-politics' as evidence for their dislike of Turkey and thus of Turks in Germany.

²¹ "If I - just as a private individual - write a letter to the leader of the FDP and point out those issues that need improvement, then that just doesn't have the same effect as if I write as the leader [of the LTD] and possibly submit the letter to the press." (*Interview with Mehmet Daimagüler, 29.5.1997*)

²² Although not a formal prerequisite, the CDU in general expects their members to be German citizens.

²³ According to him, the CDU in Kreuzberg has approximately 100 members of ethnic minority origin. The party has one BVV member of ethnic origin, a person who was born in Sri Lanka.

²⁴ In addition to these factors, at the national level younger CDU politicians have already been campaigning for a relaxation of citizenship laws and improved integration policies. After the party lost the 1998 elections, a possible 'generational reshuffle' would allow those younger Christian Democrats to take a more prominent role in shaping future

CDU politics at the national level - provided that the party does not take the same path chosen by the British Conservatives who turned even more to the right.

²⁵ However, such an international or transnational interest is by no means a unique feature for Berliners of Turkish origin but applies – although for a different set of reasons - for many segments of the German society (take the examples of solidarity campaigns for Nicaragua; or Middle East politics).

CHAPTER 8

TRANSCENDING NATIONAL POLITICS (II) POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF BERLINERS OF TURKISH ORIGIN IN IMMIGRANT ASSOCIATIONS

"In a few words, German politics is like an equation. For now we aren't really part of this equation and none of the political parties would want to damage the balance for our sake. But ... we can get involved anyway, can't we? Then their sums won't work out any longer, ... and they will have to start calculating from scratch." (Interview with U., male, 20, 6.6.1997)

The right to vote and to stand in elections as well as membership in political parties are the classical forms of political participation or involvement. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, both forms are currently either unavailable or rather restricted for most Berliners of Turkish origin. Yet, the range of forms of political participation does not stop at formal elections and party affiliation but includes a number of further possible choices. The 'repertoire of political participation' has changed significantly since the second half of the 1970s, in particular if we look at more unconventional forms (*Uehlinger 1988, p. 5*). The 'new social movements' that emerged at the end of the 1960s both supplemented and challenged classical forms of political participation in two respects: first, as regards their political focus, new social movements did not emerge against the background of 'traditional' (i.e. industrial) conflicts, but "sparked off due to new conflicts concerning societal reproduction" (for example 'ecocide'

and nuclear armament) (*Brand 1985, p. 9*). Second, they both sought, and needed to, organise outside the established political system in autonomous and self-determined small clusters (*see Jänicke 1979; Offe 1980*).

Like the activists of new social movements in the 1970s and 1980s members of ethnic minorities have created for themselves political organisations that allow them to articulate political demands thus far neglected by the existent political system. They are in many respects the representatives of new emergent societal conflicts that stem from the progressing transformation of modern societies into ethnically heterogeneous systems. In the following chapter I will attempt to demonstrate that, in their endeavour to articulate and to realise their political demands, Berliners of Turkish origin adapt to, and/or - depending on the point of view – make use of, already established ‘institutional channels’ of political participation (*see Ireland 1994*) and add at the same time new foci to Germany’s political landscape that transcend national boundaries. For the purpose of this analysis, I will first provide a brief overview of central aspects concerning the emergence of organisations of Berliners of Turkish origin. Second, I will describe the content and form of the work of selected groups in Berlin, namely the *Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin (TGB)*, the *Türkische Bund Berlin Brandenburg (TBB)*, and the *Türkischer Frauenverein in Berlin (BTKB)*.

THE FORMATION OF ORGANISATIONS OF BERLINERS OF TURKISH ORIGIN

The academic literature usually relates the process of self-organisation of Berliners of Turkish origin to the three phases of the immigration process, namely migration to Germany as contract-workers, family unification and settlement (see Layton-Henry 1990a, Özcan 1993). Changes in the structure and work emphasis of immigrant organisations occurred correspondingly: they transformed from 'situational' or private networks and/or home-oriented political organisations into associations that a) became – albeit not exclusively - concerned with issues related to the political and socio-economic situation of immigrants in Germany and b) started to articulate their interests and demands in an increasingly 'public' manner.

Already during the first phase, in the 1960s until 1973, a number of organisations can be identified in Berlin, both secular and religious. Secular organisations consisted on the one hand of those that were primarily concerned with the general welfare of newly arrived migrant workers. One of these associations was for example the *Türkischer Arbeiterverein in Berlin* (Turkish Workers' Association in Berlin), founded in 1964. Its main aim was to assist fellow 'guestworkers' in the process of adjusting to the new conditions in Germany. It provided help in coping with bureaucratic procedures or finding rental accommodation and organised social events and get-togethers. On the other hand, a plethora of political

groups emerged at that time in Berlin – founded by a small group of Turkish students and intellectuals, as well as the first flow of political refugees from Turkey - that were influenced by political and social events taking place in their country of origin. According to Özcan, at the beginning of the 1970s “nearly the whole political spectre of political parties and orientations that existed in Turkey was represented via the foundation of like-minded organisations in West-Berlin” (Özcan 1993, p. 66, *author's translation*).

Looking at the formation of religious groups during this phase of immigration, Blaschke points out that Islam developed in a rather unorganised and diverse fashion in Germany. Most Muslims of Turkish origin tended for example to practice their religion in their private flats or rooms together with friends, and did not make use of the religious and cultural activities offered the two existing mosques in Berlin (Blaschke 1984, p. 296). The first public expositions of Islamic life in Berlin only started to take place at the beginning of the 1970s, when various Islamic associations organised events at Islamic holidays. Against the background that active Muslims were not allowed to form associations in Turkey that openly depicted an Islamic orientation, organisations of Turkish Muslims formed under “clandestine conditions” in Germany and avoided using the word ‘Islam’. Instead, they employed names such as ‘Cultural and Solidarity Associations’ (Blaschke 1984, p. 299).

Political divisions in Turkey continued to have a consequential impact upon the organisations of Turkish immigrants in Germany throughout the 1970s. In particular various Islamic groups – with links to the National Salvation Party (MSP) of *Necmettin Erbakan*, and the National Movement (MHP) of *Alparslan Türkeş* – collided fiercely and at times violently with leftwing or liberal secular groups. However, as ‘temporary guestworkers’ turned gradually into settled immigrants, in addition to home-orientated politics the function and activities of Turkish associations became continuously more related to the settlement process. Take for example the agenda of the first social-democratic organisation of ‘Turkish’ immigrants, the *Verein links von der Mitte in der Türkei* (Association Left of Centre in Turkey). This association was founded in 1973 and was renamed in 1975 as the *Progressive Volkseinheit der Türkei in Berlin* (HDB - Progressive Turkish People’s Union in Berlin). The *HDB* officially pursued two aims: on the one hand it sought to actively support social democratic movements and parties in Turkey and on the other “it aimed at representing at least a segment of the Turkish population in Berlin and their demands vis-à-vis social and political equality in Germany.” (*Özcan 1993, p. 68, author’s translation*). Clearly, regarding the former point, substantial overlaps existed between the various organisations of Berliners of Turkish origin. Yet, the deep clefts stemming from political divisions in Turkey spoiled any opportunity of co-operation on this issue.

This situation changed to some degree with the beginning of the 1980s. During this decade three developments are of importance: first, we can

identify the emergence of both professional organisations (e.g. the 'Society of Turkish Doctors' or the 'Association of Turkish Businesspersons') and self-help initiatives such as the 'Turkish Parents' Association' or the 'Association of Turkish Pensioners'. Second, attempts were made to form a Turkish immigrant umbrella organisation. This step was seen as a crucial instrument to unite the divided political landscape under a new political agenda, namely the German politics of immigration. But yet again, this aim was only partially achieved as differences in orientations concerning Turkish politics led to the foundation of three umbrella organisations, the *Initiativkreis Gleichberechtigung 'Integration'* (*IGI* – Initiative Equality 'Integration') in 1980 and three years later, in 1983, the *Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin* (*TGB* – Turkish Community of Berlin) and the *Türkischer Bund für Gleichberechtigung in Berlin (West)* (*BTT* – Turkish Union for Equality in Berlin (West)). Initially, the *TGB* enjoyed the support of a rather broad basis, including conservative-liberal associations as well as some religious and social democratic groups. This consensus lasted for about three years and came to an end with the withdrawal of some key organisations¹ Today, as I will describe below, the *TGB* represents the conservative end of the political spectrum, both regarding Turkish and German political parties. The Turkish Union for Equality in Berlin (West), by comparison, was from its beginnings a social-democratic organisation. It stopped its work in 1990 and was replaced one year later by the *Bund der EinwanderInnen aus der Türkei Berlin-Brandenburg*, later renamed *Türkischer Bund Berlin Brandenburg* (*TBB*, see below).

A third development that should have an important impact upon the formation of organisations of Berliners of Turkish origin was – as has already indicated in chapter 5 – the restructuring of welfare policies in Berlin during the 1980s. In this context money for self-organised projects and social work was directly channelled to organisations of Berliners of Turkish origin. Today, there is a plethora of cultural, political religious and social organisations of Berliners of Turkish origin. The documentation material provided by the *Berliner Institut für Vergleichende Sozialforschung* lists more than one hundred associations, spanning from self-help initiatives providing assistance for persons with Aids, to psychotherapeutic advise centres, women's and girls' groups, youth initiatives, Kurdish and Alevi cultural and political organisations, sport clubs, student associations, Turkish theatre groups, professional associations etc.² In the following I will outline the work of two organisations that are central for the Berlin context, the Turkish Community of Berlin, the Turkish Union of Berlin Brandenburg. In addition, one further group, linked to the *TBB*, is included which seeks to meet the needs and interests of one particular group, namely the Turkish Women's Association Berlin.³

Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin (TGB – Turkish Community of Berlin)

The Turkish Community of Berlin has existed, as pointed out above, since 1983. From having been initially an umbrella organisation for a relatively wide range of organisations of Berliners of Turkish origin, it represents

today both secular groups with a predominantly conservative political orientation, and Islamic organisations that can be associated with the 'religious establishment' in Turkey, i.e. officially tolerated and state controlled Islamic institutions (*see Bruinessen 1984*).

In summer 1997, the *TGB* consisted of more than 20 associations, including amongst others cultural groups and sport associations, Islamic groups, employers' organisations and social initiatives. It receives financial support for specific purposes from *Barbara John's* office, in addition contributions are made by its member organisations towards running costs and the management of public campaigns. Nine persons represent its committee, the organisation's decision-making institution. The committee is elected by a council of representatives, and each member organisation – regardless of its size – is allowed to send two of its members to the council. In its organisational rules the *TGB* emphasises four principles to be adhered to by its members, namely loyalty to the German constitution, non-violence, political independence, and laicism.

According to *Mustafa Cakmakoglu*, the *TGB's* secretary in summer 1997, the organisation is strictly opposed to the use of the term 'foreigner' when referring to the 'Turkish' population in Germany. Also terms such as immigrants or migrants (*Immigranten, Einwanderer, Zuwanderer*) are "old-fashioned" and "unsuitable" as they do not capture the social reality of 'Turks' in Germany. As an alternative, the *TGB* promotes the application of the term 'national minority'. This, in *Cakmakoglu's* opinion, describes

adequately both the national – as opposed to an ethnic – background of ‘Turks’ residing in Germany and it establishes the ‘Turkish’ minority as a distinct and permanent national minority in Germany. (*Interview with Mustafa Cakmakoglu, 24.4.1997*) Thus far, only Danes and Sorben hold the status of constituting national minorities in Germany.⁴

Regarding the formal citizenship legislation, the *TGB* demands the introduction of an element of *ius soli* and the official toleration of dual citizenship. The latter point however is – according to *Cakmakoglu* – no longer of crucial necessity as Turkey guarantees important rights to naturalised Germans of Turkish origin. Since the beginning of the 1990s, when new citizenship legislation was introduced in Germany, the *TGB* strongly advises Berliners of Turkish origin to apply for naturalisation. *Cakmakoglu* estimates that currently 40,000 applications for naturalisation are being processed by local administrations (the district's registry offices) and is convinced that “the slow processing of applications is nothing but a political manipulation. They want to delay [naturalisation] as long as possible.” (*Interview with Mustafa Cakmakoglu, 24.4.1997*).

An amendment of citizenship legislation is not the only interest of the *Türkische Gemeinde in Berlin* regarding the German/Berlin situation. The organisation also demands the official recognition of Islam as one of the main religions practised in Germany, and the introduction of Islamic education in Berlin's schools. In this context, the *TGB*, in co-operation with one of its members, *D.I.T.I.B. e.V. Berlin*⁵ has articulated its interest in

becoming the single organisation responsible for providing Islamic school education (see chapter 5).

The *Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin* has both initiated and supported a number of important campaigns that focus on the situation of people of Turkish origin both in Germany, and more specifically in Berlin. In this context the *TGB* appealed to its members to support demonstrations against racist violence and right-wing extremism in the aftermath of arson attacks in Mölln and Solingen in 1992 and 1993. Every year, the Turkish Community of Berlin awards a prize to politicians who “promote a peaceful co-existence with foreigners” (*Mustafa Cakmakoglu, die tageszeitung, 8.1.1993*) So far *Barbara John*; *Heiner Geißler* (CDU); the Turkish consul in Bonn, *Onur Öymen*; the former national *Ausländerbeauftragte*, *Lieselotte Funcke*; and the former Minister for Justice (later for Foreign affairs), *Klaus Kinkel*, have received this award. The *TGB* co-operates with the police in Berlin on two subjects. First, in its endeavour to tackle existent racism within the police, the organisation demands the establishment of the post of a ‘commissioner for foreigners’ within the police force. The *TGB* supports police efforts to teach its staff Turkish, to establish personal contacts between the police force and Berliners of Turkish origin and to run seminars on ‘multi-cultural affairs’ (*die tageszeitung 4.4.1996*). Second, the *Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin* co-organises informative events together with Berlin’s police for young people of Turkish origin. With the help of such events the police hopes to increase the number of young persons of Turkish origin in the police force. In 1994,

350 of Berlin's police officers (out of a total of 21.000) were of ethnic minority origin (*die tageszeitung*, 6.10.1994)

Activities of the *Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin* are however not exclusively directed towards, and developed in response to, German politics. They are at the same time shaped by, and concerned with, political developments in Turkey. For instance, the *TGB* emphasises that vigorous action is needed to tackle "Kurdish terrorism" in Germany. The organisation accused members of the *PKK* of having carried out a series of attacks against Turkish institutions in Berlin in 1993-5 and demanded swift action on the side of the police and policy makers. It called for both the banning of the *PKK* and the extradition of known "PKK terrorists" to Turkey (*die tageszeitung*, 26.6.1993, 6.11.1993, 31.3.1995). Furthermore, the *TGB* perceives itself as a mediator, or in *Cakmakoglu's* words, as a "bridge" between Germany and Turkey, both in terms of international relations and regarding the 'transstate' interests of Berliners of Turkish origin. In co-operation with the Turkish consulate in Berlin, the *TGB* offers seminars and other informative events on Turkish politics. In addition, in summer 1997 the *TGB* founded the *Förderkreis der türkischen Gemeinde* (Association for the support of the Turkish Community) with approximately 1,700 individual members. This support association intends to offer certain services, for example cheap flights to Turkey or legal advice on matters arising in Turkey to the 'Turkish' population in Berlin. All members shall be issued with a membership card. This card – so *Cakmakoglu* – will "help to

create a sense of belonging for our members, who live in two worlds.”
(*Interview with Mustafa Cakmakoglu, 24.4.1997*).

In Germany, the *TGB* has established political links with the Christian Democratic Party – *Mustafa Cakmakoglu* is a long-standing *CDU* member (see also *Blaschke 1984*) – and seeks to convince Berliners of Turkish origin to become active in German mainstream parties. “We have to become organised in parties, too. Otherwise we will end up in a political cul-de-sac.” (*Interview with Mustafa Cakmakoglu 24.4.1997*)

Links do also exist with Turkey’s military and/or political establishment and became particularly apparent in 1997. At the time when I carried out the main part of my field research in Germany, the *Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin* was caught up in a major power struggle that potentially threatened the future of the organisation. The crisis was (officially) triggered by the question whether the *TGB* should be open towards the possibility of a renewed membership of the *Milli Görüs*. *Cakmakoglu* and his supporters vehemently rejected this idea, whereas an outspoken critic of *Cakmakoglu*, *Sabri Abrak*, and members of *D.I.T.I.B.* argued that, in order to control the “fundamentalist radicalism” of the *Milli Görüs* it would seem necessary to incorporate this organisation. The question of whether this conflict was really brought about by opposed views concerning questions principle, or was simply (as some observers have argued) concerned with internal power struggles, shall not be discussed at this point. Of more interest is the intervention of both the Turkish consulate in Berlin, as well

as members of the Turkish 'National Security Council'⁶ in Ankara. In Spring 1997, the National Security Council sent two officials to Berlin in order to appease the two conflicting parties. Observers argue that the military establishment undertook this step, because it wanted to strengthen the laicistically-orientated *TGB* at a time when Turkey's former Prime Minister *Erbakan* had planned to establish the *Milli Görüs* as the main Turkish-Islamic organisation abroad (*see die tageszeitung* 24.2.1997, 21.4.1997).

Türkischer Bund Berlin Brandenburg (TBB – Turkish Union in Berlin-Brandenburg)

The Turkish Union in Berlin Brandenburg is an umbrella organisation for a wide variety of associations of Berliners of Turkish origin, ranging from a trade co-operative, an Alevi cultural centre, to a football club. In total, 22 associations were members of the *TBB* in 1997.⁷ The *Türkische Bund Berlin Brandenburg* was founded in December 1991⁸ its beginnings however go back to the 1980s. At that time, a group of approximately thirty individuals, consisting of 'Turkish' trade unionists and social democrats, came together in order to edit a booklet summarising their point of view vis-à-vis the integration of former Turkish guestworkers and their offspring in Germany. The motivation for this was on the one hand the belief that a community of immigrants should focus in their political activities and demands primarily on the country of settlement and not on the political situation of the country of origin. "Now, we live in Germany and we don't

go back. Hence, we have to deal with the situation in Germany.” (*Interview with Kenan Kolat, secretary of the TBB, 25.4.1997*). On the other hand, it was an appeal to building an alliance of various Turkish organisations that were divided along political conflicts and party hostilities in Turkey.

Against the background of political experiences gained in the 1980s, the ‘golden rule’ of the *TBB* is that no public statements are made on matters regarding Turkish politics. The *TBB*’s committee consists of nine members who are elected by an assembly to which each organisation elects four of their own members as representatives. In addition, for every eight representatives of the member organisations, another two trade unionists and one individual member of the *TBB* join the assembly. In 1997, the assembly consisted of approximately 120 delegates. The *TBB* appeals to its member organisation to be represented by equal numbers of men and women, currently 30 per cent of the delegates are female.

Regarding its finances, the *Türkische Gemeinde Berlin Brandenburg* receives 100,000 DM annually from *Barbara John*’s office. This money is used for financing the post of the secretary (*Kenan Kolat*), a part-time post for support staff as well as overheads. The *TBB* has received another 60,000 DM from the European Union for the setting up of an ‘anti-discrimination office’. As all members of ethnic minorities who experience discrimination shall be supported by this office, and not only Berliners of Turkish origin, the *TBB* co-operates on this project closely with other

immigrant organisations, such as the Association of Iranian Refugees and the Polish Social Council (*TBB Annual Report 1996*).

On a daily basis, the *Türkischer Bund Berlin-Brandenburg* offers advice and mediation in family conflicts, or conflicts that occur at the work place and in schools, and arranges for further counselling. Furthermore, it undertakes public relations work reporting incidents of discrimination and racist violence and offers educative seminars on the situation of ethnic minorities in Germany. In 1996, the *TBB* published a bilingual guidebook containing organisations that offer advice in areas such as health, education, legal issues etc.

The main political demand articulated by the *TBB* is concerned with a change of citizenship legislation in Germany. "Political and legal equality is the prerequisite for a peaceful living together in Germany." (*Interview with Kenan Kolat, 25.4.1997*). In this context, the *TBB* demands are in principle congruent with the latest proposals as formulated by the new German government (see chapter one). Against the background of changes in Turkish law, the question of dual citizenship is no longer seen as crucially important. However, as a matter of principle an official toleration of dual citizenship is regarded as a positive step, as it would signify a recognition of existent multiple loyalties and interest of Berlin's 'Turkish' population (*Interview with Kenan Kolat, 25.4.1997*). The *TBB* published an advice leaflet that advertises the benefits of formal German citizenship in 1996 (*see die tageszeitung, 10.12.1996*).

Discussions that are articulated in the British or the US American context, and that highlight the disadvantaged position of ethnic minority members regardless of their formal citizenship are, according to *Kolat* not yet relevant for Germany.

First of all we have to get to the same starting point. When the legal conditions have changed and when we live in a new political context, then can we see what further steps have to be undertaken. (*Interview with Kenan Kolat, 25.4.1997*).

In addition to demands that are concerned with a change of German citizenship legislation, the *TBB* calls for equal treatment for Islam in Germany. However, *Kolat* points out that religious education should be offered on a voluntary basis. Furthermore, it should not only represent the Sunni version of Islam but should also incorporate religious beliefs of Shiites and Alevis. The *TBB* (standing in a social democratic, Kemalist tradition) regards religious education as the responsibility of the state, and rejects its teaching under the control of Islamic organisations (or churches for that matter).

The recognition of diversity in a situation of legal and political equality is a central theme for all member organisations of the Turkish Union of Berlin-Brandenburg. "Integration", means according to *Kolat* "to accept people on their own terms". However, the recognition of diversity should not end with the tolerance of cultural or religious practices. Recognition means, above

all, that any disadvantage experienced by minority members is seen as a disadvantage for the whole of society.

Only when the German political establishment realises, that an educational problem of young 'Turks' is not a problem of the Turkish community but one of German society as a whole, then we have tolerance and recognition. A categorisation of such problems as 'problems of foreigners' is opposed to the principle of integration. It makes the disadvantage the problem of one group. (*Interview with Kenan Kolat, 25.4.1997*)

The *TBB* rejects the idea of groups rights. Although this is currently not – as has been pointed out before - an important issue, *Kolat* stresses the point that the organisation is concerned about the rights of the individual. At this point, he emphasises that the *TBB* does not claim to be the representative of the 'Turkish community' in Berlin. "We can only speak for individuals, and we solely demand the improvement of the situation of individuals." (*Interview with Kenan Kolat, 25.4.1997*).

Activities that are supported and/or organised by the *Türkischer Bund Berlin-Brandenburg* are numerous. It seeks for example to advance a dialogue between Turkish and German intellectuals, the *Forum für Verständigung* (Forum for Mutual Understanding). The motive that led to the organisation of a series of seminars is twofold. On the one hand it is – as *Kolat* points out - transparent that German intelligentsia is only marginally interested in issues that are of concern for members of ethnic

minorities. On the other, intellectuals can be important mediators between ethnic minorities and the political establishment. In the past, the *TBB* has supported Kreuzberg's mayor *Strieder* in his letter campaign to promote naturalisation (see chapter 5). The organisation has – like the *TGB* - supported demonstrations against racist violence in 1992-1994. However, the *TBB* went one step further and organised, in co-operation with one of its members – the *Türkischer Hotel- und Gaststättenverband*, a one-hour strike, or rather closing, of Turkish businesses at the 11.6.1993 (see *die tageszeitung* 9.6.1993; 11.6.1993).

Having close social-democratic leanings itself, the *Türkischer Bund Berlin-Brandenburg* promotes strongly that Berliners of Turkish origin join political parties. One of the organisation's committee members, *Emine Demirbürken*, is a member of the *CDU* and *Uzun's DVU* (see chapter 7). The political exclusion of 'Turkish' residents in Germany has, in *Kolat's* view, contributed to the fact that religious fundamentalist, Turkish nationalist and Kurdish groups enjoy significant support.

If people don't have the right to vote, or if they are not allowed to participate effectively and actively in the political decision-making process, then, it should not come as a surprise that in some cases political interests are still orientated towards Turkey (*Interview with Kenan Kolat, 25.4.1997*)

In addition to the organisation's German political networks, the *TBB* is a member of EU Migrants' Forum. Furthermore, it collaborates with the

Turkish consulate in Berlin in organising events such as seminars and panel discussions on matters regarding immigration and ethnic relations.

Türkischer Frauenverein in Berlin (BTKB – Turkish Women's Association Berlin)

The *BTKB* was the first autonomous association of 'Turkish' women in Berlin. It was founded at the 8th of March 1975. Its founding members – a group of about 55 women – had already been active in the socialist Progressive Women's Movement in Turkey, with which they maintained strong links. The motive for setting up this women's organisation was twofold: it was seen as a means to raise support and to collect money amongst fellow immigrants for supporting campaigns on women and family issues in Turkey (e.g. campaign for the introduction of child allowance, *Türkischer Frauenverein Berlin e.V. 1991*). Furthermore, the *BTKB*'s mostly middle class founding members declared as their immediate aim the fight against illiteracy amongst 'Turkish' women in Berlin.

According to *Aysin Inan* from the *BTKB*, the organisation started to undergo major changes with the beginning of the 1980s: "The women felt more settled here and became more confident. And, of course, in addition there was the money from the Senate." (*Interview with Aydin Inan, 12.5.1997*). In a short time, the Turkish Women's Association was in a position to offer a wider programme, including German classes,

typewriting, mother and child group, girls' group, sewing classes and needlework, assistance with school homework.

At the beginning, the organisation offered what I would call 'consumer orientated social-work'. That was basically what all other social initiatives did at that time. They took the women by the hand and showed them what to do ... In the course of the 1980s this has changed. Again, it was not only us, but the whole approach to social work has changed. Our idea then was to offer help for promoting self-help. Important social knowledge, knowledge you need on an every-day level. (*Interview with Aysin Inan, 12.5.1997*)

Furthermore, the *BTKB*'s organisational and personal links with women's groups in Turkey became weaker during this period. *Inan* notes three explanations for this development:

As I said, with regard to politics many things have changed, and currently we actually focus only on the German aspects. That started definitely by the end of the 1980s. More and more of us, the second generation, became [*BTKB*] committee members. ... We were simply a little more confident and at ease with the situation here and it was clear to us, that we will remain living here. So we wanted to work on issues that concern us here. ... After the military coup [in 1981] the active women of the first generation became furthermore increasingly afraid to work on Turkish issues. .. And then there was the pressure from the Senat. 'You only get money for social work'. Well, we did that anyway, but the Senat started to control it much more strictly (*Interview with Aysin Inan, 12.5.1997*).

Today, the *BTKB* consists of approximately thirty women activists, most of whom have been born in Berlin, and are in their early thirties. In total, the organisation has about 150 members, some of whom have returned to Turkey, others no longer live in Berlin but in different cities in Germany or elsewhere. Men in general are not allowed to become members of the *BTKB*. This however does not deter men from accompanying their wives, female relatives, or friends to the premises of the Turkish Women's Association. In addition, the group does –on rare occasions – offer informative, or social events for members of both sexes.

The focus of *BTKB*'s work lies in providing social and educational services but “sometimes we do classical political work” (*Interview with Aysin Inan, 12.5.1997*) – such as participating in 8th of March demonstrations, supporting signature collections for dual citizenship, or joining public protests against the introduction of residence permits for ‘Turkish’ children (see chapter 5). In summer 1997, however, almost all political energies were taken up by the fight to secure future funding from the Berlin *Senat*.⁹ Confronted with the sword of Damocles of closing down all activities (the rent for premises, the payment for teachers, and some minor overhead costs had been covered by the Berlin *Senat*), not only the group's activists but also its clients initiated a letter campaign and organised press conferences for the survival of *BTKB*'s work.

According to *Inan* the group's conception as to what constitutes political work has not only shifted as regards to its links with Turkey, but on a more general level:

What does political work mean? For me, the fact that our women have started to fight for our survival, that they developed ideas for this, that is our real political work. They know what they want and they are able to actively fight for it. ... But, we were never able to make this clear to the older women, the activists of that time [1975]. They want us to give lectures on the 8th of March on Clara Zetkin, but we do know about the history of the International Women's Day. We might as well just celebrate it. ... Their activities when they started this group were all important and right. But, to cope with the situation here [in Berlin], and to fight our corner, that is the political work of today. (*Interview with Aysin Inan, 12.5.1997*)

The women who attend classes and events organised by the *BTKB* are from a diverse ethnic or religious background and include Kurds, Alevis, Sunnis, and Turks. And at times conflicts have arisen amongst the women. *Inan* tried to illustrate this point at two concrete examples: First, during *Erbakan's* premiership some women hung up the picture of *Kemal Atatürk* in the office of the *BTKB*. "Not only our founding members had tears in their eyes, thinking of their old Luxemburg portraits. There were also Kurdish women who felt terribly offended. The second generation was somewhat split. We quickly got rid of it." (*Interview with Aysin Inan, 12.5.1997*) A further incident occurred during the sewing classes. According to *Inan*, 'non-political' sewing classes become quite regularly

battle fields for secular versus religious arguments. Should women be allowed to sew headscarves? Should it be tolerated that they show Islamic attire during the annual fashion show? The *BTKB* does not exclude veiled Islamic women as a matter of principle but “we do point out to them that we emphasise different aspects in the life of Turkish women” (*Interview with Aysin Inan, 12.5.1997*). Regardless of any ‘official’ line however, other participants have succeeded in the past “to freeze out” on one occasion a woman who started to distribute *Milli Görüş* material, and articulate their criticism against any manifestation of sunnite Islam in an open and ardent way. “Especially the Alevi women, they sometimes have an incredibly sharp tongue.” (*Interview with Aysin Inan, 12.5.1997*).

The *Türkischer Frauenverein in Berlin* is the *TBB*’s only women’s organisation. *Inan* states that the umbrella organisation provides useful and crucial backing that assists the survival of the *BTKB*. According to her, in particular the rather well-established links between the *TBB* and the *SPD* have been important in securing the organisations’ funding provided by the Berlin Senate. “I really don’t know whether our letter writing would have been enough.” (*Interview with Aysin Inan, 12.5.1997*). Further links – on a personal level – exist with on German party, namely the *PDS* as *Inan* is a party member.

SUMMARY

Political interests or affinities regarding Turkish politics, the exclusion of Berliners of Turkish origin from classical forms of political participation, and the ignorance of mainstream political parties vis-à-vis ethnic minority interests has resulted into the establishment of a plethora of immigrant organisations in Berlin. As settlement took place, initial concerns with Turkish politics were widened and the situation of Berliners of Turkish origin in their country of residence gradually became the main focus. In the course of this transformation process, the organisations of Berliners of Turkish employed existing, unconventional, forms of political participation, such as a) the founding of umbrella organisations that aim at establishing alliances of groups with diverse political orientations under a unifying agenda, in order to influence the political decision-making process more effectively; b) the establishment of professional association, or c) self-help initiatives. Their work was further influenced by the restructuring of welfare policies in Berlin during the 1980s, that resulted into the financing of social initiatives.

Today, immigrant organisations such as the *TGB* and the *TBB* seek to influence political debates increasingly not in isolation, but rather in engaging with state institutions and political parties. Many of their activists are party members themselves, and they promote this form of involvement amongst their supporters. The establishment of networks with the political mainstream is regarded as a prerequisite for protecting and advancing the

interests of Berliners of Turkish origin. The main focus of their work lies in their demand for legal and political equality, for the recognition of diversity, as well as in providing services that are of immediate help for their clientele and that have been neglected by German institutions.

In addition to their work vis-à-vis Germany it has been argued, using the example of the *Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin*, that activities remained partly shaped by, and concerned with, political developments in Turkey and/or German-Turkish relations. Furthermore, links exist between the Turkish political establishment and immigrant organisations in Berlin. Potentially, such links could be employed to articulate the interests of Berliners of Turkish origin on an inter-governmental level. However both the interest in Turkish affairs as well as links with Turkish institutions appear to be of less concern to members of the second generation.

ENDNOTES CHAPTER 8

¹ These were the *Moscheenvereine* (mosque associations) of the *Milli Görüs*, the 'Association of Turkish Businesspersons'; and the 'Turkish Association for Science, Culture and Social work' (Özcan 1993, p. 71).

² Due to problems related to a continuous update of information and the gathering of information in the first place, this documentation does not list all existent organisations of Berliners of Turkish origin. For example the numerous small mosque associations are not included in the *BIVS* documentation.

³ I had intended to include sub-groups of all three umbrella organisations. This was however not possible, as at the time when I carried out interviews in Germany, the members of the *TGB* were involved in a power struggle that upset both the structure and orientation of the Turkish Community of Berlin fundamentally. As pointed out in endnote 1, access to organisations of the *IGMG* proved to be difficult for a different set of reasons.

⁴ Approximately 50,000 *Sorben*, who speak a distinct language, live in a particular area of the former GDR close to Berlin (Spreewald, here especially the cities Bautzen and Cottbus). Both the former GDR and the Federal Republic recognise(d) the *Sorben* as a minority with specific language and cultural rights (Art. 40 of the former GDR's constitution). The same status is granted to the Danish minority residing in Schleswig-Holstein (*Kieler Erklärung* 26.9.1949; *Bonner Grundsatzserklärungen*, 29.3.1955).

⁵ *D.I.T.I.B. e.V. Berlin* was founded in 1982. It is an umbrella organisation for those Islamic groups that represent an officially promoted and controlled Islamic orientation in Turkey (for an excellent discussion on the relation between state and Islam in Turkey, see Bruinessen 1984).

⁶ The 'National Security Council' is a constitutionally established institution with the purpose of securing the influence of Turkey's military establishment in the political affairs of the country.

⁷ These organisations were: 1. Akarsu (Gesundheit, Bewegung und Berufsvorbereitung für immigrierte Frauen e.V.); 2. Al-Birlik; 3. Bahadin-Der; 4. Bund der Psychosozialen Fachkräfte; 5. Hilfs- und Solidaritätsverein für Rentner, Behinderte und Senioren; 6. Halkevi Kultur e.V.; 7. Kulturzentrum Anatolischer Alewiten; 8. KSF Umutspor; 9. SC Umutspor; 10. SG Anadoluspor MG; 11. Agrisport; 12. Türkenzentrum; 13. Türkische und Deutsche Kauffleute; 14. Türkischer Frauenverein in Berlin; 15. Türkischer Hotel- und Gaststättenverband; 16. Türkischer Verein für Wissenschaft, Kultur und Sozialarbeit; 17. Türkisches Wissenschafts- und Technologiezentrum Berlin; 18. Interkulturelles Zentrum; 19. Verein der türkischen Reiseagenturen Berlin; 20. Kulturverein Schwarzmeer; 21. Türkisches Folklorezentrum; 22. F.C. Göztepe.

⁸ From 1991 until 1994 the organisation was named Bund der Berliner EinwanderInnen aus der Türkei Berlin-Brandenburg (BETB – Union of Berlin Immigrants from Turkey Berlin-Brandenburg).

⁹ The *Türkischer Frauenverein in Berlin* does not receive its funding from the Berlin *Ausländerbeauftragte* but from the Department for Women's Affairs, which, like Barbara John's office has been object to significant financial cuts in recent years. .

Chapter 9

CONCLUSION

The claim for "*citizenship for everyone, and everyone the same qua citizenship*" (Young 1989) within a national territory, stands at the heart of the liberal ideal of universal citizenship and represents a main principle upon which modern democracies are based. Until recently, the politics of citizenship in Germany was an example of an outright violation of this principle. Yet, despite, or in my view because of, being an extreme case, the German politics of citizenship illustrates forcefully the deficiencies of a nationally bound concept of citizenship.

The German case study shows that countries of immigration cannot take the claim that *citizenship is for everyone* for granted. The population of contemporary Germany does not consist exclusively of formal citizens, but also of 'resident aliens'. For them the concept of citizenship does not present itself as a means to achieve equality, but very often as an obstacle on their way to achieve full inclusion. On the one hand their access to rights, most importantly to crucial political rights, is restricted, or altogether absent. On the other, the lack of formal citizen status for 'non-German' immigrants and their offspring reinforces ideas of 'otherness' in contrast to 'belonging'. It thus perpetuates an ethnically exclusive

definition of 'who constitutes the people' and adds to the repression of an ethnically heterogeneous reality.

The German citizenship legislation was crucially amended between 1990 and 1993, when the former conservative government introduced, for the first time, the right to naturalisation for two groups of 'foreigners'. However, a cynic may want to question the former conservative government's rational that led to this 'change of heart'. Despite governmental claims to the contrary, it was not based upon a genuine desire to bring about legal and political equality, nor was it intended as a first step to officially accept that Germany had become a country of immigration. Rather it was part of a well-known horse trade between the conservative-liberal government coalition and the Social Democratic Party in the context of discussions to curtail the right of political asylum inscribed in the German constitution (the *Bonner Asylkompromiß* of December 1992). In order to change Art. 16(2) of the constitution the government needed a two-third majority in the *Bundestag* and thus the votes of the opposition. The *SPD* agreed, but demanded in return that citizenship legislation should be amended in a more inclusive way. In my view, the government did not expect that a significant number of members of ethnic minorities, in particular those of Turkish origin, would actually make use of their new rights as it required the applicant to give up her or his previous citizenship.

Initially, this 'plan' – that was more likely a result of political 'adhocracy' rather than a well thought-out strategy – seemed to work out. The

response from persons of minority origin was at first indifferent and interest in German citizenship remained low. Furthermore, the demand for dual citizenship continued to be at the top of the agenda of many immigrant organisations. This however has gradually changed and dual citizenship appears to be no longer of crucial importance. Just in Berlin – a city that has always been characterised by a more inclusive approach to granting citizenship - approximately 45,000 applications for naturalisation were waiting to be processed by the responsible authorities in 1995 (*die tageszeitung*, 2.2.1996). I have argued that this change of attitude amongst Berliners of Turkish origin was brought about by a number of factors. First, the Turkish government introduced important legislation that guarantees naturalised Germans of Turkish origin the possibility to retain crucial rights in Turkey, and opting for German citizenship no longer goes hand in hand with a legally disadvantaged situation in Turkey. Second, most Berliners of Turkish origin hold dual citizenship either officially, or unofficially due to legal loopholes. Third, as a result of their exclusion from German society, it was considered an act of betrayal to seek to acquire German citizenship. In this context, for some young Berliners of Turkish origin, the giving up of the Turkish passport was regarded as an act of subordination. The 'symbolic distance' - i.e. the undesirability of German citizenship - could only be overcome in the moment when the acquisition of citizenship became redefined as a strategy for improving individual life chances. Fourth, the long established 'legal normality' that citizenship was practically unavailable had to be eroded over time. This process was supported by various campaigns initiated by *Barbara John's* office. Yet, for

German citizenship to become a common everyday accoutrement for Berliners of Turkish origin, a 'critical mass' of applicants is needed, who as neighbours, friends, relatives or colleagues demonstrate and communicate the availability and the benefits of formal citizenship and who thus initiate a breakthrough and start a process by which it is normal for German citizenship to be acquired.

However, the restrictive nature of German citizenship legislation is not the only manifestation of the exclusion experienced by Berliners of Turkish origin. The principle of the primacy of the nation, as sustained by the German political establishment, affects also other dimensions of citizenship and has resulted in the disregard of people of Turkish origin in the design of social, economic and cultural policies. In this context, the urban situation of Berlin and especially one of its districts Kreuzberg, plays an important role. We have seen that Kreuzberg, with a minority population of over thirty per cent, of whom more than half are Berliners of Turkish origin, is caught in a vicious circle consisting of high long term unemployment, the erosion of the local tax base, cuts in financing social facilities (such as youth centres, kindergartens etc.), decline in school standards, loss of the middle class population and an influx of disadvantaged, low skilled new immigrants. The district is in urgent need of substantial financial support to improve the educational and employment opportunities of its population as well as to provide targeted social services. Yet, despite the aggravation of Kreuzberg's overall socio-economic situation, even the already small budget for financing various

self-help organisations (of which a high proportion are run by ethnic minority members) that have thus far provided important services, has been cut substantially over the past few years. But without the opportunity of one third of Kreuzberg's population to express their dissatisfaction at the ballot box, so far such negligent treatment is not likely to have adverse consequences for policy makers.

Furthermore, an analysis of the educational abyss as experienced by young Berliners of Turkish origin, makes transparent their disadvantaged access to one of the main areas determining the level of social equality and access to substantial citizenship in modern, knowledge based societies. The main reason for their educational underperformance can be identified in the monocultural orientation of German and Berliner education policies. This manifests itself in a) school curricula that consider proposals for 'inter'- or 'multi-cultural' education merely as additional or specific tools, but that are – if put to use at all –not seen as approaches that should be applied as a matter of course; b) the disregard of potential bi- or multi-lingual abilities of ethnic minority pupils as valuable assets; c) a lack of additional support for young Berliners of Turkish origin that are in many cases not fully literate in either German or the language of their parents; d) in staff that consists predominantly of ethnic German teachers.

Policies regarding education fall under the sovereignty of the *Bundesländer*, in this case Berlin. Therefore, the Berlin government could theoretically introduce comprehensive regulations and policies that more

adequately meet the needs of young Berliners of Turkish origin. However, both their gross underperformance and a look at the few measures introduced by the Berlin government – e.g. three primary school models that make children of Turkish origin literate in both German and Turkish, and the German-Turkish *Europaschule* – have demonstrated that the Berlin government, like its national counterpart, in general adheres to the dictum of repressing the fact of immigration and of ignoring important policies that address the disadvantaged standing of ethnic minorities.

However there are exceptions of this generalisation. In the case of Berlin there are also existing manifestations of approved multi-culturalism which are both numerous and publicly extremely visible. This makes the term 'exception' rather imperfect. Good examples of such institutions are the Berlin Carnival, the *Haus der Kulturen der Welt*, *Radio Multikulti* and many more. On the official level, the best known institution that seeks to represent and to promote multi-culturalism in Berlin, is the office of the city's *Ausländerbeauftragte*, *Barbara John*. Her main role is that of mediator between the government on the one hand and ethnic minority groups on the other. She has a small budget through which the office supports self-help initiatives, and finances the development of measures against racism and its rather well known public-relations work. *Steve Vertovec* called the latter poignantly "space-changing multi-culturalism that has sought to change the space between peoples' ears – their fundamental thoughts about social categories and processes affecting their city" (Vertovec 1996, p. 391).

The committed and effective work of the *Berliner Ausländerbeauftragte* regarding integration, is powerfully undermined and contradicted by Berlin's current government. Apart from hostile public statements made by the Berlin Minister for the Interior, the official general approach adopted by the Berlin government becomes apparent when we look at some 'hard' governmental choices, i.e. the provision of financial means and resources for the implementation of *Barbara John's* working agenda, or, at the conflict of teaching Islamic education in Berlin's schools. When confronted with a conflict that challenges established national tenets, the lack of a commitment to multi-culturalism becomes indisputable. The governmental position of repressing the city's diversity is particularly damaging as the German capital Berlin has perhaps a greater symbolic presence in the 'nation's' self-image than that of other cities. This thought is certainly shared by *Jörg Schönbohm* (Berlin's Minister for the Interior) who wants Berlin "to reassure a nation that is in search of itself".

I have argued that the legal status of a citizen has to be accompanied by measures that both respond to disadvantage, and that seek to accommodate diversity. The repression of both realities inevitably results in an outcome that is characteristic for the situation in Great Britain and in the USA – namely that *not everyone will be the same qua citizenship* but some will remain "more equal than others".

The tensions that arise in ethnically heterogeneous countries between citizenship's link to membership in a national community and its claim that equality of status is a guarantor of equality of opportunity leads us to the question of agency. Or more precisely to the inquiry as to how Berliners of Turkish origin contribute to the transformation of citizenship in their pursuit of seeking to establish themselves as equal members of society. In this context, it is important to discuss the shortcomings of modern citizenship not only with regard to their exclusionary outcome, but to identify them as motor for possible changes in the concept of citizenship.

The interviews with young Berliners of Turkish origin have illustrated that these young people think of citizenship primarily in an instrumental way. They regard the acquisition of formal citizenship as particularly beneficial in areas of employment, freedom of movement in the EU, and as a welcome respite from bureaucratic procedures that only apply to so called foreigners. Furthermore, many are also keen to finally obtain the right to participate in political decisions in their home-country – Germany. On the basis of these illustrative and insightful interviews I argue, that in their individual strategies, these young people carry out and induce a transformation of citizenship, that has become – on an abstract level – a major objective of academic debates around citizenship, namely the disengagement or disentanglement of citizenship and national identity. On the one hand young Berliners of Turkish origin regard citizenship as a means to gain access to rights and to improve their life chances in Berlin/Germany or even Europe. By doing so they construct citizenship in

a way that corresponds with the concept's basic meaning, i.e. as an emancipatory tool. Expressions of identity are not blended with formal citizenship. For them the colour of their passport is not and cannot be an expression of their identity. Their multiple links, needs and identifications cross national boundaries and can by definition not be encapsulated by a printed document that establishes a formal link between an individual and one state.

Beyond the level of individual strategies, Berliners of Turkish origin also contribute to the transformation of citizenship through their participation in main stream political parties and immigrant organisations, and through the incorporation of minority interests into the parties' agenda. With the increase of applications for naturalisation in Berlin, political parties across the political divide have begun to turn their attention to this group of potentially new voters. The parties' tentative attempts to 'court' minorities have not remained unrequited and an increasing – albeit still small - number of people of Turkish origin have joined and have become elected to political offices. Thus far three members of the Berlin *Abgeordnetenhaus* are naturalised Kurdish Berliners. The reasons for Berliners of Turkish origin to become members of political parties include:

- a) most importantly, the membership and active involvement in a political party is regarded as an effective way to demand changes for, and to improve the situation of, ethnic minorities in Germany; b) some regard party involvement as a way to advocate in favour for, or in opposition of, political affairs and conflicts in Turkey; c) finally, in particular for members

of the second generation, the interpretation of their party membership within a mono-political framework that comprehends political activities of Berliners of Turkish origin exclusively on the basis of ethnic or national affiliation is inadequate. Like for any member of the majority population, party politics are at the same time an expression of a broader and more general political agenda and preferences.

Yet, for the time being, party members of Turkish origin – regardless of the fact to which party they belong – are ‘pigeon-holed’ as being responsible for ‘matters concerning ethnic minorities’. This reflects the marginal role that both the topic and its assigned ‘representatives’ occupy in German politics in general. In their endeavour to push the interests and needs of ethnic minorities onto the parties’ agenda, specific organisations or immigrant working group were established in all parties. Main areas of their concern include first and foremost the demand for changes in German citizenship law; the introduction of Islamic education at Berlin’s schools; in the case of the SPD, changes in the selection process of candidates that currently disadvantages ‘non-German’ comrades; and provision of adequate services on the local level.

However, the political activity of Berliners of Turkish origin in political parties is not exclusively influenced by ‘German affairs’. *Riza Baran* for example, a former Kurdish activist, encountered serious problems concerning his candidacy in the run up to the elections to the *Abgeordnetenhaus* in 1997. He was the only candidate of Turkish origin

banned from appearing on the Turkish satellite channel *TD1*, and was after the election depicted as “Turkey’s enemy” in the Berlin parliament. In addition, in particular the desire to function “as a bridge between Germany and Turkey”, or the protest against human rights abuses in Turkey and the Kurdish question, have illustrated that Berliners of Turkish origin who are members of political parties, do not shape their political interests only in negotiation with, or as a result of, policies concerning their country of settlement. They also respond to the politics of the country they, or their parents have been born. In this context however, the second generation seem to be strong advocates for leaving behind Turkish political ties.

The analysis of political participation of Berliners in immigrant organisations, at the example of the *Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin*, the *Türkischer Bund Berlin-Brandenburg* and the *Türkischer Frauenverein zu Berlin* has shown similar findings. Political interests or affinities regarding Turkish politics, the exclusion of Berliners of Turkish origin from classical forms of political participation, and the ignorance of mainstream political parties vis-à-vis ethnic minority interests, has resulted in the establishment of a plethora of immigrant organisations in Berlin. Currently these are in total 800-1000 of which at least 150 are those of Berliners of Turkish origin. Analogous to the settlement process they became increasingly – albeit not exclusively – concerned with the situation in Berlin/Germany. Today, key members of many immigrant organisations are at the same time members of political parties and promote a party affiliation amongst their supporters. I have argued that immigrant organisations are part of

the new social movements that emerged as alternative and unconventional forms of political participation at the end of the 1960s. They are representatives of new emergent societal conflicts that stem from the progressing transformation of modern societies into ethnically heterogeneous systems. According to the way citizens' participation is traditionally defined – i.e. as an activity that transcends particularity and is directed at the common good of society - their interests and activities, like those of their party-counterparts, are not regarded as 'citizens' participation'. Most politically involved Berliners of Turkish origin have become naturalised to maximise their political opportunities. However, their 'particularistic politics' which reflects their position in society, is used to define their activities as those of incompetent 'citizens'. This perpetuates the exclusion of minorities, because it defines their claims as irrelevant for the wider community.

Clearly, it is insufficient to interpret the emergence of immigrant organisations, or the interest and activities of Berliners of Turkish origin merely as symptoms of a crisis or of contemporary conflicts. Rather, they have to be analysed at the same time in their role of bringing about change and inducing societal transformation processes. It is in this context that I argue that in their political activities, for example by bringing in new foci and networks that transcend the concern and the geographical boundaries of national politics, Berliners of Turkish origin induce a transformation of citizenship.

At the end, I would like to return to *Ruth Lister's* question that was posed at the beginning of this thesis: "how useful is a concept associated with the nation-state at a time when the nation-state is becoming less pivotal economically and politically and when migration and asylum-seeking are on the increase?" This thesis has been concerned with the latter part of her question and has sought to show, that by bringing together three main dimensions of citizenship – status, rights and participation – the concept retains both its political and analytical value. The modern concept of citizenship was formulated for a society far less complex and more 'self-contained' than those of today. This means that the promises of citizenship cannot be kept, as it no longer corresponds to its national enclosure. However, citizenship is not a static concept. Just as citizenship in the past could be modified to incorporate diverse segments of society especially as it transcended city boundaries some five hundred years ago, it can now be modified yet again to respond to the struggles for equality that will arise in the future on multiple levels of politics that are emerging. In this context, a conception of citizenship that stresses the 'engagement' of citizens rather than their 'belonging' becomes a prerequisite. Citizenship is 'par excellence' a contested concept and because of this it has the flexibility, to adapt to the dramatic changes taking place in the global village that world is becoming.

ANNEX I

LIST OF INTERVIEWS

1. Interviews with young Berliners of Turkish origin

(26 Interviews in total, 14 with young men, 12 with young women)

- 23.4.1997 Meeting with teachers and the headmaster of a Berlin *Gesamtschule*
- 9.5. 1997 Interview with F., male, (nearly) 18 years old
- 14.5.1997 Meeting with both girls and social-workers of a *Mädchenladen* in Berlin-Kreuzberg
- 23.5.1997 Interview with Z. male, 20 years old
- 26.5.1997 Interview with S., female, 24 years old
- 27.5.1997 Interview with A., female, 15 years old
- Interview with N., female, 15 years old
- Interview with M., female 16 years old
- Interview with Y., female, 16 years old
- 28.5.1997 Meeting with teachers and the headmaster of a Berlin *Realschule*
- 29.5.1997 Interview with Ü., female, 16 years old
- Interview with M., female 16 years old
- Interview with B., female, 16 years old
- Interview with U., male, 16 years old
- Interview with T., male, 16 years old
- 2.6. Meeting with teachers and the headmaster of a Berlin *Hauptschule*
- 3.6.1997 Interview with F., female, 17 years old
- Interview with M., female, 16 years old
- Interview with J., female, 17 years old
- Interview with S., male, 17 years old
- Interview with D., male, 26 years old
- 4.6.1997 Interview with E., female 15 years old
- Interview with D., male, 17 years old
- Interview with E., male, 15 years old
- Interview with D., male, 16 years old
- 6.6.1997 Interview with B., male, 22 years old
- Interview with S., male, 18 years old
- Interview with M., male, 18 years old
- Interview with U., male, 20 years old
- Interview with M., male, 19 years old

2. Interviews with Berliners of Turkish origin who are active members of German political parties and trade unions

- 28.4.1997 Interview with Ismail Kosan (DIE GRÜNEN)
- 29.4.1997 Interview with Safer Cinar (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund – DGB)
- 30.4.1997 Interview with Riza Baran (DIE GRÜNEN)
- 7.5.1997 Interview with Giyasetten Sayan (PDS)
- 12.5.1997 Interview with Fanem Kleff (GEW)
- 27.5.1997 Interview with Ertugrul Uzun (CDU)
- 29.5.1997 Interview with Mehmet Daimagüler (FDP)
- 4.6.1997 Interview with Özcan Mutlu (DIE GRÜNEN)

3. Interviews with Berliners of Turkish origin who are active in 'Immigrant Organisations'

- 25.4.1997 Interview with Kenan Kolat (TBB)
Interview with Mustafa Cakmokoglu (Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin)
- 29.4.1997 Interview with Nurudun Kütük (BTBTM)
- 12.5.1997 Interview with Aysin Inan (Türkischer Frauenverein in Berlin)
- 22.5.1997 Interview with Mr Hassan (KOMKAR)
- 2.6.1997 Interview with Mr Turhan ((Kulturzentrum Anatolischer Alewiten)
- 8.6.1997 Meeting with Mr Öztürk (Verein Vergessene Jugend e.V.)
- 15.5.1998 Interview with Mr Kizilkaya (Milli Görüs)
- 8.6.1998 Interview with Mr Öztürk (Verein Vergessene Jugend e.V.)

4. Interviews with members/employees of social initiatives

- 28.4.1997 Hinbun
- 6.5.1997 TIO (Hatice)
Interview with Helga Seyb (Antirassistische Initiative Berlin)
- 26.5.1997 Interview with Niruman Kurt (Familiengarten)

5. Interviews with Employees/Officials of the offices of the *Ausländerbeauftragten* on the national, regional and local level

- 29.4.1997 Meeting with Robin Schneider (Büro der Ausländerbeauftragten Berlin)
Meeting with Gerhard Simoneit (Büro der Ausländerbeauftragten Berlin)
- 13.5.1997 Interview with Gülestan Gürbay (Büro der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung
für Ausländerfragen) (a further meeting took place at the 6.6.1997)
Interview with Ms Josten (Ausländerbeauftragte Kreuzberg)

6. Miscellaneous

- 16.4.1997 Meeting with Jochen Blaschke (BIVS) (further meetings took place at the
22.4./28.5./4.6.1997)
- 23.4.1997 Meeting with Ahmed Esöz (BIVS)
- 30.4.1997 Interview with Eckhardt Bartel (SPD)
- 21.5.1997 Interview with G., female, of Turkish origin.
Interview with Eberhard Seidel-Pielen (author and journalist)
- 26.5.1997 Interview with M., female, of Turkish origin.
- 28.5.1997 Interview with Ceyhon Kara (journalist)

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