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The knowledge argument is either unsound or redundant
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McClelland, Tom (2019) The knowledge argument is either unsound or redundant. In: Coleman, Sam, (ed.) The Knowledge Argument. Classic Philosophical Arguments . Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781316494134 (In Press)
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Abstract
Jackson’s (1982) formulation of the knowledge argument (KA) has had an inestimable influence on the discussion of consciousness and the apparent problem it presents for physicalism. A common objection to KA is the ‘ignorance objection’. According to this objection, our intuitions about Mary merely reflect our ignorance of physical facts that are integral to the explanation of phenomenal consciousness (e.g. Dennett 1991; Stoljar 2006). Armed with the insights of a future science, Mary would actually be able to deduce what it’s like to see red. We only have the intuition that Mary would learn something new because we don’t know what she knows. Those sympathetic to KA have brushed away the ignorance objection on the grounds that evstructuren though we don’t know what the future science of consciousness will reveal, we do know what kind of facts it will contain and know that these are the wrong kind of facts from which to deduce facts about phenomenal consciousness. In other words, they suggest that the insight that underwrites KA is ‘future-proof’: it is not the kind of insight that could be displaced by new scientific knowledge. I argue that this strategy for defending KA is dialectically problematic and reveals a fundamental limitation of the Mary thought experiment.
Item Type: | Book Item | |||||||||
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Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy |
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Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy | |||||||||
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | Knowledge, Theory of, Philosophy of mind | |||||||||
Series Name: | Classic Philosophical Arguments | |||||||||
Publisher: | Cambridge University Press | |||||||||
ISBN: | 9781316494134 | |||||||||
Book Title: | The Knowledge Argument | |||||||||
Editor: | Coleman, Sam | |||||||||
Official Date: | September 2019 | |||||||||
Dates: |
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Status: | Not Peer Reviewed | |||||||||
Publication Status: | In Press | |||||||||
Reuse Statement (publisher, data, author rights): | “This material has been published in The Knowledge Argument edited by Coleman, S. This version is free to view and download for personal use only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © Cambridge University Press. | |||||||||
Date of first compliant deposit: | 24 March 2017 | |||||||||
Date of first compliant Open Access: | 15 March 2019 | |||||||||
Grant number: | ERC 313552 | |||||||||
RIOXX Funder/Project Grant: |
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