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Existence and dynamic consistency of Nash equilibrium with non-expected utility preferences
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Dekel, Eddie, Safra, Zvi and Segal, U. (Uzi) (1991) Existence and dynamic consistency of Nash equilibrium with non-expected utility preferences. Journal of Economic Theory, 55 (2). pp. 229-246. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(91)90039-7 ISSN 0022-0531.
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90039-7
Abstract
Sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium are given when preferences may violate the reduction of compound lotteries assumption (RCLA). Without RCLA decision makers may not be indifferent between compound lotteries which have the same probabilities of final outcomes. Therefore the conditions depend on how players perceive the game—whether they view themselves as moving first or second. We also review conditions under which the equilibria will be dynamically consistent.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
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Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory | ||||
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School > Behavioural Science Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School |
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Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | Utility theory, Game theory | ||||
Journal or Publication Title: | Journal of Economic Theory | ||||
Publisher: | Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Econimicas | ||||
ISSN: | 0022-0531 | ||||
Official Date: | December 1991 | ||||
Dates: |
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Volume: | 55 | ||||
Number: | 2 | ||||
Page Range: | pp. 229-246 | ||||
DOI: | 10.1016/0022-0531(91)90039-7 | ||||
Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||
Publication Status: | Published | ||||
Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access | ||||
Funder: | National Science Foundation (U.S.) (NSF), Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) |
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