Oaksford, M. (Mike) and Chater, Nick (1992) Bounded rationality in taking risks and drawing inferences. Theory & Psychology, 2 (2). pp. 225-230. doi:10.1177/0959354392022009 ISSN 0959-3543.

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Abstract

This commentary provides a discussion of the concept of `bounded rationality' as it applies to the theses advanced by Lopes (1991) and Evans (1991). Lopes's (1991) assessment of the irrationalist consequences of Tversky and Kahneman's (1974) work on heuristics and biases is premature because bounded rationality implies that people could not employ optimal strategies. Considerations of bounded rationality also provide additional criteria by which to judge the theories of deductive reasoning discussed by Evans (1991). Judged by this criterion, theories whose goal is to explain logically competent performance are inadequate (Oaksford & Chater, 1991). Thus Evans's assessment of the state of current theories of reasoning requires revision.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School > Behavioural Science Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Decision making
Journal or Publication Title:	Theory & Psychology
Publisher:	Sage
ISSN:	0959-3543
Official Date:	May 1992
Dates:	Date Event May 1992 Published
Volume:	2
Number:	2
Page Range:	pp. 225-230
DOI:	10.1177/0959354392022009
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access

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