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Is attack the best form of defence? A competing risks analysis of acquisition activity in the UK
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UNSPECIFIED (2003) Is attack the best form of defence? A competing risks analysis of acquisition activity in the UK. CAMBRIDGE JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 27 (3). pp. 337-357. ISSN 0309-166X.
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Abstract
The primary purpose of this paper is to investigate whether companies can use acquisition as a strategy to reduce their likelihood of take-over. The determinants of making an acquisition and being taken over are modelled for the first time within a competing risks framework using two large samples of UK manufacturing companies which together cover most of the post-World War II period up to 1990. Our results indicate that, ceteris paribus, companies which make acquisitions can significantly reduce their conditional probability of being taken over by around one-third, largely through the impact that acquisition has on corporate size. In this sense, attack, through acquisition, is the best form of defence against take-over.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
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Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions | ||||
Journal or Publication Title: | CAMBRIDGE JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | ||||
Publisher: | OXFORD UNIV PRESS | ||||
ISSN: | 0309-166X | ||||
Official Date: | 1 May 2003 | ||||
Dates: |
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Volume: | 27 | ||||
Number: | 3 | ||||
Number of Pages: | 21 | ||||
Page Range: | pp. 337-357 | ||||
Publication Status: | Published |
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