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McClelland, Tom (2019) Against virtual selves. Erkenntnis, 84 (1). pp. 21-40. doi:10.1007/s10670-017-9945-8 ISSN 0165-0106.
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-017-9945-8
Abstract
According to the virtual self theory (VST), selves are merely virtual entities. On this view, our self-representations do not refer to any concrete object and the self is a merely intentional entity. This contemporary version of the ‘no-self’ theory is driven by a number of psychological and philosophical considerations indicating that our representations of the self are pervasively inaccurate. I present two problems for VST. First, the case for VST fails to rule out a more moderate position according to which the self exists but is systematically misrepresented by us. This position regards the self as a real entity that has illusory appearances, rather than as a hallucinated entity that has a merely intentional existence. Second, I suggest that this ‘illusion model’ of self-misrepresentation is preferable to VST. Advocates of VST must acknowledge the existence of an entity—typically the brain—that is the bearer of our misrepresentations of the self. I argue that, other things being equal, we should regard the bearer of our self-representations as the self, even if that entity diverges dramatically from the way we represent the self to be. So by acknowledging the existence of a bearer of self-representations, advocates of VST are in a poor position to deny the existence of the self. I conclude that VST not only fails to rule out the illusion model, but that we have prima facie reason to prefer the illusion model to VST.
| Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy | ||||||||
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy | ||||||||
| Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | Self (Philosophy), Hallucinations and illusions | ||||||||
| Journal or Publication Title: | Erkenntnis | ||||||||
| Publisher: | Springer | ||||||||
| ISSN: | 0165-0106 | ||||||||
| Official Date: | February 2019 | ||||||||
| Dates: |
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| Volume: | 84 | ||||||||
| Number: | 1 | ||||||||
| Page Range: | pp. 21-40 | ||||||||
| DOI: | 10.1007/s10670-017-9945-8 | ||||||||
| Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||||||
| Publication Status: | Published | ||||||||
| Access rights to Published version: | Open Access (Creative Commons) | ||||||||
| Date of first compliant deposit: | 2 May 2018 | ||||||||
| Date of first compliant Open Access: | 2 May 2018 | ||||||||
| Funder: | Leverhulme Trust (LT). Early Career Research Fellowship, European Research Council (ERC) | ||||||||
| Grant number: | Grant 313552 (ERC) | ||||||||
| Open Access Version: |
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