A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick

Permanent WRAP URL:
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/88626

Copyright and reuse:
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.
Please scroll down to view the document itself.
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to cite it.
Our policy information is available from the repository home page.

For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk

warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications

Tomato Land: Women's Labour in Food Production and Processing in Turkey

by

Emine Erdoğan

Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology.

University of Warwick, Department of Sociology

November 2016

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS VII

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS... VIII

DECLARATION... X

ABSTRACT XI

INTRODUCTION... 1

INTRODUCING THE WOMEN: 'CAN YOU CALL WHAT YOU WRITE OUR STORY'? 1

RESEARCH QUESTIONS 8

SITES AND INFORMANTS IN A MULTI-SITED ETHNOGRAPHY... 9

ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS... 11

CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW.. 15

1.1. INTRODUCTION 15

1.2. FEMINIST 'LOCAL' COMMODITY CHAIN ANALYSIS 16

1.2.1. FROM BOSERUP (1970) TO ELSON & PEARSON (1981): WID TO GAD........................ 19

1.2.2. LOOKING AT THINGS, FINDING PEOPLE: COMMODITY CHAIN ANALYSIS 25

1.3. HAPPY OPEN RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PATRIARCHY AND INTERSECTIONALITY: 'INTERSECTIONAL PATRIARCHY'.. 32

1.3.1. REVISITING PATRIARCHY.. 36

1.3.1.1. KANDIYOTI FINDS WOMEN's 'LOST' AGENCY: BARGAINING WITH PATRIARCHY......... 37

1.3.1.2. CONNELL: IT IS NOT ALL ABOUT 'SEX'.. 40

1.3.1.3. INTERSECTIONALITY OF MASCULINITIES AND FEMININITIES 42

1.4. FEMINIST ANALYSIS OF LABOUR PROCESSES VIA INTERSECTIONAL PATRIARCHY. 47

1.4.1. FAMILIAL (RE)PRODUCTION OF (RE)PRODUCTION RELATIONS 48

CHAPTER 2: 'THANKFUL' WOMEN FROM THE 'CENTRE OF THE WORLD': TURKEY AND HER PEOPLE 54

2.1. INTRODUCTION: HISTORY OF THE WORLD AROUND ME.. 54

2.2. KEMALISM AND ITS WOMEN... 55

2.3. Some 'ungrateful' residents of an apartment in İstanbul: the 'Kurdish problem' in Turkey 60

2.4. For a Day, My Mother Stops Being 'Thankful': Turkey's First Direct 'Homeworking' Project 69

2.5. Unemployed Fathers, Offended Uncles: Economic and Political Instability in Turkey 75

2.6. The Era of 'Justice' and 'Development': Political and Economic 'Stability' in Turkey after the 2000s 79

2.6.1. AKP, Political Islam and Women's Work 79

2.6.2. The AKP and its 'Cooperative Nationalism' on the Turkish Lands 82

2.7. Conclusion: 'Historical Change under the 'Official Feeling' 86

CHAPTER 3: UNDERSTANDING MYSELF, UNDERSTANDING OUR 'PERFECT' WORLD, UNDERSTANDING WOMEN? 88

3.1. Introduction: 'I am Neither Inside the Circle, Nor Outside It' 88

3.2. Feminist Ethnography: 'World, Me, Women' 90

3.2.1. RECORDING, ANALYSING AND WRITING ETHOGRAPHIC DATA 92

3.2.3. Positioning Myself: Hello again! 96

3.2.3.1. introducing the people i worked with 98

3.3. Entering the Worlds of Others: Access 102

3.4. Surviving in Others' Worlds Through Knowing Yourself 105

3.4.1. The 'Powerful' Things That I Have 106

3.4.2. The 'Dangerous' Ideas I have 115

3.5. What Does 'Ethical' Mean? 122

3.6. Conclusion: Will This Study Count as Feminist Research? 127

CHAPTER 4: ON THE TOMATO LAND 128

4.1. Introduction: 'Crying with Pinar' 128

4.2. Winter: Time to Negotiate 129

4.2.1. The Factory and its 'Humble Servants': Farmers 130

4.2.2. WAITING FOR THE CALL TO 'WORK': THE *DAYIBAŞI* AND HIS 'FAMILIAL LABOUR FORCE' 134

4.3. SPRING: 'TIME TO PLANT TOMATOES'; THE INEQUALITIES OF 'FEMALE' TOMATO LAND 140

4.3.1. THROUGH MY EYES: 'WE ARE ALL WOMEN UNTIL WE ARE DIVIDED BY MONEY' .. 141

4.3.2. THROUGH THE EYES OF THE EMPLOYER: 'THE OBSESSION WITH CONTROLLING YOUNG WORKERS' 144

4.3.3. THROUGH THE EYES OF THE 'MIDDLE WOMAN': 'NO ONE LIKES ME' 149

4.3.4. THROUGH THE EYES OF A KURDISH SEASONAL WORKER 151

4.3.5. THROUGH THE EYES OF A 'RESENTFUL' LOCAL WORKER 154

4.4. SUMMER: 'TOMATOES TURN WORKERS INTO CAPITALISTS' 157

4.4.1. TO MY EYES: 'WE ARE ALL FACTORY WORKERS" 158

4.4.2. 'THE OLDEST COUPLE ON THE LAND': MANAGING WORKERS FROM YOUR FAMILY 163

4.4.3. YOUNG WOMEN WORKERS: 'COLLECTING THE REMNANTS UNDER THE EYES OF MEN' 171

4.4.4. THE YOUNGEST WOMEN: 'RESPONSIBLE FOR EMPTY SACKS' 174

4.4.5. YOUNG MEN: THE FINAL STAGE OF TOMATO PRODUCTION ON THE LAND 177

4.5. AUTUMN: TIME TO 'FIGHT' FOR YOUR PROFITS 179

4.6. CONCLUSION 181

CHAPTER 5: INSIDE THE 'KEMALIST' TOMATO PROCESSING MECHANICAL MONSTER 184

5.1. INTRODUCTION 184

5.2. THREE IMAGES OF WOMEN IN A KEMALIST FACTORY 187

5.3. THE JOURNEY TO THE MONSTER AND REACHING ITS 'KEMALIST' MANAGER 188

5.4. RIVALS IN KEMALISM: WORKING TOGETHER IN THE MONSTER'S MOUTH, THE ASSEMBLY LINE 198

5.4.1. PICTURING THE TONGUE OF THE MONSTER: TOMATO SORTING LINES 200

5.4.1.1. *ÇAVUS* -SERGEANT- FEEDS THE MONSTER 205

5.4.1.2 'RELIGIOUS' WOMEN'S STRUGGLES WITH 'KEMALIST' CONTROL 207

5.4.2.1. ‘GOD SEES EVERYTHING EXCEPT BREAK TIMES'.. 210

5.4.2. PICTURING THE THROAT OF THE MONSTER: THE MACHINES................................... 214

5.4.2.1. 'WE HAVE A POWER TO STOP THE LINE': ‘THE DAUGHTERS OF RED REPUBLIC’....... 216

5.4.2.2. ARE THE 'DAUGHTERS OF THE RED REPUBLIC' SUITABLE FOR THE MANAGERS?...... 218

5.5. ‘ANATOLIAN WOMEN’ IN THE BOWEL OF THE MONSTER: THE WAREHOUSE 221

5.6. CONCLUSION: FINDING A KEMALIST HEART AND MIND... 226

CHAPTER 6: AS TOMATOES CHANGE, FAMILIES CHANGE; AS FAMILIES CHANGE, TOMATOES CHANGE..230

6.1. INTRODUCTION 230

6.2. CONCEPTUALISING HOUSEHOLDS AND FAMILY 231

6.3. PLURALITIES OF *EL ÂLEM*: PLURALITIES OF PATRIARCHY 233

6.3.1. ISLAM, SOCIAL ORDER AND THE ‘EYE’ OF TURKISH SOCIETY 233

6.3.2. *EL ÂLEM* AND FAMILY HONOUR 236

6.3.3. EL ÂLEM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF INTERSECTIONAL PATRIARCHY 238

6.3. TWO COMMON ENEMIES OF RURAL WOMEN: *ELTI* AND *KAYNANA*, IN TWO DIFFERENT FORMS OF PATRIARCHY 246

6.3.1. ‘THERE IS NO FAMILY LIKE US ANYMORE’: THE TRIUMPH OF THE ‘FOUR GENERATIONAL’, PATRIARCHAL FAMILY IN THE VILLAGE... 247

6.3.1.1. ‘A MAN LIKE A MAN’ CONTROLS THE BUDGET...249

6.3.1.2. THE EXTRA MAN OF THE FAMILY: A MAN-LIKE ELTI 252

6.3.1.3. ‘MOTHERS-IN-LAW AS COOKS AND FASHION DESIGNER’ 256

6.3.2. ‘PATRIARCHY’ AS WE ALL KNOW IT! THE ‘PATRIARCHAL HOMES’ OF KURDISH SEASONAL MIGRANTS.. 262

6.3.2.1. ‘MAKING TANDıR FOR YOUR ELTI: KURDISH SEASONAL MIGRANTS’ SHACKS IN THE GARDENS OF LANDOWNERS’ FAMILIES...263

6.3.2.2. SENDING ‘KAYNANA’ ON A PILGRIMAGE OR BUILDING NEW HOMES TO BE SEPARATE FROM AN EXTENDED FAMILY?: THE ‘REAL HOME’ OF KURDISH SEASONAL WORKERS 270

6.4. CONCLUSION: THE POWER OF *EL ÂLEM*.. 276

CHAPTER 7: ‘KEMALIST’ AND ‘TRANSITIONAL’ PATRIARCHIES..... 278

7.1. INTRODUCTION 278

7.2. A KEMALIST FACTORY MANAGER OF A KEMALIST FACTORY AND HIS KEMALIST PATRIARCHY 279

7.2.1. ‘NO-ONE PUTS ME IN AN APARTMENT WITH A SWIMMING POOL’: FACTORY MANAGER’S ‘KEMALIST’ PATRIARCHAL HOME 281

7.3. LAZY WOMEN’S ‘LUXURY APARTMENTS’: FACTORY WOMEN WORKERS TRYING TO HAVE NUCLEAR TRANSITIONAL PATRIARCHAL HOMES 284

7.3.1. ‘SON-LIKE DAUGHTERS’ OR ‘STILL TROUBLING MOTHER-IN-LAWS’: THE NEW BUT STILL GENDERED DIVISION OF LABOUR 286

7.3.2. NOW IS THE TIME TO BE ENEMIES WITH THE *GÖRÜMCE*: THE NEW STRUCTURE OF DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES WITHIN EXTENDED FAMILY 289

7.4. CONCLUSION 292

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS... 294

8.1. INTRODUCTION 294

8.2. WHAT THE JOURNEY TELLS US: ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS........... 294

8.2.1. INTERSECTIONAL FORMS OF THE GENDERED DIVISION OF LABOUR......................... 297

8.2.1.1. GENDERED CLASS AND ETHNICITY IN THE DIVISION OF LABOUR ON TOMATO LAND 300

8.2.1.2. GENDERED ‘KEMALISM’ AND EDUCATION IN THE DIVISION OF LABOUR IN THE FACTORY 305

8.2.1.3. ‘HIERARCHY OF MASCULINITY’ IN THE DIVISION OF LABOUR AT HOMES 306

8.2.2. ‘FAMILY’ AND ‘IDEOLOGY’ AS TOOLS FOR BOTH CONTROL AND RESISTANCE 310

8.2.2.1. FAMILIAL CONTROL VS. FAMILIAL RESISTANCE..311

8.2.2.2. ‘KEMALIST CONTROL’ VS. ‘RELIGIOUS RESISTANCE’ 314

8.2.3. INTERWEAVING THE RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION AND REPRODUCTION 316

8.3. CONTRIBUTION VS. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 320

8.3.1. WHAT I HAVE SAID.. 320

8.3.2. WHAT MORE COULD HAVE BEEN SAID? 323

REFERENCES.. 327

APPENDIX A: ABBREVIATIONS OF THE NAMES OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS..355

APEENDIX B: A NOTE ON PRONUNCIATION OF TURKISH LETTERS 357

APPENDIX C: A TIMELINE OF TURKISH HISTORY …………………….358

APPENDIX D: GLOSSARY..361

TURKISH TERMS FOR THE MEMBERS OF A RURAL WOMAN'S FAMILY'........................ 361

WORDS FOR SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES OR OBJECTS IN RURAL WOMEN'S DAILY LIVES 366

WORDS RELATING TO WOMEN'S WORK.. 370

WORDS FOR 'OTHERS' OR 'OUTSIDERS' 379

APPENDIX E: LIST OF KEY INFORMANTS 384

List of Illustrations

MAP I.1: FIELDWORK SITES.. 10

MAP 2.1: REGIONS OF TURKEY.. 59

GRAPH 2.1: CHANGES ON THE SIZE OF RURAL AND URBAN POPULATION.................... 61

GRAPH 2.2: WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT RATE BY URBAN AND RURAL AREAS BETWEEN 1988 AND 2013.. 65

GRAPH 2.3: REASONS FOR NOT BEING ACTIVE IN PAID EMPLOYMENT 72

TABLE 3.1: THE TIMELINE OF MY FIELDWORK 98

MAP 4.1: THE LOCATION OF MARDIN: THE HOMETOWN OF THE KURDISH SEASONAL MIGRANT WORKERS 136

TABLE 4. 1: TOMATO GROWING STAGES AND GENDER AND ETHNIC DIVISION OF LABOUR.. 140

FIGURE 5.1:EXTERNAL ENVIRONS OF PLANT 198

FIGURE 5.2: THE FIRST AND SECOND PARTS OF THE SORTING LINES............................ 203

FIGURE 5.3: THE THIRD PART OF THE SORTING LINES.. 204

FIGURE 5.4: THE UPPER AND LOWER PRODUCTION LINES.. 206

TABLE 6.1: TYPES OF PATRIARCHY AND ASSOCIATED MASCULINITIES AND FEMININITIES WITHIN THE HOUSEHOLD 241

TABLE 6.2: HIERARCHY IN MASCULINITIES IN RURAL HOUSEHOLDS............................ 243

DIAGRAM 6.1: THE LANDOWNING FAMILY 245

DIAGRAM 6.2: *DAYIBAŞI*'S FAMI.. 261

Acknowledgements

This thesis is a reflection of what I have learnt and lived, thought and felt in the world until today. I appreciate that everyone and everything in my life makes my journey to myself and others' world possible and that without them, neither this thesis nor I would stand as I do today.

To *Carol Wolkowitz* and *Nickie Charles,* thank you for the courage and support you gave me to think and to write as I am. You always make me feel 'free' and 'happy', although my crying sessions in the supervisions might have made it seem the opposite. My way of thinking has been transformed with you so as you are everywhere in this thesis and you will be in all of the other things I will hopefully write.

Anne, I cannot believe I am saying this, but thank you for taking me 'by force' to all those markets, *güns*, villages and lands. You have made me feel like a researcher from birth. You were right that life should not just be learned from books.

I know that this thesis will make you, *babacım,* the happiest out of the whole family, probably even more than me, although I am sure you will not like some parts of it! However, you are the one who always tells me to say what I think, so thank you and sorry!

Kardeşim, you are the one who makes me feel safe in every circumstance. You are in every pause; you are my freshness!

Çağrı, thank you for making everywhere I go feel familiar and thank you for being with me on every step of my journey these past ten years.

Canım babanem, wherever I go, when I come back to your side, I always feel that I come back home! Thanks for being my home!

Nehir, the world we create will continue to re-constitute itself as long as we live, no matter whether we are together or apart. Since although everything changes, as we have concluded, ‘the world’ does not change at all!

Last but not least, I am deeply thankful to everyone who made this study possible– workers, farmers, managers, women, men, Turks, Kurds, young and old –, whose lives coloured, shaped and transformed this story. Finally, to close the circle, I am thankful to everyone whose taxes have made it possible for me, through the support of the Turkish Ministry of Education, to complete this study.

Declaration

This thesis is submitted to the University of Warwick in support of my application for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. It has been composed by myself and has not been submitted in any previous application for any degree.

Abstract

This thesis is about the place of gender roles and relations in global food production, based on an extensive ethnography of tomato production and processing in Turkey. Broadly, it looks at how attempts to integrate Turkish agriculture and food industries into the global economy have affected rural populations including women and men, but particularly the transformative consequences for women's labour. The main question guiding the research is to ask how constructions of, and the availability of, women's labour shapes and is shaped by the interaction between the global economy and local dynamics.

In order to answer this question, I chose to engage with tomato production and processing because tomatoes have the highest export rate of all fresh and processed fruit and vegetables in Turkey. My participant-observation followed the path taken by tomatoes produced in Western Turkey for one of the biggest Japanese tomato processing brands. This included my work on the tomato fields for all of the spring planting and the summer harvest in 2013 and in a tomato-processing factory in late summer and autumn 2014. The research also drew on in-depth interviews with different social actors in the global tomato production chain in Turkey, including members of landowning families and the factory manager. I completed my fieldwork by travelling to South-eastern Anatolia (March, 2014) and staying in the homes of the Kurdish seasonal migrant workers, with whom I worked on the land in Western Turkey (in 2013).

In looking at the transformation of rural women's labour in Turkey, my sociological focus comprised the gendered division of labour in factory, field and domestic work; different forms of patriarchy; the intersection of inequalities, including those of

gender, ethnicity, class and age; forms of workers' consent and resistance, as well as the interwoven nature of the relations of production and reproduction. Focusing on these aspects of women's lives has reshaped this research; it began as a study of women's labour and turned into research about gender in global food production, although women's experiences are still at its heart. My thesis is that these processes can be best understood by applying the term 'intersectional patriarchy' and its material manifestation *el âlem*[1]. The ultimate goal and contribution of my research is to integrate women's reproductive work into global commodity chain analysis and contribute to labour process theory with the help of these 'locally' developed terms.

---

[1] *El âlem* is a commonly used Turkish term to refer to what other people think about the appropriateness of one's behaviour. Broadly, I conceptualise it as a form of social control contributing to the persistence of patriarchy.

To the people who ‘struggle’ to live the ‘wrong life’ ‘rightly’

Introduction

> ‘It is, perhaps, easier to dismiss a man whose face gives no indication of an inner life. And what a pity that is: a dash of curiosity is all it takes to stumble upon treasures we never expected’[2].
>
> Sabahattin Ali, 1943

Introducing the women: ‘Can you call what you write our Story’?[3]

My first name is Emine. According to the Turkish National Office of Statistics (TÜİK, 2015a), in the country of my birth, I am one of 851,989 ‘ordinary’ Emines. My name is Arabic in origin, and was also the name of the Prophet Mohammed’s mother. It was my grandmother, my father’s mother, who bestowed this name on me; it was given to me not to carry the name of a prophet’s mother, but to carry on a longstanding tradition in our family. As for the other 851,988 Emines in Turkey, they could have been given the name for different reasons, perhaps to carry the name of the prophet’s mother or to be named after a grandparent. I do not want to alarm the reader with broad generalisations at the very beginning of my thesis – this thesis is not written to make generalisations – but I would like to make just the following one as it is related to my name, the name with which I have lived for 28 years.

---

[2] Sabahattin Ali is a Turkish novelist, who emphasised that his stories were the ‘ordinary’ stories of ‘ordinary people’ and that it was the ordinary lives of each individual that made every one of their stories extraordinary. This is also what I want to emphasise in my study by researching ‘ordinary’ women as an ‘ordinary’ woman.

[3] This is what one of the women with whom I worked with on the land for this study, whose name is also Emine, asked me to call my thesis. By saying ‘our’, she is referring to the fact that she, I and another woman from the landowning family all share the name Emine. When we were talking about my thesis, I explained that I was writing about how we work on the land, what we talk about etc. Then, I was asked what it was that I was writing, whether I was writing something like a story. To this, I replied that I was writing a kind of story. Then, Emine, a Kurdish worker, asked me to call my study ‘Emine’s story, our story’. I have permission from her, to use her real name. She wished to keep her name as it is. I used pseudonymous for the names of the other Emines. There are two real Emines inside the thesis: one is I, the researcher, and the other one is a Kurdish worker.

The families of the other 851,988 Emines could have had a traditional reason for choosing the name, as did my grandmother; presumably, they too have a rural background in the not too distant past and they are at least familiar with the extended family structure from their mothers and fathers or maybe from their grandmothers or grandfathers. Probably most of them do not come from the upper class, nor are they the daughters or wives or mothers of the bourgeoisie, as the name is not very common among children of the upper classes. For the religious bourgeoisie, the name is too traditional and, for educated and/or nationalist parents, too much associated with Islam or Arabs. However, Emine is a safe name for Kurds in Turkey because until the 2000s they could not give Kurdish names[4] to their children so chose names with a relationship to Islam.

So, it is possible that almost all the women whom we meet in this study could have been named Emine by their parents. This is because most of my informants are seasonal workers in tomato production and processing in Turkey, who have rural backgrounds, they do not come from upper-class families, among whom few are Kurdish, and they are moderate or religious Muslims. Based on this, it can be presumed that their parents would not have had any reservations about handing down a “religious” name to their child. Furthermore, it is also likely that some mothers did not have a choice in the matter and simply gave their daughters the name of their mother-in-law. Hence it is not surprising that I met seven Emines in the tomato lands and the tomato-processing factory where I worked during parts of 2013 and 2014. I have changed all of their names and used pseudonyms, choosing names common in the years in which those women were born; the only exception was the name of the young Kurdish seasonal migrant worker named Emine who I mentioned before, who worked in rural tomato production and who wished to keep her real name. She believes that she is unrecognisable, because the names of her family members have been changed, making it unlikely that people will figure out who she is; she also wanted to have the same name as mine in the study, as a sign of our close relationship.

---

[4] In 2003, as a result of the European Integration Process, the ban on giving Kurdish names to Turkish citizens as well as names in other languages, such as in Circassian languages was lifted. However, as the new law only allows people to give their children names with Turkish letters, Kurds – who have different letters in their alphabet – are still not able to give all Kurdish names to their children.

She was the first Emine I met on the land during the tomato planting time; she was a seasonal worker who had travelled approximately 2,000 km with her father and siblings and lived in a shack for six months in order to work. She had not been able to continue her education after primary school because there was no secondary school in the village that she and her family lived in at the time. She is also the eldest child in her family. When her brothers reached secondary-school age, her family migrated to the city with her uncle's family, not because of the boys' schooling but because of the conflict between the Turkish military and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) in their area. As she said, although they did not choose to move to the city her brothers now had the opportunity to continue their education at secondary school because they could travel by themselves; the girls, however, could not. Emine's father worked in casual jobs in the city during the winter and in spring. For most of the year, Emine and her two sisters would travel to the 'tomato land' with their father and in the summers, during the school holidays, her two brothers would join them. Her mother could not come because she had to stay in their hometown to look after her mother-in-law and father-in-law. Emine explained to me that:

> 'My younger uncle did not have any school age children as my parents do, this means that they can go for seasonal work together as a family, so

> my *yenge* (aunt by marriage) could not take care of my grandmother and grandfather, even though this should not be the work of the eldest *yenge* [her mother]. So, my mother looked after them for six months when we were here; then my younger *yenge* looked after them in the winter' (Emine, Fieldwork notes, 13 May 2013, on the tomato land).

When Emine's mother was not around during the tomato production season, Emine was responsible for domestic labour in the shacks; as the eldest girl in the family she did the cooking and washed the laundry by hand. Her greatest dream of all was to marry Remzi, who was a worker in the same group with us, but her father was totally against this relationship. After the season ended, Remzi, with his own family, asked her father's permission to marry her three times, but he would not let them. They tried to elope, but Emine was afraid because it was too dangerous; even though they were not followed, Emine explained that they would not be able to find a job or somewhere to live together in the big city because they did not know anyone there and did not have any money of their own. Also, it is a sin, she told me. 'Thinking about yourself but not your parents, as when you leave they cannot look other people in the eye because of the shame' (Emine, Fieldwork notes, 22 September 2013, in the shack). So, they could not manage to be together, and sadly, last autumn (2015), two years after I had worked with them, Emine married her father's uncle's son – *amcaoğlu* – as was her father's wish[5].

Another Emine[6] is part of the family that owns the land on which the workers plant and pick tomatoes. She is married to one of three sons of the landowning family, and she chose who she married. Her father also did not want to let her marry her husband, but she eloped with him. After a few months, her family made peace with her. If she had obeyed her parents, she would have lived her entire life with a man she did not like. She explained that she is glad to have disobeyed her parents. Emine, like her husband, is Turkish and has worked in agriculture since she was 11 years old when she left school after five years compulsory education[7]. First, she worked on her grandfather's land then, when her family sold off their lands, she worked on her neighbours' lands and, finally, she worked on her husband's family's lands. Although her husband's family has money, she can never spend this money as she chooses. In fact, she never so much as sees any money. Her dream is to educate her children. She believes that in farming it does not matter how much you earn because you cannot spend it freely as you have to be accountable to all the people you work with – this is what she and her husband experience. She wants her children to work in the public sector, as she believes that a stable employment contract will give them the most security – civil service contracts are permanent in Turkey and the wages are regular. For Emine, if her children do not grow up to be farmers, then they will not have to live with other people: 'I especially want this for my daughter - what could be worse than living with your husband's family?' (Fieldwork notes, 8 May 2013, on the tomato land).

---

[5] There are no official statistics for forced marriage in Turkey. However, based on research in eastern and south-eastern Anatolia, Women for Women's Human Rights, WWHR, (2004) have found that 50.8% of women in these regions are married without their consent.

[6] This is a pseudonym; there are two different Emines in the landowning family from different generations. However here I have changed to Emine the name of one of the women who is actually not an Emine. She also has a different pseudonym in the main body of the text to prevent confusion as I have already two Emines.

Another Emine, the Emine I worked with at the factory[8], unintentionally answered this question when she spoke about her relationship with her own mother-in-law.

---

[7] Until 1997, compulsory education in Turkey was five years.

[8] I wrote here her name as Emine, but this is a pseudonym. In the main body of the text and in real life she has a different name. My intention is to emphasise that Emine is a very common name among those women who share a very similar background and stories with each other. In the factory, I met four Emines.

> ‘When I was living with her, I was sure that nothing could be worse than living with her. But I was wrong. When we were with them, my husband had to come home in the evenings, or at night at the very least. He had to sleep in the house. Now, he is free to do whatever he wants, sometimes he doesn’t come home for several nights. How can I explain this to my daughters? I should have guessed that he would do something like this. As he had a bad reputation from when he was young, they – her husbands’ parents – brought me in from another of the world’ (Fieldwork notes, 14 September 2014, outside the toilets of the factory).

This Emine was from a small village on the Black Sea coast of Turkey, an area with high unemployment and limited agricultural output besides tea and nuts. Fishing also comprises one of the main economic activities in the region. This limited diversity in economic output means that there is a high migration rate to western Turkey[9]. When I was working with women in the factory, I realised that lots of women were from the Black Sea region; they were, *Laz*[10], from the Caucasus, and most of them came to the region via marriage or their mothers came to the region via marriage. Emine explained the situation for me:

> ‘When I was 16 years old, our neighbour showed me a picture of him [her husband] and asked me whether or not I would want to marry him. She told me that he has some land and property in the village. You know when I thought about coming to Bursa, the 4th biggest city of Turkey, to marry a rich farmer, I was convinced that there could not be a better option than this. We were poor, if I stayed there, I would marry a poor man. I did not think too much about why they asked a girl from so far away, our neighbour told me that one of her friends, who also went to Bursa for marriage, told my husband’s mother about me, she said that she

---

[9] See Şen, 2014 for a detailed analysis about countinuos migration from the Black sea, particularly from Trabzon to İstanbul. Recent statistics of Turkish official institute also show that settlements on the Black Sea coast have a significant decline in population. Trabzon for example, has a -6.41 % net immigration rate (TÜİK, 2014a), and Samsun has a net immigration rate of -3.1% (TÜİK, 2014b).

[10] Sarıgıl (2012) defines *Laz* as ‘a distinct ethnic group of caucasian origin mostly living at the eastern end of Turkey’s Black sea shore in coastal lowlands’ (269).

> told her that I am capable and beautiful. Then they asked my mother for a photo of me, which she gave them. He loved me at first sight, now he wants to marry me. That moment, I fell in love with him' (Fieldwork notes, 14 September 2014, in the refectory).

After she married him and moved to a village outside Bursa, she realised that her husband's family was not that rich after all. She learned that they did not own land but had to work on other's lands. Even Emine had to work the land.

Her new husband's family had paid Emine's family a dowry and some money for their neighbour's friend in order to be rid of their poor and troublesome son. Emine explained to me that 'rich' locals marry each other. She went on to say that when someone is not rich and has a bad reputation, there is only one option: finding someone who does not have a better option. Later, having spent a few years in the region, she told me, she could understand what happened to her because there are lots of brides like her and now there are lots of women like her in the factory[11].

We will soon meet these three Emines and their friends who share some similar life experiences, backgrounds and expectations. Indeed, any one of the Emines' friends could also have been called Emine. She and her friends, including the other 'possible' Emines, will be introduce in the following chapters, where I examine their work producing tomatoes for Japanese market and the differences in their positions as seasonal migrant rural workers, members of the landowning family and as factory workers. Although their class positions, ethnicities and ages make their experiences within the global tomato production chain different, their experiences are nonetheless shaped by the same political, economic and cultural contexts. All three Emines have had to learn what it means to live with their mother-in-law. All three have had to learn how difficult it is to work on the land or in the tomato-processing factory. All three Emines, however, have come to learn this in different ways. All three of their lives have been subject to change depending on changes within tomato production and changes to government economic policies. And, of course, what the government's decisions depend on is not always publicly known. But, at least these women know that the changes in tomato production depend on what the Japanese company wants. I, as another Emine and the narrator of this story, will try to focus on this global chain in which everything is interlinked. This will enable us to uncover how the stories of individual women are so deeply intertwined with national and global means of production and reproduction.

---

[11] These workers were mostly the daughters-in-law or granddaughters of former smallholders who, as a result of the Turkish state's neoliberal economic policies in the past 15 years, have been forced off their lands and into the factories. Most of these families have become local, seasonal workers in food factories and so have only had to move to their nearest towns as opposed to the 'big cities'. The ruling party, the AKP instigated these neoliberal economic policies. Ironically, the wife of the current Turkish President's wife is yet another of the 851,989 Emines in Turkey. Her husband, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was previously the prime minister of AKP goverment and has been President of Turkey since 2014. Erdoğan does not hesitate to emphasise this sameness with 'ordinary' citizens in order to maintain his majority. Even more ironically, the fact that I am writing this thesis, as an ordinary Emine, is partly due to the fact that the same ruling party has opened new state universities in almost every Turkish city and, as a result, has been able to send more students and academics abroad than ever before.

Research Questions

The research questions of the thesis try to reveal the connections between the micro and macro, local and global, reproduction and production. They attempt to challenge the usual boundaries between concepts, as these boundaries are always already human-made. Using the research questions below, I aim to reach a holistic understanding of the nature of gendered work in global production in Turkey, using tomato production as an example.

> 1) What is the gendered division of labour in tomato production in Turkey, in the case of agriculture, manufacturing and the domestic sphere?

2) How is the gender division of labour shaped by global capitalism and the local dynamics of 'intersectional patriarchy'?

3) How is workers' consent generated? What kinds of resistance are possible?

4) How do relations of production and reproduction intertwine?

Sites and Informants in a Multi-Sited Ethnography

As one of the Emines in this study, I have attempted to answer these questions, not merely by virtue of being one of Turkey's many thousands of Emines, but by working with the women of the land and of the factory over two years, with intervals, in western and southeastern Turkey (see Map I.1 on page 10). I have encountered over 100 people (see differences among those people in Table 3.2. on page 100) during my fieldwork at three different sites and 42 of them became my key informants (see Appendix E, page 384). I met more of my key informants (28) on the land, as a result of my longer fieldwork there, and 14 in the factory; while the factory work was for two months to process tomatoes, rural work lasted around 6 months. I worked on the land for two periods in 2013 and one period in the factory in 2014 (see timeline of my fieldwork in Table 3.1. on page 98). My third fieldwork site is located in Mardin (shown on Map I.1), which is the hometown of my rural Kurdish migrant worker informants.

Marcus (1995) proposes that ethnography conducted by travelling across different fieldwork sites and not focusing on one single case could be called multi-sited ethnography. As he suggested for multi-sited ethnographers, I intentionally chose these particular fieldwork sites. This mobile ethnography 'has produced refined examinations of resistance and accommodation – a concern with the dynamics of encapsulation, focused on relationships, language and objects of encounter and response from the perspectives of local and cosmopolitan groups and persons who, although in different relative power positions, experience a process of being mutually displaced from what has counted as culture for each of them' (ibid.: 96).



Map I.1: Fieldwork sites/ Tomato Lands; Factory; Kurdish Seasonal Workers' Homes. Source: Author's own drawing

According to Marcus (1995), following things and following people are two common ways of doing multi-sited ethnography. In this study, I am not only following women's labour but I am also following the journey of tomatoes. Following the path of products can prove to be a very beneficial way of exploring the differentiations of the labour process and labour force. Following exposes the circulation of capital as a whole and hence provides us with a clear picture of global capitalised labour (Rainnie, 2013). Besides the opportunity to gain a fuller picture of global capital, I think that gender roles and relations play different roles in the labour processes of each of the different phases of production. This means that in order to answer my research questions it was important to undertake a multi-sited ethnography.

Organisation of the Thesis

The thesis begins by exploring the scholarly literature that tackles existing studies of women's employment in global production (Chapter 1). It visits the women in development (WID), women and development (WAD), and gender and development (GAD) approaches as well as global commodity chain analysis. Based on these studies, Chapter 1 revisits the concepts of patriarchy and intersectionality in order to link the terms as 'intersectional patriarchy', which I define as a set of fluid and various forms of hegemonic masculinity with power over femininity and subordinate masculinities. Following Kandiyoti (1988), I retain the concept of patriarchy to indicate a structure of power and that women in some positions can exercise masculine power. I take from Connell (1985) the idea that there is a range of masculinities and femininities associated with different social positions, and that these are fluid and changeable. An example of this is that when older women govern younger women they do so by asserting masculinity. I use the term to refer patriarchal household structures, which vary with the hegemonic masculinities and associated femininities constructed in the labour process. I relate patriarchy to intersectionality because gender, class, age and ethnicity affect the form taken by patriarchy in different households through creating different forms of masculinity and femininity. Indeed, the intersection of categories – gender, age, class, ethnicity, education and so on – creates fluid categories of masculinity and femininity but throughout masculinity governs femininity. I deploy the term *el âlem* to explain why everyone invests in the constructions of masculinity and femininity that lie behind these power relations. *El âlem,* as an agential aspect of intersectional patriarchy, offers everyone a chance to exercise power over others – for the advantage of masculine power – but to a different extent.

I introduce the context to the fieldwork sites in Chapter 2 by looking at the state's role in shaping global food production and processing in Turkey and the history of women's employment in the country with a particular focus on Kemalist ideology and its gender categories. Kemalist ideology, which could be seen as Turkey's official ideology since the early 2000s (White, 2012), refers to official national commitment to the vision of the founder of country, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (1881-1938), which revolved around modernisation, secularization, westernization and cultural unity (ibid.). These principles made the position of women central to his proclaimed values. I explore how Kemalism tries to construct and sustain these principles in Turkey through accolades for two types of women it calls 'Daughters of the Republic' and 'Anatolian Women'. In contrast was a third type, the 'religious woman', which emerged in the early years of the Republic. She was seen as an obstacle to the modernisation of Turkey. To pull together my account of the current socio-political and economic context in Turkey, I deploy Merton's (1988 cited in Stanley, 1993) 'sociological autobiography' as a tool to write Chapter 2. Merton defines social autobiography as utilizing 'sociological perspectives, ideas, concepts, findings, and analytical procedures to construct and interpret a narrative text that purports to tell one's own history within the larger history of one's times' (cited in Stanley, 1993: 42). Since I use mainly people's own stories to build my data chapters, I express 'feminist responsibility' to the people in the study by using my own story to construct the context chapter.

In Chapter 3, I explain how I seek to answer my research questions, locating my research design by re-visiting the meaning of feminist methodology, focusing especially on the power relations and ethical dilemmas in which research is set, as well as my insider and outsider positions in the fieldwork sites. Through proposing the chapter as a reflexive writing practice, I will also aim to answer how and why I have ended up calling some of my ‘research subjects’ friends.

The data chapters of this thesis (Chapters 4, 5, 6 & 7) are organized around the linear sequence of tomato growing and canning, and the parallel processes of everyday life and domestic labour located in the home. First the reader will read about the planting season (Chapter 4), then about picking time (Chapter 4), then about the factory tomato-preserving process (Chapter 5) and finally about family life (Chapters 6 & 7). Chapter 4 demonstrates how the labour process of tomato planting and picking is organised through the intersection of gender, class, age, ethnicity, and kinship relations. The following chapter, 5, illustrates how the gender ideologies of the Kemalist regime, which are explained in Chapter 2, are displayed on the shop floor of the tomato-processing factory to manage the women’s labour. Chapters 4 & 5 indicate how masculinities and femininities construct and are constructed by the intersections of gender, class, age, ethnicity, education and kinship relations (with different intersections occurring in relation to different positions in production) in the labour process.

Chapters 6 & 7 look at the different forms of patriarchy in the home and their relation with the production relations on the land and in the factory respectively. In these chapters, the study answers the question of how forms of patriarchy are differentiated from each other in terms of their degree and kind by applying the concept of *el-âlem* (see Table 6.1 on page 241). Finally, in the Conclusions (Chapter

8), I review my findings and consider how this piece of research could be taken further.

Chapter 1

Literature Review

1.1. Introduction

> This [the determining factor in history], again, is of a twofold character: on the one side, the production of the means of existence, of food, clothing and shelter and the tools necessary for that production; on the other side, the production of human beings themselves, the propagation of species. The social organisation under which the people of a particular historical epoch and a particular country live is determined by both kinds of production: by the stage of development of labour on the one hand and of the family on the other. The lower the development of labour and the more limited the amount of its products, and consequently, the more limited also the wealth of society the more the social order is found to be dominated by kinship groups (Engels, 1972:36).

Like many other feminist studies on women's labour, the above quotation, one of Engels' most quoted, is the departure point of this study in terms of emphasising the mutual interdependence of the relations of production and reproduction. Here – in the case of rural tomato production and processing – I conceptualise reproduction relations as 'kinship relations' that 'produce' and 'are produced' by the total conditions of production, including the reproduction of labour and its narrower concept of human reproduction (Mackintosh, 1984)[12]. By following the movement of women's labour from the tomato lands to their homes and the tomato factories, I seek to reveal how the relationships between the ‘development’ of labour (from the land to the factory) and the ‘development’ of family (the transition from an extended rural family structure to a ‘nuclear’, ‘urban’ family structure) are interlocking; they are fluid and mutually entangled.

---

[12] Mackintosh (1984) did not define the reproduction of relations as I do here. Rather, she offered a discussion of two concepts, the reproduction of labour and of human reproduction. She highlighted that the reproduction of labour includes many tasks that are undertaken in the spheres of production, and thus there is no way to divide those two spheres. Moreover, she highlighted the concept of human reproduction, which is included in the concept of reproduction of labour, chiefly concerning the relations of marriage and kinship in society. I would like to concentrate on the same points with those concepts underlined.

In this chapter, I will try to show the necessity and the importance of my activity – following women’s labour by following tomatoes – to understand the intertwining relations of production and reproduction. In order to do this, I will examine the literature on gendered work in global production and look at how the theoretical approaches and concepts of women’s work can be revisited in order to grasp both gender and capitalist relations within the case I study. With this aim in mind, I divide the chapter into three main sections. In the first one, I explore the main theoretical approaches to understanding women’s work in global production. The second section will discuss the possible incorporation of two of the most commonly applied concepts of feminist theory, patriarchy and intersectionality, as ‘intersectional patriarchy’ to understand the mutable nature of gender relations in this ‘specific’ case. Finally, in the last part, I revisit labour process theory to seek a means to integrate the relations of reproduction and relations of production through the concept of ‘intersectional patriarchy’.

1.2. Feminist ‘Local’ Commodity Chain Analysis

Answering the question of what happens to women when they become a part of economic development, which is arguably the starting point of existing literature on women’s work in global production, would have been easy if global capital simply flowed across and over our national borders, all the while leaving our identities untouched. Another problem is situating Turkey and its workers in tomato production and processing in a global framework. As I will discuss in detail in chapter 2, the country's 'in-between' geographical location and the difficulties of generalising about people using markers such as their GDP, or property ownership rates makes this an incredibly difficult task.

Moreover, it is not always easy to identify the boundaries between social groups, for instance, it is difficult to measure citizens' 'average' 'socio-cultural possessions' so as to decide which category they fit into. With whom from the 'global north' or 'south' should I compare the workers I worked with in Turkey and how should I decide upon whom I should compare them with? Should I compare Kurdish workers in Turkey with the Polish seasonal strawberry women workers of Sweden or with the women workers of Brazil? Which parts of Sweden, for example, should be compared to which parts of Turkey and which categories present a best fit for such comparisons? I know that I am not the only one who struggles with fitting places and people into these categories; people in this study also struggle to place themselves within 'geographical' categories. As one Kurdish woman worker told me:

> 'If this is Turkey [implying the western part of Turkey where they come to work], where do we live? They [she refers to the Turkish state] insist that we are also living in Turkey, but they know that it is not true. The landowning family make fun of us saying that we have transformed their backyard and lands [where workers stay and live during the seasonal work] into Kurdistan. Everyone knows that we are different' (Melek, Fieldwork Notes, 13 May 2013, on the tomato land).

In line with Melek's words, the question of the 'local' comes directly into the analysis of global production; workers transform their working and living places and, consequently, global production. When capital enters a local market, it adapts to local ideologies to attract labour (Dedeoğlu, 2012; Eraydın and Erendil, 1999;

Kabeer, 2000; Fernandez-Kelly, 1983; Lee, 1998; Mies, 1982; Ngai, 2005; Ong, 1987; Salzinger, 2003; White, 1994). The lace-trade in India is bound up with the definition of women as housewives (Mies, 1982); garment and textile exports from Turkey depend on women's work in small family firms known as 'Atölye' (Dedeoğlu, 2012; 2014; White, 1994); relations in the factories of Malaysia are re-constructed through Islamic-Malay femininity (Ong, 1987) and electronics factories in Hong Kong have to consider women's familial responsibilities in order to organise their labour process and attract middle-aged women from the available labour pool (Lee, 1998).

Williams (2013) suggests that studying the localisation of the global and the way in which labour management is shaped by local environments must be the kernel of the analysis of globalisation. This not only gives us the chance to see how the organisation of global capital operates locally through gendered ideologies, but also enables us to see the differences among women, even if they are from the same 'geographic nation'. While Turkey can be a part of the first world for some of its citizens, it is in the third world for others. Both of these groups of citizens, however, may work together in the same low grade, unprestigious work: seasonal rural work (albeit in different positions).

Therefore, it is not surprising to see that feminists working on women's work have reformulated the question of what happens to women upon the arrival of global production (Boserup, 1970). Not only do different women experience global production differently, these different experiences may be related to changes in gender relations, including changes in the connotations of – and relation between – masculinity and femininity. As a result, instead of asking what happens to 'women' as a result of economic development (assuming that it might lead to women's empowerment)k feminists have begun to ask 'how/why are workers gendered locally when they become a part of global production?' (Salzinger, 2003: 11). This section shows the timeline that connects these two questions by looking at the changing feminist debate about women and global production in the last forty years. The first part briefly presents dominant theoretical perspectives in feminist studies that were applied to women's work in developing countries up until the end of the 1990s. The second part offers a discussion of global commodity chain analysis, which in the last decade has increasingly become the dominant framework for studying gender in the global economy (Dunaway, 2014; Williams, 2013).

1.2.1. From Boserup (1970) to Elson & Pearson (1981): WID to GAD

For most of us researching women's labour, the literature on women's employment in global production begins with Boserup's *Women's Role in Economic Development* (1970). Her work is seen as the first work of note that emphasises women's invisibility in the economic development literature and thus for many her study has been the initial starting point for gender analysis of development (Custers, 1997; Pearson & Jackson, 1998; Rai & Waylen, 2014). But other scholars have challenged her approach. One reason is that, while Boserup concentrated on women's exclusion from jobs in the modernising sectors of the economies of developing countries, by the 1970s and 1980s global production had begun to pull Third World women into factories (Pearson, 1998) without necessarily providing the gender equality Boserup had predicted.

Boserup's study led to the coining of the term 'Women in Development' (WID) in the early 1970s by the Women's Committee of Washington DC, a Chapter of the

Society for International Development' (Moser, 1993; Chant & Gutmann, 2000; Chant & McIlwanie, 2009). Pearson & Jackson (1998) call the WID school of thought a positive approach aiming to integrate women into development. Rathgeber (1990), along with others (Visvanathan, 1997; Momsen, 2004), suggests that the WID approach was articulated by liberal feminists who saw the problem as women's exclusion from the development process rather than their incorporation on a subordinate basis. According to this school, women's integration into economic development – and by implication the global economy – would equalise their position with men's. This was to be achieved by increasing women's participation in education, employment and other social spheres (Rathgeber, 1990; Visvanathan, 1997). The WID school has been criticised for not recognising that it was the way in which women were already being integrated into economic development (and the wider inequalities on which this rested), not their exclusion, which continued their subordination and reproduced inequalities between men and women and between women (Benería & Sen, 1997).

The assumption and/or expectation that gender inequality would necessarily diminish with women's increasing participation in the global market was challenged by feminists from different theoretical backgrounds (Pearson & Jackson, 1998; Momsen, 2004; Rathgeber, 1990; Visvanathan, 1997). According to Pearson & Jackson (1998), the Subordination of Women (SOW) collective in the UK developed the first systematic critique of the WID school of thought with their book titled *Of Marriage and the Market* (Young et al., 1981). The book drew a line between feminist analysis and development agencies' policies and practices around gender issues. SOW embraced comparative and interdisciplinary approaches to look at gender in development, in contrast to the Eurocentric bias of feminist literature in the

UK at that time. But the introduction of the book highlighted that ‘we were nevertheless critical of the growing literature concerned with ‘women and development’; it was predominantly descriptive, was equivocal in its identification and analysis of women’s subordination, and tended to isolate women as a separate and often homogeneous category’ (Pearson at el., 1984: x). SOW also took the malleability of gender relations as a subject of analysis instead of assuming that the position of ‘woman’ was universal. They brought reproductive work, feminisation of labour, and household conflicts of interest to the table as the previously invisible critical analytical points for women and development literature. These critics of WID led the shift to the Gender and Development (GAD) approach (Kabeer, 1994; Pearson & Jackson, 1998; Rai & Waylen, Rathegeber, 1990). GAD examined how the relations between women and men shaped and were shaped by changes in production and reproduction; their analytical category was ‘gender relations’ rather than ‘women’.

Debate on and between these schools of thought has concerned not just analysis but also policy implications (Chant & Gutmann, 2000; Chant & McIlwanie, 2009; Moser, 1993). The WID approach has been popularly applied by international agencies, NGOs, and nation states seeking improvements in women’s lives across developing regions. The theoretical shift from WID to GAD came to also be reflected in policy (Chant & Gutmann, 2000; Chant & McIlwanie, 2009; Moser, 1993). Although Rathgeber (1990) suggests that the GAD approach could only appear in policy programmes of international agencies or of NGOs partially, as the approach is socialist-feminist theory oriented, Chant & McIlwanie (2009) propose the ‘mainstreaming gender’ perspective as a way of integrating GAD analyses into policy. The approach ‘aims to assess the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies and programmes' (ibid.: 230) Here, however, I give more weight to the theoretical underpinnings of these approaches, rather than their reflection in policy and practice, because the main intention of the thesis is not to make suggestions for social policy[13] but rather to contribute to the feminist understanding of gender relations in the global economy theoretically. In this sense, the key concept in GAD for my research is the notion that women are 'inferior bearers of labour'.

Elson & Pearson's path-breaking paper '"Nimble Fingers Make Cheap Workers": An Analysis of Women's Employment in Third World Export Manufacturing' (1981) can be seen as the classic work of the Gender and Development approach to the place of gender in global capital accumulation. Rai & Waylen (2014) also emphasise that 'Nimble Fingers' led the shift from WID to GAD. 'Whilst there were predictions that women would continue to be excluded from the new economic structures of post-independence Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, it was clear that women were very much a part of this new phase of industrialisation' (Pearson, 1998: 172). Elson & Pearson (1981) suggested that rather than women being excluded from global economic development, there was an increasing participation of women in global production. They questioned whether this would increase gender equality, because the reason factories were employing women were that they sought a source of cheap and compliant labour.

The construction of women as a cheaper and more compliant labour force rested on women's position in the wider society, especially in the household, where they were seen as dependents rather than breadwinners. They brought their low social status with them into the workplace. ‘Women do not do unskilled jobs because they are the bearers of inferior labour [i.e. they are not less skilled than men]: rather, the jobs they do are unskilled because women enter them already determined as inferior bearers of labour’, said Elson & Pearson (1981: 24). Similarly, Phillips and Taylor (1980: 79) argued that ‘women workers carry into the workplace their status as subordinate individuals, and this status comes to define the value of their work they do’. When women are employed in skilled work, usually men’s work, as ‘inferior workers’, they downgrade the value of that work (ibid). Here the suggestion is that skills are saturated by ‘sex’ (Phillips & Taylor, 1980; Chant, 1995), because the value of skills is dependent on which gender is doing the work. According to Phillips & Taylor (1980), men try to use their masculinity as a way to challenge women’s entry into their jobs because men fear that it will lead to the undervaluation of their work.

---

[13] My methodology chapter (3) indirectly answers the question of why the thesis does not offer suggestions for social policy or why it cannot offer them.

Two of the criticisms of the GAD approach to women’s factory employment are particularly relevant to my research. First, Salzinger (2003) argues that scholars suggesting that capital is dependent on women’s prior construction as cheap labour and docile, compliant bodies have confused cause with consequence. She agrees that women have been increasingly filling the world’s assembly lines. However this is not because they are already ready-made docile bodies, as ‘Nimble Fingers’ suggested, but, rather, docile bodies are produced in production relations within the workplace. She drew on postmodernist constructions of gender as a discursive and performative achievement, seeing ‘gendering’ and not just gender relations as malleable. Her case studies showed that masculinity and femininity were constructs deployed by employers (ibid.) in different ways.

Secondly, the assumption that capitalist firms inevitably select women as factory workers because they are cheaper, and therefore enable higher profits to be made (Elson & Pearson, 1981), proves wrong also in the case of Turkey. Writing in 2007, Toksöz argued that Turkey had not followed the assumption of Elson and Pearson because an increase in women's participation in global production factories was not taking place. Pearson (1998) suggests that this increase also did not happen in Nepal, Pakistan and large parts of India, because these areas did not adopt the export-led industrialising project. Moreover, literature from India tells us that patriarchal ideologies are responsible for women's exclusion from factories, at least up to the 1990s (Lessinger, 1990; Vera- Sanso, 1995). Although capital may seek women's labour, it may not always be able to attract them to factories, as has been the case in Turkey. Instead, it may enter their homes. Homeworking has been a very common trend for global textile production in Turkey (Dedeoglu, 2012; 2014). This suggests that to follow the gender division of labour in, for instance, manufacturing, one might need to look outside formal factory production. Global commodity chain analysis provides a way to look at the gender division of labour in production wherever it is located. Following on from previous studies of women's labour in Turkey (White, 1994; Dedeoglu, 2012; 2014), I will adopt global commodity chain analysis. This gives more weight to households as a unit of global production than those development analyses that assume that the household is outside global production relations.

Before concluding this section, I briefly mention Whitehead's and other essays in *Of Marriage and the Market* (1984) to point to a parallel focus on the relative value of women's and men's labour in GAD analyses of production and reproduction in rural production systems. Her analysis, based on north-east Ghana, suggests that in some cases the introduction of cash crops may replicate the gender division of labour in subsistence agriculture, where tasks may be assigned according to men’s and women’s kinship roles; in other cases production for the world market may incorporate a new gender division of labour. But either may have important implications for changes in the intensity of women’s labour in the household, including in the subsistence sector, and on who controls the proceeds; it is therefore necessary to look at the rural production system as a whole. The implicit separation of research on manufacturing and rural production systems in GAD analysis may no longer be tenable, since particular market specifications for agricultural produce may affect the value of labour in rural production. This is another reason why I adopt commodity chain analysis, as it can integrate agriculture and factory production within the same frame of reference.

1.2.2. Looking at Things, Finding People: Commodity Chain Analysis

GCCA has its origins in dependency theory’s emphasis on the location of both rich and poor countries within the unequal but integrated international economy as the source of economic problems in the regions of the global South. It was developed by Gereffi and Korzeneiwicz in 1994 to address contemporary forms of globalisation in relation to the interaction between local and global initiatives.

The increasing trend of using GCC analysis for studying gender in global production has its roots in changes in the organisation of the global economy, the political responses to these, and theoretical shifts in feminist theory. First of all, in recent years, the spaces in which commodities are made have become more varied, more ‘global’ and more ‘transnational’. As a result of this, it becomes increasingly necessary to focus on more than one location and trace the transformation of labour by tracing the journey of a product in the global capitalist economy, rather than studying either agricultural production with food processing or manufacturing separately. Moreover, while production of many goods mostly occurs in the developing countries, it is very common for packaging or labelling to take place in the Global North where consumption also takes place. Consequently, global tracing has increasingly become a crucial requirement for the analysis of global production and GCC offers one of the most promising frames to follow.

Secondly, many ‘developing’ country states offer limited social welfare rights or, sometimes, none at all. Indeed, quite the opposite; by reducing labour costs and either not legislating against poor working conditions or by suppressing union activity, they often try to attract capital by cooperating with it (Williams, 2013). In this sense, adopting a framework that emphasises firms’ success in socio-economic upgrading via their interaction with global capital rather than the responsibilities of the state has become more common.

Thirdly, the method of GCC of following things, and seeing/finding the people’s labour within them, has overlapped with the increasing influence of postmodernism in social science (Marcus, 1995). Focusing on one consumable item and tracking back how production (and in some cases reproduction) was organised has been an increasingly popular method for feminist studies of the global economy. Although GCC analysts do not necessarily identify their work with postmodernism (Barndt, 2002, Chatterjee, 2001; Dixon, 2006; Ramamurthy, 2004; Tiffin et al., 2004), they use ‘multi-sited ethnography’ as a way of looking at the wider organisation of social and economic relations at different sites in the commodity chain, as does this thesis.

Although GCC analysis proposes looking at all the stages of a chain, my case of tomatoes does not include all the steps of a commodity chain: I do not include consumption, marketing or the retailing of tomatoes. Rather I apply commodity chain analysis but focus only on production, processing, and the reproduction of labour, similar to other GCC studies mainly focusing on production and/or reproduction (Collins, 2014; Dedeoglu, 2014; Dunaway, 2014; Rammurthy, 2004; 2014; Selywn, 2012; Stewart, 2015; Yeates, 2014). Dunaway criticises mainstream GCC analysis in her edited book *Gendered Commodity Chains,* (2014) by arguing that, although the original concept included reproduction as well as consumption as parts of production, the focus of the evolving version ignores households. But, she argues, GCC analysis is still one of the most promising ways to include reproduction within global production analysis, thanks to its ability to show the flexibility of households in adapting to the global economy. So my focus on reproduction is not new to existing literature on the global economy, however I attempt to integrate the relations of reproduction into my analysis of the global tomato chain in a novel way, using my locally developed terms '*intersectional patriarchy'* and '*el âlem'*, as defined below.

Turning back to the things of this thesis: tomatoes. In a very short passage in their text *Exploring the Tomato,* Harvey et al. (2002) pose the very same question as this study: 'Why Japan? Why Turkey? How does this fit into understanding the global and the local?' (ibid.: 4). Harvey et al.'s question emerged from the journey of a Marks and Spencer's production manager to Turkey, where the tomatoes for the store's fresh Tomato and Basil soup were processed in a Japanese-owned factory. In their inspiring work, Harvey et al. (2002) did not answer this particular question, simply because in their case, it was used to draw attention to the broader operation of global capital. Their main question was 'how much of a changing world can be viewed through the lens of a changing tomato?' (ibid.: 7). As they state, the tomatoes are used both as a probe to understand the changing contexts and conditions of economics, politics, and culture as well as an object of fascination in itself. They explain their reasons for not adopting global commodity chain analysis by underlining the difficulties of the tomato in playing the main role, because 'the tomato is something that usually shares its life with others' (ibid.: 9). Tomatoes are not commodities themselves but they need other objects or goods: tomato ketchup, for instance, does not only consist of tomatoes. They have not made tomatoes the subject of analysis but rather, its object. In this study, however, I look at tomatoes as subjects along with women workers. By following both of them simultaneously, I emphasise that one of them is not the determinant of the other one but rather that they continuously create each other.

Brandt's (2002) extensive work *Tangled Roots* also considers the gendered work of tomato production by following women's work and the production of tomatoes as far as Canada. In doing so, Brandt highlights that every phase of tomato production necessitates gendered work. She makes it very clear that global tomato production makes women's work more insecure, more difficult and low paid. Brandt does not however render workers' impact on globalisation visible. I suggest that this is because of the underestimation of the relations of reproduction in the analysis. Although she offers an account of the double burden women workers face due to their familial responsibilities, she does not focus on how production relations shape and are shaped by women's lives outside of work. Similarly, another influential study on tomatoes, *The Force of Irony* by Torres (1997), also neglects the relations of reproduction and solely focuses on workers' productive labour to understand their struggles.

As discussed above, feminist scholars have increasingly pointed out the invisibility of reproductive work in global commodity chain analysis and are successfully incorporating it themselves (Barrientos & Perrons, 1999; Clelland, 2014; Collins, 2014; Dunaway, 2014; Ramamurthy, 2004). In this sense, Stewart's study (2015) offers a very important account as she makes the link between production and reproduction clear by focusing on the construction of South Asian gendered identities as a part of the Global Care Chain. While doing so, she demonstrates that the care arrangements of the South Asian families who migrated to the UK are rooted in their familial relations, particularly in their marriage arrangements, which are clearly within the sphere of the relations of reproduction. In the current version of commodity chain analysis there is no place for reproduction relations or identities, and thus she, like other feminist scholars, proposes the reformulation of GCC analysis in order to take workers' identities and reproduction into account.

Following a similar line of argument as Stewart, Collins (2014) has said that feminist analysis of a global chain should follow two tracks:

> Pausing at the point of *production to journey outside the factory gate* and to explore the *mysteries of social production* is to follow one of those lateral lines that are rich with significance for many commodity stories. Another line is tracking *the circulation of gender ideologies* and *exploring the congruencies and clashes between managers and labouring communities* (37 – emphasis mine).

In actuality, Collins' points are central to many studies of gender and factory production (Ngai, 2005; Salzinger, 2003; Wolf, 1994) that go back to Westwood's study *All Day Every Day* (1984) and which precede the popularity of GCC. At the very beginning of her study, Westwood suggested that 'home and work are part of one world' (1):

> Within the setting of capitalist production, we have not only the reproduction of capitalist exploitation through the way that women are positioned in the production process as workers, but through patriarchal ideologies we have reproduction of gendered subjects and the social construction of masculinity and femininity on the shopfloor… [But] working outside the home is not only about becoming a worker; it is most crucially about becoming a woman (Westwood, 1984:6).

What Westwood says here about the construction of women's feminine identities in the workplace also appears in different studies of women's factory production at different times (Ong, 1987; Wolf, 1994; Salzinger, 2003; Ngai, 2005). For instance, Salzinger's (2003) study can be considered to be remarkable in terms of showing how femininities and masculinities are constructed on the shop floor of Mexico's factories through managers' situated perceptions about gender ideologies. She points out that 'women' are made on the shop floor. Ngai (2005) also highlights the re-construction of the *dangongmei* (working girls) in workplaces in China with reference to what goes on beyond the factory gates, as well as inside the factory: '*dangongmei* is a specific worker-subject not only embodied with production relations but also social cultural discourses, consumption relations, social networks, familial relations, gender tropes and social resistances' (ibid.:13). Ong (1987) also points out the same thing by showing how the emergence of 'class sexuality' is based on the Malay women workers' bargaining with both the demands of the factory and the cultural construction of Islamic-Malay-rural female identity. According to Bair (2010), Ong's study makes very clear that the organisation of capitalist production is embedded in and transformed through cultural practices. Bair (2010) also points out that Wolf's

(1994) study, which is about women workers is Java, is important because it highlights the interaction between patriarchal familial relations and capitalist relations. Wolf's work is also very relevant for my study not only because it underlines the relationship between production and reproduction, but also because it underlines the interaction between agrarian production and industrial production by following rural women into the factory. However, unlike Wolf, I also consider who fills the vacancies left behind in agriculture when rural women are transferred to the factories.

Turning back to Global Commodity Chain analysis, we can see that many studies on gender in global production have already emphasised the vital components of the 'feminist global commodity chain analysis'. To restate them here before concluding this section, I look at what Ramamurthy (2004) describes as the *must haves* of a feminist global chain analysis. According to her, a feminist global chain analysis should include the production of identities; the relationship between agriculture and industry; production and consumption; gender, class and age; the production of masculinities and femininities, and the connection of the local to the global. In this thesis, along with what Ramamurthy (2004) underlines, I also look at the relationship between production and reproduction relations, instead of looking the relations of consumption; this is because this study more closely concentrates on the place of labour in the global chain.

I argue that to undertake a feminist analysis of the labour process of tomato production and processing as a commodity chain, it is necessary to analyse the construction of the gendered identities of 'Turkish' and 'Kurdish' rural women as a part of this chain, and that this is not possible without focusing on the local regimes of production. In line with Stewart (2015), my analysis will focus on how gender identities are constructed and used as a factor for controlling labour. In order to do so, I will deploy the concepts of patriarchy and intersectionality to understand the prevailing ideologies of the 'place' I studied. I combine these two concepts into a composite, describing it as 'intersectional patriarchy'. For this, I will offer a definition and defence in the following section.

1.3. Happy Open Relationship between Patriarchy and Intersectionality: 'Intersectional Patriarchy'

Second wave feminists first adopted the term patriarchy in the 1970s (Eisenstein, 1979; Firestone, 1971; Hartmann, 1981; Millet, 1977; Mitchell, 1975). The idea underpinning the development of the concept was the argument that 'inequality between men and women was not just a creation of capitalism: it was the feature of all societies for which we had reliable evidence' (Rowbotham, 1981: 72). The term literally refers to the 'rule of the father' and has been used to address the particular types of household structures and families in which an older male has authority over other members of the family, including women and younger males. However, depending on the answers to the question of what is the real basis of 'women's subordination', the concept has been used in different ways (Bradley, 1996). These include 'men's control of reproductive arrangements' (Firestone, 1971), 'sexual hierarchy which is manifested in women's role as mother and 'domestic labourer'' (Oakley, 1974), 'kinship systems in which men exchange women' (Mitchell, 1975) or male control over women's labour (Cockburn, 1983; 1991; Hartmann, 1981; Westwood, 1984). Patriarchy has been criticised for being 'biologically reductionist' (Rowbotham, 1981; Patil, 2013), 'universal' (Acker, 1989; Beechey, 1979; Rowbotham, 1981; Mohanty, 1984), 'fixed' (Rowbotham 1981) and 'ignoring women's agency' (Acker, 1989; Mohanty, 1984; Pollert, 1996).

While the concept of patriarchy began to lose its popularity in the late 80s, the concept of intersectionality began gaining recognition in the 1990s. In 1989, Crenshaw used the term intersectionality to emphasise that black women's oppression is situated at the intersection of racism and sexism. Since then, intersectionality has become an extensively deployed concept of feminist studies to highlight the matrix of domination (Crenshaw, 1989) of different inequalities such as ethnicity, age, nationality, sexuality, religion, and disability (Bradley and Healy, 2008; McCall, 2005). There has been a long tradition in the study of work and employment relations, particularly within feminist scholars' work, of exploring the intersections of class, ethnicity and gender (Acker, 2006; Cockburn, 1983; 1985; Glucksmann, 1982; 1990; Pollert, 1981; Westwood, 1984). However, according to McBride et al. (2015), as the majority of these works are informed by case studies and narratives, they run the risk of becoming essentialist by presenting their findings as representative of all people who might be positioned within the same intersectional categories. Although I do not agree with McBride et al. (2015) about the case studies of women's work becoming essentialist when applying the concept of intersectionality, this criticism can be interpreted in line with what Nash (2008) and Yuval-Davis (2006) point out, that intersectional analysis ignores the articulation of identities, and reaches unsubstantiated conclusions, such as 'all black women are the same' (e.g. Crenshaw's analysis (1991).

Patil (2013) argues that both concepts, patriarchy and intersectionality, are incomplete. Although the focus of feminist studies has shifted from 'patriarchy' to 'intersectionality' in the last 20 years, Patil (2013) found, based on online research in the OCLC (specifically World cat, Article first, and Eco databases) for the year 2000 to the present, that 85% of the studies that applied the concept of intersectionality focus on the Global North and 60% of those studies focus on the U.S. in particular. Patriarchy, on the other hand, tends to be used in studies that focus on women from the Global South or 'developing countries'. When we consider relatively recent studies that adopt the concept of patriarchy, the same pattern is evident. While Ngai (2005), Lee (1998), Kabeer (2000), Cravey (1998), Dedeoğlu (2012; 2014) and White (1994) use the concept of patriarchy, Salzinger (2003) and Wright (2006) do not. Patil (2013) criticises intersectionality in a similar way to how the concept of patriarchy has been criticised: its application is not sufficiently historical and transnational and it has not been applied to cross-border dynamics. For this reason, Patil (2013) suggests the term 'domestic intersectionality' is more applicable for the current use of the concept which refers to within-nation relations.

In this section, I will try to revisit both concepts by historicising them, and seek to draw them together as 'intersectional patriarchy', which refers to 'the fluid and various forms of masculinity governing femininity'. I use the term to talk about various patriarchal household structures in relation to hegemonic masculinities and associated femininities constructed in the labour process. The form of patriarchy depends on the intersections of gender, class, age and ethnicity, which also create masculinities and femininities.

There are also other scholars who have tried to link patriarchy and intersectionality although they do not necessarily name the concepts. For instance Bozzoli's (1983: 149) concept of a patchwork-quilt of patriarchies refers to 'a system in which forms of patriarchy are sustained, modified and even entrenched in a variety of ways depending on the internal character of the system in the first instance’. Her analysis builds upon the notion of struggle rather than structure and she focuses on domestic struggle as a unit of analysis. This term refers both to struggles within the domestic sphere and struggles between the domestic sphere and the capitalist system. The domestic sphere includes the organisation of labour, allocation of income and property relations. She emphasises that the varieties of patriarchy depend on the formation of domestic struggles. She focuses on South African society and gives an historical account of how the interaction of gender, age and migrant labour plays an important role in shaping divisions of labour, domestic struggles, and thereby patriarchy. Her work is influential because it shows the transformation of patriarchies, but it does not explain why people contribute to the persistence of patriarchy or how power shifts depending on the intersection of inequalities: these two elements can be found in Kandiyoti’s work which I discuss in the following section.

Walby’s work (1990) can also be considered as an attempt to link patriarchy and intersectionality because she tackles the articulation of gender with class and ethnicity. However, for her forms of patriarchy do not depend on the intersections of these inequalities but on changes in the relations between and within six structures: the ‘patriarchal mode of production, patriarchal relations in paid work, patriarchal relations in the state, male violence, patriarchal relations in sexuality, and patriarchal relations in cultural institutions’ (20).

Fiorenza, on the other hand, proposes the concept of ‘kyriarchy’ (1992: 7) instead of patriarchy to analyse interlocking structures of domination. Kyriarchal power, she says, ‘operates not only along the axis of gender but also along those of race, class, culture and religion. These axes of power structure the more general system of domination in a matrix like fashion, or in what bell hooks calls the interlocking systems of oppression' (Fiorenza, 1992: 123). In this way, her conceptualisation of 'kyriarchy' stands very close to the concept of intersectionality. Similarly to Fiorenza, I wish to relate my analysis of power structures to intersectionality; however, I wish to prioritise gender as a source of inequalities. In the following section I discuss the work of Kandiyoti (1988) and Connell (1985) as alternative routes to building the term intersectional patriarchy.

1.3.1. Revisiting Patriarchy

Before trying to 'revisit' the concept of patriarchy. I first want to state my three reasons for insisting on using the term patriarchy. Firstly, almost all scholars, even those who avoid using the term, agree that the term must be reserved for specific historical structures, namely patrilocal extended households in which senior males hold authority (Acker, 1989; Pollert, 1996; Gottfried, 1998). Many of the women I worked with still live in rural extended family structures of this type and most of the others, who no longer live in extended households, have experienced living in them in their lifetime. My second reason lies in Walby's (2011) statement that the term 'patriarchy' means the same as the phrase 'gender regime' (104). This she defines as 'a set of inter-connected gender relations and gendered institutions that constitutes a system' (Walby, 2009: 301 cited in Walby, 2011: 104). Walby says that although both concepts refer to gender inequalities, she drops patriarchy, as there is 'a tendency for the term 'patriarchy' to be misinterpreted' (ibid.). Dropping the term is not an option for my research since I need the political sharpness of patriarchy (Acker, 1989) to reveal the structures which lead one of the women in this study to say that 'our life is a sip of water in their eyes' – implying both men and the state.

In the following, I look at how Kandiyoti's idea of bargaining with patriarchy and Connell's concept of hegemonic masculinity can together deal with some of the criticisms of patriarchy, such as underestimating women's agency, being fixed, and being biologically reductionist. In the last section, by allowing this refreshed form of patriarchy to cohabit with intersectionality, I try to overcome the problem of universalism. The following three sections are necessary steps to develop the term of 'intersectional patriarchy', so that I am able show how it actually exists and functions.

1.3.1.1. Kandiyoti Finds Women's 'Lost' Agency: Bargaining with Patriarchy

Mohanty's (1984) influential article 'Under Western Eyes' suggested that the homogeneous application of the concept of patriarchy by western feminists contributes to creating the 'image' of 'victim women' in the 'Third World'.

> An analysis of "sexual difference" in the form of a cross-culturally singular, monolithic notion of patriarchy or male dominance leads to the construction of a similarly reductive and homogeneous notion of what I call the "Third World Difference" — that stable, ahistorical something that apparently oppresses most if not all the women in these countries (Mohanty, 1984:335).

By focusing on the texts in Zed Books' Third World Series, she claims that 'in these texts, 'Third World' women are defined as victims of male violence; victims of the colonial process; victims of the Arab familial system; victims of the economic development process; and, finally victims of the Islamic code. According to her, 'western' scholars uncritically adopt the terms and categories that have been constructed by modernist assumptions. For her, 'patriarchy' is one such category. Despite this, she makes an exception for Mies (1982), as she believes that Mies is aware of the ‘local’.

I do not know if Kandiyoti had seen Mohanty’s work before publishing her own paper in the very same year, 1988, but I am reading her work as a response to Mohanty’s criticisms of the deployment of patriarchy in suggesting that women are portrayed as ‘victims’. In her well-known article ‘Bargaining with Patriarchy’, Kandiyoti (1988) demonstrates not only that women are not merely powerless agents of the system but also that patriarchy has multiple forms.

Against a universal understanding of patriarchy, Kandiyoti identifies two forms of patriarchy: ‘the Sub-Saharan African pattern’; and the other, ‘classical patriarchy’, which is characteristic of South and East Asia and the Muslim Middle East, including Turkey, in which senior men have authority over everyone else in the family, including younger men. She underlines that under both these forms of patriarchy, women have opportunities to exercise power and she defines women’s strategies and coping mechanisms within a set of constraints as ‘patriarchal bargains’, which vary depending on women’s class, caste or ethnicity. According to Kandiyoti (1988), patriarchal bargains, which are susceptible to transformation depending on changes in the ‘material bases of the patriarchy’, affect the potential for and forms of women’s active and passive resistance to male domination. She demonstrates that in Sub-Saharan Africa – Kenya, Gambia, Upper Volta, Nigeria – women are responsible for their own and their children’s needs because of polygamy and they resist when they lose control over their own labour. While highlighting how some Yoruba women want to have Christian marriages to escape from the insecurity of polygamy and to obtain men’s support, she also demonstrates how different women apply different coping mechanisms. For me, women’s different coping mechanisms are a sign of the possible cohabitation of patriarchy with intersectionality. This is because intersectionality is used as a way of understanding differences between women.

While Sub-Saharan African women perform more 'active' resistance, in the three generational patrilocal households, which embrace classic patriarchy, women's resistance is more embodied in their internalisation of patriarchy and by playing the game according to its rules. 'The cyclical nature of women's power in the household and their emancipation through inheriting authority as senior women, encourages the internalization of this form of patriarchy by the women themselves' (Kandiyoti, 1988:279). 'They would rather adopt interpersonal strategies that maximise their security through manipulation of the affections of their sons and husbands' (ibid.: 280). Women are sure that power will come into their hands when their sons get married and they become mothers-in-law to the new brides. Hence, when 'the material bases of classical patriarchy' are undermined by 'new market forces, capital penetration in rural areas or processes of chronic immiseration' (ibid.: 279), women often passively resist the demise of classical patriarchy because 'they see the old normative order slipping away from them without any empowering alternatives' (ibid.: 282). The breakdown of classic patriarchy caused by the emancipation of younger men and the separation of their now nuclear families from the paternal household means that their mothers can no longer exercise power over their sons' wives. This leads women to seek alternatives for gaining power, and so they attempt to use the features of this patriarchy in a different context (Kandiyoti, 1988), such as women's veiling when they work outside to 'use every symbolic means at their disposal to signify that they continue to be worthy of protection' (ibid.: 283). By showing that the concept exhibits variations over time and space, she demonstrates that ‘patriarchy’ can be used as an ‘unfixed’ term. Moreover, by saying that young men are also controlled in patriarchal households both by senior men as well as their own mothers, Kandiyoti also opens the door for us to make a link between her conceptualisation and Connell’s ‘hegemonic masculinity’.

1.3.1.2. Connell: It Is Not All About ‘Sex’

Scholars who are not in favour of deploying the term patriarchy suggest that ‘sex’ is not the problem, but the meanings given to the sexes are problematic, and the concept of ‘gender’ is what we should pay attention to (Acker, 1989; Rowbotham, 1981). In ‘The Problem with Patriarchy’, Acker (1989: 238) suggests:

> From asking about how the subordination of women is produced, maintained and changed we move to questions about how gender is involved in processes and structures that previously have been conceived as having nothing to do with gender.

On the other hand, as defenders of the concept, Alexander and Taylor (1981:81) actually express quite a similar view: ‘the concept of patriarchy points to a strategy which will eliminate not men, but masculinity’. They endorse a theory of gender itself, a new way of thinking about reproduction and sexuality, and they purport that such a theory can be articulated through revisiting the literature on social anthropology and psychoanalysis.

Connell’s concept of ‘hegemonic masculinity’ can be applied in order to avoid falling into the pitfall of biological reductionism. Connell defines masculinity as what men are expected to do. Masculinity here is not referring to a certain type of man but, rather, a way that men position themselves through discursive practices (Connell & Meeserschmidth, 2005). Masculinity is contrasted to femininity, and she points out that ‘rather than attempting to define masculinity as an object (a natural character type, a behavioural average, a norm), we need to focus on the process and relationships through which men and women conduct gendered lives’ (Connell, 1995: 71). She underlines that there are multiple masculinities and distinguishes ‘hegemonic masculinity’ from other masculinities, especially subordinated ones. The concept is embodied as the currently most admired way of being a man, and requires all other men to position themselves in relation to it, ideologically legitimating the global subordination of women to men (Connell & Meeserschmidth, 2005). The construction of ‘hegemonic masculinity’ owes much to various subordinated masculinities and other femininities and it is given most cultural and ideological support’ (1987: 187). Connell’s focus on compliance as a base of emphasised femininity can be linked with Kandiyoti’s idea that the internalisation of patriarchy still gives women a chance to exercise power in classical patriarchy. Kandiyoti shows that compliance does not always put women in a disadvantageous position; on the contrary, sometimes it can be the only way to gain power. This can also be read as an indirect criticism of Connell who says that femininities do not have a hegemonic form, since men usually hold social power and that this prevents women from constructing institutionalised power relations over other women, as well as ‘no pressure [being] set up to negate or subordinate other forms of femininity in the way hegemonic masculinity must negate other masculinities’ (Connell, 1987: 187). ‘All forms of femininity in this society are constructed in the context of the overall subordination of women to men. For this reason there is no femininity that holds among women the position held by hegemonic masculinity among men’ (ibid.: 187). Here Connell suggests that power belongs only to men. Kandiyoti, in contrast, while not using these terms, argues that ‘emphasised femininity’ is itself the ‘hegemonic form of femininity' and this can explain why women as well as men sustain patriarchy; compliance can be a way of exercising power. Moreover, other femininities are judged and subordinated by other women who perform 'emphasised femininity' on the grounds of not being 'proper women' because they lack 'femininity' – this includes not being married, not having children, being lesbian, not being naïve 'enough', so on. Although they do not use the concept of emphasised femininity explicitly, many scholars demonstrate how 'women' dominate other 'women', judging them not to be 'proper women' because they do not possess the 'necessary conditions' for being women, such as not being married (Westwood, 1984), being too 'masculine' (Salzinger, 2003) and not having children (Glucksmann, 1982). Although Connell's theory offers the potential to save the concept of patriarchy from biological reductionism – since it brilliantly reveals that the ideology of masculinity and femininity generates differences – her theory, alone, is not enough to save patriarchy from its critics because it ignores the fact that the reins of power are not fixed, and can be changed across space and time and that consequently, masculinities and femininities can also change. At this point, I move on to use the concept of intersectionality to understand the fluidity of gendered categories and suggest that using it in this way can save intersectionality from its critics by avoiding the trap of seeing women as a homogeneous category (Nash, 2008; Yuval Davis, 2006).

1.3.1.3. Intersectionality of Masculinities and Femininities

Here, I argue that intersectional analysis needs more engagement with studies that are based on lived experiences to escape from homogenising women's experiences. This is because such studies can provide a chance to see how 'intersections' are fluid and changeable. Moreover, it can make the intersection of privilege and oppression that is so often missing from intersectional analysis more visible (Nash, 2008). In this way, it can be argued that interaction with ‘patriarchy’ can offer space for intersectional analysis to explore the power relations between the privileged and the oppressed, as in Kandiyoti’s work (1988). In a similar vein to Kandiyoti and in order to analyse the dynamic power relations between workers and managers, women and men, Kurds and Turks, younger people and elders, mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law, I apply the term intersectional patriarchy to show how the masculine-feminine hierarchy is reproduced through the construction of masculinities and femininities in the gendered division of labour. I illustrate this process by offering some of my own data. This data will take the form of excerpts from my field notes, which are denoted by the use of italics. By putting my own data forward, I emphasise the importance of lived experience for drawing together the concepts of intersectionality and patriarchy.

The differing formats of intersectional categories are evident in the differing responses of the people – workers, landowners, and managers – that I worked with. For example, Kurdish men believe that ‘*they are doing a woman’s job – implying tomato picking – since they are Kurdish’*. In this context, being Kurdish is feminised by the type of work, and thus implies labour of low prestige. However, this does not mean that the men receive the same daily wages as the women; women on the land are not paid directly but it is their husbands, fathers, brothers who receive their money because *‘it is shameful for women to think or talk about money with a man, like a man’.* On the other hand, the factory manager shows preferential treatment to the women working in the warehouse because ‘*those women are doing men’s jobs and he ‘hates’ men who prefer not to work’*. He wants to find a man for man’s work, but ‘*men do not want to accept this men’s work since it does not offer men’s pay’.*

‘Religious’ women working in ‘proper women’s work’ – on the assembly line – explained that *‘women working in the warehouse are not ‘women’ since they are as wild* [implying physical strength] *as men’*. ‘*Educated women, however, can operate machinery with the men because they know both the language of men and that of machines’.* It is thus evident that the categories of masculinity and femininity change in different contexts and are associated differentially with women and men and particular jobs; in other words they are fluid.

To expand, let us consider how the reins of power are not fixed, and can be changed across space and time. For instance, when being a Kurd is given as a reason why men are doing women’s work, being Kurdish is seen as feminised and ‘less valuable’ in the eyes of both the Kurdish workers themselves and others. However, being a Kurd becomes more ‘valuable’ in the eyes of both the Kurds and others, in comparison to Syrians who are also searching for work. In this case, landowning families prefer Kurds *‘since Syrian men are as weak as women, but Kurds are really strong since they always eat meat products. Even Kurdish women can work like men’*. This demonstrates how the categories of masculinity are fluid and denote relative differences in social value and power. Here, I must also mention that alleged differences in physical strength are not the only reason why Syrians are not favoured. Landowning families claim that they know Kurds better than Syrians – ‘*at the end of the day, we have lived together for hundreds of years’.* They can communicate with Kurds but due to language barriers, they *‘cannot speak with Syrians like men’*[14,15].

---

[14] ‘Speak like a man’ is a Turkish idiom – *adam gibi konuşmak* – which refers to good and ‘proper’ communication.

[15] This is valid for when I did my fieldwork on the land in 2013. At that time, Syrians were not that big a group in Turkey and *dayıbaşı* did not employ them as groups. Instead, they took them on within other groups. But, this year (2015), Syrian workers have increasingly begun to be hired in group form.

Thus differences in physical strength is not the only reason given, but it often leads to the association that being Kurdish, in comparison with Syrian, leads to being stronger and more ‘masculine’ but, in the context of doing ‘women’s work’, being Kurdish is associated with femininity and weakness. As Salzinger points out ‘”feminine” at one level can be “masculine” at the next’ (2003; 15). Indeed, the intersections of gender, class, ethnicity, education and age, I focus on in this study, are variously coded as ‘masculine’ or ‘feminine’ but it is apparent that masculinity always dominates. It is for this reason that I retain the concept of patriarchy but expand it, through the use of intersectionality, to include masculinities and femininities. I argue that the intersection of categories – gender, age, class, ethnicity, education – creates fluid categories of masculinity and femininity but that, throughout, hegemonic masculinity governs femininity.

The above quotes taken from the people I worked with do not only give us clues about the shifting nature of masculinities and femininities, but they also indicate the fluid nature of the gendered divisions of labour, which persists through the ideologies of masculinities and femininities. Cockburn in *Brothers* (1983) and her follow up work, *Machinery of Dominance* (1985), demonstrates the role of technology in constructing masculinities and femininities in the work place. In her analysis she builds upon the gender division of labour. She focuses on the ‘gendered’ workplace and labour process as a site of the (re)production of masculinities. While in *Machinery of Dominance*, she asserts that as the relations of technology are masculine, men continue to hold the top positions, in *Brothers,* Cockburn (1983) draws attention to male workers’ reactions in the printing industry when they find that their jobs become less ‘manly’ because of the transition to computerised technology. Even though their work becomes less masculine, they are not eager to accept women as colleagues.

Cockburn (1983, 1985) and Salzinger (2003) both demonstrate the persistence of the gendered division of labour through changing definitions of masculinities and femininities. Masculinities and femininities, which are used by management to manage the work force, can assume different forms. For example, in one factory Salzinger studied, she found that ‘femininity’ is absent as both men and women are addressed with masculine categories and this drives competition over productivity. She argues that ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’ do not have fixed meanings, although she claims that the ‘production process marked as “feminine” (“*assembly”*) is replacing a previous process marked as masculine (*“manufacturing”*)’ (26). Her study is very important as it shows us that masculinities and femininities are not limited to people but also are present in things, machines, assembly lines, uniforms and tomatoes. They are assigned to people and things and related to their interactions. Moreover, her work shows us that masculinities are not always linked to men and femininities are not always linked to women.

While Cockburn applies patriarchy in her analysis by examining the domination of masculine ideologies over femininity, the focal point of Salzinger’s study is gender regimes. What Salzinger shows us in terms of the unfixed nature of masculinities and femininities is very similar to what I have indicated above in my fieldwork notes. On the other hand, what Cockburn demonstrates about the ‘patriarchal structure’ constructing masculinities and femininities is also very similar to the field notes I cited above. There is a clear overlap between their studies and my study. So, I argue that neither patriarchy nor intersectionality alone enable us to analyse the entangled, dynamic nature of masculinities and femininities and hence, of the gendered division of labour. However, bringing them together as ‘intersectional patriarchy’ might offer us a chance to recognise:

(1) the operation, fluidity and plurality of masculinities and femininities, and thus, patriarchies;
(2) differences between women living in different patriarchies and their dynamic positions in power hierarchies;
(3) the dynamic nature of the gendered division of labour.
(4) the overlapping relationship of production and reproduction relations.

In the following section I outline this overlapping of production and reproduction relations by tackling the literature on feminist labour process theory through the lens of intersectional patriarchy.

1.4. Feminist Analysis of Labour Processes via Intersectional Patriarchy

This section builds on Beechey’s statement made in 1979 that making the family-production relationship the object of analysis, was a requirement for building an analysis of feminist labour processes. In the following sections, under the umbrella of ‘family’, I first look more closely at the debate around the relationship between productive and reproductive relations and then, turn my attention to the debate concerning the ‘gender division of labour’ as a core of feminist labour process analysis. In doing so, I focus on the two main concepts of labour process theory: control and consent. Thus, I demonstrate the necessity of deploying intersectional patriarchy to revisit labour process theory.

1.4.1. Familial (re)production of (re)production relations

Burawoy's study (1979) *Manufacturing Consent* is very important in the labour process theory literature as it brings workers' agency to the top of the agenda. He defines the concept of 'consent' as an outwardly voluntary acceptance of capitalist production relations and puts it at the centre of labour process analysis in contemporary society. He shows how workers' consent is produced through what he later characterised as a 'factory regime' (Burawoy, 1985). According to Burawoy (1985) factory regimes can be divided into two generic types – despotic and hegemonic factory regimes – which link the shop floor to changing forms of class domination. Whereas in Marx's day, 'coercion' was the chief mechanism behind the reproduction of relations of production, in the 1970 study conducted by Burawoy in US factories, workers' consent was underpinned by state-guaranteed minimum rights and the possibility of advancement through a firm's internal labour market and competition within it, which helped to deflect united opposition against management. Thus, workers have been persuaded to collaborate in the pursuit of their employers' profits voluntarily via the construction of 'consent' on the shop floor. Here, we could argue that there is a link between his argument and Kandiyoti's (1988), since she engages with women's outwardly voluntary internalisation of patriarchal relations in the home and how this creates consent to move up the ladder of power hierarchies. In a way that is very similar to Burawoy's argument, Kandiyoti shows us that daughters-in-law cooperate with their mothers-in-law on the basis that even though they are controlled now, they are nonetheless promised future power. This mirrors Burawoy's idea that workers will gain future power as so long as they cooperate with management in the hope of promotion. The similarity in the way that both daughters-in-law and workers gain power evinces the similarity in the nature and operation of the relations of production and reproduction.

Feminist critics of Burawoy’s influential account of factory production argue that he pays too little attention to the identities workers bring with them to work, with particular emphasis on the aspects of their external consciousness and orientations with respect to gender (Davies, 1990; Glucksmann, 1982, 1990; Lee, 1998; Pollert, 1981; Salzinger, 2003; Westwood, 1984). When Salzinger (2003) demonstrated how femininities and masculinities shape and are shaped differently in the different factories of the *maquiladora* industry of Mexico, she actually implicitly revised Burawoy’s theory through showing that to obtain workers’ consent, different factories deploy femininities and masculinities differently. She related that, 'in every factory, gender has a distinctive architecture, structured and bounded by managers' ongoing, sometimes contradictory, efforts to constitute productive workers' (Salzinger, 2003:5). It is this fluidity of masculinities and femininities that make the application of intersectional patriarchy necessary to grasp these relations.

The tradition of feminist scholarship on women’s work also highlighted that factory regimes are also 'gender regimes'; that the deployment of ‘gender’ is a regulator of the labour process (Acker, 1990; Cockburn; 1983, Pollert; 1981, Glucksmann; 1990; 1992). My study also argues that there are distinct ways in which the consent of women workers is produced within production relations in which the features of a ‘hegemonic regime’ in Burawoy’s sense cannot be found (Davies, 1990). For instance, in Turkey, workers do not benefit from the trade union movement, nor are workers’ legal rights implemented. Nor, is there much opportunity for promotion, since women are effectively barred from positions above that of forewoman.

However, legal rights or the conditions of the labour market are not the only mechanisms with which to determine what workers do on the shop floor, but reproduction relations must also be analysed to understand who we are and, thus how we create consent. For instance, based on a comparative analysis of a factory in Hong Kong, and one in Shenzhen, Mainland China, which are both owned by the same company, Lee (1998: 21) demonstrated that workers' conditions of dependence (for the reproduction of labour power) are not always primarily dependent on macro institutions. She found that in the factories she studied:

> …[W]omen workers could not depend on the state or enterprise for reproducing their labour power. Instead, they depend on either localistic networks or families and kinship networks, both of which are organised by gender and are embedded in the workings of the particular labour market (ibid.).

Thus, the factories' regimes were characterised by the terms 'localistic despotism' and 'familial hegemony'. Whereas women working under the regime of 'localistic despotism' were controlled by patriarchal localistic networks, (in which male relatives had control over women workers), women working under the regime of 'familial hegemony' had more autonomy as control was mediated through a set of familialistic practices. The factory in Hong Kong organises its labour process through taking into account familial responsibilities of women workers, who are mostly available in the factory's labour pool.

Other scholars also point to the importance of 'familial networks' in the recruitment of women workers (Elson & Pearson, 1981; Dedeoğlu, 2010; 2012; White, 2004; Wolf, 1994); the deployment of 'familial elements' in gaining control over the shop floor (Ecevit, 1996); and/or women workers' application and creation of 'familial networks' as a strategy to cope with the difficulties of work. As Ngai (2005: 75) states in the case of factory women in a Chinese company who also have rural backgrounds, although the women 'might run away from their village to resist patriarchal controls either from their fathers or husbands, the rural women immediately reconstituted new familial or kin enclaves to protect themselves'. Kabeer (2000) demonstrates how garment factories in Dhaka deploy 'familial elements' to recruit and manage women's labour by creating the image of the factory as a 'protected environment' for women. For instance, factory life is domesticated through using kinship terminology for the relationships on the shop floor. Despite their different emphasis on points related to the deployment of 'family' on the shop floor, all provide evidence of how the concept of 'family' could be interpreted as a means of control by management and as a means of generating consent. This is in addition to how 'familial relations' are used by women in their own strategies to protect themselves, however, it also continues to serve as an indirect basis for reconstituting patriarchy in the workplace (Ecevit, 1991; Elson & Pearson, 1981; Ngai, 2005; Kabeer, 2000).

1.5. Conclusion: To say something 'more'

Hopefully, at this point – at the end of this chapter – the reader is convinced that the following chapters will deliver a sociological analysis of 'women and tomatoes in their 'place', Turkey', following the rubric of the research questions below:

> 1) What is the gendered division of labour in tomato production in Turkey, in the case of agriculture, manufacturing and the domestic sphere?

2) How is the gendered division of labour shaped by global capitalism and the local dynamics of ‘intersectional patriarchy’?

3) How is workers’ consent generated? What kinds of resistance are possible?

4) How do the relations of production and reproduction intertwine?

My aim is to say something ‘more’ than what has already been said about gender in global production. I know that my study is just a sip of water – as the women in this study say of their lives and how they are seen by men and politicians – in the enormous literature on women’s work and this puts me in the very difficult position in of saying something ‘more’. Perhaps I could have just said that nobody has worked with the women who are in this study, working in tomato production and processing for the Japanese market in Turkey, and hence everything I say contributes something new and ‘more’ to the literature. But, contributing something ‘more’ to the literature does not only refer to differences of place, people or things in terms of their different contexts or the results of these differences in terms of social, economic and political contexts or vice versa. Rather, saying that something is the ‘same’ across and within those differences leads us to saying something ‘more’ sociologically, and consequently we could have a chance to talk about being human, and particularly for this study, being a ‘woman’ and even more specifically, ‘being gendered’. In this sense, I have sought out the connections between what has already been done in the literature and the ways in which I can make connections between earlier studies and my own to try and build the concept of ‘intersectional patriarchy’. I use the term intersectional patriarchy to capture the various and changing ways in which masculine domination of femininity is shaped by ethnicity, class, age and education and how this, in turn shapes both gendered divisions of labour in tomato production and gendered relations of power, i.e. patriarchy, within households.

This chapter has consisted of three sections. The first one focused on conceptual frameworks dealing with women's work in global production; here I suggested that it was necessary to integrate the concepts of relations of reproduction and gender identities into Global Commodity Chain analysis. I argued that this is not only necessary to understand global production more fully, but also to put the interactions between the 'local' and the 'global' at the centre of an analysis of global production. In the second section, I attempted to develop my term of intersectional patriarchy [16] by relying on Connell's and Kandiyoti's analyses of gender relations. In the last section, I aimed to link this concept with Burawoy's accounts of class relations and factory work. I have tried to show the relevance of the concepts of emphasised femininity and compliance, agency and bargaining with patriarchy and consent and control, how these concepts are linked and how these links might contribute to the development of a feminist labour process analysis.

---

[16] Starting from chapter 6, I conceptualise the term *el âlem* as a material manifestation of intersectional patriarchy.

Chapter 2

‘Thankful’ Women From the ‘Centre of the World’: Turkey and Her People

2.1. Introduction: History of the world around me

To introduce Turkey, I begin by drawing from the world that surrounded me when I was growing up there. I believe that talking about the social, political and economic patterns of a country can be comprehended more deeply by tracing its impact on people’s lives. This chapter primarily attempts to highlight the changing patterns of women’s labour and the socio-economic transformation of the rural population in relation to the Kurdish question through exploring two main ideologies of the Turkish Republic: Kemalism and Political Islam.

In the following sections, I first identify the ideological process of creating the ‘Turkish’ citizen through Kemalist ideology, drawing on my own experiences and interpretations of the Turkish education system in the hope that it will provide background information about how people are expected to perceive the social, economic and political changes that have occurred in the country, especially in relation to my informants in the factory and on the land. I highlight the experiences my mother had as a ‘housewife’ to introduce the possibilities and limitations facing uneducated, rural women’s labour in an urban context. Through relating my educated father’s experiences in paid employment, as well as offering insights from his disputes with my uncle (father’s brother), who has an opposing political perspective, I will attempt to trace the economic and political transformations that have shaped the country until the 2000s. Then, I will stop using my own personal history and experiences and offer an account of the Turkish political economy under AKP rule, which underpins the capitalisation of Turkish agriculture.

Despite using my own experiences as a starting point, I hope that my account will not be judged to be overly personal or lacking in academic rigour[17]. As I argue throughout this study, the 'personal' can be seen to be 'academic' when it provides a balanced narrative incorporating multiple perspectives, both internal and external to the experience, and through an awareness of which of 'us' is talking at particular moments.

2.2. Kemalism and its Women

At first glance, this section might seem strange in a thesis on gender relations and women's work. But in order to understand the experiences of Kurdish women, especially those with whom I worked, and their relationship with local Turkish women workers, looking at the construction of and changes in the hegemonic ideology of Turkey, Kemalism, is vital. Therefore, I start from the place where most Turkish citizens begin to learn about Kemalism officially': state schooling[18].

I began my schooling when I was 5 years old and continued until the age of 17 when I went to university. My education was in keeping with other students in the centralised Turkish education system, whose main aim was to instill the principles established by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic (1923): these principles are those of 'nationalism', 'populism', 'secularism', 'republicanism', 'statism' and 'revolutionism' (MEB, 1983) and are the kernels of Kemalist ideology.

---

[17] See Appendix C: 'The timeline of Turkish History' for a historical orientation. In this chapter, I cover the last 30 years, but in Appendix C you can see the transformation from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic.

[18] The majority of the women in this study completed their compulsory education (all of the Turkish women and more than half of the Kurdish women). All of them know how to read and write Turkish with the exception of one Kurdish woman.

I was taught that Turkey possessed the most precious geographical location in the world. Everything bad that had happened there was due to other countries coveting her ‘perfect’ position, which is at the nexus between Asia and Europe. This ‘perfect’ geographical position is also the reason why Turkey has a lot of ‘enemies’.

Imagine that your ‘perfect’ country is surrounded by ‘enemies’, all of whom are waiting for a fatal opening through which to strike. To illustrate this thinking, Turks have a popular saying: ‘there is no friend of a Turk, apart from another Turk’. Indeed, there is no other option but to hold together as fellow Turks. ‘Fortunately’, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk says *‘*a Turk is worth the world*’*. That is why, each morning of the school day, I proudly shouted along with the other students, ‘my existence shall be dedicated to the Turkish existence. How happy is the one who says “I am a Turk!”’[19]. When I learned that I was not a Turk but a Bosnian, however, I cried to my teacher, saying that I can’t take the oath with my friends anymore[20] since I am not a ‘Turk’. Fortunately, my teacher consoled me by saying: ‘of course, we are all not Turks, but we all feel like Turks’. The only thing I should do is to be ‘thankful’ enough to Turkey for accepting me. To demonstrate my thankfulness, I had to study as much as I could to be a good Turkish citizen, and through this I could automatically pay my debt to the country for accepting my family’s presence.

What my teacher told me was a reflection of Kemalist nationalism, which is the official nationalism of Turkey according to Bora (2003). It is identified mainly as being bound up with Atatürk’s statement that ‘the nations who build up the Turkish Republic belong to the Turkish nation’, despite their different racial backgrounds. It also refers to internalising the Kemalist ideology, which entreated people to be faithful followers of Atatürk's principles and reforms (Bora, 2003). Mustafa Kemal's reforms refer to a series of changes in the social, legal and political system of the country in order to create a 'modern' and 'western' Republic (See the chronology of reforms in Appendix C: The timeline of Turkish History, page 358). For example, the caliphate was abolished in 1924; the state declared secularism in 1928; and in 1926 French and Swiss penal codes were adopted as part of the constitution. Similar to other nation-building projects[21], women are central in the construction process of Kemalist ideology via its modern – egalitarian – reforms (Kandiyoti, 1991). In Kemalist ideology, the outlook of women symbolises the outlook of the nation and thus they must be modernised[22] (Kandiyoti, 1991; 1995; Sancar, 2012). For instance, western clothing for women was encouraged and veiling discouraged (Hat Law, 1925); women were given the right to vote in 1934 (one of the earliest dates for women's voting in Europe). The Kemalists attempted to construct Turkish women as 'modernised, westernised, educated and secular' thereby erasing all other femininities (Durakbaşa, 1998). Turkish scholars call this particular women's image of Kemalism 'Daughters of the Republic' (Durakbaşa, 1998; Kandiyoti, 1996; 1997; Arat, 1998a). In order to achieve this ideal, Kemalists tried to increase women's participation in public life: the proportion of women working in highly skilled jobs, such as law and medicine, for example, was the highest in Europe (Abadan-Unat, 1991; Acar, 1994). Motherhood and marriage were de-emphasised and women were expected to adopt more masculine character traits. Durakbaşa (1998) suggests that although some called the early years of the republic feminist, because it allowed for some middle-class, educated women to enter the public domain, Kemalist ideology did not alter the patriarchal norms of morality. Rather, it mostly maintained the basic cultural conservatism about male and female relations. It did not propose the erosion of asymmetric power relations between the sexes; rather it tried to asexualise the public domain through emphasising women's masculine traits. Moreover, this was mostly applied to educated, secular, republican, urban women.

---

[19] This is the last part of a student oath; it was compulsory to recite this each morning, in every school at all levels of the education system (from primary to high school) in both state and private schools, until 2012.

[20] One day each week during my fourth grade in primary school, my friend and I read the oath using a microphone to the other students, who then repeated it.

---

[21] For a detailed discussion about women's place in the construction of nationalist discourses, see Kandiyoti (1991) and Yuval- Davis (1997).

[22] For a detailed discussion about 'modernity' in Turkey, see Bozdoğan and Kasaba (1997). In this volume, Kandiyoti examines the sexuality, family relations and gender identities that are central to discourses about Turkish modernity.

Kemalists were aware of the fact that Turkey was still a rural country when the republic was established and that the majority of women were rural and uneducated. They therefore created a second image of women which Inciroglu describes as the 'physically and emotionally strong, rural but wise women of Anatolia[23]' (İncirlioğlu, 1998: 200) – *Anadolu Kadını* – 'Anatolian Women'. Incirlioğlu (1998) shows how Kemalism portrays a powerful image of rural Turkish women as the carriers of the pre-Islamic spirit of the 'authentic Turkish' culture (200), in which women are always shoulder to shoulder with men while working or in the political arena. These wise, powerful and confident rural Turkish women are mostly portrayed as mothers of the nation (White, 2012).

On the other hand, it was evident that not all segments of society supported the Kemalist regime and its reforms. Therefore, as İncirlioğlu (1998) states, Kemalist ideology constructs 'other' rural women as 'backward', 'submissive' 'traditional' and 'primitive'. These adjectives are mostly associated with Islam, which has become the core of the counter-hegemonic struggle against Kemalism in Turkey in recent years and is symbolised by the use of the headscarf. The 1982 constitution that was drawn up following the 1980 coup banned the headscarf in the public domain. As a result, the headscarf has become a means of resisting dominant Kemalist discourses. The bodies of the ‘primitive and backward’ women who wear headscarves have become the central focus in this arena of struggle in order to reassert their own femininities[24].

---

[23] Anatolia refers to the geographical location known in antiquity as Asia Minor. The region is surrounded by the Black Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Aegean Sea. Kemalists intentionally emphasise and encourage the use of the term 'Anatolia' as they want to draw attention to Turkey's pre-Islamic heritage.

Although the power blocks are shifting in Turkey, the idea of being thankful to the country stays the same. One still has to be ‘thankful’ and ‘proud of’ the country not only because you have to internalise the idea of paying a moral debt to the country, but also because being marked as ‘being ungrateful’ has serious consequences, even dangerous ones. The country is not the only thing one should be thankful to, but women must be grateful to men, workers must be grateful to their employers. Such gratefulness is fundamental to the capacity of the state to govern around 75 million people, seeming to offer people the opportunity to survive in very basic conditions. Citizens should be grateful to the state as it gives them a place to live and the right to earn their living; workers should be thankful to employers because they earn money thanks to the jobs that employers offer them; women must be grateful to male members of the family because men earn the money to live as well as protecting women from being sexually harassed by outsider men. Therefore, the rule of life in Turkey is very basic: one cannot ‘live’ in this country without being grateful.

---

[24] Based on these discussions in Turkish scholarly literature, I highlight the three contrasting images of women in Kemalist ideology to examine the gendered factory regime in chapter 5. The first image is educated ‘daughters of the Republic’, the second one is ‘wise Anatolian women’, and the third one is ‘backward religious women’. These images are used in the same way in Turkish society.

2.3. Some ‘ungrateful’ residents of an apartment in İstanbul: the ‘Kurdish problem’ in Turkey

Until 1997, my parents and I lived in one of the most crowded neighbourhoods of İstanbul, ‘Bağcılar’, with a population of around 754,000 within an area of 22 km^2 (TÜİK, 2015b). This neighbourhood was home to migrants from all around Turkey and was an ideal place to see the lives of rural migrants and their city-born or grown-up children. In our fifteen-flat apartment building, none of the adults was born in İstanbul. My parents had come there from one of Bursa’s villages (in the same region as İstanbul – ‘Marmara region’ – the most industrialised and wealthy region of Turkey, see below map 2.1.), others came from villages on the east Black Sea coast of Turkey, one of the regions with a very high unemployment rate, second only to the south-eastern region. Kurds came from the south-eastern region mainly because of the military conflict between the Turkish army and the PKK in 1980s and 1990s. With this profile, our apartment reflected the two main social phenomena of Turkey since the 1950s, ‘excessive’ immigration from rural to urban areas[25] and the ‘Kurdish problem’.


BLACK SEA
Marmara Region
İstanbul
SEA OF MARMARA
Bursa
Black Sea Region
Ankara
Central Anatolia Region
Eastern Anatolia Region
İzmir
Aegean Region
Southeastern Anatolia Region
Mediterranean Region
MEDITERRANEAN SEA

Map 2.1: Regions of Turkey. Source: Author's Drawing

---

[25] Here, I refer to immigration from rural villages to big cities. According to Keyder & Yenal (2013), this trend has begun to shift in recent years and people are beginning to move to towns – *kasaba* – rather than big cities.

Until the 1980s, the reason for migration was mostly related to the mechanisation of Turkish agriculture. However, it was also due to the development of highways and rapid population growth (Gürel, 2011). Small-scale farmers, who could not buy the agricultural machinery that bigger farmers could, tended to move to big cities. In addition to this, Karpat (1976) also pointed to the increasing availability of employment opportunities in industry in urban areas. Thus, while around 60% of the population was living in rural areas in the 1970s, this proportion had decreased to approximately 41% by the 1990s, as seen in Figure 2.2 below (TCKB, 2012; TÜİK, 2015b). The consequences of mass migration from rural to urban areas in Turkey have been widely discussed in the literature as increasing urban sprawl, *Gecekondulaşma*, and leading to difficult working and living conditions for migrants and related issues pertaining to adaption and assimilation (Karpat, 1976; Keleş, 1983; Kıray, 1981)[26].



Graph 2.1: Changes on rural and urban population (TUİK, 2015b)

These early studies of migration as well as rural transformation did not take into account migrants' different ethnicities or the differences in agricultural dynamics in the country. Kurds and Turks had been living in different agrarian systems (Yalçın-

---

[26] For a detailed discussion about the mass immigration from rural to urban in Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s, see Karpat 1976, Keleş 1983, Kıray 1981.

Heckmann, 2012). In southeastern Turkey, Kurds had largely lived under a system called *Aşiret* in which the lands in a particular region are owned by a very large extended family that includes many smaller extended families. A group of mainly senior men from these families govern the people in the region who are bound up with each other through kinship ties. Most of the time, the area in which the extended family has power is bigger than a village. Yalçın-Hekmann's (2012) pioneering study demonstrates how kinship relations and economic organisation are bound up with each other in these communities. It is also evident that Kurds were not the only ones working on lands under the rule of a senior man. Turks also worked for an *ağa,* a senior man who owned the majority of land in a village. This system, deriving from previous feudal systems of landownership, began to decline in central and southwest Anatolia as a result of increasing employment opportunities in urban areas in the 1960s[27]. The important difference between these 'feudal' agrarian systems is mostly the place of kinship ties in constructing the group. While the former one – *Aşiret* – consists of people who have kinship ties with each other and whose class positions depend on their positioning in the hierarchical ladder, in the latter one – *Ağalık* – most of the time, there is one local landowning family who controls most of the lands and there are no kinship relations between this family and rural 'peasants'. Boratav (2004) makes a distinction between these two agrarian systems and 'wealthy landowning families'. For Boratav (2004), 'Wealthy landowning families' are more prevalent in western Turkey where the majority of the villagers also own their own plots of land to varying degrees. Boratav (2004) emphasises differences between *ağa* (of *aşiret* or of a village) and members of a 'wealthy landowning family' by pointing out that labour operates differently under these two systems. Boratav shows that under an *ağalık* both landowning families and local workers work the lands together.

---

[27] The novel, *Mehmed My Hawk* by one of Turkey's most renowned novelists, Yasar Kemal, 1955, (2013) offers an important account of this agrarian system, which is known as *Ağalik*, wherein the local landowner or *Ağa* controls the lands.

Turning back to rural-urban migration, Turkish scholars have mostly preferred to focus on trends in migration, rather than concerning themselves with the rural environment from which migrants come (Özuğurlu, 2011). Rural migrants were constructed as people without history; they have mostly appeared in academic works only in relation to the problems they create, such as urban sprawl or their 'adaptation' to urban life. Therefore, such studies mostly focused on *hemşericilik*[28]: local networks between people who were born in the same place, people who arrived from the same place and people who have a tendency to live in the same places when they migrate (Karpat, 1976; Kıray, 1981). Apparently, the neighbourhood in which we lived in İstanbul also exhibited this trend. My father's cousins lived in the next apartment, and our neighbours' relatives or *hemşerileri* (plural) also lived in close proximity to us. There was no one from central Anatolia, or the south coast of Turkey, but mainly from the Black Sea coast and from Southern Anatolia.

In the 1990s, 'Bağcılar', the neighbourhood in İstanbul we lived in, did not consist of slums, but of newly built and cramped apartments. The official website of the district describes 'Bağcılar' in the 1990s as 'a big village with no infrastructure, streets and roads full of mud. This improper urbanisation meant that our municipality [referring to'Bağcılar'] faced many great difficulties in the process of modern urbanisation beginning from 1992' (TÜİK, 2015b). The population of this big village was categorised as Turkish 'working class'. But, there were no industries in the neighbourhood. None of the women in our apartment building worked outside the home and it was not common for other women in the district to work either. Although official statistics do not tell the whole story, the district mainly consisted of a conservative population. My mother, who never previously donned a headscarf, began to wear one while she was in and around the district. She would put on her headscarf and when we got within forty minutes walking distance of my aunt's house, she removed it. My aunt did the same when she came to our house. 'Bağcılar' was a typical example of the conservative neighbourhoods in which rural women were controlled within their 'familial' and 'localistic' networks. This situation can explain the low rate of paid employment of female workers in Turkey in these areas. Indeed, this form of urbanisation can be seen in the dramatic decline in women's employment: in the 1970s and 1980s, women's employment decreased from around 50% in the 1960s to 30%, see in graph 2.2. below (TÜİK, 2011a).

---

[28] *Hemşeri* and *hemşericilik* can enable us to understand more about the supportive networks of Turks. But, among Kurds, *aşiret* is more appropriate to understand these relationships.

This seems to mirror what Boserup (1970) forecast for women in developing countries when they first migrate from rural areas. She offered a 'U' shaped model to understand the trends in women's employment. The bottom of the 'U' shows the shift from female majority farming systems to urban employment opportunities for women, when they migrate to towns and cities. But later, after such a sharp decline, as a result of foreign investment's drive for cheap labour and new opportunities in urban areas for obtaining resources, such as education, she argued that women's employment rate would increase dramatically. While the evidence from other developing countries especially in South East Asia and Latin America confirms her thesis (Pearson, 2000), Boserup's model cannot be applied to the case of Turkish women (Buğra & Yakut-Cakar, 2010; İlkkaracan, 2012; Toksöz 2007; 2011). As seen in Graph 2.2, their employment rate in urban areas has increased by only 8% since 1988 while during this time foreign investments increased from 19% in 1988 to

28.3% in 2012 (TMCB, 2012). Moreover, this participation in the labour market is also limited to certain sectors – essentially, 'socially approved' occupations (Makal & Toksöz 2012). Women are still directly excluded from some jobs, because *el âlem*[29], other people, do not find these jobs to be 'appropriate' or 'respectable' for women.



Graph 2.2: Women's employment rate by urban and rural areas between 1988 and 2013

Official statistics and academic studies of women in Turkey confirm that in the 1990s, rural, uneducated women were confined to the home even when they had moved to urban areas, much like my mother. Furthermore, educated women in urban areas were more likely to be employed in paid employment (Acar, 1994). Many rural women living in the city, on the other hand, tended to fear the outside world. My mother, for example, was not fond of the world beyond the apartment. Indeed, she adored the inside world of the apartment block, particularly her neighbours. They organised *gün*; this is a direct translation of the word 'day' and refers to regular gatherings of women in the home for tea and home-made aperitifs such as bulgur salad (*kısır)*, pastry (*börek)*, biscuits and so on. They also exchanged gold or money (it could be also foreign currency, in my childhood the German 'mark' was mostly used). This was discussed in White's (1994) study on women's work in Turkey, which pointed out the way in which '*gün*'s' – she translated *gün* as 'gold day' – were a way for women to save money for household goods and expenditure. When women came together for tea or coffee, they always had their lacework to hand. Some of the women did lacework to sell to others, while some made elaborate lace tablecloths and other such home wares for their sisters' or daughters' dowries '*çeyiz'.* My mother made lace items to sell in Germany. One of our distant relatives had migrated to Germany years before. When she came to visit Turkey during her summer holidays she took back with her what my mother had made during the year and sold it in Germany to Turkish women who did not have the time for lacework, as they were busy working in paid employment, mostly in the German factories. When, each year, my mother's money arrived, she bought a gold bracelet as a way to save to buy a house in the future. Lacemaking was a popular way of earning money for 'housewives' in Turkey (Çınar, 1991; Lordoğlu, 1990; White, 2004). This is similar to other 'developing' countries such as India (Lessinger, 1990; Mies, 1982; Vera-Sanso, 1995) and it still is. Consequently I consider homeworking in some detail in the following section.

---

[29] *El âlem* is a commonly used term to refer to what other people think. I will explain it in detail in chapter 6 where I will discuss the term in relation to the operation and function of 'intersectional patriarchy'.

The harmony women experienced in the apartment block did not exist in wider society. The 1990s were the years when the war between the Turkish army and the PKK reached its peak[30]. This conflict is also the reason for most of the Kurdish people in this study lacking the formal qualifications that might enable them to seek work beyond seasonal migrant agricultural labour. They were mostly children or teenagers in the 1980s or 1990s, at a time when continuing compulsory education was difficult, especially in the rural southeast (Akın & Danışman, 2011).

---

[30] It still plays a major role in the life of Kurdish citizens. For instance, in the last three months of 2015, many Kurds living in the south-eastern parts of the country have had to migrate to western Turkey because of the continuous conflict, including some of the people with whom I worked on the land during my fieldwork.

There are different explanations for the Kurdish rebellion and the emergence of ‘Kurdish nationalism’. The Turkish state promoted the idea that ‘international powers’ were sponsoring the PKK and trying to divide the country. Some other explanations focus on the asymmetric economic relations experienced in all the regions of the country and emphasise that Kurds live in the most disadvantaged regions of the country (Strohmeier & Yalçın-Heckmann, 2013). However, history tells us that Kurds’ uprisings date back to the establishment of the modern Turkish Republic. Kurds have lived in the region, called Kurdistan for centuries, which is now partly located in Turkey. Arabs, Armenians, Seljuk Turks and, finally, Ottomans have invaded the same region for centuries. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Kurdish region was divided into four. Kurds are now living in Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq (See Appendix C on page 358 for the chronology of the Kurdish movement in Turkey). Studies have proposed that as the assimilation policies of the Turkish state increased over the years, the movement for Kurdish freedom in Turkey became stronger (Besikçi, 1969). The military, following coups in 1960, 1971 and 1980, did not hesitate to persecute anybody showing any sympathy with the Kurdish movement (Aydin, 2005). In the period between the 1960s and 2000s, the Turkish state changed the names of Kurdish villages to Turkish names; it banned speaking and publishing in Kurdish, education in Kurdish, defending oneself in Kurdish in courts and giving Kurdish names to children. Even recording a song and singing in Kurdish was banned until the 2000s. Indeed, according to scholars, the emergence of the PKK was related to these traditionally heavy-handed state policies against

Kurdish self-expression (Strohmeier & Yalçın-Heckmann, 2013; Yeğen 1996). Apart from the peak of the war with the PKK in 1990s, the Kurdish crisis was also a big part of the agenda of parliament. In 1993, for threatening the unity of the Turkish State, three parliamentarians of the DEP (Kurdish 'Democratic Party') were arrested in Parliament and sentenced to eleven years in prison.

These events took place largely beyond the four walls of our apartment in 'Bağcılar', but one day a husband brought the conflict into our homes. After watching the news on TV, our top floor neighbour Sevim's husband began swearing at Kurds in general from his balcony. Unfortunately, they lived next door to a Kurdish family and they heard his rant. Their conversation began on the balconies and continued into the corridors of the apartment. The fight became larger when relatives or *hemşeri* from other flats in the apartment also got involved, and even other people from the streets. In the end, three men were stabbed. While they were fighting, alongside the swearing and crying of women and children, the words 'traitors' and 'tyrants' were heard flying through the air. After this, my parents decided to go back to their home city of Bursa, the fourth biggest city in Turkey, which did not receive nearly as many migrants as İstanbul[31]. There everyone 'was like us'; they had migrated from the Balkans during the last 50 years or they were already there, that is, they were locals. The one explanation my father gave me about our moving was, 'İstanbul was too crowded with lots of different people', and, as he hoped, I stopped seeing Kurds around me for a long time.

---

[31] According to TÜİK (2014d)'s latest statistics, Bursa has now taken in more immigrants than İstanbul.

2.4. For a Day, My Mother Stops Being 'Thankful': Turkey's First Direct 'Homeworking' Project

Moving to Bursa did not make structural changes to my mother's 'working life', which I look at in detail in this section in order to show the available forms of women's labour for global production in Turkey.

Like many Turkish 'housewives', my mother continued to do domestic tasks and to make her lacework in Bursa. However, she also looked after my paternal uncle's son and my paternal aunt's son, both of whom came from our village to Bursa for their schooling. Looking after the children of your husband's brothers and sisters was a very common practice in the 1990s, if parts of your husband's family was still living in the countryside. My mother was no exception, my other aunts living in the city were also looking after their husband's siblings' children, and many of our neighbours were too. But my mother did not 'work' in paid employment, until one day in 1997, when my father came home with a brochure with a headline stating 'a factory in every home', and he convinced my mother that they could earn money with this 'opportunity'.

A national company was selling Swedish knitting machines with a three-year job guarantee, providing women with free training courses with the promise that, as soon as they finished the course, the company would provide fabrics and patterns so women could work at home to produce the goods. My mother and paternal aunt accepted, and they became part of Turkey's first large homeworking scheme (Koç, 2001). They bought the machines by borrowing money from our relatives in Germany. When my mother and aunt finished their course, they immediately received patterns and materials and the company told them that they had to finish an exact amount of arms by an exact time, otherwise they would be paid less. The company paid workers by piece rates. To reach the quota, my mother was working almost 16 hours a day and as my father had found this ‘perfect’ job opportunity, he also worked on the machine when he came home.

With time, the company began to give out more difficult patterns, which were time-consuming, and reaching the quota in the agreed time became increasingly difficult. The company did not bring the yarn and other materials or collect the completed work from our home, instead my mother had to collect the materials and take the finished items to their offices in person. These loads were heavy and the office was far from our house. One day, I went with my mother to drop off what she had produced. A woman checked every piece my mother had done, and she reduced the price to be paid for almost all pieces by claiming that the quality of work was poor. Then she counted them and gave my mother some money. My mother didn’t want to accept the amount, as she thought it was too low. The woman was saying to my mother ‘take the money and give me your blessings’ – *hakkını helal et*! They began to argue and my mother began to cry. She repeatedly said that she would not accept the amount, as it was not fair to her. Since she refused the money, the woman forced me to take it. My mother took my arm and we left the place almost at a run, my mother still crying. That day, she was not thankful, she gave up the job. But the machine was still at our home and, as she had not completed the three-year working period as agreed, my parents had to pay for the machine or to find someone else to take on the agreement to purchase it. My aunt managed to find someone who had recently married and moved to the city from the village who took the machine, and my mother just broke even without making any profit.

The project that my mother worked on was the first direct homeworking scheme, operated by a national firm acting as a subcontractor for a Swedish company. According to Koç (2001), previous examples of homeworking were more like genuine self-employment. However, in this case the company had made a legal contract with the women and this contract also involved buying the machines. So some of the women who joined the project applied to the courts because of the conditions of their agreement, which although similar to an employment contract did not specify the amount of pay or working conditions. Although they were successful in some respects, they did not get any of the money they had initially invested in the machines back.

Koç (2001) says that home employment subcontracted by companies in Turkey, in contrast to self-employment at home, began to systematically increase in the 1980s. This form of employment was encouraged by the media as well as by the government[32]. Çınar (1991) conducted the first detailed research on women's homeworking in Turkey, highlighting the relationship between patriarchy and capital in using women's labour in the home. Apparently, women and the male members of their family chose to become involved with this kind of work because women could work in their 'own' homes. It enabled them to do housework and to work in a *de facto* gender-segregated environment. In another study, Lordoğlu (1990) interviewed around 500 women, again in Bursa, and pointed out that the main homeworking tasks included knitting, lace making and embroidery. Lordoğlu further noted that women in this form of employment worked without social insurance or job security. The employers provided the materials and women were paid piece rates.

---

[32] Koç (2001) emphasised the role of a series of articles in the popular press (*Guneş* Newspaper) in 1985. The 'atolier homes' (atölye evler) project was linked to the prime minister of the time, Turgut Özal.

Lordoğlu (1990) also highlights, as does Çınar (1991), how homeworking is favoured by women as it enables them to do housework and child care, while preventing them from working outside the home. In 2014 according to TÜİK (e), 57% of women who were not in active paid employment cited their role as a housewife as being the reason behind them not looking for paid work outside the home (see the Graph 2.3). This figure draws parallels with the 58.6% of respondents in the same survey who cited their responsibilities in the home, both household chores and childcare, as being the primary reason for them not seeking paid work (see Graph 2.4) (TÜİK, 2014f).



Graph 2.3: Reasons for not being active in paid employment



Graph 2.4: The reasons for not approving women's work in paid employment

Besides traditional gender roles and norms, the effects of which are evident in the figures above, according to some scholars (Makal & Toksöz 2012; Koç, 2001), the mechanisation of agriculture and consequent migration to cities, and war between the Turkish army and the PKK, were the main reasons driving the exploitation of women’s labour through homeworking in the 1990s. Women who migrated from rural areas had not traditionally been sufficiently qualified to gain better-paid skilled jobs, while working in factories was considered taboo. In the 1990s, women working in the factories were mostly those who had come from the Balkans in the 1980s and had settled in the big cities rather than women of rural origin within Turkey (Nichols and Suğur, 2004).

While the large direct homeworking project failed and gained a bad reputation nationally, the ateliers (*atölye*) kept their popularity as appropriate workplaces for women. It is likely that the majority of women workers in Turkey first encountered global capital through small textile enterprises, mostly located in the basements of buildings in residential neighbourhoods, which are called *Atölye* (ateliers) (Dedeoğlu, 2012). Therefore, it is unsurprising that ateliers were also common in the neighbourhood where we lived, even in the flat beneath our home. Our neighbours had their own small atelier, which employed only their nuclear family and close relatives. They were close friends of my parents and had also migrated from the Balkans[33], but more recently. Although my family did not know them personally before my parents moved into their block of flats, a common friend had introduced them and they asked around to find us a flat when we were coming from İstanbul. So, they found the flat for us, even though it did not belong to them. They provided a spoken reference for my parents, even though they did not know them. Finding a home for your kinfolk[34], *hemşeri,* or member of your 'imagined community'[35] (Anderson, 2006), is a very common practice and which was also shown by White (2004) in his study of İstanbul. This provided the basis for a relationship with my family and, as a 'requirement' of this friendship, my mother helped out in their atelier when the number of working people decreased for any reason. The most commonly articulated reason was that their children were busy preparing for their exams. During high school they worked in the atelier when they came home from school, but could not do so during exam season. In those days, my mother became a 'helper', as did her other friends. None of them earned any sort of remuneration other than the owners' prayerful thanks *(hayır duası).*

Dedeoğlu's (2012) study of the ateliers of İstanbul demonstrated how familial or kinship networks shape production relations in these family-run establishments. She showed how, in a highly patriarchal society like Turkey, it is difficult to bring women to the export zones, and hence global capital seeks to utilise Turkish society's most treasured concept: ‘family’. Global capital has incorporated sub-contracting family firms, and they have primarily employed female labourers in the textile and garment sectors ever since. ‘Atölye’ are seen as ‘proper’ places for women to go to work because they are not located in industrial zones, but rather in the neighbourhoods. White also emphasises this in her 2004 study. The ateliers of İstanbul do not employ men, only women, and the women workers do not have to travel on public transport to get to work. Although, my mother did not receive any money, ateliers are the main employment opportunity for many women in Turkey. However, they are invisible in the official statistics as women mostly work without registration and hence they do not obtain any of the benefits of paid employment (Dedeoğlu, 2010).

---

[33] People who migrate from the Balkans (Bulgarian Turks, Bosnians, Albanians) or other ethnicities such as Circassians create their own supportive networks. However, their networks cannot be translated as kinfolk support or *hemşericilik* because their support networks are primarly generated on the basis of ethnicity.

[34] I largely use the term kinfolk to refer to the *aşiret* system adopted by ethnic Kurds.

[35] 'Imagined community' is Anderson's concept (2006) and refers to the nation. However, here I use the term to refer to supportive networks of 'similar' groups such as Kemalists, feminists, sociologists.

2.5. Unemployed Fathers, Offended Uncles: Economic and Political Instability in Turkey

While my mother was spending her days trying to find the best price to sell her lace at the market during the last years of the 1990s, my father worked as an account manager at various different companies. He was an accountant and his salary was good enough to pay for rent, food and private tuition for my sister and I as well as to send money to his parents and brother in the countryside. In the countryside, farmers were also struggling, due to the instability of the economy, and they were constantly looking for opportunities to earn extra income. None were successful in the long term. Between 1990 and 2000, my extended family in the village built a poultry farm (which operated for only two years), opened a small stand at the entrance of the village to sell some vegetables they produced to people passing in their cars (this operated for five years), and built a ‘dark room’ to grow mushrooms (which lasted for just six months)[36].

On the other hand, my father was always saying that he could be fired from his work at any moment. My parents’ main goal was to buy a house and in those days, there was no mortgage system. People borrowed money from their relatives, friends or people from their ‘imagined communities’. However, our only ‘rich’ relative, who lived in Germany, was fed up with giving loans to all her distant relatives. Therefore, my parents bought a building plot outside of the city, and my mother began selling the bracelets she had bought with her lacemaking work. They also took loans from our other relatives and began building a house in Bursa. Before they managed to finish it, my father was fired and we had to move to our unfinished home without electricity or water. This was in 1999, during the last of the Turkish economic crises of the 1990s. So, while we were sitting by the light of a candle with our other unemployed neighbours, the economic crisis and its bedfellow, political crisis, were the main subjects of discussion amongst the adults.

Yalman & Bedirhanoğlu (2010) describe Turkey in the 1990s as a crisis-ridden country. One economic crisis after the other followed from 1994 to 1998-1999, and these had serious political reverberations. Coalition governments consisting of political parties from polarised ideological positions were in government during these years. While the conflict between the Turkish army and the PKK reached a climax at this time, there were also tensions between religious and secular groups over a religious political party, the Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi*), which had won the largest vote in the elections. People were also polarised: my father and paternal uncle

---

[36] See Keyder & Yenal (2013) for the extra things farmers have been doing in rural areas to continue their livelihoods there.

– *amca* – stopped talking over a woman parliamentarian called Merve Kavakçı. She was elected a member of parliament in 1999. However, members of the Democratic Left Party (DSP) prevented her from taking her oath of office in the opening ceremony because of her headscarf. She became a symbol of the struggle against attempts to ban the headscarf in public places, including at universities and in parliament. While my *amca* was a fervent supporter of headscarf freedom in public places, my father advocated secularism. Unsurprisingly, each accused the other of being 'ungrateful'. My father was accused of being ungrateful to his family values, of which respecting religious identities is an important part, while my uncle was accused of being 'ungrateful' to republican values and even to Atatürk himself. They were both stubborn in their beliefs and the polarising political environment brought these issues to the fore. The events that caused my father and his brother to fall out for years was also the reason why there has been tension between the country's religious and secular movements since the establishment of the Turkish Republic.

The Republic of Turkey not only makes the existence of other ethnic nationalities invisible, but also aims to make religion invisible. The Caliphate[37] was banned in 1924, and all the Islamic circles were disbanded. Not only did they ban all activism, but the state also suppressed basic Islamic Education by unofficial actors in the 1930s and 1940s. Tuğal (2009:36) has stated that 'Secularist hegemony was built on a specific party system, the establishment of bureaucratic authority, the construction of the Turkish nation, the secularisation of Islam, the making of urban identity, and the development of corporatism'. He continues by asserting that the creation and sustainability of the secularist project was based on the unintended 'balance'

---

[37] Caliphate – *halifelik* – refers to the governing of a geographical region by a caliph – *halife* – who is the successor of the Prophet Muhammad and the leader of all Muslims. Since the 16th century, sultans – governors, and leaders of the country – of the Ottoman Empire were also the caliphs of the other Muslims. Only the son of a sultan could become a caliph.

between the Turkish centre left and centre right; they differ from their equivalents in the West but express the internal divisions within the power bloc in Turkey. According to Tuğal, 'the rigidly secularist bureaucracy, the officially protected bourgeoisie, and rigidly secularist intellectuals and professionals constitute the dominant segments of the power bloc, and favour a regime of relative exclusion and repression of the subordinate sectors of the bloc' (ibid.: 37). They are 'the conservative wing of the bureaucracy, the internationally oriented bourgeoisie, merchants, mildly secularist and liberal intellectuals and professionals, and some pro-modernisation provincial notables' (ibid.).

Since the 1990s, the subordinate power bloc has successfully mobilised workers, peasants, artisans, the semi-employed and unemployed, religious intellectuals and professionals in their struggle against the dominant sectors (Tuğal, 2009). This struggle became more apparent in the 1990s following the election victory of the Islamist Welfare Party, *Refah Partisi*. This party had a chance to be a part of the coalition government as well as gaining some municipalities in local elections. However, the military perceived their practices and policies to be a threat to the secularist system. Consequently, in 1997 the military intervened in the party, in a process known as a postmodern coup in Turkey. After the intervention, in 1998, the Islamist politicians established a new party called the Virtue Party; this party was closed down, in 2001, due to being perceived as a threat to the secular republic. This was the 4th and last political party closed by the *anayasa mahkemesi*[38] – supreme court – due to being perceived as a threat to the secular state.

---

[38] *Anayasa mahkemesi* is Turkey's constitutional court. It is also Turkey's supreme court.

2.6. The Era of ‘Justice’ and ‘Development’: Political and Economic ‘Stability’ in Turkey after the 2000s

From this point forward, I depart from my family’s experiences to write about the context of the country after the 2000s. My parents finished building their home, my father got another job and ‘lived happily ever after’. The 1980s and 1990s had been their story; they were the main actors of the ‘social transformation’ of the period; they had migrated from a village to İstanbul and then back. However Turkey in the 2000s was a different world, one in which my parents were merely a part of the audience.

2.6.1. AKP, Political Islam and Women’s Work

In 2001, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, current president (2016) and former prime minister (2003-2014) of Turkey, was released from prison following four months imprisonment for reading a poem at a demonstration – perceived as a threat to the secular Turkish state – and established the Justice and Development Party (AKP). The party won a majority in its first election in 2002, after another economic crisis in 2001. Since then, Turkey's current government has embraced a full neo-liberal agenda for the country, and has largely been given free reign to pursue this agenda thanks to its position as the country's majority party for last the 12 years. As expected, the *anayasa mahkemesi* also tried to close down the AKP, but this did not happen.

Öniş (2012) offers a brief account of the political economy of Turkey post-2001, and underlines that the strong economic performance of the Turkish economy has led to the durability of the AKP’s electoral success. The AKP was elected just after the 2001 economic crisis, in which unemployment had reached a peak, output collapsed and there were negative distributional consequences. This situation forced the coalition government to make new regulatory reforms under the impetus of the IMF and European Union, and the AKP inherited neo-liberal development plans that it subsequently applied successfully. During the early years of the current government’s control, Turkey enjoyed its strongest period of economic growth since 1950. According to Öniş (2006; 2012), besides this economic growth, the AKP also secured its electoral support through applying informal and formal redistributive tools. In other words, social welfare became accessible only for groups who come under the scope of the informal communities or networks associated with the AKP. However, because they also continuously invested in health and education, this has impacted on the middle and poorer segments of society, even those who were excluded from the party’s associations (Öniş, 2012).

> What is important in the present context is that the AKP’s “social neo-liberalism” allowed it to transcend the boundaries of class politics and construct broad based cross-class coalitions of political support which would not have been possible under the old style, “classic neo-liberalism” (Öniş, 2012: 144).

Yalman and Bedirhanoğlu (2010) also point out that the AKP’s adoption of neo-liberalism is different from ‘classical neo-liberalism’, which is more to do with free-market trade. The current Turkish government has some crucial roles in the construction and regulation of the institutions that enable market forces to properly come into play. This ‘social neo-liberalism’ enables the AKP to gain supporters from different segments of society. This was also the result and the reason for the military coup in 1980, which put an end to class-based politics in Turkey via an authoritarian constitution that put limitations on trade union movements (Adaman et. al, 2009) and replaced it with identity-based politics. The AKP has successfully married social neo-liberal economic policies to the ideology of ‘political Islam’.

Examining Turkish political economy is not possible without considering the adaptation of ‘political Islam’ to the neo-liberal economy. Tuğal (2009) offers a thought-provoking analysis of how neo-liberal capitalist economic policies absorb ‘Islamic’ thinking. Drawing on research from his longitudinal fieldwork in one of the religiously conservative neighbourhoods in İstanbul (Sultanbeyli), Tuğal shows how radical Islamists who believe in the necessity of an Islamic state, have become ‘moderate’ through their ‘integration’ into the system under the AKP’s policies, while drawing on the self-perceptions of ex-radicals. While a few years ago, Islamic politicians and their supporters campaigned against both ‘communism and capitalism’, now they have shifted their economic policy agenda to include ‘some elements of capitalism but no elements of communism’ (Tuğal, 2009: 217).

In his ethnographic study, Tuğal (2009) offers a snapshot from ex-radicals’ daily life. He shows how their daily conversations in tearooms have changed from discussions about struggles and Islamic rule to the daily routines of their own enterprises. Tuğal argues that the moderation and integration of Islam into the current economic and political system have also shifted the gender regime in the neighbourhood. He mentions that it is now possible to spot more women on the streets of this neighbourhood, that the number of unveiled women has increased, and that, even if they are veiled, women choose more colourful veils and wear heavy make-up. Moreover, he states that the number of women working in the neighbourhood has exploded when compared to the situation before the AKP government. Based on this, it is possible to argue that the integration of Islam into the neo-liberal economy has opened a new door for religious women, for whom working in paid employment has become more acceptable within their social networks. It might be said that the AKP’s Islamic ideology does not aim to prevent women from working at the bottom of the employment ladder, and to be the targets of the ‘friend’ of the current government: global capital. The AKP do not constitute an obstacle to their paid employment, rather its moderate Islamic ideology makes ‘conservative’ women employees’ work more acceptable. But they are concerned about women who seek to access the upper echelons of the employment ladder, which they consider to be the exclusive realm of men, or about women who are not working in socially ‘approved’ occupations.

2.6.2. The AKP and its ‘Cooperative Nationalism’ on the Turkish Lands

The neo-liberal policies of Turkey’s current government were first applied to agriculture, and the liberalisation of the agricultural sector has directly led to an increase in investment in food processing from foreign investors. A special report published by the Turkish Central Bank on the food and beverage industry stated that foreign investment in food processing increased by almost tenfold between 2006 and 2011 (TCMB, 2012). The report also emphasised that this resulted directly from ‘developments’ in the agricultural sector in Turkey. According to the report, the food and beverage industry has become the biggest industrial sector in Turkey.

While the Turkish Ministry of Industry refers to the liberalisation of agriculture as ‘development’, many Turkish scholars see this process as ‘forcing the capitalisation of agriculture’, the ‘proletarianisation of the rural’ (Keyder & Yenal, 2013), and ‘the death of small farmers’ (Aydin, 2005; Keyder & Yenal, 2013; Özuğurlu, 2011). Inevitably, the ‘Seed Law’ and the ‘Land Law’ have had a significant impact on capitalising and opening ‘Turkish agriculture’ to ‘global capital’. With the ‘Seed Law’ (2006), the government put restraints on growing domestic crops by forcing farmers to use the ‘registered seeds’ that are sold by ‘international agricultural companies’. The ‘Land Law’ (2007), on the other hand, seeks to regulate the size of land holdings.

New legislation has compelled farmers to either sell or buy land, resulting in the rapid extinction of small farmers and the continued growth in the holdings of larger farmers and landowning families. Although 78.9% of Turkish agriculture is carried out on land holdings smaller than 100 hectares (TÜİK, 2006a), the average land holding per farm, which was 70 hectares in the period 1991–2001, increased to 93 hectares by 2001. It can be explained that this was linked to small-scale farmers leaving or selling their lands. As a result of this, the rural population, which made up 23% of total population in 2012, was reduced from 35% at the beginning of the 2000s (TÜİK, 2014e). However, as Keyder & Yenal (2011) point out, this time migration has not occurred from rural areas to big cities, as in the 1950s, but rather, to ‘rural towns’. Farmers with nothing to gain from employment in the big cities prefer to migrate to either towns with factories or to other villages, where they can work as paid agricultural workers. Seeking work outside agriculture is a common consequence of this process. Some villages, which have developed town-like characteristics in recent years, owing to the availability of a wide spectrum of income-earning activities, ranging from small-scale production in labour-intensive commercial agriculture, to seasonal employment in tourism, have also become key destinations for rural migrants (Keyder & Yenal 2011). Some of these migrations feature entire families looking to reestablish themselves in new locations, but some can also be described as seasonal migrations of workers living away from their family for short periods of time. For the most part, it is men who migrate to larger towns and villages seasonally. On the other hand, contract farming has remained a survival strategy for farmers in Turkey (Keyder & Yenal 2011). Under contract farming, farmers have to produce the crops for agri-business firms and, whilst this guarantees a market for farmers' produce, such contracts give them less money in exchange for the guarantee of earning money. Moreover, under such contracts, farmers lose some degree of control over their land and decisions about their agricultural productivity.

While almost half of the population working in agriculture in Turkey is female, women rarely figure in the scope of Turkish scholars' studies about the transformation of the rural population. However, the transformation of their number in the agricultural workforce – the only information I could find about their work in agriculture – demonstrates how they are directly affected by these changes. In 1970, 90% of women in the labour force were working in agriculture; in 1980, the figure was 87.9%; in 1990, 82.3%; and, in 2000, 75.7% (TÜİK, 2011a). The figure that stands today is 32.9% (TÜİK, 2014f). Although agriculture has lost its place as the main employment sector of women in Turkey in the last 3 years, TÜİK (2014f) still states that, informally, the proportion of women employed in agriculture is around 94%. Taking these informal statistics into consideration, it can be asserted that agriculture remains the largest sector to employ women in Turkey. In agriculture, women are generally responsible for the manual, labour-intensive tasks and their labour is attributed no value and no return by rural people (Toksöz, 2011). While male labour mostly concentrates in work that entails the use of machinery, women undertake highly labour-intensive work, such as sowing, weeding, hoeing and reaping (Toksöz, 2011). In addition, women in agriculture today are mostly Kurdish seasonal migrant workers because most agricultural labourers consist of Kurdish seasonal migrant families. Moreover, it is apparent that the conditions of Turkish agriculture have worsened due to neo-liberal policies. As we see in Chapter 4 in detail, landowners are under pressure from the companies that purchase their produce; they therefore need to increase productivity by making workers work harder and for less remuneration. Local women do not accept work in low-paid strenuous jobs, and prefer to work for the food factories in nearby towns. Consequently, in the past ten years, Kurdish seasonal migrant workers have increasingly been employed in the western, north and south coast of Turkey (Duruiz, 2015).

Seasonal migration of Kurdish labourers is also result of the ‘reconciliatory’ politics of the AKP government. Tuğal (2009) states that the AKP emphasised unity between Kurds and Turks, but focused on democratic values rather than Islam as the bedrock of unity. To solve the Kurdish crisis, the AKP government engaged in dialogue with Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK leader who has been in prison since 1999. In 2013, when I worked with Kurdish seasonal workers on the land, the government announced the beginning of the ‘reconciliation process’, which proposes to work towards an agreement between the Turkish state and the PKK to reach a ‘peace process’. The Kurdish movement began to achieve peak political representation through holding an intermediary role in meetings between the Turkish state and Öcalan. Bans on speaking and publishing in Kurdish were removed and the state media established a Kurdish TV channel. The AKP has been supported by a majority of the Kurdish population from its establishment until the election of June 2015, when the AKP lost its majority in parliament. Afterwards, the ceasefire between the Turkish state and the PKK ended. This caused tensions between Turkish local employers and Kurdish workers and some of the latter left their work places. Although farmers have tried to find other workers, it has been reported that locals will not accept the conditions, so they had to go to refugee camps to conscript Syrian workers (Cumhuriyet, 2015). This result conforms to what Tuğal (2009) has said about the nationalist ideology of

Turkey in the 2000s. According to him, the ‘hegemonic nationalism’ of the 1980s and 1990s, which aimed to assimilate minorities, has been replaced by ‘corporate nationalism’ that ‘locks them in disadvantaged urban locations, restrictive cultural identities, and low-paying jobs’ (101), which is clearly the situation first of Kurdish seasonal migrant workers and now of Syrian migrants.

2.7. Conclusion: ‘Historical Change under the ‘Official Feeling’

In this chapter, I have tried to historicise the transformation of rural women’s labour in Turkey, including their migration into cities and towns. While doing so, I have focused on the broader polarisations in the country, men-women, rural-urban, Turkish-Kurdish, secular-religious. These divisions underpin the meanings that my informants attach to their own and others’ actions. I have tried to show what it means to be a Turk or a Kurd in Turkey through focusing on how these identities are constructed in schools, on TV, in apartments and on the land.

I focused first on the education system, not only as a place where national identities are constructed, but also as one of the important institutions in which Turkish citizens learn the ‘official feeling of the country’: thankfulness. Without talking about thankfulness, it is difficult to understand women’s acceptance of their relations with men, workers’ appreciation of their employers or citizens’ gratitude to politicians. Everything about relations between people in Turkey hangs in the air without emphasising the importance of ‘gratefulness’; we are unable to understand my mother’s unpaid work for the neighbours who found us a house to rent, her looking after my cousins, or some people labelling Kurds as traitors simply because they want to speak Kurdish. To understand this research, it is important to bear in mind the ‘official feeling of the country’ and the political and economic history which most of the people I worked with have lived under until now.

Chapter 3

Understanding Myself, Understanding Our ‘Perfect’ World, Understanding Women?

3.1. Introduction: ‘I am Neither Inside the Circle, Nor Outside It’

> ‘Will we continue to see each other?’ (Elif)
>
> ‘Of course we will. Aren’t we friends?’ (Me)
>
> ‘Friends? Are we only friends? I thought that we were sisters.’ (Elif)
>
> (Fieldwork Notes, 08 March 2014, in the Kurdish workers’ hometown, Mardin)

I may view someone as a sister, but I can never be sure if they also see me as their sister. So, when Elif took offence over my preference for the word ‘friend’ rather than ‘sister’, one part of me wondered where my ‘researcher boundaries’ began and ended, and how she had concluded that I was like a sister to her. I also reflected on why I preferred to call us ‘friends’. The literature on qualitative methodology has widely discussed the possibility of fieldwork-based friendship relations from two opposing perspectives (Ellis, 2007). For example while Crick suggests that ‘given the disparities of power, culture and class that commonly separate researchers and informants speaking of friendship is somewhat odd’ (1992 cited in Taylor, 2011: 176), Gofmann (2014), in contrast, refers to people in her study as her friends or, in some instances, as members of her family. Here, I argue that by discussing my opening up to research participants, and becoming friends with some of them, I can make a contribution to feminist reflexivity regarding fieldwork experience (Pillow, 2003). Here, I understand friend in the same way that I understand it in my daily life: someone whom I open myself up to, and believe that s/he opens him/herself up to me. This opening up leads me to define my research participants as good friends: 'somebody to talk to, to depend on and rely on for help, support, and caring, and to have fun and enjoy doing things with' (Rawlins, 1992 cited in Ellis, 2007: 10). In a similar way to other studies discussing the emotional labour of conducting research with 'friends' (Ellis, 2007; Taylor, 2011), this chapter also recounts my troubles researching on/with my 'friends'. It delves deeply into my journey of becoming someone's 'friend', 'sister', as well as 'opponent' during the time that we worked together in tomato land and in the tomato-processing factory.

What I relate above has been widely discussed in sociological and feminist literature in the debate over the 'insider/outsider' binary. Although it seems that having the same ethnicity, gender, nation or class identity as one's informants is considered a prerequisite for the researcher to be considered an 'insider' of a group (Hsuing, 1994; Reay, 1996), feminist studies also recognise that sometimes sharing a similar background is not sufficient for establishing rapport. Zavella (1996: 139) states that '"insider" researchers have the unique constraint of always being accountable to the community bring studied'. Here I argue that having similarities with those you study does not make you an 'insider'. I shared fewer similarities with Elif and my other 'friends' on the land than I did with some of the women in the factory who did not see me as their 'sister'. I have a different ethnicity and mother tongue from the first group, yet I became more of an 'insider' despite our clear differences. Being an ‘insider’ cannot only be defined through the categories we share in common, but rather, as in all relationships, it emerges from feelings[39].

In this chapter I detail the methodology I used to answer my research questions, which are stated in page 8 and 9. In the following, by demonstrating my moments of being an ‘insider’ and an ‘outsider’ in the lives of the women I worked with, I aim to explore my role as a participant observer. To ensure that the reader does not miss any part of my journey, both into the lives of my female research subjects and into my own lived experience, I retrace the steps I have taken over the past two years. During this journey, I introduce my points of interest, my relations to people inhabiting these points of interest, and my reasons for stopping at these points and insisting on staying there. As such, I will begin with myself – my attempts to understand the social world and myself.

3.2. Feminist Ethnography: ‘World, Me, Women’

I situate this research within ‘feminist ethnography’ because of the differences Leavy (2007) notes in the focus between feminist ethnography and other kinds of ethnography. I focus on gender relations and seek to understand the relations between genders and other forms of power and difference. I also seek to conduct and write my thesis using feminist theoretical positions and ethics. I am applying this method because I believe that in order to research ‘someone’ or ‘something’, it is necessary to become an insider, to feel as much as to see. Leavy (2007: 187) points out that ‘using the self as much as possible’ is one of the most important aspects of ethnography. This lies at the core of this ethnographic practice and refers to reflexivity. In feminist research strong reflexivity is seen as a condition of a strong objectivity (Harding, 1986), which makes clear our vantage points, and hence our ‘situated knowledge’ (Haraway, 1988). Revealing under ‘what conditions’ our knowledge is produced also demonstrates how we researchers are transformed through our research.

---

[39] Alice Goffmann’s (2014) ethnography on the black community in Philadelphia can be seen as an example of my point. She is neither black nor male, nor under surveillance by the police as her informants were; nonetheless she became an ‘insider’ during her fieldwork. By becoming an insider I do not mean becoming like the group we study, but rather beginning to share similar concerns or feelings. Of course, women on the land or in the factory were not concerned about my PhD in the same way I was, but other things we shared led them to think about me and things related to me such as my PhD, or my boyfriend. Indeed, being an insider refers to being able to enter each other’s heart and brain by revealing your feelings and thoughts.

Previous and pioneering studies of women’s work also highlight the capacity of ethnographic methods to transform researchers themselves through producing academic knowledge (Glucksmann, 1982; Lee, 1998; Kondo, 1990; Ngai, 2005; Pollert, 1981; Salzinger, 2003; Westwood, 1984). Salzinger (2003) emphasises the advantages of ethnography to being an active/productive researcher:

> Thus, through ethnography, I was able to enter the gendered heart of global production, where the subjects who produce are themselves produced by their conditions. In consciously situating my idiosyncratic, theorising self in that space, I became capable of telling meaningful stories about the world beyond (Salzinger, 2003; 8).

In this chapter, I demonstrate how I locate myself among people in the field, but before going there, let us make our first stop in the ‘now’ and explore the way I represent the women’s stories.

3.2.1. Recording, Analysing and Writing Ethnographic Data

By using ethnography, I seek to represent the stories of women, because a story[40] has the power to show us the conditions under which a phenomenon appears and also tells us about a process; we can make the claim that everyone's world is a story and thus it should be told as a 'story'.

The women I have conducted this research with are also fans of stories. They mostly have no formal education, so books are not amongst the options for them to learn about others' worlds. Travelling is a fantasy for most of them and men most often choose the TV programmes that they watch at home. Hence, telling stories and even creating them is their main way to get to know about others' worlds. The actors in these stories are not always imaginary characters or imaginary events, but mostly real people. Some might say that they are gossiping and I would agree with this; yes most of them are 'gossiping', but they are still telling stories. And, apparently, these are not 'boring' stories; 'gossiping' is enjoyable, 'eye-opening', sometimes depressing, and even frustrating, but certainly not boring. Since it was what women wanted from me and since it also embodies their style, I have tried to write their stories as they tell them. To make this possible, I used a dictaphone to record my own voice each evening in order to recount what they told me during the day. During the day, I made quick notes to remind me the events of the day and when I came home, I recounted the day's events to the dictaphone using everyday language. Then, I translated the appropriate parts of those voice recordings that now appear in this text as fieldwork notes. I also kept a fieldwork diary, in which I mostly noted my own feelings and opinions; these more self-reflexive notes appear during the study as fieldwork notes.

---

[40] By story, I refer to enacting women's own subjectivity, their coping mechanisms and parts of their work, daily lives or life stories.

In order to analyse my data, I was constantly coding my fieldwork diary to identify themes as I went along. I created my themes by focusing on the answers to the question of how the labour process is organised. I asked this question every day when I was in the field as well as when I wrote my fieldwork diary. I coloured the sentences in my diary, which answered this question. In this way I was alerted to the intersections of inequalities which take different forms depending on which production stage we are talking about. I used different colours for the elements of gender division of labour, consent, control or reproduction. Not surprisingly, these overlapped with each other. I used A5 blocks for drawing maps and/or diagrams to structure my chapters. After each draft, I went back to my diaries and notes to see if there was more data there to strengthen the argument I was making or which went against it.

One of the women informants' main concerns was about what I would say in my writing about them and it thus became mine too. On many occasions in the field, women, especially the formally educated and relatively young factory workers, warned me about not writing something too boring for other and older women. To them, being an academic meant 'talking about boring stuff' like in the debate programs in TV. So they warned me about this: 'don't tell people boring things about us' or, as another of them told me, 'sometimes, when my husband watches TV debates, I hear some academics talk. My husband says that what they are saying is relevant to us but I don't understand what they are saying to us. You seem "normal", we understand each other. But, are you like this normally, too?' (Hatice, fieldwork notes, 09 March 2014, in Kurdish women's hometown, Mardin).

Clearly, the women I worked with had some concerns about how they would be represented in this text; they did not want to be treated distantly through ‘technical’ language, which they think of as boring and complicated. Pillow (2003: 180) notes that reflexivity is about ‘whether we can be accountable to people’s struggles for self-representation and self-determination, including ourselves’. Indeed, writing using complicated, technical language is neither their style nor mine. Thus, during the process of writing and in my analysis, I have attempted to keep the discussion as close as possible to me and to the women themselves. As I told them during my fieldwork, I discuss what they like talking about: their daily concerns. I also seek to emulate their style of narration and I do this by avoiding piecemeal storytelling. Here however, because of the obligations of my work and of academic writing – the practical concerns of writing a PhD thesis in Sociology – I have had to stop telling the women’s stories as pure narrative and instead talk about them sociologically. But the women I worked with know that when work requires us to, we must stop telling stories. Here, I am not suggesting that our stories are not part of our work on the land, in the factory and within these pages; on the contrary they are embodied in our work, they are the motivations for our work, they shape our way of working and so shape us but not merely under the title of production.

When telling a story, it should be noted that to tell a powerful story, listening and observing the occurrence of events is not enough. Applying ‘extra’ methods to ‘prove their validity’ strengthens them. This is also what the women do when they talk about their own stories; they do not only benefit from one source, and they look for other sources to make their own interpretations. These could be previous events, different witnesses, or other people’s similar experiences. Women’s strategies in applying different methods to make their stories more ‘convincing’ are not so different from the work of researchers. Feminist ethnography can apply various research methods in conjunction with observation such as interviews, applying social artefacts (photography, diaries, lists, documents) or visual methods (Glucksmann, 1995).

While I agree with Glucksmann regarding the importance and necessity of using ‘multi-sourced’ research, I do not share her views on the way knowledge is produced. According to Glucksmann (1995), the production of knowledge is not a collective enterprise of researcher and participants for a variety of reasons. Firstly, she says that the researcher chooses what ‘knowledge’ is - which data should be in the final research. In other words, some sayings, opinions or experiences of participants are privileged because of the aim of the research. Secondly, she claims that participants do not have the capacity to question the research and they do not participate in writing it. Here I am proposing that as the research participants transformed me during the research and because I also ‘touched’ their lives, this research, to some extent, has become a more collective enterprise. My values, opinions, feelings and knowledge changed during my fieldwork as a result of my interactions. They know me, we met, we shared and we produced some tomatoes together. Even if it is different from writing a thesis, producing something together in our work on the land or in the factory enabled them to see my way of producing something. They always made jokes about the seriousness with which I took the job or tomatoes or people, so they knew that I was taking the things that I do seriously. They always made jokes about how I cannot write about depressing things without crying, so they know that my emotions are also here. They saw me while I was taking notes and looking over books sometimes during breaks and made fun of how I was studying even during work, so they know that during work I see things in a different way to them, that I write things that are different from what they think. Despite this, the women have an insight into what I do and how I do it. In this way, I am not a 'God' since my research experience itself is a subject of theorisation (Bott, 2010; Stanley & Wise, 1991).

3.2.3. Positioning Myself: Hello again!

> If the eye were not sun-like, it could not see the sun…
>
> Goethe

In this section, I try to make the link between my position as a researcher and my extended family's experiences in rural Turkey. The village in which I worked on the land, which both my mother and father come from, is not a 'green natural dream village' but a 'commercial agricultural village' in which it was difficult to find a tree let alone rest in its shade. It is located in one of the most fertile regions of western Turkey and, unsurprisingly, surrounded by the biggest food factories in Turkey. Most of the people living in this village, as well as in other villages in the region, own their own land.

My parents recount this part of the story as follows: when they were children in the early 1960s, there were people already living in the area who did not have their own land and worked on others' lands. The mechanisation of agriculture however, which began at the end of the 1950s, resulted in mass rural to urban migration due to a diminished need for agricultural labour. As such, those who remained in the rural areas could only do so by participating in the process of mechanisation -- by owning their own land in the first place.

From the advent of the 2000s until the present, more than 1.7 million small farmers and landless rural workers left the villages, migrated to nearby towns rather than big cities (Keyder & Yenal, 2013), and became seasonal workers in food factories, as discussed in Chapter 2. Only farmers who managed to expand continued as farmers. Now our village is full of elderly people, a few large extended families who managed to keep their lands and, in the summer time, seasonal Kurdish workers. In the last two years there have also been a number of Syrian workers.

There is nobody in my extended family (from the generation above mine) who did not work on the land until their mid 20s, and so there are no women (my mother and aunts are in their 50s) who do not suffer from chronic back and/or leg pain. Both my paternal and maternal parents' and grandparents' families were farmers. My uncles who were also farmers were bankrupted and so they lost their land and property. While one of my uncles is still trying to repay a huge seed money-related debt to the banks, my other uncle became depressed and ultimately committed suicide. He left a note saying that he did not know 'why he is feeling like this' but said that he did not want to live 'under these conditions'. My uncle is not the only one in this small village who committed suicide because of 'the conditions' in rural areas. I know that correlation does not always mean causation but I can say that, in this situation, we can see a direct line from a particular condition to an exceptional consequence. Until the process of transformation of Turkish agriculture began, there had not been a single suicide in the village but in the last ten years four people have killed themselves in a village with a population of 150. My study is not about my uncle or other farmers who took their lives, although I feel that the things I reveal during the study may help me to understand his reasons more – but my uncle and other people in my family are affected negatively by neo-liberal economic policies in agriculture and by patriarchy, which I believe is as guilty as capitalism in accounting for the death of my uncle and the suffering of other people, mainly women, in my extended family. These are the main reasons behind me pursuing this research; the 'personal is political' and the 'political is sociological'.

3.2.3.1. Introducing the People I Worked With

The below Table 3.1. shows the timeline of my research. I spent four periods of time in the field in 2013 and 2014.

April 2013-June 2013	**July 2013-October 2013**	**March 2014**	**July 2014-October 2014**
Tomato Land Planting Season	Tomato Land Picking Season	Hometown of Kurdish Workers, Mardin	Factory Tomato Processing

Table 3.1: The Timeline of My Fieldwork

During my fieldwork I worked alongside 56 people in tomato land, 42 women and 14 men, and 68 people in the factory, 50 women[41] and 18 men. 29 of the women and 12 of the men were key informants (see Appendix E) and 11 of my key informants became my friends, with whom I still have regular contact. This, as I discuss later in this chapter, was despite the differences between us and my status as an outsider in both the tomato fields and the factory although it also led to feelings of hurt, anger and loneliness on my part.

Although I am hesitant to offer categories to introduce the people with whom I worked on the land and in the factory, in Table 3.2: "Who's Who: 'Me and the People I Worked With", I group people together to make clear who I spent my time with during my research. I present this table as a means of introducing people rather than getting to ‘know’ them. I also want to clearly show the differences and similarities between the people I worked with and myself, and to make the reader aware of possible tensions that emerged between us during the research.

---

[41] The number of women I worked alongside in the factory is not the exact number. Exact number has been changing continuously. This is 'average' number for women working on the same line. When I asked factory manager how many women the factory employs for one line, he told me that they ask for 50 women to come but not all of them come everyday.

In the table below, I avoid including any ‘subjective’ information. However, the point about people’s religion may be labelled quite a ‘subjective’ matter. Religion is one of the important dynamics of work place relations, as well as my relationship with others, and for this reason I had to include it. Apparently, people’s religious beliefs are almost impossible to label as ‘moderate’ or ‘very’ religious. Despite this, I inserted those adjectives depending on participants’ own statements about their religious beliefs. This was the same with their social class; I have not listed my own perceptions of class but individuals’ self-identifications. Quite strikingly, everyone included in my research viewed themselves as middle class.

On the Tomato Land (2013)	In the Factory (2014)
Me: Researcher and Agricultural Worker 25 years old, single, formally educated, middle class, ethnically Bosnian (but viewed as Turkish in the eyes of the women and often by myself), irreligious (this was not considered a possibility in the minds of the women).	**Me: Researcher and Factory Worker** (26 years old, married earlier in the year)
Landowning Family: Managers and Workers 15 people, 19 to 40 years old, they are mostly educated up to secondary school level, ethnically Turkish and Laz (Caucasian ethnic group), they mostly see themselves as in the upper class, moderate Sunni Muslims.	**Seasonal Women Workers and Forewomen:** In my line and shift, we were around **50 women**, 18 to 55 years old, with an average age of around 30-40, mostly married with at least one grown-up child. The range of education level is vastly divergent; there are some women without any formal education whereas others are enrolled on undergraduate courses and do seasonal work to support themselves and save for their educational expenses. This division depends on age; the younger women have a tendency to be better educated. There is a mix of ethnicities. Some (but not the majority) are ethnically Kurdish, who migrated to the town almost 20 years before; some of them have never seen their 'hometowns'. They do not refer to their ethnicity or hometowns when they are asked where they are from. They reply with the name of their neighbourhood in the town or just the name of their town. Apart from Kurds, the women factory workers consist of ethnic Turks, who migrated from Bulgaria in the last 50 years, the *Laz* people who migrated from the north coast of Turkey in the last 20 years, and Bosnian and ethnic Bulgarian Turks who migrated to Turkey during the last 50 years. These women mainly see themselves as 'Turkish', middle class, and as moderate Sunni Muslims or secular Muslims.
Seasonal Migrant Workers (31 people): Men and women, 14 to 48 years old, most of them are barely literate, Kurdish; mainly married with small children, they see themselves as middle class, observant Sunni Muslims.	**Male Workers:** There are around **80** male workers in the factory, but I only had contact with **10** of them, who were on the same shift and in the same department as I was. They are between 18 to 25 years old, work in the factory seasonally; most of them are university students and work there to make extra money for their educational expenses. They are from the same backgrounds as women factory workers, and they see themselves as middle class. They are mostly moderate Sunni Muslims.
Local Women Workers (around 10 women, their number continuously changes): 35 to 55 years old, mainly married with grown-up children, not formally educated, live in the village, or the other villages in the region, and some of them in the local town. They have mixed backgrounds, some of them are Turkish, some of them are Bulgarian ethnic Turks who migrated to Turkey in the last 30 years, and some of them are Bosnians who migrated to Turkey in the last 50 years: they are mostly moderate and secular Muslims[42], they see themselves as middle class.	**Managers:** There are **8 plant** managers who I was able to meet during my shifts. All of them are male, their age range 30 to 50. Most of them are married with grown-up children, they are from the same background as the workers, with just one difference; none of them is ethnically Kurdish. They see themselves as middle class. They are all secular Muslims. (This is what the general factory manager told me. He stated that he cannot bear to work with very religious people and so ensures that all of his colleagues are secular.)

Table 3.2: Who's who: Me and the People I worked with

---

[42] I used the term of 'secular Muslims' to refer the people who mostly believe that religion is a private matter and it must be lived in private spheres. As discussed, in the context chapter and Chapter 5, this is linked with the Kemalist ideology.

Based on the information in the above table, it is evident that I have less in common with Kurdish seasonal migrant workers than with any of the other women actors in the tomato production process and I am socially and culturally most similar to the factory women workers. This may lead the reader to assume that it would have been more difficult to build relationships with women on the land than in the factory. In truth, I had also made the same assumptions. In reality however, my experience was that when people think that you are similar to them, the relation becomes more demanding and oppressive. When people think that you are in the 'same/similar' group, they expect you to act as a 'good' representative of the group. In this sense, if I had to ascribe two different words for my relations with the women in the factory and with the women working on the land, I would use the words competitiveness and helpfulness respectively. While 'competitiveness' characterised many of my relationships in the factory, 'helpfulness' featured prominently in my relationships on the land. It is possible that this is a result of the different payment systems used in the factory and on the land. In the factory, because the hourly pay structure is not pegged to production levels, the worker's main motivation (including mine) is passing time. As a result of this, most women compete to receive the easiest tasks. On tomato land, on the other hand, workers are paid depending on their group performance.[43] Everyone's performance is important and thus people support each other in increasing the group's total output. Although rural workers have lots of arguments about each other's performance, there is an atmosphere of mutual encouragement (this extended to my own work on the land).

---

[43] For ethical reasons, I did not share the group income paid to the Kurdish workers in picking time. However, a tiny bit of gold, with a value less than one person's share of one day's earnings, was given to my uncle for my forthcoming wedding without my knowledge. Giving some gold to newly married couples is such a strong tradition in Turkey that it would have been impossible to return the gift. It symbolizes the friendship of the group I was working with towards me.

The following section demonstrates how, depending on categorical differences, I tried to negotiate the power relations between workers and myself. I will also address how these relations were often formed non-verbally. I first reflect on the material differences between the workers and myself. I then move on to examining the contextual differences. Before doing so however, I discuss the issue of access.

3.3. Entering the Worlds of Others: Access

My first stop was my village. This was not only because of the personal reasons that led me to want to explore the world of women's work in the first place but also because of 'convenience'. A 'convenience sample' is a changeable concept depending on the conditions of time, money, safety, language skills, etc. For me, a 'convenience sample' refers to a group of women with whom I can build a relationship without being afraid of men's interference. Another Turkish sociologist, Berik (1996), highlights the difficulties in making contact with women in rural areas of Turkey; she shows how men prevented her from connecting with women and how they put pressure on women during interviews by observing the interview process. Berik (1996) also mentions how she had to go to villages with her husband or her father in order to gain men's trust, and hence to reach women.

I could tell from Berik's experiences (1996) that it would not be easy for me to find a village to do participant observation over a long period in rural Turkey. Therefore, my extended family's village was the most convenient arena for me to begin the 'land' aspect of my fieldwork. Based on Berik's experiences, a strong claim can be made that there is no other village where I could have obtained access to the field in the way that I could in a village where I have personal connections. I stayed with my grandmother, and I chose to work for the biggest landowning family. This was not only because they are the richest and employ a large number of Kurdish seasonal migrant workers, but also because they moved to our village from another one by buying up large tracts of land from our village – they largely bought land from people who migrated to the nearby town and became factory workers. So, my family and I did not have any previous or strong relationship with them, unlike other people in the village. I had not met them until I went to the land. My *amca* – paternal uncle – contacted the landowning family in a men's *kahve* -- coffeehouse[44] -- and asked them to employ me. He explained that I had to work on the land for my studies. My *amca* said that they accepted it immediately. According to him, this was because 'they were looking to do a favour for someone from the local community' so as to be accepted by the older families in the village. It is also for this reason that they were always helpful to me during my fieldwork in terms of answering my questions or helping me with my work. I worked with members of the landowning family along with Kurdish seasonal workers as well as with local women workers (although not as often) in the planting season, but during the harvest, the local women left the land and I worked with just the Kurdish seasonal workers.

I chose to work in the factory in order to follow the path of the tomatoes we produced on the land through its supply chain. The factory I worked at is one of the biggest tomato processing factories in Turkey and there I processed 'our' tomatoes to send to Japan. As expected, accessing this factory was more difficult than accessing work on the land. Again, I asked for my uncle's help because he knew one of the plant managers. I talked with the manager on the phone before I began my fieldwork and he told me that he had arranged everything and indicated the time to start. However, when I arrived in Turkey, he (the manager I contacted) did not answer either my or my uncle's phone calls. I called the general factory manager directly but he also failed to answer my calls. So, I decided to follow the normal procedure and registered at an employment agency in the town. After I registered, I went to the factory and talked with the human resource manager to arrange a meeting with the general factory manager. She informed him that I wanted to talk with him and the manager later agreed to talk with me. He told me that he knew about me, because the plant manager (my uncle's friend) had mentioned me to him. The general manager was happy to have me work. When he learned about my name, however, he became irritated and changed his mind. This is both because I share my name – Emine Erdogan, a very common name in Turkey - with the Turkish President's wife (2014) and because I was studying in the UK on a scholarship funded by the Turkish State. He suspected that I was a government spy trying to get information for the government. Despite this, he changed his mind once he had met me and I had told him that I did not have any relation with either the government or the current president's family; I was then able to start work. After I had been accepted, the manager made clear to me that I should not expect any form of privileged treatment over the other workers. In his eyes, I was to be another ordinary worker, so I would not be allowed to contact him in front of other workers. He kept his determination to avoid contact with me in the work place and when he saw me on the shop floor, on most occasions, he averted his gaze. I could not be more thankful for his attitude; it helped me not to seem to be on the management's side.

---

[44] Coffeehouses in Turkey are often the exclusive realm of men. Here, local men gather to drink coffee, play board games and socialise. Coffeehouses in rural areas are predominantly all male and are often the site of extensive social and political discussion relating to the local area.

After I met with the women both on the land and in the factory, accessing their homes was easy. They invited me to visit them. The only difficult part of home visits was reaching the Kurdish seasonal migrant workers’ hometowns because of the distance involved and because I lost contact with the gatekeeper, Osman the *dayıbaşı, (*the Turkish word for gangmaster). Although I spoke with him over the phone when I was in the UK, when I arrived in Turkey to visit their hometown he didn’t reply. I wasted two days but eventually managed to find another person from their hometown who was able to help me arrange my visit.

3.4. Surviving in Others’ Worlds Through Knowing Yourself

In this section, I introduce my ‘new self’ that evolved through my fieldwork. By doing this, I also answer some preliminary questions posed by feminist methodology: Do feminists conduct research on women who are less powerful than themselves? Is there any inequality in the research relationship since those being studied tend to be in less-privileged positions? To these popular and contentious questions, my response is a resounding ‘no’. Here, I set out to scrutinise these questions by challenging their presumptions for feminist fieldwork methodology.

During the research process, I encountered several dilemmas that led me to think more critically about the asymmetrical power relationships that emerged during my fieldwork. It is significant to note that, prior to undertaking this fieldwork, I had not set out to achieve the perfect balance in power relationships in the field. However, I was well prepared to try to overcome the differences that emerged from my ‘privileged’ position. Furthermore, during my fieldwork, I realised that I had overestimated the ‘privilege’ that would be afforded to me on ‘tomato land’ or in the tomato processing factory; this privilege may have been apparent in my domain, but not in theirs. I may have been more 'powerful’ than them as a sociologist, but not as a worker.

In this instance, I had failed to sufficiently probe the definition of ‘power’. I considered myself more powerful than them because I was more educated, had more money, and, in relation to the Kurdish seasonal migrant workers, came from a more privileged ethnic group within Turkey. I had forgotten that meaning is never ‘fixed’ and that I had defined my ‘power’ from the perspective of the ruling groups. Therefore, this section provides an exploration of the process by which I experienced powerlessness during my fieldwork and how this impacted on my feelings towards my research subjects and also on my discovery of a ‘new’ self.

With these aims in mind, I engage in reflections on the different backgrounds of those being studied and myself and how our understanding of difference is influenced by the portrayal of the material world and the world of ideas. I suggest that this enables us to view ‘reflexivity’ from a different perspective; ‘reflexivity’ does not only include the vantage points from which knowledge is produced but also includes how those points change during the knowledge production process. Indeed, the following indicates that understanding relations between the women with whom I worked, means first understanding myself and then, my reaction to seeing myself through their eyes.

3.4.1. The ‘Powerful’ Things That I Have

> Sympathetic members of dominant groups should realise that nothing they may do, from participating in demonstrations to changing their life styles, can make them one of the oppressed (Narayan, 1989: 265).

In Turkey, almost 3 million people[45], mostly Kurdish, leave their homes every year and migrate to different parts of the country to find employment as rural seasonal

---

workers. They are generally employed under difficult working and living conditions, which involve issues of: occupational health and safety; casualisation of labour; gendered division of labour; and child labour. In fact, child labour is a very significant issue that has been raised in a number of studies. From previous literature (Kavak, 2012; Şimşek, 2012), I knew I was researching one of the most 'disadvantaged' groups in Turkey, with their poor economic status being their most frequently cited and significant disadvantage. Here, I do not suggest that low income is the main reason they become seasonal migrant workers – my fieldwork quickly informed me that the reasons underlying this decision were often much more complex. Nevertheless, at the beginning of my research, I had suspected that it was the primary driver. Their motivation had seemed remarkably clear to me; they set out to work as migrant labourers in brutal conditions because they needed money to survive. With this in mind, I was intent on hiding any indications of my middle-class 'wealth'.

I tried to mask anything that implied I had more money than them. I did not wear the high-quality gloves my mother had bought for me to undertake the work, nor wear my good quality shoes or shirts. I did not bring any kinds of meat or fruit, such as bananas, for my lunch when I accompanied the participants on the land. I always emphasised that I was studying in the UK on a scholarship. Moreover, in order for them to not think I was wealthy, I also informed them that my extended family had sold almost all of our lands in our ancestral village and my uncles and my grandfathers were bankrupt.

---

[45] This is valid for 2013, when I conducted the research. In the last two years, Syrian migrant workers have increasingly replaced Kurdish workers as they accept lower wages. The figure (3 million) is based on TÜİK's 2013b report on 'household labour force' and it suggests that more than half of around 6.5 million agricultural workers are Kurdish seasonal migrant workers.

Unfortunately, however, my father scuppered all my attempts to hide my middle class background. Every day rural workers drove me to my grandmother’s house and on one of the weekends they spotted my father's brand-new car, which he had bought with his retirement pension. It was not a top-class car, but as soon as they saw the car they asked me if it belonged to my father, since they knew that my parents had come to visit me on that day. I froze. I didn't answer immediately, I acted as if I didn’t even hear the question. When I went home, I asked my father why he had parked the car in front of the house; how was I going to explain this situation to my friends? He was incredulous and said that I was exaggerating; we were not so rich as to be ashamed or guilty of our possessions. These words, however, did not reduce my anxiety about how I was going to explain away my father’s car the following day. I even asked my father to park the car at my uncle’s house, so that my friends wouldn't see it again.

After a difficult night, during which I could not sleep for worry and guilt, I primed myself to be ready for the expected questions when I went to the field. Unsurprisingly, they asked me again about the car and I had to confess that it was indeed my father’s. Then they continued to question me in detail on the subject. They asked how much it had cost, when he bought it, did he have any other cars, whether he had a house, etc. They briefly questioned me about his property, his employment and income. When they were finally satisfied with the information they had received, they concluded that my father was not a smart man since although he was well educated he was still stuck at a middle-level income. He had spent years studying but still had to work for somebody else. He could have been richer if he had stayed in the village. It is apparent that they connected high economic status with property.

I was relieved that they did not label me as ‘rich’. Instead they seemed to make the opposite inference. They began to make fun of me, saying how I spent my time studying but could not even earn a decent income. They said that by the time I reached retirement, I would only have a house and a car just like my father. They went on to say that most educated people like myself do not have the motivation to become rich. With time, I realised that the workers and I were positioned within different systems of defining wealth and poverty. To them I was definitely not ‘rich’ and they were not ‘poor’. When I asked them about their economic level, they told me that they were in the middle; if someone asked me about my income, I would also definitely say that I was in the middle. Moreover, I realised that some of them (mostly men) considered me to have a lower economic level than them, since they possess land, houses or cars in their villages.

Some of the women on the land also perceived me as having a lower economic status. They asked me how many gold bracelets my mother-in-law had given me when I got engaged[46], and when I told them that she had given me none and added that she also did not give me any gold, they were very surprised and said they felt sorry for me. They told me that I did not deserve this kind of treatment. When I told them that I did not want any gold and that I would not have taken it, they clearly thought that I was lying, since this sort of attitude was impossible. Elif (one of people I was closest to in the field) told me she was very sorry for me, since, she said, I didn't have anything in the world. I tried to explain myself to her but she was not convinced. What I am attempting to convey by relating all this, is that I finally understood that even if I was to wear my high-quality gloves or shoes, they still would not have thought of me as ‘rich’ because they have a different conception of wealth to me. Here is how I expressed this realisation in my fieldwork diary:

---

[46] When a woman gets engaged in Turkey it is traditional for the mother-in-law-to-be to give the bride-to-be the gift of gold bangles and coins. The amount of gold given is indicative of the wealth of the groom’s family. More importantly, the gift is a means for the mother-in-law to provide a form of security to the bride-to-be as the gold belongs solely to the bride-to-be and is understood to only be used in, for example, ‘extreme’ cases such as the breakdown of the marriage. The amount of gold given to the bride-to-be is also associated with how much the mother-in-law likes or ‘values’ the bride-to-be.

> I don’t know how and when I became so arrogant. How I came to see myself as feeling sorry for these people. How I decided that I might have more power in the field because I have good quality gloves. How I gave value to these things. Look at my superiority! Who taught me these things? It is funny that they seem to feel sorry for me too (Fieldwork diary, 03 March 2013).

However, I wish to clarify my changing understanding of our relative social positions. I am not suggesting that their perceptions are fundamentally different and that they are happy with their current conditions and that we should not say that they work and live in poor conditions; rather I wish to assert that they did not think that I worked and lived in good conditions. So, I should bear in mind that I may not seem powerful at all from the point of view of those I am researching, at least from the eyes of Kurdish seasonal workers.

On the other hand, the factory workers I worked with had a similar understanding of ‘power’ to mine. Probably, as a ’strategy’ (but not an intentional one), most of the women in the factory did not believe that I could be someone studying in the UK at doctoral level. For them, such a person could not possibly work in a factory, even if it was for research purposes. It was too absurd to be real. As I wrote in my fieldwork diary,

> I don’t know how I can convince them about the reason for my presence in the factory. I am saying that I am doing research for my study but no

> one seems to believe me. Today, Nezahat told me ‘working in the factory is not a shame. We’re all doing it for money. Everyone needs money’. I tried to explain my research to her, but she just smiled, clearly implying that she didn’t believe me. What should I do to convince them? They even made fun of me as if I was lying to them about my life in the UK (Fieldwork diary, 22 August 2014).

Even after I managed to convince them about my real identity – thanks to my photos, which were taken in the UK – they continued to make fun of me since they were sure that I was abnormal. Otherwise, what would I be doing in the factory? While this was the case with the older women, with younger women studying at university, my relationship was different and perhaps more complicated. As they perceived us to be on equal terms, they became more uncomfortable with my role as a researcher. Burçin said to me, for instance:

> ‘I know what you will do, you will write about everything that happens here. Then you will say why we do this or not. You will talk about us. I feel that you will relate my gossip’ (Burçin, Fieldwork notes, 13 September 2014, in the factory’s refectory).

Besides their discomfort about my role as a researcher, the young educated women in the factory also became very eager to prove to me that we were ‘really’ equal. They were very concerned about balancing the power relations between us. Most of them repeated in our daily conversations how they could have gone abroad to study or that they still could, but they did not want to or how their friends, who went to abroad for their studies, were dissatisfied about leaving the country:

> Honestly, I felt guilty when Merve talked about her educational achievements. I tried to change the subject, but she was too determined to talk about it. She talked about each class, how she got the highest marks, how her professors adored her, etc. I think that she was doing it to prove

> herself to me and to prove that we are the same in terms of our ‘educational level’. Maybe, it is not because of that and because she just likes talking about her achievements. But her comments such as, ‘I could also get a scholarship to study in the UK, but I don’t want one’, makes me feel guilty. My presence in the factory as a researcher leads her to try to prove that we are equal since she is afraid of a ‘negative’ representation of her in the study. Not just Merve, but other educated women in the factory always try to show me that they are different from other women workers in the factory, they try to show that they are more like ‘me’. Ayfer made such attempts clear to me when she said the following: ‘I know those kinds of writing and films in which they say that factory women are uneducated and old fashioned. But, it is not true, you see, we are just like you. So, you will not write about us in this way, will you? (Fieldwork diary, 29 August 2014).

The college degrees which were perceived to be a prerequisite for social reputation and recognition in the factory did not have the same perceived value amongst those employed in 'tomato land'. Indeed, they were often viewed as indicating a disadvantage from the perspective of my contacts on the land, who saw me as suitable for an office job, but quite unsuitable for a job on the land; they feared I would slow them down. I, as a participant and ‘worker’ in the education system for almost 20 years, definitely did not possess any special qualification in the eyes of the actors involved in tomato production on the land.

Unlike in the factory, there are no educated women on the land. So, my presence in tomato land was extreme. When I went to the village to start my fieldwork on tomato land, my anxiety increased because many people arrived to see the researcher (me) and almost all of them said that it would be impossible for me to stay working on the land for the whole day: ‘It is not a job for "naïve" people,' they told me. I would not 'know how to work and workers would laugh at me’. Because of these discouraging remarks, I travelled with my aunt (wife of the previously mentioned uncle) to a different area where they cultivated tomatoes in another village to see whether or not I could survive on 'tomato land'. After my first day in the field, I wrote down my experiences as follows:

> This work is really tiring; I can’t sit or stand without pain. Now, going to the toilet is a very difficult task for me since I have to crouch down. I don’t know how workers dare to tolerate these conditions with the wages they are paid. And I don’t know how the landowning family justifies paying them so little for all of their hard work and toil. Fortunately, the work is not boring; time flies on the land because everything is new to me. And I am afraid that even if I work in the land for a year, the women will find something to make fun of me for. Apparently someone coming to the land and working for reasons other than money is unbelievable to them. I am absurd to them, not only to the workers or to the other people in the village, but also to my family and friends. They cannot understand why I am working with the workers instead of asking them for whatever information I need directly. I do not know how I can justify my methods to them. Today, the workers called me a ‘student’. According to them, education is the first dimension that separates me from them. All of the workers I met today live in the town nearest to the village, but I will meet with Kurdish seasonal migrant workers tomorrow. And I wonder whether the very first aspect that separates me from them will change or not. It is a pity that there is no ideal way to introduce oneself to others (Fieldwork diary, 30 April 2013).

The following day, I met with the group of workers who I would continue to work with until the tomato season ended. In terms of personal relationships, a lot of things changed from the first day we met. However, my initial impression that ‘even if I work on the land for a year, the women will still make fun of me’ proved true. This situation did not change; they always found something to amuse them in my reactions to working on the field. They always asked me, 'Emine, it isn't the same as studying, is it? It is more difficult, isn't it? This is not a job for everyone, isn't that right?' They always viewed my awkwardness in the field as being a result of my education.

With time, this situation began to disturb me and I began to feel anger towards some of the workers. My anger resulted in a change in my behaviour towards some of them, which made me feel guilty, as I noted in my diary:

> I am getting angry with some of the women because they always make fun of me. Not only the workers, but other women in the village also do the same. They come everyday to see if I will give up working. When they see that I am not completely miserable, I feel that they become angry and start to make jokes about how I like tomato land or the workers. Then, the discussion always shifts to my strangeness; how I am absurd. No one believes that I am living abroad. Such things… I think that they want to believe that not everyone is capable of doing this difficult work and when they see me here for the entire tomato season – someone who, according to them is naïve, physically weak, a ‘student’, and a person for office work – they are clearly sceptical. In the beginning, I tried to tell them that it was very hard work and how admirable it was that they were able to do it for so many long years, etc. However, these compliments are now not enough for them. They want me to give up, this makes me disappointed and I am becoming more and more angry (Fieldwork diary, 25 August 2013).

I could not escape or erase this feeling of frustration during my fieldwork, but I learned to cope with it. To do so, I used my oldest tactic that I had developed during my childhood. When someone makes fun of me, I make fun of myself. Even though this was sometimes hurtful for me, I believed that there were more serious incidents and dialogues to become angry about other than this situation.

The arguments I expand upon above relate to the material differences/similarities that were present amongst us and it is easier and less painful to bridge these gaps when one realises that they are embedded in different material schemas. However, the gulf between our perceptions and ideas proved more problematic and painful than they at first seemed.

3.4.2. The 'Dangerous' Ideas I have

> This was my worst day in the field. To be honest, I haven't felt this bad for a long time. Today, Recai (one of the landowning family) came to me and we talked about my marriage (which is due to happen in October). He said he had heard about it from his wife and that he is very happy about it, etc. Then he asked me how I met my boyfriend. I told him that it was a long story; we met in high school. When Yahya (the oldest worker, I called him *abi*, meaning brother) heard this, he asked me how it was possible that I could be friends (meaning a lover) with my boyfriend for 10 years. There were two reasons for this in his way of thinking: either I am rotten (he used the word to imply that I am dirty since I have sex with my boyfriend) or my boyfriend is rotten (he implies that he is homosexual if we have not had sex). If I were his daughter, he would have killed me.
>
> I was shocked, and in that moment, I could think of no way to defend myself. In Yahya's eyes, I was one hundred per cent guilty and saying that my boyfriend was gay might have been my only way of redeeming myself. Then, he continued by saying that I had disappointed him and that from now on, he wouldn't accompany me to the fields. I only managed to reply that I was still the same person as I was before he heard the news. He didn't answer. Then, Recai (the landowner) said 'in our tradition having a boyfriend is not a reason to be killed'. I did not say anything to either of them but my eyes were filled with tears. It was not because of his ideas; it was easy enough to guess what they (particularly the men) thought about the issue, but I felt lonely. I try to understand them in every

> situation but it seems that they are not interested in me personally. They only like me because I help them (Fieldwork diary, 30 August 2013).

This event made me so depressed that I could not go to the land for a day, and I stayed at home to try to heal my hurt feelings. I told myself that their perception of me as 'unnatural' was normal for them in the context of their lives, and that I could not expect them to accept me as I am because it is not my right to do so. After all, I came to them to do my research, not the other way round. Such thoughts did not completely soothe all my hurt, but I was able to recover enough to go back to the field the next day. My relationship with Yahya was always distant after that day, which even now remains a source of regret to me.

This was one of the harshest examples of issues around acceptance that I encountered during my fieldwork on the land. But, it was not that different in the factory either. Almost every day when I was on the land or in the factory, I felt that I had to hide some of my ‘dangerous’ ideas, especially, on the land, from the men who thought they might have to prevent me from going to work as they feared I could pass on these ‘dangerous’ ideas to the women and particularly the young girls. For instance, one worker said ‘if you work with Emine then you will end up falling love with another worker and then your father will have to send one of his brothers to watch over us'. These kinds of comments and insinuations always made me feel depressed during my work, but I soon got used to them.

It should be noted that on some occasions the workers did not hesitate to insult me, albeit indirectly. For example, when other groups of workers from the local towns occasionally arrived to work with us, these workers were mostly women and they primarily worked on the land without any men. Men and women from my group told me that these were 'shameless and dishonourable women' because these women were always at the front. They made all the decisions. Firstly, this statement was not true from my experience, because the women did not seem to me to have that much power; they were still working under male gang masters and under the landowning family. Besides, I accompanied Kurdish workers to lots of lands that were far away from our village because the land we worked in changed every few days. Sometimes, I did not even ask them where we were going, we would just go somewhere and start to work; the location did not seem important to me. The kinds of statements they made sometimes made me uncomfortable, thinking about how they viewed my ‘honour’. I was sure that they were even more sceptical and critical about my father or my fiancé’s honour. While they did not say anything directly to me, they asked me how a man who is my fiancé could send me to work the land. For me, the most depressing thing about such questions was the seeming impossibility of answering in a way that felt satisfactory; I always had to evade. This made me feel helpless, alone and weak.

They also made me so angry on one occasion that I could hardly bear to keep working with them. One day (05 September 2013, fieldwork notes, on the tomato land) Kadriye, who was one of the oldest woman workers, made me really angry. She had seen my mother the previous day, and she told me she looked overweight, which is perfectly true. I admitted that it was true and said that she liked eating. I also explained that it was related to psychological problems that she began suffering from; five years before she wasn’t like this. But Kadriye could not keep her mouth shut and she asserted that Turkish women are generally overweight because they take birth control pills. I responded that I didn't think it was related. She then said that there was no way I could know this since I was not married. I said there was no need to be married to know about birth control. But it was impossible for me to dissuade her from her position. The exchange made me angry in lots of ways: firstly, I thought she was unfairly judging my mother; secondly she provoked me about me having sex before marriage; and, thirdly, she claimed that her opinions were universal truths.

In the factory, I could be more open about myself since there were no men around to prevent me from continuing my work. My co-workers at the factory were also more aware of the kinds of thoughts and opinions I might have. Pre-marital sex was top of the agenda as a topic of insult for factory women. This was also directed towards me. I made my opinion about the issue clear in daily conversation and then some women began to insult me in order to provoke me into making some sort of a ‘confession’, trying to force me to admit that I was having pre-marital sex.

> Today during lunch break, Asya sat with us and began to talk about how her friend had sex with her boyfriend, but is now marrying another man and because of this, her friend has to re-stitch her hymen before marriage. I could not hide my horror and depression. Although I knew that pre-marital sex is still taboo for many people in Turkey and although I knew that ‘sewing the hymen’, reconstructing it, is still practised, I had never been in contact with anyone with any real life experience of it. All the women at the table started to yell at Asya demanding why her friend had had sex with her boyfriend. All the women at the table were also insistent that it was all Asya’s friend’s fault and that she had to suffer the consequences of her action. Absolutely no one at the table objected to the idea that she should reconstruct and re-stitch her hymen. I could not stop myself and told them that this was too dangerous and that Asya’s friend shouldn’t do it. Asya told me that her friend had to ‘pay’ for her actions. I told Asya that her friend had done nothing wrong. Everyone at the table was shocked. Melike told me now, she was really convinced that I live in the UK. ‘This is a westerner’s low moral understanding’, she said. She then went on to say that people cannot change their country of origin and

> that the state shouldn't send us abroad because we will become corrupted and teach corrupt practices to our children (Fieldwork diary, 12 September 2014).

In the factory, the women suspected that I had 'dangerous' ideas. This was because I was more open about my ideas in the factory than I was on the land and also because they had their own assumptions about a woman who studied abroad, who is married but does not live with her husband, and who does not always wear her wedding ring. And so, they tried to test their assumptions about me.

> Today, Fahriye asked me whether it is true that people in England do not believe in God. I told her that just like everywhere else, some people believe in God and others don't. As soon as I said everywhere, I realised that I had trapped myself. She didn't miss the chance, and told me that her neighbour's daughter's friend became non-religious after she went abroad to study. She said that based on this she wouldn't send any of her children abroad. She asked if I know anyone who stopped believing in God after they came to England? I replied, no. Then, she asked me whether or not I pray. I replied, no. Then she asked me whether or not I fast. I said no. From my responses, it should have been obvious that I was not comfortable with this conversation. But, she didn't stop and asked what happened to me after I went to England. To stop the conversation I chose to not answer the question and instead asked her why she was interrogating me. I told her that it was sinful for her to interrogate me in this way (according to Islam, making a pronouncement on someone's true faith is a sin as it is something that only God can know). Then, she had to stop. I felt unbelievably bad, since I could not present myself as I am. But, at that moment I felt that I could not to do it for the sake of my research. Now, I was thinking that even if I told her the truth, whatever the result, it would still be a part of my research. Why didn't I do it? What I have realised is that since I was brought up in a society in which being an atheist is a taboo, I do not have the bravery to be open about it. I know what they will think about me, what they will feel about me if they knew

> the truth. And, I didn't admit to being an atheist because I thought that it would not only compromise my research, but would also compromise myself. This is because I am to some extent concerned about being accepted. I am not ready for total rejection. This is also connected with being a good researcher; I should care about the continuity of my research, I should seek the women's acceptance so I can continue to work with them (Fieldwork Diary, 28 August 2014).

As a researcher, it was difficult to not expect anything from anyone, since I was so deeply involved:

> My feelings of being cheated and lonely reached their peak. Another group of workers came to work on the land but they were based further away from us; my group does not like any new group of workers who come to pick the tomatoes because the new workers decrease their future workload. Today there were not enough sacks for both groups of workers to put their tomatoes in. What this meant is that when the other group of workers filled all of their sacks, they started to take ours. As there wasn't a second tractor on the land today, this resulted in one of the tractors on the land taking all the filled sacks from the other group of workers and forcing us to stop work because there were no sacks left for us to put our tomatoes in. Hence, they became very angry with the other group and began to fight. Everything started with them hurling verbal insults, then the women started to fight, then the men came and they began to threaten each other. Our *dayıbaşı* said their fight wasn't suitable for women and it became bloody, so they stopped taking our sacks and the *dayıbaşı* said that if the other group of workers came tomorrow he would bring out his gun. Then someone from the landowning family arrived to intervene, attempting to calm down both sides. It was really frightening; I just watched without saying a word. After a time, the *dayıbaşı* came over and said: 'Do you see how they are shameless, dishonourable people. All of them are like this. They are not even Muslim; they are wild, barbaric. I can't have any relations with these people, but 'Recep' (the landowner) does this to us'. I understood him to be saying these things because the

> second group of workers were Alevi[47]. I felt cheated because we were always talking about how discriminating against someone is wrong, about how some Turkish people's behaviour towards Kurdish people is unacceptable. But, when I saw them doing the same thing to another people, I myself felt cheated and alone. I felt that nobody on that land actually understood me, or had any sympathy for me even though I am supporting them to gain their rights as citizens and as humans. When I asked Osman (the dayıbaşı) why he insulted the people because of their religious beliefs, he was totally taken aback and he asked me whether their behaviour of taking our sacks was fair. I told him that it was not fair but that their behaviour had nothing to do with their beliefs. He didn't answer me. Once more, I was left feeling alone in the field (Fieldwork diary, 11 September 2013).

Here, I should note that on such occasions, when I wanted to down tools and just go home, the anger I had towards the rural workers was more in the form of disappointment whereas in the factory the anger I experienced towards the factory women was more 'proper' anger. This could be because of the different characteristics of our relations, which I stated above as 'helpfulness' and 'competiveness'. However, at such times I always reminded myself that I should not expect the women to understand me because I came to them, to see their lives; they did not invite me, so control, to some extent, lay with them. However, I am a human being and humans always have expectations of their relationships, especially of the ones we call our friends. I was hurt and angry with Kurdish workers more because I feel closer to them than women in the factory. Because of this closeness they had the power to hurt me more. My hurting and feeling angry and alone also underlines my outsider status, despite becoming friends with some of them. I was close to them as much as the nature of being human enables me and I was outsider to them as much as the nature of being human prevents me.

---

[47] Alevism is one of the two main branches of Islam in Turkey (after Sunnism). Alevis are estimated to constitute around 20% of the population of Turkey. Alevism is associated with the 12 Shia Imams. Alevis believe that the prophet Ali was the rightful successor to the prophet Muhammad and that Ali's descendants are the rightful leaders of Islam. Alevism is distinct from Shiaism in that it is based on Sufi mysticism. Some Kurds are also Alevis. Alevism is more prevalent in central Anatolia.

3.5. What Does ‘Ethical’ Mean?

We researchers have various ethical guidelines to promote good research practice. Here, I will consider the ethical guidelines of the Association of Social Anthropologists of the UK and the Commonwealth (ASA) since it covers detailed codes for ethnography and for participant observation in particular. These codes primarily include issues around consent, avoiding directly and indirectly harming participants, responsibilities to participants, sponsors, the discipline, wider society, government, etc., but not to ourselves, as researchers. In the following, in addition to demonstrating that following the steps set out by published ethical guidelines is extremely difficult, in line with Emerald & Carpenter (2015), I will also argue that ethical guidelines should also include possible ‘emotional harm to the researcher’.

For example, the first key step of participant observation, according to the ASA is that:

> Participants should be made aware of the presence and purpose of the researcher whenever reasonably practicable. Researchers should inform participants of their research in the most appropriate way depending on the context of the research. (ASA guideline, 2011).

It is not always possible to apply these measures. In the case of my research, I could not convince some of the workers that I had been doing research for a long time and some were reluctant to believe me about my role as a researcher. I am not suggesting that we should not inform participants of our presence as researchers because they will not believe us, rather I am asserting that it can be the case that participants are not aware of what it means to be a researcher or of the purpose of your research.

The possibility of anticipating indirect harm to participants can also be difficult to prepare for. As ASA guidelines suggest:

> The researcher should try to minimise disturbances both to subjects themselves and to the subjects' relationships with their environment. Even though research participants may be immediately protected by the device of anonymity, the researcher should try to anticipate the long-term effects on individuals or groups as a result of the research (ASA guideline, 2011).

I am not always convinced of the possibility of minimising disturbances to subjects or their relationships within their environment. It is apparent that when the researcher also becomes a subject of the environment, predicting possible indirect harm is a highly complex task. Moreover, regarding the target itself: anticipating the long-term results of research does not seem achievable in the social world. If we are talking about social relations, just one word can cause many unintended consequences.

> When she thanked me for my encouragement, she found a brief moment to look at him. And, then they began gazing. Later, he told her that he liked her. I felt my face turn red. I did not want to cause trouble. Now, they love each other and Emine's father strongly opposes the relationship. Emine has been crying continuously and Remzi does not seem happy either. I thought that this could not be because of me. She told me that she had not realised that Remzi liked her, but I told her I saw him looking over at her. It was only then that she began to look at him. I could have cried, how could I have known that this would turn out to be an impossible love story? I remembered the conversation between us, the day we were talking about our relationships and she told me that she does not have any chance in love; that there is no one who likes her. And, I told her I think she must be blind since I have seen Remzi gazing at her on so many occasions. It was just girly chatting, and now a drama has unfolded in front of our eyes and Emine says that I'm responsible for it.

> What did I do? I should not have come to this place; I came here to interrupt people's lives (Fieldwork Diary, 09 August 2013).

This was not the only time I blamed myself for the negative effect my presence had on people's lives. I should confess here, I did many 'wrong things' according to the 'ethical guidelines' because I was not able to foresee the long-term consequences of my research. But, this was not for a lack of taking the participants' physical, psychological and financial wellbeing into consideration as the guidelines suggest. On the contrary, I always acted to ensure I did not exacerbate these critical factors. But 'good' intentions do not always guarantee 'fair' outcomes. For instance, Emine asked me to take a photo with everyone so that she could then see herself and Remzi in the same picture and this meant a lot to her. She cried when she asked for it and said that there was no possibility for them to be together in real life. They could not have taken a photo together alone, the only way I could have photographed them was by taking a group photo. This was her only option. I did as she asked me and gave copies of the photo to almost everyone. But, then Remzi and Emine exchanged their photos writing some notes on the back. Emine's father discovered this and beat her. Unfortunately, I have many examples of how my good intentions caused trouble for the participants, and such instances always made me depressed in the field, and I tried to find methods to overcome this depression. This included me avoiding talking with the other workers. Unfortunately, this was also problematic since the other workers immediately noticed my silence:

> Today, I was not talking very much and trying to work alone by having as little contact with others as possible. I am feeling very guilty. I came here to do research, but I am continuously causing trouble. Every time I talk about different things to them I seem to make more trouble. So, today, I was just doing my work and only speaking when someone asked me a

> question or spoke to me directly. However, after lunch, Melek came to my side and asked me whether everything was okay. Why am I not talking to anyone? She said that I was not behaving normally. I said everything was fine but it was clear to them that it was not. Then, Hazal and Pınar asked me if they did anything to upset me because I was not talking to them like I usually would. I don't know what I should do. I came here and now I have a relationship with them, I cannot change myself and become someone different, after having developed a relationship (Fieldwork diary, 17 September 2013).

When you seek to restrain your spontaneous relationship with the people you work with, the result is noticed as something 'unnatural' and somehow 'childish'. After a long time, I accepted that I cannot do anything better than continuing to live with them without trying to focus on the long-term results of it, since these situations are unpredictable and focusing on foreseeing them can lead to personal insecurity and make your relationships with other people seem insincere. I am aware that my position as a researcher and my research could be criticised if I lost my outsider perspective: the 'danger of going native'. Losing an 'outsider perspective' is not possible no matter how much of a native you become. It is true that you can become a 'new person' by going native, but you cannot leave your past behind you; everything you already are and owe yourself to also comes with you when you enter a new world. It is true that I have viewed the people with whom I worked not so much as research participants but more as my friends, and they have not seen me as a researcher but as their friend. But, being a sociologist is only one part of my identity, one that I cannot lose when I interact with my friends; my interpretation of social life cannot be separated from my sociological knowledge; my perspective has been 'sociologised', it is part of how I interpret the world around me. Thus, my role as a researcher was with me throughout the whole process because this is a part of who I am.

After making the existence of my identity as a researcher in the research process explicit, we can now return to the question of ethical guidelines. Based on my experiences during the research process, I suggest that the ethical guidelines should include a section warning researchers about the potential for unintentionally harming research subjects. Without adding ourselves to the ethical guidelines, we lose our chance to add new dimensions to ‘reflexivity’ by discussing our dilemmas as researchers in the context of ethical dilemmas. I referred to this issue above when I discussed how I survived working in the field and the impact that this had on my reflexivity. Our ethical guidelines are not designed to protect ourselves as researchers. They do not take into account our feelings towards our own research experience; as Carroll (2013) suggests, they do not consider researchers’ ‘emotional labour’ and, they indirectly force us to distance ourselves from our research and from the people we work with, while labelling some of the potential negative feelings that we have as ‘unsuccessful research experiences’. I experienced many moments in my research in which I thought about why I liked one woman more than another, or why I was getting angry with a person, or questioning my abilities as a researcher. I even tried to manipulate myself into thinking that I was able to foresee the long term consequences of my research, or on occasions I found myself not writing some of the things which I thought in the field as I considered that they could be too controversial to commit to paper, such as how I argued with some of my friends in the factory over break times etc.

However, during the research itself, I learned that to be yourself during the research process is the first condition of ‘protecting’ the people you work with. You should first listen to yourself and accept yourself as you are, it is only then that you can see the world as it is through the lens of your own subjectivity, but not separated from the world as it exists. We should depart from saying things that ‘must be said’, and try to say ‘what ‘can and should’ be said’. I believe that this exploration will enable us to further ‘define’ what is ‘ethical’ in relation to the research process

3.6. Conclusion: Will This Study Count as Feminist Research?

I know that we do not possess a common definition of feminist research, but that what counts as feminist research and what does not is well established (Maryland 1995). Hopefully, by offering what constitutes the ‘core elements’ of feminist research – such as the discussion over friendship, ‘insiders/outsiders’, ‘reflexivity’, ‘power relations’ and ‘ethics’ in a reflective way – I have established that this study constitutes feminist research. This was a difficult attempt in the world of unfixing, as feminist epistemology does not propose one ‘right way’ of doing research (Kelly et. al, 1995); it is flexible in its design insofar as it seeks to reveal the perspective of the ‘powerless’. Here, quite intentionally, I am not simply stating women’s standpoints. Although this research focuses more on women workers’ experiences and mainly aims to understand them, at heart, I seek to explore the standpoints of those who are marginalised, whatever sex they may be. This does not prevent the study from being feminist because, as I have argued, to be ‘feminine’ is to be seen as powerless and vice-versa. This constitutes the foundation of my study.

Chapter 4

On the Tomato Land

4.1. Introduction: 'Crying with Pınar'

I always believe that numbers are cold and distant from named individuals. People cannot cry for Turkey's 3,000,000 seasonal workers but they can cry for Pınar, just one of them. I am not suggesting that the intention of this study is to make people cry for somebody. Here, I only use the word 'cry' to empathise with someone and I write this chapter with the intention of making readers 'feel' with the women workers on tomato land. While feeling with them, this discussion answers the question of how the agricultural labour process is organised in Turkey, using the example of the production of tomatoes with mostly Kurdish seasonal migrant workers for the Japanese market. By feeling with them, we can see what they see and come to understand how the relations of capitalist production, kinship, ethnicity, class, age and gender intertwine in the agricultural labour process of tomato production. In addition, the chapter demonstrates how these intersections create masculinities and femininities within the division of labour in tomato production. This is important for my subsequent development of the term intersectional patriarchy.

The chapter is divided into four sections. These sections follow the four seasons of the year and that is why this is a long chapter. The four seasons correspond with different phases of the annual production cycle and thus, different working relations. The first part explains how the labour force is constructed over the 'winter' by the *dayıbaşı*[48] through his connections with his kin, I also consider the contact between the farmer and factory which purchases the tomatoes. The two sections that follow focus on how labour is organised and managed during production. The first of these focuses on the planting in spring which is strictly a 'woman's job', especially the differences in women workers' experiences. The next section shows how the labour process of picking in the summer is organised by ethnicity. At this point, I also make clear that 'tomato work' is gendered, so that male Kurdish workers are seen to be doing women's work. The last section focuses on the conflicts between labour and capital at the end of 'autumn' when workers' wages are due.

4.2. Winter: Time to Negotiate

According to their producers, there are two types of tomatoes: 'factory tomatoes' and 'tomatoes for eating'. Workers and farmers refer to the tomatoes which are produced for the factory as 'factory tomatoes' and to those which are produced for national supermarkets and sold 'fresh' as 'tomatoes for eating' – *yemelik domates*. The story I tell in this study is mainly the story of 'factory tomatoes', not 'tomatoes for eating'. This is because I focus on global production and the 'factory tomatoes' are 'global' enough to travel as far as Japan. So, let us start with the role of one of the biggest tomato-processing factories in Turkey. The tomatoes I planted and picked are produced for the factory and I will explore how these tomatoes shape the agricultural labour force.

---

[48] *Dayı* means maternal uncle and *başı* means headman. The direct translation refers to the most senior of the maternal uncles. This can be considered as an interesting reflection on the relation between women workers and their male 'agents'. The factory does not work with *dayıbaşı* to recruit workers, but landowning families need to contact a *dayıbaşı*.

4.2.1. The Factory and its 'Humble Servants': Farmers

The structure and operation of Red, the factory that purchases the tomatoes that I helped produce on the land, has benefitted indirectly from many of the policies of the current AKP government which has been in power since 2002 and encouraged the internationalisation, liberalisation and privatisation of the Turkish economy as discussed in Chapter 2. The factory was established in the 1960s in Bursa, which produces 68% of the processed tomatoes in Turkey (ZMO, 2014) and Red is one of Bursa's five major factories. It produces tomato purée, tomato paste, chopped tomatoes, peeled whole tomatoes, and ketchup. Since 2007, the company has had Japanese shareholders. On its website, it introduces itself as pioneering the establishment of the export-oriented agricultural industry in Turkey. Official reports on processed tomato exports also support this claim. In the last 15 years, Red has increased their export range to 40 different countries including Japan, USA, Germany and the Netherlands. The website and the general manager assure me that all phases of tomato production and processing from seed to canned tomato products are under the company's control. And as a result of this control, they claim that they are able to offer products of the desired quality and freshness to their consumers. I will talk about the structure and organisation of the factory in more detail in Chapter 5. Here however, I will focus on how the company's control, from seed to canned tomato, is reflected in agricultural production and how the desired quality of the product affects the construction and composition of the agricultural labour force, as well as its working conditions.

The factory's main method for establishing control over farmers is through 'contract farming'. After harvesting, the factory and farmers agree upon a fixed price per kilo of tomatoes for the next year. Then, the factory gives farmers the seeds and fertilisers they need or advances payment to them to buy particular seeds and fertilisers. According to this agreement, a farmer has to produce an exact amount of tomatoes for each hectare of land planted. If farmers cannot meet their production targets, then it is considered to be their fault. In cases such as this, the farmer receives a lower price for the crop. The same goes for cases in which the quality of the tomatoes is lower than expected.

Farmers often complain about how the factory reduces the ‘fixed price’ by accusing farmers of not using fertilisers or pesticides correctly. During harvest time, there are regular fights between farmers and quality controllers outside of the factory gates at any given time, on any given day.

> ‘Once you get involved with the factory [implying contract farming] you cannot escape. If you want to stay in your job [implying farming], you have no choice but to keep producing for the factory, as they are the ones providing seeds and fertilisers’ (Halil Ibrahim, a member of the landowning family, 29 April 2013).

Turkish agriculture consists of mainly small-scale farmers; around 90% of farmers have properties smaller than 3 acres (TÜİK, 2011b). The factory manager states his dissatisfaction with this:

> ‘We have to deal with lots of people. It takes all winter and far too much time. A man has 10 hectares [around 3 acres]. When he comes to us you should see him, he believes that he is a king; you know that those peasant[49] men think that they create the world. Their women are not

---

> judicious, so they always tell their men that they are the best. Then, we have to grapple in order to reach an agreement. The farmers think that they have endless fields that are more fertile than any other. But, farmers do not know how to manage their fields, they are not aware of technology, new fertilisers, nothing, absolutely nothing. The government should do something about it, if they want to compete with the world. They [the farmers] drive me crazy. We have tools but don't have competent people. Imagine trying to produce for the Japanese market with people like them' (18 September 2014).

Although scholars see the current neo-liberal policies of Turkish agriculture as heralding the 'death of small farmers' (Keyder & Yenal, 2013; Özuğurlu, 2011), the factory manager thinks that the government's regulations geared towards organising agriculture in a more export-friendly way are insufficient. It is evident that the factory manager desires the end of smallholder farming. His scorn for farmers and preference for the extinction of small-scale farming or peasant production is very similar to what Wright & Madrid (2007) found in the Colombian cut-flower industry, where peasants were seen as backwards, hazardous and undisciplined, and thus unable to cope with changes in agriculture. In a similar vein, the factory manager of Red sees peasants as responsible for Turkey's not advancing in capitalist agricultural production and, as chapter 5 explores in detail, he sees modernisation as a tool to 'heal' them.

---

[49] The factory manager uses the words of 'peasants' and 'farmers' interchangeably because he sees farmers as just farmers. Farmers often do so too. As discussed in the previous section, this is related to the rapid transformation in rural settlement patterns in Turkey. Moreover, being a peasant does not only refer to occupation, but also includes life style, beliefs, values and so on. As discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, the founding ideology of the Turkish Republic, Kemalism, in some cases celebrates rural settlements, but also sees all things rural as 'backward, conservative and religious'. Although Mustafa Kemal Atatürk did say good things about peasants such as 'Peasants are the leaders of the people', in reality, dividing the rural population into two: wise Anatolian republicans and backward, traditional and religious people, led to the idea of 'being rural' essentially becoming a pejorative term. Calling someone a peasant is a means to humiliate people. For example, when somebody behaves inappropriately, depending on the context, one might say, 'Are you a peasant?' Linking peasantry and inappropriate behaviour is also one of the consequences of mass rural to urban migration in 1970s.

On the other hand, the factory manager's claim about farmers' lack of knowledge, appears to ring true. It is clear that farmers have relatively limited knowledge about the application of new seeds, fertilisers, or new technologies, including irrigation systems. However, the manager appears to ignore the fact that there is no source from which farmers can learn about the new demands and requirements stemming from the transformation of agricultural production. Neither effective unions nor official training programmes exist for farmers. Ironically, official reports also agree that farmers are totally alone under the new system and that they do not know how to cope (TEPGE, 2014).

Not knowing how to use the fertilisers is not the only problem that farmers have to contend with. The obligation to use registered seeds (Seed Law, 2006[50]) is their biggest problem, as before they did not have to pay for seeds. Because registered seeds are hybrids, they cannot be used year-on-year.

> 'You can borrow a tractor from your neighbour, but you cannot borrow seeds from someone. You have to buy seeds and the only way you can get money for seeds is by going to the banks. In order to borrow from the banks, you need valuable property to give to the banks in the form of loan. So, if you have many acres of land, you can apply for credit from the banks. If you don't, you won't have the money to buy seeds, fertilisers etc. So, most of our neighbours are giving up farming and looking for other jobs [in the last 10 years, around a million farmers have given up farming (TÜİK, 2013b). They [former smallholder farmers] no longer work in the villages because they are not satisfied with what we offer them. You know we cannot afford to employ workers in tomato picking with a daily wage in hours. It is impossible! We are producing more tomatoes than before, so we need a larger workforce. But, we cannot

---

[50] See Chapter 2.

> employ more workers since we also do not have money' (Halil Ibrahim, a member of the landowning family, 29 April 2013, on the tomato land).

Under these conditions, farmers try to reduce the cost of labour in order to try to guarantee a profit. The cost of labour is the only thing the factory does not have direct control over.

4.2.2. Waiting for the Call to 'Work': The *Dayıbaşı* and his 'Familial Labour Force'

As can be expected, with the cost of production tied to the whims of global capital, working conditions on the land where 'factory tomatoes' are grown have consistently deteriorated. Working hours are now longer and wages are based on group performance. As the factory pays the farmers depending on the amount of tomatoes they bring to the factory, the farmers also pay the workers depending on the amount of tomatoes they pick. Both farmers and farm workers are paid depending on the aggregate weight of these tomatoes, with the plum ones weighing less. When some tomatoes are over-ripe, the factory pays the farmers less and the farmers subsequently pay less to their workers. In this sense, both farmers and workers share a common interest; they both want to pick as many tomatoes as possible before they decrease in weight. Based on this, farmers try to find workers eager to work very long hours a day, because the dividends from the tomatoes decrease as the picking season wears on.

Local women workers work on the tomato land in planting season (see gender and ethnic division of labour regarding the tomato growing stages in Table 4.1, on page 140). They are paid a daily wage based on eight hours of work a day. However, local women do not accept work during picking season, when working hours rise to sixteen a day and payment is based on group performance. Instead, in the summer, local workers often choose to work in the factory or picking ‘tomatoes for eating’, which are produced for national supermarkets. The working conditions are far better on the lands of ‘tomatoes for eating’ than the lands of ‘factory tomatoes’. In this way the cheapest way and often the only option available to farmers is employing Kurdish migrant families to pick ‘factory tomatoes’. Kurdish migrant rural workers do not have regular employment and their main source of income is seasonal rural work. This is the lowest paid, most insecure and least prestigious work in Turkey. This is in line with Turkey’s nationalist ideological position, which has become more prominent since the 2000s. This form of ‘corporate nationalism’ (Tuğal, 2009) locks Kurds into disadvantaged urban or rural locations, restrictive cultural identities, and low-paying jobs. The extended family structure of Kurdish families also fits in perfectly with the conditions of rural tomato work; they can work on a group performance based payment system within extended family groups. Also, their lack of alternative employment opportunities makes them more willing to acquiesce to long working days and a performance-based payment system.

Existing literature on the on the ‘feminisation’ of agricultural work in the Global South shows the prevalence of low paid work, poor working conditions, precariousness and seasonal migration (Barndt, 2002; Barrientos & Perrons, 1999; Barrientos, et al., 2003; Chant, 1991; 1997; Chant & McIlwaine, 1995; 2009; Whitehead, 2011; Wolf, 1994). So, it is not surprising that when we think about rural tomato production, we mostly imagine women workers working for long hours in 40-degree heat. This is the quintessential image of the tomato lands in Turkey. To tell the story of the tomato lands, however, I will begin with the view from the window of one Kurdish migrant woman’s house. This house is around 2000 km away from tomato land in a village near the town of Mazıdağı, near Mardin city, Turkey. I will begin with the story of a house, as it is in homes that labour is first constructed.

TURKEY
MAZIDAĞI
MARDIN

Map 4.1: The location of Mardin: The hometown of the Kurdish seasonal migrant workers I worked with

The population of Mardin is 779,738. According to official statistics, the level of unemployment in Mardin is 20.6%. This is the second highest rate of unemployment across Turkish cities (TÜİK, 2014c). Because of this, seasonal rural work is an important source of income for the people of Mardin, including the workers I worked with in this study. Mardin, Mazıdağı – the town – is located in the Mesopotamia region, which as part of the Fertile Crescent has gone down in history as the birthplace of settled agriculture. However, for almost a century, the fields that Hatice's house overlooks have lain fallow. The 'emptiness' of those fields, and, consequently the pull of migration to Western Turkey both seasonally and permanently, is seen by some to be a cause of the Kurdish-Turkish conflict and as a result of it by others. Although Hatice does not appear to care about whether the conflict is the cause or the consequence of economic deprivation in her region 'anymore' (*in her words*), it still seems absurd to look out of one's window onto the fields of the 'famous fertile Mesopotamia' and talk of travelling 2000km for seasonal rural work.

Although there are plenty of options for seasonal rural work in western Turkey, Kurds often want to remain with the same employer over a number of years. Melek reports that this makes them feel safer in a place. On the other hand, although they cannot trust 'strangers', they can migrate, work and live with their familiar and 'trustworthy' relatives. 'All I can ask from God is that we migrate together as a family and work for someone we have worked for before' (Melek, 10 March 2014). Unfortunately, however, this is not always the case:

> 'Leaving home to become seasonal workers requires a quick decision' says Yaşar [Hatice's husband], 'You do not have very much time to decide, as the farmers will not wait for you. When they call you, you should directly respond with 'yes' or 'no'. The agreements are mostly made at the end of the season every year. If you're happy with the farmer you already work for during the year, your *dayıbaşı* has to very quickly promise that you will work for him the following year. As you know, we will not be working for the same family this year[51], so our *dayıbaşı* [Hatice's husband's brother] will find us a new landowning family because we do not have a prior agreement. That's why he has gone to 'Bursa'[52], he has gone to find a new family for us to work for. When he finds someone, he always calls me and tells me to gather 'our lot'- [meaning his extended family members, who always migrate together seasonally] and, if there aren't enough of us for the landowning family, I will ask our distant relatives to come with us, or our relatives' distant relatives. Here, everyone is some kind of relative, you just have to find out how you're related' (Fieldwork notes, 9 March 2014, in Mardin).

---

[51] They had really big fight with the landowning family at the end of the picking season because of 'money'. This fight, its reasons and consequences, are explained later.

[52] Hatice's family has been migrating to Bursa every year for the past 15 years.

Being related in some way is a basic condition for becoming a member of the group. While the *dayıbaşı*'s elder brother tries to reach the numbers of workers the landowning family want, in the meantime the *dayıbaşı* waits in the hope that the others will come to work. Last season, whilst we were working on the land, I asked the *dayıbaşı* how he found the employers, and he told me that he did so with the recommendation of their previous landowning family. When I asked him how he first established connections with the region's landowning families, he replied that his military service provided the opportunity to meet the first landowning family he worked with. While he was doing his military service in the northern part of Turkey [in Turkey, military service is compulsory for all Turkish male citizens over 18 years old], he became close friends with a farmer's son. After they finished their military service, he visited his friend's hometown and worked with him on his father's land. By working on the land, Osman gained the trust of his friend's father who then asked for Osman's relatives to come to work on his lands. So, Osman initially invited his two brothers to work on the land with him, and they later started to migrate seasonally as an extended family and worked for his friend's family for six years.

> 'We called him 'father'. Unfortunately, he died, and his children divided the land between them. Then, they got smaller they did not need us anymore, but because we worked there for long years, now farmers in the region knew us and we knew them. Because of this, it is easier for us to find a job in this region. However, there is no one like him. He treated us just as he would treat his family. Now, the others treat us like we are their slaves. After him, we did not find regular employers, we had a lot of troubles, but still this region is the place we know the best' (Osman, Fieldwork notes, 7 September 2013, on the tomato land).

Before Osman established connections in Bursa, the family were migrating to İzmir – Turkey's third biggest city; interestingly, they only began to go to İzmir after

Osman's elder brother completed his military service there. Like Osman, he became familiar with the city and later invited his other brothers to join him. As seen, although Osman is not the eldest male member of the family, he arranges their working contract with employers and this gives him a more privileged position in decision-making process in the family than his elder brothers. He controls not only his younger sisters' and brothers' labour, but also over all his elder brothers except the eldest. This show us how managing the public relations of the family – the public face of family – is one of the main components of (hegemonic) masculinity in rural (see Table 6.1).

Kurdish women only entered the migrant labour force later and this is very similar to the literature suggesting that women elsewhere too are only able to enter the work force alongside their male family members (Kabeer, 2000; Lessinger, 1990; Vera-Sanso, 1995). Initially, Osman's family did not migrate seasonally as an extended family; the women and children initially stayed at home whilst the men migrated for seasonal work in tourism, industry or agriculture. 'There were no jobs for our women in those times. All of the "landowners' women" [inverted commas added] were working on the land but now that they are richer, their women do not want to work on the land. But, it is good for us now because we are getting richer' (Osman, 7 September 2013). If leaving the land and becoming workers in factories or in the service sector is considered to be an indicator of becoming richer (official sources also consider this to be indicative of 'economic development') then, Osman is right. However, people who migrate are more in debt than ever before. Often these debts are accrued by former smallholder and subsistence farmers selling their land in order to raise a deposit for mortgaged flats or houses in towns and cities. Once families have bought houses in the towns and cities however, they not only lose their means of subsistence (their farms) but they are also effectively stripped of their land. These people's conditions are explored in detail in Chapter 5.

4.3. Spring: 'Time to Plant Tomatoes'; The Inequalities of 'Female' Tomato Land

Stages of Tomato Growing	Gender and Ethnic Division of Labour
Buying tomato seedlings and pesticides	Oldest son (2nd generation) of Turkish landowning family
Preparation of land for planting - Ploughing **(by tractors)** - **Setting up irrigation pipes**	Male members of Turkish landowning family
Planting the Seedlings	- Female members of Turkish landowning family - Kurdish women seasonal migrant workers - Turkish local women workers
Checking and servicing irrigation pipes	Male members of Turkish landowning family
Applying pesticides	Male members of Turkish landowning family
Tying trusses and pinching out (between planting and picking)	- Female members of Turkish landowning family - Kurdish women seasonal migrant workers
Picking[53] tomatoes	Seasonal Kurdish male and female migrant workers
Filling trucks	Seasonal Kurdish male workers

Table 4. 1: Tomato Growing Stages and Gender and Ethnic Division of Labour

The above table (4.1) indicates the gender and ethnic division of labour on the tomato land depending on tomato growing stages. As seen in this table, planting of seedlings is strictly women's work regardless of their ethnicity and class. The following section focuses on how the labour process of tomato planting is shaped by class, ethnicity and also locality of those women.

---

[53] I intentionally use 'picking' rather than 'harvesting' since, in the Turkish language, tomatoes are not harvested but picked.

I dedicate each sub-section to different women whose identities reflect their different positions in the organisation of production on the land. The first sub-section is 'mine' and covers what I experienced while we are planting tomatoes in terms of our working conditions and the organisation of labour. The second sub-section is Fatma's; she is the wife of one of the landowners, a housewife and an unpaid worker on the land for the past 25 years. The third section is Melek's; she has been a seasonal worker for the past fifteen years and is married to the *dayıbaşı*. The fourth sub-section is Hazal's; she is 15 years old this is her second year of working. The final sub-section reports from Mefaret, who is a local Turkish woman who has worked in agriculture for the past forty years.

4.3.1. Through My Eyes: 'We are all Women until we are Divided by Money'

In the planting season, there were no men but only women on tomato land. This is why I call tomato land during the planting season 'female tomato land'. Men – from the landowners' family – come to the land first, when the women are not there, in order to prepare the land for planting by ploughing breaks up the soil and laying pipes to irrigate the tomatoes (see Table 4.1. on page 140). Then the women come to the land prepared for planting and they plant continuously all day. The landowners' wives[54] and daughters[55] live, work and spend their time with the Kurdish seasonal migrant workers on the land. Sometimes, local women work on the land too. The landowners' wives work both as workers and as managers. Fatma, the landowner's eldest daughter-in-law is the manager.

---

[54] I am aware that using the term "landowners' wives, daughters etc." implies I am comfortable defining the relationships of the women I worked with according to their relations with men. Whereas this appears to contradict the overtly feminist approach and methods of this thesis, women workers on the land often define themselves according to their relationship to men and in the absence of a more appropriate collective noun I have used terms such as "landowners' wives".

[55] When I use the term landowning family, I am referring to a single extended landowning family. There are four generations of this family.

Regardless of their seniority, all the women workers must wake up around 6 am. First, they serve breakfast, wash the dishes and prepare lunch for themselves and other family members. This is also applicable to the landowning family's wives and daughters. Despite their wealth, the landowning family do not hire domestic workers. This is because in rural communities, hiring a domestic servant is seen as shirking one's responsibilities and duties as a 'proper woman'. This is why all workers regardless of their social status and wealth wake up at the same time and get ready to go out to the land by 07.15.

The women's different class identities are evident from the very start of the day. The first instance of class divisions manifests itself in transportation. The landowning family's wives and daughters sit in the cabin of the truck, whereas the ordinary workers, including me, sit in the open air at the back of the truck. Most of the time, the truck driver is one of the landowning family's sons. If no one from the landowning family is available to drive, one of the male migrant workers will. As soon as women step onto the land, they start planting, even if they are from the landowning family. During the day, they are unlikely to see or interact with any men unless something urgent happens such as someone falling ill or running out of clean drinking water.

Planting is a monotonous task. First, the women bring boxes of tomato seedlings from the edges of the land, where the men leave them, to where they will be planted. Carrying fresh drinking water and boxes of seedlings is a job usually reserved for younger women or inexperienced women like me. Throughout the day, the women have to plant the seedlings. They do not need to dig holes for the seedlings, as the earth is very soft. The earth is softened by water that is fed into the soil through pipes.

The method of drip irrigation is used to water the soil. The drip irrigation method pre-softens the soil and makes the process of planting a relatively simple one. None of the women see the process of irrigation or ploughing. As seen in Table 4.1 (on page 140) these are entirely men's jobs, as is application of pesticides. Women do not have any knowledge about using pesticides. As these tasks require driving tractors or other special machines (for instance, for applying pesticides), both men and women normalise this gendered division of labour. Existing literature elsewhere on the gender division of labour in using machines has already demonstrated how technology is seen as men's area both in agriculture and manufacturing (Boserup, 1970; Cockburn, 1983; 1985; Cockburn & Ormond, 1995; Phillips & Taylor, 1980).

Turning back to women's work on the land, working in the capitalised rural tomato planting process is not dissimilar to working on an assembly line, although here neither tomatoes nor lines move. While it is the women who move continuously, there is substitute organisation. Tomato work, over time, has become both repetitive and unskilled. Tasks are divided and largely automatic, with no thought required; women are simply responsible for pushing seedlings into the soil all the day. The women do not have any knowledge of or control over what they are producing. Before the capitalisation of agriculture, the previous year's crops were using to fertilise new seeds. So, workers needed to be able to tell healthy seedlings apart from the unhealthy ones. The introduction of hybrid seeds, however, has meant there are no visible differences between seedlings and hence no difference in planting them. In this way, the women are further alienated from their work: global seed corporations control their planting methods and they have no autonomy over the production process.

Although the process of planting is very similar to assembly line production, unlike in the factory, women working in the fields are able to freely talk to one another. They can gossip or listen to music together more freely. These are the enjoyable activities that are permitted during the working day. They can go to the toilet whenever they want but, if they go to toilet in the breaks, they earn the accolade of star worker. Most, however, prefer to go to the toilet in their working time since working on the land is backbreaking work. Going to the toilet is seen as a welcome break. There are however no toilet facilities on the land. Women have to use the edge of another field hidden by brushwood as a toilet.

The tasks on the land are the same for all the women, but there are slight differences in responsibilities based on social status. If they belong to a landowning family, they will have the dual role of worker and manager. They have to keep other women under control to guarantee that they 'deserve' what they earn. 'Deserving what you earn' is very subjective. Because of this, different women from the landowning family have different attitudes towards controlling workers.

In the following section, I will introduce Fatma. She is the wife of the eldest son of the landowning's family and is known for being the strictest and most controlling landowner/worker.

4.3.2. Through the eyes of the employer: 'The Obsession with Controlling Young Workers'

> 'When Fatma does not come to work, I feel more comfortable. She is always watching me, so I panic when she is with us' (Pınar, 5 May 2013, on the tomato land).

Fatma's controlling behaviour towards Pınar is because Pınar is the youngest worker. Pınar says that she is fourteen years old. Even though Pınar takes shorter breaks and tries to work faster than the others, Fatma always shouts at her. As Fatma explains to me, her problem is not with Pınar personally but with her father, the *dayıbaşı*. The landowning family do not want to employ workers younger than sixteen because they are not capable of long toil and heavy manual labour. Fatma says that the landowning family do not want to pay child workers the same wages as adult workers. She says that they told the *dayıbaşı* that they did not want young workers on the land but the *dayıbaşı* brought young workers in anyway. Fatma further explains that the *dayıbaşı* threatens to break up the work groups if the landowning family do not agree to pay younger workers at the same rate as adults. In the planting season, there are about fifteen of us working on the land. Of the fifteen of us, five workers are under the age of sixteen. Fatma told me that the *dayıbaşı* and his workers threatened to stop work if they did not agree to hiring children and that the landowning family were forced to capitulate because of how difficult it is to find thirty boarding workers once the season has begun. Fatma explained that situations such as this arise every year. She says that she feels pity for those young girls who are made to work by their families. Her perception of coerced labour is in part true, as Pınar told me that if she had a choice, she would not work. Fatma's attitude to Pınar was contradictory; sometimes she shouted a lot, but I have also seen Fatma in tears after shouting at Pınar. She said that she knows that mistreating the young girls is a sin but that she is in a situation where she must ensure production output by controlling workers but is powerless to prevent the use of child labour. Fatma explained that she could not simply put an end to their employment by talking to either that *dayıbaşı* or to the girls' families. She says that this is because if she raised the issue, the workers would threaten to down tools and would leave the land altogether.

Fatma and other members of the landowning family are also angry because they claim that although the *dayıbaşı* brings young workers to the land in planting season, he does not in picking season. Fatma and other members of the landowning family argue that this is because they know that during picking season, when wages are paid based on group performance; young workers will not be able to 'pull their weight'. During the picking season, young workers stay at home to take care of the younger children. Fatma told me that:

> 'I guess that you will write something about me and my harsh attitudes towards the younger ones, so please say that we are losing 175 TL (around £45) every day because of the young workers and 175TL is the same cost as a box of tomato seedlings. And, say that I am more concerned about them than their families are' (Fatma, Fieldwork notes, 9 May 2013, on the tomato land).

Fatma's conflicted reactions regarding Pınar mirror the conflicting relations of capitalist production and these are reflected in my fieldwork diary as follows:

> Honestly, I want to become angry with someone; I want to become angry with Fatma or the girls' parents, but when I talk to them, I find myself empathising with them. I am not angry with their families because I know that they need their girls to work because they need money. I have learned from the land that it is almost impossible to blame one side. They all have their reasons to blame others. I am not sure whether I can say that the structure causes both sides to behave unethically or not. I do not want to underestimate people by saying that the system is to blame but the situation reminds me of Adorno's saying that 'the wrong life cannot be lived rightly'. In my mind, the structure is the 'wrong' one, and the 'people' are very limited in their means to live 'rightly' in this structure (Fieldwork Diary, 13 August 2013).

When I hear Fatma's remonstrance about what she sees as workers' attitudes towards the landowning family, it is difficult to say that she is wrong:

> 'They [the workers] do not understand that earning money is difficult for us as well. I am working here just like them, we do the same job, my children do the same job with their children, and my husband does the same job with their husbands. When they see the large lands, they automatically think that we are rich; they are not aware of how much we have to pay for seeds, land, gas, irrigation and workers. They only think that I am a happier woman than they are since my husband is richer than their husbands. They do not know that I have to live with my husband's siblings to survive. Otherwise, we get smaller by sharing what we have, and we can't cope with the factories. They do not think that we have financial problems too. Recently, Sinan [their neighbour in the village] killed himself because of bankruptcy. Many of our neighbours have already migrated to towns. Workers only think that they earn less and ignore that we do not earn much either. They do not see that we do the same work as them under the same conditions. My position is worse than them since I am also responsible for the quality of work, if these do not grow well because of bad planting, my husband will blame me for not controlling the work and for cooperating with workers rather than him. Also, if our employees work slowly, I am again responsible for this and directly lose money by having to extend the amount of time worked. I have to do something to speed up their work' (Fatma, Fieldwork Notes, 13 May 2014, on the tomato land).

The landowning family consists of two brothers' and their sons' nuclear families (see in Diagram 6.1, page 243). The wives of all of these sons work on the land in the planting season, but none of them behaves like Fatma. All of them agree with Fatma's thinking about workers and work, but their reactions are very different. They all have different reasons for behaving differently towards the workers. For example, Nezahat is the workers' favourite among women from the landowning family. Her husband's family employed her as a seasonal migrant worker some years ago, and this is how she met her husband, Recai. Although they come from different economic backgrounds, their marriage was not shocking news for anyone in the village they lived in or possibly around the region. They are both 'peasants' and 'Turkish', and in rural western Turkey it is more acceptable for a woman to marry someone from a higher socioeconomic background than it is for a man[56]. Nezahat, explains her reason for being a 'nice boss' to me:

> 'Before I married Recai, I was one of the seasonal workers on 'his' land[57]. So, I know what workers think about their lives because I thought like them. I thought that if I can marry him, I can save my life but as you see nothing has changed for me, I am still a worker on land, but it belongs to us. I hope that my children will not have to work on the land. I know that they [the workers] think that our life is perfect, and that we are lucky because we are richer than they are. I am not angry with them because I know that that's how it looks from the outside' (Nezahat, Fieldwork notes, 4 May 2013, in her home).

Not only is Nezahat the workers' favourite, but Fatma has problems with her because she thinks that Nezahat is always on the side of workers. 'Nezahat cannot understand me because she still thinks and acts like one of the workers' (Fatma, 7 May 2013). I am not sure if Nezahat understands Fatma's concerns. Although I think that she understands what Fatma worries about, she does not think in the same way as Fatma. I think that Nezahat understands the *meaning* of work better than Fatma does. On the other hand, Fatma thinks that Nezahat is as lazy and as slow as the workers. Even though both workers and landowning family see Nezahat as being on the workers' side, I do not think that Nezahat is totally on the side of either the landowning family or the workers. For the women I worked with, not strictly controlling the workers automatically puts Nezahat on the workers' side. From my point of view, she is the only one from the landowning family who shows concern for both groups. Maybe, the position of the *dayıbaşı*'s wife, Melek, can be likened to Nezahat's position.

---

[56] 'Cross-class' marriages are common in the western rural Turkey – both of my two aunts were seasonal workers on my uncles' lands when they met. It could be different among Kurds under the *aşiret* system, where the priority is to marry someone from one's own kinship group.

[57] Before Kurdish families were employed, workers from around the villages, which are known as 'forest villages', were employed seasonally around the region, as in their villages there were no commercial agricultural lands. With the capitalisation of agriculture, this trend is no longer observable, as it requires more workers and longer working hours. Nezahat –ethnically Turkish– was one of those seasonal workers, who also lived in the shacks for a season before the Kurdish families arrived.

4.3.3. Through the Eyes of the 'Middle woman': 'No one Likes Me'

Melek is 28 years old, the wife of the *dayıbaşı* and mother to four daughters. She has a similar position to the forewoman in the factory in that she is a worker but also a manager. Her job is called a *çavuş* (corporal); this is similar to the way in which ranks are assigned in the factory. On the land, however, unlike in the factory, workers call Melek by her name. She was five months pregnant in the planting season. Although she does the same work as other workers, she is paid twice as much as the other workers because she is the *dayıbaşı*'s wife. She has known the landowning family for three years; her husband has brought a different group of workers for three years to the same land. Her biggest problem is not having a son, and her greatest hope is that her current pregnancy will result in one. If she does not have a son, her husband will have the 'right' to take another wife[58].

Her situation was very perplexing for me since I am totally against the idea of preferring boy children, but I have found myself hoping that Melek has a boy. This confusion persists in my interactions with Melek. This confusion is not only tied to the sex of her child but also with her attitudes towards her work and the workers. Melek means 'Angel' in Turkish but most of the workers call her a 'devil' because they say that she is always on the side of the landowning family. Seeing Melek on the land, I am forced to agree. For instance, it is Melek's responsibility to announce the start of break time but Melek shortens breaks by delaying her announcements. She also shouts at workers when the landowning family complain about them. Despite this kind of behaviour, the daughters-in-law of the landowning family are still not happy with her. They think that her attitude towards the workers is too soft.

---

[58] Here, I do not refer to a registered, official marriage, as polygamy in Turkey is illegal.

Melek told me that unless she behaves in this way, none of the workers will be able to work on the land the following year. She says that they will not even be able to return to the same region because then they will be perceived as lazy. She said to me that

> 'If I am on 'our' [the workers'] side, we will all lose our jobs for next year. They [the landowning family] will not call us next year, and they also will complain to all of their neighbours [other landowning families], saying that we are not working fast enough. This bad reputation even affects people from our hometown. They will say that people from Mazıdağı [where they come from] do not work properly. It is always like this' (Fieldwork notes, 11 May 2013, in the shacks).

Awarding or punishing workers collectively is a very common way of managing labour, especially when it is constructed through localistic or familial networks (Dedeoğlu, 2010; 2012; Ecevit, 1991; Lee, 1998; Kabeer, 2000; White, 2004). Kabeer demonstrates how factories in Bangladesh manage women by comparing them with each other with reference to their neighbourhood. These studies also show that being a good worker depends on not agitating for your 'own' rights such as breaks or starting and finishing work on time. The same applies on tomato land. I have heard lots of conversations in the village about the definition of a good worker. It mostly includes obeying the wishes of the landowning family. For example, one of the women from the local village whose family also employs seasonal workers came to me and said ‘make your research about our workers. This year we have perfect workers. They start work at 7.00, and they do not stop until we want them to’ (Esma, 31 April 2013). Where I worked, the landowning family thought that ‘Melek’ spoiled her workers because she followed exact start and finish times. On the other hand, the workers said that she does not follow exact start and end times; they always start early and finish late. Apparently, Melek mostly overlooks the agreed finishing time in favour of the landowning family but she did not do this because she was a ‘devil’, but because she tries to be an ‘angel’ for the others in the long term.

4.3.4. Through the Eyes of a Kurdish Seasonal Worker

Hazal, who is fifteen years old, is Pınar’s aunt. Pınar’s father is married to Hazal’s elder sister. Hazal comes to land with her three brothers. She hates Fatma and Melek because of their attitudes towards Pınar. Although Hazal is Pınar’s aunt their relationship is more like one between two sisters. Hazal always works on the next row to Pınar, and they are the slowest, so Fatma and Melek always send me to help them finish their line. Pınar and Hazal like me because I help them. I can see that they are struggling to keep working all day. Hazal is ten years younger than I am. Although this is clear to see from our faces, if you were to compare our hands, it would be easy to think that Hazal was many years my senior. Working on the land is very strenuous, particularly for someone who is fifteen. Hazal, however, told me that she is not that young. She explained that she started working on the land two years ago and that she once found the work a lot more difficult. She also told me that working on the land is sometimes more enjoyable than staying at home. She has said that the most enjoyable part of the work, apart from talking with Pınar, is having a chance to socialise with other women and compete with them. For me, the competition between workers is one of the most irritating things at the work because

Fatma uses competition to cheat and manipulate the youngest workers into working faster. Fatma says she will give a reward to the fastest worker; she says that she will reward them with an ice-cream, a Coca-Cola or permission to finish work ten minutes early but this never actually happens. Hazal works really hard to win rewards and she often 'wins' but ultimately, she is never able to claim her rewards. Even when she wins the 'reward' of stopping early, Fatma creates a new job for her such as burning empty seedling boxes. I find this really upsetting. It is depressing to see a child deprived of the ice cream she has worked so hard to earn. Fortunately, Hazal is also aware that 'Fatma' cheats them by offering false promises, and she told me 'I know that she will not buy me ice-cream, but I can motivate myself by making myself think that I'm going to win something at the end of it' (14 May 2013). Ice cream is not the only thing to ease the work for her; the gang master, 'Osman', is also another reason for her to come to land.

Osman, the *dayıbaşı*, does not work with the women during planting season, but he comes to the land to see whether everything is all right. The *dayıbaşı*'s visits are the only time when fellow workers from the landowning family are not the only ones to evaluate the seasonal workers' output. When he comes to inspect the workers, the *dayıbaşı* always comes to Hazal's side first instead of coming to his wife, Melek's side. When I realised this, I could not believe it since although I know that there is a possibility of Hazal being taken as a second wife, I did not imagine it actually happening. Now I see how Osman's attention makes Hazal happier and how it makes Melek more desperate. Being someone's second wife is not common among Turkish women, whereas this is seen as an active possibility for Kurdish women. Fatma has not missed this opportunity to use this 'delineation' between Kurdish and Turkish women as a means of exercising control over Hazal's work by trying to irritate her:

> Today, I was upset. Fatma was angry with Hazal because she is always at the back when we are planting. She is really slow, and Fatma told her ‘Pray that your father doesn’t give you away as a second wife. The other wife will kill you because you are so incompetent. While she said this, she looked at ‘Melek’ (she did so directly since everyone knows what Osman thinks). I couldn’t believe how cruel Fatma is. How can she pick on a fifteen year old girl in this way? But, fortunately, Hazal only smiles since she views this as an opportunity. I know that Fatma said this just to hurt Hazal because Fatma views Hazal becoming a second wife in the same way that I do. The women in the landowning family always make jokes about how Kurdish women’s husbands or fathers marry more than one woman. I could not imagine what would happen if Osman flirted with Fatma’s daughter, who is only three years older than Hazal. There would be no possibility for the workers to make fun of it. You simply cannot make fun of women in the landowning family (Fieldwork diary, 15 May 2013).

Hazal appeared to be happy with Osman being interested in her since she thinks that he is a good option for her to marry[59]. She told me:

> ‘He likes me, and I don’t have any chance to marry someone I like [she already likes someone but her family are totally against this relationship]. So, he is a real option for me, he owns land in his hometown, and he does not have any sons’ (1 September 2013, in the shacks).

I did not say anything since I felt that she would know what I would say and do in her position. We however, live in entirely different worlds; they are even not parallels or opposites; they are on different planes.

---

[59] Here, I reiterate that this marriage would be a religious marriage that would not be officially registered. In Islam, a *nikah* is a formal marriage contract. Whilst a *nikah* is not recognised as legally binding by the Turkish state, it is common for couples to have both a wedding registered by the state and a *nikah*. Although the practice of polygamy is illegal and most clergy are overseen by the state through the diyanet (religious authority), there are imams who are not overseen by the *diyanet* and will perform polygamous marriage ceremonies.

4.3.5. Through the Eyes of a 'Resentful' Local Worker

Mefaret is 58-years-old, ethnically Turkish and is one of the most 'resentful' workers on the land. She has been working in the same village for as long as she can remember. Now at the age of 58 the landowning family, her neighbours, do not offer her a job but prefer Kurdish seasonal workers.

This is how she perceives the transformation process in Turkish agriculture, and this is why she is 'resentful' towards the village landowning family:

> 'In old times, they would come to us and offer us work. Now we want to work but they have Kurdish workers for a whole season. They just call us when they need extra workers in planting season. In the picking season, it's only Kurds who work on the land so there are no jobs for us. If I were younger, I would work in the factory, but now, I am much too old to work in the factory' (Mefaret, Fieldwork notes, 06 May 2013, on the tomato land).

She is not the only one who feels let down by the landowning family. During my two years of fieldwork, I often had the opportunity to talk to local village women both in the day and in the evenings. Although local women feel betrayed because the local landowning family choose to employ Kurdish workers, they do not show their dissatisfaction to the landowning family, only to the migrant Kurdish workers. Local workers believe that if Kurds would not accept working in those conditions – group performance based payment, long working hours, living in shacks,–they could continue to work on the land as before. As a result of this belief, local women do not have any reservations about expressing their anger towards Kurdish migrant workers on the land.

The landowning family employ local women during the planting season but this is usually for less than half of the planting season, when there are concerns about ensuring that the seeds are planted before heavy rain. These women come from the nearest villages or the nearby town. The women who come from the nearest town are usually recent migrants from nearby villages who move to access job opportunities or for their children's education[60]. Mefaret is the unofficial and aggressive leader of this group. She has a good relationship with the women in the landowning family, especially with Fatma, and she does not have any hesitation about acting like a member of the landowning family in terms of managing the workers. She continuously criticises Kurdish women workers and complains to Fatma about them not 'working properly'. In my diary I wrote:

> 'Today when I saw Mefaret on the shuttle in the morning, I became anxious. This is because I know that whenever she's on the land, the day does not pass smoothly. She always bullies Kurdish workers, especially the younger ones. She starts quarrels with the Kurdish workers and with the landowning family's wives. Unfortunately, she didn't surprise me today. After an hour of working, she asked me to give her water. And when I went to her, she whispered to me 'look at their lines' [she pointed to the Kurdish workers' lines and said that they had not been weeded properly] and look at my daughters' lines [she pointed to the work of the local Turkish women]. Honestly, I could not see any difference between the different lines of seedlings but she insisted she was right and she began to tell them off. Fortunately, the Kurdish women did not seem to take her seriously and they did not respond to her. Mefaret did not react well to being ignored and she complained to Fatma about the women not

---

[60] When the number of children registered at small village primary schools fall below ten, the schools are shut down. Although compulsory education spans twelve years and the state is committed to ensuring school access through school bus schemes, these schemes are often poorly overseen: poor control over school bus drivers, who often do not arrive to collect school children in the mornings, mean that school children in more remote villages are unable to attend. Although villagers do complain, local authorities do not generally hear these complaints. As a result of this, many families from smaller villages move to larger towns for the sake of their children's education.

> working properly. Fatma called Mefaret '*abla*' [older sister][61], Fatma took her complaints seriously and began shouting at the Kurdish women. Melek could not remain silent and she said to Fatma that the women had been working in the same way that they usually do. Melek then said that Mefaret was looking for a fight. When she said this, Mefaret began to shout at Melek. She shouted: 'they [the Kurdish women] know how to fight better than everyone…you're terrorists', she said. Mefaret's words reflect the hegemonic discourse surrounding the Turkish-Kurdish conflict that labels Kurds as 'terrorists' because of their possible support of the PKK. I could not believe how she could develop such a tenuous link, especially when we were all on the land together planting tomatoes. Nobody else seemed surprised by the seemingly ridiculous link that Mefaret made. Melek's response was also unexpected; she said 'you are the real terrorists, you are real murderers'. When she said this, all of the women were shouting at each other in a matter of seconds. Fatma panicked and raised her voice. 'That's enough; I don't want to hear anymore politics!' *Maşallah* [Praise be!], you are worse than men talking about politics. If they hear you, they will divorce you!' This was enough for women to stop fighting. I was relieved that Fatma put an end to the fighting. Despite this, I was hurt by the way she put an end to the fight, by implying that women should not be talking about politics. I think that most of the women felt guilty and ashamed for talking about politics like 'men'. I am not even sure if women were talking about 'politics', they were talking about the prejudices of both groups, but is that 'politics' in and of itself? Nevertheless, Fatma clearly knows how to control the women. First, she compares them to each other, and if this does not work, she compares them with men and accuses them of being like 'men' (Fieldwork diary, 12 May 2013).

Fatma uses 'emphasised femininity' (Connell, 1987) as a management tool. Through reminding women that the realm of politics does not belong to them, she indirectly accuses the women of not behaving according to the 'rules' of being a 'proper' woman. This accusation is sufficient to put an end to the women's argument. This form of management, however, is not enough to quell Mefaret's anger about being forced into precarious, intermittent work. Further, it is not enough to prevent Mefaret from attacking her rivals on the land.

---

[61] *Abla* is also a way of showing respect to older women.

4.4. Summer: 'Tomatoes Turn Workers into Capitalists'

> 'This is a bloody job. Everyone knows this and calls it a "bloody job". Look, don't you think that this land seems blood stained?' (*Dayıbaşı*, Fieldwork notes, 05 September 2013, on the tomato land).

This section reveals the social relations underpinning what workers call the 'bloody' story of tomato picking. Workers use this metaphor to link the colour of tomatoes to the difficulty of the job. In this sense, it is not surprising that the landowning family's wives and daughters as well as local workers have left the 'bloody land' in the picking season, whilst the Kurdish migrant workers have remained. Since the planting season Kurdish women continued to work on different products, such as watermelons, melons, onions or peppers, with women from the landowning family while the tomatoes were growing,. None of those products are produced for the factory but rather for national market consumption and so these products are not planted to make a profit per se, but to not waste time whilst they wait for the tomatoes. When harvesting time for tomatoes comes, the same Kurdish women who were working on the land in the planting season work in the picking season, except for Melek[62] and the young labourers, who rarely work during picking season. Some of the Kurdish women will have continued to work on the tomato land doing tasks like pinching out excess growth while waiting for the picking season. At picking time, Kurdish men who had been working on different tasks such as ploughing or hoeing for the same landowning family join the women on the land. Since tomato land offers more money in the picking season because of the group based payment system, more men come to the land and some women are sent back home to do domestic tasks. We will return to this in Chapter Six.

---

[62] I discuss the reasons for her absence in the picking time in Chapter 6.

The absence on the land of any members of the landowning family managing the labour process during the harvest means that the analysis of the picking process provides a very vital insight into the nature of capitalist production; it illustrates the way in which capitalist production generates control, deskilling and creating new hierarchies of power among workers themselves. On this basis we can observe the impact of the production process on workers' autonomy and consent, as well as on the intersections of this with workers' 'external' consciousness including gender, ethnicity and age. In the following, before listening to the workers' voices, I will once again set the scene by beginning with my perceptions of the land. Then, we will look at workers' various experiences during the harvest and the four different tasks assigned to them depending on their gender, age and position in the familial hierarchy.

4.4.1. To My Eyes: 'We are all Factory Workers"

The working day on the tomato land mostly begins with complaining about the factory's purchasing decisions. The ones who complain could be either workers or members of the landowning family, as in the following case:

> 'Emine, if you consider me a boss, you are mistaken. I am only like a worker in the factory. They play with us. They decide everything; price, amount, quality. You do not know how we have to give bribes to the factory workers [workers in the quality control section] to say that our

> tomatoes are of good quality. You don’t know how we have to give bribes to purchase managers to give us more tractors when prices are high [when they sell in the open market and not to contract farmers]. What do I do? I just do what the factory tells me to do. And, they say different things every day. I wait until midnight to give them the tomatoes that the workers pick during the day. The factory doesn’t take tomatoes as soon as they are picked but only once they have started to shrink from the heat. Then their weight decreases, and they pay me less. When I tell workers the weight of the day, they get very excited because they think that they have picked more than the factory has asked them to. It is true they always pick more than the factory ask for. But, what can I do? I will show them the invoice, but they continue to blame me’ (Recep, a male member of landowning family, 26 August 2013).

What Recep said draws a clear parallel with what Fatma said about the planting season. When talking about controlling the workers, Fatma argued that in reality, the necessity to control workers is not out of her own choice but out of the obligation that she owes to her husband for the quality of the planting: she is trapped between the workers and her husband. However, the workers do not believe either Fatma or Recep. They do not see the factory workers in the quality control section or the commissioners, who decide when, at what time and what amount of tomatoes the factory should take on that day, based on their appraisal of production across the region. However, these commissioners only have contact with the landowning family, who call the *dayıbaşı* in the late morning and tell them how many tractors the workers should fill for that day. They are mostly not happy with the amount since they would like to pick as much as possible, because of their desire to work for another landowning family for a higher price at the end of the season. Towards the end of the season, there is sometimes work available with other smaller landowning families who mostly sell their tomatoes on the open market. Kurdish migrant workers are often able to work for them for higher wages as they are employed by the day (even if they remain on the group performance based wage system).

There is an unceasing tension between the workers and landowning family over the number of tractors. Workers think that the landowning family has the power to increase the number of tractors available to them. There is also the tension caused by the employment of casual workers later in the season. The landowning family employs casual workers when prices on the open market are high. In doing so, the landowning family try to cheat the factory because the factory does not want to accept fixed priced tomatoes from contract farms until late in the season when the tomatoes have begun to shrink. I will talk more about the disputes between the factory, landowning family and workers in the next section. Here, however, I want to focus on how the group performance based payment system structures the labour process of tomato picking.

In the literature, a performance based payment system, as in a factory, is referred to as a ‘piece work payment system’ (Glucksmann, 1982; Pollert, 1981, Burawoy, 1979). Burawoy (1979) highlights that the piece-rate payment system is used as a generator of consent. On the land, workers are paid depending on the amount they pick, the only difference is that workers picking the tomatoes share what they earn as a group. For example, when workers pick 15 tons of tomatoes in a day, they earn 4500 TL (almost £1000), shared between around thirty people. However, rural workers do not see who they are cooperating with or who they think that they are cooperating with as did the factory workers Burawoy studied (we will return to this in Chapter 5). Instead, they are proud of resisting the landowning family. In this case, it is difficult to identify the ‘capitalist’. Even when we think of who makes the most profit, it is still vague. As every social actor of the tomato production and processing chain claim that the ones above them make the profit. Workers on the land identify the landowning family as the ‘capitalists’, whereas the landowning family point towards the factory and the factory point towards the Japanese company. Here, there is only one reality. The reality is that everyone in each subsequent step of the chain claims greater profits than those who work beneath themselves. The only ones who lose out are the workers on the lands as they are at the very bottom of the chain. For the workers on the land, the farmers are definitely the representatives of capital. The farmers own the land and employ the workers but they do not have control over the direction of their production process. Instead, they take orders from the factory and they also think that they work for the factory. The requirements of the factory manage the process, but these requirements are invisible to the workers. Here, I want to draw a parallel between the positions of farmers in tomato production and mothers-in-law in the reproduction of rural Kurdish family. The reproduction of a rural Kurdish family will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6. The way in which the workers are controlled is very similar to the ways in which daughters-in-law are controlled.

As discussed in Chapter 6, in rural extended patriarchal families, older men determine the rules of social reproduction in Kurdish households, but as the mother-in-law is the main implementer of decisions, disputes between the mother-in-law and the daughter-in-law are highly visible, whereas conflicts between the father-in-law and the daughter-in-law, for example, are rendered invisible. Here, the Kurdish workers do not have any chance to be promoted to the position of a member of the landowning family. For the Kurdish workers on the land, they neither own land nor have opportunity to own land. This is not only because of their financial circumstances but also, crucially, because of their ethnicity. Yahya told me how they wanted to buy a very old house and move to the region as an extended family. However, Yahya's offer on a house was rejected because the local villagers would not let the homeowner sell to a Kurdish family. Unsurprisingly, Kurdish workers are not eager to cooperate with farmers in a way that differs to the way in which daughters-in-law cooperate with mothers-in-law in rural Kurdish households. Therefore, the tomato land becomes a scene for conflicts between workers and farmers. Here, the workers do not cooperate with the farmers but indirectly cooperate with the factory.

> 'Today, Recai (one of the landowning family) said to me 'I am happy that you came back. Now, you will understand how workers are undignified. You saw in the planting season how they tire easily, how they work slowly and how they took long breaks. Look now, they are working like bees. They are even arguing with each other because some of them are slow'. I couldn't say anything to prove that he is wrong because he was not. Workers work differently now; they do not stop, they do not eat or go to the toilet. I could only say that money is the undignified one, not them. But, I am not sure how I can separate them from what they want to have. The only thing I am sure of is that they are not less dignified than the landowning family, or me or any other person who lives in an undignified world' (Fieldwork diary, 19 July 2013).

I use the word undignified in relation to the workings of capitalism. However, for both farmers and Kurdish workers, this is also used to refer to ethnicity. The landowning family are sure that Kurds work harder in the picking season – when they work under a piece rate system – than in the planting season, because they are 'Kurdish'. They believe that the migrant workers are 'undignified' because of their Kurdishness. Kurdish seasonal workers are also sure that the landowning family tries to reduce their earnings by employing extra Turkish workers in the picking season. Turkish workers, moreover, are ungrateful for the labour of Kurdish workers. The

Turkish workers see it as their right to pick the tomatoes, not only because they were the ones to plant them in the first place, but also because they see it as their 'right' on the basis of their 'Turkishness'. How both groups blame each other is very similar to how local women workers and Kurdish women workers attack each other when work-related arguments quickly descend into racism (this was seen in the previous section of this chapter). Kurds blame Turks for being 'cruel' and Turks accuse Kurds of being 'terrorists'. When they cannot see the enemy, they create an enemy. The enemy emerges from their 'different ethnicity' since it is the most visible difference between them, so they do not hesitate to attack each other over their 'ethnicity'. Indeed, the factory prevents any possible collaboration between the landowning family and the workers by acting as the 'invisible hand' in the labour process. In this way, both the workers and the landowning family try to break each other's hands rather than breaking the invisible hand. On the other hand, when members of the landowning family are not present on the land, as they are absent during the harvest, a new 'enemy' division appears among Kurdish workers and their solidarity shatters. At this point, divisions based on age and gender becomes more visible and these categories lead to the creation of new 'enemies'.

4.4.2. 'The Oldest Couple on the Land': Managing Workers from Your Family

When I went to the land for the picking season, I felt as if I was attending a training programme entitled: 'the most effective way to create a capitalist in a day' because of the piece rate payment system. The way we earn money determines who we are. Capitalist tomato production reduces both farmers' and workers' earnings in order to increase profits and consequently, both farmers and workers try to increase what they earn. Unsurprisingly, this sometimes means that they scramble to gain what they can from each other. In trying to get what they can from the 'opposing' camp, workers are powerless, as they do not hold the means of production. Workers pick more tomatoes than they are supposed to. They use tomatoes to make tomato paste for both household consumption and to sell within their community. Workers are comfortable with what they do when they claim the fruits of their labour; as they think that the amount the landowning family gives them is not fair or commensurate with the amount of tomatoes they have produced. In this way, they try to redress the unequal distribution of production outputs in their own way by taking tomatoes from the field when they pick and by feeding the demand for tomato paste in their own community. For the working class, buying pre-made tomato sauce from the supermarket shelves is far too expensive. The same applies to tomato paste made at home from fresh tomatoes bought at the local markets, as there are significant costs involved (in terms of gas and electricity) in cooking and processing the tomatoes. So, workers sell tomato sauce, paste and purée that they have made using the tomatoes they have gotten from the *köylü pazarı* – 'peasant market'[63] – in the town, the village they work in or when they go back to their hometown.

Selling tomato purée is not their only strategy to 'take their labour back'; workers also manoeuvre to eject casual workers – who the landowning family try to employ outside of the group in order to sell as many tomatoes as possible before they over - ripen and decrease in weight– by threatening to go on wildcat strikes. Apart from these attempts to protect their earnings or to increase them, capitalist tomato production causes them to compete with each other. This limits intra-group solidarity and causes workers to turn against each other. Here, I will elaborate on the above arguments by examining the way in which the oldest couple on the land navigate the division of labour, divisions between workers and divisions between the different actors involved in the production process.

---

[63] A peasant market takes place in the village where local people and migrant workers sell their handicrafts and other locally produced goods.

My anger and disappointment about the piece rate payment system is not reflected in the workers' response. In contrast, I think that the piece rate payment system is a key innovation of capitalism as it causes workers themselves to become capitalists and thereby limits resistance and abjures solidarism. It is evident that the piece rate payment system 'alienates everyone from everyone, everyone from everything and everything from everyone (Fieldwork diary, 8 September 2013). Workers state that they come for this bloody job because they are paid by the piece and that is how they can earn money. Although this payment system makes them happy, as they are earning money, it also makes them dissatisfied with each other, as it seems that they reduce each other's earning capacity. Workers working on Recep's tomato land are first alienated from each other; the *dayıbaşı*'s extended family is alienated from his distant relatives. Then, they are divided again between nuclear families. They continue to be separated from each other within the nuclear families: 'Your sister or father cannot work like you. But you all earn the same' (Remzi, 22 August 2013). When your earnings are dependent on your group's performance rather than yourself, solidarity becomes impossible. Here, the payment system itself manages the labour process; there is no need for a controller, because all workers drive each other to work harder and faster. As Kadriye told me 'of course the landowning family leaves us alone to work the land, they know just how much we need the money' (Fieldwork diary, 15 September 2013).

However, everyone's 'needs' have different limits. For example Memdullah (male worker, 23) left the land because of the heavy workload. He explained that the work on the land prevented them from *living* so he resisted by walking out on the job. He explained that sometimes it is vitally important to stop and rest but that some of the workers on tomato land do not stop, not even for a second. Speaking of workers in the *dayıbaşı*'s family, he said 'what we do to our bodies on these lands is a sin. God entrusts our bodies to us, we should not use them for money in this way. These people are just greedy' (Fieldwork diary, 16 August 2014). In stark contrast to this, other workers who want to work harder claim that slower workers who take regular breaks commit the sin of laziness. They claim that slower workers unfairly gain from the work of others, that they are scroungers and that God does not like lazy people. It appears that sin is ever present in the fields of tomato land. The presence of such 'sinful acts' however, does not stop the workers from fighting. Only Yahya seems able to put an end to fights.

Yahya is the oldest male worker (48) and the *dayıbaşı*'s eldest brother. The *Dayıbaşı* is the one who makes arrangements with the landowning families – the public face of the family –, however Yahya, as the oldest member of the family, is the one who makes arrangements during the work; inside the family. Apparently, he wholeheartedly embraces tomato work.

> Today, I was surprised when Yahya shouted at the landlord about the tomatoes. He said: "We plant, we pick. What do you do? You have the lands and seeds, but we are the ones who do the job. If we don't work, there will be no children" – by children he refers to the tomatoes –. This metaphor makes me laugh just like the other workers. It is very exciting to hear how he views the relations of production. In Turkish slang, people refer to having sex as 'doing the job' and conception is often referred to using the metaphor of women as the earth into which the male seed is planted. So, when Yahya said that without the workers there would be no

> children, it seems that he is very aware of the vitality of their work (Fieldwork diary, 19 August 2013).

Yahya is the effective leader of the group for three reasons: first because of his knowledge of how work is conditioned by the relations of production, second because he argues with the landowning family on the phone over the amount of tomatoes that they will pick for the day and, third, because he initiates and maintains the principles of a system of 'scientific management'. Here, I do not refer to the actual meaning of the concept of 'scientific management'; rather I am using this analogy to highlight the irony of calling the very human process of management 'scientific' management.

The actual concept of 'scientific management', also known as 'Taylorism', has been defined as an attempt to separate mental and manual labour by increasing segmentation in the division of labour and thereby deskilling work (Thompson, 1989). In large-scale tomato production, global agribusinesses accomplish the elimination of mental labour by removing farmers' responsibility for producing seeds.

No one who works on the land thinks about the 'well-being' of the tomatoes anymore, they only focus on their own personal well-being. In this instance, Yahya's main concern is not the division between manual and mental labour, but how best to focus on output efficiency through the application of Taylorist principles. Braverman (1974) in his influential analysis of *Labour and Monopoly Capital* suggests that this segmentation allows for the increase of control over the labour process by the employer, which in turn leads to more reliable output expectations. Although Yahya or other workers are not the employers, because of the piecework payment system, they embrace the work as their own and are thereby transformed into capitalists. They begin to see the world through employers' eyes; they are selling their labour. In this sense, the workers do not have any qualms about ceding their limited control over the labour process to Yahya who, as the eldest male, is assumed to know what is best or pretends to know what is best, to guarantee more output. Yahya applies the same method as industrial scientists, sociologists or managers (Braverman, 1974) to reach the efficient organisation of labour process, and so he divides tasks and task allocation by matching skills to equipment. He makes assumptions about skills depending on gender and age. This creates a division of labour based on age and gender. By dividing labour, he, as is to be expected, increases his control over labour.

According to Braverman (1974), workers are deskilled as a result of the division of labour. His work focuses on the deskilling of labour in the transition from craft and cottage industries to large-scale Fordist and Taylorist manufacturing industries. This does not fully translate into the realm of agricultural production. In the case of tomato picking, because the work is already de-skilled, the division of labour 'de-skills' on the basis of age and gender – by defining some tasks as women's tasks and others as the tasks of the young. Women do not carry sacks as this is seen as a man's job and older women do not carry empty sacks, as this is a young woman's job.

Even before Yahya implements a gendered and age-based division of labour using Taylorist principles, Yahya uses Taylorism to ensure that greatest efficiency is maintained by breaking each small task down into further smaller tasks. This leads to more reliable output, the further deskilling of labour and increased alienation. He then combines this with an age-based and gendered division of labour. This is evident in the way that the tomatoes are uprooted and shaken. The older men are responsible for this task. Men mostly uproot the tomatoes by hand and if women do this, they use a knife. They then shake the plants so the tomatoes fall to the ground. Then women –

always only women – next to them pick up the tomatoes and place them in sacks. At first, the tomatoes are placed into sacks that lie flat on the ground and once the sacks are half full, they are placed in an upright position. Yahya finds that this is the most efficient way to fill the tomato sacks.

One day after work he went to town and bought ten large plastic washing bowls. Then, next day, he came to the land with his big innovation. He distributed the bowls, and the men began to shake their tomatoes into the basins instead of shaking them onto the earth. This enabled the women to pick up the tomatoes much faster than before. This innovation however created a new problem, as the younger women struggled to lift the bowls and tip them into the empty sacks. The younger and weaker women were consequently assigned the task of collecting tomatoes that had been missed by the first pick.

Yahya is the founder of “scientific” management and manager of the labour process on the land. Zarife, Yahya’s wife, takes on the role of forewoman and Melek is the absent middle-woman (as during picking season she remains in the shacks doing domestic work). Zarife (44), as the oldest female worker, and as Yahya’s wife embraces the informal role of forewoman. Yahya and Zarife always work side by side. Yahya is mostly interested in male workers from outside the *dayıbaşı*’s family, whereas Zarife’s focus falls squarely on young women from her extended family. As the oldest ‘bride’ and mother of the largest number of sons, Zarife does not hesitate to use her power. She comes just below the oldest man in the familial hierarchy. With this authority, she does not do other work, which women do on the land such as preparing meals or bringing water to other workers. In this sense, she has a very similar role to the landowner’s wife in the planting season. Like her husband, she takes on the dual role of worker and manager in the picking season. She continuously criticises the younger women for not working fast enough, either by directly chastising them or complaining about them to Yahya.

Zarife’s attempt to control others is not the only reason for other women’s anger towards her. The example about Songül reveals how the familial relations shape the relations of production. When I met Songül on the land, she had recently separated from her husband and joined the work group. Her husband was Zarife’s brother and Songül’s second cousin. She was separated from him because she did not get pregnant within six months of their marriage. Because of this, her husband contracted a religious marriage with another woman. However, according to Zarife, the story is entirely different: Songül and her mother wanted more gold bracelets than what Zarife’s brother had already bought for Songül. He (Songül’s ex-husband) promised that he would buy her more gold bracelets when she gave birth. However, they kept insisting, saying that he had married an ‘unproblematic’ girl who deserved more bracelets. Apart from the impossibility of knowing the true story, the concrete result is an unceasing battle on the land between these two women and their respective supporters. One of the two other brides in the *dayıbaşı*’s family, also working on the land, supports Zarife, and the other believes what Songül says. Kadriye (Songül’s sister) also takes Songül’s side. This polarisation combined with Zarife’s hierarchical power sometimes made the women’s lives more difficult.

Working relations are not only shaped by how you work; sometimes on tomato land it does not matter how fast you work, your work relations are shaped by your interactions with other members of your family. I am sure that there may be other reasons why Zarife and Songül do not like each other. The levels of dislike expressed towards family members, however, are not stable. When I went to their hometown in 2014 after the picking season, I saw that Songül and Zarife's relationship had completely changed. When Songül returned to her family home because of her divorce, she was able to take a share of the money earned by the entire group (as opposed to a joint share with her husband). Zarife opposed this because she saw Songül as taking more than what she deserves and in so doing, reducing others' share. When I visited their hometown, however, after Songül had married the richest man in the village and had moved away, Songül became Zarife's favourite family member.

4.4.3. Young Women Workers: 'Collecting the Remnants Under the Eyes of Men'

As clearly seen from Songül's case, not all women have the same power in the familial hierarchy as Zarife. As is to be expected from a patriarchal extended family structure, young women are positioned on lower rungs of the ladder in the familial structure. This positioning also affects their place in the labour hierarchy on tomato land. The reason Elif is positioned at the very bottom of the family hierarchy – with the exception of the children– is also linked to the relatively low status of her husband, Ramazan, who is the youngest brother in the *dayıbaşı's* family. Moreover, Elif only has one infant son who is nine months old. Moreover, she does not have a close relationship with her mother-in-law and nor does her husband have close ties with the older men in the family. As a result of this, he is able to make only very limited contributions with regards to decision making on tomato land and is at the periphery of the production process. What is notable is that Ramazan had actually repeatedly proposed Yahya's great innovation of using large plastic bowls to collect tomatoes. As explained in the previous section, when Yahya introduced the system of large plastic bowls in which to gather tomatoes and to then deposit tomatoes from the bowls into the tomato sacks, he was seen as a great innovator. Despite this, both Elif and the others were aware that this was in fact Ramazan's idea but Ramazan was unable to take ownership of his idea because of Yahya's authority in the family hierarchy.

Elif is not fond of the new method. The same goes for the other young women (women in their late teens). The women who are not strong enough to life up heavy washing bowls full of tomatoes and tip them into upright sacks lose out because of the new system. Their inability to lift the heavy bowls means that they are relegated to less important tasks and deemed to be bad workers. Elif was unable to switch to the new method because she was heavily pregnant. Like most of the other women, Elif is also unable to uproot the tomatoes even with a knife, as this also requires considerable physical force. As a result, she is even more vulnerable than the other young women who can uproot the tomatoes with a knife – this is not desirable as it takes more time but when women do this men's task most of them use a knife – because the young male workers (usually in their mid-teens) have to uproot her tomatoes for her. She cannot follow a line with the other workers, as she is a lot slower than them and cannot fill her tomato sacks at the same rate as the others. This means that she leaves her full sacks in different places to the other workers. As a result, the male workers, who carry the full bags to the trailers, have to double back on themselves to collect Elif's sacks. This slows down the process of carrying the tomatoes to the trucks, so instead of following the line of workers, Elif picks tomatoes close to the trailers. This creates the impression that she is not working hard enough to deserve her share. Other young women who are also struggling to follow the line (especially women who are made to pick tomatoes with the male workers), are sent to pick with Elif-- picking remnants and tomatoes missed by the other workers. Elif often over-exerts herself in order to show that she too deserves her share. By doing this, Elif puts her health and the health of her unborn child at risk.

This is not unsurprising given the working environment, in which being fast is the primary requirement for being a good worker and hence, occupational health and safety is of little importance. What I found the most shocking was how Elif would not be allowed to travel in my uncle’s car with me even though her health was in danger. This in large part explains why Kurdish women have begun to join seasonal rural migrations: because they are able to work with their extended families where they will not come into contact with strangers, and in particular, with any unfamiliar men. This is very similar what to Kabeer (2000) demonstrated for Bangladeshi women’s factory work in London. As with the factories in London, there are ‘stranger males’ who must be avoided. Bangladeshi women’s employment in those places was thus strained and as a result, they tended to work in their own homes or in the homes of other women. Unsurprisingly, working from home is also very common for women in Turkey as was discussed in Chapter 2. In the case of Kurdish women, they can be employed during the planting time as there are no men around during the day and in picking time they work with their family and relatives. Here, there is an exact link showing us how the piece rate payment system of tomato picking and patriarchal family relations overlap. Men need the women so that they can earn more under the piece rate payment system, so they began migrating with the women to Western Turkey. As they have very large extended families, they can then control women’s labour in the workplace.

In this chapter and throughout this study, the effects of patriarchy are flexible and target a range of family members. Ramazan is also subject to patriarchy: he had to stay quiet about his stolen innovation. Patriarchy however is not flexible in the sense that a woman cannot ride in a strange man's car even if her health is at great risk. That is why I term the gender regime at play here 'patriarchal' and Elif also recognises the role of patriarchy but expresses it in a different way. When I got upset because she was unable to go to the hospital she said: 'Don't cry. Our life is but a sip of water in their eyes' (12 August 2013). Here, in addition to agreeing with her, I will also add that it is not simply the lives of women that are seen as 'a sip of water' but the lives of men too. This is particularly the case when the men are not seen as being 'proper' men and thus threaten the ideal of being a proper man. In the following section, I will examine the effects of the undignified world of capitalism (to which I have referred in the previous section) on 'the people' – the *el âlem*[64]. I will look in detail at how the *el âlem* is the material manifestation of patriarchy in Chapters 6 and 7.

4.4.4. The Youngest Women: 'Responsible for Empty Sacks'

As soon as I went to the land, I was directly assigned to collect empty sacks from beside the tractors and deliver them to the workers. It seemed like a very easy job, but it was not easy at all. Because these empty bags are used throughout the season, they become more smelly and dirty with tomato juice day by day. Also, you always have to move around during the day, you cannot sit. And, because this task does not require you to work continuously — even if you are required most of the time— you also have to assume responsibility for carrying water to the workers, which also means that you have to move around the land with at least 10 kg of water bottles. This job is not assigned to particular women; every day one of the younger ones is assigned to it, and none of them is happy to be given this task as it places them on the periphery. When I worked with one of them, Hacer (14), she explained to me why she doesn't want to do this job (Fieldwork diary, 18 August 2013):

---

[64] El âlem is an Arabic term that directly translates into 'the world'. Both in Turkey and in the Arabic speaking world, the term is used to refer to 'the people' or the populace in the broadest sense. It is a term that is often used to refer to what is thought of one group of people by another. It is sometimes used to refer to the other in a pejorative way.

> 'When I pick tomatoes, I am with the others, so time passes quickly. But, when I do this, I get really bored. Everyone thinks that you are not really working but it is still very tiring work. This is an outsider's job' (Hacer).

'What do you mean by an outsider's job'? (me).

> 'I mean now we are outsiders [referring to me and her since we were working together], look [pointing to the workers] we are working far away from them, working outside' (Hacer).

'Do you think they want me to do this task because I am an "outsider"? (me).

> 'No, it's because you are not fast enough to pick tomatoes' (Hacer).

When you are not fast enough, you become an outsider and become distant from the centre of production. Although collecting empty sacks supports the continuity and the speed of the work, it does not lead people to think of it as integral to tomato picking, since tomato picking is seen as *the job*- the most important job of all. However, to put it simply, when the circulation of empty bags stops, the work has to stop. Workers become aware of this when the landowning family brings casual workers to the land.

> Today is once again very stressful because every time another group of workers arrive, empty sacks become a serious issue. I was collecting them as always, and I went to carry water for half an hour. When I returned to

> collect the sacks, I thought that there were fewer than before. Clearly the sacks were disappearing and I understood that women from the other group were hoarding them. I was very surprised. First, I could not understand their intention of collecting all the empty bags; we needed empty bags because we had filled all of them, and there were no empty trucks on the land at that moment. So, we could not empty our filled bags onto the trailers, however if we had empty bags we could continue to fill them until the empty trucks arrived. But, the other group of workers told me they could not give me any sacks and when I said this to my group, they got really angry. They told me that it means that when new trucks arrive, they will collect the other group's produce since they had more full bags than we did. Now we do not have empty bags, and our trucks are full so we have to wait for new trucks and when they come, the other groups will take them. Unsurprisingly, they fought with the other group. They first sent young women to try to take empty bags from them and did not send the men over in order to prevent the fight from escalating. Nonetheless, the women attacked each other. Then the young men from each group had to come and separate them. My group phoned the landowning family and asked them to bring more empty sacks. Otherwise, they said that they would leave the land and not come back to work. Since my group works for less money than the other group [the farmers pay casual workers more than they do for the boarding Kurdish workers] the landowning family could not risk losing them so within fifteen minutes, new sacks arrived. This was the first concrete triumph of the workers I had seen during my fieldwork (Fieldwork diary, 17 August 2013).

This struggle over bags and the workers' triumph does not change the overwhelming evidence to suggest that the youngest women have the most vulnerable and risky task in the tomato picking process. The task is seen as vulnerable not because it is not imperative for the continuation of work, but because anyone can do it. You do not need to be physically strong and you do not need to use your mind, as there is no possible way to increase efficiency and productivity. On the tomato land, the prestige of tasks decreases proportionally according to the number of people who are capable of doing the task. In this sense, young women's work is seen as the least valuable and the young women are seen as the most replaceable. On the other hand, there is just one task that everyone agrees that only young men can do: emptying the bags into the trailers.

4.4.5. Young Men: The Final Stage of Tomato Production on the Land

Most of the men on the tomato land, including the *dayı-başı,* believe that they are doing a woman's job because they are Kurdish. As in other countries, work that is low paid and unskilled is labelled as women's work (Cockburn, 1985; Elson & Pearson, 1988; Phillips & Taylor, 1980). Most of the Kurdish men on the land believe that they are subjected to tomato work because of the day-to-day discrimination, marginalisation and racism experienced by Kurds both at the micro and macro levels. Some see this combination of being 'low-caste' and powerless as leading to Kurdish men being forced to do 'women's work'. This reveals how the intersection of their working class and ethnic identities compounds their marginalisation.

On the other hand, some of the young Kurdish men on the tomato land assigned to carry full sacks to the trailers believe that they are doing this man's job because they are Kurdish and therefore stronger and hardier than Turkish men. The fluidity in the discourses surrounding the definition and meaning of Kurdish identity means that for some young Kurdish men, carrying 20kg sacks of tomatoes to and from the trailers is seen as a prestigious job that weak Turkish men cannot do. In this way, the manipulation of discourse imbues the same work with divergent meanings: some Kurdish men conclude that they do a woman's job because they are Kurdish and oppressed whereas others, in Remzi's words, are empowered because they see themselves as doing work that only Kurdish men can do. This illustrates the way in which the interplay between gender, class and ethnicity can subtly impact upon the way in which individuals self identify and how they 'place' themselves within society. We can see the way in which gender, class and ethnicity can affect the job opportunities and tasks allotted to particular groups and we can also see the way in which categorisations derived from class, ethnicity or gender are in and of themselves fluid and subject to change. The men doing the prestigious job of depositing sacks are seen as important and irreplaceable despite being seen by some as doing a woman's job. At the same time, the men depositing the sacks become more secure in their masculinity *because* they are doing a demanding job that only men can do. Remzi is the strongest and quickest amongst this group of young men and is consequently seen as the most indispensable and prestigious worker on the land.

> 'I should have sent Remzi (22) back because of his relationship with Emine [implying that they fell in love with each other]. But, even Emine's father [he is against this relationship] does not want to get rid of him because otherwise, who would 'do the trucks' (doing the trucks is used to refer to loading the sacks of tomatoes onto the "truck trailers"' (*Dayıbaşı*, Fieldwork notes, on the tomato land, 11 September 2013).

When Remzi leads the group 'doing the trucks' there is a recognisable difference in the speed at which the tractors are filled. Remzi is also aware of this and this has empowered him to open up about his 'forbidden' love for 'Emine'. Emine's father insisted that her younger brother (17) could do the carrying instead of Remzi so they could send Remzi back to his hometown. He said that otherwise they would have to leave the land as a whole family. The *dayıbaşı* had to accept this because losing the whole family would be considerably worse than only losing Remzi and his two siblings, and even if Remzi left with his entire family, they are far fewer than Emine's family. But, their plan did not work because Huseyin (17) was too young to 'do the tractors'. He simply was not as strong as Remzi is. As a result, Emine's family were forced to accept Remzi's continued presence on the land until the end of the season. They were forced to accept this as their wages also depend on Remzi's performance. This makes Remzi and the other men 'doing the trucks' appear to be even more prestigious; their role is proven to be one that simply cannot be done by anyone. This is the only task on the land that is not seen as a woman's job: 'To do this job you have to be young but not too young', Levent (19) told me. This is also the requirement of hegemonic masculinity in rural Turkey. So, it was unsurprising when I asked Emine what she liked the most about Remzi? As expected, she replied that it is because Remzi is '*a manly man'.*

4.5. Autumn: Time to 'Fight' for your Profits

How can workers resist capital when they are not organised? Hints to the answer to this question have been embedded in this chapter so far: 'family'. Family is not only the tool for resistance but as I have shown, it is also a tool used to control workers. As the tomato-picking season comes to an end, the power of familial resistance begins to lose its effect on the landowning family. Workers often threatened the landowning family with wildcat strikes and work stoppages, but as the season comes to an end, this threat is no longer as powerful as before. When the farmers' fear of losing their workers ends, the real battle begins.

> Today was horrible. Everything was normal in the beginning: I was working with Elif and we were talking to each other about her son. In the meantime, we were hearing that Yayha was shouting at someone on the

phone. I could not understand what was going on because the conversation was in Kurdish. Since I was accustomed to his shouting and there was no possibility of the conversation being held with the landowning family because it was in Kurdish, I did not pay attention. However, suddenly they all began to talk loudly in Kurdish. I understood that something had gone wrong. Elif told me that we were going to stop working because Osman and the landowning family had gotten into a big fight and Osman had called Yahya to say that we were to stop working. I was surprised but not able to ask about the reasons because Elif was talking with the others. And, it seemed that something was wrong among the workers too. It turned out that some of the workers, workers who are not members of *dayıbaşı*’s extended family, did not stop working, and it seemed that Yahya had tried to stop them from working by shouting at them. I didn’t understand what he was saying, and then suddenly Yahya and Pınar’s father began physically fighting. I became panicked and shouted at Ramazan to stop them. Ramazan pulled Yayha and Remzi pulled Huseyin, then ‘Razaman said that we are not working because Osman said so. Even if we work, the landowning family won’t pay. Elif translated this for me and said that we should have lunch whilst waiting to hear back from Osman. While we were waiting for news, the *jandarma* (military police more commonly seen in rural areas) came to the land with Recai and Halil Ibrahim (both members of the landowning family) and asked to speak with Osman. The workers said that they did not know where Osman was. Yahya told them that they had not seen Osman since the previous night. This was clearly not true. Then, as I feared they would, the landowning family asked me whether I had seen Osman on the land. I said I hadn’t seen him since the previous day, which is true. However, I did not tell them that Osman and Yayha had just spoken on the phone. I felt close to tears. Recai (a member of the landowning family) said that I should go back to the village with him and the police since it would be unsafe to stay on the land. Then Ramazan began to shout at him. Fortunately, the police prevented this from escalating. I replied that I would stay on the land to continue to look after the small children who accompany the adults to the land. This was again, not

> truthful. The small children who often accompany the adults to the land are never looked after. Either way, I could not think of a better excuse to justify me remaining on the land until the resolution of the dispute. I knew that if I had told the truth the landowning family would report back to my uncle and that this would worry my family. So I stayed and the *jandarma* and the landowning family went back to the village. Then, I asked Elif what was going on. She told me that Osman wanted to increase the 'fixed price' since tomato prices are so high on the open market and the landowning family sold them to the open market. She explained that Recep (a member of the landowning family) was strongly against this, so they fought violently. Now, Recep had lodged a complaint with the police and Osman had made himself scarce. I asked Elif why Osman had gone away because he had not actually done anything wrong. She told me that she did not know. Within half an hour we all returned to the village. I am relieved that the situation did not escalate' (Fieldwork diary, 24 September 2013).

Unfortunately, it did escalate. That night the landowning family came to workers' shacks – where they live during the seasonal work – and tried to convince those of the workers who are distant relatives of the *dayıbaşı*'s family to work for them instead of for the *dayıbaşı*. This caused significant tension between the workers who are part of the *dayıbaşı's* extended family and the *dayıbaşı'*s more distant relatives. Then the workers began to fight with each other. Remzi threw a stone at Ramazan's head and he was seriously injured. After that day, the Kurdish workers stopped working together, and they left the tomato lands not as one big group, but as smaller groups.

4.6. Conclusion

The chapter has shown how the family is central to shaping the capitalist tomato production process on the land. And as we see here, capitalism makes capitalists of us all. In this sense, our 'capitalist families' re-construct and are re-constructed by the familial work place. We have seen that different payment systems – daily wage and piecework – lead to different forms of organisation and management of labour. These differing modes of organising labour consequently lead to differing intersecting identities, causing either harmony, disunity, or as is often the case, some combination of the two. In this way, we have also seen how the divisions within the organisation of capitalist production are sustained by the workers' different identities: gender, class, ethnicity, kinship and age, which also reinforce the creation of masculinities and femininities which are important for understanding intersectional patriarchy in the labour process.

I have demonstrated that assembly line production or the principles of 'scientific management' is not only possible in the factories, but the nature of capitalist production causes farmers or rural workers themselves to create their own assembly line – as we saw with both the picking and the planting. I have shown that this occurs even without the highly technological aspects of manufacturing and industry and that gender, class, ethnicity, kinship and age become ways of effectively dividing and deskilling labour in the absence of technology. The study of the history of the division of labour and the spontaneous worker-led imposition of the management styles of control and the regularity with which it arises is also an area of significant potential further research. I have also explored the impact of gender, class, ethnicity, kinship and age based relations as tools that shape both control and resistance in the tomato production labour process. Hopefully, I have contributed to some of the key concepts of the labour process such as control, deskilling, consent, resistance, and the division of labour by integrating the intersection of the different identities of labour. In doing so, I have also tried to show how 'tomatoes' are also main actors in determining which workers' identities come to the fore and how the material condition of the tomatoes – whether they are seedlings, or mature tomatoes, or rotten tomatoes etc. – determine the conditions of work – in terms of payment system or working hours.

Chapter 5

Inside the ‘Kemalist’ Tomato Processing Mechanical Monster

5.1. Introduction

Not ‘once upon a time’, but in 2014, not in a country far, far away, but in Turkey, a country proud of its geopolitical position, there lives a 'mechanical monster'. In the lands of this mechanical monster, in one of the richest regions in the country, women must wait for ten months each year in order to earn a ‘living wage’[65] for just two months by processing tomatoes inside this mechanical monster. At first glance, this may seem an odd metaphor, but in Turkey, ‘taking bread from the lion’s mouth’ is an old expression used to refer to working under difficult conditions. Working inside the ‘mechanical monster’, therefore, does not frighten people in Turkey, particularly nowadays. Owing to the neoliberal economic policies of the current Turkish government, the AKP, this figure of speech has become reality to the point where it is getting more common to hear someone that they are ‘taking bread from the lion’s stomach’. The permanent condition of earning bread from the lion’s stomach evinces the precariousness of contemporary working conditions. For many workers in Turkey, a permanent contract is now an unattainable dream. Indeed, subcontracting employment firms – *taşeron* – have mushroomed and deaths in the ‘lion’s stomach’ are no longer very rare[66].

---

[65] A ‘living wage’ is set by the Turkish State. All women in the factory receive the same money. There is no gender wage-gap, and the material differences between workers lie in working conditions – levels of autonomy, types of contract and the way they are treated - which are mostly shaped by Kemalist gender categories and are used by the factory as a way of managing women’s labour.

This chapter, however, is not about a lion. Instead, it is about workers’ struggles with the 'mechanical monster'. Using the imaginative allegory of likening a factory to a mechanical monster is a tradition in Marxism[67]. The term ‘mechanical monster’ was used by Marx himself (1990: 503) to refer to machine technology:

> Here (in the most developed form of production by machinery) we have, in the place of the isolated machine, a mechanical monster whose body fills whole factories, and whose demonic power, at first hidden by the slowed and measured motions of its gigantic members, finally bursts forth in the fast and feverish whirl of its countless working organs.

In this chapter, the metaphor of 'mechanical monster' is used in order to refer to the moving assembly line in the tomato-processing factory ‘Red’. As Braverman (1974: 195) points out, ‘The moving conveyor, when used for an assembly line, though it is an exceedingly primitive piece of machinery, answers perfectly to the needs of capital in the organisation of work which may not be otherwise mechanized’. In this chapter, the production line of the 'Red' tomato processing factory is viewed as an embodiment of the 'mechanical monster', not in terms of being an example of modern technology, but in terms of serving as an agent of labour control. However, asking ‘how capitalist control of the labour process is obtained’, Thompson (1989) highlights the combined forms of control and the fact that the control structures of 'the assembly line cannot be reduced to a technological dimension. It may have altered the role and pattern of supervision, but its successful operation always depends on human agency' (150). This study is also an attempt to show how the control of the labour process is 'technical', but also 'humanised' and hence, a 'varied' process that occurs inside the 'mechanical monster'. In a similar vein with other feminist factory studies identifying gender ideologies as a dimension of control in assembly lines (Glucksmann, 1982; Lee, 1998; Ngai, 2005; Pollert, 1981; Salzinger, 2003; Westwood; 1984), the study demonstrates that the gender ideologies of the Kemalist factory regime are used to control labour. As in chapter 4, I will explore the construction of masculinities and femininities in the labour process as an intrinsic part of development of the term intersectional patriarchy. Using my term 'intersectional patriarchy', I will explore how the intersections of gender, class, age, education and religion construct the masculinities and femininities of the Kemalist factory regime in the labour process in the mechanical monster.

---

[66] In the last ten years 14,269 workers have lost their lives in workplaces in Turkey (ISGM, 2014). This is a rising trend. Moreover, in the past four years, the average number of accidents in food manufacturing per year has been around 1000. This, too, according to report of TCKB (2014), is on the increase.

[67] I am aware that using the term ‘mechanical monster’ lends weight to a negative interpretation of factory work. It reflects, however, the views of the majority of my key informants who expressed negative views of factory work, in terms of working conditions and environment, particularly inside the plant. Most of them stated that they found the factory too claustrophobic, too loud, too hot and too dirty. Neither they nor I would deny the economic and social advantages of factory work but these advantages are not always enough to create a ‘positive’ interpretation of factory work. Despite this, women work in the factory because it provides them with jobs.

While Marx did not state his reasons for using this metaphor (maybe, for Marx, what underlies the monster metaphor is self-evident), the reasons behind my adoption of this metaphor are elaborated in the following entry in my fieldwork diary:

> …you cannot imagine how frightened I was when I first entered the plant. It was like stepping into somewhere out of this world. There was no fresh air, it was unbearably hot, loud and smelly. I saw exactly why people kept saying that they were earning money from the lion's stomach. Even the thought of a lion is more comforting; less alien and less forbidding than the actual work that takes place under these conditions. The work we do here is otherworldly; it is so mechanical that it cannot possibly be equated with the idealised images we have of proud lions roaming pristine

> savannahs. There can be no natural feelings or emotions in a place like this. Inside the plant, I feel like I lose all connection with reality. I think that if I were a surrealist painter, I would paint the production line as a constantly moving mechanical monster (Fieldwork diary, 18 August 2014).

In this chapter, underlying my surreal image is the 'reality' of this ‘monster’ as I witnessed it in summer 2014. I will begin by describing my journey to the factory, the monster's lair, I then focus on providing snapshots of my observations during the time inside the monster. The monster has neither heart nor brain of its own, but it is the people inside it, mainly women, who dedicate their hearts and minds to its operation. How and why they give their hearts, their minds, or both to this monster are the main questions that this chapter addresses. While answering these questions, I suggest that their minds and hearts shape and are shaped by a Kemalist factory regime. The concept of a factory regime is developed by Burawoy (1985) to refer to the informal rules and relations that workers outwardly and voluntarily accept in order to work. I suggest that this mechanical monster is a distinctly Kemalist mechanical monster, because of the key social divisions mobilised by management and workers, including the hierarchy of masculinity above femininity, and the typology of femininities deployed by Kemalist ideology, structure the way the factory is governed.

5.2. Three Images of Women in a Kemalist Factory

In this chapter, after completing the journey to the monster, I show how managers and women workers of the Red factory constitute the Kemalist factory regime. I demonstrate how the three categories of womanhood imaginatively constructed by Kemalist ideology, as introduced in chapter 2, underpin the roles and prestige assigned to women workers. The assignment of different women to different parts of the production line mirrors the division between these categories: ‘backward, traditional, religious women’ are allocated roles at the beginning of the assembly lines, where they are responsible for sorting the overripe tomatoes from the usable tomatoes; ‘educated modernised women of the Republic’ are assigned to control the machines; while ‘physically and emotionally strong, rural but wise women of Anatolia’ – Anatolian Mothers – are permanently employed in the warehouse. The chapter shows that the Kemalist factory regime does not deal with femininity on the shop floor and thus attempts to construct ‘*Anatolian women*’ as more masculine and ‘educated daughters of Republic’ as less feminine. Women working on the sorting lines, on the other hand, are seen as feminine and thus they deserved to be humiliated and controlled strictly; femininity is seen as an obstacle to modern factory production.

5.3. The Journey to the Monster and reaching its ‘Kemalist’ Manager

Red’s Kemalist factory regime is very much a part of the received wisdom of how a modern, secular factory ought to be run. How a factory ought to be run in line with Kemalist principles however, differs vastly from the reality. The factory manager’s outlook is embedded within the wider social context and conflicting ideologies inherent in the legacy of Kemalism. The factory manager’s statements regarding subcontracting will give us our first insights into the contradictions of the Kemalist factory regime:

> 'I am a leftist. Neo-liberal policies are being applied by this government to corrupt our country. I wrote lots of letters to the general board of managers about subcontracting but they did not reply even once. I am totally against sub-contracting. I am trying to talk to the union to prevent this, but they are not interested in real problems, they are too busy with

> encouraging the workers to stop working properly. They are saying to workers “do not miss a minute from your break”, “breaks are your rights”, and so on. I hate the unions’ (16 September 2014).

The apparent contradiction in the general manager claiming to be a leftist but simultaneously hating both trade unions and the workers sheds considerable light on the workings of the Kemalist factory regime. The factory manager’s assertions, which arose in the context of talking about the women who work in the warehousing section, do not differ significantly from when the chief executive of Turkey’s largest industrial company, Ali Koç, said: ‘capitalism should be abolished because it is the source of all inequality’ at a recent G-20 Summit in Antalya, Turkey (14-16th November 2015). Apart from being ridiculed in social media as a result of its obvious contradictions, Koç effectively revealed the conflicting ideological position of the Turkish bourgeoisie. As Buğra and Savaşkan (2012) and others (Onis, 2010; Tuğal, 2009; Yalman, 2012) highlight, the Turkish state is the midwife of capitalism in Turkey and the bourgeoisie often express that they owe their existence to the founding of the Turkish republic and promulgate the founding values and principles of Turkish Republic: Kemalism.

Here, attention should be drawn to the links between the history of the left in Turkey, Kemalism and unionisation. Turkey’s first political party, which was established by Atatürk, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), situates itself on the left of the political spectrum. It does this based on its own anti-imperialist legacy stemming from the establishment of the Republic and its commitment to creating a *de jure* welfare state. Although the CHP contradicts the universalism of ‘left wing politics’ by excluding minority groups, many still see it as a party of the left. This can be seen as stemming from the ideology that lies at the heart of the CHP. The CHP as *the party* of Atatürk nationalism embodies many of the nationalist tenets more commonly associated with right wing politics. Kemalism, therefore, has become an internalised ideology on both the left and the right. This internalisation, however, is deeply symbiotic. The conflation of left wing anti-imperialism and social democracy with an exclusivist nationalist politics embodies the contradictions implicit in the factory manager’s position. Beyond these contradictions, however, the factory manager’s self identification as left wing and his disdain for trade unionism presents a secondary contradiction that needs further unpacking. This is particularly necessary because the trade union active at Red is renowned for being a Kemalist union.

After the 1980 military coup unions in Turkey, by cooperating with the state, effectively undermined worker’s solidarity (Adaman et al., 2009). This is also valid for the union at Red. From the union’s actions, the general manager is right to say that the union does not act either to prevent subcontracting or to defend the rights of warehouse workers. The union does not do anything for them; warehouse workers are not even on their agendas. The warehouse workers told me that they could not join their union since it is forbidden by their subcontracted employment agency. This however is not seen as a loss. Even if subcontracted agency workers were to join their union, nothing would change. The women view the union as ineffective, inefficient and not acting in their interests. Interestingly, all the women on the production lines are registered with the union because if they are union members, they are paid more. I asked them why this was the case and they told me that they did not know. They did not even know the name of their union. When I asked the name of union, they told me that 'it is a union' and they laughed at me. They were belittling me for not knowing that a union does not really need a name; that the union is just a union. Until I visited the union’s offices, I did not know its name. When I visited, I saw that ‘the union’ is allied with the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (Türk-İş), which is the biggest union in Turkey and has a reputation for being both Kemalist and close to the state even now (Cemal, 2012), when there is a real tension between Kemalist ideology and Turkey's current moderate Islamist government. However, it is not so surprising when we look at the history of unionisation in Turkey after the 1980 military coup and the way in which unions have become a means for the Turkish state to control workplaces. The union laws put into practice following the 1980 coup effectively prevented effective and worker oriented unions from forming (Adaman et al., 2009). In this way, the Kemalist unions of the post 1980 period can be seen to be a close bedfellow with the current politics of Islamist[68] capital. This will be discussed in greater detail in the following sections where the subject of Red's subcontracting for Islamist capital will be considered.

The union's closeness to the state can be seen as one explanation for why the women saw the union as just 'the union'. Secondly, the union's proximity to the state can be seen as a possible factor explaining the general manager's categorisation of the workers along Kemalist lines and how his letters to the union erased the women who he thinks are less amenable to the Kemalist conceptions of women. The manager's communications with the union regarded only the 'Anatolian women'[69] who work in the warehouse. This illustrates the way in which the manager seeks to 'save' only the 'Anatolian women' who are worthy of being 'saved' by the state, the women closest to the state's ideal of womanhood with their republican daughters – women working on the machines in the lower lines. However, as they are already saved by education, the manager does not need to do anything extra for them. On the other hand, he did not express any sympathy for the plight of the other workers, the 'backward religious' workers sorting the tomatoes.

---

[68] When I say Islamist capital, I refer the capitalists who have closely aligned themselves with the 'moderate' Islamic ideology, which is supported by the current Turkish government. I am saying 'moderate' here intentionally, as Tuğal (2009) demonstrates in his influential ethnography in one of the most religious neighborhoods in İstanbul, the AKP's neoliberal economic policies lead to the absorption of liberal economic ideals by political Islam, and this converts 'radical Islamists' to 'moderate' ones, in the neighborhood he studied. As he points out, the dream of Islamic state does not exist anymore amongst the residents of the neighborhood, they are satisfied with the governing of the state. Tuğal (2009) shows how the discussions amongst the men in the local coffee houses often begin with Islam and the concept of the Islamic state but quickly transform into conversations about money and economics. This is a very striking example that shows the way in which Islamic ideology in Turkey has developed and changed as a result of AKP governance.

[69] By 'Anatolian women', I refer to the women who work permanently in the warehouse throughout the year. The Kemalist factory regime implicitly constructs the women warehouse workers as amongst the women Kemalism terms 'Anatolian women', because of their ability to cope with difficult working conditions and long hours.

The manager, Hakan, has worked in managerial positions in food factories in the region for 18 years. Therefore, he thinks that he knows the region very well because he has witnessed the transformation of the region's rural population. Although his above statement implies that he is not fond of neoliberal policies, he does not think there is a relation between these policies and farmers' migration to the towns looking for jobs. He is certain that small farmers leave their land because they are lazy. In addition to his anger towards farmers and workers as whole, women are his specific targets. He asked me: 'Can you believe it? I have to run this factory with all these lazy women'. According to Hakan, women have inveigled their husbands into selling their lands and forced them to move to the towns. Because of their laziness, they do not want to work on the land, to light the charcoal stove, to live with their mothers-in-law and so on. He is sure that they are lazy because if they were not, they would work as hard as the warehouse workers. In this way, it is evident that he sees relatively older seasonal workers – not student seasonal workers – in a different way to warehouse workers despite both groups' common rural background. From his point of view, one group of women encapsulates the idealised rural woman of the Republic whereas the other group embodies the lazy, backward religious rural woman who blindly supports conservative and neoliberal policies. His dissatisfaction is evident in what he says about the women who work sorting tomatoes:

> ‘I hate most of them, really. They are not working. You know that the warehouse workers work for 12 hours a day, they carry 30 kilogram crates, but they don't complain. But the others...they only come here for 2 months but they complain continuously. They work for only 8 hours, but they seem tired all the time. How difficult can it be to sort tomatoes?' (16 September 2014).

Before answering his question about the difficulties of sorting tomatoes, let us first look at the women’s journey into the monster. The journey to the monster begins in different neighbourhoods of the same town, but the piazza is the most crowded. During the months of August and September, when the tomatoes are being harvested, the shuttle buses leave at 23.10, 7.10 and 15.10, for shifts beginning at 00.00, 8.00 and 16.00, respectively. If you are near the piazza at those times, you will see lots of people, mainly women, waiting for shuttles going to different factories. You will also see how different sex couples –sister and brother, wife and husband, mother and son- walk together until they reach the piazza but wait for shuttles separately in two different corners. The men wait with the men and the women wait with the women. When a shuttle comes, you will also see that men use the backdoor and women use the front door to enter the bus. And if one reads the report of Turkish Association of Trade, s/he could safely conclude that most of those shuttles are going to the tomato processing factories. Indeed, tomato processing is the biggest industry in this town, with nine tomato processing factories producing almost a quarter of the total processed tomatoes in Turkey. As the report suggests, they produce this amount with a total workforce between the nine factories of 50 engineers, 8 technicians, 65 craftsmen, 67 administrative employees, and just 249 workers (TOBB, 2014). Nine factories with just 249 workers; this may seem to contradict what is seen in the piazza, which is not the only pick-up point, as even in the piazza at any one pick-up time there are more than 249 workers. Apart from the crowds at pick-up points, there is a lot of evidence indicating that there are more workers than the official reports suggest: the numbers of shuttle buses, the amount of meals the factory purchases to feed the workers, the numbers of uniforms, and the number of boots. It is enough to look at the number of workers in just one shift to prove that reports do not show the exact numbers. Assuming this is a mistake would be naïve in the world of the mechanical monster; rather, it relates to the workers' contractual status. The official number of workers in the report comprises only the workers with permanent contracts. As a factory manager, Hakan, confirmed, 'there is not even one permanent contract worker in one of the biggest tomato processing factories in Turkey'. Indeed, he added that as far as he is aware, none of the factories employ permanent workers. Then, I asked him, what number is this in the report? He replied, 'I guess this is the number of warehouse workers'. These workers are permanent, as they themselves have claimed and the factory manager confirmed that some of them had worked there for over 10 years. However, working for 10 years in the same factory has not enabled these workers to enjoy the social rights of permanent employment. This is because they are not officially permanent employees, but remain contract workers. They work long years on 3-4 month contracts through their sub-contracting firm.

However, the women on the shuttle, at least when they are in the shuttles, do not seem to worry about the type of their employment contract, as this is not an issue at any time on the shuttle buses. Although the conversations held on board the shuttle buses that take the women to the factory do not vary a great deal, it is worth noting that one prominent conversation topic and source of pride is that Red's shuttle buses are the newest and most comfortable. It is only the time of the shift that changes the content of conversation. When women wait for the night shift shuttle, the main topic of conversation is how much sleep the women have had. Workers waiting for the morning shift shuttles tend to mostly talk about what they did the previous evening. When these discussions are not related to household labour, they tend to be about weddings as most weddings happen during the summer months. Sometimes, women arrive at the piazza where the bus picks them up wearing full make-up and with salon hair-dos. This is a sign that they have attended a wedding the previous night and is usually an excellent way to strike up a conversation. Although it is acceptable for younger women to wear make-up to work, this is not the case for older, married women. However, if married women have attended a wedding the previous evening and have come to work the following morning still wearing make up and still with their hair elaborately styled, then this is far less frowned upon. Unfortunately, in this patriarchal society, there is little room for women to safely display their bodies or for them to have any space to bring their bodies to the fore. Here, however, we can at least quote from Westwood (1984: 102) and use her work to highlight that 'weddings' are a tool to cope with the boredom of work. 'If there was one area of excitement which never seemed to wane, it was the glamour of white weddings. Everyone was excited by the prospect of a wedding because it kept romance and sex alive through the boredom of sewing side-seams day after day'.

Returning to our journey to work: as soon as the shuttles arrive at the factory, the hustle begins. First, the women rush to clock in with their fingerprints on the clocking-in machine. A queue always forms in front of these machines because most women struggle to use them. The women commonly fail to press their fingers to the reader firmly enough for their fingerprint to register. When it does not work, they panic that their attendance will not be registered, so they continue to try more than once. At the gates of the factory, one can observe the first division between these women; namely, by age. However, this age difference also correlates with a difference in educational levels. Young women are more likely to be educated. Indeed, workers are assigned to different tasks according to their age. This is because managers assume that the younger women are better educated and are consequently more likely to be modern ‘daughters of the republic’ who will be able to cope with ‘complicated’ machinery.

I will now consider how these divisions are reflected inside the plant in the following sections. We begin our journey into the factory at the clocking-in machine where the first division between the workers and how these divisions are utilised by the Kemalist regime become clear.

> Helping the women use the clocking-in machine takes me more time each morning than it does to change into my work clothes. They really worry about it. As soon as I get off the shuttle, some of them surround me. I take their fingers inside my hand and we press down together. They can do it themselves, but they panic very quickly. And when they panic, they press down continuously and the machine does not respond. I don't know why the factory has this system, because it basically doesn’t work (Fieldwork diary, 25 August 2014).

Why does the factory use these machines that do not work properly? The human resources manager told the women that if they could not use the machine, it would not affect their official time sheets at all. This means that the clocking-in machines have no real function. When I asked the general manager about this, he told me that using the clocking-in machines was far more modern than simply shouting out a register. I told him: they still call out a register of names even when people clock in with their fingerprints. The response I received closely mirrors the Kemalist ideology that cites modernisation as one of its key tenets: ‘the women will have to learn to use the clocking-in machines because we will not give them up, machines like this are best suited to a factory like ours’ (18 September 2014).

When I see women trying to press their fingers to these English-speaking, 'foreign' and hence, ‘modern’ machines, I feel that the management uses this technology to intentionally make some of the older, uneducated women feel that they are incapable of coping with the ‘new technology’ because they are not modern and/or educated enough. Those women also panic when something goes wrong with the machines. Some women even do not want to work with different machines because they think that sorting out overripe tomatoes is preferable to the responsibilities of working with machines. These are generally the same older women who are discomforted by the clocking-in machines at the factory gates. Putting these machines at the factory gates and insisting that the women use them seems to me to signal the presence of the mechanical monster from the very beginning. The mechanical monster that alienates and controls workers thus ushers the workers in at the gate.

Women, on the other hand, already have assumptions that Red is different from other factories in the region. They know that it is a Kemalist factory and they participate in the performance of elitism that this entails. For example they think that Red is very selective when it comes to recruitment. The factory manager, however, refuted these claims and explained that they take on everyone who applies because it is difficult to find seasonal workers as they share the same labour pool with several other factories. Red also differs from the factories in the region based on its reputation. It is accepted amongst workers that Red is the best in terms of canteen food, its regular payment of wages and its hygienic conditions. It is also renowned for legally employing the workers. On the other hand, it is also known for being the strictest factory to work in. This feeds a dual dichotomy of love and hatred for the factory. This duality also maps onto the binaries created by Kemalist ideology: its inside/outside binary, combined with the binary between Kemalism's progressive core that underlines the equality of both sexes, national sovereignty and welfarist principles *contra* its tendency towards totalitarianism and regular state intervention by the military.

5.4. Rivals in Kemalism: Working Together in the Monster's Mouth, the Assembly Line


FACTORY MANAGER'S OFFICE
CHANGING ROOM
STORAGE
HUMAN RESOURCE & FINANCE BUILDING
CAR PARK
PEDESTRIAN ACCESS
GARDEN
DINING HALL
MEDICAL
ENTRANCE
CLOCK-IN MACHINES
SECURITY
MAN'S COFFEE HOUSE
PLANT
WC

Figure 5.1:External environs of plant [70].

Once the women clock-on and change into their work clothes, they assemble for roll call just outside the Human Resources building which is located just inside the factory gates, see above Figure 5.1 for the outside of the plant. When all the names have been called, the *çavuşlar* – forewomen in Turkish – (directly translated as corporals) gather their groups and begin to walk through the monster's mouth to the doors of the plant. As they do so, they pass through the male workers working amongst fully laden trailers of tomatoes. I call this outside place ‘limbo’; I feel that in every step I am moving away from 'heaven' and going to 'hell'. I feel uneasy when I walk. It is somehow better to be inside the plant as soon as possible rather than walking towards it. After passing through limbo, women entered inside the monster: dark, hot and loud and run to their lines.

---

[70] My sister drew the pictures for the thesis, according to my instructions, because I am not able to use professional drawing programmes, as for figure 5.4, nor do I have the artistic drawing skills required for figures 5.2 or 5.3. I took photos of the factory during my fieldwork with the permission of the factory manager. However, he requested that I did not use the actual photos but drew the images instead.

I thought of the line as the 'tongue' and 'throat' of the monster, as this tomato-eating mechanical monster first chews tomatoes in the upper lines – tomato sorting lines- and then swallows them in the lower lines – in the machines. Tomatoes are processed differently depending on whether they are being chewed or swallowed by the monster. In line with this, the women's work changes depending on whether they are on the tongue or in the throat of the monster. While the ‘backward religious women’ mostly work on the tongue where the sorting process takes place, ‘the educated daughters of the republic’ are in the throat where women control the machines. These are two of the categories of women identified by Kemalist ideology, as explained in Chapter 2. Republican women who are emancipated by the state do not see rural women – apart from Anatolian women celebrated as the Republic’s mothers– as sisters but as the ‘backward’ other. Red divides them on the shop floor with the same assumption; the throat is more privileged and ‘modern’ than the lines on the tongue, which are a bit ‘backward and traditional’. In the following, first I will picture the ‘backward tongue' then fill this in with women workers and the ç*avuş.* Then, I will do the same for the 'modern throat'.

5.4.1. Picturing the Tongue of the Monster: Tomato Sorting Lines

The monster's tongue refers to the moving tomato-sorting lines, which are elevated five metres above floor level. On these lines, tomatoes are selected in several phases: first the whole tomatoes are sorted, the women checking to see if they are green or overripe; then the machine peels them and women again check whether they are green or overripe, this time when the tomatoes are hot; after the second selection some tomatoes go directly into the huge boilers to become tomato sauce. The rest become 'diced' tomatoes inspected for a third time after the machine dices them.

There are 12 lines for tomato sauces and 2 lines for diced tomatoes. The factory does not just produce tomato sauces and chopped tomatoes for its own brand, but it also produces for other national and international companies. Thus, these lines process different quality tomatoes depending on their buyers. Consequently, working on some of the lines is more difficult than others. Apparently, working on the lines producing for the Japanese shareholder's brand is relatively easy because the tomatoes are less overripe or green. Workers call the most difficult line the ‘disgusting’ line, as it produces for a cheap national supermarket brand. Although the factory manager told me there is no quality difference between the national and international markets, the quality difference is very obvious in the work place. Women can understand for whom they work by looking at the speed of the line and the quality of tomatoes. There is no 'specific' line for Japanese company or others; technically, all the lines are the same. But, if a line works with the worst quality tomatoes for a long time, it is cleaned deeply before starting to produce for a Japanese company. When managers say that we will do cleaning, we all understand that the tomatoes destined for Japan have finally arrived. 'Their tomatoes are different', the factory manager told me.

'Their seeds are different, their fertilizers are different, and these are totally different tomatoes'.

On the other hand, given the Kemalist leanings of the company, it is ironic that the factory also produces tomato sauce for companies that have close ties with the current government. Öniş (2012) suggests that the AKP government tried to create its ‘own’ alternative bourgeois, especially after 2011, following its third major electoral success and the completion of its debt repayment to the IMF. The country’s internal social and political divisions are even mirrored in consumers’ supermarket trolleys and at the checkout. Those who oppose the government tend to buy produce from ‘opposition companies’. As can be expected, the relations of production in Red are also as politicised as consumption relations. Knowing that some people buy Red’s products *because* they oppose the government’s policies, I wonder what the public’s reaction would be if they knew that Red also sold to companies with close government ties. I imagine that they would be extremely disappointed. When I asked the general manager (who is very critical of the current government) about this conflict of interests, he said that 'if our consumers knew about this, we would lose our reputation. But, you know, we have to do it to survive’ (16 September 2014). As I am not well versed in business, I do not know if this is strictly true. On the other hand, although I am no business person, I know from an old Turkish expression that 'money does not have any religion or faith'. It is based on this that I think that a Kemalist factory has no hesitations about co-operating with supporters of its rival ideology. However, the management does not like to talk about this situation as if there is no connection. Instead, they prefer to emphasise how they have Japanese shareholders. The emphasis on Japanese shareholders feeds into the modern, western and hence, prestigious image that the factory tries to sustain. Both managers and workers are proud of the factory’s modern outlook. Women workers are even grateful that the factory has foreign shareholders.

> ‘If Red was not there, what would we have done? Conditions in the other factories are really terrible. Our factory is really big. Atatürk – the founder of Turkish Republic – himself established it. We are so lucky to have the Japanese. When the Japanese come, they check everywhere; they even eat in the same canteen with us. So, our food is good, and our factory is clean most of the time, especially when the Japanese visit’ (Cennet, 10 September 2014).

Red is the oldest tomato-processing factory in the area, but Atatürk did not in fact establish it. This is a very common myth among workers that no one attempts to correct. On the contrary, everyone including management and some of the workers enjoy this myth because it makes identifying with the Kemalist factory regime easier.

Returning to the lines, whilst the conditions between the lines vary, as discussed above, the conditions along the line are also very different. In some ways the beginning of the line, where the tomatoes are selected, is more comfortable to work in: it is cleaner, because the tomatoes are cold and recently washed, and cooler, since it lies towards the outside edge of the plant. But, the difficulty is that the tomatoes bring lots of rubbish and dead animals with them to the line, because they are not picked one by one on the land; rather they are first shaken onto the ground and then are dragged to the bags. This means that rural workers do not see what goes inside the bags and sometimes if there is rubbish or dead animals on the soil, these also go inside the bag. So, in the factory you have to act quickly to dispose of bits of chewing gum and dead animal. Some women are willing to work here since it is cooler; some of them however, prefer working on other parts of the 'line' since they say that, at the very least, it is a 'clean' job even if it is a ‘hotter’ one.

In the second part of the line, peeled tomatoes come to the lines and women again sort them depending on whether they are overripe or green. Since they are selected a second time, more red and fewer overripe tomatoes come to this line. But, these tomatoes are hot and since they have been peeled, the acidic, juicy surface causes your hands to swell. There is fresh water on the lines to clean your hands but this water is both shared and limited, so the water gets tomato-saucy very quickly. Moreover, the more you wet your hands, the quicker they swell. Although everyone knows that wetting your hands causes more trouble in the long term, it is often worth it in the short term as the water provides a temporary relief from the burning sensation.

In the third part of the line, tomatoes come to the line to be diced. They just look like red meat cubes. Here, the difficulty is that they are very small, so when you follow and pick out some green amongst lots of red cubes for 8 hours, you feel dizzy and when you look away from the line, all you can see is red and green.



Figure 5.2: The first and second parts of the sorting lines: before tomatoes are diced

In all parts of the selecting lines, there is another belt, which moves in the opposite direction from the main line, onto which women place the discarded tomatoes. In the first and second parts of the line, this belt runs over the main line, as shown above

(Figure 5.2) and in the third part, it runs under the line. When this additional line is under the main line (Figure 5.3), onto which the women throw the 'green ones', the women do not complain about pain in their arms. But the first and the second parts of the line, where women have to lift the rotten or green tomatoes onto the 'over' additional line, causes lot of arm and shoulder pain.



Figure 5.3: The third part of the sorting lines: When tomatoes are diced

All women on the tomato sorting lines stand all day, there is no place to sit. When trailers are being changed in the 'tank' outside the plant, sometimes lines stop for 1-2 minutes. These moments are life-saving: women fill the water cups with clean water and sit just on the floor. The factory manager told me that before he came to the factory there were seats on the lines, but as soon as he began his job, the first thing he did was remove the seats. Since, he told me, no one could earn money while sitting and talking with each other for 8 hours: this is not the (women's) ‘kitchen’ (18 September 2014). As seen here, the factory manager does not see the ‘religious’ women working on the selecting lines as workers but as lazy women. His prejudices are also shared by the warehouse workers, who are constructed as ‘*Anatolian women’*. The warehouse workers think that other the women could also work permanently – as the warehouse workers do – but that they choose not to because they are lazy. In reality, women selecting tomatoes work almost the whole year round but in different seasonal jobs around the region. They do not want to be employed permanently – although finding a permanent job is also very difficult – in the same factory both because of their familial commitments and their social environment, which does not approve of women becoming full-time factory workers. This is because, out of season, the number of women factory workers decreases dramatically and factories become male-dominated workplaces. Therefore, women prefer working in the factories during the summer season, when women dominate the factory. So yes, those women are ‘more conservative’.

5.4.1.1. Çavuş- Sergeant- Feeds the Monster

From the *çavuş*’s perspective, selecting tomatoes on the line is an unskilled task. For this reason, the forewoman selects the *işe yaramaz* for the lines. The *işe yaramaz* are what the *çavuş* calls useless. These women overwhelmingly tend to be older. If I showed you a photo of the whole production line, you would see that middle-aged women are on the upper lines where they select tomatoes whereas the relatively younger women are in the lower lines, working at the machine. (See figure 5.4 below for the position of the upper and lower lines.) In that sense, 'age' seems to be the main criterion for task allocation. However, if you spend time in the plant or you talk with the forewoman or any managers, you eventually understand that youth is not just a physical criteria; they see younger women as being more 'energetic', more 'capable', and more 'confident'. For the managers and the forewomen, these characteristics stem from their education.



Figure 5.4: The upper and lower lines.

Lots of university students work in the factory as seasonal workers. Based on this, the forewoman assumes that younger women are students or at least she assumes that younger women are more educated. As far as the continuously increasing education level in Turkey is concerned, it can be assumed that younger women have more chance of being more educated. I discuss younger women's work – ‘daughters of the Red Republic’ – in the monster's throat in another section. Turning back to older women and their selection, it is possible to say that the forewoman deems older women to be 'useless', 'uneducated', and ‘needing close management’. As discussed above, these characteristics map onto the characteristics imposed upon more religious women. By older I mean older than university students but these women are mostly in their late 40s, and more religious women are directly labelled by the Kemalist factory regime as supporters of the AKP, the current government. Kemalists find their legitimisation for assuming that AKP supporters are ‘uneducated’ and ‘conservative’ in statistics. Reports suggest that as education level increases, the likelihood of voting for the AKP and self-identification as conservative decreases (KONDA, 2014; 2015).

White (2012) and Kavakçı (2014) highlight how more religious communities in Turkey have been marginalised and stigmatised by being labelled ‘backward’, and ‘uneducated’. Kavakçı (2014) demonstrates that religious groups cope with these labels by trying to develop their own elite consisting of educated, liberal democratic, moderate Muslims. This was also the image that the AKP sought to create and was a key factor in securing the support of more ‘marginalised’ religious people who did not conform to the Kemalist ideal. However, the AKP and connected religious groupings’ self-construction and widely promoted image as being moderate, liberal Muslims has not been able to save the uneducated, older women working seasonally at Red from being labelled ‘useless’. These women’s position on the peripheries of Kemalist ideology leads to the perpetuation of their perceived role as useless, as fit only to work selecting tomatoes on the lower lines. In contrast, the younger educated women represent the modern, western ideal of a woman, so they are trusted to work with the machines. These latter women are assumed to be compliant with the Kemalist regime. This raises the question of whether either group can challenge the militaristic control of the Kemalist regime. Here I use Kemalist control interchangeably with militaristic control because militarism is deeply imbricated within Kemalism[71].

5.4.1.2 ‘Religious’ Women’s Struggles with ‘Kemalist Control’

The *çavuş* does not choose some women to work on the selecting lines to punish them for their apparent or assumed support of the current government. She chooses them because they are older and hence more likely to be uneducated. But the management assumes that the majority of these women are more likely to support conservative ideologies, and therefore support the AKP as the main representatives of this group in the current political arena. There is no indication which political party these women actually support. But, their rural backgrounds, the neighbourhoods they live in, and their irregular employment history leads the management to assume that they are AKP supporters. However, the management does not overtly use 'supporting the AKP' as a reason to legitimise its 'Kemalist' control. In fact the surveillance of the women on all parts of the sorting lines resembles Bentham's panopticon (Foucault, 1991). Women are more closely supervised on the upper lines and harsh attitudes, including shouting and arguing, are more prevalent on the selection lines. Here, the perception of religious, conservative women is used to justify harsh control. The women chosen for the sorting lines are seen as 'traditional', 'backward', 'lazy' and 'incapable', 'followers'[72]. The treatment the women receive on the selection lines is much harsher than elsewhere in the plant.

---

[71] Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was a chief commander during the Freedom War (1919-1923), afterwards founding the Turkish Republic and becoming its first president. Almost all members of the first Turkish Parliament (1921) were commanders and/or military officers.

This does not differ greatly to the way in which Kemalist ideology constructs the image of conservative women (İlyasoğlu, 1998; Kavakçı, 2014). Indeed, the *çavus* believes that strict control of these women is necessary. She justifies her attitude by saying that 'these women are used to doing what they're told. They only understand harsh words and do not understand what you're trying to do if you treat them humanely' (23 August 2014). The general manager shares the same ideas as the forewoman and claims that these women prefer to be commanded rather than governed democratically:

> 'Those women do not know how to think as they are lazy. Following is easier for them. So, they don't care if someone commands them, they like

---

[72] Secular people have increasingly begun to associate those adjectives with conservative people in Turkey. This is because conservative groups continue to support the AKP despite their increased authoritarianism, fraud and oppression.

> it and they prefer being bossed around to being treated fairly [by this he implies the current Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's authoritarian attitudes]. We see this everyday'' (16 September 2014).

He then went on to explain that the reason why the AKP are still in power is because of passive, mindless people like the women in the factory. He further argued that this is similar to how these women are dominated by their husbands and argued that these women deserve to be treated the way they are because they do not think for themselves, they are completely passive and mindlessly obey (16 September 2014).

Poor treatment of the women working on the lines is seen as what the women deserve as they are neither trustworthy nor hardworking. In this sense, it is not surprising that the 'forewoman' is called *çavuş*- corporal. The *çavuş* herself claimed that if she did not behave authoritatively enough, the women working in the monster's mouth would not do their jobs properly.

The women working on the selection lines, on the other hand, seem to expect this strict control and find it 'normal'.

'Of course, they need to control, otherwise how will they earn money? This is needed for both them and us. We need this factory' says Hatice (Fieldwork notes, 23 August 2014). This statement is reminiscent of the way in which 92% of Turkish citizens accepted the constitution known as the military coup constitution in 1982 after the military coup in 1980. The 1982 constitution was largely shaped by Kemalist ideology. Much like Turkish citizens in 1982, women workers at Red in 2014 accept and tolerate 'military control' as being just the way things are. This, however, does not mean that they are satisfied with the status quo. These are the thankful women of Turkey, people created by the ideology of Kemalism, which was discussed in detail in

Chapter 2. However, these women still find ways in which to resist the norm; some women are waiting to be rewarded by God, and all of them are trying to have greater autonomy over break times as well as have longer breaks than permitted. The following demonstrates how religious women workers construct their means of resistance and how 'Red' blocks them.

5.4.2.1. 'God Sees Everything Except Break Times'

> Our working place is like a 'Survivor' island. I think they should do this programme[73] in the factory rather than a remote island. When work becomes harsher, women become more selfish and, as on the programme, as time passes, people start to fight. Since everyone begins to focus on saving their own strength, everyone is looking for ways to ease their work. I think that there is no exception about it. Just that some women make me think about the second time; they seem to be fine with their burden and are not trying to ease their work. I don't know about 'masochistic' behaviours and I am worried about claiming something wrong 'scientifically'. But, this is my fieldwork diary, anyway! As I observed, these women think that the more they suffer, the more virtuous they become. Better than others; different to the others, more respectful than others. It is actually what the religion suggests and patriarchy also leads to what women feel about themselves. Islam is highly patriarchal already. When I asked one of these women, Fahriye (39), why she accepts everything from the forewoman and also other women, she told me that 'Since God sees. I don't need to do anything. When they behave unfairly to me, I become more happy since it means that I will be rewarded'. I didn't know what to say to this (Fieldwork diary, 03 September 2014).

If the *çavuş* heard Fahriye, she would probably tell her, 'god sees everything except you taking longer breaks, doesn't he?' – just as she had told one of the women previously. By saying this, the *çavuş* implied that women are committing a sin by not returning from their breaks on time. This is because they are effectively stealing money from the factory by taking longer breaks. According to most of the workers, however, they are working hard enough to deserve their wages. Apparently, for the management this is not the case. It seems that for the *çavuş*, managing the women selecting tomatoes mostly involves deciding their break times. Breaks are at the centre of the women's relations with the *çavuş* and, also with each other. This is similar to what we saw on the land, but this time the control of management over them is much more strict.

---

[73] 'Survivor' is a popular TV show around the world, in which people try to live on a remote island without using any consumer goods.

For example, our line manager (on the diced tomato line) was always waiting in front of the ladies' toilets in order to make sure that everyone returned from their break on time. He shouted constantly, 'women from the lines it's time to go back inside' (they called the upside of the lines, 'lines' and the lower sides the 'machines'). He asked us whether we were on the machines or on the lines. He was really frightening when he was shouting; he also violently hit the tin shacks in which the toilets are housed which made it all the more frightening. He did not ask the younger women working on the machines when they started their breaks, but constantly kept track of the women working on the tomato selection lines. He usually sends women from the line back from their breaks fifteen minutes early because of the time it takes to walk back to the line from the toilets. He uses his anger as a means of control and it works. I heard from lots of women saying 'let's go, before this madman starts shouting'. He makes people feel uncomfortable while they are on their breaks, so they feel like it is better to go back to work as soon as possible. This reflects how the Kemalist factory regime causes women to internalise control through creating fear by being as authoritarian and aggressive as possible.

Since all women cannot go for a break at the same time – the lines never stop over the 24 hour day except for changing trailers or maintenance – sometimes the *çavuş* chooses who goes first and who waits for later and when she chooses, it is always either as a reward or as a punishment. Break times for the day shift (8.00 am to 4.00 pm) are normally at 10.00 (15 minutes toilet break), at 12.00 (lunch, half an hour) and, at 14.00 (15 minutes toilet break), but they usually do not apply all the time.

> Contrary to my expectations, we could not go out on our break until 13.30. I began to feel dizzy, like the surface of the floor was slipping from beneath my feet. When I looked in front of me at Yeliz and Mehtap, I couldn't see them as stable; it was like they were moving with the line. I already had chocolate in my pocket but it wasn't enough. At 13.00 I told Yeliz, I don't feel good; she told the forewoman, who came and told me that we would not be allowed to break until 13.30. It was almost unbelievable that all the women were complaining before she came, but none of them said anything to her. I asked her why we were waiting and she replied that it was because the cafeteria gets very crowded and there was not enough space for all the workers. Half an hour later, she returned and said everyone could go to lunch except Necla and me. We had to do cleaning. It was apparent that she punished me for my previous comments. If I said nothing to her, I wouldn't have had to stay behind (Fieldwork diary, 22 August 2014).

Although in the above example, waiting for the second round was a punishment, taking the breaks first is not always desirable, especially on night shifts. Break times on night shifts are normally at 2.00 am, 4.00 am, and 6.00 am. While on day shifts the forewoman usually starts break time later than normal, on night shifts she always sends women on breaks earlier than this. I thought many times about why she came earlier on night shifts but I couldn't find a reasonable answer. On night shifts, productivity decreases as time goes on and most women say that the most difficult hours are between 3.00am and 5.00 am. You begin to feel that your eyes are closing after around 2.00 a.m. and standing on the line becomes harder. Thus, it is not reasonable to send women to breakfast earlier, but the *çavuş* does. When I asked the women what they thought about this, most of them just said because the *çavuş* did not like us, so she intentionally chose the worst break time for our line. I did not think that this could be the reason behind her choice and I asked her why she sent us out for our breaks later on the day shift and earlier on the night shift. She just told me that: ‘it must be like this’ (2 September 2014).

It must be like this is an expected answer under militaristic control, although there is no reasonable answer for every question. I could not claim that I was getting on well with the *çavuş* or that I had adapted to Kemalist control. The *cavuş* always accused me of questioning everything and complaining. I do not think that she was wrong. I was really wondering about everything and complaining more than most women. She was also uncomfortable with my role as a researcher, as she told me more than once:

> ‘I don't know what you will write about me. But, next time just do research about being a forewoman. It is really difficult when you are responsible for everything. Managers continuously shout at you and women continuously gossip about you. Ask any of these women, who wants to become a *çavuş*. I tell you none of them’ (Fieldwork diary, 1 September 2014).

She was right; on many occasions, I saw the managers shout at her. According to the forewoman this is because the managers do not want to address the workers directly. The general manager confirmed this when he said: 'I don't want to see close relationships between the managers and the women; they don't need to know each other otherwise the women won’t work properly. They should refrain from speaking to the managers. You know that the *çavuşlar* (plural of *çavuş*) are also workers so they speak the workers' language' (18 September 2014).

The *çavuş*'s position is very similar to the 'middle woman' on the land; they are stuck between workers and managers, and neither group thinks that the *çavuş* is on their side. However, this is to be expected from the position of a *çavuş,* the sergeant, as sergeant both commands and is commanded. This position makes it almost impossible for her to satisfy anyone's demands, as she is literally on both sides and hence on neither. But, there is one group of women who like the *çavuş,* the protector of the regime; this is the 'daughters of the Republic': educated women working with alongside the machines. These women work in the monster's throat and will be discussed in the following section.

5.4.2. Picturing the Throat of the Monster: The Machines

The monster's throat refers to the lower parts of the line, to which the assembly line brings tomatoes after they are selected. In the throat, women basically prepare the tins to be sealed. Women are still standing on the moving assembly line, but now they have full tins rather than tomatoes. Managers and women called these parts of the line 'machines'. It is because women also have to engage with the machines, which fill, weigh, and seal the tins. Women's involvement with machines is limited. They are just responsible for informing technicians when they realise that something has gone wrong, such as slowing down or making a different noise.

The first part of the 'machines' is 'filling'. Two women stand at this station. The assembly line sends tomatoes down from the upper lines into a huge container and in the meantime a moving line brings cans to this container. Women push tomatoes into the cans, while this big machine stirs the tomatoes in the container. This task has a reputation for being the most difficult task of all the lines. When the tomatoes fall into the container, they are boiled and women have to push tomatoes inside the very hot water with gloves on, standing all day.

At the second set of machines, two women weigh the filled tins. They check whether they are heavier or lighter than their intended weight. In the diced tomato line, the cans are 5 kg, so the weight should be between 4800 – 4900 grams. This is an especially tiring task when women have to lift 5 kg tins constantly while remaining standing.

In the third part, which is called 'cover', where I mostly worked, two women pour tomato sauce into the tins on top of the tomatoes, to make up their weight, and then put the covers into a machine to cover the tins. It is one of the hottest places to work, since basically, there is a boiled tomato sauce tap and women take the sauce from there continuously. The tap is usually open so the place is usually hot. After this part of the line, the tomato tins go into a cooling section and they wait there for three hours. Although they wait there, the lines do not stop because the factory runs 24 hours a day seven days a week except for maintenance and cleaning, which only ever occurs in the run up to a visit from one of the representatives of the Japanese shareholders.

Once the tomato cans are sealed, they are out of the production part of the line. It means that they are swallowed and they are now in the stomach. In the ‘stomach’, the cans of tomatoes wait for women to scan their barcodes. Before going to the ‘stomach’, however, the next section will tell you about the women on the machines.

5.4.2.1. 'We Have the Power to Stop the Line': 'The Daughters of Red Republic'

> Today was a disaster. I caused the production line to stop for a whole three hours. Can you believe it? I still feel very anxious. Everything started when Ayfer went for break. I was alone and pouring the tomato sauces into cans, as always. While leaving, Ayfer told me that she had already fed the machine with the covers. I didn't need to put extra covers for five minutes. So, I only focused on the cans. In the meantime, Süheyla (working after me, controlling the covers) came and started to talk with me about her boyfriend. How he doesn't give her 'permission' to swim in a bikini, how he is jealous and so on. Since I was so angry with him, I become too engaged with her talking and I totally forgot about the covers. I could keep pouring the tomato sauce automatically, but the covers are behind me so I wasn't seeing them. I didn't realise that there were no covers inside the machine and cans were going to the cooler without covers. Also, because Süheyla was with me, there was no one to control the covers. Everything happened in 3-4 minutes. Suddenly, tins stacked in front of me, and when I looked behind me; I saw an endless queue of cans, all stacked. I just pushed the emergency button to stop all the line. I felt like I was going to faint. But, as I learned in the factory, fortunately I am not that weak. I can keep going on even if disaster happens.
>
> Anyway, after I stopped the line, Süheyla and I ran to the end of line and started to take down the cans from line to the floor. We tried to take down as many as we could before technicians and managers arrived. If they would see how many they are, they would have understood how long it took for us to realise that there was a problem. We managed to take down half of them and the floor was covered in cans. When the technicians came, they directly thought that the settings of the cover machine had broken down, so they started to change the settings. It made everything worse since the machine actually didn't break down. Solving the problem took them an hour. But when the lines started to work again, we just realised that the cooler had also broken down, since lots of cans went there without covers. It took another two hours to repair that too and they had to change some parts of it. I was really stressed, because of Süheyla

> and me production in the whole factory had stopped for 3 hours, we didn’t work. Süheyla told everyone it happened because of me (I think, it was also because of her, but she just acted like it was only my fault). Some of the women came and told me 'please do it again'. On the other hand, some of them threatened me, saying 'don't be afraid we won’t tell anyone’ and laughing at me. But, clearly they were just trying to tell me that they could tell anyone that I was to blame. Why I didn't tell anyone? Since I don't want to be fired. Is it ethical? I don't think so. I am not 'ethical', then. Maybe, I don't know' (Fieldwork diary, 30 August 2014).

As seen from this quotation, women are not observed or controlled strictly in the monster's throat. The *Çavuş* does not manage these women, since, as I noted in my fieldwork diary, she trusts them. They are her ‘smart daughters', as they are educated and ‘modern’ enough to observe and monitor the machine. It is another question whether she trusts us as a management strategy or she actually trusts the machines and not us. In the machines section, the assembly line continues to move and the machines do the work, women just help the machines. So, even if no one were there, the process would not stop. The task itself is enough to control us. But, *çavuş* always emphasises that only educated woman can work on this part of the line because there is lot of responsibility here. Older women (implying women working on the selecting lines) could push the wrong buttons on the machines. As a consequence of this trust, we decide our break times, we stay on break for more than 15 minutes or half an hour for lunch, it all depends on your agreement with your colleagues. Since, in every position two women are working, when actually one woman is enough, they can arrange their break times with each other. When managers or forewoman see you are alone, they assume that your friend is on their break and they do not ask you when she went or will come back.

When I was selecting tomatoes, *çavuş* and managers shouted at me to be quick, as they did to everyone, but on the down side of the line, *çavuş* gets on well with all women. No shouting, no controlling, no problems. *Çavuş* and managers imply to us that we are 'smart' enough to put covers inside the machine. But, apparently, I am not as smart as they thought I was. In the above example, the technicians immediately thought that it was machine's fault, not mine, since I am the most educated woman on the line. How would it be possible to forget to put covers into the machine? Indeed, they trust their machines and they think that they try to guarantee their machines' well being while putting ‘the educated daughters of the republic' there, who are hardworking, trusted as well as sexually modest.

5.4.2.2. Are the ‘Daughters of the Red Republic’ Suitable for the Managers?

Flirtation in the factory usually takes the forms of gazing, talking, smiling, and subtle insinuation; it is not conducted openly. This mirrors the image of modesty portrayed by Kemalism. Machines could be the boring and exploitative part of the line, since workers do not have any control over the production and are controlled by the machines. However, by adding romance or the promise thereof, the workers transform this part of the line into the most enjoyable part of work. The management also encourages this by allocating all the young workers to the machines and not controlling them strictly. This is apparently what Burawoy (1979) implies when he outlines the cooperation of workers with capital to create their own consent in the hegemonic factory regime. On other parts of the line, however, where work is more hands on, the management aims to prevent flirtation as the quality as well as the amount of the production depends on workers’ efficiency: coercion comes easily to the management. As bound up with the material conditions of the work, flirtation is only tolerated between ‘educated’ couples that are ‘suitable’ for each other and where there is a possibility of marriage.

Although, like the managers, the ‘daughters of Red’ are educated to degree level, they believe that the managers are above them because they come from 'different worlds'. Here, the expression ‘different worlds’ addresses different socio-economic backgrounds. This is clearly a reflection of how women from rural and conservative families who have entered tertiary education have increasingly begun to challenge the terms of an older ‘category’ of secular, urban educated women[74]. But, this is not apparent from the point of the management, as they only see ‘young educated’ women, and because everyone inside the factory wears a cap, they cannot see which of the women wear headscarves. Although, the general manager continues to ‘trust’ educated women, he views flirtation in the workplace differently from his colleagues:

> ‘I know that some women and men who come to the factory come here to find a partner. But, that is good, isn't it? At the end of the day, it doesn’t matter why people come to work here, it just matters that they come. Otherwise, you would not have these young people here’ (18 September 2014).

---

[74] The emerging of a category of ‘educated conservative’ women in Turkey can be also seen in light of the Gülen movement. Fetullah Gülen is a Turkish preacher and leads a social movement that tries to organize Muslims socially and politically. Fetullah Gülen and AKP have been the two main actors of Liberal Islam in Turkey (see Tuğal, 2013) since 2013. The Gülen movement has been very active in establishing after-school tuition centres – *dershane* – which help children pass university or high school entrance exams. These tuition centres can be found all around the country including in rural towns. In the town where I completed this study, the Gülen tuition centre was the only one available. In Turkey, after-school tuition centres are widespread because many see the state school system as inadequate. Through its tuition centres, the Gülen movement has rapidly increased its reach and scope. Yavuz (2012) has emphasised that the Gülen movement use tuition centres to empower Muslims as he believes that social transformation is possible with education. The Gülen movement also provides accommodation for young people who secure university places. The movement effectively spread the ideology and practice of liberal Islam. The Gülen movement has succeeded in raising its own cadre of intellectuals and maintained close ties with the AKP until 2013 when the government moved to shut down Gülen tuition centers. For detailed discussion about the relationship between the Gülen movement and AKP, see: Turam (2006) *Between Islam and the State: The Politics of Engagement*.

Begum (21) points out her reason for not attempting to flirt with managers as 'they cannot attempt to flirt with us because they cannot be sure if we are suitable for them. You know, anyone can work there. We are not like the women in quality control' (14 September 2014). Although management continues to assume that these women are like the 'Daughters of the Red Republic', because it is difficult to see social differences among them, managers prefer not to risk flirting with these workers and flirt with women working in quality control instead. The women who work in quality control are employed by interview and this means that managers can guarantee that these women are from the same world as they are.

Therefore, it is mainly the male workers, who are young seasonal workers and usually students just as women are, whom the women working at the machines see as the recipients of 'proper' flirtation. There are no male workers with permanent contracts in the factory. Someone may say that 'love' cannot be reduced to the statement of being appropriate for one another due to similar backgrounds. To these people, I would say that love (at least in this factory) is also a matter of convenience. There is a very popular Turkish expression that is used to refer to the vitality of being together with someone like you in terms of your social background: *'davul bile dengi dengine calar',* which has a similar meaning to 'birds of a feather flock together'. However, while the English idiom is more about common interests and values, in the Turkish the emphasis is on similar backgrounds and, specifically, class and ethnicity. I know it seems very depressing, at least for me. I wish I could have written that convenience is not the condition of love, but it seems that our logic decides who is loveable and then our heart loves. Picking someone from outside of 'loveable' pools, for the women in the factory leads to their fate being determined by sheer chance and, for them, chance is always much too risky. Rather, they believe in 'destiny'. From their point of view, flirting with male workers is much more their destiny, whereas flirting with managers would be playing a dangerous game of chance. At least inside the factory, as Filiz who is 21 told me, 'if we would encounter with Halit (one of managers), I would like him. He is very nice, but here we are in different positions. It is not appropriate' (12 September 2014). We call the managers *Bey*, which equates to 'Sir' in English. This is another obstacle to flirtation and this is how Kemalist ideology makes the public domain suitable for women to work in: by professionalising all relations (Incirlioğlu, 1995).

5.5. '*Anatolian Women'* in the Bowel of the Monster: The Warehouse

And the women,
our women
with their awesome, sacred hands,
pointed little chins, and big eyes,
our mothers, lovers, wives,
who die without ever having lived,
who get fed at our tables after the oxen,
who we abduct and carry off to the hills
and go to prison for,
who harvest grain, cut tobacco, chop wood, and barter in the markets,
who we harness to our plows
and who with their bells and undulant heavy hips surrender to us in sheepfolds
in the gleam of knives stuck in the ground-
the women, our women.

Nazım Hikmet Ran

The above poem is extensively cited to highlight the ambiguous image of the ‘Anatolian woman’ in Kemalist ideology. On the one hand she is powerful, capable and sacred; on the other hand she is undervalued (Durakbaşa, 1998). Although I do not personally like some parts of Nazım’s poem, because I feel that it underestimates the women’s agency, one can readily see how rural Anatolian women are perceived contradictorily. As Durakbaşa (1998) highlights, this portrayal of ‘the toilworn village woman’ in terms of their heavy workload in rural life fills the gap between the ‘sophisticated urban women’ and the ‘backward village women’ in the eyes of Kemalists. The emphasis on their devalued work in both Durakbaşa’s conceptualisation and Nazım’s poet is also reflected in how the women warehouse workers working in the bowel of Red are perceived by management.

The warehouse is the only section of Red factory in operation year round. Thus, its workers are not seasonal workers, but, as mentioned at the very beginning of the chapter, they still do not have permanent contracts. They are employed via a subcontracting firm, and their contracts are renewed every few months. These are mainly women workers, there is just one male worker here, who works permanently – again via a subcontracting firm, but he does not work under a permanent contract officially – and he is the foreman of the section. In the warehouse, the main task is to put products into boxes. For each product, the way of doing it varies and it mainly depends on the weight of the product. There is a machine, in the shape of a line – everyone calls it a 'machine' – which can pack the products when they are above a certain weight. However, for 5 kg products, the women have to do it themselves. This is the main work in the warehouse.

First, you have to set up the box and put 6 tins inside it. This is the easy part, at the end; they have to align their 30 kg boxes as a tower. They call these towers 'pallets'. Then, a male worker comes and takes them by using a lift truck. This is exhausting physical work. In my case, since I couldn't manage to pick up 30 kg boxes alone, so I made pallets with one of my friends, who also struggled to stack hers alone. It was still hard. All women working there complain that they have to do a man's job, however they do not give up. Although they complain, doing men's work brings them admiration from factory managers including the general manager but not from the women working on the sorting lines. The women doing the seasonal work sorting the tomatoes disrespect the warehouse women, who they see as not like ‘women’. They are seen as wild as men, so warehouse women can do the men’s job, and the women on the sorting line would not like to do this.

The Kemalist factory regime tries to make women working on the warehouse more masculine by emphasising their physical power. Red achieves this by assigning those women to ‘men’s’ tasks and, then appreciates that the ‘powerful Anatolian women’. As the factory manager told me: 'while these women try to do men's work with all their power, how can others complain about selecting tomatoes while standing?' (16 September 2014). This is all to explain why he wrote a letter to the company’s general board to complain about the use of a sub-contracting firm employ the warehouse workers on temporary contracts when, as he sees it, they work harder than anyone else; harder than men. The manager also complained that the men are lazy and do not want to work in the warehouse: 'They are not even as good as women'. Unfortunately there is not an alternative ‘hero’ image of rural men in the Kemalist ideology, so men have to stay in the category of ‘backward rural people’.

Although the general manager does not trust or like rural men, he wants to employ male workers in the warehouse, since he knows that it is a man's job, but the conditions of work do not attract men subcontracting work is too insecure. As I wrote in my diary:

> The factory manager said that men prefer being security guards with the same wage. Since they are sitting all day. They are lazy'. What about seasonal male workers, I asked him, could you employ them in the warehouse at least in the season? He answered me in the following way: 'don't mention them. They are show-offs. They come here to flirt with girls. They do their hair, they wear their jeans and they hang around the plant, they are no different from the women. Even if we had one of them here, we would not be able to have a single woman in the warehouse (Fieldwork diary, 16 September 2014).

In this very contradictory statement, the manager seems to like having women working in the warehouse, basically because they are doing a difficult man's job, and he does not like male workers since they are doing ‘women’s work’, and not doing it properly as men, but like women who care more for their appearance and flirting than doing a good job. He has a very rigid division between men's and women's work in his mind and he is very upset about not being able to apply it in the factory properly. He is even ashamed of this since he told me he was really sorry that I had to work in the warehouse. On the other hand, although women working in the warehouse complain about it, they are also proud of doing man's job. Zeliha told me that 'Emine, are you also writing about the warehouse... Then, write about how we are even more powerful than men. Write that men do not want to work there, but we do it easily' (Fieldwork notes, 13 September 2014).

Unfortunately, they actually do not work do this work 'very easily'. They work for 12 hours a day for the whole year with one day off a week. In peak season, they work 12-hour shifts and start work four hours earlier than the other workers. They also cannot enjoy the benefits of a permanent contract, even if they work for the factory for long period of time. These women also earn less than women who work on the production line seasonally. But, they say, 'they always have a job and others work just seasonally. That is why they earn less. There is a price for everything'. They also say that 'we appreciate having this permanent job[75] since it is very difficult to have a job permanently in this town where there are mainly food factories and they always employ workers with temporary contracts'. These women are just how the factory manager desires them to be: they work more than everyone else in the factory but they do not complain even though their conditions are precarious: they are sufficiently toilworn to be respected and thought of as sacred. At the same time, this means that they are undervalued as women.

The contradictory assessment of the warehouse women workers, who I have argued are constructed in a similar way to the 'Anatolian women' of Kemalist ideology, show us that employing women in a 'man's job' does not necessarily lead to the undervaluation of that work, contrary to what previous literature suggests (Chant, 1995; Phillips & Taylor, 1980). Rather, in the Red factory it increases the 'reputation' of those women by masculinising them because of the men's work they do. Phillips and Taylor (1980: 79) state that 'women workers carry into the workplace their status as subordinate individuals, and this status comes to define the value of their work they do'. When women are employed in skilled work, usually men's work, they downgrade the value of that work because they are 'inferior bearers of labour' (Phillips & Taylor, 1980). Phillips and Taylor suggest that skills and the definition of their value are saturated by 'sex' (Phillips & Taylor, 1980; Chant, 1995); men do skilled work but when women do the same work it becomes seen as less skilled or unskilled work. The masculinising of 'Anatolian women', on the other hand, and respect for their work demonstrate that in this factory the prestige of a job is more about it appearing to call for masculine or feminine traits, and this then affects how the workers are seen: the task itself is already masculine or feminine before people are employed. Regardless of their sex, workers are masculinised and feminised on the shopfloor, as Salzinger has shown in Mexico's maquiladoras (2003), but with reference to politics of the manager and his understanding of feminine and masculine.

---

[75] Women in the warehouse perceive the job as permanent, although it is not a permanent job officially rather a series of contracts.

5.6. Conclusion: Finding a Kemalist Heart and Mind

In this chapter, I have tried to show how the mechanical monster of Red finds a guiding heart and brain in the labyrinth of Kemalist ideology. It is in this way that Kemalism forms the ideological bedrock categories of labour control that allows the beast to continue to 'live'. To keep the monster alive, the Kemalist factory regime organises labour in Red through reconstituting the three categories of women in Kemalist ideology on the shop floor, and women give their heart and brain to the hands of the ideology, as they believe that this is the best option for them to survive. Red convinces women of the factory's preciousness thanks to the modern core of the Kemalist ideology. Women regardless of their category in the Kemalist ideology are happy to receive their wages regularly and according the amount of employment law requires, be given good and enough food, safe transportation, and fixed working hours. Although they cannot press their fingers properly on the English speaking clock-in machines at the gates of the factory, and they always complain about having to clean when the Japanese come to visit the factory, those complaints do not prevent them from showing off at the pick-up points where they wait with all other women working in the different tomato processing or food factories around the their town. This is not different to what women think about Kemalism outside the factory. Many feminists also continuously criticised the authoritarianism, elitism and homogeneity of Kemalism, but are nonetheless positive about it when and if they see potential dividends from it (Arat, 1998a). However, recognising the advantages of the Kemalist ideology does not mean that women cannot also resist Kemalism (Arat, 1998a).

One might argue that Kemalism is feminist because of its progressive core that underlines the equality of both sexes. However, very little of this so-called emancipation is self-directed and women, having had no agency in the so-called feminist revolution in the early Turkish republic, perpetuate the patriarchal norms that it seemed to challenge. This is very similar to the way that Red offers women far better conditions than other factories across the region in terms of transportation, lunch as well as in wages, but it still sustains the patriarchal forms of control over women of all ‘three categories’ of women in Kemalist factory regime.

Red’s Kemalist factory regime is patriarchal as it sees femininity as an impediment to modern production. The adaption of global production to local conditions is the deployment of Kemalism and its contradictory views of women’s strengths and weaknesses - which it allocates to different types of women. It constructs women working on the machines as gender neutral and defeminises them whereas warehouse women are seen as masculine. Women in the production line are seen as feminine and that is why they are humiliated. It is evident that only masculinity gets respect. Thus, if women get respect they have to be seen as like men; they can't be respected as women. Similarly, men doing women's jobs are feminised, as in the way the manager depicts men workers in the factory. Masculinity governs femininity in different forms – educated women and/or Anatolian women – in Red. This shows us the operation of intersectional patriarchy on the shop floor.

'Equalitarian' Kemalist ideology has not tried to destroy patriarchy, it has just tried to change the image of ideal women and the Kemalist 'leftist' bourgeois management of Red has not tried to destroy capitalism, it has just constructed capitalism in the image of 'mechanical monster'. The 'emancipation' of Turkish women, which is in the hands of the state and mainly men, only includes secular, educated urban women and hence exacerbates the class divisions, which are impossible to separate from religion and ethnicity. This also draws parallels with what we see in Red in terms of the management's assumptions about women working in the sorting lines – 'backward religious women' and women working at the machines – 'daughters of the Republic'. However, this distinction does not exacerbate the differences among women as expected by a Kemalist regime, since they two categories now overlap. As Kemalist ideology began to lose its hegemony outside the factory gate after the early 2000s, educated women no longer include only secular *Daughters of Republic*; they now include the sisters of the *Hizmet*[76]. This is a challenge to the Kemalist factory regime. In order for Red to continue organising labour as it does, it will need to respond to the shifts in Turkish society and, in particular, to the shifting tectonics of religious and secular movements[77].

---

[76] The Gülen movement is named *Hizmet* by its followers. *Hizmet* can be translated as a 'mission' for society. Here, I also use 'sisters' intentionally, as women in the Gülen movement are called *abla* (elder sister). A group of female students have *abla* to take care of them intellectually, economically, personally. The same is valid for male students with *abi* (elder brother).

---

[77] Although, politically it could be argued that secularism has been seen as embodied by the main religious political actors of Turkey, both AKP government and the Gülen movement (Turam 2006, Kuru, 2012). Here, I continue to refer to these two counter ideologies as secularism and Islamism, as this is how the workers and managers of Red perceived this difference, as do many other citizens of the country.

Chapter 6

As Tomatoes Change, Families Change; As Families Change, Tomatoes Change

6.1. Introduction

This chapter draws on observations made at the landowning family's home and at the seasonal agricultural workers' homes – both the shacks the latter live in while working on the land and at their own homes in their hometowns. I identify different forms of rural patriarchy, which occur in parallel with the actors' different relations with tomatoes. I apply the term 'intersectional patriarchy', as outlined in the introduction and Chapter 1, to reveal how patriarchy has taken different forms in the landowning family's household and in Kurdish migrant workers' households. Then in the next chapter I will examine household relations in the families of the Red factory manager and workers.

The chapter explores the concept of *el âlem*, – which in Turkish refers to a group of unidentified 'real' and at the same time 'imaginary' people who are outside the family. Speakers refer to these people when explaining why it is necessary for them to do this or that. *El âlem* is both an abstract concept and a concrete term, which refers to a particular form of social control serving to contribute the persistence of patriarchy. In the following passages, I first discuss the definitions of household and family with reference to the usage of the terms by people in the study. Then, I reveal the varieties of patriarchy at the household level through conceptualising *el âlem* and discussing its relation to honour. In the third section, I examine how *el âlem* 'decides' which kinds of household structure women and men should have and how this depends on their position within the process of tomato production. First, I focus on the households of women from the landowning family who are involved in planting tomatoes on the land, and then I look at Kurdish seasonal migrant workers' homes, both the shacks they stay in during seasonal work and their 'real' homes in their hometowns.

6.2. Conceptualising Households and Family

This section clarifies my definitions of the terms 'family' and 'household'. The difficulties in agreeing a universal definition of the household and the pitfalls of using the terms households and family as equivalents of each other are widely discussed in the literature (Chant, 1997; Chant & McIlwanie, 2009; Dunaway, 2014; Kabeer, 1994; Kandiyoti, 1985; Walby, 1990), and in this particular context, they are not always necessarily coterminous.

Firstly, the existence of kin-marriages and their function as a means of organising production and reproduction relations causes an overlapping of families and households, especially for Kurds. Chant (1991) argues that when households consist of kin, they become vehicles for familial ideology and Kandiyoti (1985) confirms this for rural Turkey. Secondly, I have linguistic reasons for using family to refer to Kurdish workers' households. In the Turkish language, family is called *aile* and household is called *hane (or hane halkı). Hane* is the direct translation of household, but it also carries the meaning associated with economic and social cooperation and not always inside the same dwelling. *Hane* (household) is different from *aile* (family) as the former is seen as an economic unit rather than a social one. For example, when a woman gets married and moves to her husband's parents' house, it means that she leaves her *hane* (*haneden ayrilmak*) and becomes a member of her husband's *hane*, but she does not leave her family (*aile*). Family is here associated with kinship relations. It is different among Kurds. In the Kurdish language there is no particular word for households, as Chant & McIlwanie (2009) also observe for Tanzania (and for southern Mexico, for instance). Rather Kurds use the word *malbat* to refer to a social and economic unit in which members depend on the same labour force for consumption; even when they are not living in the same dwelling. *Malbat* is the direct translation of an 'extended family', but the word also includes the lands, properties and/or animals of those who share a common budget even when they do not live in the same space. The size of *malbat* can be large: over 100 people (Yalcin-Heckmann, 2011). *Malbat* is the smallest section of an *asiret* - see detailed information about *asiret* in chapter 2 - which cannot be used to refer to households but refers to family.

Therefore, in my study, I use the word family when it is necessary to underline the kinship relations. On the other hand, for the purposes of understanding the households, mostly Turkish, involved in my study I deploy Dunaway's (2014: 57) definition, which sees a household as a unit 'in which members inequitably pool and redistribute labour, resources, and survival strategies that are grounded in both unpaid and paid (non-waged and waged) income sources' because it offers a better chance to show the interdependency of household relations and production relations. I use this definition as the majority of women do not live in the same dwelling as members of the same household but lived in the same apartment building, neighbouring buildings or even in different places (e.g. a town and a village). However they still referred to each other as belonging to the same household because of their joint budget and/or dependence on each other's productive or reproductive labour. This demonstrates that household members do not necessarily live under the same roof and that definitions of household vary. This runs contrary to what Chant (1997: 5) says is one of the most widely deployed definitions; 'households as spatial units where members live in the same dwelling and share basic domestic and/or reproductive activities such as cooking and eating'.

6.3. Pluralities of *el âlem*: Pluralities of Patriarchy

It is well known that the degree and forms of patriarchy are various and depend on social contexts (Bozzoli, 1983; Kandiyoti, 1988; Walby, 1986; 1990). In this study, the key differentiator of forms of patriarchy experienced by women is the different positions in the tomato production. Revealing these different positions of women through the intersectionality of gender, class, ethnicity and age will hopefully lead us to see that these intersections shape and are in turn shaped by patriarchal household structures. However, exploring the ways in which patriarchy is (re) constructed still may not tell us why patriarchy persists. Drawing on my informants' own explanations of their reasons for contributing to the re-construction of patriarchal relations, I conceptualise (the) *el âlem*[78] as a particular form of social order – in this particular context – serving as an agential aspect of intersectional patriarchy.

6.3.1. Islam, Social Order and the 'Eye' of Turkish Society

Mernissi (1985: 37) states that in the Muslim order it is not necessary for an individual to eradicate their instincts or to control them for the sake of doing so, but they must use them according to the demands of religious law. In the Muslim world an individual cannot live without a social order. In the Turkish context, on the other hand, Mardin (1991) suggests that since the late Ottoman period Islamic law has been gradually displaced by the implementation of European laws and reforms. The Islamic order has been replaced by an all-seeing 'eye', which controls and governs Turkish society (Çakır, 2008). For Mardin, neighbourhoods, the smallest administrative sections of urban areas, are the main agents of establishing and sustaining this 'eye'. His 1991 publication states that marriages, deaths, births, education, religion are all organised in and by *mahalle* – neighbourhood – under the eye of *mahalle sakinleri* - neighbours. He conceptualises the social control of this all-seeing 'eye' as *mahalle baskısı* – 'neighbourhood pressure (Mardin, 2007). According to Mardin (1991; 2007), in the early years of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk attempted to demolish the 'eye' through his modernist reforms mentioned in Chapters 2 and 5; however these reforms led to the creation of another social order called Kemalism. Therefore, it is not surprising that once Mardin (2007) had suggested the concept of neighbourhood pressure, the Turkish media interpreted the term to refer to the demonising of non-conservative groups such as Kemalists by conservatives[79].

---

[78] The Turkish language does not have a definite article, so el âlem is not directly translated as 'the el âlem'. However, in certain contexts 'the el âlem' in English better captures its meaning when I refer to an identifiable group of people.

Mardin does not directly say that 'neighbourhood' and 'neighbourhood pressure' refer to *el âlem*, a term people use in everyday life, but he sees neighbourhood pressure as a means to control both action and speech by forcing the social actor to reflect on how others perceive them[80]. I am not suggesting here that the concept of neighbourhood pressure is identical to that of *el âlem*, but that it is at least a close conceptual fit for how 'people' who are subject to *el âlem* as a form of social control define it.

---

[79] As stated periodically throughout this study, there is an ongoing tension between conservative and secular citizens of Turkey. When Mardin introduced this concept in 2007 in an interview for a newspaper article about his book *Religion, Society and Modernity in Turkey* (2006), the opposition media used it to emphasise a 'pressure' exerted by the conservative population – with the presumption that the latter are primarily AKP supporters – against the lifestyles of secular citizens. The concept has received greater attention in the media than the academy, and is typically associated with the AKP's conservative ideology. Mardin has tried to clarify that the concept has historical roots in Turkish society and its existence is not directly related to the AKP's conservative ideology or policies, but his efforts have not prevented the concept from being associated with the demonising of non-conservative Turkish citizens. Toprak et al. (2009) have noted that *mahalle baskısı* [neighbourhood pressure] is on the rise in Turkish society, especially in small Anatolian cities with regard to religious practices. Social taboos against the non-observance of Ramadan are an example of this phenomenon.

Mardin's conception of *mahalle baskısı* has been criticised for not taking the relative isolation of nuclear households into account and not recognising that urbanisation leads to the diminishment of the 'neighbourhood' as an agent of social control (Subaşı, 2008). Furthermore, despite the fact that there are strictly speaking no 'neighbourhoods' in rural areas, people living in such areas may in fact experience social control to a greater extent than people in the 'neighbourhoods' of cities or towns. The word *mahalle* – 'neighbourhood' – already bears too many urban connotations to capture the forms of social control in rural areas. So, as my study suggests, the concept of *el âlem* might be a better way of understanding the changing nature of social control in Turkey, one which can be applied to urban or rural settings, especially since (the) *el âlem* is conceptually ubiquitous – referring, as it does, to every stranger (as well as everyone) in society.

El âlem can be understood as referring to the normative order, and can either be abstract or personified depending on context. For instance, *el âlem* occurs in the abstract when a mother tells her 'educated' daughter that she cannot marry an uneducated groom. What will *el âlem* say about it? In contrast, *el âlem* occurs in a personified form if, for example, I ask my mother why she is exerting herself so hard over domestic chores, and she responds that the *el âlem* are coming for *gün* tomorrow. In this instance, a significant aspect of the personified *el âlem* in the latter example is that it includes her relatives as well as neighbours, even her sisters. This distinction goes some way towards explaining why the Turkish Official Dictionary (TDK) defines *el âlem* as referring both to 'strangers' and to 'everyone'.

---

[80] When the concept was particularly popular during 2008, my mother and I were watching a TV programme in which different scholars were discussing what 'neighbourhood pressure' meant. Given her profile, my mother – rural, uneducated – shares an affinity with the people in this study, and she asked me with surprise why they did not specifically use the phrase *el âlem ne der* – 'what will el âlem say?' –.

6.3.2. *El âlem* and Family Honour

Although the concept of *el âlem* has not been previously explored or adopted in the academic literature, the literature has already addressed the different forms of ‘gendered’ social order (Chant, 1997; Chant & McIlwaine, 2016; Lessinger, 1990; Mernissi, 1985; Vera-Sanso, 1995; Fenster, 1999), particularly in relation to the concept of honour. These studies (Chant, 1997; Chant & McIlwaine, 2016; Lessinger, 1990; Mernissi, 1985; Vera-Sanso, 1995) indicate how the social order serves to monitor or to control women’s sexuality ‘for the sake of family honour’. In Madras, for instance, a woman’s participation in retail trading of fresh fruit and vegetables could only be possible when a male member of the family joins her in order to prevent possible sexual assault (Lessinger, 1990). Fenster’s (1990) study looks at how the policing of women’s sexuality has been intensified by the modern planning project in Israel that has replaced traditional Bedouin living spaces. New tents have been designed to prevent women encountering ‘stranger’ men and hence they serve to protect ‘family honour’. Chant’s study (1991) underlines the pressure on women-headed households to protect the reputation of their family by acting in a ‘sexually modest’ way. These examples of mechanisms of social control over women’s sexuality in the interest of men’s or families’ honour demonstrate how widespread these practices are (Salzinger, 2003; Kabeer, 2000; White, 1994; Wolf, 1996). Here, however, *el alem* does not only refer to the policing of women’s sexuality. Below I discuss the different conceptualisations of honour in the Turkish language in order to expand this argument.

In the Turkish language, and it is the same in Kurmanci (Kurdish), family honour is referred to by two different words, *namus* and *şeref.* While the former is most strongly associated with women's bodies and sexuality, the latter broadly refers to acting in accordance with the moral norms of society. When a woman is disloyal to her husband, she is called *namussuz* (dishonourable), but not *serefsiz* (dishonourable). For many, the control of women's bodies and sexualities is the only way in which one can be *namuslu* (honourable). Honour killings are called *namus cinayeti* not *seref cinayeti. Seref* is more associated with good reputation, and this reputation depends on the extent to which your acts are approved by *el âlem*: the extent to which you follow the demands of *el âlem*. For instance, when *el âlem* concludes that a worker deserves his/her wage thanks to their performance, this adds to their family *seref.* If s/he does not deserve the wage, then *el alem* talks about them and their family, how they do not have *seref* and so on.

In this sense, deploying the concept of *el alem* as a material manifestation of patriarchy offers a chance to understand why people are eager to sustain it. In other words, a woman can explain why she 'accepts' being 'governed' in the household by her mother-in-law in terms of organisation of her unpaid labour or a man can explain why he 'needs' to go against his sister's wishes by pointing to *el alem*. In this way we can see how *el âlem* is exercised over both kinds of honour. In the former one following her mother-in-law's demands by a bride increases the reputation of the family. *El âlem* will admire the harmony in the household and praise the family's honour – associated with good reputation. In the latter example, *el âlem* will praise a brother's control over his sister's sexuality. In this sense, we can also see how patriarchy is sustained and modified.

6.3.3. El âlem and the Persistence of Intersectional Patriarchy

Below is a quotation from Remzi (a young male worker) that demonstrates the role of *el âlem* in sustaining patriarchy.

> 'I know that you are on the women's side. But Emine [speaking directly to me as the researcher], do you really think that I don't like Hazal and I don't want what is good for her? But, if she runs away with someone, you know that we [implying her brothers] have to do something. Otherwise, we cannot continue to live in our village. How would we look others in the eye? This is why we have to prevent this from happening. That's why I cannot give her a phone.' (Remzi, Fieldwork notes, 14 September 2013, during the lunch break on tomato land)

Remzi, the 22-year-old brother of 15-year-old Hazal made this statement. As seen in the land chapter, Hazal also works on the land. And, Remzi fell deeply in love with one of the women working on the land, but his beloved's father strongly disapproved of their relationship. On that occasion, Remzi seemed to me to have a soft, romantic heart, arranging the tomatoes in a heart shape on the ground to send a signal to his lover. He related the above to me when I asked him why he wouldn't permit Hazal to have a mobile phone. His reply really surprised me. As he implied, they (Hazal's brothers) have to do 'something' if their sister decides to runs away with a boyfriend. Here, 'something' might even imply physical harm, as this is not a rare situation in Turkey; indeed, we have all heard about 'honour killings' – *namus cinayeti*. However, Remzi himself was in the same situation, insofar as he too was planning to run away with his lover. When I posed this contradiction to him, he told me 'but what can I do? I hope if she (Hazal) elopes, she will do so once I elope with Emine (the girl he loves), then I would not see and hence not need to do anything'.

Remzi is expected to control Hazal's behaviour[81], Remzi's father is expected to control him, Remzi's older uncle is expected to control Remzi's father, and some other people from their extended family are expected to control their older uncle, other people from the village also are expected to control their extended family, and so on. They all justify their reasons for their responsibility for the behaviour of others by referencing a group of unidentified and at the same time identified people – the *el âlem*. The members of *el âlem* do not have a particular age or sex, and do not belong to a particular religion or ethnicity. They cannot be seen, but 'they' can see all your actions, feelings and even thoughts. If someone asks you to point to *el âlem* you cannot do so directly, but you know who they are when they begin to speak about the appropriateness[82] of your behaviours. Your father is a member of *el âlem*, your mother, your older or younger brother, your sister, your neighbour and even you. When you want to do something, you must therefore first ask yourself: 'What will '*el âlem*' say about it?' *'El âlem ne der'* is a very commonly used expression in Turkish, and refers to others' perceived approval of your acts. Its equivalent in Kurdish is*'Werr xalke be ci?'*, with the Turkish and Kurdish statements being direct translations of each other.

El âlem is the 'one' who governs people in Turkey, but it also manifests itself in different forms. While Hazal's running away with her boyfriend can be given as a reason for her to be killed, Fatma's father (Fatma is a member of the landowning family) wanted her to run away with her lover as he did not have enough money to pay for her *çeyiz* (dowry). Apparently, in Fatma's father's context, not having enough money to pay for his daughter's *çeyiz* would have attracted the disapproval of *el âlem*, – as a man must provide money for his daughter's *çeyiz* – as it would mean she would not have a father who could marry her off 'properly' and this is not good for a family's *seref*. In this case, according to *el âlem*, his daughter's running away would be preferable to the inability to provide a *çeyiz*. In this way, *el âlem* determines the 'appropriateness' of acts performed by everyone depending on their gender, ethnicity, class, age, education, and so on.

---

[81] Having control over someone is understood in daily life in Turkey as a right to have a say about someone else's life – söz söyleme hakkı. It refers to the 'right' to pass judgment or make a decision about what the other should do in a given context and it can also include the right to issue punishment if the individual is not deemed to act 'appropriately'.

[82] In the Turkish language, this judgment is more rigid than the mere appropriateness of behaviour; (the) *el âlem* have the right to talk about the 'rightness' or 'wrongness' of your behaviour. According to my friends on the fields, the same applies in Kurdish (kurmanci).

The specific way a person is governed by *el âlem* depends on their position within the intersections of gender, class, ethnicity and age and, relatedly, masculinities and femininities. *El âlem* is an agential aspect of intersectional patriarchy. You cannot just feel patriarchy, but you can see it, almost hold it – practise it yourself – by looking at *el âlem's* demands or judgements. Table 6.1 (below) illustrates how the type of patriarchy depends on the intensity of the *el âlem*'s voice in the household as well as on the types of masculinity and femininity that are constructed, in accordance with which el âlem decides the appropriateness of your behaviour.

Types of Patriarchy	Degree of Patriarchy = Intensity of the *el âlem*'s voice inside the household/ family	Forms of (Hegemonic) Masculinity	Forms of (Devalued) Femininity
Rural	High	**Turkish, Landowning Family** Authoritarian, knowing how to govern (with harmony), affinity with machines, belonging to public sphere.	**Turkish, Landowning Family** Obsessive about consumption (not aware of the value of money, not able to control money, unreceptive), lazy, competent at domestic work.
	Very High	**Kurdish, Migrant Workers; Families** Physical strength, aggressive, uneducated (or educated in certain areas such as law), arranging 'public relations' and/or 'working' relations.	**Kurdish, Migrant Workers' Families** Belonging to private sphere, passive, seductive, prefer to be governed.
Transitional (Turkish, (lower) middle income level, educated up to high school level, rural background, moderate religious)	Medium	Breadwinner, independent, regularly employed, having regular wage, taking care of a nuclear family.	Earning extra, eager to work (probably seasonally), taking care of an extended family, entering the public if it is necessary.[83]
Kemalist (Turkish, (middle/upper) middle income level, educated to university level, urban background, secular.	Low[84]	Educated (or wise), physically durable (no need to be strong), hardworking, determined, affinity with machines, sexually modest.	Femininity is derided as irrational, uneducated, backward, lazy, religious, liking to be governed, always thinking about sex.

Table 6.1: Types of Patriarchy and Associated Masculinities and Femininities within the Household

---

[83] Here femininity is not devalued as in the other examples because it is in the process of construction.

[84] I set the levels while comparing the households to each other.

Intersectional patriarchy also refers to the fluidity of the different positions of individuals in relation to kin as well as non-kin. The fluidity of these positions means that everyone ends up having a stake in the patriarchy. Power is consequently available to all individuals to different extents, as everyone is a member of *el âlem* writ large in their respective social positions. For instance, while Remzi can exercise some power over his sister by controlling her sexuality as her brother, even Hazal can have the right to 'have a say' over Pınar, her fourteen year old niece. Someone thus monitors everyone's behaviour, and each in turn can monitor someone else's behaviour. Everyone has a chance to exercise power over someone else, as long as *el âlem* exists. The only way of having power over someone is to act in accordance with the dictates of *el âlem* and this, at the same time, sustains it. To be a member of *el âlem,* it is sufficient to be able to pass judgements on others' actions. Despite this, the concept is not particularly concrete, since it is impossible to label any specific person as being a part of *el âlem*, and few 'members' of *el âlem* choose to be part of it. Most of the women and men who took part in this study think that they are *living for el âlem. El âlem için yaşamak* is a common expression in Turkey, and refers to the way in which people think they live their lives simply to satisfy the demands of 'others'. Some of them even believe that one *ought to* live for *el âlem,* and that this is the way of the world, but there are others who say that they hate it and do not want to live for it.

I refer to the exercise of power which *el âlem* offers to everyone to a greater or lesser extent as 'masculine governing' for two reasons. The first is that it is more available to 'masculine' social actors, and the second is that it operates to protect the reputation and honour of these masculine actors. In the hierarchy of masculinity in rural households of tomato production (see Table 6.2), however, older women come near the top of the hierarchy:

Hierarchy of Masculinities in Rural Households	
Turkish Landowning Family	**Kurdish Migrant Worker Family**
The Oldest Son (Husband) (2nd generation)	The Oldest Man of the extended Family (Father in Law) (1st generation)
The Oldest Man of the extended Family (Father-in-law) (1st generation)	The Oldest Woman of first generation (mother-in-law) (1st generation)
The Oldest Woman (Mother in Law) (1st generation)	Oldest son of first generation (2nd generation)
Wife of eldest son (2nd generation) (*elti*)	Sons (of second generation) – both married and unmarried) (3rd generation)
Other male members of the second generation (husband's brothers)	Wives of older male members (2nd generation) (*elti*)
Younger daughters-in-law (Bride) (2nd generation)	Youngest daughters-in-law (2nd generation)
3rd generation males (sons of the 2nd generation(	Daughters (of 2nd generations), (3rd generation)
3rd generation females (daughters of 2nd generation)	

Table 6.2: Hierarchy of Masculinities in Rural Households

In the above table, older women's place might come as a surprise to some but it is widely accepted by my informants. This is because when a woman reaches her menopause, she loses her femininity. For instance, when the women working on the land discussed the menopause, they spoke of it as the period in which women cease to be women. Mernissi (1985) states a very similar argument for Moroccan women. Her findings suggest that in a traditional family (to be found amongst rural and low-income women) mothers-in-law have control over the operation of households and they are perceived as totally asexual. Not surprisingly, daughters-in-law in her study stated that the most important person in their family was their mother-in-law. Although Mernissi (1985) explains this situation by referring to the close relation between mother and son (see also White (1994) for Turkish mothers and their sons), here I mostly explore this phenomenon by focusing on the organisation of production and reproduction and their interaction, following Kandiyoti (1985; 1988), with cultural discourses around women’s sexuality.

Turning back to mothers-in-law, ‘There is no reason to protect her’, said Nezahat when she explained to me why her mother-in-law went to the market instead of her or any younger members of the family. Here, ‘protection’ specifically implies the need to protect a woman who is capable of getting pregnant. If you have already had your menopause, then there is no need to worry about being impregnated by a stranger, and it is also more difficult to determine whether someone is having extra-marital sex. However, this does not bring women sexual freedom. Infertility defeminises menopausal women in the eyes of rural people, since being a woman among women is intimately tied to fertility. It is therefore unsurprising that when women are no longer fertile, they have more freedom in the contact they can have with men. For both the Turks and the Kurds in this study, post-menopausal women are seen as becoming more like men. It is for this reason that they can exercise greater control over the younger men, as they are effectively older 'masculine' actors. This puts them further up the ladder in the ‘hierarchy of masculinity’. In the following, therefore, you will see how mothers-in-law are the main enemies of both Kurdish and Turkish women.


ÇİFTÇİ FAMILY
RECEP + AYSE
(M, 84 ,H) (F, 81, D)
MELAHAT (F->X)
HANIFE (F->X)
ALI + AYSEL
(M,65,H) (F,60,H)
HUSEYIN + SALIHA
(M,62,H) (F,59,H)
EMINE (F->X)
HIKMET (F->X)
RECEP + FATMA
(M,41,W) (F,39,W)
HEDIYE (F->X)
RECAI + NEZAHAT
(M,35,W) (F,31,W)
AYSE (F->X)
ELIF (F->X)
HALIL IBRAHIM + NURHAN
(M,39,W) (F,37,W)
NESE (F->X)
EDANUR (F,19,S)
TARIK (M,17,W)
MERVE (F,13,S)
IREM (F,9,S)
SENA (F,7,S)
GAMZE (F,18,W)
MUSTAFA (M,16,W)
SUDENAZ (F,5)
F->X : Since they are female, they do not have any rights on family properties including lands.
S : Studying
H : Working on the lands
D : Death

Diagram 6.1: The landowning family

6.3. Two Common Enemies of Rural Women: *elti* and *kaynana*, in Two Different Forms of Patriarchy

Here, I will introduce two different forms of patriarchy in two different types of household, the landowning families' households and Kurdish migrant families' households, whilst highlighting the differences between them as well as their similarities. I will discuss the landowning family first. According to Fatma,

> 'all women have two troubles in their lives; not a husband but a *kaynana* [a mother-in-law; your husband's mother] and a *elti* [a woman's husband's brother's wife], if you find someone [to marry] without a mother and a brother, this will the best thing, which you can have for your whole life.' (Fatma, Fieldwork notes, 16 September 2013, at her home during the night gathering of women in the village)

Fatma's statement could seem harsh to those of us who have lived most of our lives in a nuclear family with a husband and children and are not subject to a mother-in-law's authority, and not obliged to compete with a *elti* for a greater share of the common budget or more authority in household decision-making. However, for most women who live in a 'patrilocal family structure' where women marry into their husband's family, Fatma's statement is fair. They themselves have sons, so they may themselves become mothers-in-law in the future, and they may well already be someone's *elti*. A young *gelin* (bride) in a rural household has not one, but two 'enemies': *elti* – the other brides of the family – and *kaynana* – her mother-in-law. While *elti* could become a bride's allies by virtue of having a similar position in the familial hierarchy, having a joint budget and problems that arise with regard to sharing money immediately destroy any possibility for solidarity between the brides in a family. This section mostly talks about women's struggles with their *eltileri* [plural form of *elti*], *kaynanalari* [plural form of *kaynana*], and the male members of their families over the distribution of resources, the control of labour and money, and the gender division of labour, which are all shaped by the interweaving of kinship and production relations.

6.3.1. 'There is no Family like Us Anymore': The Triumph of the 'Four Generational', Patriarchal Family in the Village

Describing her household, Nurhan, a bride in the landowning family, says:

> 'We are the richest people of this village. Everyone envies our money; however I bet none of them prefer our life. We are the only family in the village who has 3 mothers-in-law at home. There is no family like us anymore in the whole village, maybe even in the surrounding villages. All of these families are separated and young couples move to the town. Who does not want to live alone with her husband and children? Honestly, I do not want money but peace. But, in a crowded family like ours there is no peace.' (Nurhan, Fieldwork notes, 5 May 2013, on the tomato land)

Unfortunately, however, in order to grow tomatoes on their large portion of land, they have to live in a four generational patrilocal household structure, which I will explain in detail. Kandiyoti (1988) suggests that when 'the material bases of classical patriarchy' were undermined by 'new market forces, capital penetration in rural areas or processes of chronic immiseration' (279), younger men and their nuclear families separated from the paternal household and the three generational patrilocal family structures began to fracture. This is the case for the factory women's families in the same region, which will be explored in the next chapter.

However, new market conditions do not always drive the division of extended families into nuclear units, rather they can also cause the reinforcement of the 'extended patriarchal family' as in the case of Nurhan's family and/or the intensification of patriarchal family structures like Kurdish workers' families.

In the case of the landowners' family, in order to make money from tomato production, they need to live as a crowded single household. There are two main reasons for this. The first is related to regulations governing land size, which put restrictions on having land of less than around 4 acres (Land Law, 2007). Most of the land belonging to landowners is inherited from their fathers and these plots are too small to be divided further. Although the Çiftçi family collectively possess around 300 acres of land, the size of the largest plot is only around 8 acres. Therefore, under the law, if they cannot divided their land into three. The second reason is that factories prefer working with bigger farmers as contracting farms, which is very common in tomato production. The general manager of the factory in which I worked explained his reason for choosing bigger farmers for contract farming by stating:

> 'We cannot spend time contacting every farmer. We have to watch the quality of our products while they are growing; we have to intervene if something extra is needed such as fertilisers. So, we prefer to work with a small numbers of farmers if it is contract farming.' (Fieldwork notes, 18 September 2014)

Apparently, in order to obtain their raw material by working with a small numbers of farmers, they prefer to work with bigger farmers. Not being able to divide their land indirectly causes families to live in the same building because everybody wants to observe and thus to control each other's spending habits.

Thus, nobody can move out of the building, nobody will let each other go, and nobody is ‘free’ because they have too much money.

6.3.1.1. ‘A Man like a Man’ Controls the Budget

To illustrate the structure of the landowners’ extended family, imagine that you are one of the children in the youngest generation: your elementary family lives in the same building as your great-grandfather and great-grandmother, your grandfather and grandmother, your father’s paternal uncle and his wife, your father’s paternal cousins’ nuclear families and your paternal uncle’s family (for instance, imagine that you are Gamze, 18, see diagram 6.1 on page 243). When Gamze enters the building where her home is, she encounters three flats. She lives in one of them with her parents, siblings and paternal grandmother, and her uncles’ families live next door. Those I worked with on the land (the third and forth generations) are not in a literal sense the owners of the land, since their fathers (the second generation) - and indeed their fathers’ father - are still alive, and the land is in their names. However, their fathers no longer work or supervise the work, so in this text, I refer to the third generation male members of the family who are managing the work as the landowning family - two of them are brothers and the other is their paternal cousin. Their properties, work and hence their budget are shared. Nine people are working and nineteen people are dependent on the money generated by the profits of the farm on which those nine people work, including 4 women. Six of the nine are in the third generation of the family (between the ages of 30 and 40) and three of them are in the fourth generation (aged 16-18). Unsurprisingly, distribution of resources, as well as control over and access to money, always create tension within the family, particularly among the women. Their direct access to money is limited, since the oldest man of the third generation, Recep, controls the majority of the money. The women complain about not being able to take decisions over how to spend what they see as their own earnings. All of the brides agree that being part of the richest family in the village does not benefit them as individuals since they are not able to do what they desire.

> ‘I cannot buy a carpet for my house due to our joint budget. Everything in these houses is purchased as three. If I need a carpet, then I should wait until they also need one, or even if they do not need one, we also have to buy one for each other. I remember when I first married Recai; one day when he went to the town, he bought me some pantolon (trousers) as a gift. Then, my mother-in-law saw them and she did not give permission for me to wear them because of the risk of being seen by the other brides with my new trousers. Can you believe it? Recai also cannot buy himself even ‘rubbish’ that is different from the others, but at least he can go out, and he can spend money. We want money to buy some clothes or home stuff, but we cannot use it even for this. So, why do we have money?’ (Nezahat, Fieldwork notes, 14 May 2013, on the tomato land)

These problems are more serious for the women than the men. This is because the men have more access to pocket money and more freedom to spend it. That being the case, in the household in question, Recep (the oldest male of the third generation) controls the budget and decides how much money he will give to others. Recai, the youngest of the three male brothers in the third generation, explains the reason for Recep's financial control as follows:

> ‘Of course, I would prefer to have my own money in my hand. I still have to ask for money from my brother, it sounds strange doesn’t it? I have three children but I am still asking for pocket money. But,

> Emine [me, the researcher], it must be like this. We need someone to manage all of us. Otherwise, we cannot live together. Recep *abim* (my elder brother) was born to manage. He knows when he should be harsh or soft. It is difficult to have this balance. I am not that kind of person; I am a softie. But, you should not be, especially towards women and children, as they begin to exploit your softness.' (Recai, Fieldwork notes, 24 August 2013, on the tomato land)

Recai (see Diagram 6.1 on page 243) is the youngest male of the third generation of the landowning family, and he had a disability. 'His disability makes him very emotional', says Fatma (Recep's wife). According to her, after the motorcycle accident that disabled him, he became more reserved and emotional, making him incapable of governing. 'Also', she added, 'they [implying Nezahat and Recai] do not have any sons but three girls. This also makes them unwilling to work harder or to be more active in the family. They don't have anybody to give their wealth to'. (Fatma, Fieldwork notes, 04 May 2013, on the tomato land). Fatma enjoys being the boss's wife. She is the oldest bride, her husband controls all the money and properties and her sons are older than Nurhan's son. Hence, unsurprisingly, she exerts control over her *eltiler* (Nurhan and Nezahat), as well as their husbands (Recai and Halil Ibrahim).

She says, 'fortunately, my man [implying her husband, Recep] is a *man like a man*'– '*adam gibi adam*' – which is a very common expression used to refer a man who meets the requirements of masculine strength in society. In this case, she used it to say that he is not diffident in his oversight of the budget and the other family members, this being seen as a sign of masculinity.

> 'I cannot stand a diffident man. I was the most beautiful girl in our village. I had many *kısmet* ['kısmet' refers to suitors wishing to

> marry a woman. This man is her ‘kısmet’]. My mother was a very smart woman. When my *kaynana* came to our house to ask for me to marry Recep, my mother asked her whether Recep went out for men’s coffee, which age he began driving a tractor, does he know how to spend money, and could he elope with me. As my father did not have enough money to pay my ‘*çeyiz*’ (dowry), so my parents asked me to elope with him. They seemed to be offended for a time. Since *el âlem* could condemn them if they hadn’t acted as if they were cross with me. Sometimes, I remembered and got angry with my family when Recep told me that my family got rid of me. But I know that they didn’t have any other choice; we were 6 siblings and brothers, they needed money for my brothers’ weddings. I frequently get angry with Recep, but I always tell him that he is my man. Others [in the family] also married by eloping [implying other couples – Nurhan-Halil Ibrahim, Nezahat- Recai], but Recep and me organised everything. If we wouldn’t have been, they could not manage to do it’. (Fatma, Fieldwork notes, 12 May 2013, in the shuttle)

Fatma’s above statement about the elopement shows us the flexibility of patriarchy as well as of *el âlem.* Her family had to pretend to disapprove of her elopement so as not to be shamed by *el âlem,* but in reality this was what they wanted, in order to save themselves from a bigger shame - the inability to make a proper wedding for their sons. This shows us how people have the chance to negotiate with *el âlem* as well as patriarchy.

6.3.1.2. The extra man of the family: A man-like elti

Not only did Fatma think that Recep was the ‘man’ of family, but so did her *eltileri* (Nezahat and Nurhan). They called him *abi* (elder brother). The following comment of Nurhan's indirectly answers Pahl’s (1989; 1995) question about whether an individual who contributes more money to the household also has more power when it comes to making household decisions:

> ‘I got angry with him [Recep] too many times as he is spending more on his family, but God knows that Halil Ibrahim [her husband] can’t do what he is doing. He makes agreements with buyers, he finds the lands to rent or buy, and he follows the new seeds or machines. Ours [implying her husband and Nezahat’s] can’t talk too much. That is why Fatma speaks so much [implying her authority over other family members]. I tell Halil Ibrahim [her husband] to talk a bit more as I can speak as much as he speaks.’ (Nurhan, 16 August 2013, in her home)

As Recep is the one who brings the money-making opportunities to the household table, he and his wife can talk a lot. Besides her talkativeness, Fatma even drives a car sometimes. Although driving a tractor is common among local women in the village when the work requires it, driving a car is seen as exceptional. The village's *el âlem* would have it that ‘men drive a car but rural women cannot drive since this carries a danger of being labelled as a ‘socialite’’. *Sosyete* is a commonly used term in rural Turkey which pokes fun at someone who acts like an‘urban’ person, and the term is often especially applied to women. Examples of behaviours that might attract the label *sosyete*, include driving, and wearing sunglasses or a large summer hat. However, Fatma was permitted to drive the car until she reached the edge of the village. Sometimes she had to bring women back from the land when they had travelled a long distance to the fields, and on those days she drove the car to near the edge of the village, and a man from the family or among the workers would come to pick us up from there. She explained to me that ‘she couldn’t pass by the men’s *kahve* – coffeehouse – driving a car since this would be going against *el âlem*’.

Although she can’t enter the village driving a car, this does not prevent her from being labelled a ‘woman who is like a man’ by workers. Fatma enjoys these kinds of comments. When they say that Fatma is a ‘woman like a man’, they always add *Maşallah* at the end of their sentences. *Maşallah* is used to invoke protection from the ‘evil eye’. The idiom of ‘woman like a man’ can be both something to be appreciated, as in this case, or a term of opprobrium, when it is used for instance by Fatma’s *eltileri* and *kaynanana*. This demonstrates the contradictions of patriarchy very clearly. In contradistinction to outsiders, other female members of the family are clearly not happy with having a ‘man-like’ *elti* or ‘daughter-in-law’. Nurhan explained her reason to me by saying that they already have enough men and so do not need more; ‘a woman must know her womanhood’ (‘*kadın kadınlığını bilmeli*’, which means that a woman should act like a woman).

There is constant tension between Nurhan and Fatma, and it is not only because Fatma sometimes can be a ‘man-like’ woman. It is also because Nurhan is seen as the luckiest by her sisters-in-law since her husband has no brothers, so in the end her elementary family will have half of the landowning family’s properties while the other two brides’ elementary families will have to share the other half, since their husbands are brothers. Indeed, Recep and Recai were brothers, and Halil Ibrahim is their *amcaoğlu* – uncle’s son. However, because of the young age of the senior men – Halil Ibrahim's father and the father of Recep and Recai (see diagram 6.1) – the prospect of sharing the inheritance in the future is still a source of problems inside the home. As Nurhan told me ‘they (the other two brides) do not like her since Halil Ibrahim (her husband) will have more land than them’. On the land, it is possible to see that the advantageous position of Nurhan has already created polarisation between her and the other wives. While they are working, one can see that Fatma and Nezahat always work side by side and at the same speed so they can continue to talk to each other, although they criticize each other's attitudes towards the workers. Fatma and Nezahat become one group when Nurhan is also on the land. Although Nurhan is Fatma's cousin (her mother's sister's daughter) – Fatma married Recep and she introduced Nurhan to Halil Ibrahim (Recep's *amcaoğlu*) –, this does not seem to be enough to prevent Nurhan's loneliness on the land, so she finds her own solution: she forges a coalition with her daughter, who also works on the land.

The fact that Gamze (18), the daughter of Nurhan and Halil Ibrahim, works on the land highlights the current money sharing problems inside the extended family. Gamze and her brother, Mustafa (16), both work on the land. Mustafa is responsible for driving tractors, collecting workers, bringing water and so on. This means that from Nurhan's family, four people are working. Three of Fatma's family and two of Nezahat's are also working. Since they divide all the profits by three, the unbalanced number of people working from each family creates tension. Nurhan says that,

> 'Edanur [Fatma's 19 year old daughter] is studying and mine is working on the land like a worker. We are paying for Edanur's education. Does it make sense to you? We are four, and Nezahat's are just two, but we have the same amount of money to spend. When the children were small, it was easy. But, now it is really difficult. Edanur (19) is going to do a university course. Who pays? We are paying. Now, the children have begun arguing with each other because of the unfairness. Tarik [Fatma's son] spends money like crazy. He smokes; he spends too much money buying phone credits. Who is earning money for his phone credits? They are earning less than us, but spending more than us. Do you think it is fair?' (Nurhan, Fieldwork notes, 19 September 2013, in my grandmother's garden)

Nurhan is not the only one who thinks that the other elementary families spend more than hers. Nezahat also complains that the others' children are grown up so their expenses are higher than those of her own three small children. Fatma, on the other hand, believes that they are more hardworking as a family, so even though there are three of them, they work more than the others.

> 'You can see how Gamze works, but she still counts as working. She hates working; she is always talking on her phone. She is always sick because of the heat. Sometimes, it is better not having her since when the workers see her laziness they also slow down their work. But they still continue to complain about Eda's education expenses.' (Fatma, Fieldwork notes, 27 September 2013, in her home)

While the *eltiler* do not get on well with each other, when money sharing comes to the table, thinking about their mothers-in-law can lead them to share the same feelings very easily.

6.3.1.3. 'Mothers-in-Law as Cooks and Fashion Designer'

All three wives of the third-generational men in the landowning family have a mother-in-law in their section of the house, and none of them are happy with the situation. As such, while they can gossip about each other and how they spend money in secret, when the subject of the difficulty of living with their mothers-in-law arises, they band together. The main responsibility of their mothers-in-law (two of them since the older one cannot cook because of her age) is cooking while their daughters-in-law work on the land. Although the landowning family have money enough to pay for domestic servants, there is no tradition of having domestic servants in the region. This does not even enter into people's minds as *el âlem* cannot countenance that a proper rural woman needs a servant. For this reason, female family members, including those of the fourth generation, are responsible for carrying out the domestic work. While cleaning is the task of brides, cooking is the mothers-in-law's task. Daughters are responsible for helping both their mothers and grandmothers, and are not assigned an exact task. Although the brides are mostly dissatisfied with the cooking of their mothers-in-law, the main reason for arguing with them is, of course, again related to money. The mothers-in-law are in a position to spend money more freely than their daughters-in-law, since they can go to the market every week on Tuesdays to shop for the home and for themselves. This shopping is the most popular topic of conversation on the land on Wednesdays for the women from the landowning families.

> 'She makes me crazy [referring to her mother-in-law]. Yesterday, she bought a bracelet as a present for my sister's daughter's wedding. You should see it. It is not 'heavy' [the value of a gold bracelet depends on its weight] but she bought a 20 gr. bracelet for her sister's son's wedding. She also bought a dress for herself for the wedding. You should see it; it is like a girl's dress. It is almost a vivid blue. How old is she? She competes with me. I have the same colour dress for this wedding. I argued with Recep all night. I do not want this bracelet for my niece; he has to buy a new one! [she wants to buy a more valuable bracelet for her niece as a wedding gift]'. (Fatma, Fieldwork notes, 14 September 2015, in her home)

The weight of gold bracelets, which are given as gifts at weddings or worn by women themselves to the weddings or *Eid*s, is a sign of their status in the eyes of *el âlem*. More gold jewellery makes them more prestigious in the village or even in the region. Fatma and her other *eltileri* are very proud of the fame they garner for their gold jewellery. Nezahat told me this indirectly as an explanation for my own supposed distaste for attending wedding ceremonies; she told me that as I [me, the researcher] don’t have any gold jewellery, it cannot be enjoyable for me to attend a wedding ceremony. Women dress up for weddings or *Eid*s, and this involves putting on gold jewellery in addition to heavy make up and fancy hairstyles. Nezahat told me that she began to enjoy wedding ceremonies and *Eid*s after she married Recai, as now she can dress up, whereas before, she told me, without money, how could she?

All the brides of the family therefore love putting on gold jewellery for another reason: it is also what their mothers-in-law want. In this way, they are able to make *el âlem* both ‘jealous’ and ‘approving’ (the latter in virtue of *el âlem*'s strict ordinances on the role of brides’ heavily-adorned bodies as a source of familial pride through the conspicuous display of wealth). When Aysel [Fatma’s and Nezahat’s *kaynana*] spoke to me after my engagement, she despaired at my lack of gold jewellery. She told me, ‘I am so sorry for your mother-in-law, how can she feel that she has a bride if you don’t put any gold on you? I will stop complaining about my brides. They will wear whatever I want.’ (Fieldwork notes, 2 September 2013). She is quite right when she states that all wives and their daughters in the family wear what their mothers-in-law approve of, taking into consideration what is permitted by *el âlem.* Putting on gold jewellery and avoiding trousers or mini-skirts are the main dress codes for brides; daughters need only avoid mini-skirts. Brides’ putting on of gold jewellery is also a way of showing off the wealth of their family.

Although brides are also happy with this practice, their struggles with their mothers-in-law still come to the fore when control over money arises. While sometimes the reason for arguments can be over something as valuable as gold, sometimes it could just be over coffee. However, the gravity of such disputes is similar.

> ‘How old am I? I am almost a mother-in-law, but still my mother-in-law buys coffee for me. I told her to buy Nescafe to make a dessert for my guest. I found a new recipe and I wanted to try it, but no. She didn’t buy it. Why? Since it is expensive she said. We are the richest family in the village but I cannot make a dessert with Nescafé. But, my mother-in-law continuously gives money to her daughters. I am working and her daughters eat desserts with Nescafé. I told Halil, I am not making desserts at home anymore.’ (Nurhan, Fieldwork notes, 15 August 2013, in her house)

Nurhan’s resistance to making desserts did not last long since Halil Ibrahim (her husband) bought the Nescafé and appeased her, but the brides’ resistance to their mothers-in-law seems to persist as long as they live together. This might be because, as Nezahat says:

> ‘I don’t know anyone who likes her daughter-in-law or vice versa. It can’t be a coincidence. I even hate my mother-in-law’s clothes; can you believe it? Sometimes, when I think about it, I feel guilty. Since it is ‘sin’ to hate someone older than you. Maybe, if we could live separately, I could like her. But, now we are always on opposite sides. We always have different ideas for everything. She is old and the world is not like it was in her time anymore. But she still wants us to behave like them. We have one house and it is my house. But she thinks that it is her house. So, problems are inevitable and we always have tension. Recai says that we cannot live separately from each other since we are powerful when we are together. This is the rule of nature. Look at animals, he says to me, they are not separated from each other; otherwise they die. God creates all people to live

> with their extended family, he says to me, to survive. I don’t know, I am looking at others who are separate and they seem to me happier than us. Even Kurds do not work and live with their *amcaoğlu,* just with their brothers. Even they seem to me more modern than us.’ (07 May 2013, on the tomato land)

Nezahat is right that the extended family structure of Kurdish seasonal migrants is smaller than hers since it consists of only three generations, but she is wrong to say that they do not work and live with their cousins, since they are already married to them. And, as I discuss below, Kurdish women’s resistance is more constrained by the authority of men and mothers-in-law than is the case for the women in landowning families.


GANGMASTER'S (OSMAN) FAMILY
SEHMUZ + MERYEM
(M, 68 ,H) (F, 65, H)
YAHYA + ZARIFE
(M,48,W) (F,44,W)
ALI (M,8)
SEHMUZ
(M,6)
YASAR + HATICE
(M,44,W) (F,33,W)
HEVAL (S,16,W)
Mehmet (S,12,W)
GULBEYAZ
(S,11)
HAMZA
(S,7)
KADRIYE + SEHMUZ
(both 40s)
HUSEYIN
(20,W)
ROJDA
(S,15,W)
HAMIT
(S,11)
ZEYNEP
(S,7)
OSMAN + MELEK
(30s) (F, 28)
MERYEM
(F,8)
HASIBE (F,7)
ELIF
(F,5)
BEYZA
(F,2)
ALI SEHMUZ
(NEWBORN)
RAMAZAN+ ELIF
(M,22,W) (19,W)
SEHMUZ
(A
YEAR)
MEKKE
(NEWBORN)
SONGUL
(F,25,W)
DIVORCED IN PLANTING TIME + REMARRIED IN MY VISIT TO THEIR HOMETOWNS

Diagram 6.2: Dayıbaşı's family

6.3.2. ‘Patriarchy’ as We All Know It! The ‘Patriarchal Homes’ of Kurdish Seasonal Migrants

This section revisits the ‘classical form’ of patriarchy, which is defined by Kandiyoti (1988) as a senior man’s authority over women and younger men. However, ‘senior man’ is too ‘sacred’ and ‘respectful’ a figure to comment on the operation of ‘daily life’ in the household. Therefore, the ‘senior man’ – who could be a father-in-law, father or husband – is ‘invisible’ in the daily life, conversations and discussions of the extended family; he is the ‘God’ of the family; his rules are known by everyone so he doesn’t need to repeat them. Repeating the rules may be seen as a sign of weakness in his authority as it would indicate that his words are not valuable enough to follow on first utterance. Hence, senior women (mothers-in-law or mothers) and the sons of the family (husbands/brothers) enforce the rules on daughters-in-law or daughters. Therefore, in the following analysis of how masculine control is practised over women, the reader will barely see ‘senior men’, but more often ‘mothers-in-law’, husbands or brothers. Here, the difference between classic patriarchy and village patriarchy is that in the former the assumed wishes of the ‘senior man’ is the family members’ reference point, rather than the more generalised *el âlem* that determines their ideas about proper behaviour.

The following section consists of two parts. In the first part, I introduce the shanties that Kurdish migrant workers live in during tomato planting and harvest, and in the second part I explore their permanent homes located around 2000 km away. While the first part shows how kin marriage organises the division of labour, in the second part, I reveal the operation of ‘extended patriarchal households’ and reproduction of labour power. We will see that through kin marriage, women's productive and reproductive labour are controlled very strictly in Kurdish workers' families.

6.3.2.1. 'Making Tandır for your Elti: Kurdish Seasonal Migrants' Shacks in the Gardens of Landowners' Families

As discussed in chapter 4, the seasonal work lasts for around six months. Some of migrant workers do not return to their 'homes', but instead continue to travel around the western parts of Turkey for other seasonal rural work. Elif is relatively lucky, since at least she can imagine returning to her home when the tomato-growing season finishes after six months of heavy work. She arrives at the workplace with her extended family, which consists of her husband, his five siblings and their spouses and children (see above diagram 6.2 in page 259). They travel together from their hometown by coach for almost two days - the image seen in figure 6.1 shows the distance as the crow flies. When they arrive at the workplace, some shacks are offered to them by the landowners – a shack is the best option for Kurdish seasonal workers[85]. Fortunately, Elif's family was allocated a shack, but most seasonal migrant workers are only offered tents. Usually they do not have proper toilet and bathroom facilities; there are no white goods in the accommodation, and not enough rooms for each elementary family. These living conditions and photographs of Kurdish migrants are very popular subjects in the summer issues of leftist Turkish newspapers[86]; there is an awareness that they are 'living' in those horrible conditions but the public do not have a clue about 'how' they 'live' in those conditions, which this chapter talks about. Unsurprisingly when we enter the shacks, we encounter a 'crowd', again like in the landowning families' homes.

---

[85] See Küçükkırca, 2015 for the housing conditions of Kurdish seasonal workers across Turkey.

[86] When some of the other workers around the region (not those I worked with during the season) saw me on the tomato fields, they complained about the newspapers' photographers who continually took photos of them. One of them asked, 'Do you also have a camera? I do not know how many photos they took of our children. We are too famous. Don't talk with me if you will take photos.'

These crowded Kurdish family premises are needed in order for the tomatoes to be picked. When we think about the difficult working conditions, the long working hours and the group performance-based payment system during tomato picking time, it becomes clear that landowners require a large workforce that can work collectively and share the money they earn depending on the number of unblemished tomatoes they pick during the day. The landowners also need workers who can work very long hours since the tomatoes should be picked as soon as possible so that they do not become rotten as a result of the heat or possibly rain later in the season. The Kurdish migrants can supply this labour thanks to their extended families. Thus, in Turkey, rural landowners draw most of their employees from Kurdish seasonal migrant workers and capitalize on the features of their extended patriarchal families.

Kurdish seasonal workers come to the workplace as large extended families. They are three-generation patrilineal families that also include daughters-in-law as part of the family (all couples are first cousins). Fortunately – in the women's words – their mothers-in-law and fathers-in-law stay in their hometowns. Apparently, the mothers-in-law of Kurdish women workers are in a more privileged position than their daughters-in-law, so the mother-in-law does not stay in the shacks, but in her 'proper home', waiting for 'money' to go on a pilgrimage. As such, not surprisingly, every woman is waiting to become a mother-in-law so that she does not need to do any work either on the land or at home.

> 'To send them on a pilgrimage, we will give them almost 80% of our earnings from this year. I told Osman (her husband), we are poor; going on a pilgrimage is not an obligation for us. But he called me 'profane'. Do you think I am wrong?' (Melek, Fieldwork notes, 22 September 2014, in the shacks)

Unfortunately, my agreement with Melek will not help her; she has to continue to cook for 13 people during picking time, wash their clothes by hand and take care of the children while her *eltileri* are working on the land with the male members of the family. In the case of Kurdish extended families, since all of the money goes directly to the grandparents, not to the brides' husbands, the brides do not argue with each other over money sharing. Their fights are more about who works the most. This discussion, unsurprisingly, centres on the division between those working in the shacks and those working on the land.

> 'Every morning, I make tea before everyone wakes up. The men want to drink tea before going to the land. In the meantime, I also get their lunch bags ready. Since it is too early, they do not eat breakfast here. I also put their breakfast into bags. When the men also work on the land with women in the picking season, it is more difficult: they want better food. It takes me longer to prepare. They want more than one course. In planting time, our job is easier because they eat their lunch with the landowners. Now, they continuously complain about the quality of the food. After the workers have left for the land, I prepare breakfast again [this time] for the children. When breakfast time finishes, I begin to wash clothes. There are always clothes to wash, so I do not try to finish them. I just wash until lunchtime and then I feed the children, wash the dishes and begin to cook for the night. I cook a lot, so we can take the next day's lunch from it. I also cook some extra food like kısır – bulgur salad – because sometimes the work on the land can be longer. So, they need extra. Then, if we do not have tomatoes to make a purée, I make tandır – a special kind of bread. Making tandır is the most difficult part of my work. *Tandır* is very important; it is like 'water' for us'. If it is not good, everyone has the right to complain about my cooking.' (Melek, Fieldwork notes, 24 September 2014, in the shacks)

The above is a typical day for Melek and her *eltileri*. She is the luckiest among them since she is not working on the land. Why it is she who stays at home is unclear. It is very difficult to answer this exactly because of the women's perplexing answers. According to Melek, she is at home because it is more prestigious than working on the land and she is the wife of a *dayıbaşı*. However, she has to keep complaining about the difficulty of staying at home and doing domestic tasks since it is not given as much value as working outside. On the other hand, according to the other brides, Melek has to stay at home because she has problems with her husband's sister so they create tension on the land together and Osman (*dayıbaşı*) thinks that the squabbles between these women will cause their work, and that of the other workers, to slow down.

Aside from the ambiguous reasons given for Melek staying at home, it makes it possible for the others to work very long hours, and she insists on emphasizing this. However, her intentions of making a contribution to the family are not sufficient for her *eltileri* to see her domestic work as work, and that's why their arguments are inevitable.

> 'We are not talking with Elif for a week. She is crazy; she wants me to bath Şehmuz [Elif's nine- month old baby] everyday. Do you think it is reasonable? You can see our shacks. How can I bath all of the children everyday? I know that she is doing it when she is at home, but then she does not have enough time to cook tomorrow's lunch properly. She told me that I am escaping from work. You see how I am working all day and doing their work. Do you think that it is easy to do housework here? We don't have a kitchen for cooking [they cook on the garden stove], we don't have a bathroom. I am bathing the children in the garden in the basin, but she is still not satisfied with my work. What can I do?' (Melek, Fieldwork notes, 26 September 2013, in the shacks)

It is difficult not to agree with her about the problems of doing housework in the shacks. One day I helped her:

> Today, I [me, researcher] stayed at home because of my eye infection. Before and after I went to hospital in the town, I went to help Melek wash the clothes; since their washing machine has broken down again she called me for help. We washed endless clothes in the heat in the garden. My hands got creased because of the water. But I continued since she has too much work to do. For example, she is taking care of the children. Others bring some of the children with them to the land. Every day the number of children at home is changing, Melek says to me. They are all ages and I think they are in danger. All of them are playing with whatever they find around, including a knife as I saw today, or the small ones are eating whatever they find. The sewage pipes, which are behind the shacks, have just broken down and they were playing around them. Melek cannot take care of them alone; it is not possible. When the others come, they do not ask about the child-care, she told me, but food. So she has to pay more attention to cooking than watching the children, she says to me. What she has done at home is crazy but still the others do not recognise it and she is continuously arguing with her 'eltis'. It is strange when I also think about the fact that they are also relatives of each other. Melek told me that if they were not relatives, they could not live together in those conditions even for a minute. She told me that 'I can even bear my 'sister' only with difficulty, [they are not literallys sister but cousins], how could I stand a 'foreigner'. (Fieldwork diary, 29 August 2013)

What Melek says about kinship relations between her and her *eltis* is very similar to what the male members of the families say regarding the legitimization of kin marriage. In this extended family, there is no 'bride' that is not connected with a husband through kinship relations before marriage. They mainly give two reasons for this kind of marriage: the first one is to protect your family's power over other families in the region, and the second one is that other members of the family, who are already connected through kinship, can isolate a ‘stranger bride’.

Huseyin is the father of Emine who loves Remzi, who does not have any kinship relation with Emine. The answer Huseyin gave below was to explain why he is against Emine and Remzi’s marriage and why he insists on forcing Emine to marry his brother’s son (Emine’s *amcaoğlu*).

> ‘I am not saying that you do it ‘wrong’ [implying people who do not make kin-marriages] but we do the ‘right’ thing. I don’t know how you can trust a ‘foreigner’. When you already have people around you, why look for someone who you have not known for your whole life? You don’t know anything about his life, his parents, his siblings etc. I don’t give my daughter to a stranger and I don’t want a daughter-in-law whose parents I don’t know. How we can live with a ‘stranger’? Then, our grandchildren cannot be totally from our blood[87]. Then, our family will break down; it will be separated. God knows the right thing for us and he does not punish kin-marriage. So, how can ordinary people claim that they know better than God? Don’t be offended but I saw you when you hugged your *amcaoğlu*[88] [my paternal uncle’s son]. I could not believe how that is possible on the earth. You are entitled to marry even in our religion. But, I think it is not your fault, but your parents’. They should warn you about that. They should inform you about the rules of Islam. Don’t worry; it’s not you but your parents who will be punished for this, in the other world [implying after death]. *’* (Huseyin, Fieldwork notes, 30 September 2013, on the tomato land)

---

[87] The official statistic institute in Turkey (TÜİK, 2012) also supports my findings from the field with regard to the reasons for kin-based marriage. According to (TÜİK, 2012) 51.3 % of people in southeastern Anatolia who married with their kin state that they accept kin marriage because of knowing the familial roots of her/his partner. 19.1 % of the informants of the survey said that in kin marriages, the mother and father-in-law are more respected by bride and groom.

[88] The same report (TÜİK, 2012) shows that in southeastern Anatolia 29.3 % of women who married their kin married their *amcaoğlu*. This is the biggest category of marriages between kinfolk.

While Huseyin is a fervent advocate of the necessity of kin marriage because of the rules of Islam, not all men are so rigid about this.

> ‘I fell in love once when I was in the military. She was working in the hospital and while on duty I had serious stomach problems and stayed in the hospital for a week. We met there and continued to meet for a year during my military service. I told her I would marry her. Of course, I had known that I could not because it was not possible for us to marry a “stranger”. But, I could not say that directly to her face, and I also tried my chance with my parents but of course they did not accept it. My mother told me, ‘if you marry her, that will be the worst thing in her life. How can she get on well with your family? How will she adapt to your life? No-one will talk to her, and she will always be “stranger”. If you move to town with her, then it will be a disaster for you. How can you work and live among the “strangers” ‘alone’. She was right. I gave up, called her and said that we could not marry. She told me, ‘I hope you cannot love your wife’. This is one of the worst curses to place on someone, isn’t it?’ (Osman, Fieldwork notes, 22 August 2013, on the tomato land)

It is difficult to say whether Osman loves his current wife, Melek. She is his paternal cousin, but apparently for Osman, not marrying a “stranger” is a matter of ‘staying in his comfort zone’. He concluded by saying,

> ‘I did the right thing. These women do not even get on well even though they are relatives. I could not imagine them with a “stranger bride” in the same house. I know from my distant cousin who married a “stranger” that he had to move to another town since he could not continue to work with his brothers. Because other “brides” united and discriminated against his “stranger wife”. They didn’t help her.’ (22 August 2013, on the tomato land)

It became obvious what Osman was referring to when he said, ‘they did not help her’ Elif’s words when I asked her about her possible feelings towards being an *elti* with a ‘stranger’;

> ‘Melek is my ‘*abla*’ (elder sister), so I try to help her as much as I can. She has more children than me, so she has more work than me. So, in our homes [implying their hometowns] mostly I make *tandır*. I mostly look after our elders [their mother and father-in law] we arrange the division of our work mostly in favour of Melek and Zarife [her other *elti*] since they are older than me. I am like their sister. I have known them since I knew myself. We grew up together. Although we have disputes sometimes, you know ‘you cannot spare your nail from your finger’ [Common idiom: ‘et ile tirnak birbirinden ayrilmaz’]. But, I don’t know about some ‘stranger’. I could not do most of the things that I should do for my own people [implying her related *eltileri*]. Also, I think they would not behave towards me as they behave towards their people.’ (Fieldwork notes, 29 September 2013, on the tomato land)

Apparently, the Kurdish seasonal migrant workers who pick Recep’s tomatoes see their extended patriarchal family based on kin marriages as the only way to sustain their lifestyle and family solidarity. So, it is possible to say that tomatoes can only be picked when a Kurdish woman makes a *tandır* in the shack of a Turkish landowner, in order for her *elti* to send their parents-in-law on a pilgrimage or to do another thing that is ‘possibly’ one of the biggest desires of their life.

6.3.2.2. Sending ‘Kaynana’ on a Pilgrimage or Building new Homes to be Separate from an Extended Family?: The ‘Real Home’ of Kurdish Seasonal Workers

If we only look at women’s shacks in order to get to know Kurdish women and hence their motivations to sustain these working and living conditions, we would fail to see their picture fully. In order to understand the social actors of tomato production we need to know their homes, so this study followed Kurdish families to their hometowns to see their 'actual' homes.

> When I first saw the village from a distance, I was quite surprised by its appearance; it included lots of new houses, extensions and houses under construction, which was contrary to my expectations. The construction is also continuing in *Yasar* abi's current house's roof to add an additional floor of the house for a new apartment. This new extension dominates all of our conversations. How it should be, how it will be. We went to the construction site twice today with Hatice abla (elder sister), she talked to me about her plans in detail and asked me about my opinions about the shapes and sizes of the rooms. Now they have just two rooms in the home, one for her four children and one for Hatice and Yasar. In the new plan, they will have four rooms and a kitchen and a bathroom, which is now outside the house and also has the toilet facilities. The kitchen is also very small now, but it will be huge, she told me. Hatice kept saying that they will also buy sofas and bed frames like in our homes and next time, when we come, we will have comfort, she told me. I told her that sitting on mats is also fine; I like it. But she insisted on saying that every proper home should have sofas like 'our' houses [implying the houses in the village where they work] (Fieldwork diary, 05 March 2014, in workers' hometown, Mardin)

During my time in the village, I came to understand that building a new house and having a sofa is the goal of almost all of the women. Building a new house has two phases: in the first phase, a young couple with small children build a small house for themselves so as to live separately from their extended family; then, when their children get bigger and are close to marriage (sons), they build another bigger flat, mostly on top of their current house, which is also the case for Yasar and Hatice, and they create their own three generational extended household through their sons' marriages. Construction is continuous in the village, mostly with the money from the seasonal work they do during the summer in the western part of Turkey.

However, for recently married younger couples, building a separate home away from the groom's parents is still only a dream, at least for daughters-in-law. While they are saving their money to build a separate house for themselves, they also have to give most of their money to their mother and father-in-law. Consequently, separating from the elders takes ages and until they leave the 'extended family house', not surprisingly, daughters-in-law are responsible for all of the housework, including cooking, cleaning, taking care of the elderly and children. Moreover, they grow plants in the garden of their homes for household consumption and rear animals to sell. In the case of the group that I worked with, Elif and Melek live with their husbands' parents and wait for the time when they will be free from work. So, every penny they give to send their mother and father-in-law on a pilgrimage takes them further from their dream. Thus, the possibility of a good relationship between daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law is erased as the labour of the daughter-in-law pays for the mother-in-law's dream.

As I heard so many daughters-in-law's stories about their heartless mothers-in-law during my fieldwork on the land, I became more anxious about meeting with the mothers-in-law in their hometown. However, during my time in the their hometowns, I understood that these people strike a temporal balance regarding who is paying for whose dream. In other words, daughters-in-law know that first they should pay for their mother-in-law's dreams as their mother-in-law has already paid for her mother-in-law's dream. Paying for your mother-in-law's dreams is the only way to become a mother-in-law and consequently find someone to pay for your own dreams. When I met their mother-in-law, she saw me and kissed me on my forehead, which implies a blessing from her. This surprised me because of the stories I had heard about her from her daughter-in-law on the land, which had given me a colder impression of her. During my time at their home, I spent a lot of time with her since she is responsible for entertaining guests because of her old age. Apparently, it is not proper to spend time with youngsters when elders are at home. She continuously gives orders to Elif and Melek (since they are the youngest brides and live in the same household as their mothers-in-law). This made me very uncomfortable because she literally did not do anything.

As Kandiyoti (1988) points out, in the extended patriarchal family, since all daughters-in-law know that they will become a mother-in-law in the future, the power relations between a mother-in-law and a daughter-in-law can persist. However, the reason that this relationship reminds me of that between landowners and workers, could be related to the understanding of power. Neither brides nor workers take issue against the authority itself, but they are against its usage over them. They do not have problems with the existence of 'authority' but they only do not wish to be the 'subject' of it, rather they want to be an 'agent' of it. 'Power' is embedded in the situations in which people are positioned as workers or landowners or as mothers-in-law or daughters-in-law. As people shift their positions, power shifts and this shifting makes it durable as everyone has an interest in maintaining the system because they all benefit at some point. In the case of the relationship between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law, tension does not prevent them from building 'closer' relationships than that of workers and landowners, as 'brides' are sure to have power in the future and giving birth to a male child is vital to strengthen their hand in their struggle.

From the time I spent in the homes of Kurdish seasonal women workers, I came to understand that ‘freedom’ is a contentious and delicate ‘thing’, and it is quite difficult to pin down in ‘reality’. These women told me that only having many ‘sons’ and living in a separate home could bring them freedom. When being a *kaynana* is the only way of being ‘free’, ‘sons’ become the most important figures for women. They see ‘sons’ as the guarantee of their future well-being. Although ‘sons’ are also important for men – as a son brings his father recognition and prestige in the family – the relationship between a mother and her son is closer. White (2004), in her study of urban women’s employment in Turkey, highlighted that ‘sons’ in the patriarchal family state feel themselves to be ‘kings’ due to their mothers’ attitudes towards and care of them. Sons in Elif’s extended family continue to be spoiled by their mothers. They do not worry about anything related to daily life, their mothers do and think of everything for them or they tell their daughters to do what needs to be done and to think only of their elder or younger brothers. Mothers create these ‘kings’ so that they can become ‘queens’ in the future. Therefore, they cannot stand hearing that their sons are not masculine ‘enough’.

> ‘I was surprised seeing how all the women think that their sons are aggressive, naughty, and strong. Today when we talked about Şehmuz [Elif’s nine month old son], I told her he was very calm. And, unbelievably, she became offended. She told me he was not calm but very aggressive most of the time. I should have seen him in the mornings. He even woke up angry. Not only Elif, but also other women try to compete by stating how aggressive their sons are. During the last days, when I told Kadriye that her younger son is calmer than her elder one, she also became offended and proudly told me that both of her boys are the most mischievous and strongest ones in the whole family. Her children beat all the other children, even those older than them. They are like a ‘the part of a flame’ [‘*ateş parçası’* is a commonly used expression

> to refer to naughty children in a positive way, see Appendix D for a detailed definition and usage of the idiom], she told me.' (Fieldwork diary, 16 September 2013, on the tomato land)

Having a son is not only a fulfilment of women's desires, but they must have a 'proper son' who is a 'go-getter', 'fighter', 'aggressive' like a 'part of a flame'. Kurdish men are not different in those desires and most of them see education as dampening those features that make 'real men'. Yasar told me that education makes the boys henpecked; there are only two occupations that his sons can be: solicitors or politicians. It is not surprising to see that they want their children to be solicitors or politicians as they also see these occupations as helping their 'freedom war'. 'We need solicitors or politicians. We don't need engineers, we should first save ourselves then we can make buildings', says Cumalı when I asked what he thought about the future of his children. They view their political struggle with the Turkish state as a 'battle', using the same words to refer to their sons' characteristics and those of Kurdish actors in Turkish politics. As Ramazan told me,

> 'Ours [implying the Kurdish politicians] are like part of a flame, Turks are henpecked except Erdoğan [current president of Turkey], that is why Kurds also vote for him. Even our women [implying Kurdish women politicians] are more men than Kılıçdaroğlu [the leader of the main opposition party in Turkey].' (9 March 2014, in workers' hometown, Mardin)

While men can only accept an educated son if he goes into a specific set of occupations due to the danger of losing his status as a 'proper man', women also do not desire their sons to pursue education in certain directions due to the 'danger' of acquiring a strange bride. Zeynep explained her fear to me after her son went to boarding school:

> ‘I am happy that my son is studying. I want him to save himself. But, you know, sometimes I have to think that if he meets an educated girl in the city, what can we do. If my daughter meets a ‘stranger’, it is not a problem for me. But, I don’t want to lose my sons.’ (Fieldwork notes, 29 August 2013, on the tomato land).

Although women have different concerns than men about having an educated son, they share the main concern that ‘educated sons’ can change the structure of the family. Zeynep put this concern into words, saying: ‘How can an educated bride live with us and work on the land? Then, I will lose my son!’

6.4. Conclusion: the Power of *El âlem*

In this chapter, I have tried to explain two forms of rural patriarchy through focusing on the intersecting relationship between kinship relations and production relations in agricultural tomato production. It consisted of three main sections. In the first section, I conceptualised the term *el âlem* as an empirical example of how intersectional patriarchy works. In the following sections, I examined two forms of rural patriarchy within the households of women who are involved in growing tomatoes on the land: the wives of landowners and Kurdish seasonal migrant workers. The conflicts in patriarchal households and the different ways in which women generate consent depend on the intersections of gender, class, ethnicity and age, some of which are generated in the labour process. This shows that patriarchy is variable and fluid, as well as sustains and is sustained by *el âlem*.

People can negotiate with *el âlem* to get what they want. For instance, Fatma’s family had forced her to elope with her husband to save themselves from her wedding expenses. They pretended to be offended, as they had to be according to *el* *âlem.* Or in the other example, we saw how Fatma’s driving has been approved, as it is required for work. Those examples do not simply tell us about the flexibility of patriarchy but they also tell us why people re-constitute it. It is negotiable and the extent of negotiation is the main reason why I identified two different patriarchal forms. Apparently, in the Kurdish families’ households women have less chance to negotiate. The chapter also demonstrates that there are two ways they exercise power - as wives and mothers of men and as postmenopausal ‘women’, and women are located in the hierarchy of masculinities also depending on these positions.

Chapter 7

‘Kemalist’ and ‘Transitional’ Patriarchies

7.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I discuss two further forms of patriarchal household structure which characterise the factory manager’s and the women factory workers’ homes, and which I identify as ‘Kemalist’ and ‘Transitional’ patriarchies. Kandiyoti (1995) has suggested that household structures that are neither extended (portrayed as traditional and rural) nor nuclear (portrayed as modern and urban) are assumed to be ‘transitional’. In this chapter, I conceptualise this as ‘transitional patriarchy’.

As the previous chapter, this chapter focuses on the interrelationship of production and reproduction relations, but in contradistinction to Chapter 6, we visit the town in which tomatoes are processed. We see that in the town, *el âlem* do not talk as much as they do in the villages, but patriarchy is still alive and continues to ‘govern’ femininity. Kemalist and Transitional patriarchies are different in terms of both their degree and kind (see Table 6.1 on page 241). While in Transitional patriarchy what *el âlem* says is still important in shaping people’s behaviour, in Kemalist patriarchy, living according to *el âlem* is a sign of being ‘backwards’. However, this does not mean that in Kemalist households there is no *el âlem*. *El alem* can still talk but about different issues, such as the necessity of being educated, and its volume is not as loud as in Transitional households. The chapter does not suggest that there is or will be a linear historical shift from transitional patriarchy to Kemalist patriarchy but that these patriarchies coexist in the same period of time in different households and are related to the organisation of tomato production.

The chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, we see the factory manager's 'Kemalist' household, the operation of which is recognisable based on the materials presented in Chapter 5. Then, we look at factory women workers' 'transitional' households. I call these households transitional as they include both a mother- and father-in-law in the village and a nuclear (most of the time) family in the town. Factory women have mostly migrated from the surrounding villages in the last ten years as a consequence of the capitalisation of Turkish agriculture (see Chapter 4). These women's husbands are emancipated from their extended patriarchal family and their familial structure is in transition from an extended to a nuclear one. Husbands' families' control over the newly separated nuclear families of the factory women is still visible, but more tenuous, so I term this form of patriarchy 'transitional patriarchy'. Besides, women are living in an actual 'transition' process during the factory work, as they have to go to their mothers-in-law's homes in the villages to see their children, who are looked after by the children's grandmothers. Here, I should note that I do not have any intention of saying that when the transition is completed, patriarchy will necessarily be diminished. Rather I would like to emphasise the blurring of boundaries between two households, one of them being the home of the father- and mother-in-law in the village and the other the factory women's 'nuclear' home in the town.

7.2. A Kemalist Factory Manager of a Kemalist Factory and his Kemalist Patriarchy

Before talking about the factory manager of 'Red' tomato-processing factory, I should remind the reader briefly about Kemalism and Kemalist patriarchy. As seen in Chapter 5, the founders of the factory, which is the biggest and oldest family business in Turkey, are ‘Kemalists’. It is little surprise that the factory manager is a member of this ‘imagined community’, which is considered to be a replacement for kinship relations in the ‘modern’ world (Anderson, 2006). Kemalists have a strong belief that ‘education’ will enable them to fulfil their aim of matching Western societies in terms of economy, science and political power. Therefore, uneducated and religious populations are seen as obstacles to the dream of becoming a modern, model westernised country. Kemalist ideology views women as an active participant in the process of development. Atatürk himself said that ‘a nation cannot be developed when half of its population are not free’ (1923).

As discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, although Kemalist ideology attempts to create ‘masculine women’, the gender division of labour does not vanish, and women continue doing their ‘womanly’ jobs in a more ‘manly’ fashion. Here I explore how the factory manager judges factory women as being physically weak, lazy, uneducated, prone to gossiping, and fond of vanity, etc. when comparing them with his ‘Kemalist’ wife. I do not argue that all factory women are educated or hate gossiping, but rather I assert that the factory manager dislikes the women as he thinks that they are not sufficiently like men.

Although his family also has a rural background and migrated to the city when he was of primary school age, he is willing to state without any hesitation that ‘peasants are lazy, ignorant (*cahil*), uneducated and religious’. In the following section, I discuss how the Kemalist patriarchal attitude of the factory manager relates to seeing ‘femininity’ as an enemy of ‘modernism’. Hopefully, this section will compliment the factory chapter, as we look at the same material but in more detail.

7.2.1. ‘No-one Puts Me in an Apartment with a Swimming Pool’: Factory Manager’s ‘Kemalist/Opponent’ Patriarchal Home

‘They are all working in this factory since they want to live in apartments without their in-laws’, the general factory manager (in his mid-40s) says of the women workers in Red factory. According to him, all of the women workers are obsessed with an urban lifestyle and the most important element of this is an apartment. I will look at those women’s homes in the next section, but in this one will try to understand the factory manager’s relationship with his own home and the relationships inside it.

I begin with a quotation from him about women’s homes, since he described and told me about his own home and familial relations while comparing them with those of the women workers. This strange, and - as one might easily argue - meaningless comparison seems to arise in his mind in order to justify his offensive attitudes towards women workers in the factory, especially those who work in the tomato sorting lines. When I asked about workers, it was these women he immediately began to talk about, not the educated young women who also work seasonally, or the warehouse workers. Apparently, in his mind the other two groups of workers do not belong to the category of ‘workers’, they are ‘students’ and ‘ours’, which is what he calls them. He sees the (sorting) workers as a group of ‘lazy, uneducated, ignorant, selfish, conservative and religious women’ and also, as we saw in chapter 5, in his ‘Kemalist’ mind they are representatives of the current conservative Turkish government and represent a corrupting influence on his ‘perfect western modernised country’. According to him, as for many opponents of the current government in

Turkey, the construction of ‘their disgusting buildings’ is one of the main elements of this corruption. So, he said,

> ‘They can’t put me in these apartments with swimming pools[89] ….. they cannot find people that know how to swim for their big ‘swimming pools’. They [implying here, the current Turkish government and their supporters] can just find women who continuously eat sunflower seeds on their swimming pool view balconies. Sorry, but my wife does not have that much spare time; she has more important things to do than gossiping about neighbours, her mother-in-law or *görümce* [her husband’s sister]. We don’t need to have a house with a big balcony or a swimming pool. We are working most of the time. Recently, our old friends from university came to visit us after a long time from another city and they were shocked to see that we were still living in the same house after so many years. They noticed that it does not have security guards at the entrance and they said, aren’t you afraid? I asked them, what would we be afraid of? Can you believe how people are going crazy? Why do you think they need security? Who are they? Everyone thinks that they and their children are the most precious people in the world. So, anyone can attack them at any time. I just laughed. What has this government done to these people? They build lots of houses to make money for themselves and they bring a ‘mortgage’ here, so it puts lots of debt on those people but nobody complains; they love them. They are crazy, this country all goes crazy.’ (16 September 2014)

The factory manager continues to contrast ‘those uneducated and lazy’ women workers of Red factory with his ‘educated and hardworking’ wife whom he met at university. He also underlines how his wife is different from the women workers by being ‘educated’, ‘independent’, ‘powerful’, not partaking in ‘womanly’ daily life activities or concerns, such as taking care of the home, ‘gossiping’, worrying about their mothers-in-law, and eating sunflower seeds on the balcony while gazing at the neighbours. His wife is like ‘him’: working all day and not caring about the ‘simple things’ of social life, such as buying household goods.

---

[89] The construction of new buildings, especially those built by the TOKİ (Housing Development Administration of Turkey), and especially apartments and shopping centers, is criticized by opponents of Turkey’s current government. One of the largest protests in Turkish history, which occurred recently in Gezi Park (2013), aimed to prevent the demolition of a park and the construction of a new shopping centre in one of the most important centres in İstanbul. It could easily be said that this attitude towards new buildings has become a symbol of politics for some of the government's opponents.

When he mentions women’s insistence on living in apartments or buying new sofas, he actually implies that they are showing off, which is seen as a sign of being ‘backward’ by Kemalists. This could be linked with Kemalists’ attempt to draw rigid lines between the new Turkish Republic and the Ottoman Empire, which can be described with pride. Showing off is a habit of Easterners and is associated with being ‘traditional’ thereby close to Islamic than secular Turkish identity. Those who show off are living for *el âlem,* to enjoy *el âlem*, to get approval from *el âlem*, to be liked by *el âlem.*

On the other hand, the factory manager and his wife ‘do not live for the approval of *el âlem’* [as he implies] so they do not need to move to a luxury apartment. Moreover, his words also imply that insisting on living in his old style apartment is a part of his resistance to the new political actors of Turkey.

> ‘We are working all the time; we are not children of high-class people. We did everything by ourselves together. I cannot believe these women who expect everything from their husbands. My wife can manage everything on her own; she is even more powerful than me. I am also a village boy. So some of my childhood friends have married uneducated women from villages even though they are educated. They claim that an urban wife would not get on well with their family, but now they are listening to complaints from their wives about their mothers and fathers, since those women do not have any other work. My wife has a very

> respectful relationship with my family. They do not interfere with each other. You shouldn’t be afraid of an educated woman but of an uneducated one. I wish you could meet her. I am sure you would like each other. I understand that you are a bit feminist; she is too. So, she can tell you better than me about the danger of being sympathetic towards those women. Believe me, they are not like you [including me and his wife] they are only thinking about moving to a town and decorating their house as they wish. I didn’t see my wife buying something for our house for a long time. It is not her kind of job. In our spare time, we ride our bikes; we walk in the limited ‘empty space’ that we can find. We don’t stick ourselves to shopping centres as they want us to do [implying politicians].’ (Fieldwork notes, 16 September 2014, in his office)

It should be pointed out here that he told me all of the above when I asked him, ‘you said that you are a leftist so what do you think about the working conditions of the women workers in this factory?’ At first glance, his words seem irrelevant to my question. However, as we go deeper, his justification of the ‘bad’ working conditions can be seen. Those women deserve those conditions since they are not hardworking like him and his wife, and they support the current Turkish government, which is mainly responsible for all of the corruption. They act without thinking and follow what their politicians want; this means that those women want to move to the town and buy a fancy house with credit from a bank. But is he right?

7.3. Lazy Women’s ‘Luxury Apartments’: Factory Women Workers Trying to Have Nuclear Transitional Patriarchal Homes

Almost all of the women workers I spoke to at Red factory lived in villages before moving to the town, where they were the unpaid family workers of small farmers for most of their lives. When survival as a small farmer in rural Turkey became almost impossible due to neo-liberal economic policies, they moved to the towns of the region to find a job in the factories. However, their low income does not enable them to live totally independently from their extended families. So, although the husbands' parents mostly stay in the village, they continue to give economic 'help' to those couples who are 'trying to be a nuclear family'[90]. Their help takes two forms: the first is that they sell their small piece of land and give the money to their sons to help them buy a house in town. Although men have more permanent jobs than women in the factories (this is an assumption from asking about their husbands' working conditions), the low earnings of those couples make their lives more difficult as they also pay rent for their accommodation. Thus, selling their parents' small piece of land in order to have the money they need to buy a house in town and to get a mortgage, becomes the most reasonable solution to improving their living conditions. From this perspective, 'desiring to have a house' does not appear to be an absurd 'obsession' of the women workers, as the factory manager claims, but a necessity in order to adapt to their new economic conditions. However, obtaining money for a new home from the husband's parents means that the elders are still in a position where they have a right to direct the couple's life. The second possible way in which these older couples, especially mothers-in-law, help their sons and daughters-in-law is to take care of the children and cook when they are both away working in the factory. In this section, I will conceptualise 'transitional patriarchy' through looking at the (re) distribution of the resources of the extended family and the newly structured division of labour.

---

[90] Abadan-Unat (1986: 186) calls household structures where conjugal families live in *separate dwellings* but their budgets are not separated fully the 'functionally extended family'. Here, I prefer to describe these households as 'trying to be a nuclear family' as I want to emphasize the viewpoint of the brides of these families. In either case the boundaries of the household can be understood as including parents-in-law and the son's nuclear family even though these families do not share a dwelling.

7.3.1. ‘Son-like Daughters’ or ‘Still Troubling Mother-in-Laws’: The New but Still Gendered Division of Labour

The women workers of Red factory mostly send their small children to the villages while they work in the factory and visit them whenever possible. Women do not like this solution, since sometimes they cannot see their children for two weeks at a time. Some villages are far away and they have to wait until they can have a day off. This is the only solution for them, especially for those doing night shifts. None of the women trust their husbands to take care of small children, so their mother-in-law is their only option. Moreover, most of their husbands also work in the factories and they also work on the shift system. It is not rare for a wife and husband to work the night shift at the same time. So, sending children to the villages becomes the most reasonable option. This option is also what makes women’s factory work possible. The seasonality of factory work apparently fits with children’s schooling and makes it possible for them to go to the villages

However, this option does not solve the problem according to the women. They always complain about this relationship, sometimes because of their mother-in-law’s attitude towards the children and sometimes because of their attitude towards the women themselves.

> ‘Whenever I go to my mother-in-law’s house, I always buy lots of food and I always clean her house. Since she is looking after the children, she cooks for them. So, this is my obligation. I am not complaining about it. But she always complains about me and my work in the factory. But this is a good option for us; we are paying our children’s education fees, I am buying some stuff for the house. This is good.’ (Aylin, Fieldwork notes, 15 September 2014, in the dinner hall)

According to the women, the common problem with women working and mothers-in-law helping is that mothers-in-law do not give enough support to daughters-in-law while they do factory work. Mothers-in-law expect their daughters-in-law to do some domestic tasks such as cleaning on their days off.

> ‘Yesterday, I didn’t come to work since my mother-in-law called me last night and told me that if I did not come the next day and help her with cleaning and stuff, she would not look after the children any more. I told her, there is no day off this week, but she insisted. So, I didn’t come to work, although I didn’t have permission, and I went to the village. She even asked me to clean the windows. What do my children do to the windows? Thank God she likes my children and looks after them. But God knows she hates my factory work. I am as tired as on a factory day.’ (Zile, Fieldwork notes, 13 September 2014, in the break – outside the toilets)

The women’s stories were similar; when a woman with children did not come to work without asking, going to the village to help her mother-in-law or staying at home to help were considered the reasons why.

In these conditions, a ‘helpful’ daughter of their own comes on the scene as a heroine for women workers. She can do all the work that a mother-in-law can do and she is not interfering or ‘trying to dominate’ the household’; she also enables their ‘nuclear family structure’ to be sustained during her mother’s seasonal work. Thus, it is not surprising for factory women, that having a daughter becomes a desire just as having a boy is desirable for women in Kurdish extended families. So although it is not typical in Turkish society and, more specifically, in the region where I did my fieldwork, there are expressions about the luck of women who have daughters and women verbalise these frequently, especially when they talk about the work done at home when they are in the factory. As one of the women told me,

> ‘I have two daughters since I am loved by God. Do you know an expression that says if a woman has two daughters, it is like a celebration of 29th October [the day the Turkish Republic was established]? If she has a daughter and a son, it is like a celebration of 23rd April [the day of the establishment of the Turkish parliament]? If she has only boys, it is like 10th November [the date on which Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic, died]. I am always celebrating the ‘republic’. When I go home, there is always food for dinner; they also take care of their brother. What more could I want from God? (Rukiye, Fieldwork notes, 14 August 2014, in the shuttle)

The expression she used, and other similar expressions that highlight the ‘importance of having girls’, are very common among women in the factory.

In their new conditions, under which women are trying to create and sustain their own independent nuclear families through working in the factories seasonally, ‘helpful daughters’ become more attractive than ‘useless boys’. ‘In summer I work in the factories since the schools are closed, and my daughter can help me at home. She takes care of her brothers and can do housework. She is ‘my hand and my foot’’ [‘*elim ayagim*’] (Seviye, Fieldwork notes, 17 September 2014). Those daughters are mostly under the official working age. That is why they work at home rather than in the factories. When they reach 17, they can begin to come to the factories with their mothers. Most of them also continue with their education. ‘A woman cannot want more than an educated daughter’ says Feride. Lots of women in the factory seemed to agree with this statement, since they believe that when their daughters work in white collar jobs, they will earn regular money and a daughter's regular money means support for them.

> 'Everything is changing. Women are like men now. They have money. They put their mothers in their cars and go everywhere together. A bride's mother is like a 'camping gas'; it is always in the car [implying you will always go out with your daughter's nuclear family]. But if you are a groom's mother, you are like a 'house gas'. You always have to stay at home [implying your bride does not want you to go out with them]. Now having a girl is even better than having a boy.' (Rukiye, 14 September 2014, on the line)

Women are aware of the fact that mothers-in-law are losing their power over other members of the family, especially their sons and younger brides and, due to economic changes and the impact of these changes on the household, they prefer to have 'helpful, sensitive, hardworking daughters to support them rather than 'useless, thoughtless, henpecked sons'.

7.3.2. Now is the Time to be Enemies with the *Görümce*: The New Structure of Distribution of Resources within Extended Family

It is no coincidence that in this section we do not discuss factory women's *eltis* – their husbands' brother's wives. Even though they no longer live together, they are still 'potential enemies' when the issue of sharing the resources of their husbands' parents arises. However, this relationship does not play such a disruptive role as when they lived in a rural setting within an extended family structure. They now have their *görümce* (husband's sister) to contend with instead. When the 'daughter' of an 'extended family' begins to work in paid employment, she also becomes a more powerful figure in the familial hierarchy and is in a better position to fight for an equal claim on her parents' property.

As we have seen, the main objective of young couples who have just migrated to town is to buy a house. This is because paying rent and education expenses for their children on a husband's official minimum wage and a wife's seasonal wage is impossible. As they mostly arrive from rural areas, and their families have survived the first wave of rural transformation driven by mechanisation in the 1950s, they are likely to possess a small plot of land. In this sense, Karacabey, the region in which I conducted this study, has become the region which has one of the highest rates of buying and selling properties in Turkey (TÜİK, 2014c). Under these circumstances, it is mainly the husband's parents who still live in the village or want to move to towns with the young couple, who sell their land in the village and divide the money between their sons, but not their daughters. They legitimise this difference by saying that 'if everyone gives money to their sons, then their daughter will also have money from her parents-in-law'. Moreover, everyone still thinks that 'a son has to take care of his mother and father when they get older and not a daughter', so they are trying to guarantee their future. In those conditions, the enemies of the extended family – *eltiler* – make a peace agreement through sharing the money and becoming allies against their new shared enemy: *görümce*.

Görümce are the sisters of husbands, and are the ones who are most subject to discrimination in the sharing of the properties of the extended family. Passing the lands on to 'sons' is not a new phenomenon in rural Turkey, however, *görümceler* have also migrated to towns and hence need money to buy a house there. In this scenario, if their parents-in-law do not have anything to give them and their natal family gives all the inheritance money to their brothers, they become offended. Zile explains her situation with her *görümce* as follows:

> 'She [implying her *görümce*] is the devil. She envies us [implying her nuclear family]. My mother-in-law has to take care of me, not her. I will clean their shit! [Implying taking care of her mother and father-in-law, when they get older]. I can't fight with them in *el âlem's* house, at least I deserve it. I don't adore her crumply parents, I wish they could stay with their beloved daughter, however, they would not go there, but will come to me. She wants to have the house and make me look after her parents. See, how smart she is. No one gives you 5 kofte with 3 lira [*uc kurusa bes kofte*, a commonly used expression, its meaning is similar to 'there is no such thing as a free lunch'].' (Zile, Fieldwork notes, 11 September 2014, on the line)

Zile believes that she deserves money for a house from her husband's parents because she will have to take care of them in the future. And this is what *el âlem* requires women to do:

> 'I wish my mother-in-law could go to my *görümce*. I don't want anything from her. I don't want her money, without peace what is money? She gives us money and continuously says that she is feeding us. She interferes with everything we buy, wear, everywhere we go. My children learn to tell lies because of her. As we have to hide everything from her. I told my *görümce*, if she wants she can have her mother and money. But, you know, Ali [her husband] told me that we have to accept that if we send her to my *görümce*, *el âlem* will cause trouble for us. They will speak about us. Everything we have done until that time will be forgotten. And they will just talk about how ungrateful we are. Ali can't stand hearing such things. He is very proud.' (Asiye, Fieldwork notes, 3 September 2014, in the lunch)

While some women achieve their ‘dream home’ in exchange for their unpaid labour they take on caring for their elders in the future, for other women whose parents-in-law do not yet require care and/or still live in the village separately from them, women’s obligations mostly take the form of cleaning their husband’s family home.

> ‘I don’t know where my home is. I am always between two houses. They [her husband’s family] do not accept that we are not living with them anymore; they are always calling us for everything. My mother-in-law is obsessed with cleaning and I am her favourite bride. Don’t think that it is a good thing. Don’t be the favourite bride of your mother-in-law! This is *abla’s* [elder sister] recommendation. My mother-in-law thinks that I am the best at cleaning, so I am always there. And, of course, if you go to clean, you can’t just escape with cleaning, I always cook when I go there. I’m complaining to mine [implying her husband], but he always tells me what more can I want? They are [implying both mother and father-in-law] giving us everything. He of course is happy, because I am doing everything, but he just gets the money.’ (Neşe, Fieldwork notes, 22 August 2014, in the shuttle)

7.4. Conclusion

This chapter has introduced two different forms of household-based patriarchy and demonstrated how they shape and are shaped by the intersectionality of gender, class and age, which also constructs masculinities and femininities.

In the first section of the chapter, we looked at the factory manager’s household and, as in Chapter 5, explored how Kemalism erases femininities due to its belief that ‘femininity’ is the antithesis of modernity. The factory manager compared ‘feminine’ workers with his ‘masculine’ wife and concluded that she is far better than women workers thanks to her ‘masculinity’. Her masculinity is, in turn, constructed through education and particular forms of white-collar employment and is superior to ‘femininity’, which is backward and is displayed by uneducated women factory workers who are employed seasonally. A second form of patriarchy was identified as ‘transitional patriarchy’ and it also includes the appreciation of a masculine character – son-like daughters’ – who are emerging as educated young women who can help their mothers with domestic work and who will gain white collar, ‘masculine’ jobs when they seek employment. These women might be the future ‘masculine wives’ of Kemalist husbands. They are preferred to sons by factory women because they not only earn and control their money as men do, but also they still help their mothers with domestic tasks. In this way different types of masculinity are shaped by the intersectionality of age, education and gender and affect the form taken by patriarchy within these different households.

Chapter 8

Conclusions

8.1. Introduction

This is our last stop; it is where I finally stop following the path taken by the tomatoes and remind the reader of what we have seen in the last few hundred pages. At this juncture, I also consider what the future of studies of women and their tomatoes may be. To do this, in the first section I look at how I have answered the research questions and then, in the second section, I underscore the differences and similarities between this study and previous studies focusing on gender in global production; this will highlight my own contribution to knowledge. Finally, I talk about the limitations of this study and possible directions for future research.

8.2. What the Journey Tells Us: Answering the Research Questions

It is first important that we remind ourselves of what the research questions are.

> 1) What is the gendered division of labour in tomato production in Turkey, in the case of agriculture, manufacturing and the domestic sphere?
>
> 2) How is the gendered division of labour shaped by global capitalism and the local dynamics of 'intersectional patriarchy'?
>
> 3) How is workers' consent generated? What kinds of resistance are possible?

4) How do relations of production and reproduction intertwine?

I have tried to answer these questions mainly by observing women and men who live these questions in their everyday life, through working and talking with them. However, I must admit that different methodologies and approaches might have led to different conclusions than those I have drawn because the way we do research transforms and is transformed by our understanding of the social world, as discussed in the methodology chapter. It is important, therefore, to bear in mind that no set of conclusions can be right or wrong in and of themselves.

Drawing on one case study, I have explored the gendered relations in global tomato production and processing in western Turkey. Case studies have always been the preferred method for the study of women's work in global production, although one might criticise this method for being relativist or too specific. My study has the usual advantages and disadvantages of a case study, being able to capture holistically an environment and its interlinking sets of relations but needing careful thought before findings can be generalised. I suggest that by looking at this 'specific' case, we can see the similarities and differences between this particularity and others people have drawn, generally, and in doing so, develop a generalisable theory about how production and reproduction reinforce each other and about how intersectional patriarchy is working in tomato production and processing in Turkey as part of a global commodity chain.

I want to suggest that the methods I used make empathy possible. Empathy does not merely mean trying to understand someone's position from the points at which we stand in our lives. If we tried to do this every time, we would come to conclusions based on our own subjectivity without necessarily understanding people's conditions, and ultimately, we would not understand the whole subject of our inquiry. The only possible inference of this way of looking are statements like 'if I were you'. On the other hand, in order to generate empathy and thus make understanding possible, we must experience the conditions that 'others' face even if this is not always completely possible because of our differences. In this study, I have shown that empathy is vital. Without seeing the payslip addressed to you that shows how little you have earned in comparison to your huge bodily effort, without tomatoes entering your dreams, or without developing an eye infection because of tomato dust, or feeling grateful just for the existence of clean drinking water, it is difficult to find the answers to the above research questions with the depth and meaning they have for the people who already live these questions.

Living and observing the lives of women workers also makes it possible to reveal the malleable and various forms of masculinity governing femininity – which I conceptualise as intersectional patriarchy – since close observation and a deep focus are vital to reveal the ways in which gender relations are becoming unfixed. For instance my findings suggest that daughters and mothers become closer in Transitional patriarchy. Older women begin to see their daughters as their future 'protector' instead of their sons and as a result daughters are more highly valued and seen as more 'masculine'. In a similar vein, women from the landowning family do not have as much confidence as Kurdish women that they will become mothers-in-law in an extended household due to the changing structure of production relations. This pushes them closer to their husbands rather than their sons. Moreover, in order to see the mutual changes in the relations of production and reproduction, a close look is necessary because the dynamics of those relations are constantly shifting.

Furthermore, the possible forms of resistance cannot be easily grasped without the application of qualitative methods, as the mode of resistance, in reality, is actually quite different from what we expect when we define resistance without having a deep understanding of women's own strategies. Besides, most of the time women themselves do not think or say that they are resisting – culturally women's resistance is not desirable so they do not like to see themselves as resisting. The intersectional forms of the gendered division of labour are also hidden, both at the workplace and in homes when we look at them through defined gender roles.

In the following sections I will review the changing patterns of women's work when situated within the context of global capitalism, then I will approach how it shapes and is shaped by local dynamics via intersectional forms of the gendered division of labour on the land, in the factory and at home, then demonstrate the ways in which workers generate both consent and resistance, and finally highlight the interweaving of production and reproduction relations.

8.2.1. Intersectional Forms of the Gendered Division of Labour

In this section, I will discuss the answers to the first and second research questions. The first question asks about the gendered division of labour in three different spheres, agriculture, and manufacturing and in the home, and the second one asks about its persistence or change in relation to global capitalism and its local dynamics. By integrating the answers to these two questions, I highlight how the gendered division of labour is best understood by the application of the concept of 'intersectional patriarchy'.

‘Intersectional patriarchy’ refers to the way that different masculinities are constructed through the intersectionality of gender, class, ethnicity, age and education in various and malleable ways within the division of labour, their power over femininities and their association with particular patriarchal household structures. In Chapter 6, I addressed the role of *el âlem* in supporting this system of male governing and operating intersectional patriarchy. *El âlem* as a mode of social control refers to a group of unidentified people whom you believe will talk about and pass judgement on the appropriateness of your behaviour. It simultaneously refers to a group of identifiable people who decide on the appropriateness of your behaviour according to requirements of *el âlem’s* unidentifiable members. In my analysis, I have tried to show that gendered social control makes masculine dominance over femininity possible and persistent in rural Turkey. I have further tried to illustrate how this is constructed through the fluid and various intersections of gender, class, ethnicity, age and education which themselves construct and are constructed within the division of labour in the labour process. However, before continuing this discussion, I would like to reprise the broader patterns of the division of labour in relation to global capital in Turkey and the chapters of my study that preceded this one.

In Chapter 2, I provided background information on the changing patterns of rural life in Turkey over the last 30 years, providing insight into how rural women’s employment has been affected by these changes. Mass migration to urban areas in the 1980s and 1990s increased the precariousness of rural women’s employment, leading them to work mostly in the home, or in family-owned small textile firms known as *atölye*. While this is relevant to the women who migrated to urban areas, for women who stayed in rural communities, being an unpaid family worker remains the main occupational position. Today, 94% of women working in agriculture are unpaid family workers (TÜİK, 2015). Although rates of women's employment and their numeric domination of agricultural labour has not changed significantly in the past 30 years, in the last 15 years women's agricultural work has become more precarious and difficult as a result of the Turkish government's neoliberal economic policies. According to the reports of the 'occupational health and safety association' (ISGM, 2014), 23% of worker fatalities occurred amongst agricultural labourers in 2014.

As we have seen at several points in this study, the regulations imposed by the Turkish state, such as restricting the use of local seeds (Seed Law) or the minimum amount of land someone has to have (Land Law), results in an effective land grab, whereby the lands of smallholders are transferred into the hands of big landowning families. As emphasised in Chapter 2, the only way to become a bigger farmer within tomato production is by increasing your stake in the system. In this sense, although most farmers in Turkey are still not big landlords, they have begun to produce large amounts by renting the lands of others who have been 'forced' to stop cultivating their small plots of land. In Chapter 5, which looked at women factory workers, we saw that in the region in which this study took place, the people who were effectively forced off their land had to move to the towns to look for factory work. On the other hand, farmers who have stayed on the land have tried to find the cheapest labour force possible in order to expand their business; in order to do this they have sought the cooperation of Kurdish migrant seasonal workers. Kurdish migrant workers become the most profitable option for them not only because of their acceptance of low wages but also because of their acceptance of the group performance-based payment system. In the following, I talk about how this study has revealed the interrelated effects of these changes on the gendered division of labour.

8.2.1.1. Gendered Class and Ethnicity in the Division of Labour on Tomato Land

Employing Kurdish workers does not change the appearance of the gendered division of labour on tomato land at planting time. In the spring, most of the time, the women occupy the tomato fields by themselves; they plant tomato seedlings all day without seeing any men. This is because men come to the land before the women's work starts in order to prepare the land by ploughing it and setting up the irrigation systems. They then leave as soon as these tasks are complete. However, as we saw in Chapter 4, this rigid division between the sexes is not associated with overt class divisions in the organisation of labour in the planting season. At planting time, women from the landowning family, Kurdish seasonal workers and local women workers work together. Women from the landowning family take two roles on the land, as both workers and managers, since although they do the same job as other workers they also assume a managerial position. We met Fatma who most readily embraced her managerial position. Based on this, it is unsurprising that she was seen as the 'man of the group' even though there were no 'actual' men around. Others perceived her in this way because she is slow to tire, has considerable physical strength, knows how to control others and can drive both cars and tractors. In addition to her 'masculine' personal traits, her ability to perform masculinity on the land is bound up with the intersection of her class as a member of landowning family, her ethnicity as a Turk and her age as the oldest woman from the landowning family who still works on the land. Those intersections apparently feed her 'masculine' personal traits. None of the Kurdish women on the land perform masculinity, even though the gangmaster's wife is on the land as a *çavuş* (forewoman) and also has considerable strength and is slow to tire, though these traits for her are not sufficient to perform masculinity. Performing masculinity is associated with being powerful and being powerful on the land for Kurdish migrant women workers, especially when someone from the landowning family is around, does not seem to be possible.

On the other hand, although Fatma's 'manly woman' character is desirable on the land so as she can organise work, she becomes the target of the agent of patriarchy, *el âlem*, as soon as she leaves the work place. Her driving, which enables workers to leave the land when there are no men available to pick them up, is applauded but once she returns to the village, her ability to drive suddenly becomes inappropriate. She has to stop driving at the entrance to the village because she cannot drive past the men's coffee house without being criticised by the *el âlem.*

As discussed mainly in Chapters 6 and 7, as a social control mechanism, *el âlem* demonstrates how everyone including men and women, young and old, has a stake in the patriarchy. Everyone can have some power over someone occupying a different role. So while Fatma has control over workers' labour on the land, she loses her power as soon as she arrives outside the men's coffee-house where she suddenly becomes a *gelin* – daughter-in-law – of the Çiftçi family. Outside the coffee-house, the *el âlem* does not allow her to be a 'man-like woman' because there are enough men around. These malleable power hierarchies demonstrate how *el âlem* as well as patriarchy is flexible and this flexibility is discussed as a reason for the persistence of patriarchy. When everyone gets something from it, they are eager to perpetuate it.

While the application of the concept of *el âlem* explains why patriarchy persists, the question of how it persists is explained by emphasising the intersectional formations of masculinity and femininity, which are reproduced via the gendered division of labour, as seen in the case of Fatma. While Fatma has a right to be masculine on the land as a member of the landowning family, for other workers, being masculine is not an option. On the other hand, Fatma also uses femininity as a means to control the workers. These attempts were quite clear in Chapter 4. For example, when she interrupted the argument between local workers and Kurdish workers about the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, she humiliated the other women by accusing them of talking about politics 'just like men'. Here, she acted as a member of *el âlem,* which in rural Turkey condemns any interest that women may show in politics. In this way the term *el âlem*, which when translated, simultaneously captures 'others' and 'everyone', functions as a way of disciplining and controlling behaviour based on perceived and imagined norms. The gangmaster's wife also adopted the use of the term *el âlem*. She is effectively a middle woman in the planting season and works to increase worker productivity. We saw that this justified her control over workers by emphasising her need to protect the reputation of the group for being hardworking, otherwise she said 'people' would talk about how they were lazy and this would decrease their chances of being employed in the same region again. Those 'people' to whom she referred are also (the) *el âlem.*

Unlike during the planting season, at harvest time Kurdish men are also on the land and they replace the women from the landowning family. Therefore, in the second part of Chapter 4, we saw how the gendered division of labour intersects with ethnicity and age. As the group performance-based system eliminates the necessity of direct managerial supervision during harvest time, the male workers have some control over their labour. In this case, we saw that the oldest member of the group, Yahya, took this control into his own hands by using his higher position in the familial hierarchy to organise the labour process by assigning and allotting specific tasks. Most of the workers were eager to follow what Yahya proposed as their primary focus was on producing greater outputs. As we saw in Chapter 4, the basis of Yahya's division was physical strength, which subsequently led to a division of labour based on age and gender. Tomato picking is physically labour intensive and thus more output can be guaranteed by people who have more strength than others. Indeed, the tasks of young women are deemed to be the least important as they require minimal physical strength.

However, we saw that young women's elimination from tasks requiring more physical power such as shaking the tomato roots does not prevent the men who do this task from perceiving themselves as doing a woman's job. Here, the difference between this task – uprooting tomato plants – and the only male task of the tomato picking -- carrying the full bags to the tractors – is that relatively older or physically stronger women can be assigned the former task, but assigning women to the latter is almost impossible. Therefore, the pride of the men who are given the task of carrying the sacks to the tractors is clearly visible, as they are happy to be given a task that 'fits' with their masculinity.

Here, the study found another chance to discuss intersectional patriarchy as a result of the starkly contrasting views of two groups of Kurdish men. One of these groups believed that they were 'doing a woman's job because they are Kurdish' whereas the second believed that they were 'doing a man's job because they are Kurdish'. Based on the former statement, being Kurdish is feminised, in the latter, it is masculinised. Here we can see how men in the second example are masculinised through the intersection of gender, ethnicity as well as age. This is because carrying the sacks to the tractors is strictly the work of younger males due to the physical strength required. In this way, such emphasised masculine traits in addition to the way in which work is organised with the oldest male, Yahya, allows for masculinity to be performed. Moreover, it also allows those masculine workers to hold power over other workers. For this group, Kurdish ethnic identity is masculinised in order to exert control over the workers. In order to make them proud of their work, the idea that only Kurdish men can carry the sacks because of their sheer strength in comparison to Turkish men is constructed. This shows us how ethnicity is intertwined with gender whereby ethnicity itself becomes gendered. This maps onto our discussion of class in the previous section. Moreover, these also show us that people can change their positions from masculinity and femininity, but femininity and masculinity are always present in a hierarchical relationship. In the present binary, the hierarchical positions of these categories do not change. When something or someone is subordinated it become feminised, and they are seen to be doing a woman's job and vice versa.

When we consider the processes of masculinisation and feminisation of the Kurdish ethnic identity, it is also evident that it is actually specific tasks that are feminised and masculinised as well as ethnic identity. Both men and women can change their position within masculinities and femininities. However, the femininity and/or masculinity of tasks remains the same. Indeed, the workers who have the closest physical interaction with the tomatoes, are feminised, whether by planting the seedlings, sorting tomatoes on the assembly line, or making tomato sauce at home. Feminisation increases as direct engagement increases. The final tasks, both on the land – carrying the tomatoes to the tractors – and in the factory -- carrying the tomatoes to the warehouses, belong to men and never to women. Even within the scope of the men's jobs, the tasks are more feminised and less prestigious depending on how much direct contact workers have with the tomatoes. This is because masculinities and femininities are not attached to people, but to the way people behave or, even, to material things such as tomatoes, rural work, assembly lines and so on. People who exercise authority are seen as masculine, even if they are women, and people who follow commands, are seen as feminine, even it they are men. This clearly restricts changing the meaning of femininity to include wielding authority.

8.2.1.2. Gendered 'Kemalism' and Education in the Division of Labour in the Factory

The chapter on work in the factory clearly evidenced the gendered nature of specific tasks. This was shown when we saw how women were masculinised when they were assigned tasks in the warehouse. Tasks in the warehouse require physical strength and if there are no men available for this task, the management has to employ women. Although the general manager admits that he prefers employing men in the warehouse, the factory management managed to modify 'women' to 'fit' masculinity by deploying the gendered ideologies of Kemalism. We saw how the image of 'Anatolian women', who are physically strong, hardworking and always shoulder to shoulder with men, was re-constituted on the shop floor by the management and by women workers to normalise their 'masculine' actions. Here, trying to find a justification for these women's 'absurd' position it is necessary to convince (the) *el âlem* that women working in the warehouse are not challenging social norms and conventions. The women who work on the tomato sorting lines constitute (the) *el âlem* for the women working in the warehouse. The former group argue that working in the warehouse is not appropriate for women as it makes the women there 'wild' and 'masculine'. This social judgement of what is proper and what is not reproduces the social control of the *el âlem.* Indeed, the women in the warehouse fear this judgement and therefore strive to contribute to the reconstruction of the Anatolian woman image in the warehouse.

As discussed in Chapter 5, physical strength is not the only determinant of the gendered division of labour; education is also important. We saw how the Kemalist regime uses education as a tool to organise labour on the shop floor. The management assumes that 'educated women' are less feminine and they put them in the machine sections. They also do not hesitate to assign more educated women to tasks where they may come into contact with male workers. This is because they 'trust' their educated daughters to know how they should behave in every circumstance, including not flirting on the shop floor. Here, again, it is possible to see the construction of femininity through the intersection of gender, age and education within the division of labour in the shop floor. (The) *el âlem* also endorses this by underlining the assumption that educated women do not constantly think about flirtation.

8.2.1.3. 'Hierarchy of Masculinity' in the Division of Labour at Homes

The division of labour in women's homes is mostly bound up with their labour on the land or in the factory. The conditions of their paid work shape and are shaped by what women do in their homes. A striking example of this is what I call 'seasonal cooking workers' which refers to some Kurdish women who migrate with other workers to western Turkey in order to cook. I focus on this striking example in the forthcoming sections. First however, I focus on gendered divisions of labour in the household.

When we look at the homes of the landowning families, we can see that Recep (Turkish), who is the oldest male of all the generations who live in the household and is consequently the most 'masculine' individual, manages all of the financial resources. We can also see that the post-menopausal mothers-in-law assume the management of all domestic tasks. The common features of the above are the management of masculinity. As discussed in Chapter 6, power in patriarchal structures is more available to masculine actors, and in the 'hierarchy of masculinity' within households, after older males, older women (primarily the mothers-in-law) come second mainly as a result of the belief that post-menopausal women lose their femininity and are thus more like men. Although this does not give post-menopausal women sexual freedom, as the menopause is seen as the end of the period during which one needs to be protected because they are seen as asexual, the menopause nonetheless gives women the opportunity to see themselves on a more equal footing with men and in this way, their age enables them to climb the ladder of the familial hierarchy. As chapter 6 shows that women also benefit from the status of their husbands in the masculinity hierarchy.

Ascending the hierarchy of masculinity decreases the work they do both in the household and on the land. In this sense, the only thing a mother-in-law does is cook. The answer to the question of why they cook instead of hiring a domestic servant once again raises ideas that surround the concept of *el âlem*. In western rural Turkey, hiring a domestic servant is seen as shameful for women. *El âlem* would say 'what kind of women are they?' – *bunlar nasıl kadın?* – which suggests that they are not 'proper' women because they are not proper housewives doing all the domestic tasks themselves. Indeed, hiring a domestic worker would be likely to provoke the ire and gossip of (the) *el âlem,* women would literally 'fall upon the tongue of (the) *el âlem* *(el âlemin diline duşmek*). This shows how *el âlem* is not only about protecting men's *namus* – honour related to the 'purity' of female members of family – by protecting women's sexuality but it is also about protecting women's reputation as 'proper housewives'. In this way *el âlem* also controls women's labour. Therefore, while mothers-in-law in the landowning families are responsible for cooking, their grandchildren (the youngest of the four generations in the household) are mostly responsible for cleaning and assisting with the cooking whilst their mothers, the second youngest generation in the household work on the land.

In the case of Kurdish workers, we should look both to their shacks during their seasonal work in rural Turkey, and to their homes in their hometowns during the winter in order to see a more complete picture of the household division of labour. As discussed in Chapter 6, along the same lines as the landowning family, in the hierarchy of masculinity, mothers-in-law also occupy the second most prestigious osition within the home. This placement in the familial hierarchy releases them from the need to migrate for seasonal work. When the younger generations return from seasonal work, however, their daughters-in-law become responsible for all domestic tasks, including their mother- and father-in-law's care. In the case of Kurdish mothers-in-law, their chance to perform 'masculinity' is very much bound up with how many sons they have borne whereas with the landowning family this is not as pronounced. As discussed in Chapter 6, reaching menopause is not enough to warrant equality with men, indeed for these women, they must reach menopause only after a sufficient period of fertility - one that is measured by the number of sons that a woman has had. This 'earned masculinity' gives them a chance to control both their sons and daughters-in-law's labour and sexuality.

As far as the gendered division of labour in the homes of factory workers is concerned, as discussed on Chapter 7, we can see how their labour in the factory depends on their mothers-in-law's or daughters' labour in the home. This dependency on the labour of the mother-in-law to take care of the children prevents women workers from escaping the experience of the extended patriarchal family structure. Although most of them move to towns with their nuclear families, they still maintain very close connections with their villages, which are mostly in the same region, as their mothers-in-law care for their children when they work at the factory. At that point, as we saw in Chapter 7, the 'daughters' of those women gain greater importance. This is because they can do domestic tasks in the home including caring for their younger siblings. In this way, the number of daughters one has decreases women factory workers' dependency on their mothers-in-law. In turn, daughters are also masculinised by their mothers who work in the factory by underlining their increasing similarity with men as a result of their education. As we saw in Chapter 7, women say that (the) *el âlem* take pity on women who do not have daughters. This is because young women are increasingly able to earn and control money through paid work. This makes them even more 'manly' than men, according to many women in the factory. This however, does not relieve them of the dual burden of domestic work and paid work. Here, it is important to note that much like Fatma, women factory workers who are masculinised by their paid work cannot perform this masculinity in the home. Indeed, they do not perform masculinity in the home until they reach their post-menopausal age as we discussed in Chapter 6. This situation is also supported by the positions occupied by mothers-in-law because, thanks to their daughters-in-law or grandchildren, they become less associated with domestic tasks as they get older and consequently, become more masculine.

In light of this, we can draw the same conclusions as those made in the section about the land and the factory. Although people can move between masculine and feminine categories, this is nonetheless bound up with the intersection of their gender, class, ethnicity and age. It is clear therefore that femininity or masculinity of the domestic tasks themselves is not subject to change. Across space and time, tomato picking has not led to social mobility or heightened prestige, and neither has washing the dishes.

Being a man or a woman, Kurdish or Turkish, young or old can be both an advantage and a disadvantage in different places and in different social contexts. Working with tomatoes however, remains a constant - the meanings involved in tomato production remain static. This stasis prevails even if living conditions and working conditions differ depending on social setting, as with tomato production in Mexico (Torres, 1997). In my context, we see that although the way of picking tomatoes and gendered division of labour on the tomato land change, gendering of the tasks do not change, even if their ingredients change. Kurdish men who make the most effective workers since Yahya's redesigned the picking routine by using washing-up bowls to shake the tomatoes into, and which men lift more easily, continue to believe that they are doing women's job, even if they do it differently than women.

8.2.2. 'Family' and 'Ideology' as Tools for both Control and Resistance

I have answered my third research question on the generation of consent and possible forms of workers' resistance by focusing on the concept of 'family' and of 'ideology' respectively on the land and then in the factory.

8.2.2.1. Familial Control vs. Familial Resistance

In Chapter 4, we saw how the 'family' acts as the chief mechanism in shaping tomato production in a capitalist way. The interweaving of kinship relations with the intersection of gender, class, ethnicity and age organises the labour process on the tomato land. Here, the important point was the deployment of family at one and the same time for control by management – it can also be applied by workers to control other workers in the group performance payment system – and for resistance by workers.

Kurdish migrant families are persuaded to work in poor conditions on the tomato land, as this is the only work in which families can draw upon women's and children's labour. It is not possible for Kurdish women to work in paid work 'alone' without direct supervision from male members of the family. Most of the Kurdish women (with one exception, as she is continuing her high school education) in this study noted that they have never gone to the market, hospital or another village to visit their relatives alone or in an all-female group. This is not too different for the women from the landowning family. In the landowning family's case, the women also stated that they had never been to public places alone with the exception of those who were pursuing their secondary education. The difference between these groups, however, is that the women from the landowning family can be in public places as a group of women from the same family. Therefore, both for women from the landowning family and for the Kurdish seasonal women workers, agriculture becomes the only viable option for their labour. However, unlike their Kurdish counterparts, the local women can work anywhere in the region as long as they are with other women in a group consisting of their family and neighbours. In such cases, it is permissible for these women to work alongside men. Kurdish women on the other hand cannot work with men unrelated by blood or marriage. For this reason, they require female-only work places or a place where they can work only with men from their own family. Tomato work has become the only work in western Turkey where Kurdish women can work in all-female or extended family groups. Work to produce other agricultural commodities such as peppers, watermelons, melons and olives does not offer the same opportunities to Kurdish families as they are only produced for national markets and there is thus no great demand for 'cheaper' labour[91]. In Chapter 4, we saw how the landowning family uses the kinship relations of Kurdish families to organise and to manage the labour process as well as using their own kinship relations for the very same reasons.

Kurdish migrant workers, just as the landowning family, use their families to sustain capitalist relations of production. Tomato production gives them a chance to capitalise their own familial relations in the work place. In other words, they come to capitalist tomato land as 'who they are' and they do not need to change at all. On the contrary, they know that they are the ones whom the capitalists seek. So, this is a form of automatic cooperation with capital; both sides accept each other as who they are and indeed, both sides even seek each other out. Workers embrace capitalist production as it gives them profit and they themselves become capitalists and thus do not hesitate to capitalise their familial relations. For instance, in Chapter 4, we saw that workers are eager to adopt the group performance payment system as it gives them more income and they already have a shared budget in their extended families. Another striking example of this can be seen in Yahya's and his wife's Zarife's harsh attitudes towards other workers and the pressure they put upon them to increase their speed and hence, their productivity. As they occupy higher positions in the familial hierarchy thanks to their age, their control of other workers is largely accepted. This is especially evident in Yahya's case as the oldest male worker.

---

[91] At this point, it is important to note that the distribution of Kurdish seasonal family workers shows parallels with the demands of global production. Kurds work on the north coast of Turkey to pick nuts (Duruiz, 2015), which are exported in huge quantities to Russia, the Middle East and Europe. On the south coast of Turkey, Kurds work to pick oranges, which are exported to Russia, whereas in Central Anatolia and the West, Kurdish seasonal workers produce onions and tomatoes for export.

On the other hand, as we saw in Chapter 4, workers also use their family as a means of resistance. As highlighted in Chapter 2, there is no effective union for agricultural workers in Turkey. As a result of this, rural workers depend on their family for acts of solidarity. As we have seen, family becomes a 'natural' form of organised labour under the management of a 'natural' leader, the oldest male worker in the family. So, we saw that they often threatened the landowning family with wildcat strikes and work stoppages. The most striking gain of the workers in this study was seen at the beginning of Chapter 4, during planting time, when the workers forced the landowning family to employ younger women and give them daily wages. The workers were clear that if the landowning family did not pay the teenage women workers, they would stop work altogether. As it was the beginning of the season, the workers were aware that they would easily be able to find alternative work, whereas the landowners would not be able to hire new labour with such ease. However, as we saw, as the season wore on, this threat began to lose its clout. This was because the landowning family had already sold the majority of the tomatoes to the factory and they knew that local workers could pick the remaining tomatoes. Time pressure owing to the likelihood of rain decreased as the season wore on. So, as seen at the end of Chapter 4, workers' familial resistance was not as effective as before and the landowning family succeeded in dividing the workforce and sacking non-compliant workers. Here, as underlined in Chapter 4, these divisions were also bound up with the conflicts in the familial relations of the workers.

8.2.2.2. ‘Kemalist Control’ vs. ‘Religious Resistance’

In Chapter 5, I demonstrated how the gendered ideologies of Kemalism are used to organise women’s labour in Red tomato-processing factory. By perpetuating the three Kemalist categories of ‘Religious Women’, ‘Educated Daughters of the Republic’ and ‘Anatolian Women’ on the shop floor, the factory offered the workers familiarity with hegemonic ideologies. As Chapter 5 emphasised, consent was generated in a way that mirrored the way in which Kemalism generated the consent of Turkish citizens before losing its hegemony in the 2000s. As Kemalism has a modern-western core, the factory is proud of being the most modern and westernised factory in the region, and even, in Turkey. In order to uphold its reputation for being the most favoured company by workers as well as by consumers, it pays its workers regular wages, which are higher than any other factory, it encourages workers to join their union and it offers the best food and transportation options. Therefore, women cooperate with the factory, as they also believe that this is the best option they have in the region.

However, this does not automatically persuade them to work on the shop floor. This only makes it possible for them to come as far as the factory gates. Once within the factory gates, however, as I have shown, the ‘backward religious women’ are controlled very strictly, as these are the workers that the Kemalist factory regime trusts the least and is most suspicious of for their unwillingness to sustain the factory regime. As we saw in Chapter 5, the factory management justifies its strict control by claiming that those ‘backward religious women’ can only understand and, even, enjoy draconian disciplinarian practices. The factory managers assume that harsh discipline is what these ‘backward’ women experience in their home lives. They believe that as they are brow-beaten by their husbands and vote for the AKP, so they deserve harsh treatment and strict surveillance. The women we met in Chapter 5 clearly show that they do not support or respond well to harsh discipline. However, Chapter 5 also shows that there is little desire for resistance among the workers and indeed, that the managers are confident in their belief that no organised resistance will occur. Women working on the sorting lines think that the treatment they receive is simply part of the way things are and that there is nothing to be done about it other than praying to God. Apart from praying to God, women try to take longer breaks, and go on slowdowns as a means of revolt.

On the other hand, as has been illustrated in the case of the 'daughters of Republic' who work in the machine section and the 'Anatolian women' working in the warehouse, there is no need to resist as they are 'enjoying' their position as the most 'privileged' workers of the factory. As Chapter 5 demonstrates, they become a privileged group and are masculinised by the factory regime. By applying the gender categories of Kemalism, the factory makes the 'daughters of republic' less 'feminine' by means of their 'education'; educated women take on 'masculine' values and attributes compared to their less well-educated sisters. In addition to this, the regime masculinises 'Anatolian women', by emphasising their physical strength. As 'masculine' actors it is not surprising that they cooperate with the management. This was very clear in the example from my fieldwork diary in Chapter 5. Although I stopped the line due to my carelessness, neither the forewoman nor managers punished me, as they believed that someone with my educational background could not possibly be careless. It is clear that management thinks that in the machine section, the workers do not need to be strictly controlled, as the machines effectively control them. The same is valid for the 'Anatolian women' in the warehouse.

In their case, it is not the machines, but their daily quotas that act as an effective disciplinary method. As with the 'educated daughters of the republic', the managers believe that they do not *need* to strictly monitor and discipline the trustworthy 'Anatolian women'. Not surprisingly, in these circumstances, both of these groups of women are eager to cooperate with Kemalist capitalism. This mirrors the conditions of Turkish society beyond the factory gates where 'backward religious' people are seen as undesirable by Kemalists. However, as Chapter 5 reminded us, this has been undergoing a rapid change in Turkey, as many so-called 'backward' groups are now pursuing higher education and thus deconstructing the hegemonic categories of 'the educated daughters of the republic'. For the time being, the factory has chosen to ignore these developments and changes in the fabric of Turkish society. However, choosing to ignore such changes has already had severe consequences for the strength of traditionally Kemalist political parties electorally, and it can be assumed that the factory could have difficulties in sustaining the same management principles in controlling its labour in the near future.

8.2.3. Interweaving the Relations of Production and Reproduction

As evidenced by the bulk of discussion in the body of my thesis, it is clear that the boundaries between home and work places blur and, in some cases, overlap. People live to work and work to live. One of the clearest examples of this in this study was in Chapter 7, when Kurdish families explained to me the importance of having a son in order to continue to live and work as they do now. This was also evident in how both male and female Kurdish workers underlined kinship marriage as a necessity to sustain their lives and working conditions as they are now. Melek is very clear that she cannot do seasonal work with a 'stranger', *elti*. Osman's story about his previous lover, who was neither Kurdish nor part of the same extended family, also showed us the link between the relations of production and reproduction. In this case, Osman's mother warned him that he would not be able to find work if he married a stranger because, if he did, he would have to leave the village as it would not be possible for a bride, *gelin*, from outside the extended family to live and work with the extended family she marries into.

These examples can be expanded by also focusing on the landowning family and factory workers. Strikingly, the landowning family continues to live in one dwelling as a four generational patrilineal family. This is because splitting their inheritance would effectively lead to the end of their livelihood; this leaves them with no option but to preserve and increase their landholdings by living under one roof as an extended family. Working together is not enough to control each other's access to resources, so as we have seen, they also live within the same building in order to control each other's spending. In the case of the women factory workers, they were compelled to move to the town closest to their village of origin because they remained dependent on their mother-in-law's labour for childcare. The factory manager's household type is also closely associated with employment. His 'Kemalist' home – as he claimed – does not surprise us, especially when we think about his position in the Kemalist factory.

These connections make it possible to discuss the similarities and differences between the positions people occupy in the family and in their place of work. The similarity in generating the consent of workers and of brides was discussed in Chapter 6. While workers were eager to 'produce' for the profit of capital, Kurdish women were eager to 'produce' for the sake of their 'family' and the continuation of their patriarchal kinship relations and to secure their status as future 'mothers-in-law'. The differences here are quite clear. While Kurdish workers and factory workers do not believe that they can one day wield the same power as landowners or managers, brides know that they will one day become mothers-in-law.

Here, there is a link between Burawoy's theory of manufacturing consent and Kandiyoti's theory of bargaining with patriarchy which highlights the similarity between the creation of consent amongst both Kurdish women in their extended patriarchal families and amongst workers in the US factories Burawoy (1979) studied. As discussed in several places in this study, Burawoy (1979) defined the concept of 'consent' as an outwardly voluntary acceptance of capitalist production relations and put it at the centre of labour process analysis in contemporary society. He showed that 'coercion' was not the chief mechanism behind the reproduction of relations of production, but workers were persuaded to collaborate in the pursuit of their employers' profits voluntarily via the construction of 'consent' on the shop floor. This voluntary acceptance and collaboration with capital is similar to women's voluntary acceptance of the patriarchal reproduction relations at home and their collaboration with their mothers-in-law as a way of bargaining with patriarchy. Burawoy demonstrates that workers were eager to 'produce' for the profit of capital and, in a similar way, Kurdish women were eager to 'produce' for the sake of their 'family' and the continuation of their patriarchal kinship relations but also to ensure their future status as 'mothers-in-law'.

However, in contrast with what Burawoy (1979) stated on the basis of his study of factory workers in the USA, the chief mechanism in the construction of Elif's consent in accepting and contributing to those patriarchal relations, was still ‘coercion’. Burawoy (1979) did not take into consideration the identities workers bring with them to work, especially aspects of their external consciousness and orientations with respect to gender. Therefore, he concluded that ‘consent’ can be created in ‘hegemonic’ regimes rather than ‘despotic’ ones, but as I argue here, the opposite can occur. Although in the case of ‘Kurdish extended patriarchal relations’ the main mechanism is ‘coercion’, there is still ‘consent’ to sustain this form of patriarchy, as the women know that they will benefit from it in the future.

In the case of agricultural workers, the way of creating consent is different. The tension between these workers and landowners is higher when workers do not have any hope of gaining authority themselves. Therefore, as we saw in the previous chapters, resistance is more common amongst agricultural workers than brides at home or factory workers – even though agricultural workers have more need of the money they make to survive than do factory workers. Here, the difference between factory workers and agricultural workers is important. Although factory workers also do not have to be promoted, they create consent by mirroring the gendered ideologies of Turkish politics, ‘backward traditional’ women by ‘coercion’, and the other ones – daughters of republic and Anatolian woman – by incorporation. Here, ideology makes the differences, and it also interweaves with ethnicity. In the Kurdish workers' case, their resistance also manifests in a specific form against ‘Turkish’ landowners, not just ‘landowners’ in general, as they – landowners, and workers – both see each other as representatives of an ‘other threatening group’.

Despite the limited prospects for workers, they nonetheless embrace capitalist production because it offers them some profit and power and in this way, they themselves become capitalists. This is also the case in family relations. Both men and women become patriarchs and there is a prospect of some future gain in terms of power for all. This similarity is important when pointing out the similar operations of capitalism and patriarchy, as they are the two interweaving systems that underpin this study. I hope that by demonstrating the similarities between patriarchy and capitalism, I have also been able to highlight the ways in which they interweave and, in this way, contribute to feminist theory on this question(Hartmann, 1981; Collins, 2014; Clallend, 2014; Dunaway, 2014).

8.3. Contribution vs. Limitations of the Study

In this section I will first talk about the contribution and then the limitations of the study. While the main contribution of the study can be seen as the integration of reproduction relations into global chain analysis through making them the core of labour process theory, the main limitation is the lack of focus on consumption relations. In the following, I will briefly restate how I make the integration of reproduction relations with global production analysis possible. Then I will talk about how I have already started to focus on consumption relations by chasing the tomatoes of this study to Japan.

8.3.1. What I Have Said

Why and how do we sustain this ‘unsustainable’ system? The people’s answer in the study speaks to the contribution of this study: their familial relations. People working in tomato production and processing most often do what they do in the workplace in order to meet their family commitments and support their family members, and most of the time they work in a way which their familial relationships construct and they are constructed through it. Hopefully by integrating reproduction relations with global production analysis, this study also contributes to labour process theory. I base this on my agreement with Thompson & Smith (2009), who argue that we urgently need to develop labour process theory in order to understand global production. The necessity of refreshing labour process theory comes from the crucial importance of understanding the reasons why and the ways in which workers do their work as well as focusing on the places in which production and reproduction occur. So, I claim that through focusing on the 'local' as a place where production and reproduction occur as well as showing the interweaving of those relations as both reasons for and ways of workers' generating consent, this study has managed to refresh labour process theory as a kernel of global commodity chain analysis.

My study takes a somewhat different focus than many other feminist studies of women's roles in global production. While they too may incorporate a focus on the relation between production and reproduction relations, they mostly concentrate on 'new factory workers' with rural backgrounds – but this provides us with insight into just one part of the operation of capitalism and patriarchy (as well as the transformation of rural life) (Lee, 1998; Ngai, 2005; Wolf, 1994). However, my study looks at who fills the spaces in agriculture that are left when the process of industrialisation begins. In so doing, it offers a fuller picture of the functioning of capitalism in relation to reproduction relations by showing the transformation of families and their incorporation into production relations and vice versa. Rammurthy (2004) emphasises the necessity of underscoring the relationship between agriculture and industry in order to understand the operation of global production chains in the cotton industry. She looks at the link between production and consumption using the relation between agriculture and industry. Here, however, I have tried to show the link between agriculture and industry by looking at the link between production and reproduction. I have looked not only at how global production affects the women's production and reproduction relations, but also at how these in turn affect global production. Focusing on these linkages rather than the link between production and consumption (although I still consider this to be beyond the main objective of this study) makes it possible to analyse the effect of the local in global production. This is because the focus on the relationship between production and reproduction relations reveals the differences and transformations inside the local more clearly, and consequently as we understand the local more fully, we can understand its connection with the global more fully.

The study has used the term 'intersectional patriarchy' to understand the social relations in the 'local' by depending on the local itself. When feminists said that they gave up using the concept of patriarchy (Acker, 1989; Pollert, 1996; Rowbotham, 1981; Gottfried, 1998), their reasons were that patriarchy is an abstract and reductionist (to biology) concept; it neither captures the malleable nature of gender relations nor does it offer us a chance to see the interweaving relations of gender and class. In contrast, I have suggested that through using the term 'intersectional patriarchy' this study overcome these critics, at least for this context. By emphasising (the) *el âlem* as a reproducer of patriarchy, I hopefully concretise the concept of patriarchy. Besides, it prevents patriarchy from being biologically reductionist as everyone can exercise some power in the patriarchal structures and I noted this as a reason for the persistence of patriarchy. Moreover, through also showing how patriarchy sustains and is sustained through the intersections of other inequalities, mainly of class, ethnicity and age, I have tried to capture the interweaving of gender and class. My understanding of intersectional patriarchy is as the various and fluid forms of masculinity with power over femininities within the labour process. I have also argued that masculinities are themselves constructed by the intersectionality of gender, class, ethnicity, age and education in various and malleable ways within the division of labour in tomato production. In addition, the thesis demonstrates how similar material conditions of work can lead to the overlapping of some elements of hegemonic masculinity (e.g. affinity with machines both in rural and Kemalist patriarchies) and, as a result, similarities between patriarchies. Indeed, intersectional patriarchy gives us a chance to examine similarities and differences between patriarchies other than those explored in the thesis and shows how the forms taken by patriarchy and masculine domination are dependent upon gendered divisions of labour within production.

8.3.2. What More Could Have been Said?

I argue that the main limitation of this study is that it has not looked at consumption relations as a part of the global chain analysis, so it cannot entirely capture how global capitalism operates and is sustained. As I was always aware of this during the study, in May 2015, from one rainy day in London, I went to another rainy day in Tokyo via İstanbul at least to see the fate of the tomatoes that I had been following for the past two years. When I arrived there, I was only thinking of how tired I was and of how it could not possibly be profitable to purchase tomatoes from such a long way away.

> The reason for our tomatoes’ lengthy journey to Japan results from the difficult working conditions on the tomato lands and in the factory; making such profits in spite of such distances is possible because of low pay and long working hours. All this travelling has made me feel like a squeezed tomato. My face is totally red as happens whenever I get too tired, and my whole face and my feet are swollen. At the end, I become

> like a tomato myself while I am following them. (Fieldwork diary, 20 May 2015)

Over the next few days, I spent time interviewing women who used the company's tomato sauce, and seeking out the tomato sauce we produced in Turkey on Japanese supermarket shelves. But, after interviewing Japanese women, it turned out they bought the same brands of tomato sauce from the supermarket but they were produced in Italy and tomato paste from Turkish tomatoes was in warehouses rather than in supermarkets. In effect, it seems that 'Turkish' tomatoes are not viewed as 'good' enough to enter Japanese households. Instead, catering companies or 'low grade' foreign restaurants purchase them.

So, while I was heading to one of Tokyo's most touristic spots –*'Akihabara'* – with the hope of finding a Turkish kebab shop to locate the destination of 'our' tomatoes – I was thinking millions of things: how could I tell the women workers back in Turkey that people in Japan prefer Italian tomatoes to ours? I was remembering how women working on the Japanese production line would flaunt their position over other women workers in the factory, because of their role in producing for the Japanese market. They were different and 'better' than other workers. *Cavuş*'s words were echoing in my mind, 'be serious, we are not playing here. Those tomatoes go to Japan. Show them that *'*we' [implying the 'Turkish nation*'*] have the best tomatoes. You don't want to shame us, do you?' I remembered how we would clean for hours when the representatives from a Japanese company came to the factory on one of their regular visits. We even had to clean the streets outside the factory gates. I remembered how the forewoman sent me to another line, where tomato sauce for a national supermarket was produced, because my uniform was not clean enough. How proud landowners were of themselves because they were 'chosen' to plant for the

Japanese, how Kurdish women on the land enjoyed the idea that they ate the same tomatoes as the Japanese. But, as it turns out, they do not, or at least people in Japan do not eat Turkish tomatoes in their homes. And, in a Turkish kebab shop in Tokyo, these tomatoes, that were held in such high esteem at the Turkish factory, are in fact used by Kurdish workers to make tomato sauce for *döner kebabs* intended to be consumed by migrants, tourists or Japanese people from low-income groups. And this is how the story of 'local' Turkish tomatoes connects the Japanese 'global' tomato production in this thesis: via a Kurdish worker in a Turkish kebab shop in Tokyo.

Ali, the young Kurdish employee in the Turkish kebab shop in Tokyo, explained this to me by saying that the 'Chinese come to eat here, the South Koreans come, they are migrants just like us and like us, they try to save money. Sometimes, young Japanese women come, as they like me [laughing here, and implying that young women visit the shop solely because of his attractiveness]. Students and tourists come' (22 May 2015, in the kebab shop).

Clearly, in a future study I will take 'the identity of tomatoes' more seriously; here I underestimated that tomatoes become the representatives of 'us', their producers; tomatoes are also inscribed within ethnicity and class as well as gender. Turkish tomatoes cannot compete with Italian tomatoes in the Japanese supermarkets because of the higher prestige attached to the latter. Finding an answer to the question of why richer countries like Japan prefer Italian to Turkish tomatoes will be the main objective of my further research. I will aim to investigate how the identities of workers, consumers and the products themselves are shaped by and shape each stage of the global tomato commodity chain. But for now with this study, we know that when someone touches a tomato on the land, in the factory or in their homes, which are the places we cannot name, they create themselves as well as us.

Let me conclude this study in a similar way to how it began, with the words of a Kurdish woman worker, Emine:

> ‘Emine [me, researcher], please tell the people we are working here under the sun not only just for ourselves, but for them. Ask them if we had not been here, how do they think they could live?’ (Fieldwork notes, 27 September 2013, on the tomato land)

References

Abadan-Unat, N. 1986. Women in the Developing World: Evidence from Turkey. Denver: University of Denver Press.

Abadan-Unat, N. 1991. ‘Educational Reforms on Turkish Women’. In N. Keddi and B. Baron (eds.) Women in Middle Eastern History: Shifting Boundaries in Sex and Gender New Haven: Yale University Press: 177-94.

Acar, F. 1994. ‘Higher Education in Turkey: A Gold Bracelet for Women’. In S. Suzanne, L. Malik and D. Harris (eds.) The Gender Gap in Higher Education London: Kogan: 160-70.

Acker, J. 1989. ‘The Problem with Patriarchy’. Sociology 23(2): 235-40.

Acker, J. 1990. ‘Hierarchies, Jobs and Bodies: A Theory of Gendered Organizations’.

Gender & Society 4 (2): 139-158.

Acker, J. 2006. ‘Inequality Regimes: Gender, Class and Race in Organisations’. Gender & Society 20(4): 441-64.

Adaman, F., Buğra, A. and İnsel, A. 2009. ‘Social Context of Labor Union Strategy: The case of Turkey’. Labor Studies Journal 34(2): 168-88.

Agricultural Economic and Policy Development Institute (TEPGE). ‘Domates ve Domates Salçası, Durum ve Tahmin 2012/2013’ (Tomato and Tomato Puree). Ankara, 2014.

Akın, C. R. and Danışman, F. 2011. Bildiğin Gibi Değil: 90'larda Güneydoğu'da Çocuk Olmak. (Being Children in Southeast in 90s) İstanbul: Metis.

Alexander, S. and Taylor, B. 1981. 'In Defence of Patriarchy'. In M. Barrett, S. Bruley, G. Chester, M. Millman, S. O'Sullivan, A. Sebestyen and L. Segal (eds.) No Turning Back London: The Women's Press: 79-82.

Ali, S. 2010. Kürk Mantolu Madonna (Madonna in Fur Coat). İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları.

Altınay, G. A. 2004. The Myth of the Military-Nation: Militarism, Gender, and Education in Turkey. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Anderson, B. 2006. Imagined Communties: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso.

Arat, Y. 1998a. Türkiye'de Modernleşme ve Ulusal Kimlik. (Turkish Modernasition and National Identity) İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları.

Arat, F. Z. 1998b. 'Educating the Daughters of Republic'. In Z, Arat (ed.) Deconstructing Images of the Turkish Women. London: Macmillan: 157-83.

Association of Social Anthropologists of the UK and Commonwealth (ASA), 2011. Ethical Guidelines for Good Research Practice. Accessed online: http://www.theasa.org/downloads/ASA%20ethics%20guidelines%202011.pdf. 18 June 2015.

Aydın, Z. 2005. The Political Economy of Turkey. London: Pluto Press.

Aydın, Z. 2010. 'Neo-Liberal Transformation of Turkish Agriculture'. Journal of

Agrarian Change 10(2): 149-187.

Bair, J. 2005. 'Global Capitalism and Commodity Chains: Looking Back, Going Forward'. Competition and Change 9(1): 158-80.

Bair, J. 2010. 'On Difference and Capital: Gender and the Globalization of Production'. Signs 36(1): 203-26.

Barndt, D. 2002. Tangled Routes: Women, Work and Globalization on the Tomato Trail. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publication.

Barrientos, S., Dolan, C. and Tallontire, A. 2003. 'A Gendered Value Chain Approach to Codes of Conduct in African Horticulture'. World Development 31 (9): 1511-26.

Barrientos, S. and Dolan, C. 2006. Ethical Sourcing in the Global Food System. London: Earthscan.

Barrientos, S. and Kritzinger, A. 2004. 'Squaring the Circle: Global Production and the Informalization of Work in South African Fruit Exports'. Journal of International Development, 16: 81-92.

Barrientos, S. and Perrons D. 1999. 'Gender and the Global Food Chain: A Comparative Study of Chile and the UK'. In Haleh Afshar and Stephanie Barrientos (eds) Women, Globalisation and Fragmentation in the Developing World London: Macmillan: 150-173.

Beechey, V. 1979. 'On Patriarchy'. Feminist Review 3: 66-82.

Beechey, V. 1987. Unequal Work. London: Verso.

Beneria, L. and Sen, G. 1997. ‘Accumulation, Reproduction and Women’s Role in Economic Development: Boserup Revisited’. In N. Visvanathan, L. Duggan, L. Nisonoff and N. Wiegersma (eds.) The Women, Gender and Development Reader London: Zed Books: 42-51.

Berik, G. 1996. ‘Understanding the Gender System in Rural Turkey; Fieldwork Dilemmas of Conformity and Intervention’. In D, Wolf (ed.) Feminist Dilemmas in Fieldwork. Colorado: Westview Press: 56-71.

Beşikçi, İ. 1969. Doğu Anadolu’nun Düzeni: Sosyo-ekonomik ve Etnik temeller (Organization of East Anatolia: socio-economic and ethnic foundations). İstanbul:E yayınları.

Boratav, K. 2004. Tarımsal Yapılar ve Kapitalizm. (Agricultural Dynamics and Capitalism) Ankara: İmge.

Bora, T. 2003. ‘Nationalist Discourses in Turkey’. South Atlantic Quarterly 102(2/3): 433-51.

Boserup, E. 1970. Women’s Role in Economic Development. London: George Allen & Unwin Publishing.

Bott, E. 2010. ‘Favourites and Others: Reflexivity and the Shaping of Subjectivities and Data in Qualitative Research’. Qualitative Research 10(2): 159-73.

Bozdoğan, S. and Kasaba, R. 1997. ‘Introduction’. In S. Bozdoğan and R. Kasaba (eds.) Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey Washington D.C.: University of Washington Press: 3-15.

Bozzoli, B. 1983. ‘Marxism, Feminism and South African Studies’. Journal of Southern African Studies 9 (2): 87-96.

Bradley, H. 1996. Fractured Identities: Changing Patterns of Ineqality. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bradley, H and Healy, G. 2008. Ethnicity and Gender at Work: Inequalities, Careers and Employment Relations. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Braverman, H. 1974. Labor and Monopoly Capital: the Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Buğra, A. and Yakut-Cakar, B. 2010. ‘Structural Change, the Social Policy Environment and Female Employment in Turkey’. Development and Change 41(3): 517-38.

Buğra, A. and Savaskan, O. 2012. ‘Politics and Class: Turkish Business Environment in the Neoliberal Age’. New Perspectives on Turkey 46: 27-63.

Burawoy, M. 1979. Manufacturing Consent: Changes in the Labor Process under Monopoly Capitalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Burawoy, M. 1985. The Politics of Production. London: Verso.

Cansever, E. 2005. Sonrasi Kalır/ Bütün Şiirleri 2. Cilt (Collection Volume 2) İstanbul: YKY.

Carroll, K. 2013. ‘Infertile? The Emotional Labour of Sensitive and Feminist Methodologies’. Qualitative Research 13(5): 546-61.

Cemal, N. 2012. Tekel'in Elleri: Mücadele ve Yordam. İstanbul: H20.

Chant, S. 1991. Women and Survival in Mexican Cities: Perspectives on Gender, Labour Markets and Low-income Households. Manchester: University of Manchester Press.

Chant, S. 1997. Women-headed Households: Diversity and Dynamics in the Developing World. Macmillan: Houndmills, Basingstoke.

Chant, S. and Gutmann, M. 2000. Mainstreaming Men into Gender and Development: Debates, Reflections and Experiences. Oxford: Oxfam.

Chant, S. and McIlwaine, C. 1995. Women of a Lesser Cost: Female Labour, Foreign Exchange and Philippine Development. London: Pluto.

Chant, S. and McIlwaine, C. 2009. Geographies of Development in the 21st Century: An Introduction to the Global South. Cheltenham: Elgar.

Chant, S. and McIlwaine, C. 2016. Cities, Slums and Gender in the Global South: Towards a Feminised Urban Future. London: Routledge.

Clelland, D. 2014. 'Unpaid Labor as Dark Value in Global Commodity Chains'. In W, Dunaway (ed.) Gendered Commodity Chains: Seeing Women's Work and Households in Global Production.California: Stanford University Press: 72-90.

Cockburn, C. 1983. Brothers: Male Dominance and Technological Change. London: Pluto Press.

Cockburn, C. 1985. Machinery of Dominance: Women, Men and Technical Know-How. London: Pluto Press.

Cockburn, C. 1991. In the Way of Women: Men’s Resistance to Sex Equality in Organisations. Basingstoke: Macmillan Publishing.

Collins, H. P. 2000. ‘It’s All in the Family: Intersections of Gender, Race and Nation’. In S. Harding and U. Narayan (eds.) Decentring the Centre: Philosophy for a Multicultural, Postcolonial, and Feminist World. Bloomington: Indiana University Press: 156-77.

Collins, J. 2014. ‘A Feminist Approach to Overcoming the Closed Boxes of the Commodity Chain’. In W, Dunaway (ed.) Gendered Commodity Chains: Seeing Women’s Work and Households in Global Production. California: Stanford University Press: 27-38.

Connell, R. 1987. Gender and Power: Society, the Person and Sexual Politics. Cambridge: Polity in association with Blackwell.

Connell, R. 1995. Masculinities. Cambridge: Polity.

Connell, R and Meeserschmidth, J. 2005. ‘Hegeomonic Masculinity Rethinking the Concept’. Gender& Society 19(6): 826-59.

Cravey, J. A. 1998. Women and Work in Mexico’s Maquiladoras. Boston: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Crenshaw, K. 1989. ‘Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics’. University of Chicago Legal Forum: 139–67.

Crenshaw, K. 1991. ‘Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and

Violence against Women of Color'. Stanford Law Review 43(6): 1241-1299 .

Çarkoğlu, A. & Kalaycıoğlu, E. Türkiye'de ve Dünya'da Vatandaşlık – 2014 ISSP Araştırma Raporu. İstanbul, 2014.

Çınar, E. M. 1991. Labour Opportunities for Adult Females and Home-Working Women in İstanbul, Turkey. Los Angeles: University of Califronia, The G.E. von Grunebaum Centre for Near Eastern Studies, Working paper 2.

Davies, S. 1990. 'Inserting Gender into Burawoy's theory of the Labour Process'. Work, Employment & Society 4: 391-406.

Dedeoğlu, S. 2010. 'Visible Hands – Invisible Women: Garment Production in Turkey'. Feminist Economics 16(4): 1-32.

Dedeoğlu, S. 2012. Women Workers in Turkey: Global Industrial Production in İstanbul. London: I. B. Tauris.

Dedeoğlu, S. 2014. 'Patriarchy Reconsolidated: Women's Work in Three Global Commodity Chains of Turkey's Garment Industry'. In W, Dunaway (ed.) Gendered Commodity Chains: Seeing Women's Work and Households in Global Production. California: Stanford University Press: 106-118.

Dunaway, W. 2014. (ed.) Gendered Commodity Chains: Seeing Women's Work and Households in Global Production. California: Stanford University Press.

Durakbaşa, A. 1998. 'Kemalism as Identity Politics in Turkey'. In Z. F. Arat (ed.) Deconstructing Images of 'the Turkish Women'. London: Macmillan Press: 139-57.

Duruiz, D. 2015. ‘Embodiment of Space and Labour: Kurdish Migrant Workers in Turkish Agriculture’. In Z. Gambetti and J. Jongerden (eds.) The Kurdish Issue in Turkey London: Routledge: 289- 308.

Ecevit, Y. 1991. ‘Shop Floor Control: the Ideological Construction of Turkish Women Factory Workers’. In N. Redclift and T. M. Sinclair (eds.) Working Women: International Perspectives on Labour and Gender Ideology. London: Routledge: 56-75.

Eisenstein, Z. 1979. (ed.) Capitalist Patriarchy. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Elson, D. and Pearson, R. 1981. 'Nimble Fingers Make Cheap Workers': An Analysis of Women's Employment in Third World Export Manufacturing. Feminist Review 7 (Spring): 87-107.

Ellis, C. 1999. ‘Heartful Autoethnography’. Qualitative Health Research 9(5): 669-83.

Ellis, C, 2007. ‘Telling Secrets, Revelaing Lives: Relational Ethics in Research with Intimate Others’, Qualitative Inquiry 13 (1): 3-29.

Elmas, E. 2007. Ilkokul çoçuklarında Atatürk algısı: Sevgili Atatürkçüğüm (Primary School Children’s Understanding of Atatürk: My Dear Atatürk). İstanbul: Hayy Kitap.

Emerald, E. and Carpenter, L. 2015. ‘Vulnerability and Emotions in Reseacrh Risks, Dilemmas, and Doubts’. Qualitative Inquiry 21(8): 741-50.

Engels, F. 1972. The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State. London: Lawrence and Wishart..

Eraydın, A. and Erendil, A. 1999. 'The role of Female Labour in Industrial Restructuring: New Production Processes and Labour Market Relations in the İstanbul Clothing Industry'. Gender, Place and Culture 6(3): 259-72.

Fernandez-Kelly, P. M. 1983. For We are Sold, I and My People: Women and Industry in Mexico's Frontier. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Fenster, T. 1999. 'Space for Gender: Cultural Roles of the Forbidden and the Permitted'. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 17: 227-46.

Fiorenza, E. 1992. But She Said: Feminist Practices of Biblical Interpretation. Boston: Beacon Press.

Firestone, S. 1971. The Dialectic of Sex. London: Paladin.

Foucault, M. 1991. Discipline and Punishment. London: Penguin Books.

Fromm, E. 1961. Marx's concept of Man. New York: Ungar.

Gereffi, G. and Korzeniewicz, M. 1994. (eds.) Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Glucksmann, M. 1982. Women on the Line. London: Routledge.

Glucksmann, M. 1990. Women Assemble: Women Workers and the New Industries in Inter-war Britain. London: Routledge.

Glucksmann, M. 1995. 'The work of Knowledge and the Knowledge of Women's

Work'. In M. P. J. Maynard (eds.) Researching Women's Lives From a Feminist Perspective. London: Taylor & Francis: 149-66.

Goffman, A. 2014. On the Run: Fugitive Life in an American City. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Gottfried, H. 1998. 'Beyond Patriarchy? Theorising Gender and Class'. Sociology 32(3): 451-68.

Gürel, B. 2011. 'Agrarian Change and Labour Supply in Turkey, 1950-1980'. Journal of Agrarian Change 11 (2): 195-219.

Haraway, D. 1988. 'Situated Knowledges-The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective'. Feminist Studies 14 (3): 575-99.

Harding, G. S. 1986. The Science Question in Feminism. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.

Hartmann, H. 1981. 'The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: Towards a More Progressive Union'. In L. Sargent (ed.) Women and Revolution: A Discussion of the Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism Boston: South End Press: 1-43.

Harvey, M., Quilley, S. and Beynon, H. 2002. Exploring the Tomato: Transformation of Nature, Society and Economy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Heinemann, F. 1934. 'Goethe's Phenomenological Method'. Philosophy 33(9): 67-81.

Hsuing, P. 1996. 'Between Bosses and Workers: The Dilemma of a Keen Observer and a Vocal Feminist'. In D. L. Wolf (ed.) Feminist Dilemmas in Fieldwork. Oxford:

Westview Press: 122-38.

İlkkaracan, İ. 2012. ‘Why so Few Women in the Labor Market in Turkey?’. Feminist Economics 18 (1) : 1-37.

İlyasoğlu, A. 1998. ‘Islamist Women in Turkey: Their Identity and Self-Image’. In Z. F. Arat (ed.) Deconstructing Images of ‘the Turkish Women’. London: Macmillan Press: 241-63.

İncirlioğlu, O. E. 1998. ‘Images of Village Women in Turkey: Models and Anomalies’. In Z. F. Arat (ed.) Deconstructing Images of ‘the Turkish Woman’ London: Macmillan Press: 199-225.

Kabeer, N. 1994. Reversed Realities: Gender Hierarchies in Development Thought. London: Verso.

Kabeer, N. 2000. Power to Choose: Bangladeshi Women and Labour Market Decisions in London and Dhaka. London: VERSO.

Kandiyoti, D. 1985. Women in Rural Production Systems: Problems and Policies Paris: UNESCO.

Kandiyoti, D. 1988. ‘Bargaining with Patriarchy’. Gender & Society 2(3): 274-90.

Kandiyoti, D. (ed.) 1991. Women, Islam and the State. London: Macmillan.

Kandiyoti, D. 1995. ‘Patterns of Patriarchy: Notes for an Analysis of Male Dominance in Turkish Society’. In S. Tekeli (ed.) Women in Modern Turkish Society London: Zed Books: 306- 318.

Kandiyoti, D, 1996. Cariyeler, Bacılar, Yurttaşlar: Kimlikler ve Toplumsal Dönüşümler. (Concubines, Sisters and Citizens: Identities and Social Transformation) İstanbul: Metis.

Kandiyoti, D. 1997. 'Gendering the Modern: On missing dimensions in the study of Turkish modernity'. In S. Bozdogan and R. Kasaba (eds.) Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey. Seattle: Washington University Press: 113-132.

Kavak, S. 2012. Struggling for Survival in the Village: New Rurality and Patterns of Rural RestructuringPublishing, 2012.

Kavakçı, M. 2014. Headscarf Politics in Turkey: A Postcolonial Reading. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Keleş, R. 1983. 100 Soruda Türkiye de Kentleşme Konut ve Gecekondu (100 Questions on Urbanisation and Squatting in Turkey). İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi.

Kelly, L., Burton, S. and Regan, L. 1995. 'Researching Women's Lives or Studying Women's Oppression? Reflections on What Constitutes Feminist Research'. In M. Maynard and J. Purvis (eds.) Researching Women's Lives from a Feminist Perspective. London: Taylor & Francis: 27-49.

Kemal, Y. 2013. İnce Memed (Mehmet Hawk). Ankara:YKY

Keyder, C. and Yenal, Z. 2011. 'Agrarian Change under Globalization: Markets and Insecurity in Turkish Agriculture'. Journal of Agrarian Change 11 (1): 60-86.

Keyder, C. and Yenal, Z. 2013. Bildiğimiz Tarımın Sonu: Küresel İktidar ve Köylülük (The end of agriculture we know: global hegemony and peasantry). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Koç, Y. 2010. Türkiye İşçi Sınıfı Tarihi: Osmanlı'dan 2010'a (The History of Turkish Working Class: From Ottoman Empire to 2010). Ankara: Epos.

KONDA. '30 Mart Yerel Seçimler Sonrası Sandık ve Seçmen Analizi' (Voter Analysis after 30th March). İstanbul, 2014.

KONDA. '7 Haziran Genel Seçimler Sonrası Sandık ve Seçmen Analizi' (Voter Analysis after 7th June). İstanbul, 2015.

Kondo, D. K. 1990. Crafting Selves: Power, Gender and Discourses of Identity in a Japanese Workplace. London: University of Chicago Press.

Küçükkırca, A. İ. 2015. 'The Transformation of the Private Home of Kurdish Seasonal Workers'. In Z. Gambetti and J. Jongerden (ed.) The Kurdish Issue in Turkey London: Routledge: 309-330.

Leavy, L. P. 2007. 'The Feminist Practice of Ethnography'. In S, Nagy, H. Biber and L. P. Leavy (eds.) Feminist Research Practice. London: SAGE: 187-219.

Lee, K. C. 1998. Gender and the South China Miracle: Two Worlds of Factory Women. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Lessinger, J. 1990. 'Work and Modesty: The Dilemma of Women Market Traders in Madras'. In Leela Dube and Rajni Palriwala (eds) Structures and Strategies. New Delhi: Sage: 129-50.

Lordoğlu, K. 1990. Eve İş Verme Sistemi İçinde Kadın İşgücü Üzerine Bir Alan Araştırması (A Fieldwork on Women's Employment in Homeworking). İstanbul: Friedrich Ebert Vakfi.

Mackintosh, M. 1984. 'The Sexual Division of Labour and the Subordination of Women'. In K. Young, C. Wolkowitz and R. McCullagh (eds.) 2nd ed. Off Marriage and the Market: Women's Subordination Internationally and Its Lessons. London: Routledge: 3-18.

Makal, A. 2010. 'Türkiye'de Erken Cumhuriyet Döneminde Kadın Emeği' (Women's Labour in Early Republican Era in Turkey). Çalışma ve Toplum (Work and Society) 25: 13-39.

Makal, A. and Toksöz, G. (eds.) 2012. Geçmişten Günümüze Türkiye'de Kadın Emeği (From Past to Present Women's Labour in Turkey). Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Yayinevi.

Mardin, Ş. 1991. Türkiye de Din ve Siyaset Makaleler I. (Religion and Politics in Turkey I). İstanbul: İletişim.

Mardin, Ş. 2006. Religion, Society and Modernity in Turkey. New York: Syracuse University Press.

Marx, K. 1990. Capital: The Critique of Political Economy Volume 1. London: Penguin Classics.

Marcus, G. 1995. 'Ethnography in/of the World System: The Emergence of Multi-sited Ethnography'. Annual Review of Anthropology. Volume 24: 95-117.

Maynard, M. 1995. ‘Methods, Practice and Epistemology: The Debate about Feminism and Research’. In M. Maynard and J. Purvis (eds.) Researching Women’s Lives from a Feminist Perspective. London: Taylor & Francis: 10-27.

McBride, A., Hebson, G. and Holgate, J. 2015. ‘Intersectionality: are we taking enough notice in the field of work and employment relations?’. Work, Employment and Society 29(2): 331-41.

McCall, L. 2005. ‘The Complexity of Intersectionality’. Signs 30(3): 1771-1800.

Mernissi, F. 1985. Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society. London: Routledge.

Mies, M. 1982. The Lace Makers of Narsapur: Indian Housewives Produce for the World Market. London: Zed Books.

Millet, K. 1977. Sexual Politics. London: Virgo.

Ministry of Development (TCKB). ‘Onuncu Kalkınma Planı 2014’ (10th Development Plan 2014). Ankara, 2013.

Ministry of National Education (MEB). ‘Meb Mevzuat: Milli Eğitim Temel Kanunu’ (National Education Law). Ankara, 1983.

Mitchell, J. 1975. Psychoanalysis and Feminism. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Mohanty, C. 1984. ‘Underwestern Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourse’. Boundary 2 12(3): 333-58.

Mogdaham, V. 1998. Women, Work and Economic Reform in the Middle East and North Africa. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Momsen, J. 2004. Gender and Development. London: Routledge.

Moser, C. 1993. Gender Planning and Development: Theory, Practice and Training. London: Routledge.

Narayan, U. 1989. 'The Project of Feminist Epistemology: Perspectives from a Nonwestern Feminist'. In A. I. Jaggar and S. Bordo (eds.) Gender/Body/Knowledge: Feminist Reconstructions of Being and Knowing. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press: 256-69.

Nash. C. J. 2008. 'Re-thinking Intersectionality'. Feminist Review 89:1-15.

Ngai, P. 2005. Made in China: Women Factory Workers in a Global Workplace. Durham [NC]: Durham University Press.

Nichols, T and Sugur, N. 2004. Global Management, Local Labour: Turkish Workers and Modern Industry. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Oakley, A. 1974. The Sociology of Housework. New York: Pantheon Books.

Ong, A. 1987. Spirits of Resistance and Capitalist Discipline: Factory Women in Malaysia. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Öniş, Z. 2006. 'Globalisation and Party Transformation: Turkey's Justice and Development Party'. In P. Burnell (ed.) Globalizing Democracy: Party Poltics in Emerging Democracies. London: Routlegde: 122-40.

Öniş, Z. 2012. ‘The Triumph of Conservative Globalism: The Political Economy of the AKP Era’. Turkish Studies 13 (2): 135-52.

Özuğurlu, M. 2011. Küçük Köylülüğe Sermaye Kapanı: Türkiye'de Tarım Çalışmaları ve Köylülük Üzerine Gözlemler (Capital Trap on Small Peasantry: Observation on agricultural studies and peasantry in Turkey*)*. Ankara: Nota Bene.

Pahl, J. 1989. Money and Marriage. London: Macmillan.

Pahl, J. 1995. ‘His Money, Her Money: Recent Research in Financial Organisation in Marriage’. Journal of Economic Psychology 16(3): 361-76.

Patil, V. 2013. ‘‘From Patriarchy to Intersectionality’: A Transnational Feminist Assessment of How Far We’ve Really Come’. Signs 38(4): 847-67.

Pearson, R. 1998. ‘Nimble Fingers Revisited: Reflections on women and Thirds World in dustrialisation in the late twentieth century’. In C. Jackson & R. Pearson (eds.) Feminist Visions of Development: Gender, Analysis and Policy. London: Routlegde: 171-188.

Pearson, R. 2000. ‘All Change? Men, Women and Reproductive Work in the Global Economy’. European Journal of Development Research. 12 (2): 19-37.

Pearson, R., Whitehead, A. & Young, K. 1984. ‘Introduction: the continuing subordination of women in the development process’. In K. Young, C. Wolkowitz, and R. McCullagh (eds.) Off Marriage and the Market: Women’s Subordination Internationally and Its Lessons. London: Routlegde: ix-1.

Pearson, R. & Jackson, C. 1998. 'Interrogating Development'. In C. Jackson & R. Pearson (eds.) Feminist Visions of Development: Gender, Analysis and Policy. London: Routlegde: 1-17.

Phillips, A. and Taylor, B. 1980. 'Sex and Skill: Notes towards a Feminist Economics'. Feminist Review. 6: 79-88.

Pillow, W. 2003. 'Confession, Catharsis or Cure? Rethinking the Uses of Reflexivity as Methodological Power in Qualitative Research'. International Journal of Qualitative Research in Education 16(2): 175-96.

Pollert, A. 1981. Girls, Wives, Factory Lives. London: Macmillan Press.

Pollert, A. 1996. 'Gender and Class Revisited; or the Poverty of Patriarchy'. Sociology 30(4): 639-59.

Rai, S. M. and Georgina, W. (eds) 2014. New Frontiers in Feminist Political Economy. London: Routledge.

Rainnie, A. 2013. Global Destruction Networks, Labour and Waste. Rutgers University: International Labour Process Conference, no.31.

Ramamurthy, P. 2004. 'Why is buying a 'Madras' Cotton Shirt a Political Act? Feminist Commodity Chain Analysis'. Feminist Studies 30(3): 734-69.

Rammamurthy, P. 2014. 'Feminist Commodity Chain Analysis: A Framework to Conceptualise Value and Interpret Perplexity'. In W, Dunaway (ed) Gendered Commodity Chain Analysis: Seeing Women's Work and Households in Global Production. California: Stanford University Press: 38-54.

Ran, H. N. 2007. Memleketimden İnsan Manzaraları (Human Landscapes from my Courntry). İstanbul: YKY.

Rathgeber, M. E. 1990. 'WID, WAD, GAD: Trends in Research and Practice'. The Journal of Developing Areas 24(4): 489-502.

Reay, D. 1996. 'Insider Perspectives or Stealing the Words Out of Women's Mouths: Interpretation in the Research Process'. Feminist Review 53: 57–73.

Rowbotham, S. 1981. 'The Trouble with Patriarchy'. In M. Barrett, S. Bruley, G. Chester, M. Millman, S. O'Sullivan, A. Sebestyen and L. Segal (eds.) No Turning Back London: The Women's Press: 72-79.

Ruşen, Ç. 2008. Mahalle Baskısı (Neighbourhood Pressure). İstanbul: Dogan Kitap.

Salzinger, L. 2003. Genders in Production: Making Workers in Mexico's Global Factories. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Sancar, S. 2012. Türk Modernleşmesinin Cinsiyeti (The Sex of Turkish Modernisation). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Sarıgıl, Z. 2012. 'Ethnic Groups at "Critical Junctures": The Laz vs. Kurds'. Middle Eastern Studies 48(2): 269-86.

Schick, C. I. 1998. 'The Women of Turkey as Sexual Personae: Images from Western Literature'. In Z. F. Arat (ed.) Deconstructing Images of 'the Turkish Women' London: Macmillan Press: 83-101.

Seamon, D. 1998. 'Goethe, Nature and Phenomenology: An Introduction'. In D. Seamon and A. Zajonc (eds.) Goethe's Way of Science: A Phenomenology of Nature.

Albany: State University of New York Press: 1-15.

Selwyn, B. 2012. Workers, State and Development in Brazil. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Skeggs, B. 1995. ‘Situating the Production of Feminist Ethnography’. In M. Maynard and J. Purvis (eds.) Researching Women’s Lives from a Feminist Perspective. London: Taylor & Francis: 72-93.

Smith, E. D. 1987. The Everyday World as Problematic: a Feminist Sociology. Boston: Northeastern University Press.

Stanley, L. 1993. ‘On Auto/Biography in Sociology’. Sociology 27(1): 41-52.

Stanley, L. and Wise, S. 1990. ‘Method, Methodology and Epistemology in Feminist Research Processes’. In Stanley, L. (ed.) Feminist Praxis: Research, Theory and Epistemology in Feminist Sociology. London: Routledge: 20-63.

Stanley, L. and Wise, S. 1991. ‘Feminist Research, Feminist Consciousness and Experiences of Sexism’. In M. M. Fonow and A. J. Cook (eds.) Beyond Methodology: Feminist Scholarship as Lived Research. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press: 265-284.

Stanley, L. and Wise, S. 1993. Breaking Out Again: Feminist Ontology and Epistemology. 2nd ed. London: Routledge.

Stewart, A. 2015. Gender, Law and Justice in a Global Market. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Strohmeier, M. and Yalçın-Heckmann, L. 2013. Kürtler :Tarih, Siyaset, Kültür

(Kurds: History, Politics, Culture). İstanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yurt Yayınları.

Subaşı, N. (2008). Mahalleyi baskıyla hatırlamak. *Şerif Mardin Okumalar,* T. Takış (Ed.). Ankara: Doğu-Batı Yayınları.

Şen, M. 2014. 'Trabzon'dan İstanbul'a göç edenlerin sosyo-ekonomik analizi' (Socio-Economic Analysis of Migrants from Trabzon to İstanbul). Çalışma Dünyası (Working Life) 2(3): 46-61.

Şimşek, Z. 2012. 'Mevsimlik Tarım İşçilerinin ve Ailelerinin İhtiyaçlarının Belirlenmesi Araştırması' (Seasonal Agricultural Workers and Families Survey). Ankara, Üreme Sağlığı Araştırması.

Taylor, J. 2011. 'The Intimate Insider: negotiating the ethics of friendship when doing insider research'. Qualitative Research. 11(1): 3-22.

The Chamber of Agricultural Engineers (ZMO). 'Türkiye' de Domates ve Domates Salçası Üretimi ve Dış Ticareti' (Tomato Production, Processing and Export in Turkey). Ankara, 2014.

The Union of Exporters of Fresh Fruit and Vegetables (YSMİB). 'Değerlendirme Raporu Mayıs 2014' (Evaluation Reports May 2014). Mersin, 2014.

Thompson, P. 1989. The Nature of Work. London: Palgrave: Macmillan.

Thompson, P. and Smith, C. 2009. 'Labour Power and Labour Process: Contesting the Marginality of the Sociology of Work'. Sociology 43(5): 913-30.

Toksöz, G. (2007). Women's Employment Situation in Turkey. Ankara: International Labour Office.

Toksöz, G. 2011. '"One step forward, two step backward' from labour market exclusion to inclusion; a gender perspective on effects of the economic crisis in Turkey'. In N. Visvanathan (ed.) The Women, Gender and Development Reader. London: Zed Books: 306-317.

Toprak, B., Bozan, İ., Morgül, T. ve Şener, N. (2009), *Türkiye'de farklı olmak: din ve muhafazakârlık ekseninde ötekileştirilenler (mahalle baskısı raporu)*, İstanbul: Metis Yayınları.

Torres, G. 1997. The Force of Irony: Power in the Everyday Life of Mexican Tomato Workers. Oxford: Berg.

Tuğal, C. 2009. Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Turam, B. 2006. Between Islam and the State: The Politics of Engagement. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Turkish Association Trade (TBOO). 'Sanayi Kapasite Raporu Istatistikleri' (Industry Statisctics). Ankara, 2014.

Turkish Official Gazette, 2006. Tohumculuk Kanunu (Seed Law) [online] available at; < http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2006/11/20061108-1.htm> , [accessed at; 24.04.2013].

Turkish Official Gazette, 2007. Toprak Kanunu (Land Law) [online] available at; < http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2007/02/20070209-1.htm> , [accessed at; 24.04.2013].

Turkish Republic Central Bank (TMCB). 'Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to Food

Manufacturing’. Ankara, 2012.

Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK). ‘Tarımsal İşletme Yapı Araştırması’ (Research on Agriarian Structures). Ankara, 2006a.

Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK). ‘Türkiye’de Aile Yapısı Araştırması’ (Family Structure Survey 2006). Ankara, 2006b.

Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK). ‘ Zaman Kullanim Anketi Sonuclari 2006’ (The results of time spent survey 2006). Ankara, 2006c.

Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK). ‘İstatistik Göstergeler 1923-2011’ (Statistical Indicators). Ankara, 2011a.

Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK). ‘Tarim Istatistikleri Ozeti’ (The summary of the agricultural Statistics). Ankara, 2011b.

Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK). ‘Istatistiklerde Kadin 2012’ (Women in Statistics 2012). Ankara, 2012.

Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK). ‘Istihdamin Sektörel Dağılımı’ (The distribution of labour force by sectors). Ankara, 2013a.

Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK). ‘Hanehalkı İşgücü İstatistikleri’ (Household Labour Force Statistics). Ankara, 2013b.

Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK). ‘Seçilmiş Göstergelerle Trabzon 2013’ (Trabzon with Selected Statistics). Ankara, 2014a.

Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK). ‘Seçilmiş Göstergelerle Samsun 2013’ (Samsun with Selected Statistics). Ankara, 2014b.

Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK). ‘Seçilmiş Göstergelerle Mardin 2013’ (Mardin with Selected Statistics). Ankara, 2014c.

Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK). ‘Seçilmiş Göstergelerle Bursa 2013’ (Bursa with Selected Statistics). Ankara, 2014d.

Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK). ‘İstatistiklerle Türkiye 2014’ (Turkey in Statistics 2014). Ankara, 2014e.

Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK). ‘Toplumsal Cinsiyet Araştırması’ (Gender Survey). Ankara, 2014f.

Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK). ‘Nüfus kütüklerine kayitli en çok kullanilan 50 kadin ve erkek adi’ (The Most Used 50 Female and Male Names in Registration System). Ankara, 2015a.

Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK). ‘İl ve ilçelere göre il/ilçe merkezi, belde/köy nüfusu ve yıllık nüfus artış hızı’ (The annual growth of population in urban and rural areas). Ankara, 2015b.

Walby, S. 1986. Patriarchy at Work: Patriarchal and Capitalist Relations in Employment. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Walby, S. 1990. Theorizing Patriarchy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Walby, S. 2011. Future of Feminism. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Westwood, S. 1984. All Day, Every Day: Factory and Family in the Making of Women's Lives. London: Pluto Press.

White, J. 2004. Money Makes us Relatives: Women’s Labour in Urban Turkey. Austin: University of Texas Press.

White, J. 2012. Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Whitehead, A. (2011) The gendered impacts of liberalisation policies on african agriculture economies and rural livelihoods. *In:* RAVAZI, S. (ed.) *The gendered impacts of liberalisation; towards "embedded liberalism".* Oxon: Routledge.

Williams, S. 2013. Globalization and Work. London: Polity.

Wise, S. and Stanley, L. 2006. ‘Having it All: Feminist Fractured Foundationalism’. In K. Davis, M. Evans and J. Lorber (eds.) Handbook of Gender and Women’s Studies. London: Sage: 435-56.

Wolf, D. 1994. Factory Daughters: Gender, Household Dynamics and Rural Industrialization in Java. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Women for Women’s Human Rights (WWHR). ‘Gender Discrimination in the Turkish Penal Code Draft Law’. İstanbul, 2004.

Worker Health and Work Safety Assembly (İSGM). 2014 Yılı İş Cinayetleri Raporu (Report of Workers' Death ın 2014). Ankara, 2014.

Wright C. and Madrid, G. 2007. 'Contesting Ethical Trade in Colombia's Cut-Flower Industry: A Case of Cultural and Economic Injustice'. Cultural Sociology. 1 (2): 255-75

Wright, M. 2006. Disposable Women and Other Myths of Global Capitalism. London: Routledge.

Vera-Sanso, P. 1995. ‘Community, Seclusion and Female Labour Force Participation in Madras, India’. Third World Planning Review. 17 (2): 155-67

Visvanathan, N. 1997. ‘Introduction to Part I’. In N. Visvanathan, L. Duggan, L. Nisonoff and N. Wiegersma (eds.) The Women, Gender and Development Reader London: Zed Books: 17-33.

Yalçın-Heckmann, L. 2012. Kürtlerde Aşiret ve Akrabalık İlişkileri (Tribe and Kinship among Kurds). İstanbul: İletişim.

Yalman, G. and Bedirhanoğlu, P. 2010. ‘State, Class and the Discourse’. In A. Saad-Filho and G. Yalman (eds.) Economic Transitions to Neoliberalism in Middle-income Countries: Policy Dilemmas, Economic Crises, Forms of Resistance. London: Routledge: 108-25.

Yeates, N. 2014. ‘Global Care Chains: Bringing in Transnational Reproductive Laborer Households’. In W, Dunaway (ed.) Gendered Commodity Chains: Seeing Women’s Work and Households in Global Production. California: Stanford University Press: 175-208.

Yeğen, Mesut. 1996. ‘The Turkish State Discourse and the Exclusion of Kurdish Identity’. Middle Eastern Studies 32(2): 216–29.

Young, K. Wolkowitz, C and McCullagh, R. (eds.) 1984. Off Marriage and Market: Women's Subordination Internationally and Its Lessons. London: Routledge.

.Yuval-Davis, N. 1997. Gender and Nation. London: Sage.

Yuval-Davis, N. 2006. 'Intersectionality and Feminist Politics'. European Journal of Women's Studies 13(3): 193-209.

Zavella, P. 1996. 'Feminist Insider Dilemmas: Constructing Ethnic Identity with Chicana Informants'. In D. L. Wolf (ed.) Feminist Dilemmas in Fieldwork. Oxford: Westview Press: 138-60.

APPENDIX A: Abbreviations of the Names of Political Parties and Other Organizations (with year of foundation)

AKP Justice and Development Party (2001, currently (2016) in control of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM))

CHP Republican People’s Party (1923, currently the main opposition in the TBMM)

DEP Democracy Party (1991-1994)

FP Virtue Party (1997-2001)

HADEP People’s Democratic Party (1994-2003)

HDP People’s Democratic Party (2013, currently a minority party in the TBMM)

İSGM Worker Health and Work Safety Assembly (1969)

MEB Republic of Turkey Ministry of Turkish Education

MHP Nationalist Movement Party (1969, currently in the TBMM)

PKK Kurdistan Worker’s Party (1984-present)

RP Welfare Party (1983-1998)

TCKB Republic of Turkey Ministry of Development

TCMB Central Bank of Republic of Turkey (1930)

TEKGIDA-İŞ Confederation of Food Workers Union (1952)

TEPGE Agricultural Economic and Policy Development Institute (1996)

TÜİK Institute of Turkish Official Statistics (1926)

TÜRK-İŞ Confederation of Worker Unions of Turkey (1952)

TÜSİAD Association of Industrialists and Businessmen of Turkey (1971)

YSMİB The Union of Exporters of Fresh Fruit and Vegetables

ZMO The Chamber of Agricultural Engineers (1954)

APEENDIX B: A Note on Pronunciation of Turkish Letters

Modern Turkish uses a modified version of the Latin alphabet. Turkish is pronounced phonetically, but there are a few letters that readers who are unfamiliar with the Turkish language may struggle with:

Â â although this letter is currently being phased out of the Turkish language, it is an elongated 'a' and is pronounced like the 'a' in stable

C c is pronounced like an English 'j', as in jelly.

Ç ç is pronounced 'ch', as in chair.

G g is pronounced as a hard 'g', as in garment.

Ğ ğ is silent but lengthens the vowel that precedes it- so Erdoğan is pronounced Aer-doe-an.

I ı does not have a direct equivalent in English but is pronounced like the 'e' in open.

İ i is pronounced 'i', as in sin.

J j is a soft 'j', similar to the French, je.

Ö ö is pronounced like the 'i' in bird.

Ş ş is pronounced 'sh', as in shout.

Ü ü is pronounced like the 'ew' in flew.

APPENDIX C: A Timeline of Turkish History (Since Turkish Settlement in Anatolia)

Before Republic of Turkey – Ottoman Empire	
11th Century (1071)	Turks began to arrive Anatolia from Central Asia.
1299	Ottoman Empire was founded in western Anatolia.
In the late 13th century	The regions where Kurds lived were conquered by the Ottoman Empire.
1453	The Ottomans conquered Istanbul (that time Constantinople) and ended Byzantine Empire.
Through 15th 16th and 17th Centuries	The Ottoman Empire expanded into Asia, Africa and Europe and reached it's the widest boundaries.
At the end of the 17th century	The Ottomans lost the Battle of Vienna, and their advance to Europe was halted, the decline began.
Beginning of 20th Century	In the First World War, the Ottomans were on the side of central powers: Germany, Austria and Hungary, and lost the war. This triggered the collapse of Ottoman Empire and allied powers occupied most of its land.
1918-1922	• After the Ottomans lost the First World War, Anatolia (current borders of Turkish Republic) was occupied by allied powers, mainly by British Empire, France, Italy and Greece. • In 1920, The Ottoman Empire signed the '*Treaty of Sevres*' with allied powers. The agreement was not only meant to be annihilation of the Empire it also brought the possibility of an Independent Kurdish Nation in South-eastern Anatolia. • Independence War, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, against the invasion and Ottoman ruling.
Establishment of Turkish Republic and Kemalism	
1923	• After the triumph of Independence War, Turkey signed another treaty with allied powers, *Treaty of Lausanne*, which eliminates the *Treaty of Sevres.* • Mustafa Kemal Ataturk declared the establishment of Turkish Republic.
1922- 1934	Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's reforms • 1922 Sultanate abolished.

	• 1924 Caliphate abolished. • 1925 Veiling was discouraged through the promotion of western clothing both for women and men (Hat Law). • 1925 Islamic calendar is replaced with Gregorian one. • 1926 New constitution adopted, which was based on France and Switzerland's penal codes. Islamic polygamy was ended and civil marriage was introduced. • 1928 Based on Latin alphabet, New Turkish alphabet was introduced. • 1928 The secular state is declared in the constitution. • 1934 Women were given a right to vote.
1925	Sheikh Said Rebellion, planned by Kurdish extremists against the secular state. The aim was to re-establish the caliphate and Islamic rules. It failed and rebels were executed.
1938	Mustafa Kemal Ataturk died.
1938	Dersim Rebellion; organised by Alevi Kurds against the relocation plans of the government, for some in favour of creating cultural homogeneity, and for others assimilation of ethnic minorities. It failed and tens of thousands Kurds were killed by Turkish army.
1945	Turkey did not take part the Second World War and after the war it joined the United Nations.
1955	September Events (6-7 September): Mob attacks directed to Greek minority in Istanbul. It resulted in majority of Greek population immigrating to Greece from Istanbul.
1952	Turkey joined Nato.
1960	The first military coup.
1974	Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) was founded by Abdullah Öcalan.
1974	Turkish military forces entered the Northern Cyprus.
1980	The second military coup.
1982	New constitution adopted (also current constitution), criticised for being more authoritative than previous ones.
1984	Turkey recognised the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus'. PKK began guerrilla war in South-eastern Anatolia.
1990	USA led coalition began to use Turkish bases for air strikes against Iraq. Iraq war resulted in a large number of Kurdish

	immigrants moving to Turkey.
1993	Sivas Massacre, targeted Alevi and leftist intellectuals gathered for a conference in a hotel. Attack was led by Sunni extremists and 35 people burned to death.
1999	PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, captured in Kenya and accused with life sentence.
Rising AKP and Political Islam	
2002	Justice and Development Party (AKP) won the general election.
2002	Death sentence abolished and bans on Kurdish education and broadcasting lifted.
2003	The parliament approved a series of laws easing the restrictions on freedom of speech, Kurdish language rights.
2005	EU membership negotiations officially began.
2007	Secularists groups organised secularism rally against AKP.
2007	AKP won the general election for the second time.
2009	Official Turkish broadcasting (TRT) began Kurdish broadcasting for the first time in Turkish history.
2011	AKP won the general election for the third time.
2013	Gezi Park Protest. Thousands of people protested in Istanbul, against the demolition of Gezi Park. Soon after, the protests morphed as anti-government protests across Turkey. It lasted around 10 days. At the end, the park is saved.
2014	Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the leader of AKP and Prime minister at that time, was elected as President.
2015	• AKP lost their majority in the general election (June). • Pro-Kurdish HDP won seats in the parliament (June). • Constellation process (Baris Sureci) frozen: talks with Abdullah Ocalan were stopped and ceasefire between PKK and Turkish State came to end (Summer 2015). • AKP got the majority of seats in parliament in November. • ISIS increased its attacks in major Turkish cities such as Ankara, Istanbul, and Urfa.
2016	• The number of Syrian migrants (due to war in Syria) reached at 2.7 million in Turkey. • In July, a military coup attempt occurred. It resulted in more than 200 people deaths and many injuries. The Attempt failed.

APPENDIX D: Glossary

Turkish Terms for the Members of a Rural Woman's Family'[92]

Abi elder brother

In Turkish, using this word to talk to or about a man older than yourself is very common, regardless of whether you have a literal kinship link or not.

For instance, in my fieldwork diary (22 August 2014)[93], I wrote *'To prevent possible gossip about me and Seçkin in the factory, I decided to call him 'abi'*

Abicim my dear brother

Although the direct translation of the word is 'my dear brother', it is used by women to address their *abi* (older brothers) or, by children, for any adult man. It can be used by women and men, girls and boys. When women and younger men use the word, it is used to address their older brothers with affection. But, when older men use it, it is used to address younger men or women with affection. Women can also use the word for non-relatives, but it is not common.

---

[92] In the text, I have used the Turkish words to refer to positions in the familial hierarchy. The reason for choosing Turkish words rather than Kurdish, which is the native language of most of the rural workers in tomato production, is because all of my communication with the people in the study was in Turkish, including with Kurds. All of the Kurds in the study with the exception of one woman spoke Turkish. I have checked that for each word I used in Turkish, Kurds also use the direct translations in their language. Here, I should note that as inter-family marriages are common for Kurds, most of the Kurdish informants in the study continue to use the terms they used to refer to family members before marriage once they are married. For instance if one were to marry their aunt's son, they would continue to call their mother-in-law their aunt. However, *kaynana* is still used is specific discussions about their mothers-in-law.

[93] To give examples of word usage, I have used quotes from my fieldwork notes and diary as examples when appropriate. When I could not find appropriate examples form my fieldwork diary or notes, I have chosen examples that could have been used by the informants of the study at any point in their lives.

I [elder brother] *am very proud of you 'abicim' as you* [his sister or brother] *are so hardworking*.

Abla elder sister

Abla (ablalar, pl) is the female version of *abi* and has the same usage:

'It is good to have "ablalar" on the land to not get bored' (Pınar, young Kurdish worker, Fieldwork notes, 13 May 2013).

'Ablacim! Return to your place quickly' (One of the most common phrases spoken by a *çavuş* to issue warnings to the women in the factory).

Amca paternal uncle

Amca is a very central figure for a child in the extended rural family, particularly their older *amcalar* (the plural form of *amca*). An *amca* has a say in decisions about their nieces' and nephews' lives, especially if he is the eldest paternal uncle, including financial issues, the work children should carry out for the family, their education and their possible marriage partners.

Amca is also used to refer to a man older than yourself.

'My "amca" is so strict that we cannot even meet even our girlfriends alone'. (Edanur, a young woman from the landowning family, Fieldwork notes, 17 September 2014)

Amca, where is the peasant bazaar?

Amcaoğlu **paternal uncle's son**

Amcaoğlu is a very important figure for the male members of the extended rural family as in adulthood one's male paternal cousins will be jointly responsible for managing land, property and household affairs.

My amcaoğlu and me will run this business together in the future when our fathers retire.

For some of the Kurdish women in the study, an *amcaoğlu* is also an important figure as a potential marriage partner.

'I knew that I was going to marry my amcaoğlu' (Melek, Fieldwork notes, 12.05.2013).

Elti **wife of your husband's brother**

Elti is a potential rival for a daughter-in-law, especially in an extended rural family, as they compete for a share of the family resources. Turkish idioms also reflect the possible tensions between *eltiler* (plural form of elti'). For example:

'Elti eltiye denk olmaz, arpa unundan aş olmaz', an idiom that is used to explain that it is as difficult to maintain cordial relations with an *elti* as it is to make a meal from barley.

'When I give away my daughter [implying her daughter's marriage], *I will first ask my dünür* [referring to the mother of the groom], *how many elti my daughter will have. Learning the number of her eltileri* [plural form of *elti*] *is crucial for her happiness'* (Fatma, member of the landowning family, Fieldwork notes, 09 August 2014).

Gelin **daughter-in-law**

Gelin is the direct translation of a ‘bride’. It is used to refer to the daughter-in-law on the day of her wedding and thereafter. Similarly, *Damat, the Turkish word for ‘groom’,* is used for the son-in-law on the day of wedding and thereafter.

‘Our younger gelin is useless’ (Meryem, the mother in law in the landowning family, Fieldwork notes, 23 August 2013).

The word *gelin* also connotes being silent and submissive.

She left the room quietly like a gelin.

Why are you sitting at the edge of the room like a gelin?

Görümce **husband’s sister**

Görümce is another rival facing a *gelin* in the extended family structure. Most of the time, the main complaints of a *gelin* are about the way her *görümce* and *kaynana* jointly criticise her treatment of her children or her attitudes towards her husband (e.g. spoiling the children and not being respectful towards her husband), as well as about their gossiping and thus controlling the *gelin*’s monetary expenditure.

‘Having a ‘görümce’ at home [referring to a single görümce who lives under the same roof with the extended family] *is really difficult. It feels like you have two kaynana’* (Elif, young Kurdish worker, Fieldwork notes, 13 March 2014).

Kaynana mother-in-law

The word *kaynana* derives from *kayınvalide* in Turkish. It is used to refer to both the mother of a bride or the mother of a groom. However, if a woman does not get on well with her mother-in-law, she is more likely to use the word *kaynana* than she is *kayınvalide.* While the word *kayınvalide* connotes ‘respect’ and some distance, *kaynana* includes negative associations. On the other hand, the usage of *kayınvalide* instead of *kaynana* is also associated with being more ‘modern’, ‘urban’ and ‘educated’. It is safe to say that most educated urban women prefer to use *kayınvalide*, especially when they speak in public.

‘I bet you call your “kaynana” “kayınvalide”. The word [she is referring to the word kaynana] *wouldn’t suit you as a girl studying in the UK* (Nezahat, member of the landowning family, Fieldwork notes, 17 August 2013).

The word ‘kaynana’ also refers the type of relationship between a *gelin* and her mother-in-law. There is an idiom to refer to someone as ‘*being a kaynana – kaynanalık yapmak’* to refer to the authoritarian and oppressive attitude of a mother-in-law towards her daughter-in-law.

‘When I have gelin, I will not be a ‘kaynana’ to her but instead a mother’ (Fatma, member of the landowning family, Fieldwork notes, 12 September 2013).

Yenge the wife of your paternal uncle

Cicianne and *küçükanne* are the words used by other children in the extended rural family to call their *‘yenge’*. These words can be directly translated as ‘sweet mother’ and ‘little mother’. By applying these words, the distinctiveness of the mother figure in the nuclear family is blurred within the extended family structure.

My yenge prepared meal for me before coming to the field, as my mother was not at home.

Words for Significant Activities or Objects in Rural Women’s Daily Lives

Akşam oturması night gathering

Women in the village use this phrase where this study was conducted for the evening visits to different neighbourhoods. After dinner, most of the men in the village go to the coffee house – *kahve* – and women go each other’s houses. Watching TV together, drinking tea and gossiping are the main activities during the evening.

We have been invited by the neighbours to akşam oturması.

Börek pastry

This is the generic name for filled pastries. It is made by rolling out filo pastry (*yufka)* and is usually filled with cheese, potato, mince or spinach. Making börek requires more time when you make your own *yufka*. Buying pre-made pastry decreases the value of börek as well as the value of ‘being a woman’ among the women I worked with.

A woman must know to make her own yufka.

My mother’s spinach börek is her speciality.

***Çeyiz* dowry**

Çeyiz refers to the cost of a new bride setting up a home. It usually includes furniture, white goods and kitchen equipment as well as homemade lace tablecloths and tea towels etc. that have often been made overtime and throughout a woman's youth. Female members of the family and the bride herself often make the items that make up the *çeyiz* themselves. The contents of a bride's *çeyiz* vary significantly by region. For example, in the region in which this study was undertaken, while the bride's family purchases bedroom and living room furniture, for Kurdish women this was not the case. The Kurdish women in the study told me that the groom's family buys everything for their çeyiz.

My 'çeyiz' has been ready for years and waiting for the right man for me to get married to.

***Gün* gathering**

The direct translation of *gün* is a 'day' and it refers to a meeting of women in each other's homes regularly for tea and homemade aperitifs. Apart from socialising, *gün* has another important function for women: a chance to save money. Since in *gün*, every woman brings a certain amount of money (or around 1.2 grams of gold – *küçük altın* –) to give the host.

'I insisted on hosting my gün this month as I need money for new curtains' (Zile, factory worker, Fieldwork notes, 15 September 2014).

Kısır **a type of bulgur salad**

This is highly popular in traditional Turkish and Kurdish cuisine. While in Turkish cuisine it is mostly consumed on occasions like '*gün*', especially in the region where this study takes place, among the Kurdish workers in the study, it is one of the main dishes that they bring to the land, as it is so easy to prepare. Although the ingredients used vary depending on region, adding tomato paste, spring onions, lemon juice, parsley or lettuce to pre-prepared bulgur wheat usually makes kısır. Its simplicity derives from the fact that bulgur does not need to be cooked and is ready to be eaten once the bulgur has been steeped in boiling water.

'Everyday you have kısır. It is like we are having a gün all the time' (Me, laughing, on the land).

Kısmet **chance, fate, destiny, possible marriage partner**

Kısmet is mostly used for unknown situations and is used to refer to things that occur depending only on luck or chance. The word has religious connotations so may also be translated as fate or destiny. The role of God distinguishes chance from *kısmet*. In *kısmet*, your luck depends on Allah's will. Allah knows what will happen to you, what your *kısmet* is. In Turkish, there is also a direct translation of chance – *şans* – and non-religious people mostly use it.

For example, someone can use both *kısmet* and chance when s/he fails in job interview.

Don't be sad! If it is not your kısmet, you cannot do anything to change it! (Implies that your fate is in God's hands).

Don’t be sad! Şans simply wasn’t with you.

Kısmet is also used to refer a possible marriage partner.

I have lots of kısmets. It is difficult to choose when you have only one chance!

Köylü pazarı peasant bazaar

This is a bazaar mostly appealing to villagers who wish to sell their homemade products and purchase small goods. They are common in the village-towns. ‘Peasants’, especially women, from nearby villages, come and sell their hand-made products at these markets. Buying or renting a stall is not necessary. Mostly, the customers of the bazaar are people living in the town and working in the factories, as they do not have enough money to buy these products at a supermarket, but also do not have enough time to make them for themselves. The products typically include tomato sauce, tomato *purée*, pepper *purée*, varieties of homemade pasta, cheese and eggs. Women from the same village sell their products in the same area of the bazaar, and there is no rigid class division among the women who come to sell their products; it is still possible to see women from very big landowning families alongside the women from landless families. However, things are changing and women from rich families have begun to stay away. The oldest and youngest women from the families are the most suitable for the job. Among Kurdish seasonal workers, only young men – in their mid teens – are seen as suitable for this job.

Let’s go to the ‘köylü pazarı’ to get some cheese.

Tandır **outdoor earthenware oven and a type of bread**

Tandırs are mostly used to bake bread. The bread made in this oven is called *tandır ekmeği – tandır* bread –, but women in the study simply call it *tandır* for short. *Tandır* is a vital part of Kurdish cuisine. Every day, the woman who stays at home is responsible for making *tandır* for the family members working on the land.

'Since Pınar is not good at making tandır Hazal stayed in the house to make it' (Remzi, a male Kurdish worker, Fieldwork notes, 06 September 2013).

Words Relating to Women's Work

Atölye atelier, workshop

Atölye refers to small textile enterprises, mostly located in the basements of buildings in residential neighbourhoods. *Atölyes* are where lots of women working in the garment and textile industries encounter capital. It offers 'safe', 'approved' working places for women in Turkey, as they are mostly small family run businesses.

My aunt has been working in an atölye in our neighbourhood for 10 years.

Çavuş **foreman and forewoman**

Çavuş literally refers to the military rank of corporal but it is used both on the land and in the factory to refer to foremen and forewomen.

'Our çavuş is not different from the one I had during my military service. Both of them are obsessed with finding people's faults' (Hamdullah, Kurdish worker, Fieldwork notes, 04 September 2013).

Hakkını helal et

There is no direct translation of this idiom in English. Nonetheless, it is widely used in the Turkish language and is used when you want to thank someone for everything they have done for you and to seek their forgiveness. The term has religious origins, as Muslims believe that you will be punished in the after life if you breach another person's rights. Therefore, a person can force you to say that you will forgive them in a case where *your rights* have been breached by another (*Hakkımı helal ettim*). For instance, on the land when the landowning family forced workers to work for more than they earned, they told them to please *hakkını helal et*! In this way, the landowning family assuaged their guilt as God 'bore witness' to the 'fact' that the workers had consented and forgiven the landowning family for their actions.

She didn't say hakkımı helal ettim. This makes me too uncomfortable, I have to find her and ask for helallik again.

Hayır duası **a prayer of thanks**

Praying for someone else because of the kindness or care they have shown you. *Hayır duası* is the only thing that some women receive for their unpaid labour. Elders give *hayır duası* for their *gelin* as she looks after them. My mother's neighbours gave her *hayır duası* for working in their *atölye* in busy periods without pay. Mostly, a son should make some financial contribution to his parents to get *hayır duası;* for a bride however, this is related to unpaid care work and domestic labour. When you make something for someone, they mostly want you to say *hakkimi helal ettim,* and then, they will only give you *hayır duası* for your unpaid work.

‘*She took my hayır duası a lot, she is the best; her hand is always over us* [implying her daughter-in-law’s care for and her husband]’ (Mefaret, Fieldwork notes, 16 May 2013).

Taşeron **employment subcontractors or gangmasters’ agencies**

In the last decade, workers in Turkey have had to meet with *taşeron*. Working in the factories without *taşeron* has become almost impossible. Women working permanently in the factory where I conducted the study said:

‘*There is no chance to get work without making contract with taşeron, our contracts are with this agency rather than the factory itself, and it is always short term. So, we do not have anything* [implying full time employment benefits]’ (Fevziye, factory worker in the warehouse, Fieldwork notes, 22 September 2014).

Yemelik domates **tomatoes for eating**

One of the two main types of tomatoes that are produced on the land where I worked – the other type is a factory tomato. *Yemelik domatesler* (plural) are sold to national supermarkets for fresh consumption and in some urban households and markets are called *sofralik domates* (table tomatoes).

We need to spare some yemelik domates for the salad.

Words and Idioms Relating to *El âlem*

El âlem refers to a group of unidentified ‘real’ and at the same time ‘imaginary’ people – to whom speakers refer when explaining why it is necessary for them to do this or that. ***El âlem ne der*** – what will the *el âlem* say? – It is a commonly used expression to refer to what other people think. *El âlem* is both an abstract and concrete concept. It can designate someone who acts like the *el âlem* by judging you according to social norms. On the other hand, you may feel forced to give up doing something you want to do because of what you fear the *el âlem* may say.

I cannot believe you aunt; you are just talking like the el âlem.

El âlem is coming, go and quickly tidy your room!

Are you not ashamed to talk like this in front of el âlem?

Whatever the el âlem say, I will marry you.

The difference between concrete and abstract *el âlem* might be clarified more with the common expression ***el âlem için yaşamak***, which can be directly translated as living for the *el âlem.* It refers to prioritising the thoughts you perceive others to have of you when you make a decision about something.

Even though she loves him so much, she will not elope because she lives for the el âlem.

When someone does something of which the el âlem do not approve, and she or he and their family is talked about by the el âlem, the idiom for this kind of situation is ***el âlemin diline düşmek*** (falling on the el âlem’s tongue)**.** It means that people – el âlem – in general (other villagers, for example) are gossiping about what a certain individual has done.

I will not forgive her. Because of her eloping with that guy, el âlemin diline düştük.

***Adam gibi adam* a manly man or a 'real' man**

This idiom refers to a man performing his pre-determined societal roles 'properly'. This term could be associated with Connell's concept of hegemonic masculinity. The concept of *adam gibi adam* is constructed around expectations of masculine behaviour.

It also connotes having good character, albeit a specifically masculine one.

He is adam gibi adam, providing everything his family needs.

***Anadolu* Kadını* Anatolian woman**

The term attaches a 'sacred' meaning to *woman,* especially in terms of self-sacrifice, endurance, capability and fearlessness. It refers to one of the most important icons of women's roles in building the new nation-state in the 1920s. The current regime has preferred to emphasise women's ties with Anatolia rather than Islam and highlights how men and women were represented in public 'equally' but 'differently' in the authentic Turkish culture.

'*These women* [referring to women working in the warehouse] *are 'real Anatolian women'. They can do men's work without complaining about it'* (Factory manager, Fieldwork notes, 18 September 2014).

****Anadolu* Anatolia** refers to a geographical location, known in antiquity as Asia Minor. After the establishment of the Modern Turkish Republic, the concept of Anatolia has become a tool to emphasise the country's ties with the region's other historical civilisations, distinct from Islamic culture. Anatolia has also been romanticised by creating and sustaining an image of ‘sacrificing’, ‘dedicated’ and ‘hardworking’ Anatolian people (*Anadolu insanı*), mostly living in the countryside.

Ateş parçası **part of a flame**

This is an adjective used for a dedicated and proactive person. It is mostly used to refer to children and boys in particular. It is a prerequisite step to becoming an *adam gibi adam*. Boys who are *ateş parçası* are dynamic, physically strong, intelligent and outgoing. These features are also seen as masculine characteristics both by Turkish and Kurdish people in the study.

Everyone is impressed with my son’s capabilities; he is ateş parçası, maşhallah!*

*** *Maşallah*** a word that originates in Arabic and roughly translates as “praise be unto God”. The term is often used to praise someone or something. For example, the parent of a child who has performed well in an exam may say: “she has done well in her exams *maşallah*”. The use of the term varies widely across the Muslim world and within Turkey.

Cahil **simple minded, ignorant, an uneducated ‘peasant’**

Cahil is mostly used to refer people who do not think about the consequences of their actions. It can also imply being uneducated or from a rural background. Simply being uneducated, however, does not necessarily lead to one being labelled as *cahil*. *Cahil* can also be used to refer to someone who is deemed to be ‘backward’, superstitious and conservative. As before however, simply being conservative does not necessarily mean that one is *cahil.*

Cahil is most often used when you want to emphasise that someone is unthinking. It usually refers to someone who chooses not to think things through. In urban areas, however, and in middle class enclaves in particular, the term *cahil* is often used to denigrate uneducated, working class people from rural areas. Recently, the term has become popular among opponents of the Turkish government, and to refer to the supporters of the AKP.

You cannot tell them anything. They are cahil like a blind person.

Davul bile dengi dengine çalar **birds of a feather flock together**

This is a common idiom used to justify supporting marriage and relationships between couples who have similar socio-economic backgrounds.

His family does not approve her marriage with an uneducated man. They are right! El âlem ne der? – what will el âlem say? *– Davul bile dengi dengine çalar!*

Elim ayağım **my hand and my foot**

This idiom is used by an individual to refer to another individual who performs their domestic labour for them. For this reason, it is mostly used to refer to women. Husbands use it to describe their wives, whereas mothers-in-law may use it to refer to their daughters-in-law, and mothers may use it in reference to their daughters.

She is elim ayağim, cleaning my clothes, cooking and shopping for me.

Güzelin düşmanı çok olur

This literally translates as "she/he* who is beautiful has many enemies" and is used to explain that a beautiful person is at greater risk of harm and may have more rivals within society. It may also be used to explain the jealousy of others. The idiom also justifies the control of women's bodies by threatening them about the possible dangers of displaying their beauty.

I told her to be careful about what she wears. She must be careful as güzelin düşmanı çok olur.

***** There are no gendered pronouns in Turkish and no gendered nouns.

İşe yaramaz **useless**

This phrase is used for things and people. When it is used for people, it refers primarily to a lack of productivity.

They are işe yaramaz; they do not contribute anything to world.

Kadın kadınlıgını bilmeli **a woman should know her place or, a woman should know to act like a woman**

A phrase used for a woman exhibiting 'disapproved' behaviours such as arguing against a decision taken by her husband in front of others.

She is doing things without getting consent from her husband. She must kadınlığını bilmeli.

Sosyete **high society or a member of high society**

In the countryside, this is used to tease people about unexpected and so-called 'modern' behaviour from a rural woman. This is especially the case for women who migrate to towns and cities and later return to visit their village. Using accessories associated with being urban, such as sunglasses and straw hats, or changing one's accent is among the main reasons for teasing a woman for being *sosyete*. Men are not the targets of such teasing, as their adoption of 'modern' culture is more accepted by the *el âlem*.

She acts like a sosyete now. Did you see her sunglasses?

Söz söyleme hakkı **the right to say something about someone**

This idiom is used to refer to someone's 'right' to judge you for your behaviour and to make a decision on someone else's behalf. For instance, you mother has *söz söyleme hakkı* about your marriage. This idiom is also important for understanding one of the ways in which the el âlem are referred to as strangers, as someone can use the expression like this:

Who are they to have söz söyleme hakkı about my life, they are the el âlem.

I heard my aunt and uncle talking about my decisions. I am surprised at how el âlem believes that they have söz söyleme hakkı over someone's life in this society.

Who has *söz söyleme hakkı* over someone's life depends on the household structure in which that person lives. For example, in the rural extended family, it is not your parents but your grandparents or elder uncle who have the right to make a decision on your behalf. If you are living in a rural Kurdish extended family, it is your grandparents, other people in the village, or those in your *aşiret* who make decisions for you. For ease of understanding it is best to imagine the way in which decisions are made on behalf of small children.

Namus honour

Namus refers to acting in accordance with the moral norms of society. Although both men and women can be labelled as *namussuz (*dishonourable*)*, for women it is easier to be considered *namussuz*, as the concept of *namus* is most strongly associated with women's bodies and sexuality. For many, the control of women's bodies and sexualities is the only way in which one can be *namuslu* (honourable). Honour killings are called *namus cinayeti (*along with *töre cinayeti* where in *töre* refers to the moral customs of a society*).*

You cannot hang out with this man before getting married, as you have to think about our family's namus.

Words for 'Others' or 'Outsiders'

Alevi

Adherents of the caliph, or prophet Ali are called *Alevi*. This is the second-most widespread branch of Islam in Turkey after Sunnism. However, some controversy remains as to whether it is actually a sect of Islam as its adherents worship and follow the principles of Caliph Ali (13th century). It is also worth noting that Alevism is distinct from Shia Islam. Although there is no current 'visible' tension between Alevis and Sunnis in Turkey, it is safe to say that Alevis are a marginalised group within Turkey.

Her father would not let her marry an Alevi.

Anayasa Mahkemesi constutional court

Anayasa mahkemesi is Turkey's constitutional court. It is also Turkey's supreme court. It was established in 1962 following a military coup in 1960 in order to judicially review laws passed by the Turkish parliament. Although it was established to control the parliament by reducing its power and to ensure that all laws were made in accordance with the constitution, whether or not its outcomes lead to greater 'fairness' remains the subject of debate. This is particularly pertinent given current Turkish politics.

In the 1990s, the anayasa mahkemesi was an important figure in determining the landscape of Turkish politics.

I will take this case to the anayasa mahkemesi; all other options are closed for me.

Ağalık

Refers to the feudal system that was in place in Turkey until the republic was established. Whilst *ağalık* is no longer taken to hold political significance, feudal class divisions are still evident and remain influential in south-eastern Turkey. The power of the former *ağalık* has been further undermined by urbanisation, mass migration and the mechanisation of agriculture. Despite this, the concept is still widespread and families of former *ağa* (lords) still hold social and political strength in some regions.

There was a peasants uprising against the ağalık.

Aşiret

Tribes formed through kinship and ruled by a feudal *ağa*. Moral and political codes imposed by the *aşiret* are understood to supersede the law. Some tribes number in the tens of thousands and have an impact on local politics in their regions. Although the power of the *aşiret* is decreasing, it is still a social phenomenon predominantly affecting Kurds in Turkey.

Our aşiret is so powerful in the area we even have a seat in parliament.

Gecekondulaşma **the creation of shanty towns and slum communities**

The creation of shanty towns as a result of mass migration into urban areas from the 1960s onwards transformed the landscape of Turkey's largest cities. Although the establishment of new slum areas *gecekondu mahellesi* has now slowed to a halt and many of the largest *gecekondular* (plural) have now become established as boroughs in their own right with legal and political recognition, it is also important to note that as a result of gentrification and booming house prices, many former *gecekondu* are now being replaced by luxury high-rise apartment buildings in the inner cities. This has led to accusations of social cleansing. Moreover, the *gecekondu* communities displaced by rapid economic growth in Turkey's big cities have often been forcibly evicted to high density social housing on the outskirts of big cities and often to areas where there is limited access to social amenities such as schools, shops, public transport, health centres and employment.

Gecekondulaşma was one of the most widely discussed aspects of Turkey's urban development in the sociological literature of the 1980s.

I love my gecekondu and do not want to give up it for an apartment flat like a cheese box.

I am so happy to replace my gecekondu with this new apartment. After 25 years, I feel like I finally feel like a proper resident of the city.

***Kasaba* town**

A *Kasaba* most closely translates to the English idea of a rural market town. A *kasaba* has rural characteristics. In the region in which I conducted this study, many people migrate to the nearest *kasaba* in order to find work in the factories there. Most *kasabalar* (plural) are far removed from the closest big city and often play host to large industrial estates. *Kasabalar* are also associated with the seat of rural power; the extended families of the local landowning class often live in a *kasaba* where they are able to exercise control over their rural holdings but can still access some of the benefits of urbanisation.

When we moved to the kasaba, my kaynana went mad with jealousy.

***Hemşeri* a person who is from the same hometown**

A hemşeri is a very important figure for a person who has just migrated to the city. A *hemşeri* not only acts as a guide to one's new life in the city, but living in proximity with ones *hemşeriler* (plural) makes people feel like they are in a comfortable, secure environment.

When he immigrated to İstanbul from his small town, he directly found his hemşeri who has been with him for a long time.

She can work in that Atölye because everyone there is her hemşeri.

***Hemşericilik* favouring some *hemşeri* above others**

This is a supportive network usually made up of people who have migrated to the city from the same rural area or small town. It can serve to find a job, a house and even possible marriage partners.

I could not get the promotion because the boss made hemşirecilik and gave the job to someone from his own hometown.

***Jandarma* military police**

Most commonly seen in rural areas.

The *Jandarma stopped us several times when we were going back to our village and asked us many questions. Our kids were so frightened!*

APPENDIX E: List of Key Informants

On the Tomato Land[94]

Landowning Family

Aysel, 60, married, mother-in-law of Fatma and Nezahat, has three children, Turk.

Fatma, 39, married to **Recep** (41, controls the budget and organises the work*)*, has two children, *Laz*.

Gamze, 18, single, high-school graduate, **Nurhan**'s eldest child, Turk.

Nezahat, 31, married with **Recai** (35, disabled, Recep's younger brother, Turk), has three children, Turk, previously seasonal worker.

Nurhan, 37, married **Halil Ibrahim** (39, Recai and Recep's *amcaoğlu,* Turk), has three children, *Laz*, (she is also Fatma's cousin).

Kurdish Seasonal Workers[95]

Elif, 19, married with **Ramazan** (her *amcaoğlu*, gangmaster's youngest brother, 22), has two children.

Emine, 21, during the fieldwork she was single and in love with **Remzi** (22), who is Hazal (15), **Levent** (19) and **Memdullah's** (23) brother, their mother is the gangmaster's aunt from second generation), came to land with her father **Huseyin** (in his 40s, has 6 children, his father and gangmaster's father are *amcaoğlu).*

---

[94] As everyone has kinship with each other, in this part I have not introduced the informants in a list, rather I have tried to clarify their relation to each other. Women's names are listed in alphabetical order, then I have written mostly their connections with male members of their family.

[95] As none of the key informants among Kurdish workers have finished any degree of education with the exception of Hacer, who is still studying, I have not recorded their education level. Moreover, as all of them are observant Muslims, I have also not pointed this out specifically.

Hacer, 14, still studying in secondary school and coming to the land only during the picking time when schools are on holiday, Emine's youngest sister.

Hatice, 33, married to **Yaşar** (her aunt's son, gangmaster's elder brother, 44), has four children.

Hazal, 15, single, she is the aunt of Pinar (14, come to the land with his father, **Memduh**), as Pinar is her half sister's daughter.

Kadriye, in her early 40s, married with her aunt's son (**Hatice**'s brother), has four children, gangmaster's oldest sister.

Melek, 28, married to **Osman (**her *amcaoğlu,* around 30, *gangmaster*), has four children.

Songül, 25, divorced, she married again, has no children, the youngest sister of gangmaster.

Zarife, 44, married with **Yahya** (her *amcaoğlu*, 48, the eldest brother of gangmaster, who organises the work in the picking season), has two children.

In the Factory

Manager

Hakan, in his 40s, married, industrial engineer, has one child, secular Muslim, Turkish.

Women Workers

Asya, 20, single, studying in undergraduate level to become a teacher, born in a village but grown up in the town, moderate Muslim, Turkish.

Ayfer, 22, single, studying economics, grown up in the town, secular Muslim, Turkish.

Aylin, 33, married, has two children, recently moved to the town, her husband is also working in another factory, moderate Muslim, Turkish.

Burçin, 22, single, studying in undergraduate level in statistics, grown up in the town, secular Muslim, Turkish.

Cennet, 35, married, has two children, her husband still works in the village, recently moved to the town, moderate Muslim, *Laz.*

Emel, 21, single, born in a village and grown up in the town, studying in undergraduate level to become a psychotherapist, her mother is *Laz* and father is Turkish, secular Muslim.

Fahriye, 39, married, moved from a village to the town for work, has two children, her husband is also working in another factory, moderate Muslim, Bulgarian Turk.

Feride, 46, married, has one child, still living in the village, moderate Muslim, Turkish.

Filiz, 21, single, studying in an undergraduate level in politics course, born and grown up in the town, secular Muslim, Turkish.

Merve, 21, single, studying in psychology, grown up in the town, secular Muslim, Turkish.

Neşe, in her 30s, married, has four children, recently move to the village, moderate Muslim, *Laz.*

Rukiye, 38, married, has two children, secular Muslim, recently move to the town from a village, moderate Muslim, Turkish.

Süheyla, 19, single, studying in undergraduate level to become a teacher, born and grown up in the town, her mother is *Laz* and father is Turkish.

Zile, 42, married, has two children, moved to the town from a village, moderate Muslim, Bulgarian Turk.