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Moral hazard in marriage : the use of domestic labor as an incentive device

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Walther, Selma (2017) Moral hazard in marriage : the use of domestic labor as an incentive device. Review of Economics of the Household, 15 (2). pp. 357-382. doi:10.1007/s11150-016-9347-8 ISSN 1573-7152.

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11150-016-9347-8

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Abstract

This paper argues that some women in developing countries use domestic labor as a tool to incentivize husbands. A theoretical model is derived based on the traditions of rural Malawi, where men often supplement farm income with wage labor. As wage labor is not observed by the wife, this creates moral hazard: husbands may not make enough effort to bring home wages. The model predicts that women overcome this by using domestic labor as an incentive device: they increase their domestic labor and reduce their leisure in response to good consumption outcomes, but only if they cannot rely on divorce threat as an alternative source of incentives. This prediction is confirmed using survey data from Malawi. Identification is based on the fact that Malawi’s kinship traditions exogenously determine women’s accessibility to divorce. Where divorce is not an option, women make inefficient labor choices in order to provide incentives.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: G Geography. Anthropology. Recreation > GN Anthropology
H Social Sciences > HN Social history and conditions. Social problems. Social reform
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Matrilineal kinship -- Malaŵi, Divorce -- Malaŵi, Moral hazard -- Malaŵi, Rural conditions -- Women -- Malaŵi, Wages -- Men -- Malaŵi, Developing countries
Journal or Publication Title: Review of Economics of the Household
Publisher: Springer New York LLC
ISSN: 1573-7152
Official Date: June 2017
Dates:
DateEvent
June 2017Published
28 September 2016Available
8 August 2016Accepted
Volume: 15
Number: 2
Number of Pages: 26
Page Range: pp. 357-382
DOI: 10.1007/s11150-016-9347-8
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Open Access (Creative Commons)
Date of first compliant deposit: 11 October 2016
Date of first compliant Open Access: 11 October 2016

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