Melkonyan, Tigran A. (2013) Hybrid contests. Journal of Public Economic Theory, Volume 15 (Number 6). pp. 968-992. doi:10.1111/jpet.12052 ISSN 1097-3923.

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Abstract

This paper examines hybrid contests where participants commit two types of resources to improve their probability of winning the prize. The first type is forfeited ex ante, before the prize is allocated, by winners and losers alike, while the second is committed ex ante by all contenders but expended ex post, after the prize is allocated, and only by the contestant that wins the prize. The model yields a number of interesting results. Among them is the finding that, as the number of contestants increases, the ex ante expenditures of individual contestants decrease while the ex post expenditure increases. Even more interesting, the total of the ex ante and ex post expenditures by the contenders in a hybrid contest may decrease with the number of competitors. The study also finds that there is no rent overdissipation, and compares the total expenditures in the contest and “all-pay” allocation mechanisms.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School > Behavioural Science Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School
Journal or Publication Title:	Journal of Public Economic Theory
Publisher:	Blackwell
ISSN:	1097-3923
Official Date:	December 2013
Dates:	Date Event December 2013 Published
Volume:	Volume 15
Number:	Number 6
Page Range:	pp. 968-992
DOI:	10.1111/jpet.12052
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access

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