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Who benefits from the uniformity of lawyer's contingent fee rates?

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Zamir, Eal, Medina, Barak and Segal, U. (Uzi) (2014) Who benefits from the uniformity of lawyer's contingent fee rates? Review of Law & Economics, 9 (3). pp. 357-387. doi:10.1515/rle-2013-0009 ISSN 1555-5879.

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Official URL: http://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2013-0009

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Abstract

Lawyers’ Contingent Fee (CF) rates are rather uniform, often one-third of the recovery. Arguably, this uniformity is a type of anti-competitive price-fixing, which results in clients paying supra-competitive fees. This paper challenges this argument. It shows that uniform CF rates provide clients with an important advantage, as suchthey rates enable them to make a de facto “take-it-or-leave-it” offer. Consequently, lawyers cannot exploit their private information, and clients retain the transaction’s entire surplus and may hire the best lawyer among those who find it profitable to handle the case.

The paper also addresses the effect of uniformity of CF rates when lawyers refer cases to other lawyers. It shows that uniformity facilitates matching of clients and lawyers through the referral system. It also demonstrates that the fact that both direct clients and those obtained through paid-for referrals pay the same CF rate does not attest to cross-subsidization. The clients whose cases are transferred for a referral fee (paid by the handling lawyer) “pay” for the referral service by obtaining a less highly ranked lawyer.

Item Type: Journal Article
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School > Behavioural Science
Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Lawyers -- Fees, Contingent fees, Practice of law -- Economic aspects
Journal or Publication Title: Review of Law & Economics
Publisher: De Gruyter
ISSN: 1555-5879
Official Date: 8 January 2014
Dates:
DateEvent
8 January 2014Published
16 December 2013Accepted
Volume: 9
Number: 3
Page Range: pp. 357-387
DOI: 10.1515/rle-2013-0009
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access
Date of first compliant deposit: 6 September 2017
Date of first compliant Open Access: 7 September 2017
Funder: Milton and Miriam Handler Foundation, Universiṭah ha-ʻIvrit bi-Yerushalayim. Aharon Barak Center for Interdisciplinary Legal Research [Hebrew University of Jerusalem]

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