Fetzer, Thiemo and Marden, Samuel (2017) Take what you can : property rights, contestability and conflict. Economic Journal, 127 (601). pp. 757-783. doi:10.1111/ecoj.12487 ISSN 0013-0133.

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Abstract

Weak property rights are strongly associated with underdevelopment, low state capacity and civil conflict. In economic models of conflict, outbreaks of violence require a prize that is both valuable and contestable. This article exploits spatial and temporal variation in the availability of land with title that is contestable by private actors to explore the relationship between (in)secure property rights and civil conflict in the Brazilian Amazon. The results suggest that resolving this contestability of title at the local level could eliminate substantively all local land-related violence but might increase conflict in areas where title remained contestable.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory S Agriculture > SD Forestry
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Right of property -- Amazon River Region, Deforestation
Journal or Publication Title:	Economic Journal
Publisher:	Blackwell
ISSN:	0013-0133
Official Date:	24 May 2017
Dates:	Date Event 24 May 2017 Published 14 July 2016 Accepted
Volume:	127
Number:	601
Page Range:	pp. 757-783
DOI:	10.1111/ecoj.12487
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access
Date of first compliant deposit:	27 October 2016
Date of first compliant Open Access:	24 May 2019
Related URLs:	Related dataset

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