Bernhardt, Dan and Xu Lee, Frances Z. (2016) The optimal extent of discovery. RAND Journal of Economics , 47 (3). pp. 573-607. doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12137 ISSN 0741-6261.

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Abstract

We characterize how the process of publicly-gathering information via discovery affects strategic interactions between litigants. It allows privately-informed defendants to signal through the timing of settlement offers, with weaker ones attempting to settle pre-discovery. Discovery reduces the probability of trial. Properly designed limited discovery reduces expected litigation costs. Stronger defendants gain more (lose less) from a given amount of discovery. We find that the court should grant more discovery when defendants are believed to be stronger and should grant discovery on more efficient sources of information, leaving less efficient ones to trial.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	K Law [Moys] > KN Common Law, Private Law
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Discovery (Law), Citizen suits (Civil procedure) , Costs (Law) -- Mathematical models -- United States
Journal or Publication Title:	RAND Journal of Economics
Publisher:	Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
ISSN:	0741-6261
Official Date:	27 July 2016
Dates:	Date Event 27 July 2016 Published 20 October 2015 Accepted
Volume:	47
Number:	3
Page Range:	pp. 573-607
DOI:	10.1111/1756-2171.12137
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access
Date of first compliant deposit:	31 May 2016
Date of first compliant Open Access:	27 July 2018

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