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Contests for experimentation

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Halac, Marina, Kartik, Navin and Liu, Qingmin (2017) Contests for experimentation. Journal of Political Economy, 125 (5). pp. 1523-1569. doi:10.1086/693040 ISSN 0022-3808.

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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1086/693040

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Abstract

We study contests for innovation with learning about the innovation’s feasibility and opponents’ outcomes. We characterize contests that maximize innovation when the designer chooses a prize-sharing scheme and a disclosure policy. A “public winnertakes-all contest” dominates public contests—where any success is immediately disclosed—with any other prize-sharing scheme as well as winner-takes-all contests with any other disclosure policy. Yet, jointly modifying prize sharing and disclosure can increase innovation. In a broad class of mechanisms, it is optimal to share the prize with disclosure following a certain number of successes; under simple conditions, a “hidden equal-sharing” contest is optimal.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: A General Works > AS Academies and learned societies (General)
G Geography. Anthropology. Recreation > GV Recreation Leisure
H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Contests -- Mathematical models, Awards -- Mathematical models, Technological innovations
Journal or Publication Title: Journal of Political Economy
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
ISSN: 0022-3808
Official Date: October 2017
Dates:
DateEvent
October 2017Published
22 August 2017Available
19 February 2016Accepted
Volume: 125
Number: 5
Page Range: pp. 1523-1569
DOI: 10.1086/693040
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access
Date of first compliant deposit: 15 September 2016
Date of first compliant Open Access: 16 October 2018
RIOXX Funder/Project Grant:
Project/Grant IDRIOXX Funder NameFunder ID
UNSPECIFIEDNational Science Foundationhttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/100000001

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