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Eilan, Naomi (2014) The you turn. Philosophical Explorations, 17 (3). pp. 265-278. doi:10.1080/13869795.2014.941910 ISSN 1386-9795.
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2014.941910
Abstract
This introductory paper sets out a framework for approaching some of the claims about the second person made by the papers collected in the special edition of Philosophical Explorations on The Second Person (2014, 17:3). It does so by putting centre stage the notion of a ‘bipolar second person relation’, and examining ways of giving it substance suggested by the authors of these papers. In particular, it focuses on claims made (and denied) in these papers (a) about the existence and/or nature of second person thought, second person reasons for action and second person reasons for belief and (b) about possible connections among thought-theoretical, ethical and epistemological issues and debates in this area.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||||
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Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy | ||||||
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy | ||||||
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | Other (Philosophy)., Interpersonal relations|xPhilosophy. | ||||||
Journal or Publication Title: | Philosophical Explorations | ||||||
Publisher: | Routledge | ||||||
ISSN: | 1386-9795 | ||||||
Official Date: | 5 September 2014 | ||||||
Dates: |
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Volume: | 17 | ||||||
Number: | 3 | ||||||
Page Range: | pp. 265-278 | ||||||
DOI: | 10.1080/13869795.2014.941910 | ||||||
Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||||
Publication Status: | Published | ||||||
Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access | ||||||
Date of first compliant deposit: | 6 April 2017 | ||||||
Date of first compliant Open Access: | 11 April 2017 |
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