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**Identity Transformation and Japan's UN Security Policy:
From the Gulf Crisis to Human Security**

by

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
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Declaration

Apart from Tables 4.1 and 4.2, which are adaptations of the original versions appearing in my own thesis entitled 「1990年代の日本の国連政策：PKO参加問題と常任理事国入り問題を事例に」 (Japan's UN policy in 1990s: the cases on PKO participation and the bid for a permanent UNSC seat), submitted in 2003 for a Master's Degree in International Relations at Hitotsubashi University (Japan), this thesis is my own original work and has not been submitted for a degree at another university. A partial draft of Chapters 2, 4 and 5 has also been published in *Globalisation, Regionalisation and National Policy Systems: Proceedings of the Second Anglo-Japanese Academy*, 7-11 January 2006, under the title 'Identity Transformation and Japan's UN Security Policy: Participation in the Gulf Crisis and the Cambodian Peace Process.'

Abstract

This research uses discourse analysis to examine Japan's UN security policy after the Cold War period using three cases: the Gulf Crisis, the Cambodian peace process and the promotion of the human security policy. The key argument is that there is a need for a new IR theory-based approach that could explain foreign or security policy decision-making process and could also provide the analysis at both the domestic and the international level simultaneously. This research therefore adopts Wendt's Constructivism, along with the use of 'identity' as the key analytical platform, from which the 'recursive Constructivist model' is developed. Unlike popular literature, this research suggests that 'identity transformation' and the level of conformity between the identities projected internationally (international-role identities) and those embraced domestically (domestic-type identities) are the key factors determining Japan's foreign and security policy preferences. On the interpretation of Japan's post-Cold War security development, this research argues that it could be understood via the UN framework, and not only from the traditional perspective of the Japan-US alliance. Apart from the fact that it could be understood via the process of 'identity transformation', this research provides strong evidence and suggestions that Japan's assertive foreign and security pursuits in the post-Cold War era are the result of the nation's changing sets of ideas and beliefs on the link between 'national' and 'international' security.

The original contributions of this research are two-fold. The theoretical contribution is a modification of Wendt's original framework of identity transformation into the so-called 'recursive process of identity transformation.' The application of 'identity' and the 'recursive Constructivist model' to Japan's UN security policy in this research is significant because it is the first example among research in the field of Japanese studies to use a different analytical framework and tool in examining Japan's foreign and security policy. The model's ability to capture the intertwined process of social interactions at both the domestic and the international level is also important as it contributes to further IR theoretical development and a better understanding on Japan's foreign policy decision-making process. Also, the value-added benefit of the examination of human security policy is another vital substantive contribution, as this is the first exploration of this issue within the context of Japan's UN security policy.

Abbreviations

APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CDC	Council for Development of Cambodia
DPJ	Democratic Party of Japan
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICORC	International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia
IPCH	International Peace Cooperation Headquarter (Japan)
IO	International Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JCIE	Japan Centre for International Exchange
JFIR	Japan Forum on International Relations
JIIA	Japan Institute of International Affairs
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
JIM	Jakarta Informal Meeting
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party of Japan
MITI	Ministry of International Trade and Industry (Japan)
MOF	Ministry of Finance (Japan)
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan)
MOD	Ministry of Defence (Japan)
MOE	Ministry of Education (Japan)
MOJ	Ministry of Justice (Japan)
MOT	Ministry of Transport (Japan)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NDPO	National Defence Programme Outline
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
P-5	Permanent members of the UN Security Council
SDF	Self Defence Force
SDPJ	Social Democratic Party of Japan
SNC	Supreme National Council (Cambodia)
TICAD	Tokyo International Conference on African Development
UN	United Nations
UNAMIC	United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNIKOM	United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIBH	United Nations Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNOMUR	United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda
UNOSOM I	United Nations Mission in Somalia I
UNOSOM II	United Nations Mission in Somalia II
UNPKO	United Nations Peacekeeping Operation
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
WFP	World Food Programme
WTO	World Trade Organisation

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Glossary

Comprehensive Security Promoter: contends that the maintenance of international peace and security must be managed through such an ‘all-round’ approach as ‘human security,’ which addresses both the ‘protecting’ and the ‘empowering’ function of promoting international peace. The former aspect stresses the importance of emphasising the negative effects on people’s survival and dignity during conflicts. The latter focuses on long-term or ‘continuous and interconnected’ investment and assistance to help guarantee people’s basic needs, which will in turn prevent conflicts from happening in the first place.

Development Peace Promoter: addresses the seamless connection between peace operations and development and between short-term humanitarian assistance and long-term human development. Under the framework of human security and peace operations, development peace promoters prioritise the empowering function, which involves short-term humanitarian assistance and long-term development programmes. It takes a preventive approach rather than a protecting approach to the maintenance of peace and security.

Domestic-Type Identity: a set of properties or a system of ideas and beliefs that apply to persons sharing the same social meanings, attitudes, values, skills, knowledge, experiences, opinions and behavioural traits and so on. This social identity is constituted at the domestic level and shared among domestic constituents.

Humanitarian Peace Intervener: emphasises the need or the responsibility to protect people facing serious harm in the event of intra- or inter state wars, insurgency or state

failure. It is an identity that results from the understanding that present threats confronting the international community are primarily internal and such violence has a direct impact on people rather than on states. Assuming the identity of peace enforcer or peace promoter alone does not help protect people from becoming victims of violence and so on. Therefore, the humanitarian peace intervener reserves the right to intervene whenever people's well-being is at stake and places the 'protecting function' at the core of the UN peace operations.

International-Role Identity: a role that cannot be enacted by the state itself but is acted out according to the shared expectation of others prior to or during interactions at the system level. This social identity is projected at the international level, corresponding to others' demands. Continuous projection of the 'international-role' identity will lead to its transformation into a 'collective' identity.

Multilateral Pacificist: holds the idea that international peace and security could be maintained only through 'multilateral' efforts, especially through the UN mechanism, rather than a single country's political or military manoeuvres. The idea also requires the strengthening of multilateral mechanisms (such as the UN) through a greater degree of physical, financial, ideational and political contributions.

Peace Enforcer: stresses the importance of the use of force or the capability to project one in every stage of UN peace operations, especially in peacemaking and peacekeeping operations. It is an idea that addresses the lack of enforcing units to respond to any form of aggression during the Cold War period. The role of a peacemaker/enforcer is, therefore, to respond to both imminent and actual aggression as well as to enforce the conflicting parties to comply with ceasefire agreements.

Peace Promoter: undertakes more complex and multi-dimensional UN peace operations. The role of peace promoter moved one step further from that of the peace enforcer during the Gulf Crisis by strengthening and stressing the ‘multi-dimensional’ aspects of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. It rejects the idea that UN peace operations should be conducted in sequential fashion. Rather, to address the multi-faceted and complex problems that arise during and after any conflict, rounded and well-synchronised peace operations are needed.

Political Arbitrator: aims at addressing post-Cold War multi-faceted intra- and interstate conflicts, which mostly require an external arbitrator to help settle differences among conflicting parties. The political arbitrator believes that the enhancement of international mechanisms to help disentangle conflicts and provide full-scale national rehabilitation or revive the collapsed economic and social system is indispensable for effective UN peace operations.

Political Facilitator: is the identity based on the idea that Japan had to do something ‘politically’ to help sustain long-term international peace and security. Only adhering to the ‘unilateral pacifist’ identity was apparently insufficient for a member of the international community. To help facilitate the progress of the peace process and the UN peace operations suggests a greater degree of confidence on Japan’s part in taking up political functions that fulfil the expectations of both the international community and the domestic constituents.

Peace Supporter: undertakes the core functions in every step of UN peace operations, from peacemaking and peacekeeping to the peacebuilding stage, in almost every area, ranging from personnel to financial, political and ideational inputs. However, while the

‘peace promoter’ may choose to launch full-scale peace operations including the use of force, the ‘peace supporter’ is still cautious about the use of military exercises. That is to say, some restrictions are still in place for peace supporters and prevent them from taking part in full-fledged UN activities.

Traditional Peacebuilder/Developer: holds the idea that the maintenance of international peace and security should be based on ‘joint prosperity’ through the promotion and the strengthening of the sustainable developing assistance regime and activities in less-developed countries. Traditional peacebuilders/developers also believe that the lack of prosperity and the inefficiency of the post-conflict peacebuilding operations via sustainable assistance programmes and long-term projects are key causes of instability in international peace and security.

Unilateral Pacifist: emphasises love for freedom and devotion to peace by relinquishing physical military capability and adhering to the ‘no-war’ principle. For Japan, it suggests that that the country’s survival and sustainable international peace could be achieved only if Japan limits its military capability to invade others or involve itself in any military arrangements, even under the auspices of the UN. It basically addresses Japan’s one-sided military self-restraint.

US Follower: this is the identity that Japan had assumed through the post-war period. It suggests behaviours that pursue foreign policies following demands and pressure from the US. The lack of mutual ideational inputs from Japan’s part in the bilateral relations between the two countries covered both political and economic aspects of Japan’s international relations. It also shows Japan’s political choice to position itself as a ‘secondary power’ in relation to the US.

US Partner: this is the identity expected by the US from others during system interactions in the Post-Cold War period in the maintenance of peace and security. It indicates the ideational transformation of the US in the post-Cold War period, acknowledging that the rationale of unilateral attempts to secure peace and security has become invalid and that cooperation from other countries under the label of ‘US-led multilateral effort’ is indispensable in handling international conflicts.

US Supporter: this is another set of identities expected by the US from others to support the US international political agenda. This was obvious during the Cambodian peace process, when the US could exert its ideas and political leverage on the guidelines of the peace agreement only in the UNSC. On Japan’s part, its transformation from the status of US-follower to US-supporter also suggests that the country did not have to be ‘demanded’ to make political or ideational contributions, but to help fill the political void among the conflicting parties where the US and others major powers could not.

Chapter 1 Introduction and Methodology

1.1 Research Questions and Purposes

Similar to the majority of research on Japan's foreign policy making and foreign relations, this research is also triggered by the complex nature of Japan's decision-making process and policy choices, which have sometimes been pursued distinctively from the established norms of the 'major powers' and the popular neo-realist explanations. Since the post-war period, most scholars have agreed on Japan's 'passive and reactive nature' in pursuing foreign and security policy simply to fulfil its obligations under the Japan-US alliance. Given the Cold War structure, Japan's projection as a close US ally both inside and outside the UN was not at odds with the predictions of traditional neo-realism.

One good example is Japan's increasing contributions in its physical, financial and ideational resources to the organisation since the early 1990s. Apparently, Japan's assertive policy in the UN after the Gulf Crisis may follow the logic of burden-sharing and confirm the neo-realist explanation that Japan would step up to take greater responsibility as a normal superpower. However, despite these contributions to the UNPKOs and other UN-related development activities, the country's refusal to commit to full-scale military activities, its reluctance to form a security strategy independent of the US and its unique incorporation of the new UN-Centrism and security insights via the promotion of human security policy may indicate a more substantial policy complication than that predicted by the mainstream approaches. From this outset, this research thus concerns itself with three significant research questions and objectives.

The first question deals with the substantive issue of Japan's security policy and its relationship with the UN. In other words, *it raises the question of whether the understanding of Japan's security orientation could be assessed under the UN*

framework. To many scholars and policy makers, the two policies are often situated in different locales of academic interests and political concerns. Although both security policy and UN-Centred Diplomacy have been mentioned as the key cornerstones of Japan's post-war policy agenda, the emphasis has been placed on the former, while the latter was treated as a mere rhetoric without much policy implication or political significance. Even in the post-Cold War period, when Japan started to be more assertive in political and security affairs within the framework of the UN, as evident in its participation in the UNPKOs and its promotion of human security policy, most are still convinced that such assertiveness in the UN policy or the revival of UN-Centrism was nothing but temporary hype following its interest in the UNSC permanent membership bid. The key question regarding Japan's security development within the UN context is therefore whether this policy assertiveness will be short-lived or whether it indicates that the security policy, previously attached only to Japan-US bilateral relations, could be developed in tandem with the UN policy. Since the latter is the case, the sources of Japan's policy preference – to pursue security policy based on UN-Centrism or to pursue the UN policy that addresses the security facet at its core – is the central focus of this research, as opposed to Japan's past emphasis on social, economic and development areas.

Second, *it raises the question of whether the existing popular theoretical frameworks in IR could render adequate insight and understanding of Japan's foreign policy preferences, which in this case is Japan's security policy in the UN.* It might be correct to assert that the existing mainstream IR theories (Realism or Liberalism and its neo-versions) and foreign policy analysis have contributed extensively to the contemporary understanding of Japan's security and UN policy. However, there are also some problems that are not and perhaps cannot be well assessed by these existing

analytical tools. For example, the Gulf Crisis is the classic case for which most scholars exercise their theoretical understandings to explain why it was considered a diplomatic failure for Japan during the course of international security cooperation and a situation that invited harsh criticism of the country. The existing mainstream theories and foreign policy analyses would normally point either to Japan's usual response to external pressure or to the domestic and organisational constraints within the country as the key factors responsible for Japan's attempts, or the lack thereof, to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. Although this research does take account of the advantages of the explanatory power of the existing IR theories and foreign policy analytical models in explaining Japan's foreign relations and foreign policy, as thoroughly elaborated in Chapter 2, its purpose is to explore a different way of looking at Japan's foreign policy using Wendt's Constructivist framework.

Third, *by employing Wendt's Constructivism, another related theoretical question is whether the original version of his Constructivism is appropriate to examine foreign policy preferences and the decision-making process.* Considered one of the mainstream IR theories, the advantage of Constructivism over the contending schools is the incorporation of 'non-material' factors such as ideas, beliefs or culture and the social interactions among actors or agents into the analytical process without losing touch with the positivist ground. However, adopting any mainstream IR theory to examine foreign policy outcomes and the political structure of domestic politics might be problematic, as these theories are intended to explain the changing normative structure of the international system. Although this research aims to apply the constructivist approach to explain the source of preferences regarding Japan's security policy within the UN, it is believed that the adaptation of Wendt's Constructivist model, which will be elaborated in section 2.4, is inevitable.

1.2 Case Studies and Theoretical Work

To address the above three primary research objectives and questions, the following section will discuss the case studies chosen to capture the development of Japan's UN security policy and how they could be used to test the explanatory power of Wendt's Constructivism. This research has its roots in an attempt to locate its epistemological position and understand social phenomena via the examination and interpretation of the world through the eyes and opinions of key actors or participants. Its ontological position also subscribes to the view that social properties or phenomena are, to a certain degree, constructed through the interactions of individuals, actors or even states.

Contrary to the positivist ontological position, which explicates that social properties or phenomena are clearly separated, the tradition of involving people's interactions in the 'making of social phenomena' is the primary target of most Constructivist research. This research is similarly designed to treat and view each case as a social process, which unfolds its pattern over time: hence the selected cases, which cover a decade of policy transformation. Accordingly, the case studies on the Gulf Crisis, the Cambodian peace process and the promotion of human security policy were chosen to cover a period of more than a decade to represent the overall process of 'identity transformation', which is one of the key analytical tools of Wendt's Constructivism. The three cases will be examined in turn not only to reveal the overall process of the transformation of ideas and beliefs of the Japanese society and domestic actors regarding international security and UN peace operations, but also to capture the particular 'political identities' dominating Japanese society during each period. The examination of these dominating political identities and their transformations from the Gulf crisis until

the promotion of human security policy will benefit the understanding of Japan's change from passive to active security postures within the UN.

Briefly, the Gulf Crisis is considered as a starting point, as it hypothetically called the attention of the Japanese decision-makers and people to the matter of international security. The system of ideas and beliefs that informed political identities during the period, which is believed to be the reason for the country's reluctance and passive response to the multilateral peace attempts, will be compared with the subsequent UNPKO in Cambodia. The Cambodian peace process is important, as it was the first operation where Japan made significant efforts, helping the four Khmer factions to reach a peace agreement. The event also overlapped with the later stage of the Gulf Crisis and occurred prior to the promotion of human security policy. Therefore, the case is treated in this research as the transition period linking the overall process of Japan's identity transformation. The final case, the promotion of the human security approach, is chosen for its value-added benefit to the study of Japan's UN security policy, as it has never been systematically explored within the context of Japan's UN security policy. This case is also treated as the end-result of the process of identity transformation, as it presents a sharp contrast to the event in the Gulf Crisis, with the Japanese government and the public taking an assertive stance to promote international peace and security via this policy.

To enable these cases to be tackled in a systematic way, Wendt's Constructivism is the key theoretical framework adopted in this research. Numbers of researchers often use postmodernism, feminism or critical theory to expand the issues of international relations from 'high' to 'low' politics and to challenge the existing research methods of mainstream Realism and Liberalism. This research, however, does not seek to confront the mainstream IR theorists conducting research on 'high' politics or issues regarding

foreign policy by simply adopting the opposite epistemological supposition. This research shares the conviction with other theorists following Wendt's Constructivist approach that a 'moderate' or 'thin' version of the social construction framework is needed. This research believes that a framework incorporating ideational and non-material factors into the analysis of such 'high' political issues would provide IR scholars with additional techniques and insights into foreign policy patterns and choices, which are rarely found in the existing literature on Japan's security or UN policy.¹

Wendt's Constructivism, in essence, focuses on 'non-material' factors, especially the transformation of systems of ideas and beliefs, which, in effect, contributes directly to the transformation of system agents' identities and the transformation of the system structure simultaneously. Unlike the traditional post-modernist constructivism, Wendt's constructivism focuses on the observations of ideas and discourse through the study of norms and identities and how these norms or identities are constructed and reconstructed by collective ideas and social discourse. With respect to the analytical device or tool that will be adopted in this research, among several studies conducted by Wendt's constructivists, there are three main themes using culture, identity and norms as the analytical focus to understand IR issues. Admittedly, norms are deliberately chosen to represent identity and culture, as it is agreed among IR scholars that the latter two are difficult concepts to define and the examination of the constituent parts of identity and culture through norms is relatively more practical. It is therefore a common experience to see that norms and identities are sometimes used interchangeably within the same texts – signifying the same thing – in many constructivist studies.

¹ See Berger (1996) and Dobson (2003), for example of Constructivist work on Japan's foreign policy.

As opposed to Neo-realism's emphasis on structural determinants, the original formulation of Wendt's Constructivism is initially meant to explain the transformation of the international system, which is the culmination of the social interactions of actors. However, this research will firstly introduce the adapted 'recursive' version of Wendt's Constructivism to suit the analytical purpose of assessing foreign policy outcomes and preferences, as discussed in section 2.4.3. Another significant difference from other constructivist research that focuses on norms or culture is that, in this research, the 'transformation of identity' will be the focus from which policy changes and preferences are indicated.

Based on Wendt's categorisation of identities, as shown in Figure 2.1, this research focuses on observing, in each case, the degree of conformity between the 'international-role' identities and the 'domestic-type' identities. While the former refers to identities that are adopted among the international community at a certain period and are expected to be projected internationally by Japan, the latter points to the transformed identities happening at Japan's domestic level. The comparison of the degree of conformity between the 'international-role' and 'domestic-type' identities in each case will not only reveal the overall process of identity transformation from the Gulf Crisis to the promotion of human security policy, but will also explain the sources of policy activism and passivism during each particular period. By setting up the above theoretical ground, the core arguments will be outlined in the following section.

1.3 Key Arguments

This research firstly argues that the existing mainstream IR theories and foreign policy analytical approaches are not sufficiently well developed to explain the complexity of Japan's foreign and security policy decision-making process. This

research therefore strongly suggests that a middle ground framework, which simultaneously captures Japan's interactions with the system structure and the dynamics of the domestic decision-making process and emphasises the importance of 'non-material' or 'cultural' factors, such as 'identity', should be further developed. As outlined above, this research initially raises the question at the theoretical level as to whether the existing mainstream IR theories and foreign policy analytical models are able to make sense of Japan's complicated process of decision-making and its complex nature of foreign and security policy orientation. This research certainly does not deny the strengths of the existing IR theories and foreign policy analytical approaches in explaining Japan's interactions with the international system and its complex internal political structure. However, the overly clear-cut divide between the emphasis on the separate level of analysis and the emphasis on 'material factors' associated with the mainstream IR theories and foreign policy analytical approaches has led to an incomplete understanding of Japan's choices of active or passive policy pursuits.

Among the contending theories and approaches, this research adopts Wendt's Constructivism as the main theoretical framework because it questions the excessive emphasis on 'structure' and 'material factors' as the only key determinants that generate policy outcomes. Wendt's Constructivism incorporates 'non-material' or 'cultural' factors into the mainstream positivist research schemes by emphasising how 'ideas about self and others' through the studies of the transformation of norms, identities and cultures shape system interactions and (re)create the system structure. It is believed in this research that an examination of how these 'non-material' factors determine foreign and security policy outcomes will provide more reasonable explanations for Japan's choices of active or passive foreign and security policies. However, this research is still convinced that Wendt's Constructivist framework is not developed to explain the source

of foreign policy preferences or adequately clarify the decision-making process. Its emphasis only on the transformation of ‘international-role’ and ‘collective’ identities offers only an insight into how social interactions among states affect the reconstruction of the system structure. In this sense, Wendt’s Constructivism still focuses only on one level of analysis: that is, the system level.

In order to apply IR theory to the analysis of foreign or security policy choices, it is therefore essential that the adapted version of Wendt’s Constructivism must be introduced. This research suggests that it is indispensable to incorporate the ‘domestic-type’ identity, which is treated as given in the original form of Wendt’s Constructivism, into the analytical process in addition to the existing focus on the ‘international-role’ identity. As will be further demonstrated in Chapter 4 on the Gulf Crisis case, the ‘international-role’ identity projected at the international level does not always conform to the ‘domestic-type’ identity embraced within the domestic level. The lack of conformity between the two identities is therefore responsible for Japan’s reluctance in projecting active foreign or security policy. In order to capture the process of these identity transformations, this research substitutes Wendt’s original ‘linear’ process in assessing ‘international-role’ identity at the system level with the ‘recursive’ version of identity transformation. This process will be further elaborated in section 2.4.3 and shown in Diagram 2.2.

In short, the ‘recursive model’ is designed to allow the dual processes of social construction of ‘international-role’ and ‘domestic-type’ identities being transformed at the international level and domestic level to be captured simultaneously. The significance of examining the recursive process of identity transformation at both levels is to discover how far the conformity between the two identities would result in Japan’s choice of policy assertiveness or passiveness. As argued in this research, the lower the

degree of conformity between the 'international-role' and 'domestic-type' identity. the more likely it is that policy passivism will be pursued, as evident in the Gulf Crisis. In contrast, the higher degree of conformity between the two identities in the Cambodian peace process and the promotion of human security policy suggests a greater chance of policy activism and success.

This research does not only attempt to develop a middle ground analytical model that incorporates observations at both system and domestic levels and includes the non-material factors in the traditional positivist assessment. Another important argument is also at the substantive level. This research challenges the standard interpretation of Japan's security policy under the Japan-US bilateral relations by suggesting that Japan's security policy is also developed within the context of the UN framework. This research argues differently that the clear dichotomy between national and international security throughout the post-war period was responsible for Japan's lack of policy coherence in pursuing security policy choices that serve both national and international interests. Because national security had always been given more weight through Japan-US security treaties and bilateral relations, international security had been therefore either rhetorically located elsewhere, for example, within the UN framework, or simply forgotten by the post-war decision-makers. It is also pointed out in this research that the process of identity transformation throughout the past decade has narrowed the gap between Japan's emphasis on securing national security under Japan-US security agreements and its promotion of both national and international security via the UN. Following the Gulf Crisis in the early 1990s, it is demonstrated in this research that the transformation of ideas and beliefs on international security and the essence of peace operations, which has informed Japan's 'domestic-type' identities and affected the

transformation of its ‘international-role’ identities throughout these past years, has contributed to a more balanced security policy under the UN framework.

In addition, it is also highlighted in this research that the development of security understanding under the UN framework has also contributed to the revival of Japan’s new UN-Centrism, which integrates the security dimension into its core. Through the examination of the three cases studies, this research found that Japan’s perpetual identity transformation during those periods has contributed significantly to its increasing emphasis on physical security as much as humanitarian contributions. Among the three cases, the Gulf Crisis and the Cambodian peace process, both set in the identity transitional period, reveal a gradual change of Japan’s understanding of the linkage between national and international security as well as the essence of the new UN-Centrism. Human security, which is treated as the end-result of Japan’s identity transformation, is assertively promoted as a result of the transformed and constructed understanding among the Japanese of the inextricable link between national and international peace and security and also between physical security and humanitarian contributions. In the following section on the methodology that will be used to examine the process of identity transformation and to capture the system of ideas and beliefs that inform Japan’s political identities at both the international and the domestic level will be discussed.

1.4 Method of Interpretation and Analysis: Discourse Analysis

To impart Japan’s foreign policy patterns while exploring the establishment of the key actors’ system of ideas and beliefs, constructed through the process of social interactions both at the system and the domestic level, this research requires a methodology that allows the qualitative examination of non-material factors as well as

an analytical device that performs as a tool from which the system of ideas and beliefs could be extracted. Among several methodologies adopted in qualitative research, this dissertation has opted for the ‘discourse analysis’ approach, agreed among scholars to provide flexibility as a device to observe and impart the meanings of actions through forms of communication. Because of its high degree of flexibility, the label ‘discourse analysis’, therefore, has been applied in several social science disciplines. As Jonathan Potter rightly states, sometimes discourse analysis is a convenient name for a practice of analysing discourse, which can involve various approaches such as speech act theory, narrative analysis, conversation analysis or qualitative content analysis. At other times, it is also treated as a term for language in use or theorised as a linguistic object that can be counted and described.² Accordingly, it is important to clearly define the scope of the discourse analysis being employed in this research.

The discourse analysis adopted in this research incorporates the insight from the work of Michel Foucault, whose definition of discourse analysis ‘denotes how a particular set of linguistic categories relating to an object and the ways of depicting it frame the way we comprehend that object’ and ‘emphasises how a group of statements provide a way to represent knowledge about a particular topic or moment.’³ General proposition aside, discourse analysis based on Foucault’s construction of new objects (social phenomena or reality) and subjects (those who utter the discourse) also suggests a ‘twin or intertwined processes’ of producing both new objects and subjects through the examination of sets of discourse.⁴ Unlike other strands of discourse analysis, which tend to focus more on the action-oriented nature of language or the function of language as people use it to do things, Foucauldian discourse analysis is interested in how the social

² Potter and Wetherell (1994: 47)

³ Bryman (2004: 370)

⁴ Potter (1996: 86-87)

world (both the objects or social phenomena and the subjects or those using the language) is constructed through discourse.⁵ In this sense, a discourse is not merely a language or only a form of communication, but a device to form a subject identity and to impart and explore the meanings that constitute social phenomena and objects. By observing working sets of discourse throughout a certain time, it is believed that practices or objects of social phenomena and individual human subjects in general, or in this case, foreign policy processes and outcomes and the practice of foreign policy actors, can be significantly understood. Although there are several variations of discourse analysis depending on the research discipline, making it extremely difficult to bring about a generalisation of research methodology, they basically share some essential propositions or theoretical principles that categorically distinguish discourse analysis from other qualitative research. As summarised in Table 1.1, this research adopts the general assumptions and the analytical steps provided as follows:

Firstly, the majority of approaches in discourse analysis are concerned with ‘actions.’ In other words, discourse is simply ‘action-oriented’ and put together as part of a broader context and practices.⁶ Accordingly, one could theoretically observe and expect to extract concrete acts out of sets of discrete utterances. Because discourse equals action, different kinds of discourse, which includes almost all kinds of communications – talk or text⁷ – thus produce different kinds of actions and practices. Through the same logic, attention to various sets of different discourses certainly establishes series of change in different actions and practices. Although the original Foucauldian discourse analysis treats not only talk and text but also almost anything as

⁵ A more modern way of applying discourse analysis on Constructivist work could also be seen in Milliken (1999) on the study of discourse and international relations.

⁶ Potter (2004: 609), Wood and Kroger (2000: 4)

⁷ Anything that can be read and interpreted – written or spoken forms of language use – is treated as discourse.

discourse, for the purpose of research feasibility and systematic analysis, this research will focus only on talk and text as the key analytical materials.

Table 1.1: Summary of Research Methodology

Philosophical Supposition (Foucault)	Theoretical Assumption (Foucault, Potter)	Analytical Methods (Potter)	Layers of Analysis (Potter and Fairclough)
A 'twin or intertwined processes' of constructing both new objects (foreign policy outcome) and subjects (foreign policy actors) through the examination of sets of discourse	1. Discourse is 'action-oriented'.	Attention to various sets of discourse to compare and establish patterns of foreign policy transformation	1. Identity (political identities – how they are set up in discourse)
	2. Discourse is 'situated' and embedded in sequences of interaction at macro level.	Attention to details and rhetorical organisation to capture the system of ideas and beliefs in foreign policy	2. Relational (social relationship between discourse participants)
	3. Discourse is 'constructed' and 'constructing' social identity, relationship and identity.	Attention to the transformation of constructed discourse and how it constructs political identity and establishes foreign policy patterns	3. Ideational (the construction of systems of knowledge and beliefs)

Source: Author's Table

The second theoretical supposition of discourse analysis contends that discourse is 'embedded in sequences of interaction', and as expressed by Potter, 'actions do not hang in space' but respond to other actions, which in turn set the environment for new and subsequent actions. Discourse is, therefore, 'situated' in terms of rhetoric, where analysis is a process that considers how talk and texts are embedded in sequences of interaction and specific institutional settings.⁸ Unlike other strands, Foucauldian discourse analysis seeks to identify the set of interactive environments at the macro-level and how the discourse serves to 'position' subjects.⁹ Therefore, to understand discourse or actions in the context of any given situation, the method of reading into details and looking for rhetorical organisation forms the prominent step of research analysis. While

⁸ Potter (2004: 610)

⁹ Langdrige (2004: 338)

in linguistics or in psychological disciplines, the emphasis on the former might rest upon the details of pauses, grammatical cohesion and so on, the primary concern in this research simply examines the discourse beyond the sentence, that is, within the context of given situations. This research pays more attention to rhetorical organisation, specifically how various versions of rhetoric could capture the system of ideas and beliefs in foreign policy among policy makers.

Finally, the third theoretical assumption shared among discourse analysts is that discourse is ‘constructed’ out of rhetorical devices, while it ‘constructs’ and stabilises versions of social realities.¹⁰ To incorporate this assumption into Foucault’s philosophical supposition, the function of discourse used in this research therefore is not only for text interpretation but also for revealing the constructed social phenomena behind it and identifying the identity of the subjects (policy makers) involved in the discourse. Fairclough clearly supports the function of discourse in being ‘constructed’ and in ‘constructing’ the social identity of the objects, the social relationship between the subjects and the overall system of ideas and knowledge.¹¹ In other words, it literally maps out the social world presented by the sets of discourse. These structures are analysed simultaneously in this research by taking Japan’s formation and transformation of systems of ideas and beliefs as the object of social analysis and the main foreign policy transformation of political identity among policy makers as the subject of social analysis. In order to be certain about the way in which discourse is being constructed and constructing social realities, these three-dimensional analyses will be cross-checked through different case studies to ensure its validity in different contexts via the following groups of data.

¹⁰ Potter (2004: 610)

¹¹ Fairclough (1992: 64)

1.5 Data Collection

The primary source of data used in this research is written materials, which include public records from government agencies, Japan's political parties, the UN and other international organisations. Primary documents, such as academic papers by government officials or primary accounts of events by officials or the people involved, are analysed with secondary sources consisting of analyses by other IR scholars or historians. The third type of documents and records comprises media and editorial accounts from the leading newspapers and series of polls conducted by both newspapers and government agencies throughout the past decade. The final source of data includes electronic texts, such as academic documents and bulletins posted on the Internet. Another crucial source of data is in-depth interviews with a variety of key actors in Japanese politics, including politicians, MOFA officials, newspaper writers, academics and Japanese officials in the UN.

1.5.1 Documents and Records

a) Public Records

The key public records used in this research can be divided into three parts, covering the period from the early 1990s to the early 2000s. The first source of official documents is the Japanese government agencies, including the MOFA, the MOD and the Cabinet Office. The official documents include:

- a) Diplomatic Blue Books (MOFA)
- b) Defence White Papers (MOD)
- c) Reports, publications and monographs (MOFA, MOD, PKO Headquarters)
- d) Security Treaties and Defence Programme Outlines (MOD)

- e) Keynote addresses and speeches of foreign ministers, ambassadors and permanent missions in the UN (MOFA)
- f) Keynote addresses and speeches of Prime Ministers (MOFA and the Cabinet Office)

The second source of public documents is the collection of UN official records relating to the case studies, from both the UNSC and the UN General Assembly. These documents include:

- a) UNSC Resolutions
- b) UNGA Resolutions
- c) Presidential Statements
- d) Reports of the UN High Commissioners
- e) Reports of the Secretary General

The third source of public documents used in this research is the US government; these documents mainly include:

- a) Keynote addresses and statements of the Presidents, UN mission, Secretary of State and other officials in the Department of State
- b) Presidential Directives
- c) Congress Resolutions

b) Primary/Secondary Sources

The primary source of documents analysed in this research that do not belong in the domain of public records includes first-hand accounts by the actors concerned. These documents include:

- a) Basic policies of political parties
- b) Historical accounts of political parties

- c) Reports from internal committees of political parties
- d) Written documents by key interviewees
- e) Speeches and statements made by key interviewees
- f) Reports or academic works from research institutes
- g) Reports, publications and monographs from Japan's specialised agencies, for example, the JICA or the JIA

The secondary sources include analytical accounts from various scholars and practitioners through books, book chapters and articles.

c) Media Accounts

Unlike other countries, Japanese newspapers are considered a reliable source of information. According to the World Association of Newspapers, Japan ranked number two in 2005 with a total daily circulation of more than 70 million copies per day, of which the average combined circulation among the largest four papers accounted for almost 40 million copies.¹²

This research therefore examines series of editorials and media accounts from major newspapers in Japan, including the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, the *Asahi Shimbun*, the *Mainichi Shimbun* and the *Nikkei Shimbun*. The analysis of media accounts also includes special reports or recommendations on certain issues such as revisions to the Constitution or recommendations for PKOs conducted by these newspapers.

¹² According to the *Nihon Shimbun Kyokai*, the official daily circulations of the *Yomiuri*, *Asahi*, *Mainichi* and *Nikkei Shimbun*, the largest four newspapers, are around 14, 12, 6 and 5 million copies, respectively. Available from: <http://www.pressnet.or.jp/english/member/tokyo.htm> and <http://www.wan-press.org/article7321.html> [Accessed 03/11/2006].

d) Polls and Official Statistics

Polls and official statistics covering the decade-long period being studied are also collected. These polls and official statistics can be divided into three categories. The polls are collected from different sources, including:

- a) *The ROPER Centre, University of Connecticut*: this is a database that stores the results of polls on political, economic and social issues. The polling institutions vary from newspapers and the NHK research bureau to independent polling agencies such as the US Information Service and so on.
- b) *The Prime Minister's Office*: polls regarding foreign relations provide full coverage of the decade after the Cold War
- c) Other official statistics are collected from the UN website

e) Electronic Texts

This research also relies on some electronic sources of data, such as electronic texts, bulletins and press releases from certain organisations that are not available in printed form. The data collected from the Internet are in two separate forms.

- a) Academic bulletins of independent research institutions dedicated to academic works, such as *Global Governance*, *Frontline* and so on.
- b) Some sources of information from independent and educational organisations, such as press releases or collections of key speakers giving speeches or statements that are available only on the Internet.

1.5.2 Interviews: In-depth Interviews

- a) *Politicians*: in-depth interviews were carried out with members of leading political parties – both LDP and the DPJ politicians, including cabinet ministers, former and current members of the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors and the parties' policy staff.
- b) *MOFA and MOD officials*: high-ranking MOFA officials responsible for the UN policy, former diplomats to the UN and SDF officials were interviewed.
- c) *Officials in international and development organisations*: in-depth interviews were conducted with former MOFA officials who are now serving in UN agencies – the UNHCR, the UNDP or in the UN Secretariat--as well as those serving at Japan's development agencies and research institutes such as JICA and JIA.
- d) *Newspaper writers*: Political and foreign policy staff writers in major Japanese newspapers, including the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, the *Asahi Shimbun* and the *Mainichi Shimbun*, were interviewed.
- e) *Academics*: Well-known Japanese academics in the fields of Japan's foreign policy, security policy and UN policy from leading universities, such as Tokyo University, Hitotsubashi University and Keio University, were interviewed.

1.6 Presentation of Findings: Chapter Outlines

This research is divided into seven main chapters. The first chapter outlines the research questions, key arguments, methodology, data collection and so on. The key research questions is two-levelled, asking firstly, on the theoretical ground, whether the existing mainstream IR theories are capable of explaining and understanding Japan's

preference in pursuing its UN security policy. This research accordingly explores whether other contending approaches, especially Constructivism, could provide a better insight into the process of policy formation, transformation and preference in contemporary Japan's security and UN policy. Secondly, this research also raises a substantive question about the direction of Japan's UN security policy and whether this security policy could be developed under the context of UN-Centrism. If so, the way in which this process has taken place throughout the past decades is another main focus of this research.

Chapter Two provides a systematic literature review, including an examination of the existing IR theories commonly adopted by scholars conducting Japanese studies. The mainstream IR theories – Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism – are examined along with foreign policy analytical models. The shortcomings of the existing literature and theoretical framework in understanding Japan's post-Cold War foreign relations and foreign security policy are extensively countered. Also mentioned in this chapter is an illuminating account of Wendt's Constructivist approach and how it has been previously applied to the study of foreign relations by using such factors as norms and culture. Although this study does not oppose the theoretical insights of norm- and culture-led studies, it opts for the observation of identity transformation and how it affects the preferences of foreign policy outcomes. The adapted version of Wendt's original constructivist approach, 'recursive constructivist logic,' is accordingly introduced and discussed in depth as an alternative tool to explore the relationship between the transformation of political identities and the preferences on policy outcomes.

The third chapter presents an overview of Japan's security and UN policy. The main emphasis of this chapter is to point out and elaborate on the dichotomy between Japan's national and international security policy since the post-WWII period and the

possible re-orientation of its policy functions in the post-Cold War period. While it has been problematic to understand Japan's security policy without the framework of the Japan-US security alliance, it seems equally difficult to ponder the clear linkage between Japan's security orientation and UN-Centrism. This chapter, on the contrary, proposes that Japan's security policy could possibly be understood within the framework of UN-Centrism and how the lessening of the security dichotomy within the country throughout the past decade has contributed to the development of Japan's security policy under the UN framework.

Chapters Four to Six are the main bodies advancing the evidence regarding how Japan's gradual identity transformation, based on the reorientation of the country's system of ideas and knowledge, has contributed to more assertive policy preferences in the security area under the UN framework. The collective ideas being shared by the international community and within the Japanese society on the aspects of international peace and security, UN peace operations and Japan-US relations will be simultaneously explored and compared in each case to confirm the level of conformity between the 'international-role' and 'domestic-type' identities. The fourth chapter starts with the background of Japan's awakening security consciousness during the Gulf Crisis in early 1990. The case clearly captures Japan in a state of political and ideational confusion, which resulted in political embarrassment and diplomatic and policy failure. Japan's adherence to its 'unilateral pacifist' identity clearly clashed with the identity that the international community expected the nation to project in dealing with the maintenance of peace and security in the post-Cold War period, which was more multilateral in nature.

Chapter Five explores the case of the Cambodian Peace Process, in which Japan gradually transformed its security insights, corresponding to the changing international environment, especially on the ideas of how peace and security should be pursued within

the UN context. One might argue that it was merely a diplomatic endeavour that aimed at saving the government's face following the Gulf Crisis. On the contrary, this research argues that the obvious transformation of self-understanding about its place and its responsibility in securing international security, not the external force of other major powers, was the primary reason for such an assertive political and security stance during the Cambodian peace process. The process of ideational transformation within the country and the process of projecting the right identity into the international community were, however, not complete at this stage. Nevertheless, it was a significant stage where Japan revised its sets of ideas and understanding about peace and, specifically, how Japan could contribute to achieve it.

The sixth chapter deals with the most dynamic period of Japan's post-Cold War UN diplomacy. The promotion of human security policy is literally the end-result of the decade-long interactions with the international community in the international security area and several years of self-apprehension in various security and UN-related aspects. In a way, the human security policy has emerged as a policy that combined Japan's concern on security issues with its UN-Centred diplomacy. The policy did not emerge out of a vacuum or simply because it was forcefully induced by external powers, as had usually been the case during the Cold War period. The policy itself combines the issue or policy reluctance that had long been Japan's key disadvantage – security beyond the areas surrounding Japan – with the most inspired but inactive UN-Centrism, which could not otherwise be actively pursued. This chapter plays an important part, concluding the account of the whole process of political identity transformation within Japan and explaining the development of ideational re-orientation from the Gulf Crisis until the present, when Japan has come to grips with its preferred 'domestic-type' identities and its projection of 'international-role' identities.

The final chapter provides conclusions to the issues previously raised in the research questions. Firstly, it confirms the possibility of opening up another theoretical and methodological venue to examine foreign policy outcomes. By not only relying on mainstream IR theories that tend to treat the external or system structure as the main determinants, or on foreign policy analytical tools, which tend to emphasise domestic factors, this research has followed the direction of Wendt's Constructivism in finding a middle-ground analytical mechanism which largely focuses on the social and ideational interactions of the Japanese state at both the internal and the international level. The most important finding, however, contradicts the popular view that only one facet of external or internal factors could influence policy outcomes. Rather, capturing the whole process of how a certain identity is literally transformed into another through a series of social interactions renders a richer understanding of policy preferences.

1.7 Contributions

The original contributions made in this research are two-fold – at the theoretical and the substantive level. The first significant theoretical contribution is the application of Wendt's Constructivism and the use of 'identity' in the examination of Japan's security policy in the UN, which has never been conducted before. Another important contribution is the modification of Wendt's Constructivism to examine Japan's foreign and security policy in the UN. The 'recursive version' adapted for the purpose of examining Japan's foreign policy decision-making process is as original as it is significant, because it contributes to the further development of an IR theory-based approach that could be applied to foreign policy analysis. In other words, it is an attempt to establish a middle-ground approach that combines two levels of analysis via the examination of 'non-material' factors: in this case, 'identity.' Among other things, this

research also offers a re-interpretation of how 'identity' should be treated in the process of social constructions and how it could be utilised as a framework for the foreign policy decision-making process. Instead of focusing only on 'material interests' among political actors, an examination of the changing sets of ideas and beliefs that inform political identities offers an illuminating account of how decision-making is determined by the process of ideational construction and transformation.

Also, rather than treating 'domestic-type' identity as pre-given and exogenous to social interactions, the examination of this sort of identity offers more insights into how certain sets of ideas and beliefs are formed in the first place, which also leads to an explanation of the sources of foreign and security policy preferences. The inclusion of the 'domestic-type' identity into the analytical process alongside the 'international-role' identity technically allows the analysis to be conducted at both levels simultaneously. The process also leads to an explanation of how social interactions at both system and domestic level affect the transformation of identity, which determines the choices of foreign and security policy.

At the substantive level, this research essentially contributes to a new interpretation of Japan's contemporary security and foreign policy direction, by focusing on security development under the UN framework rather than under the Japan-US alliance. The examination of Japan's security policy under the UN reveals how Japan's understanding of the inseparable link between 'national' and 'international' security has been developed in the post-Cold War period, as a result of social interactions and exchanges of ideas and beliefs at both the domestic and the international level. Another contribution that is important to the study of Japan's UN policy is the way in which the new UN-Centrism can be understood. This research suggests that the revival of UN-Centrism consists of a more balanced approach, promoting international peace and

security via both physical security contributions and humanitarian development and assistance, as discussed in Chapter 6 on Japan's human security policy.

In addition, via the examination of Japan's promotion of human security through the Constructivist approach, which is rarely tackled by other scholars, this research provides historical accounts of the development of the policy during the past decade. Most importantly, this research does not provide an interpretation or explanation of the development of Japan's security policy in the UN from passive to active pursuits through the popular notions of power relations or domestic politics. Instead, it furnishes the academic community with a significant new interpretation that focuses on a systematic assessment of the level of conformity between Japan's projected 'international-role' identity and the country's transformed 'domestic-type' identity. In sum, this research attempts to show that the lower the conformity between the two identities, the higher the chance that the security or foreign policy will be passive, as in the case of the Gulf Crisis. On the contrary, it is evident that the higher the conformity between the 'domestic-type' identity and the 'international-role' identity, the lower the chance that the country will pursue a passive or reluctant policy. Both theoretical and substantive contributions will be discussed in detail below.

On the one hand, this research employs Constructivism to examine the empirical cases of Japan's UN and security policy, which is an issue typically examined by the Realist and Liberal schools. Although some studies have applied Constructivism to Japan's foreign policy, they have not been entirely successful in producing a model that combines the analysis of the system and the domestic structure. One of the major pitfalls is the attempt by these studies to apply Wendt's Constructivism to foreign policy analysis as it is, without considering the limitations of the original design, which emerged as an alternative to neo-realism in explaining the transformation of the

international structure. The existing studies using norms or identity, when applied to foreign policy analysis, therefore address only the ‘what’ question (what sort of foreign policy is transformed and projected at the international level?), but not the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions (how and why are norms or identities initially transformed or formed?). This dissertation, on the contrary, highlights this theoretical backdrop for the first time and focuses on developing an IR theory that is suitable for the analysis of foreign policy behaviours and preferences as well as for addressing ‘how, why and what’ questions simultaneously. By introducing the adapted version or the middle-ground approach of the ‘recursive Constructivist model’, this will be the first time that social interactions and the process of identity transformation informing foreign policy preferences, will be simultaneously captured and analysed at both the international and domestic levels.

In essence, the ‘recursive’ constructivist model is designed to overcome the disadvantage of the original model, which is intended to explain the changing normative structure of the international system resulting from social interactions and ideational transformation among states at the system level. In applying this theoretical approach to examine not the changing configuration of the existing normative structure but the foreign policy preferences and behaviours of an individual state, Japan’s social and ideational interactions at both the international level (the ‘international-role’ identity) and the domestic level (the ‘domestic-type’ identity) are considered equally important. Accordingly, there is a clear need for an adaptation of Wendt’s ‘linear’ model, which treats the ‘type’ identity as exogenous to the analysis and focuses only on the process of the ‘role’ and ‘collective’ identity transformation and how these transformations affect the system structure. The ‘recursive’ model is therefore designed to suit the examination of foreign policy outcomes and preferences by observing how social interactions and the system of ideas and beliefs have transformed at the system level as well as among

domestic actors. This recursive constructivist model is certainly advantageous when applied to cases where the policy preferences are considered abnormal or could not possibly be understood perfectly through the changing normative structure or the re-prioritising of domestic interests alone. The model is also especially beneficial when concerns about the process of policy reorientation or the understanding of policy-making are central to the research question.

The contribution in terms of theoretical significance aside, this research provides an alternative to the existing way of looking at Japan's foreign policy-making and its consensus-building process. While popular literatures focus mostly on interactions among particular groups such as elites or non-governmental actors and how their individual or group interests are prioritised, this research emphasises comparing systems of ideas and beliefs that have transformed through time across different key actors. The observation of identity transformation both at the domestic and the international level through a certain time reveals a complex process, indicating that Japan's foreign policy is formed according to ideational interactions that repeatedly occur internally among key domestic actors (domestic-type identities) and internationally with the international community (international-role identities) rather than because of simple external pressures or domestic political strictures or constraints.

Not only does it provide a new way to understand Japan's foreign policy decision-making process; this research also seeks to offer an alternative explanation for the issue of Japan's UN policy, especially its participation in political and security issues, by looking into the development of Japan's security orientation in the post-Cold War period within the framework of the UN rather than in the context of Japan-US bilateral relations. Whereas there is an abundance of studies on Japan's security policy and Japan's UN policy, almost no study explores the development of Japan's post-Cold War

security orientation under the framework of the UN or the possible linkages between the two policy issues, which are normally believed to represent different poles of the political spectrum. Furthermore, while there has been analysis of Japan's foreign and UN policy using constructivism (norms and culture), this research is the first that observes the issue of Japan's UN and security policy through the examination of identity transformation.

This research also adds value to the study of Japan's security policy and the UN policy by examining the human security issue through the Constructivist approach. Although there are several studies of Japan's UN policy, their emphasis is generally on either Japan's UNPKO participation or on its bid for permanent membership of the UNSC and its contributions to economic and social development. A thorough examination of the newly emerging human security policy and how it affects the re-direction of Japan's UN policy and establishes new security insights within Japan itself has never been seriously undertaken. Furthermore, apart from the fact that Japan's human security policy is infrequently explored by those interested in Japanese studies, Constructivist examination of the issue itself is also a rare occurrence. Due to Japan's active promotion of the policy during the past few years through the systematic integration of the policy with both its UN agenda and ODA principles, as elaborated in Chapter 6, this research is believed to contribute to the knowledge in this particular issue area and set the preliminary work for further examination.

In addition, although the other two cases chosen to be studied in this research, the Gulf Crisis and the Cambodian peace process, have been covered by many scholars throughout the past decade, these cases have never been positioned in a way that allows a systematic assessment of their development and their implications for the overall framework of Japan's UN policy and its security understanding. By analysing these two

cases with the human security policy, this research will certainly contribute to a better understanding of the new-UN Centrism, new security insights, and among others, the way in which Japan's foreign policy-making process is formed. A detailed background to the past literature and the theories and frameworks usually adopted to explain Japan's foreign policy issue, as briefly mentioned in this introduction, will be presented in Chapter 2, while a substantive background to Japan's UN security policy will be discussed in Chapter 3.

Chapter 2 IR Theories, Identity and Japan's UN policy

2.1 Mainstream Theories in International Relations

One of the most difficult questions in IR and international political scholarship is 'Which IR theory is the most appropriate lens through which we could examine significant international phenomena (or cases) with more accuracy and could simultaneously tender more sophisticated explanations to our problems?' Since the 1980s, the mainstream international relations theories have faced this challenge from both inside and outside their theoretical domains. The awareness among IR scholars regarding the differences of *explanatory/ foundation* theory (realism, liberalism and constructivism, also known as 'rationalism') versus *constitutive/anti-foundation* theory (post-modernism, feminism, critical theory, normative theory, also known as 'reflectivism') and the rejection of the former have become more acute and dominated the discussion in recent years.¹³

With the above starting question, this research firstly attempts to find a suitable theory that posits the most viable set of explanations to the research question raised in the previous chapter. This chapter, therefore, sets out to review the past literature by outlining the background of the existing IR theories (Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism) and their applications to Japan's foreign relations. This chapter further explores analytical models of foreign policy analysis (the elitist, pluralist, reactive-state and civilian power theses) and their applications to Japan's foreign policy and decision-making process in section 2.3. and lastly, it examines the shortcomings of these theories and analytical models and how Wendt's Constructivism and the 'recursive version' are suited to the understanding of Japan's foreign policy preferences.

¹³ Baylis and Smith (2001: 226-228)

2.1.1 Realism

Realist Taxonomy and Main Assumptions

It is agreed among scholars that realism is perhaps the most classical and the most influential IR theory, which can be traced back to 430-400 BC, the period of the Peloponnesian War. At this time, the key thinker was Thucydides and the key thinking on classical realism was drawn from pure 'human nature', which determines the course of a state's relationship through the 'endless struggle for power.'¹⁴ Like other theories, the definition and taxonomy of realist theory itself are still subject to considerable contention. The majority of realist scholars, although they agree upon the general premises that underlie the core assumptions of realism, are still divided into different clusters. These clusters also hold different accounts of theoretical notions, which in turn reflect the development of the theory through the course of the IR history.¹⁵

Hans J. Morgenthau, the proclaimed father of *classical realism*, contends that politics is governed by the objective law that has its roots in 'human nature.' The trademark of this traditional realism is the concept of 'interests', defined in terms of 'power.' Alternatively, it is the idea that explains how material and interests dominate the actions of both men and states and how the idea of interests provides the link between 'reason and facts' that helps us to understand international politics.¹⁶ E.H. Carr is another scholar who has helped strengthen the focus on power and interests in classical realism by questioning the obscure notion of morality in international politics

¹⁴ Accounts of Realist theory often begin with a prologue about the Peloponnesian War and the thoughts of Thucydides. The original text can be found in Rex Warner, *The Peloponnesian War*, London, Penguin Classics, 1954.

¹⁵ We are indebted to several other thinkers such as Machiavelli (*The Prince*), Thomas Hobbes (*Leviathan*), Jean Jacques Rousseau (*The State of War*), E.H. Carr (*The Twenty Years' Crisis: 1919-1939*), Hans Morgenthau (*Politics Among Nations*), Hedley Bull (*The Anarchical Society*) and Kenneth Waltz (*Theory of International Politics*), for the elaboration of Realist theory, which has been extended over time since Thucydides constructed its philosophical backbone.

¹⁶ Morgenthau (1973: 4-15)

and the harmony of interests advanced by liberal utopianism, such as the concept of economic laissez-faire, internationalism or the idea of ‘the greatest good for the greatest number.’ What really matters is the unconscious reflections of national policy based on each state’s individual interpretation of interest at each point. The international principles, institutions or the non-existing international harmony are, in fact, disguises of vested interests of those at the top of power structure.¹⁷ Beyond the key concept of ‘power and interests’, Bull also advances the idea of ‘anarchical society’ or the focus on the ‘system structure’ in his thesis, which contends that the current system of states is simply ‘anarchical’ because there is no higher level of authority over states. Despite the anarchy, states do form a society with common rules and institutions, although none is considered the dominant element in international politics.¹⁸

A refined articulation of the system structure, however, can be found in Waltz’s *neo-realism*, in which he advances the argument that the ‘anarchical system’, as opposed to ‘human nature’, is the primary reason for which fear, suspicions and insecurities among states are fostered. Even if the actors have not possessed any malign intent towards each other, conflict can easily emerge from such system anarchy. It might be true to assert that the core realist assumptions agreed upon by the contemporary realists would seem to stem from the key ideas of classical and structural/neo-realism. Both realist traditions make the central assumptions of the ‘causes of war/conditions of peace’ and the ‘focus on the state’ utterly clear.¹⁹ Realists, especially neo-realists, speak of international politics as ‘structural anarchy’, consisting of states which, similar to human beings, are wicked and sinful as well as full of desire to dominate others. Under this condition, the ultimate goals of states that exist in this anarchical environment are to

¹⁷ Carr (1946: 103, 146-152)

¹⁸ Bull (1995: 25 and 49)

¹⁹ Holsti (1995: 36-37)

promote their 'national interests' and to secure their 'survival, power and relative capabilities' via political and military means, labelled under 'self-help.' The practice will eventually result in a 'security dilemma', which, in turn, generates the prerequisite condition for the system's structural anarchy and intrinsically imprints international politics with the vicious circle of a power struggle.²⁰ Although they are prone to power maximisation and war, as unitary 'rational' actors guided by the logic of national interests, states are said to be able to resort to peace through the mechanism of 'alliance systems' and 'balance of power'. Nonetheless, both realist traditions leave room for neither international institutions nor economic instruments to play significant parts in peace construction and maintenance.

In sum, Waltz's theory of international politics neatly elaborates the above-mentioned characteristics of the contemporary international politics and the transition from classical realism to neo-realism into three following main points. Firstly, Waltz sets himself firmly against what he sees as the classical realist's claim about the causes of war, such as human nature and state attributes, known as the first and second images respectively. He develops a theory which includes the 'third image' or system structure into its analytical process and extends his proposition rendering the causes of war.²¹ For him, the answer lies at the system level: that is, 'In anarchy, there is no automatic harmony and among autonomous states, war is inevitable.'²²

Secondly, Waltz further develops the idea of system structure in his work on the Theory of International Politics. Crucial to his structural approach is the belief that the contemporary system is anarchic and decentralised rather than hierarchical. States in the same anarchic system would seem to have the same rather than different traits of

²⁰ Morgenthau (1973: 3-4)

²¹ Waltz (1959: 16-41, 80-123 and 159-186), for the elaboration on the first, second and third image, respectively.

²² Ibid (1959: 186)

behaviour. IR scholars, therefore, are allowed to emphasise the study of system transitions and other system phenomena in lieu of the study of each individual state itself.

Thirdly, relating to the previous point, the heart of Waltz's structural analysis is the observation of the 'distribution of capabilities' among the units of the system. In his own words:

'[...] the structure of a system changes with changes in the distribution of capabilities across the system units. And changes in structure change expectations about how the units of the system will behave and about the outcomes their interactions will produce.'²³

Simply put, the distribution of capability establishes system equilibrium and explains the outcomes of states' behaviours and international politics. Once the structure of states' relative capabilities in the system is reconfigured, the new equilibrium and environment of international politics will be re-established according to the change of states' capabilities. The end of the Cold War is the most recent obvious example of the reconfiguration of the states' relative capabilities. The collapse of the former Soviet Union, once a superpower, transformed the structure of the international system from bipolarity to uni-polarity. By the same token, the changed relative capability of Russia and the US also resulted in changes in both countries' foreign behaviours.

2.1.2 Liberalism

Liberal Variances and Main Assumptions

Emerging as an alternative to realism, liberalism is said to be at the other end of the IR theory spectrum. As Dunne put it:

²³ Waltz (1979: 97 and 192)

‘Rather like political parties, realism is the natural party of government and liberalism is the leader of the opposition, whose main function is to hound the talking heads of power politics for their remorseless pessimism.’²⁴

In terms of theoretical advancement, liberal variants have been extended to several interrelated strands, which reflect all facets of a larger dynamic of international politics and international change. Some IR scholars categorise post-war liberal writings into *republican liberalism*, *commercial liberalism*, *military liberalism*, *cognitive liberalism*, *sociological liberalism* and *institutional liberalism*.²⁵ Others, such as Michael Doyle, also divide liberalism in accordance with states’ actual behaviours into three strands: *liberal pacifism*, *liberal imperialism* and *liberal internationalism*.²⁶ The majority of liberals, however, agree upon the classification of three main strands of *liberal internationalism*, *liberal idealism* and *liberal institutionalism* and their neo-versions corresponding to the changing international politics, affected by globalisation.

Firstly, liberal internationalism and its neo-liberal internationalism contend the original ideas of Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham on individual liberty, free trade, prosperity and interdependence. Liberal internationalism holds that undemocratic states’ domestic and international interventions are the major factor that disturbs the ‘natural order’ of the system. Balance of power is also included as one of the most outdated and unnatural policies, which interferes with and inherently results in the ‘imbalance’ of the international system.²⁷ Similar to the ideas of republican and commercial liberalism, contact among people throughout the world through commerce and travel will facilitate a less destructive form of international system and override the deep structural effects of

²⁴ Dunne (2001: 163)

²⁵ Zacher and Matthew (1995: 122-137) and Lamy (2001: 188-189)

²⁶ Doyle (1986: 1159-1165)

²⁷ Dunne (2001: 165-167)

anarchy.²⁸ Ikenberry also suggests in his articulation on ‘liberal grand strategy’ that democratic politics, economic interdependence and international institutions encourage a stable, secure and legitimate political order.²⁹ In other words, democratic states that have policies of little or no interference and are more transparent will reduce the possibilities of other states’ misjudging attention, thereby eliminating the anarchical structure of international politics. Along the same line, neo-liberal internationalism develops the existing research agenda to cover the debates about the pattern of relationships among liberal and democratic states and the democratic states versus authoritarian regimes. For neo-liberal internationalism, peaceful coexistence would seem to succeed only among liberal states. Therefore, it has become the agenda of powerful liberal states, especially the US, to use its foreign policy to promote peace by putting pressure on authoritarian regimes and transform the countries into new democratic states, as evident in several regions throughout the world: in the Philippines, South and Central America in the 1980s and most recently in Afghanistan and Iraq, for example.

The second strand of liberalism is known as liberal idealism or neo-idealism. The most influential thinker on this Liberal tradition was Woodrow Wilson, who believed in and spent many years of his political life trying to promote the importance of constructing an ‘international order.’ The idea was also understood as fundamental for subsequent liberal idealist development, which advocates that international order cannot possibly be accomplished without effective international organisations, which bind states by rules and norms and facilitate peaceful coexistence via disarmament, arbitration, enforcement and national self-determination.³⁰ Neo-idealism borrowed much from the previous account of 19th century Wilsonian idealism, specifically on the notion

²⁸ Ibid, (2001: 178) and Zacher and Matthew (1995: 124)

²⁹ Ikenberry (2000: 103-104)

³⁰ Wilson (1918) gave his speech on Wilson’s Fourteen Points to the US Senate establishing the platform for American Idealism.

of how to strengthen international organisations via both the top-down and the bottom-up approach. As agreed by Dunne, the former focuses on the significance of promoting democratisation and the fortification of domestic state structures whereas the latter advances the argument on the roles and practices of civil society.³¹

Lastly, among several liberal traditions, the most developed strand and the one considered the true realist challenger has been Liberal institutionalism. Since the end of World War II, liberal institutionalism has been developed through three successive presentations, namely functionalist integration theory in the 1950s, functionalist regional integration theory in the 1960s and finally interdependence theory in the 1970s.³² In a way, the core idea underlying Liberal institutionalism is the rejection of the Realist account of ‘the state as the unitary and primary actor’ and the ‘pessimism about the role of international institutions.’ Liberal institutionalists in every tradition – the functional, neo-functional and interdependence schools – all agree that non-state actors, such as technical experts, specialised agencies, political parties, labour and trade unions, TNCs and so, should be put in the spotlight alongside states. It has also been suggested that international institutions should carry out a number of functions that cannot be performed by states, particularly in the more globalised and interdependent world. As for neo-liberal institutionalism, although it varies from the conventional strands by accepting the realist emphasis on anarchy and the centrality of the state, its research focus is still centred on the creation of ‘regimes’ and the maintenance of system cooperation, facilitated by international organisations. The variances of the notion of the ‘possibility of cooperation’ and the concept of ‘system anarchy’ adopted by neo-liberal

³¹ Dunne (2001: 177)

³² Grieco, (1995: 151)

institutionalists, however, diverge considerably from Realism. As suggested by Axelrod and Keohane:

‘Achieving cooperation is difficult in world politics. There is no common government to enforce rules, and by the standards of domestic society, international institutions are weak. Cheating and deception are endemic. Yet, cooperation is sometimes attained.’³³

Therefore,

‘Anarchy also needs to be defined clearly. As used here, the term refers to a lack of common government in world politics, not to a denial that an international society – albeit a fragmented one – exists.’³⁴

In sum, unlike realism, liberalism fundamentally objects to the view that ‘human nature is sinful and bad’ and that ‘cooperation is unattainable’, regardless of its liberal origins or traditions. As human nature is basically good, aid and cooperation are thus the intrinsic nature of the international society. Bad human behaviours, wars between states and anarchy are in fact the product of bad institutions and structural arrangements. To eliminate such malign structural conditions, the strengthening of international institutions and the construction of international society are the key.³⁵ In recent years, with the end of the Cold War and the success of the UN in dealing with international conflicts as well as the longevity of international economic and security organisations, the influence of neo-liberal institutionalism seems to have received overwhelming recognition among IR scholars.

³³ Axelrod and Keohane (1985: 226)

³⁴ Ibid (1985: 226)

³⁵ Kegley and Wittkopf (1997: 4)

2.1.3 Constructivism: An Overview

In recent years, it is undeniable that Constructivism has gained a prominent place alongside other mainstream IR theories and has become the key framework in international politics and foreign policy analyses. Similar to Realism and Liberalism, Constructivism is also divided into several variations, although the distinctions between the ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ versions are most common.³⁶ Some Constructivists, like Hopf, Jepperson and Katzenstein, would rather call the variations ‘critical or postmodernist’ versus ‘neo-classical or conventional’ as to differentiate the methodology and epistemology between the former, whose emphasis is on ‘interpretivism’, from the latter, whose retention of ‘classical pragmatism and positivism’ methodology is highlighted.³⁷

In other words, the difference between the ‘thin or conventional’ and the ‘thick or critical’ versions of Constructivism is that the former Constructivist work is still assessed under the positivist assumptions in which ‘statism’ and ‘realism’ are the core endorsements.³⁸ Some other scholars, like John Gerard Ruggie, however, locates Wendt’s Constructivism as the third variant or ‘naturalistic constructivism’ which combines both aspects of mainstream Constructivist theorising but grounded in scientific realism.³⁹ Accordingly, although Wendt’s Constructivism and Katzenstein’s or Adler’s Constructivism could be grouped under the ‘thinner’ Constructivist version, subtle differences between the two can still be spotted.

³⁶ Carlsnaes (2002: 339) has grouped Wendt (1999), Adler and Barnett (1998), Checkel (1999 and 2001), Ruggie (1998) and Katzenstein (1996), for example, as the ‘thinner’ Constructivists. The ‘thicker’ version of Constructivists includes Kratochwil (1989), Onuf (1989) or Larsen (1997), for example.

³⁷ Hopf (1998: 181-187) and Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein (1996: 65-67)

³⁸ Lapid (1996: 13-14)

³⁹ Ruggie (1998: 35-36) He also points out that Katzenstein or Adler’s Constructivism, which according to some scholars belong to the ‘thinner’ group of Constructivism, has close affinity with pragmatism which a set of analytical tools necessary to make sense of intersubjective meanings is the core methodology.

Although both Constructivist versions contain methodological dissimilarities, they join force in arguing against the other two mainstream IR theories on several grounds. Adler is right in pointing out that Constructivism occupies the ‘middle ground’ between rationalist approaches (Realism and Liberalism) and interpretive approaches (postmodernism, poststructuralism and critical theory).⁴⁰ Both ‘thick and thin’ strands basically stress the emphasis of ‘idealism, holism and interpretivism’ over ‘materialism, individualism and rationalism’ advocated by the other two mainstream IR theories. However, the ‘thin or conventional’ version of Constructivism has fewer tendencies to strictly adhere to the interpretative approach and tends to highlight the understanding of behaviours and foreign policy through rules or collective meanings. Therefore, the commonalities between the two variations when applied to empirical cases are only the focus on ideational or social factors over material ones and the emphasis on the social structure over individual motivation. Despite the similarities shared between the two strands of Constructivist paradigm, this research tends to limit the discussion only within the ‘thinner’ variation, as to engage more in developing a Constructivist-based analytical tool which could be applied to foreign policy analysis.⁴¹ The clear discussion only on the ‘thin version’ of Constructivism will also allow this research to engage in less detailed examination on the ‘meta-theory’ of the reconstruction of Constructivism, which is not its main objectives.⁴²

⁴⁰ Adler (1997: 319-321)

⁴¹ Carlsnaes (2002: 339) clearly suggests that the ‘thick, critical or postmodernist’ version is difficult to incorporate within a foreign policy analytical framework. This is also confirmed by Dessler (1999: 124) that these traditions have little or no interest in the project of developing causal accounts of international relations.

⁴² The detailed discussion of philosophical position or the meta-theoretical controversies of the reconstruction of Constructivism and the way in which ‘reality’ is constructed can be found in Guzzini (2000) in which the relationship on the level of observation (social construction of knowledge and social construction of the social world) and the intersubjective unit of analysis (how intersubjective meanings or shared recognition and consensus shape ideas and relations) is emphasised as opposed to the neo-realism’s narrow definition of reality.

With regard to the use of Constructivism on empirical inquiries, the central concerns are the relationship between ‘agents or actors’ and ‘social structure’ and the extent to which social factors determine the outcome of the normative structure or the outcome of foreign policy choices. In general, the ideational factors being employed in Constructivist work are grouped into two crucial streams – norms and identity.⁴³ While serious debates about the specific applicability of each social factor to particular empirical questions are rarely found, one could easily spot the sizable volume of norm-led empirical cases over the other types of social factors. Furthermore, although Constructivists can liberally pick and choose their preferable version of analytical tool and the distinctive emphasis on rules and practices (norm-led) and constitutive properties of identity (identity-led) are clearly suggested, according to Carlsnaes, the use of these two factors – norms and identity – is usually intertwined.⁴⁴

According to Finnemore and Sinkkink, the studies using norms seek to examine how norms shape interests of states as opposed to the limited role of norms in neo-liberal literature which usually subjects norms under power distributions. It essentially points out how normative issues and how norms have been the key determination to both the changes of system structure and human behaviours.⁴⁵ The empirical Constructivist work linking norms to domestic change can be found in, for instance, Finnemore’s own analysis of the role of humanitarian norms in shaping patterns of humanitarian military intervention in the past century or in Price and Tannenwald’s examination on norms and deterrence and the ‘norms’ explanation on the inhibition on nuclear use.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, as pointed out by Checkel, the Constructivist studies using norms still exhibit two

⁴³ Constructivist work using ideology and culture can be found, for example, in Kier (1996) about how the French culture explains the choices between offensive and defensive military doctrines or in Berger (1996) on the way in which Japan’s culture of anti-militarism affects the choice of passive security policy.

⁴⁴ Carlsnaes (2000: 340)

⁴⁵ Finnemore and Sinkkink (1998: 889)

⁴⁶ Finnemore (1996: 153-185) and Price and Tannenwald (1996: 114-152)

crucial limitations in producing a clear systematic mechanism through which the international norms reach and have constitutive effects on domestic arena and in providing the account on the constitutive impact in one case but failing to do so in others.⁴⁷ This research is also convinced that those engaging in the use of identity as the analytical tool in Constructivist work also experience the very same theoretical and methodological shortfalls, as will be further discussed below.

Similar to other Constructivists emphasising the importance of ideational factor or the distribution of ideas on the construction of (international) reality, Constructivist studies using identity focus on how specific identities of states shape their interests and policy outcomes, in other words, how ideational factors constitute interest base in the first place. Wendt and Ruggie, along with other Constructivists, help elaborate the theoretical accounts by arguing that, firstly, international politics or international political reality is 'constituted' by the distribution of interests and that the content of interests are also constituted in part by ideas and that these ideas are generated in part by social interactions.⁴⁸

The empirical work focusing on identity and the examination of ideational factors on policy choices has been constantly developed and could be divided into two distinctive groups. The first category strictly examines how identities could be employed to explain the 'origins' of interests or preferable policy choices. Risse-Kappen and Herman, for example, have demonstrated how a reconceptualisation of interests grounded in new ideational understandings about reality and actors' evolving identities has contributed to Soviet's 'new thinking' policy towards the end of the Cold War and towards solving the problems of East-West confrontation.⁴⁹ Although a few

⁴⁷ Checkel (1999: 85)

⁴⁸ Wendt (1999) and Ruggie (1998)

⁴⁹ Herman (1996: 271-316) and Risse-Kappen (1994: 185-214)

constructivist research projects have demonstrated the interactive process or the constitutive analysis of how identities and interests are defined and redefined, they were simply a response to the criticism about the lack of the analysis of social construction from the bottom-up or at the unit level.⁵⁰ The other group, which is the central focus of this research, is theoretically developed by Wendt. Within this group, identity is employed to explain the changing structure of the normative system structure and not foreign policy outcomes *per se*.⁵¹

As mentioned previously, norms and identities are in fact facing critical theoretical pitfalls, despite its explanatory power. On the one hand, the cases using norms may fail to produce a clear systematic mechanism through which international norms have constitutive effects on domestic arena. Identity-led cases, as pointed out above, are criticised as one-sided because they either focus on how the identity at the unit level affects interests and policy outcomes or how the transformation of identity at the system level contributes to the changing system structure as evident in Wendt's Constructivism. Unlike traditional mainstream IR theories in which the issue about the 'level of analysis' has always been one of the key theoretical focus and development, Constructivism is obviously short of a serious debate on the overly clear-cut divide on the level of analysis.⁵²

As mentioned in Chapter 1, one of the key objectives of this research is to address the above problem and to also develop a clear analytical mechanism through which the interactive process of identity transformation at the system level affects the re-

⁵⁰ The constructivist self-criticism could be found in Ruggie (1998: 855-886). Apart from Risse and Herman, the Constructivist work which responds to the criticism or attempts to address the problem at the constitutive level is, for example, Milliken's work on the Social Construction of the Korean War (2001).

⁵¹ Wendt (1999)

⁵² See for example, Putnam (1993), about the theoretical development in traditional mainstream IR theories which addresses the importance of the two-level analysis or the linkages and the analyses of the international bargaining process by key actors at both levels simultaneously.

definition of identities and interests at the domestic level. Wendt's Constructivism is chosen to be the starting point, even though it is not originally designed for the analysis of foreign policy, because the systematic process of identity transformation at the system level provides the platform from which further development on the analysis at the system level could be linked with the transformation of identity at the domestic level. Moreover, Wendt's Constructivism also allows us researchers to conduct the study on security in the name of socially-constructed identities while enables modes of analysis to be closely linked with scientific realism. The way in which foreign and security issues are examined in this fashion is not new. Buzan and Wæver have developed a framework for security studies which takes identity as socially constituted but not more so than other social structures. To them, this 'inert constructivism', at some point, allows identities and other social constructions to become relatively constant to be examined with objectivist mode of analysis.⁵³

As for the application of Constructivism on empirical security cases, Wæver tries to create a middle ground conceptual framework which captures the reconceptualisation of security focus between 'state and society', as evident in his 'hourglass model.' His work on the dual process of examining the 'state security' and 'societal security' is an example of how Constructivism has been developed to make sense of a hard case like security policy.⁵⁴ This research, however, takes on a different direction by emphasising the lack of a dual mechanism which could bridge the gap between the analysis of the redefinition and the transformation of identity at the system and the unit or domestic level. In other words, it explores the way in which a particular model of Constructivism – Wendt's Constructivism – which has been originally limited to the study of the

⁵³ Buzan (1998: 203-207)

⁵⁴ Wæver (1995: 65-71)

changing normative structure can be developed to explain the process of foreign policy outcomes and decision-making process. This research, in essence, addresses the concern about the development of an analytical pathway through which the transformation of identity at the system level reach and have constitutive effects on the identity and interests embedded at the unit level. Further details on Wendt's Constructivism will be discussed in the following sections.

a) Wendt's Constructivism

As mentioned above, Constructivism has been developed as an alternative to the above two traditional mainstream IR theories since the late 1980s by several modernist and post-modernist theorists such as Emanuel Adler, Jeff Checkel, Yosef Lapid, Friedrich Kratochwil and Nicholas Onuf.⁵⁵ However, the elaboration of the most developed and most recognisable version of Constructivism, which will be adapted in this thesis to be applicable to foreign policy analysis, can be found in Alexander Wendt's *Social Theory of International Politics*, published in the late 1990s. His 'thin version' of constructivism has hence been unanimously accepted among IR scholars as one of the three contemporary mainstream IR theories, alongside neo-realism and neo-liberalism.⁵⁶ Wendt's Constructivism emphasises '*ideas and discourse*' through the studies of '*norms and identities*' and how '*ideas about self and others*' shape '*system interaction*' and vice versa, thereby creating an international system that is based on '*the structure of shared social knowledge or distribution of ideas*' rather than '*the structure of material capabilities or distribution of capabilities*'.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ See, for example, Adler (1997) on the middle ground approach of world politics, Checkel on norms, institutions and national identity in contemporary Europe (1999), Lapid and Kratochwil (1995) on culture and identity in international relations, Kratochwil (1989) on norms and international relations and Kubáľková (1998) on constructivism and international relations.

⁵⁶ Smith (2000: 151) and Keohane (2000: 125)

⁵⁷ Wendt (1999: 1-2, 22-23, 165-167, 224-225 and 249-252)

Constructivism directly challenges neo-realist and neo-liberal notions that the 'structure' and 'behaviour' of agents are the only factors which basically generate outcomes and that neither identity nor interests can be changed, but only behaviours.⁵⁸ Because the process of identity and interest transformation is disregarded and states' interests simply exist to be discovered, the question regarding 'how' changes occur, thus, cannot be accounted for by both rationalist mainstreams. This fact has become one of the major frailties of both neo-realism and neo-liberalism.

Whereas both rationalist and positivist scholars are unwilling to explore non-material factors or the explanatory power of 'idealist' or social construction factors and such reflectivist schools as postmodernism, feminism and critical theory also have no interest in developing the fundamental account of mainstream IR theory, Wendt's Constructivism, along with other versions of Constructivism is aimed at filling the gap and developing a middle ground between rationalist and reflectivist theories with a 'moderate' and 'thin' version of 'social construction' that is still based on positivist epistemology.⁵⁹ This attempt invites several attacks on Wendt's Constructivism, ranging from its combination of positivist epistemology and post-positivist ontology and the dichotomy between 'materialist' and 'idealist' notions to the conviction on '*a priori* identity' coalescing with the lack of the analysis of the nature of agency or the 'identity of identity.' The following section will offer a detailed examination of Wendt's logic of constructivism and the use of norms and identities in empirical case studies, and elaborate on 'norms and identities' in Wendt's Constructivism.

⁵⁸ Wendt (1992: 391-397)

⁵⁹ Wendt (1999: 1); Dessler (1999: 123) and Smith (2000: 151)

b) Identity typology in Wendt's Constructivism

In examining identities in Wendt's constructivism, it is important to look carefully at the distinction among different types, levels and structures in which identities are constituted. The point of raising this issue is that although 'identity' is practically the main focus of Wendt's constructivist model, Wendt does not emphasise all sorts of identities or incorporate them into his analysis. A certain type of identity – corporate identity – is left untouched and considered as 'exogenous' to the process of identity formation, while others are regarded as 'endogenous.' The identities (and interests) that matter most to Wendt's constructivists are those constructed by 'shared ideas' and socially exchanged at the system level. Unlike others, Wendt contends that identity is:


'a property of international actors that generates motivational and behavioural dispositions. This means that identity is at base a subjective or unit-level quality, rooted in an actor's self-understandings. However, the meaning of those understandings will often depend on whether other actors represent an actor in the same way, and to that extent identity will also have an inter-subjective or system quality. Two kinds of ideas can enter into identity, those held by the 'Self' and those held by the 'Other.''⁶⁰

Four types of identity are constituted with different qualities at different structural levels, as illustrated in Figure 2.1. Corporate and social qualities suggest how each of the identities is originally constituted. Corporate quality, including both its material and its subjective base, durably and intrinsically exists as a 'site' or 'platform'

⁶⁰ Wendt (1999: 224)

for other identities to develop and requires no other elements to confirm its existence. Corporate quality is also believed to be ‘pre-given’, ‘auto-genetic’ and ‘exogenous’ to the process of any interaction.⁶¹ Unlike the corporate aspect, the social quality emphasises that some kinds of identity can be constructed only when a particular subject, such as states or human beings, is in relation with others and that the social qualities are usually developed, redefined or transformed through social interactions at different domestic and system structures.

Figure 2.1: Wendt’s Identity Typologies
Corporate Social



Source: Author’s Figure

Among the four types of Wendt’s typologies, the first one, ‘personal’ identity, is categorised as having the corporate quality, which is essentially self-organised and embedded in the domestic level. For example, in the case of people, ‘A’ has his corporate identity represented through his ‘body’ and his ‘memory’ as ‘A.’ Despite his thoughts or activities, he is still ‘A’, with the biological (or material) quality and the consciousness (or subjective quality) of being ‘A.’ In the case of states, corporate identity is the joint narrative of themselves as actors among their populations, also

⁶¹ Ibid (1999: 225)

known as domestic group-level recognition. According to Wendt, an actor can have only one such identity or existence.⁶²

The 'type', 'role' and 'collective' identity are all categorised as having been socially constructed. The main difference is that the 'type' identity, referred to as labels or properties that are applied to persons who share the same social meanings, attitudes, values, skills, knowledge, experiences, opinions and behavioural traits and so on, is the social identity that is constituted by internal principles at the domestic level. Considered exogenously given to the system interaction, most Constructivists do not pay much attention to both 'personal' and 'type' identities, as they are not practically constituted through social interaction at the system level.⁶³ They are simply the identities that the state carries with it prior to the system interaction and are bound to be transformed during the stage of system interactions.

'Role' identity, on the other hand, is considered endogenous to the process of system interactions, as it exists only in relation to others. It is the role that cannot be enacted by the state itself but is acted out according to the sharing expectation of others prior to or during interactions at the system level.⁶⁴ In a way, another difference between 'type and role' identities is that the former is the identity commonly shared by domestic constituents while the latter is the one adopted in corresponding to others' demands. What is noteworthy about this difference is that there are times when these two identities might clash with each other, as is the case with Japan's pacifism (domestic-type identity) and the role identity Japan has been expected to play by the international community. In tandem with the emphasis on role identity, constructivists also put much emphasis on 'collective' identity and take it as the logical conclusion to the process of system

⁶² Wendt (1996: 51)

⁶³ Wendt (1999: 226)

⁶⁴ Ibid (1999: 227)

interaction. Put more elaborately, it is the result of a process in which the ‘Self-Other’ distinction becomes blurred, transcended, and finally becomes a ‘collectively’ shared identity among the community of states.⁶⁵ In Wendt’s Constructivist analysis, ‘role’ and ‘collective’ identities are socially and systemically constructed: the former represents a process or mechanism by which to incorporate the self into others and vice versa, while the latter represents the concluding result of the process. Both can be made evident through states’ behaviours.

c) Logic and Process of Wendt’s Constructivism

Wendt’s constructivism deals simultaneously with the ‘*identity transformation*’ of system agents (states), which is the key to states’ behavioural dispositions, and the ‘*change*’ of system structure due to the transformation of states’ identities. He set out to demonstrate the relationship of agents and structure and how each affects the process of transformation of the other. He terms his kind of Constructivism ‘*structural idealism*’, which primarily suggests, on the one hand, that identities can be constructed, reconstructed and internalised by ‘intersubjective or social’ aspects of system structure through the ‘distribution of knowledge’ at structural level. On the other hand, it further argues against neo-realism, suggesting that the system structure can also be (re)created through the process of actors’ identity transformation. As opposed to neo-realism, which contends that ‘structure (alone) affects states’ behaviours’, constructivism points out, as mentioned above, that it is the actors’ identities that play an important role in the interacting process and that ‘identities motivate what states want (interests) and what they do (behaviours).⁶⁶ In this sense, ‘anarchy or cooperation’ is, therefore, ‘what states make of it.’ In other words, whether the system structure will be in anarchy or in

⁶⁵ Ibid (1999: 229)

⁶⁶ Ibid (1999: 1 and 318)


cooperation depends upon the conditions with which states identify themselves. Constructivists expect states to identify themselves with the 'Other', thereby allowing their identities to be fused with others in the system as well as with existing collective norms. The system structure, anarchical or not, is therefore reconfigured in this fashion.

In Wendt's *Social Theory of International Politics*, he primarily emphasises the process of 'identity transformation', on which this study places its focus and which will be discussed in further detail. As elaborated in the above section, the constructivist process of identity transformation concentrates on 'role and collective' identity and considers 'corporate and type' identity as exogenous to the process of identity transformation. In brief, the former two are treated as 'socially constructed', while the latter two are treated as intrinsically given. As for the process of Wendt's Constructivism, shown in Diagram 2.1, Wendt embarks on the supposition that his constructivist version is mainly concerned with the transformation of 'role and collective' identities, influenced by the social mechanism called 'cultural selection', which consists of 'imitation' and 'social learning' processes. According to Wendt, states' identities and interests are acquired during the imitation process when a state adopts the 'self-understanding' of those attitudes, material assets or behavioural traits that have been successful or have been the basis of national accomplishment in the past. States then bring with them 'material assets' in the form of geographical entities or associated needs (corporate identity) and 'representational assets' or *a priori* ideas about who they are (type identity) to the system interaction.⁶⁷

The second process, 'social learning', plays a vital part at this stage, and is regarded by Wendt's Constructivists as the most significant element of the theory. Via the process of social learning, once entering the system interaction, states (A and B) will

⁶⁷ Ibid (1999: 326-328)

choose from among the available representations of the ‘Self’ they would want to be and among the interests they would want to pursue (international-role identity) and keep sending these signals to the ‘Other’ in the system. Until they reach the stage where the distinction between the ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ is blurred, states will keep sending signals to others while expecting to have their identities altercasted during system interactions. More precisely, the ‘collective identity’ that appears at this stage is the extension of the boundaries of the ‘Self’ to include the ‘Other’ and to merge the two into a ‘single’ identity.⁶⁸ The process of social interaction and the end-result of collective identity, in a way, are deliberately chosen by constructivists to explain the possibility of structural change towards international cooperation. The process literally wraps up Wendt’s initial argument that ‘anarchy’ or ‘international structure’ is ‘what states make of it.’



Source: Author’s Diagram

⁶⁸ Ibid (1999: 229 and 329-331)

d) Norms and Identities in Wendt's Constructivism


It remains now to consider how Wendt's Constructivism can be applied to empirical cases. While Wendt contributes tremendously to the theoretical construction of social theory, Peter Katzenstein, Robert Herman, Ted Hopf, Thomas Berger, Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, to name a few, help promote the theory by incorporating it into research practices.⁶⁹ In essence, Constructivists generally point out that, instead of putting the emphasis on the distribution of material capabilities in the system structure, the focus should be on the distribution of ideas and shared experiences among states, which inherently leads to states' identity transformation, and the restructuring of state systems should be regarded as central.

Previous constructivist empirical research can be roughly divided in two categories, those adopting 'norms' and those adopting 'identities' as analytical tools. Admittedly, 'norms' are deliberately chosen to straightforwardly represent 'identity and culture', due to the fact that the latter are difficult concepts to define and the examination of the constituent parts of identity and culture through norms is more practical.⁷⁰ Generally, norms are also used interchangeably with identities and can be seen scattered within the same text – signifying the same thing – in several constructivist studies. However, one objection to this assertion might be that identities and norms, although closely related, are not precisely the same. Moreover, the assertion that identity and norm can be used interchangeably has paid far too little attention to the fact that identity-led cases and norm-led cases address different sets of methodical departures, ask different kinds of research questions and render different analytical explanations, as summarised in Figure 2.2 and in Table 2.2.

⁶⁹ See Katzenstein (1996) in which many constructivists analyse international structural change and foreign policy via norms, identity and culture. See also in Hopf (2002) on identity and foreign policy.

⁷⁰ Dobson (2003: 27-29)

To begin with, as mentioned earlier, Constructivism focuses upon the relationship between agents and structure – states and the international system – and the mutual impacts of both towards one another. The effects of structure on actors, and vice versa, can be distinguished into three levels of social constructions, which correspond to the identity typologies (Figure 2.1) suggested in Wendt’s Social Theory of International Politics, namely existence (corporate identity), properties (type identity) and behaviour levels (role and collective identity).⁷¹ Wendt, Katzenstein and other constructivists conduct empirical research in similar veins. In other words, all ignore the corporate identity and the effects of agents and structure at the existential level. For norm-led theorists or the majority of the constructivists, who are convinced that ‘we are or become what we do’, the emphasis is placed particularly on the ‘level of behaviours’ from which researchers could infer the transformation of ‘role and collective identity’ or from the observed behaviours. On the contrary, identity-led theorists, who believe that ‘we behave in accordance with the self-understanding of who we are’, would instead focus on the ‘property level’ or the ‘type identity,’ as shown in Figure 2.2.



Source: Author’s Diagram

As shown in Table 2.2, with respect to other dissimilarities between norm-led and identity-led cases, the starting questions or research objectives posed by the two are poles apart. Norm-led theorists ask about the impacts of norms on international politics

⁷¹ Katzenstein (1996: 41)

or how norms generate actions and behaviours in international politics, which implicitly affect the nature of agents. Alternatively, the concept of ‘norms’ is employed to explain the continuity and change of system phenomena or interstate normative structures, for instance, collective security, alliance formation, democratic peace or anarchy. Among others, as mentioned previously, some Constructivists believe that identity is a difficult concept to grasp.

Table 2.2: Distinction between Identity-led and Norm-led Cases

	Identity-led	Norm-led
Analytical Questions	How do identities become sources of actions (or norms)? (Q: where do the behaviours or norms themselves come from?)	How do norms generate actions in international politics? (Q: what are the impacts of norms on international politics?)
Explanatory Focus	Formation or transformation of states’ policies and actions	Continuity and change of system phenomena or interstate normative structures, such as collective security, democratic peace, anarchy and so on.
Independent Variables	Ideas, beliefs, ideologies, political culture and so on.	Practices and behaviours
End Result (Dependent Variable)	New ‘type’ identity (shared conception of identity) → policy change	Collective identity → structural change

Source: Author’s Table

To integrate identity observation into empirical analysis is also perceived as a huge stumbling block. Norms thus emerge as an alternative, for it is claimed that norms can occasionally operate like rules that define and specify the identity of states.⁷² Via ‘behaviours and social practices’, believed to be the premises of state’s ‘self-reflection’ and the most concrete analytical variables, norm-led case studies adopt these two

⁷² Ibid (1996: 5)

variables to describe the social process or the transformation of role identity that generates standards of action both within and outside states' parameters. The concluding result is unquestionably the explanation of continuities and changes of the international structure. Possible collective identity, which might emerge from the social construction during the system interactions, is believed to be the result that will eventually transform the international system altogether.

Explicitly or not, identity-led cases, which stress the importance of 'type identity' at the 'property level' of social construction, take off in a different fashion by asking how identities become the sources of states' actions, how the 'static' state of norms could be overcome or how the sources of norms themselves could be discovered. Although the question is simply put, however, it is essentially posed to answer another level beyond the mere 'causal effect' of the agent-structure relationship: the 'constitutive sources' of the causes themselves. This kind of question, in a way, does fill the gap of contemporary Constructivism, since the norm-led cases do somehow answer the questions regarding the impact of norms, but not the sources of norms *per se*.⁷³ Incidentally, identity-led cases can be found in foreign-policy related cases, although they are not as abundant as the norm-led ones, which aim at attacking and replacing neo-realist explanations of international political structure.

As regards the use of identity as the analytical focus, some acknowledgement of the claims about the controversial definition of identity and the difficulty in using it as a tangible variable is certainly necessary; however, to argue that the use of identity is too difficult to tackle is perhaps too pessimistic a view. Identity-led theorists, knowing the limitations of the concept itself, adopt the use of 'ideas, beliefs, and political culture',⁷⁴

⁷³ Kowert and Legro (1996: 454)

⁷⁴ Among others, Judith Goldstein, Robert Keohane and Thomas U. Berger. See Goldstein and Keohane (1993) on ideas and foreign policy.

and so on, just as norm-led theorists use behaviours and practices to solidify norms. In recent years, researchers conducting identity-led cases have developed a way in which identity could be utilised as a concrete social variable itself. Herman, for example, advanced the argument about how the transformed identity shared by the Russian think-tank became the major source of the country's political transformation and the move towards the 'New Thinking' policy.⁷⁵ The concluding result, as opposed to norm-led cases, is the 'shared conception of identity' that has been transformed over time and signifies the 'recursive processes' of social construction, which is the principal cause of the new 'type-identity' or even the establishment of a new set of norms. There will be a detailed discussion of Constructivism and the use of identity in foreign policy analysis in section 2.4.

2.2 IR Theories and Japan's Foreign Relations

Now, let us look at how the above IR theories are applied to the study of Japan's foreign relations and Japan's foreign policy. The literature on Japan's foreign policies can be divided into two main categories – mainstream IR theorists adopting IR theories to explicate Japan's external relations and political scientists or economists taking on foreign policy analysis as the main instrument by which to make sense of foreign policy behaviours. The main objective of those belonging to the former category is to specifically answer 'what and why' questions or to offer the vivid scenarios for Japan's past, contemporary and future station in international politics through an understanding of the changing structure and power relations in the international system. This is not to say that IR theory is inapt in explaining Japan's foreign policy behaviours. To some extent, IR theorists are capable of capturing how far the changing system structures affect Japan's behavioural projections and simultaneously rendering the notions that

⁷⁵ Herman (1996: 271-311)

Japan is as normal as others and could be understood through analysis at the systemic level.

In contrast, based on the belief that unlike the study of the foreign policies of other countries, exponents of the latter category argue that Japan's 'unfamiliar ways of politics' are somehow best understood through the assessment of domestic factors at the internal level. Those political scientists espousing foreign policy analyses and decision-making models to explain Japan's foreign policy behaviours from domestic viewpoints are more concerned about 'why and how' questions and tend to focus more on the changing domestic structure that designates the outcome of both foreign and economic policies. In this section, the extent to which each IR theory could draw viable explanations of Japan's foreign relations will be discussed. Nevertheless, it is important to note that to decisively pinpoint whether Japan's foreign policy is best described by one or other particular theory is believed to be a rather futile effort, for each theory and analytical tool does contribute to the understanding of the complexity of Japan's foreign relations.

2.2.1 Realism and Japan's Foreign Relations

The earlier version of realism, which focuses its analysis at the sub-systemic or domestic level and treats the state as the primary actor, contends that the core interest of states lies in the pursuit of interests defined in terms of power. As the concept of power is placed at the centre stage, several attempts have been made to explain Japan's political moves, power acquisition and foreign relations since the pre-war era. Pre-war Japan is best described by classical realism, as military leaders, ambitiously driven by the surge for power and prestige, attempted to build a mighty Japanese empire through the formation of the 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere' and alignment with the Axis during World War II. In fact, the urge to promote the country's power and place in the

world, or to become a 'first-rate country' (*ittō koku*), had been rooted in Japan since the early 19th century, when the country faced the challenge of Western imperialism that led to the Meiji restoration from 1860 until the early 20th century. The options for the country's survival lay only on paths that led to the pursuit of power and leadership in the Asia Pacific region as a front-runner with the West.

To classical realists, Japan in the post-war period has pursued the same ends. To these scholars, the concept of the pursuit of power remains the focus of analysis. However, the conception of power itself has also been developed through time, from the emphasis on material and ideal elements of power into other 'soft' elements, such as cultural or social elements. As argued by Huntington and Drifte, it is inevitable for a great economic power to transform itself into a military power. Huntington clearly argues that Japan has accepted all the realist assumptions about power maximisation but simply applied them to economic rather than military competition. Instead of acquiring military instruments of power such as missiles, tanks or warships, Japan has accumulated instruments of power in the form of market control, trade surpluses, technology and ownership of foreign companies and so on.⁷⁶

However, unlike other realists, Drifte is not convinced that such transformation would be automatic. Rather, the understanding of how the term 'power' has been defined by the Japanese is also important. The notion of power is not directly linked to 'coercion' or 'military prowess': what remains prevalent in the concept of 'power' of the Japanese state is the possibility of 'unintended influence' or 'relational power', and not that of the distribution of power as usually circumscribed by structural realism.⁷⁷ Post-Cold War mercantile realists also share similar notions with classical realists, as they

⁷⁶ Huntington (1993: 72-73)

⁷⁷ Drifte (1998: 4-8)

both assume that states always seek to maximise power to ensure their security. The main difference is that the latter are more concerned with ‘economic security’ rather than ‘military security.’ In Japan’s case, despite its capability to generate military power, Japan tends to use economic power through the ability to generate technology as the basis for national sovereignty and security.⁷⁸

Nevertheless, Japan’s post-war foreign policy has not been solely driven by the concept of power alone. Neo-realism or structuralism also holds its international resonance by directing the analysis on the outcome of foreign policies to a broader scope, especially to the impact at the systemic level rather than the sub-systemic level. Although both realist strands share the same notion of the pursuit of power, for neo-realists, power is not an end in itself, as notably put by Morgenthau, but rather a means to several ends.⁷⁹ Besides, neo-realism largely explains the effect of the degree to which the Japanese state and its policies affect the status quo and the distribution of power in the system, or to put it another way, how the country’s position affects, for example, the balance of existing powers in the international system. The core tenet of neo-realism therefore holds that rational state actors, like Japan, with its escalating economic strength, must also assume roles of leadership, shoulder more responsibilities and pursue more assertive agenda-settings, particularly in the security sphere and in the area of public goods. This, in turn, is believed to fulfil its national interests.

Put more clearly, throughout the post-war period, the change of power configurations at the systemic level was largely tied with the developments and implications of Japan’s increasing economic power and the country’s decision to assume global leadership. Some scholars expected to see Japan claim the position of a new

⁷⁸ Heginbotham and Samuels (1998: 201)

⁷⁹ Schmiegelow (1990: 553-556)

hegemony and to create the so-called 'Pax-Nipponica' to challenge or even replace the then 'Pax-Americana'. The view has been especially echoed among international political economists like James Fallows, Clyde Prestowitz and Chalmers Johnson and those in the media, such as Karel van Wolferen, for instance.⁸⁰

On the contrary, others believe that the existing Japan-US bilateral relationship remains one of the essential beams of the system structure. From the 1980s, when the US was believed to be in decline, until the present, when it has assumed the position of the sole superpower, Japan has always been viewed as the main 'supporter' of the existing US-led system structure. The Japan-US alliance has led to such speculated scenarios as the emergence of 'Japan-US parallelism', which signifies the division of labour between the two powers in promoting stability of the international system and explains the concordance of the two countries' policies towards third countries, for instance.⁸¹ Another strand of literature focusing on the impact of the Japan-US alliance on security and regional matters also argues that to sustain the Asian balance of power in the Asia Pacific among potential powers like China, Russia and North Korea, Japan is expected to strengthen its ties with the US through a Japan-US security treaty rather than reviving its military prowess itself.

2.2.2 Liberalism and Japan's Foreign Relations

With regard to Japan's foreign relations, liberal institutionalism, especially the functionalist and neo-functionalist strands, is regarded as having better performance in explaining Japan's political and foreign policy uniqueness. Although both classical realism and liberal institutionalism emphasise the sub-systemic level, the latter allows the inclusion of domestic political structures beyond the state's 'black box' into the

⁸⁰ See further discussion in Fallows (1995), Johnson (1995), Prestowitz (1988) and Van Wolferen (1989).

⁸¹ Schmiegelow (1990: 553). See also Campbell (1993) on Japan-US bilateral relations.

analysis. The latter also has its advantage in incorporating the dynamic processes into systemic analysis through such concepts as ‘interdependency theory.’ Besides, liberal institutionalism also paves the way for researchers to examine the pluralistic influence of domestic actors over foreign policy making, such as political parties, bureaucracy, societal groups, business conglomerates (*zaibatsu*), the media and so on.

The study of Japan’s foreign economic policy, although it relies on economic theory for the most part, stresses the tight knots between the ‘political triad,’ including the LDP politicians, business groups and the bureaucracy. This combination is believed to account for the success of economic policies since the mid 1970s.⁸² Similarly, in the political and security spheres, the focus on domestic politics, specifically the role of the MOFA and political parties, is also evident and is located at the other end of the spectrum, opposite to the Realist structural explanation. Most studies that adopt domestic politics as their explanatory factors often suggest that the ‘pluralistic nature’ and internal politics among those actors are the major constraints obstructing Japan from pursuing active foreign policy and are essentially the main reasons for the incompleteness of policy re-orientation during the past decade.

As stated above, liberal institutionalism is not only concerned with analysis at the sub-systemic level. Its recent version of the interdependence school, which has been developed since the 1970s, further suggests the significant impact of systemic change on Japan’s foreign relations. In terms of actors, as pointed out previously, the pluralistic nature of the Japanese state is emphasised by most liberals, and it is vital to note that such nature does not simply exist. The force of globalisation is believed to be the factor that erodes the relevance of the traditional unit of analysis or state, and avails the

⁸² Johnson (1982 and 1995)

opportunity for other actors, such as sub-national governments or NGOs, to flourish and take part in foreign policy making.⁸³

With respect to the impacts of interdependence and globalisation towards foreign policy mechanisms, the economic interdependence and the escalating force of globalisation penetrating Japan have constrained the choice of states in pursuing their foreign policies, such as mercantilist foreign economic policies on trade and investment. The globalised and interdependent world has blurred the boundaries of the traditional units of sovereign states and, in a way, has transformed the way in which Japan deals with international issues. Some issues, such as environmental problems or human rights, have also required collaborative efforts from all states. The fundamental question of Japan's foreign policy choices is therefore not about what kind of policy Japan should or would pursue but how Japan could possibly contribute to the enhancement and maintenance of the international public good in order to sustain the well-being of both Japanese and other world populations.⁸⁴

2.2.3 Constructivism and Japan's Foreign Relations

As mentioned previously, Wendt's original constructivism primarily aims at giving an account of the changing normative structure of the international system, as an alternative to Waltz's neo-realism. Most studies using Wendt's constructivism, therefore, also attempt to explain how the social interactions between state actors at the system level affect the existing structure of the system. However, the use of constructivism in Japan's foreign policy is still considered limited and has not thoroughly developed. At one point, constructivism was also criticised as a mere extension of liberalism and

⁸³ Jain (2000: 20)

⁸⁴ Ohta (2000: 96)

sharing common grounds with existing rationalist theory.⁸⁵ However, some distinctions are also evident, as follows.

As regards the process of decision-making, while Liberal decision-making is processed within the parameter of the state's apparatus, Constructivism stresses the interacting process, which is truly embedded in the social parameter. In terms of interaction, Liberalism contends that the interaction or relationship among important actors is still confined to the sphere of states. The decision-making process is usually exclusive to the state's actors rather than mutual interaction between actors in different spheres. To put it more simply, although Liberalism recognises the important inputs and indirect impact from non-state actors, whether these actors have gained solid positions in the foreign decision-making process is still very much in doubt. On the contrary, Constructivism places more emphasis on the process of policy decision-making embedded in social and ideational interactions between actors. The heart of the Constructivist perspective is therefore to observe how actors, both states and non-states alike, interact with one another and how the outcomes of such interaction subsequently affect the transfiguration of structure and motivations that actually inform foreign policy choices.

As regards the constructivist explanations for Japan's foreign relations, the focus in the Constructivist study of political and security policy is also on how those key actors' norms and identities are mutually and socially constructed, which inherently affects the transfiguration of the international structure as well as the motivations that inform foreign policy. The study of Japan's foreign policy so far falls into the latter categories or 'how social factors like norms and culture could inform different foreign policy choices.' The study of the impacts of norms, identity and culture on Japan's

⁸⁵ Smith (2000: 151-152)

national security can be seen through the work of such scholars as Thomas Berger, Hugo Dobson and Peter Katzenstein, who emphasise the use of cultural understanding and norms to help explain political and security issues in Japan. For example, Berger argues that the primary reason for Japan's reluctance to become a major military power lies not in any structural explanations such as the higher degree of interdependence nor the changing distribution of power in the world system. Rather, Japan's humble position as a non-military superpower is attributed to the 'culture of anti-militarism.'⁸⁶ Katzenstein and Okawara are, however, convinced that Japan's security policy is influenced by the structure of the state. Both emphasise the scrutiny of the context of social and legal norms, which helps to define standards of appropriate behaviours for specific policy choices.⁸⁷ Dobson further develops the utility of constructivism and norms in explaining the empirical case of Japan's UNPKO participations. He argues that Japan's assertiveness in PKO participation, which had been a long-time national taboo, is the direct result of the role of norms of behaviours in promoting the forward moves in UNPKOs.⁸⁸

Despite these convincing Constructivist arguments regarding how non-material factors such as norms and cultures have determined Japan's security restraints throughout the post-war period, other scholars still point out the shortcomings of Constructivism in explaining the substantial gap between Japan's adopted norms and values and its actual policy preferences. Lind, for example, argues against Constructivists' claim that if Japan truly adhered to the 'anti-militarist norms', it would have distanced itself from the US and built a truly defensive military structure, not an offensive one that supports the US military presence. To Lind, Japan's security direction

⁸⁶ Berger (1993: 120)

⁸⁷ Katzenstein and Okawara (1993: 85-86)

⁸⁸ Dobson (2003: 4-5)

is simply a ‘hard-nosed realist’ policy.⁸⁹ This underlying problem regarding the inability of Wendt’s original Constructivism to bridge the gap between the actual policy outcomes and the upheld norms or values is addressed in this research and the adapted ‘recursive’ version of Wendt’s Constructivism, which is able to demonstrate the applicability of identity transformation to explain Japan’s policy preferences, will be introduced and discussed in section 2.4.

2.3 Foreign Policy Analysis and Japan’s Foreign Policy

Unlike IR theorists, political scientists are not greatly concerned about the structure of the international system and its relation to Japan’s foreign relations. The latter rather put more emphasis on explicating Japan’s foreign policy uniqueness via the assessment of its domestic structure and politics at sub-systemic level.⁹⁰ Interestingly, because the large majority of the existing literature on Japanese politics and international relations is filled with studies of Japan’s sub-systemic issues, the development of several foreign policy analytical models to render better insights into Japan’s foreign behaviours are abundant and more advanced than those using IR theories. As the main objective of most foreign policy analysis is to explore and explain the causal roots that determine Japan’s foreign behaviours, various models with different combinations of ‘actors, relationship and issues’ will be introduced in this section, including the elitist, the pluralist, the reactive-state and the civilian power model.

2.3.1 Elitist Model

Scholars who portray Japan’s decision-making model as ‘elitist’ agree with the basic propositions that the major groups of prominent elites are often, although not

⁸⁹ Lind (2004: 92 and 119-120)

⁹⁰ Schmiegelow (1990: 554)

always, united in terms of purpose, interest and action. Earlier studies generally suggest that the tight niche of the 'ruling triad', the 'triple alliance' or the 'tripartite power' among bureaucracy, political party (the LDP) and big business is the major factor accounting for the unified and goal-oriented type of foreign policy. When this is coupled with the nature of the decision-making process itself, which habitually leaves out the participation of outsiders, those who are excluded from the inner circle of the tripartite powers literally 'have no say' in important policy issues.⁹¹ In other words, the relationship among the actors representing the policy makers in the elitist model is somewhat intertwined. In general, one would say that there is nonetheless a division of labour between them. That is, the bureaucracy plans and drafts the policy strategies, the political party (LDP) helps push them through and the big business has them implemented. Nevertheless, there is still some dispute about the emerging contending schools of thought – the 'bureaucratic-dominant school' and the 'political party-dominant school' – in terms of who has assumed a dominant role in the decision-making process.⁹²

One of the most strongly fixed images of Japanese policy-making is the image of bureaucratic dominance, consensus building and the absence of charismatic leaders. In foreign policy issues, the role is visibly left to the MOFA as the main actor to deal with all routine decisions. As Minor suggests, for routine decisions that involves non-controversial situations with little political consequence, decisions are usually technical and more computational, and are best left with experts on bureaucracy and especially with the 'middle echelon' in the bureaucracy.⁹³ As in the case in foreign policy, the role of politicians and foreign ministers has always been hindered by the lack of real

⁹¹ Fukui (1977: 35)

⁹² Koh (1989: 204)

⁹³ Minor (1985: 1230) and Hosoya (1974: 359)

technical knowledge about international issues. However, although the MOFA is believed to be the primary actor among the Japanese bureaucracy involved in foreign policy decision-making, other actors such as the MITI, the MOFA or the MOD are also sometimes included in the process.

Ahn also suggests that after Japan's attempt to 'internationalise' its country, the numbers of new ministries such as the MOT, MOC, MOE or MOJ, which are involved in foreign decision-making, has also increased because of the importance of several international issues.⁹⁴ This elitist model or triple alliance model has characterised Japan's foreign policy-making throughout the post-war period, specifically in foreign economic policy, in which the alliance among the MITI, the LDP and big businesses has been prominent. The economic policy based on the 'developmental state' approach has been the trademark of the close cooperation between the governmental and business sectors in targeted industries throughout the post-war years.⁹⁵ In other issues, especially with respect to Japan-US bilateral relations, the elitist model and the 'bureaucratic-dominant school' are also often adopted to explain the process in which the Japanese state politically deals with Washington. This was specifically the case in the post-war period when the MOFA, the MITI and the MOF were the major actors exercising influence over policy outcomes of Japan-US bilateral relations.

2.3.2 Pluralist Model

Another parallel strand of the literature on foreign policy analysis also emphasises the 'pluralist nature' of Japan's foreign policy-making by showing evidence of factions and political infighting among LDP politicians and among the bureaucracies themselves. Furthermore, later works on Japan's foreign policy-making also began to

⁹⁴ Ahn (1998: 42)

⁹⁵ Scalapino and Masumi (1962: 93), Fukui (1977: 35-37) and Curtis (1999: 57)

stress the increasing importance of non-political actors, especially interest groups, the media and public opinion, and suggest these actors' influences on foreign policy decisions, such as the peace movement, sub-national government, political parties, labour unions and women's groups in terms of injecting their input into the process of decision-making. The central idea of the pluralist approach is thus to suggest the openness and accessibility of the decision-making process to extensive participants, both governmental and non-governmental actors.⁹⁶

Another set of domestic actors, who have become undeniably important for the analysis of Japan's domestic politics, are those representing the view of the public. Pharr and Krauss pioneered the field of study on 'Media and Politics' in Japan.⁹⁷ Unlike others, who often generalise that the media are the same thing as public opinion, Pharr and Krauss make a clear distinction between the two. The media are sometimes treated as a mirror reflecting and transmitting what public opinion believes at a given time. At other times, the media, especially major newspapers, also play their part as 'tricksters' by setting their own agenda, stimulating, evaluating and impinging on the policy direction of the government.⁹⁸

The broadening landscape of foreign policy today makes it inevitable for the government to involve other non-state actors in its decision-making process. The interactions and relationships of the actors involved in the decision-making process in countries that espouse the features associated with western democracy, such as Japan, are said to be much more complex. The relationship of those actors who participate in the foreign policy decision-making process is not merely within organisations, political parties or particular groups, as before. Rather, the relationships and interactions of these

⁹⁶ Cheng (1990: 251)

⁹⁷ See Pharr and Krauss (1996) on the Japanese media and their impact on domestic politics.

⁹⁸ Ibid, (1996: 27-32)

actors are more criss-crossed, as evident in several policy areas. For example, the interactions between the bureaucracy, the Diet interest groups and the political parties were exchanged throughout the course of the Gulf Crisis during the early 1990s. The close interactions of the central government, sub-national government and NGOs can also be seen scattered throughout this past decade in such issues as human rights, education, environmental protection and even world peace.⁹⁹

Furthermore, pluralism in Japan's foreign policy analysis is not only characterised by numerous emerging political newcomers but also by the relationship and interactions between actors or factions within and among key actors in the political arena. Previous studies have often concentrated on the factional politics within Japanese ministries and the MOFA and their dominance in agenda setting, for instance. From the post-war period until the latter half of the 1990s, it is often said that the MOFA had pursued independent foreign policy on behalf of the Japanese people. Studies that regard the MOFA as their key analytical focus, thus, are questioned as to their validity as representations of Japan's real foreign policy agendas and whether other domestic political actors are properly taken into account.¹⁰⁰

Among key actors who deal with the same foreign issues, factions and political infighting are also evident in Japan's pluralist world. To a large extent, the decision about a certain issue is usually made within the ministry directly responsible for the policy's implementation. These ministries also have the tendency towards compartmentalisation and strict adherence to autonomous existence, which subsequently encourages a strong 'ministry-centred' consciousness or 'inter-ministry consultation,

⁹⁹ Jain (2000: 19)

¹⁰⁰ The work of Drifte (2000) on the quest for a permanent UNSC seat, for example, is often criticised by Japanese scholars for its invalidity in placing the MOFA as the core mechanism in analysing UN policy.

coordination and decision-making'.¹⁰¹ Despite all this, this tendency increasingly misleads us to believe that foreign policy decision-making simply springs up from the ministry responsible for such issues. On the contrary, the clear-cut jurisdictional boundary is often blurred because of the intertwining nature of foreign policy issues, as evident in the bureaucratic politics between the MOFA and the JDA over such matters as personnel issues, the MOFA and the MITI over sanction measures or the MOFA and the MOF over the size of economic or financial aid and so on.

2.3.3 Reactive-State Thesis

The reactive-state thesis is perhaps the approach that draws out the most vigorous debates among scholars conducting research on Japanese studies. Throughout the past fifty years, Japan has been portrayed as a 'reactive state,' conveying the meaning of a country that lacks international goals and will as well as the capabilities to play assertive roles commensurate to its power in world politics. As originally suggested by Kent Calder, the characteristics of the reactive state are two-fold. The state fails to undertake major independent policy initiatives when it has the power and incentives to do so and responds to outside pressures for fundamental domestic change, albeit erratically, unsystematically and often incompletely.¹⁰²

Largely, the reactive and passive state of Japan's foreign policy is the result of the emphasis on the post-war 'Yoshida Doctrine,' advocating minimalist, risk-avoidance diplomacy, the separation of politics from economics and dependence on the US with regard to security. The doctrine has played a pivotal part in framing the Japanese state's policy behaviours or its concentration only on economic aggrandisement without having to commit the country to international burdens. Japan's reactive character could also be

¹⁰¹ Ahn (1998: 41-60)

¹⁰² Calder (1988: 519)

understood through the post-war international system that allowed Japan to be cocooned in the Japan-US security umbrella.¹⁰³ But most important of all, the factor that has played a major part in rooting the reactive character into Japan's political nature is the domestic political structure. Both Kent Calder and Akihiko Tanaka agree that the domestic setting and constraints, including the fragmented character of the 'doughnut-politics', the lack of leadership and the high level of consensus-building offer critical clues to the immobility of Japan's political, economic and security spheres.¹⁰⁴

However, some acknowledgement of the merits of the reactive state is certainly necessary. Major studies of Japan's foreign policy that adopt reactive state approaches rightly pick up the lack of military and security contributions as examples to support the argument for Japan's reactivity. Japan's lack of enthusiasm in despatching military troops to the Gulf war and subsequent PKOs and the lack of initiation in other political issues in the UN are often raised as the best examples by proponents of the reactive state thesis. Furthermore, compared to other middle-range European economies, Japan's foreign economic policies remain even less pro-active and confrontational.¹⁰⁵ Nevertheless, the limitation of the approach to the understanding of Japan's contemporary foreign policy through the traditional depiction of Japan as always being subservient to external pressures and confined by domestic politics cannot be overlooked. Throughout the past decades, Japan has developed several of its foreign policies independent of external pressures and the US, especially its foreign aid, environmental and even human rights policy.

Another group of scholars argue differently that Japan is a 'rising state' rather than a reactive one. Pharr and Yasutomo are convinced that Japan should be classified as

¹⁰³ Ibid (1988: 526), Pharr (1993: 235)

¹⁰⁴ Calder (1988: 528-530), Calder (1991: 24) and Tanaka (2000: 5-6)

¹⁰⁵ Ibid (1988: 522)

either a 'defensive state' or a 'proactive state', as Japan has undertaken the security policy of 'low-cost, low-risk and benefit-maximising,' which essentially implies a character that is active more than reactive.¹⁰⁶ Based on the defensive perspective, Japan seems to secure its survival through such strategies as securing its national integrity by avoiding security and military involvement but pursuing its national agenda through the 'new-multilateralism' via multilateral organisations and so on.¹⁰⁷

2.3.4 Civilian Power Thesis

The civilian power approach has emerged as an alternative way to view Japan's foreign policy only recently. In the light of the changing international system environment after the Cold War period, many scholars, including the proponents of the civilian power thesis, have also pointed out the transforming essence of international politics and international relations, especially the transformation of the relationship between 'power and security'. To them, any study of international relations that revolves around the concept of 'power struggle' must be re-examined and the concept of 'power' itself must also be redefined. The term 'power' must not be used only to refer to the 'hard' or materialistic/structural nature of military prowess, geographical and resource endowment or the ability to 'command' others.

Rather, as suggested by several scholars, the ability to 'persuade' and to use 'soft' power, which connotes non-military uses of power such as economic, culture or diplomatic means to set agendas and complete political or security ends, has become a new principal element in today's state of affairs.¹⁰⁸ According to Maull, the shift from a realist system structure to a more liberal institutional-based one allows the emergence of a new archetype of international power or a 'civilian power', as in Japan and Germany.

¹⁰⁶ Pharr (1993: 235-236)

¹⁰⁷ Yasutomo (1995: 4)

¹⁰⁸ Nye (1990: 166), Maull (1990-1: 92)

The new kind of power is believed to advocate the necessity of international cooperation as a vital means by which to reach international goals; to instrumentalise economic and non-military resources in lieu of military means to secure national interests and objectives; and lastly, to develop a supranational organisation to deal with international issues.¹⁰⁹

The concept of civilian power actually originated from the same source as did other approaches questioning how Japan could possibly enhance its political assertiveness commensurate to its economic status. Much of the literature on Japan has revolved around either Japan's failure to assume international responsibilities or its leap forward to establish a new kind of superpower or to transform itself to a 'normal power.' Both extremes interestingly raise the same question about the validity and relevancy of an 'economic superpower'. Although Japan's focus on economic development and the country's sense of 'anti-militarism' are evident, Japan's ability to assume the role of a prototype civilian power is still very much in doubt. On the one hand, Japan is exposed to the strengthening and the utilisation of the vast arrays of international organisations, from regional groups like APEC or ASEAN to global ones like the UN, IMF, OECD or WTO.

However, regarding the core relationship of 'economic power and security', the necessary quality of a civilian power, who must be able to effectively wield its economic resources to counter not only non-military issues such as human rights or foreign aid policy, but particular security threats as well, is still lacking in Japan. For example, Hughes tested the validity of the civilian power concept by investigating how Japan exerts its economic power over North Korea's military aggressiveness. He found that at

¹⁰⁹ Maull (1990-1: 92-93)

present, Japan still lacks sufficient policy-making will to mobilise its economic power to reach a resolution regarding North Korea's security problem.¹¹⁰

Other scholars also further point out that the evolving dimensions, such as political, domestic or even military aspects, still need further examination alongside further development of the civilian power conception itself. Pempel, for instance, raises questions about the development and evolution of democracy in Japan.¹¹¹ The primary reason is because in order to substantiate the assumption that Japan is on the verge of turning itself into the first civilian power, as originally suggested by Maull, it is also important to consider that factors such as political development within Japan, which has not exactly followed western liberalism, might present an intricacy in terms of political will, institutional support or domestic mechanisms for Japan to transform the country into a real civilian power.

2.4 Constructivism, Identity and Foreign Policy

2.4.1 Shortcomings of IR Theories and Foreign Policy Analysis

In the previous sections, the IR theories, foreign policy models and their application to the cases of Japan's foreign relations and foreign policy have been reviewed. In this section, their shortcomings and the adapted Constructivist model will be discussed in detail. The main shortcoming of IR theories and foreign policy analysis in the study of Japanese foreign relations and foreign policy perhaps lies in the epistemological problem or the overly clear-cut divide between the external and the domestic level of analysis. IR theories, regardless of their distinctiveness, are well known for their focus on the analytical observation of the system structure and its impact on the power relations among international actors. Foreign policy analysis, on the

¹¹⁰ Hughes (1999: 32 and 187)

¹¹¹ Pempel (1994: 17)

contrary, focuses on ‘sub-system’ examination and is the major analytical tool for those scholars interested in domestic structure.

The sharp contrast between scholars adopting IR theories and those using foreign policy analyses and their emphasis on separate levels of analysis is simply the underlying problem that inevitably causes incomplete understanding of a state’s foreign behaviour. To put it more clearly, by concentrating only on external factors, IR theories de-emphasise the ability and distinctive variety of factors of individual agents that might offer sound explanations for the understanding of international relations and states’ behaviours. Foreign policy analysis falls into a similar trap by focusing excessively on domestic agents and ignoring the systemic effects on states’ behaviours. As clearly put by J. David Singer, the lack of communication between the international relations theorists interested in the system structure and the political scientists and economists dealing with foreign policies and domestic structure is the key impediment in the study of states’ policy behaviours.¹¹²

On the one hand, the limitations of such IR theories in explaining states’ behaviours, especially those with a lot of peculiarities like Japan, may be due to the incorrect calibration of the concepts of the Realist’s ‘state as the unitary actor’ or ‘structure and distribution of material power’ and Liberalism’s reliance on the economic paradigm.¹¹³ Realism, for example, bases its explanation of Japan’s place in the world and foreign behaviours only on Japan’s material capability and resources. The assumption that a certain state would automatically follow the same course of international behaviours simply because the system mechanism and structure allow it to do so seems irrelevant in Japan’s case. To date, Realism still finds it difficult to explain

¹¹² Singer (1969: 28-29)

¹¹³ Schmiegelow (1990: 556)

why Japan is so reluctant to develop its political and military capability to match its amplified economic leverage. In contrast, Liberalism is regarded as performing better in explaining the uniqueness of Japan's foreign policy by allowing the inclusion of the domestic political structure into the analysis. However, Liberalism is still unable to offer an empirically sound explanation of Japan's resistance to the force of globalisation and interdependence. For example, despite Japan's full recognition of the advantageous devices of international organisations and cooperation, Liberalism still fails to understand Japan's inertia to move towards 'full-fledged' contributions other than the financial one.

On the other hand, foreign policy analysis seems to have more advantages in attempting to reveal Japan's foreign policy complexity. Several models have been introduced throughout these past decades, as stated in the previous section. Although each model is capable of disclosing the factors that determine Japan's foreign behaviours as evident in the extremely tight niche of Japanese elites, the varieties of domestic actors or the psychological factors such as the reactive nature in Japanese politics, detailed investigation into domestic determinants is sometimes plainly inadequate. For example, the reactive state thesis merely suggests domestic politics as a major constraint on Japan's development of more resilient international political gestures and argues that the country cannot engage in fundamental change if not forced by external pressures. The civilian power thesis is another alternative, offering a new possibility to speculate on the future directions of Japan's foreign policy.

However, one of the major flaws of using these models of foreign policy analysis is that they are somehow 'pre-determined' and several cases raised by these models simply support the validity of their arguments. By the same token, it is also easy for the opponents of these models to pick up particular cases that suggest the contrary. In other

words, the advocates of the reactive state thesis always have to confront their opponents – the ‘active-state’ thesis and the proponents of the civilian power thesis are also challenged by the advocates of Ozawa’s ‘normal-power’ thesis. Therefore, in terms of theoretical development, it seems that the existing models adopted to explain the directions and behaviours of Japanese foreign policy are incomplete and merely consist of groups of scholars throwing cases and evidence towards one another.

As for Constructivism, despite its advantage in filling the theoretical gaps of the IR theories and foreign policy analysis, some critics still question Wendt’s attempt to mix positivist or scientific epistemology with post-positivist ontology to create a middle way between rationalist and reflectivist theories.¹¹⁴ Wendt’s attempt to develop a new theoretical framework, which emphasises the concepts of ‘idealism and holism’, is often criticised as an attempt to muddle up ‘social and natural scientific epistemology’ and is somehow inconceivable. The second criticism lies in Wendt’s clear dichotomy between ‘materialism’ and ‘idealism’ and the precedence of ‘idealism’ over ‘materialism’. According to some, the social world is not constituted of one or another, but of a mixture of both material and ideational factors. As pointed out by Keohane, the issue is not one of ‘material forces versus ideas’ but how they are actively linked together.¹¹⁵

Among others, as far as this research is concerned, Wendt is also often criticised for his complete negligence of the importance of domestic politics upon states’ identity formation. Put another way, Wendt fails to discuss the ‘identity of identity’ or how actors are initially constituted into ‘self’ and ‘other,’ but simply sets this aside as exogenously given.¹¹⁶ By ignoring the so-called ‘type-identity’, the overall process of identity transformation is simply ‘one-sided,’ focusing only at the international level.

¹¹⁴ See Smith (2000) and Keohane (2000)

¹¹⁵ Keohane (2000: 127)

¹¹⁶ Smith (2000: 160) and Zehfuss (2002: 89)

Although such criticism is acknowledged in this research, it is believed that the advantages of Wendt's Constructivism, mentioned previously, still surpass these theoretical controversies. However, it is still admittedly problematic to apply Wendt's Constructivism to foreign policy preferences and outcomes. Therefore, the adapted version, recursive Constructivism, is needed and will be discussed in the following sections, which focus on the relevance of the model to the analysis of foreign policy outcomes.

2.4.2 Why Constructivism?: Identity and Foreign Policy

The use of 'identity' as a starting point for foreign policy analysis is nothing new. However, the application of 'identity' usually centres on the basis of defining domestic ideals and politics and represents 'national identity' instead of defining 'interests.' The traditional use of 'identity', although useful to some extent, only addresses one-sided concerns about 'self-image' on the domestic front and how these sets of self-images converge with or diverge from one another. The mitigation and exacerbation of conflicts are certainly the result of the converging or the diverging of these self-images.¹¹⁷ In contrast, Wendt's Constructivism offers a deeper theoretical basis for approaching identity, as argued in section 2.1.3. Again, it is important to repeat that Wendt's constructivism originally aimed at explaining the transformation of international political structure and not how the identity at the domestic level is transformed or the extent to which these transformed identities impinge on the direction of foreign policy. These questions began to catch constructivists' attention only recently. To constructivists interested in the transformation of identity and the impact on policy

¹¹⁷ See Nau (2000) on identity approach, identity and interests and American self-image.

preferences, the key that hooks up the ideational factors such as identity to the substance of foreign policy is perhaps the link between identity and interests.

On the one hand, the heart of the neo-realist argument on foreign policy analysis is based on the rational choice theory of states' actors pursuing foreign policies, which they perceive as fulfilment of national interests. On the other, for constructivists, national interests are closely knitted with identity and both are socially transformed and defined. Unlike neo-realism, in the view of constructivism, national interests do not simply exist to be discovered by rational actors. Foreign policies may be pursued in accordance with national interests, but interests themselves are significantly defined through the process of identity transformation. Therefore, whether it is relevant to infer foreign policy direction from the transformation of identity, the answer is obviously affirmative. As Wendt puts it:

‘Interests presuppose identities because an actor cannot know what it wants (desire) until it knows who it is (beliefs). This is to suggest that without interests, identities have no motivational force, without identities, interests have no directions. Both designate motivations that help explain state’s behaviours.’¹¹⁸

‘How possible is it to infer identity from ideas and beliefs that are embedded among political actors?’ is another question often raised by most sociologists and reflectivists on the validity of applying sociological concepts in the study of international relations and foreign policy analysis. It is important to make clear from the start that the constructivist empirical studies, while using sociological concepts such as culture, norms or identities, do not focus on the construction of norms or identities *per se*. Among constructivist scholars, norms and identities are literally ‘pre-given’ and the

¹¹⁸ Wendt (1999: 231)

focus is rather placed upon how the norms and identities of states are transformed or merged into collective ones. On the one hand, most constructivist cases concentrate on the process of identity transformation from ‘role identity’ to ‘collective identity’ and treat the process as the main reason for the transformation of the system structure. On the other hand, constructivists who focus on the transformation of ‘type identity’ to the new collective one and its effect on foreign policy initiatives are concerned with the process of transformation at the domestic level. As for the latter, with particular reference to foreign policy analysis, ‘identity’, used for this purpose, signifies a ‘social cognitive structure’ within which some political traits dominate others.¹¹⁹

In his introduction to the study of cultural factors and national security policy, Katzenstein defines the use of identity as the depiction of varying national ideologies of ‘collective distinctiveness and purpose’. Identity, according to constructivists, is a label for the construction of statehood enacted domestically and projected internationally.¹²⁰ The existing constructivist empirical studies on foreign policy argue about the importance of the observation of a genuine re-conceptualisation of interests, and how experiences and shared knowledge grounded in new collective understandings of the dynamics of world politics and actors’ evolving identities are interpreted by domestic political actors.¹²¹ In these analyses, identity formation is not treated as central and usually pre-given. Ideas and beliefs, collectively shared among domestic constituencies, are often used to infer the overall depiction of the transformation of existing identities. In contrast, other studies go even further to trace identity formation itself in order to avoid the pitfall of Wendt’s constructivism, which relies on the *a priori* assumption and

¹¹⁹ Hopf (2002: 1)

¹²⁰ Katzenstein (1996: 6)

¹²¹ Herman (1966: 273) and Berger (1996: 318)

pre-theorisation of identities.¹²² In sum, one could possibly infer ‘political’ identity, which is believed to be developed over time by observing shared ideas and beliefs revolving around political actors. Once the transformed identity is defined, national interests follow, and through this process, one could render a better assessment of the direction of foreign policy, which reflects both national identity and interests.

2.4.3 Recursive Constructivist Logic: Understanding Identity Transformation

As mentioned repeatedly throughout the previous sections, Wendt’s Constructivism may provide us with an alternative in incorporating ‘non-material’ factors, especially norms and identities and culture, into the analytical system and render better insights into how social interactions at the system level affect the transformation of the normative structure. However, to apply his model ‘as it is’ to the analysis of foreign decision-making processes or foreign policy preferences might be problematic, as discussed in section 2.4.1. This research, therefore, aims at observing simultaneously how the ‘domestic-type’ identity has been transformed and how it has affected the direction of Japan’s projection of ‘international-role’ identities, and vice versa. The adoption of identity as the analytical tool and the adaptation of Wendt’s original model into the ‘recursive version’ are based on the following assumptions.

Firstly, the first assumption articulates that *political identities are social assets, which can be pinpointed and are as evident as material factors*. In the case of Japan, IR scholars have long struggled with some difficulties in making sense of the foreign policies pursued by the Japanese state throughout these past decades. The principal reason for this is that they fail to notice the importance of identity transformation, which is inextricably linked with Japanese politics. Neo-realists have tried for a long time to

¹²² Hopf (2002: 4-9)

specify the best foreign policy courses for Japan – a policy based on material capability: that is, one in which Japan would behave in accordance with its transformed power position. Unfortunately, Japan has never followed this route, or if it has, it would appear to be only temporary and only when it was forced to do so by heavy external pressures. Given its historical accounts, Japan's political identities have been developed during the course of its relations with the external environments. Japan has developed the symptoms of political schizophrenia and xenophobia through the course of the country's 250-year effort to isolate itself from Western influence during the Meiji era. The symptoms were innately implanted in the Japanese society and resulted in the attempt to establish the so-called 'Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere', with its leading role attached to the regional structure, during the World War II.

In retrospect, apart from the Realist account of power hunger and economic rationality among Japanese militarists, it would also seem that Japan had for a long time attempted to distance itself from the existing western powers and also recognised itself as 'different'. Even the pursuance of the policies in the post-war period, which resulted in the emergence of a humble economic giant, also contrastingly mirrored Japan's self-understanding of its safest place in the world arena, as a pacifist, an economic power and a follower of the US. On the contrary, Japan's political identities during the post-Cold War period have entered another loop of transformation. Although its identity as an economic giant has been secured for some time and the policies that reflect Japan's identity as such could be seen through, for example, assistance and multi-development programmes, its political identity as a pacifist country creates many problems and controversies for its policy speculation. Appearing as the new alternative, Constructivism suggests how IR scholars could shift their focus to study the effect of social construction on the country's identity, rather than placing their theoretical

commitment on only economic-based, profit-maximising rationalist theories. The social factor, often overlooked by mainstream IR, is believed to be the one that determines Japan's foreign policy directions.

Secondly, *in order to observe social factors such as identity, this research will take on the concept of 'social construction' as the major process to be scrutinised.* Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein outline five main pathways or social construction processes as follows:¹²³

- a) The process by which 'norms' shape national interests or state policies
- b) The process by which 'norms' shape identity
- c) The process by which 'identity transformation' shapes national interests and state policies
- d) The process by which 'identity transformation' shapes the normative structure of the inter-state system
- e) The process by which 'state policies' reproduce and reconstruct the international structure

This study slightly modifies the existing Wendt's social theory to suit its own objective, which aims at using the concept of identity transformation to explain Japan's UN policy sources and directions in the past decade, but not the effect of identity transformation on system structure nor the study of the process of identity formation *per se*. This research is restricted to primarily observing process 'c' or 'the process by which 'identity transformation' shapes national interests and state policies, so as to address the question of how identity transformation has affected the direction of Japan's UN security policy in the past 15 years. In addition to that, another 'recursive process' will also be observed, that is:

¹²³ Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein (1996: 52-65)


- f) The process by which ‘social interaction at the system level’ affects the transformation of identity at the domestic level (how the international-role identity affects the transformation of ‘type-identity’)

To elaborate this point, as shown in Diagram 2.2, this research argues that although the formation of the ‘domestic-type identity’ is taken as given, the transformation of such identity cannot be taken as exogenous to the research observation. Contrary to Wendt’s concentration on the linear process of how ‘international-role identities’¹²⁴ have been transformed into the ‘collective identity’ or the expected end-result of the social interaction at the system level (stage 1 to stage 4, without passing stages 2 and 3), this research is convinced that this social process of identity transformation is rather ‘recursive’ (with the inclusion of stages 2 and 3). The interactions between or among states do not necessarily or habitually result in ‘collective identity’ at the system level. This implicitly signifies that the transformation of identity might not occur at system level, as predicted in the *linear structure* of social interaction, as shown previously in Diagram 2.1.

Nevertheless, the result of the interactions at the system level (stage 1) is the major signal sent to states as to what kind of conditions or expected roles are the requirements prerequisite to the joining of the international community (stage 2). Such a process, or *process ‘f’* (stage 2), will be sent back to the political actors. However, this is not to say that states will transform their identities to suit with demands or conditions set by the interactions at the system level, otherwise this would be simply the repetition of the process advocated by Neo-realism. The most important point is that states also engage themselves in *process ‘c’*, which basically deals with identity ‘redefinition or

¹²⁴ The selection of ‘domestic-type identities’ which states want to make apparent while interacting with others.

transformation’ at the domestic level. Again, the process of identity transformation or redefinition, or as Katzenstein puts it, ‘self-reflection’, does not occur in isolation.¹²⁵ It is communicated to others as these transformations of identity and the preferred ‘domestic-type’ identities will be sent back to the international system again (stage 3).



Source: Author’s Diagram

Whether the new ‘collective (type) identity’ at the domestic level would correspond to the ‘collective (role) identity’ defined at the international level very much depends upon the issue concerned, and will vary from issue to issue. Thus, in order to speculate as to the direction of a country’s foreign policy, the observation of the conformity of both the transformed domestic-type and the international-role identity should be considered equally important, as hypothetically put in this research. To sum up, as seen in Diagram 2.2 and previously drawn in Diagram 2.1, the linear structure of

¹²⁵ Katzenstein (1996: 21)

Wendt's Constructivism follows route number 1 straight to stage 4, without passing through stages 2 and 3. On the contrary, the 'recursive version' suggests a process that begins and ends in numerical order, from stage 1 to 2 to 3 to 4, respectively. Furthermore, by comparing Diagrams 2.1 and 2.2, Wendt's original model clearly focuses on the system level, while the 'recursive model' emphasises identity transformation at both domestic and system level.

Thirdly, to solidify 'identity' and to make the study of its impacts on foreign policy directions possible, the examination of identity should be drawn from *the 'distribution of ideas, shared beliefs and experiences'* among political actors.¹²⁶ The extant literature observing identity formation and transformation depicts different kinds of variables to be examined. Hopf, for example, chooses to infer Soviet identity formation by observing 'habitual form of action'. He is convinced that among Max Weber's four categories of social actions, namely rational, normative, emotional and habitual, the unthinking, automatic and unintentional latter is the most reliable source from which identity can be inferred.¹²⁷ Others depict 'historical experiences and political cultures' of key political actors and institutions as the main variables and examine how those variables are institutionalised in the society, and hence become an integral part of national identities. Thomas Berger contends that the cultural-institutional context in which defence policy is made in Germany and Japan is the key to the antimilitarism stance in both countries. To him, political culture, which simply refers to cultural beliefs and values, is the primary factor that shapes a given society's orientation towards politics.¹²⁸

¹²⁶ See Herman (1996) on the use of constructivism in Soviet foreign policy analysis and Dobson (2003) on the use of norms in Japan's policy towards the UNPKO participation.

¹²⁷ Hopf (2002: 10-11)

¹²⁸ Berger (1996: 323-325)

Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane have also indirectly contributed to the use of ‘ideas and beliefs’ in constructivist analysis, though both are strong advocates of the rationalist school. Despite this fact, their articulation that the three sets of ideas and beliefs – world view, principled and causal ones – provide causal pathways and affect policy preferences supports the constructivists’ claim that non-material factors can also be located at the centre of scientific analytical focus. With respect to the relationship between ‘ideas and beliefs’ and ‘identity’, Goldstein and Keohane state that they are literally entwined with people’s conceptions of their identities, and since ideas and beliefs cannot easily be compartmentalised from interests, nor can identities.¹²⁹

To put it in more concrete terms, the main articulation in this dissertation proposes that the higher the degree of conformity between the ‘domestic-type’ and ‘international-role’ identity, the more likely it is that activism on human security policy or the new UN-Centrism will be sustainable. In other words, the foreign policy or ‘international-role’ identity projected internationally should coincide with the collective knowledge of ‘domestic-type’ identity among political actors at the domestic level. One might argue that there is no surprise in seeing Japan pursue its UN foreign policy based on its national interests (if one accepts the notion that identity and interests are closely knitted and one can infer national interests from identity), that is, when the ‘international-role identity’ is in tune with the ‘domestic-type’ identity.

The point is that Japan’s interest and identity does not simply exist, awaiting discovery by rational actors. The country does not suddenly know what its national interest is, but has been through several recursive processes of social construction, both at domestic and international level, to acknowledge and adjust itself to the changing identity. Saying that Japan’s activism of in human security policy (the direction of

¹²⁹ Goldstein and Keohane (1993: 8 and 27)

Japan's foreign policy) depends upon the transformed identity (domestic-type identity) is therefore different from saying that Japan pursues its human security policy based on the existing national interests. The main reason is that national interests simply exist in rationalist viewpoints, whereas identity transformation in constructivist cases - both national interests and identity - involves the process of social interactions both at internal and international level. The 'type identity' is not merely there to be discovered but also evolves and transforms from time to time. Thus, the observation of the transformation of 'type identity' will be one of the viable references to explain the success or failure of the state's foreign policy preferences.

2.5 Conclusion

In general, the literature on Japan's foreign relations and foreign policies can be divided into two main categories. The first group consists of those adopted mainstream IR theorists who adopt Realism, Liberalism and their neo-versions to explicate Japan's external relations. The other group are those political scientists or economists who take on foreign policy analytical models as the main instrument to make sense of foreign policy behaviours. Despite their contributions to the understanding of Japan's foreign relations and policy behaviours, the main shortcoming of IR theories and foreign policy analysis lies in the epistemological problem or the overly clear-cut divide between the external and the domestic level of analysis. IR theories, regardless of their distinctiveness, are well known for their focus on the analytical observation of the system structure and the impact of material factors on the power relations among international actors. Foreign policy analysis, on the contrary, focuses on 'sub-system' examination and is the major analytical tool for those scholars interested in domestic structure and internal politics. The sharp contrast between scholars adopting IR theories

and those using foreign policy analysis and their emphases on separate levels of analysis is simply the underlying problem that inevitably causes incomplete understanding of a state's foreign behaviour.

Wendt's Constructivism, however, emerged only recently as an alternative approach that serves the purpose of bridging the gap between the positivist and post-positivist research schemes by integrating 'non-material' factors such as ideas and beliefs into the analytical process. Furthermore, it also offers a new way to understand how the normative structure of the international system could be transformed through social interactions and exchanges of ideas, beliefs and knowledge among system agents. Despite the theory's contribution, this research slightly modifies the existing form of Wendt's social theory to suit its objective, which aims at using the concept of identity transformation to explain Japan's UN policy sources and directions in the past decade, but not the effect of identity transformation on system structure, nor the study of the process of identity formation *per se*. Firstly, this research is restricted to primarily observing how 'identity transformation' shapes national interests and state policies, in order to address the question of how identity transformation affects the direction of Japan's UN security policy. Additionally, another 'recursive process' will also be observed – the process by which social interaction at the system level affects the transformation of identity at the domestic level or how the international-role identity affects the transformation of 'type-identity'.

Secondly, this research argues that although the formation of the 'type identity' is taken as given, the transformation of such identity cannot be taken as exogenous to the research observation. Contrary to Wendt's concentration on the linear process of how 'role identity' (which is indirectly the selection of type identities that states wish to make apparent when interacting with others) has been transformed into the 'collective identity',

which is the expected end-result of the social interaction at the system level, this research is convinced that this social process of identity transformation is rather *'recursive'*. The interactions between or among states do not necessarily or habitually result in 'collective identity' at the system level. This implicitly signifies that the transformation of identity might not occur at system level, as predicted in the *linear structure* of social interaction.

Thirdly, to solidify 'identity' and to make the study of its effects on foreign policy directions possible, the examination of identity should be drawn from the distribution of ideas, shared beliefs and experiences among political actors. By comparing the system of ideas and beliefs embraced by the international community, which informs their 'international-role' identities, and those adopted within Japan, which also inform the 'domestic-type' identities throughout the past 15 years and the conformity between these two identities, it is believed that the sources of Japan's foreign policy preferences will be revealed. In Chapters 4-6, the 'recursive model' will be applied to the cases of the Gulf Crisis, the Cambodian peace process and the promotion of human security policy to examine the degree of conformity between the 'international-role' identities and the 'domestic-type' identities and the overall process of Japan's identity transformation. In the next chapter, however, the background to Japan's UN and security policy will be outlined to introduce the basis of Japan's security direction in maintaining international peace and security.

Chapter 3 Japan's Security Policy in the UN Context

3.1 Japan's Security Policy: An Overview

Before looking into the case studies in Chapters 4-6, the background to how Japan's UN security policy has been examined over the years and why Japan's security direction could be understood within the framework of the UN will be discussed in this chapter. While studies on Japan's security policy under Japan-US bilateral relations are abundant, few venture into the examination of Japan's security policy under the UN framework. Besides, the popular arguments simply substantiate the existing contention that 'the UN did not play a central part in Japan's security policy' and that Japan usually 'had no motivation to take the initiative to strengthen the influence of the UN in the international political and security spheres.'¹³⁰

Unlike Japan-US security arrangements, since its formal admission to the UN in 1956, there has always been a question about whether there is anything peculiarly significant about Japan's 'UN-Centrism' or 'UN-Centred Diplomacy' and whether the UN could perform as a security shield for Japan or as the key security mechanism to uphold international peace and stability. Scholars often argue that Japan's attitudes towards the pronouncement of 'UN-Centrism' have been ambiguous and the concept itself has been a mere replica of Japan's minimalist foreign policy pursuits.¹³¹ It is undeniable that for more than five decades, Japan's UN diplomacy had lurked behind the scenes, as a background to Japan's foreign policy setting, and tended to have only a limited association with Japan's security policy. In contrast to the majority of studies that contribute to the limited understanding of Japan's UN policy, the following sections will discuss the development of Japan's security insights under the framework of UN-

¹³⁰ Pan (2005: 347)

¹³¹ Ueki (1993: 390)

Centrism in parallel with the popular security understanding under the Japan-US security alliance. This is to serve as the basic background for the argument to be advanced in subsequent chapters on the effect of identity transformation on the emerging activism of Japan's UN security policy.

Since its WWII defeat, Japan has embarked on a security policy that entrusted its own national survival to Japan-US Security arrangements and to its security belief in the unique conviction that it could build a truly peaceful nation. To achieve such an ambitious end as a military-free and a peaceful nation, the adoption of the Peace Constitution, the special relationship under the framework of the Japan-US security alliance and UN-Centred diplomacy have been the most integral mechanisms steering Japan towards such political security inspiration. The first legal and political gesture symbolising the post-War 'peaceful' Japan was the adoption of the 1946 Peace Constitution, especially as it was stipulated in the Preamble that:

'[...] We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationships, and we have determined to preserve our security, and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world [...]. We recognise that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.'¹³²

Ideationally speaking, the Constitution Preamble not only reflected Japan's traumatic experience in WWII, which inevitably resulted in the country's aversion to war and militarism; it also echoed Japan's ideas and beliefs that the only way international peace and national security could be totally secured was perhaps through having faith in others' political morality and the universality of international law and

¹³² See the full text in *The Constitution of Japan, 1946*

through the strict adherence to the pacifist sentiment of neither resorting to war nor to other military endeavours to achieve peace. This ideal pacifism has become the cornerstone characterising Japan's security and foreign policy and has been one of the fundamental ideas that have evolved and been transformed throughout several decades. Immediate after the end of WWII, Japan's understanding about building up a 'peace-loving nation' or a country upholding pacifist sentiment was certainly 'inward-looking.' To a certain extent, 'pacifism' was very much understood among Japanese people as 'anti-militarism,' a sentiment that was concerned only with restraining itself from military ambition so that Japan would never again have to experience the horror of war. Such high ideals, stipulated in the Constitution Preamble, were materialised through a well fabricated 'no-war clause,' also known as the famous Article 9, which also laid out the framework for Japan's post-war foreign relations.¹³³

On the one hand, it clearly mirrored Japan's post-war concern about how international peace and security could be achieved. In the mindset of the Japanese government and people, 'war' or any 'use of force' could never be a legitimate choice towards the maintenance of peace and international security. To substantiate this ideational conviction, Japan willingly renounced its sovereign right to wage war against others and curbed its 'land, sea, and air forces' to the lowest level possible. The very idea of the preservation of peace and the banishment of oppression and intolerance derived from atrocious wars was also believed to be shared by other 'peace-loving nations.' On the other hand, the sincere wish to establish eternal international peace through the upholding of such pacifism, as set forth in Article 9, was not the only

¹³³ Article 9 stipulates that:

'Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognised.'

security aspect initially portrayed by the Japanese political founders. While the Constitution might clearly limit Japan's military potential to the minimum, it does not deny the 'inherent right of self defence that Japan is entitled to maintain as a sovereign nation.'¹³⁴ To translate the above ideas and spirit of the Peace Constitution into tangible and sensible policy implementation, Japan's politicians during the post-war period apparently placed their concern regarding national security on the Japan-US Security arrangements while quietly hoping to rely on the newly established UN for the task of maintaining international peace and security, as originally stated in Yoshida's three main pillars of Japan's post-war foreign policy principles.


As described in Figure 3.1, the pattern of Japan's security and foreign policy is largely comprised of three subsets. At its core, Japan's primary concern since the post-War period has always been how to protect and secure its national security in the absence of proper and normal military capacity. By renouncing the sovereign right to maintain traditional military components, the minimum necessary level of SDF has been developed under close bilateral ties with the US and within the framework of Japan-US Security arrangements. Moreover, Japan's concern over its national security was also linked with the maintenance of peace and stability at the regional and international level. On paper, it might seem that Japan put tremendous faith in the UN to uphold international peace and security, as stipulated in the Constitution Preamble and even in the 1957 Basic Policy for National Defence, in which Japan's pledge to support the organisation's promotion of international peace was the topmost priority.¹³⁵ Despite its original intention, the lack of efficiency of the UN, coupled with the ideological rivalry between the East and the West that characterised most of the Cold War period, forced

¹³⁴ Website of MOD, http://www.jda.go.jp/e/defense_policy/japans_defense_policy/1/1.htm, accessed 06/06/2005.

¹³⁵ Website of MOD, http://www.jda.go.jp/e/defense_policy/japans_defense_ppolicy/2/1.htm, accessed 15/03/2004.

Japan to reconsider the whole scenario of its security policy. By placing these three sets of security concerns under Japan-US security arrangements and close bilateral relations, this served both the purposes of physical and military protection as well as acting as an efficient deterrent measure for Japan throughout the past decades. This pattern of Japan's security policy, with the Japan-US security arrangements and the bilateral relations in place and in which all three levels of security concerns – national, regional and international – are located as subsets of the Japan-US security alliance, has been believed by some scholars to characterise Japan's post-War and contemporary security policy.¹³⁶

Figure 3.1: Japan's Security and Foreign Policy Design




Source: Author's Diagram

Although many scholars acknowledge the theoretical and historical credentials of the above-mentioned security pattern, an alternative contention is also suggested. One could not simply ignore Japan's ideas and sincere determination to establish itself as a 'peace-loving nation' and its belief that the ideas of eternal peace would be shared by other nations via the UN mechanism, and possibly Japan's adherence to UN-Centrism. The 1957 Basic Policy for National Defence even first called for the promotion of

¹³⁶ Hook *et al.* (2001: 12) and Interview with a Japanese scholar, 25/01/2006.

international cooperation and other efforts for international peace via the support of UN activities in order to ensure ‘the realisation of world peace.’ The sentiment had apparently been separated from the issue of protecting national security or how Japan would deal with external aggression, which was tied up with the development of the effective but minimal defence capability of the SDF and the Japan-US security arrangements.¹³⁷ As shown in Figure 3.2, a clear dichotomy between Japan’s ‘national’ security under the Japan-US alliance and ‘international’ security under UN-Centrism can be observed. However, it is largely true that due to the absence of efficient UN mechanisms and the lack of effective functioning of the UN in establishing the ‘world peace’ envisioned by Japan, the emphasis of Japan’s security policy during the Cold War period was undoubtedly on the issue of national and regional security under the Japan-US security alliance rather than on the issue of international security or the importance of promoting UN-Centrism.

Figure 3.2: Japan’s Post-War Alternative Security and Foreign Policy Design



Source: Author’s Diagram

¹³⁷ Website of MOD, http://www.jda.go.jp/e/defense_policy/japans_defense_ppolicy/2/1.htm, accessed 15/03/2004.

Functionally speaking, apart from the fact that the Japan-US Security arrangements were literally a great substitute for Japan's absence of military forces, the significance of Japan-US Security arrangements was that they fundamentally served the purpose of 'defending Japan' and ensured the nation's security and integrity. The security arrangements, special as they seemed, also served to maintain security in the areas surrounding Japan, which doubly confirmed the importance of Japan's national security in the grand strategic design of the US in Asia Pacific and vice versa. These arrangements have been suggested by some scholars to represent an alternative way for Japan to place all its security concerns, national or international, on the security alliance between the two countries.¹³⁸ Coupled with the dysfunction of the UN during the first few decades, it is fair to agree with the contention that Japan's security blueprint was drawn on the basis of maintaining national security and the Japan-US Alliance rather than on the promotion of international security through its connection with UN-Centred Diplomacy, which inherently resulted in a very limited discussion and exploration of the development of Japan's security policy under the UN framework. However, by pointing out the possible pattern of Japan's security understanding in terms of securing its national survival under the US framework and through promoting international security via the UN, Japan's security orientation under the Japan-US security alliance during the post-war and the post-Cold War period will be analysed in parallel with the security understanding developed under the UN framework.

3.2 Japan's Security Policy in the Post-War Period

Apparently, in the post-war period, the functions of the Japan-US security alliance in maintaining peace and security at the national and regional level were clearly

¹³⁸ Tanaka Akihiko, for example.

dichotomised from the functions of UN-Centrism in promoting Japan's concerns regarding the maintenance of international peace and security. As shown in Figure 3.2 and discussed in section 3.2.1, Japan's security focus was crucially placed upon the Japan-US alliance, with relatively less concern for security promotion under UN-Centrism, as will be further discussed in section 3.2.2. Therefore, Japan's national security and defence policy has been in constant development under the Japan-US security treaty, which leaves the question of whether Japan's international security concern was paid as much attention as its national or regional concerns. This scenario also generates questions regarding whether Japan's security concerns, especially international ones, could ever be developed outside the framework of the Japan-US Security Treaty or under Japan's UN framework. In this section, the main characteristics and the security functions of the Japan-US alliance and Japan's UN-Centrism during the post-war period will be discussed correspondingly.

3.2.1 Japan-US Post-War Security Arrangements

a) Main Characteristics

It was a mutual understanding between the two allies that in order for Japan to achieve what it portrayed in the Peace Constitution as the status of a 'peace-loving nation' and to adhere to its pacifist principles of not becoming a military power that might pose a threat against another, the establishment and maintenance of Japan-US security agreements were indispensable. Based on the 1951 Japan-US Security Treaty and the revised 1960 Japan-US Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security, the two countries agreed on the following three main principles – cooperation with the UN, concern over the security of the Far East and cooperative efforts between the allies to ensure Japan's national security. Firstly, irrespective of the gridlock of the East-West

conflict, both countries were to adhere to the purposes and principles of the UN, as stipulated in Articles 1, 2 and 7. The intentions to utilise the newly established UN and to strengthen other free institutions to further develop peaceful international environment were mutually prioritised by the two counterparts. The ‘desire to live in peace’ mentioned in the 1960 Japan-US Security Treaty coincided with Japan’s inspiration to build its country into a ‘peace-loving nation’, as mentioned in the Constitution Preamble and in Article 9.

Another fundamental principle specified in the 1960 Japan-US Security Treaty was their common concern over regional stability or the international security of the ‘Far East.’ While Articles 1, 2 and 7 did mention the desire to support UN activities as the main conduit to maintain international peace and security and to prevent the use of force of any nation against the territorial integrity or political independence of others, it was not particularly clear how concerted efforts among the ‘peace-loving countries’, especially the two allies, could be pursued in order to achieve such an ideal environment. On the contrary, it was perceptible in the language used in Article 5 that the main concern about ‘international security’ during the Cold War period under the context of Japan-US security relations was in fact the security of the ‘Far East’ and the areas surrounding Japan.¹³⁹ This outright stipulation under the context of Japan-US security relations unreservedly linked up Japan’s national security with regional rather than international integrity. Therefore, whether Japan’s security policy in the post-war period consisted of any element of international concern or whether international security was fully integrated into the bilateral security framework between the two countries remains a controversial question.

¹³⁹ See further details in Article 5, Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the US, 1960

The third fundamental principle was the mutual agreement, based on Articles 3 and 6, stressing both individual and cooperative efforts of ‘self-help’ and ‘mutual aid’ to develop the capacities to resist armed attacks, including the granting of permission for the US to use military facilities in Japan. Since Japan had voluntarily relinquished the right of a sovereign state to maintain effective or full-scale military means or to exercise such forces overseas, it was inherently important that Japan’s national security be defended by the US forces under the Japan-US Security Treaty. Although it was clearly stated in Article 9 of the Peace Constitution that Japan would forever renounce war and the use of force as means to settling (international) conflicts, this clause has been interpreted by Japan to mean that a limited level of self-defence capacity could be retained. The implication of this interpretation is evident in the gradual increase in defence spending of the Japanese government on the SDF as it coincided with the Japan-US Security Treaty, which, explicitly or not, encouraged Japan to cooperate with the US in facilitating the US forces’ efforts to protect both Japan’s national security and maintain stability in the Far East.

b) Security Functions of Japan-US Alliance

According to Satoh and other scholars, although Japan began to step up its security efforts with increasingly broad external and domestic support by shouldering more responsibility on political and economic fronts,¹⁴⁰ the focal concern of Japan towards international security at this stage was still somewhat ‘premature’ and had been developed in the context of the Japanese post-war mindset, which was based on an aversion to military exercise and the use of force. The main corresponding security policies therefore revolved only around the existing policy of ‘non-nuclear principles’ of

¹⁴⁰ Chapman (1983: xi)

not acquiring, not possessing and not exporting such weapons. Another emphasis was put on the country's economic prowess, which had served as the key component of Japan's economic-security policy, which comprised of, for example, the use of ODA and other economic manoeuvres to convince other states into altering their political and security courses.¹⁴¹ Furthermore, during the post-war period, Japan was still the beneficiary of the security relationship and the international economic and security order provided by the US. The Japan-US security agreements, during this stage, still played a critical part as the 'major shield against external attack.'¹⁴²

In terms of the role of Japan-US security arrangements in determining Japan's security posture and direction, the security alliance served two integrated functions during this period. Firstly, the 'protection function' of the Japan-US security arrangements served as the key protective shield for Japan's national security. Under the Japan-US security pact, Japan was allowed to pursue the so-called 'exclusively defence-oriented policy', which generally undermined and limited the scope of the use of force to only the minimum level required for self-defence. Regarding the level of defence capabilities, it has been commonly known and recognised by both the Japanese and others that the Peace Constitution only permits Japan to possess self-defence capabilities at the minimum necessary level. However, the Japanese government has interpreted this to mean that 'the specific limit of the minimum necessary level of armed strength for self-defence varies depending on the prevailing international situation', which provided a legal base for Japan's increased security cooperation with the US in the Cold War period.¹⁴³

¹⁴¹ Hughes (1999: 22-23)

¹⁴² Satoh (1982: 2-3)

¹⁴³ See the government's view and interpretation of Article 9 on the MOD Website, http://www.jda.jp/e/defence_policy/japans_defence_policy/1/3/.htm, accessed 10/12/2005.

Secondly, the Japan-US security arrangement also served the security interests of both countries as a 'deterrent function' for overall regional security design. The security arrangements may prioritise the function of protecting Japan's national security – Japan's territorial land, sea and airspace – as the highest precedence. In truth, it has always been interpreted by the Japanese government to include 'the areas surrounding Japan' and the scope for maintaining security and stability has been always extended to the regional level, as clearly stated in the Japanese Government's View of Article 9:

'[...] the use of minimum necessary force to defend Japan as employed in the execution of its self-defence *is not necessarily confined to the geographic scope of Japanese territory* [...]. Nevertheless, the government believes that the Constitution does not permit it to despatch armed forces to foreign territorial land, sea and airspace for the purpose of using force, because such an overseas deployment of troops generally exceeds the limit of minimum necessary level of self defence.'¹⁴⁴

The above interpretation by the Japanese government implied two significant points regarding Japan's regional security posture. On the one hand, it clearly suggested that under the framework of the Japan-US security arrangements, regional security and stability have been prioritised as key security elements along with Japan's national security. Under certain circumstances in which the regional stability of the area surrounding Japan is considered to be at stake, Japan would reserve the right to extend the exercise of self-defence beyond national boundaries. This could be seen as an integral part of the US grand security posture in the Far East to deter communism during the Cold War. On the other hand, it was evident that the concern about international

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, http://www.jda.jp/e/defence_policy/japans_defence_policy/1/3/.htm, accessed 10/12/2005

security had lagged behind somewhat. According to the strict interpretation of the Japanese government, overseas deployment theoretically exceeded the minimum necessary level of Japan's self-defence. As for securing international security, although the Peace Constitution did not stipulate that Japan was prohibited from participating in military activities overseas for the benefit of international peace and security, and the integral use of force under the 'collective security' action has never been strictly prohibited as actions under 'collective self-defence,' the ability of the Japanese government to exercise such a right to participate in collective security was still limited by the spirit of the Peace Constitution and Article 9.

3.2.2 Japan's Post-War UN-Centrism

a) Main Characteristics

Unlike the Japan-US security alliance, it is undeniable that UN-Centrism or UN-centred diplomacy is indeed a *vague* foreign policy concept, as it has been frequently talked about but has never been clearly defined by Japanese policy makers. The origin of UN-Centrism was found in 1957 in Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi's idea about redefining Japan's foreign policy framework and was formulated in addition to the existing Yoshida Doctrine as the third pillar of Japan's foreign policy. It initially conveyed the idea that Japan would utilise the UN as the major international arena in which it could pursue national interests and reduce international tensions.¹⁴⁵ As suggested previously, successive policy makers and diplomats have never clarified the essence of the policy and made it clear to the public.¹⁴⁶ In reality, the ideas behind UN-

¹⁴⁵ Iwanaga (1998: 32)

¹⁴⁶ The academic community, however, agreed on the core substance of UN-Centrism as follows: Japan is to conform to UN obligations and to respond positively to proposals for new UN activities. Japan is to strengthen the UN and other international agencies and to seek opportunities for creating initiatives to strengthen the UN and place the organisation as the top priority in Japan's foreign policy. See also Dore (1997: 95-96)

Centrism had neither been implemented nor functioned in the post-war period. Other scholars even suggest that UN-Centrism was not meant to be the framework in which the UN would be the central focus of Japan's foreign policy; nor was it meant to be the structure on which Japanese diplomacy was to be based. Rather, the concept of UN-Centrism itself merely implied that Japan's foreign policy should be carried out in line with the rules and principles articulated in the UN charter.¹⁴⁷

It might be true that Japan's lack of clear definitions of UN-Centrism and its UN policy inertia in the post-war period were the result of the fact that the policy was meant to serve as 'a means to other ends.' Japan's focus on the UN was not directed particularly towards upholding or enhancing the organisational functions *per se*, due to both structural and ideational limitations. However, the UN-Centrism contrarily became the source of Japan's hidden national agendas, serving, for example, as the source of legitimacy, an auxiliary security guarantee and a self-constructed image as a peace-loving nation, as discussed below. To some, for the first fifteen years after Japan's admission to the UN, Japan's UN policy was parochial and many of the efforts were only directed towards the restoration of its international position.¹⁴⁸

In addition, it could also be pointed out that the early stage of Japan's UN-Centrism involved a process in which the solid idea of 'UN-centred' foreign policy was initiated. In fact, the 'vagueness' of the concept or the 'passivity' of the actual UN policy could possibly be the result of Japan's inability to manifest the idea into more tangible practices. The main reason for such deficiency was perhaps that all the energy was poured into economic rehabilitation rather than into more complex issues of international politics or the promotion of peace through the UN. Pan suggests that

¹⁴⁷ Ueki (1993: 348)

¹⁴⁸ Iwanaga (1998: 37)

although the UN did not completely lose its value in Japan's national security policy in a broader sense, the post-war UN policy simply functioned as a forum for security debates and a safeguard for its economic interests among the Third World.¹⁴⁹ The vagueness and passivity of Japan's UN policy, which was the direct result of the incoherence between 'idea' and 'practise', could be seen in several cases. Besides the self-proclaimed rhetoric about its aspiration to be a peace-loving nation – the country's guiding principle to the maintenance of peace and security – Japan in the early post-war period was simply a bystander waiting to cast supporting votes in the UN General Assembly alongside the US, even when it came to peace-threatening issues like nuclear disarmament.¹⁵⁰ It was not until the post-Cold War period that ideas about international peace and national security were manifested in a more coherent policy, as will be discussed in section 3.3.2. Inactive as it was, the post-war UN-Centrism still had its own security functions in Japan's diplomatic scenes, as described in the following section.

b) Security Functions of UN-Centrism

i. Source of auxiliary security guarantor

The aftermath of WWII influenced the restructuring of post-war Japan in several ways, from political and economic effects to social structure. However, the most groundbreaking structural alteration of the Japanese state was probably the adoption of 1946 Peace Constitution and the renunciation of war as well as the ban on the use of armed force. While on the political and economic fronts, Japan was ensured of a stable liberal democratic system and a liberal market provided by the US, it was well aware of the security vacuum resulting from the adoption of the Peace Constitution. In this initial stage, the UN filled in the gap effortlessly as a guarantor of auxiliary security. In this

¹⁴⁹ Pan (2005: 342-343)

¹⁵⁰ Ueki (1998: 353)

early stage, the UN was not a mere international organisation, but a pathway on which Japan would place its security reliance and promote some measures for world peace through the Allied Powers under the organisation.¹⁵¹ However, although the initial idealist scenario of the post-war Japan was to place its security future in the hands of the UN, this UN-Centrism was actually pursued alongside close bilateral relations with the US. The security alliance that has been developed between the two countries since the enactments of the San Francisco peace treaty in 1952 and its revision in 1960 proved to be firmer and more promising than the one with the UN, as discussed in the previous section.

The relatively more solid security guarantee from the Japan-US security agreement raises a fairly difficult question about the relevance of the UN as a security guarantor to Japan. Without its own military muscle, the ideal scenario to place its national security under the UN umbrella and the emphasis on UN-Centrism was less practical and more elusive. It is therefore not surprising that by the early 1960s, UN-Centrism had gradually disappeared from the speeches of Japanese political leaders. Several scholars largely agree that one possible reason that contributed to the inability of the UN to perform as a security guarantor for Japan was that the UN itself had not been able to fully function as a world organisation for the maintenance of peace and security.¹⁵² Considering the outbreaks of both proxy and internal wars throughout the Cold War period – the Vietnam War, the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan or the threat from Korean Peninsula – all plainly confirmed the significance of having a more substantial security agreement firmly in place, in this case with the US, rather than ideally placing the country's survival in the hands of the inadequate UN. Inevitably, the

¹⁵¹ Wakamizu (1987: 26)

¹⁵² Iwanaga (1998: 35-36), Ueki (1993: 347) and Ogata (1987: 961)

post-war UN-Centrism was simply impractical and the essence of the concept itself was soon forgotten by the subsequent Japanese administrations.

ii. Source of legitimacy

Contrary to its failure as a security guarantor, the post-war UN-Centrism successfully functioned as a source of legitimacy for the Japanese state on several political scales. At the regional level, Japan's membership of the UN and the pronouncement of UN-Centrism provided an opportunity for Japan to lessen any tensions that would otherwise have occurred around the Pacific Rim.¹⁵³ For Japan's Asian neighbours – China, the USSR, Korea, or even Southeast Asian countries – Japan's close ties with the US and its military revival were both suspicious. Japan's heading towards full-scale commitment to the UN through its UN-Centrism was, to some extent, perceived as a legitimate political gesture that eased their minds on security and strategic worries. Despite this gesture, Japan still very much suffered from negative responses from some of its neighbouring countries, especially the former USSR and China. Although having been recognised as a member of the UN, its legitimacy was still tarnished by Articles 53 and 107, often referred to as the 'enemy clause'¹⁵⁴ of the UN Charter.

However, acquiring legitimacy at the regional level was not in fact the concern of the Japanese government during the post-war period. At the international level, having been positioned as a war defeated nation and occupied by the victor, post-war Japan was desperate to re-establish itself to secure its membership of the UN. In this

¹⁵³ Ueki (1993: 347-348)

¹⁵⁴ The clause states that if any country is to be attacked by any state which, during WWII, had been an enemy of the signatories of the UN Charter, the former could take full countermeasures on its own without authorization by the UNSC. Although the Charter does not state the names of the 'enemy states', it seems that the message was sent exclusively to Japan, Germany and Italy. This issue remains controversial and Japan's legitimacy could never be completed without the deletion of this clause from the UN Charter.

period, the emphasis on UN-Centrism was rather a symbolic gesture echoing Japan's full commitment to the norms of the international community towards peace and security.¹⁵⁵ To some extent, admission to the UN might have been Japan's ultimate wish, as it signified the end of the defeated status of the country. On the other hand, one could always argue that the admission was inevitable, as Japan was encouraged by the US to move into the circle of the world community as a US political supporter. The road to community recognition was not automatic; nor was it the genuine self-directed policy agenda of the Japanese government. The tension between the Eastern and Western blocs in the UN was no less than that on the battlefields in other parts of the world. The veto on the admission of Japan to the UN until 1956 was no coincidence, given the Russo-US rivalry. Coupled with the US loss of its automatic majority in the UN General Assembly, the need for a loyal alliance in the world organisation was equally important.¹⁵⁶ Thus, the source of legitimacy from the UN membership during the post-war period was, in a way, a by-product of the heightening Cold War state of affairs and Japan's conviction in placing its national and regional security on the Japan-US security arrangements and bilateral ties, which might partly explain why Japan could not clearly form a more coherent idea about UN-centred diplomacy in the subsequent post-war years.

iii. Source of self-constructed image

As well as serving as a source of legitimacy, the UN has played a significant role as a source of Japan's self-constructed image. Through the UN-Centrism, Japan has made it clear that its priority as a 'peace-loving nation' was to uphold the principles of the UN in order to secure sustainable peace and security. According to Iwanaga, in its early years, Japan sought to assume a position of 'bridge-builder': to link up, mediate

¹⁵⁵ Interview with a former senior Japanese diplomat, 21/02/2006

¹⁵⁶ Dore (1997: 62-65)

and intermediate between the Western and Eastern blocs. In an acceptance speech to the world body, the then-Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu also emphasised that the nation's post-war Constitution was founded on the same basic principles of peace that have underlined the UN Charters.¹⁵⁷ Apart from the self-portrait as 'bridge-builder' between the East and the West, to a certain degree, the UN-Centrism was also ideally set as a conduit for Japan to assume the role of a peaceful country and to pursue activities commensurate to its idealism, that is, to promote peace and security via an international organisation. In a way, these were integral components of the process of identity transformation to a peace-loving nation, as opposed to the former military aggressor. UN-Centrism was, therefore, a means towards the end that contributed to Japan's major identity-reconfiguration.

However, as previously mentioned, one of the vital reasons why UN-Centrism was even more ambivalent was that the concept was never really transformed into coherent policy practises during the first two decades of the post-war period. Clearly put, Japan's peace and security had usually been considered under the framework of its Peace Constitution, banning the right to collective defence and the use of force overseas, and had also been considered in parallel with the Japan-US security strictures. In this fashion, Japan had already confined itself within a separated peace and security parameter that left virtually no room for the UN's peace and security agenda. As for the country's 'bridge-builder' position, it was apparently short-lived and practically unattainable during the post-war period. Because Japan had never been on good terms with some of the Asian countries like China or North Korea and was even in a state of clear hostility with the former USSR due to Japan's subscription to a full-fledged alliance with the US, it simply demonstrated a misnomer of Japan's self-image as a

¹⁵⁷ Iwanaga (1998: 34-35)

bridge-builder between the Western-Eastern blocs or the Western bloc and other Asian countries. As suggested by Mendl, the legacy of the war, fear and suspicion of Japan's intentions, and the impact of the Cold War structure combined to keep Japan far from fulfilling its original UN-Centrism and its wish to cultivate this new legitimate self-portrait in the post-war period.¹⁵⁸ In the following section, the development of Japan's security understandings in the post-Cold war period will be discussed.

3.3 Japan's Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Period

During the post-war period, it was fairly clear that Japan's security orientation was dichotomised between the concerns over national/regional versus international security. While the Japan-US security alliance had served the country as the umbrella under which Japan's national security was firmly placed, the UN-Centred diplomacy had provided an alternative, albeit futile, framework in which Japan's focus on international security could be developed during the post-war period. The security dichotomy and Japan's emphasis on the Japan-US alliance has been transformed during the post-Cold War period and Japan's revival of the new UN-Centrism is believed to have resulted from the converging security insights between national and international security.

At the start of the post-Cold War period, some scholars were convinced that the re-emerging activism in UN-centred diplomacy was because of the obvious lack of trust between Japan and the US over its economic frictions in the 1980s or the result of the Gulf War effects.¹⁵⁹ To some extent, the impact of the economic decline of the US in the late 1980s and the negative feedback from the international community towards Japan's attempt, or the lack thereof, to help re-establish peace and stability 'in cash but not in kind' during the Gulf crisis, on Japan's post-Cold war security understanding was

¹⁵⁸ Mendl (1995: 31-32)

¹⁵⁹ See, for example, Ueki (1993), Immerman (1994) and Purrington (1992).

unmistakable. Therefore, in this section, the characteristics of the post-Cold war Japan-US security arrangements, the post-Cold war UN-Centrism and their security functions will be discussed and the outline of Japan's security understanding and settings directed during the period will be examined.

3.3.1 Japan-US Post-Cold War Security Arrangements

a) Main Characteristics

During the Nakasone Administration in the early 1980s, which was considered the period where Japan was at its economic zenith, the Japan-US bilateral relationship had reached the point where both traditional political and security rapport were not functioning properly.¹⁶⁰ It is impossible to deny that Japan's economic success in the 1980s and the decline of the US economic prowess was one of the prominent factors that might have contributed to the re-orientation of the Japan-US security posture. Despite this, Japan's security orientation still relied heavily on the existing Japan-US security arrangements. The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security was still very much in place as the cornerstone for common security objectives during the 1980s. This was subsequently confirmed in 1996 by the Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the 21st Century, which requested the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation in 1997. By comparing the 1997 Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation with the previous 1978 Guidelines, although the premise of the security cooperation largely remains during normal circumstances and when Japan is under armed attack, major nuances that signify the development of the Japan-US security relationship could also simultaneously be deducted.¹⁶¹

¹⁶⁰ Interview with a former Japanese MOFA official and the current UNDP official, 07/03/2006

¹⁶¹ 1978 Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation and the 1997 Review of the Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation.

Firstly, regarding cooperation under normal circumstances, both Guidelines generally indicate that Japan will certainly maintain its defence capacity at the appropriate level in accordance with the ‘minimum necessary’ restriction in the Peace Constitution. However, the key difference between the two Guidelines is the extent to which ‘the increasing mutual cooperation’ between the two countries was underscored in the revised 1997 Guidelines.¹⁶² This trend had emerged in Japan’s security depiction since the 1980s, especially when Nakasone clearly pronounced in the basic principles of his administration that ‘Japan’s top priorities included maintaining peace at home and *abroad*.’ As vague as it seemed, without systemic clarification or an implementation plan for what he meant by Japan’s emphasis on ‘peace at home and abroad’, one thing that was repeatedly expressed by Nakasone was that ‘Japan and the US share a common destiny that binds them together across the Pacific, hence the need for Japan to share responsibilities for peace and security in the region.’¹⁶³

At face value, the cooperation between Japan and the US under the 1978 and 1997 security guidelines may be relatively analogous. Nevertheless, the increasing cooperation had become ‘mutual’ in a true sense of the word and no longer followed the route of a ‘patron-client’ security relationship. The mutual cooperation has also become the framework under which Japan’s defence posture has been developed beyond the narrow-minded framework of self-defence, but with concern for ‘a more stable international security environment.’ This also suggested that the function of Japan-US security arrangements in the post-war period might have been ‘re-prioritised’ by focusing more on utilising the security arrangements as a platform to address regional

¹⁶² While the US will maintain its nuclear deterrent capability and its forward deployment forces in the region, Japan will enhance mutual cooperation via information sharing, policy consultations, several types of security cooperation through arms control and disarmament.

¹⁶³ LDP, Period of President Nakasone’s Leadership, <http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/english/history/chap11.htm>, accessed 22/11/2004

problems and international activities rather than heavily addressing the issue of Japan's national security, as it previously had. As clearly mentioned in the 1997 revised Guideline:

‘Bilateral cooperation to promote regional and global activities in the field of security contributes to the creation of a more stable international security environment.

Recognising the importance and significance of security dialogues and defence exchanges in the region, as well as international arms control and disarmament, the two Governments will promote such activities and cooperate as necessary.’¹⁶⁴

Secondly, Japan's mounting concern regarding regional and international security has been more evident than in the post-Cold War period, especially after the latter half of the 1990s. It has become widely recognised by Japan that the situations in areas surrounding Japan will certainly contribute to the well-being of the nation's peace and security. The 1978 Guidelines mentioned only Japan's modest functional assistance to facilitate the US forces in case of situations in the Far East: the systematic facilitative modalities were never clearly stated. The 1997 Review Guidelines apparently demonstrate how Japan would step up to shoulder the security responsibility in the region alongside the US. Apart from customary diplomatic efforts and the use of bilateral coordination efforts through such activities as relief measures, search and rescue, non-combatant evacuation and other economic sanctions, Japan will actively provide not only the use of facilities for the US forces but also will provide 'rear area

¹⁶⁴ See further details in the completion of the Review of the Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation on the MOD's website, http://www.jda.go.jp/e/defense_policy/japans_defense_policy/3/6.htm, accessed 16/09/2004.

support', primarily within the Japanese territory and possibly on the high seas and international airspace around Japan. Above all, the SDF will also take part in such activities as intelligence gathering, surveillance and minesweeping to protect lives and property and to ensure the safety of the US forces. These post-Cold war characteristics have certainly contributed to the changing security functions in several ways, as discussed below.

b) Security Functions of Japan-US Security Arrangements

As for the functionality of Japan-US security arrangements in the post-Cold War period, the post-Cold War Japan-US security arrangements were still the principal cornerstone upon which Japan's national and physical security firmly depended. From the comparison between the 1978 and 1997 Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation, action in response to an armed attack against Japan is the only element that did not go through many changes. Basically, the Review of the 1997 Guidelines, which became the actual law in 1999, followed through the mechanism articulated in the 1978 Guidelines, which outlined the necessary steps from diplomatic efforts to such military activities and operations as command and coordination, communication, intelligence activities, or other logistic support activities.¹⁶⁵ The 1996 National Defence Programme Outline (NDPO) also further stressed the importance of the Japan-US security arrangements, which would continue to play a key role in the security of Japan and peace and stability in the surrounding region.¹⁶⁶ However, it had also been evident since the Nakasone era that the Japan-US security arrangement was to serve as a platform from which Japan could exert its economic and security responsibilities and work with

¹⁶⁵ 1978 Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation and the 1997 Review of the Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation.

¹⁶⁶ See the full text of the 1996 National Defence Programme Outline at the MOD's website, http://www.jda.go.jp/e/defense_policy/japans_defense_policy/4_ndpof1996/index.htm, accessed 15 03/2005.

other advanced democracies in order to ‘establish a new peace and restructure the global economic order’.¹⁶⁷

There were several attempts from many Japanese officials and think-tanks to furnish the new conceptual framework in a way that was compatible with the changing position of the Japanese economy and dynamic security environment from the 1980s onwards through such ideas as ‘comprehensive security.’¹⁶⁸ According to those who advocated the comprehensive security concept, Japan’s security direction should revolve around several layers of security, from political to social, economic and military security. With Japan reaching its economic apex in the late 1980s and the criticism of the nation’s lack of international political responsibility during the Gulf Crisis, the argument as to whether Japan should start to substitute the narrow understanding of national security or its sole concern with physical survival with the so-called ‘economic security policy,’ which focuses more on the relationship between economic measures and development to ensure both national, regional and international security, was audible.¹⁶⁹

However, in the areas of international security, it was still evident in the early post-Cold War period that the arguments for the clear dichotomy between national/regional and international security were apparently convincing. While Japan has doubled its defence and security efforts to complement the US security strategy in Asia-Pacific, the joint cooperation between the two countries for the benefit of international security was somewhat limited. It was not only that the core security agreements, the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation or the Review of the 1997 Guidelines for US-Japan

¹⁶⁷ LDP, Period of President Nakasone’s Leadership, <http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/english/history/chap11.htm>, accessed 22/11/2004

¹⁶⁸ Several think tanks and non-governmental research institutes, such as the Nomura Research Institute and governmental-supported bodies such as the Study Group on Comprehensive Security, had been started since the late 1970s and were very active in the 1980s to conceptualise the way in which Japan’s security policy should be directed.

¹⁶⁹ Chapman (1983: xvii)

Defence Cooperation, did not enthusiastically outline serious policy executions that both countries could follow to tackle the problem of international security, apart from pointing out in principle the importance of upholding the UN; the kind of implicit cooperation between the two countries regarding the betterment of the international security environment had only been about curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, arms control and disarmament.¹⁷⁰ Although the 1997 Guidelines allowed Japan to despatch the SDF beyond its territory, it remained restricted to the 'areas surrounding Japan.' It was not until the promulgation of the Anti-Terrorism Special Law in 2001 that the restriction was lifted and the SDF was allowed to support the US overseas to counter terrorism.¹⁷¹ While the international security understanding under the Japan-US alliance has been developed to an extent since the 1980s and fully embraced in early 2000, corresponding to the heightened intensity of international terrorism, a more comprehensive approach, which has combined Japan's security insights, addressing both national and international concerns, was advanced under the development of the security understanding under the UN framework, as will be further discussed in the following section.

3.3.2 Japan's UN-Centrism in the Post-Cold War Period

a) Japan's Post-Cold War UN-Centrism

The UN-Centrism in the post-Cold War period is not entirely catered for by the new-found policy concept, but is rather based on the same fundamental philosophies – the source of legitimacy, the pathway to peace and security and the source of self-constructed image. However, the nature of the post-Cold War UN-Centrism differs

¹⁷⁰ 1996 National Defence Policy Outline,

http://www.jda.go.jp/e/defense_policy/japans_defense_policy/4/ndpof1996/2.htm, accessed 15/03/2005

¹⁷¹ MOFA, Japan (2002a), 'Campaign Against Terrorism', <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/terro0109/policy/campaign.html>, accessed 15/03/2005.


greatly from that of the post-war period. Firstly, the sign of more *activism* in UN-Centrism has become evident. Unlike the vague UN-Centrism of the post-war period, the policies based on the UN-Centrism in the 1990s were more structured and coherent. It was only after the Gulf Crisis that Japan could actually define a tangible set of UN policies or a more coherent policy manifestation that hardened the concept of UN-Centrism and was actually associated with the embedded philosophy of peace and security promotion. In the post-Cold War period, the top-most priority of the UN-Centrism and Japan's foreign policy has been to maintain international peace and security, thereby ensuring Japan's own peaceful environment. This security understanding significantly demonstrates the lower degree of security dichotomy and a more balanced approach between national and international security concerns. Compared to the early period of activism in UN-Centred diplomacy, especially during the Nakasone administration, the UN contributions, both financially and logistically, were merely spent on particular issues and to only some sectors of the UN organs. For example, during the period from 1960 to the mid 1980s, 75 per cent of the total annual contribution went to economic and social activities, more than to any other area.¹⁷²

On the contrary, in the post-Cold War period, the emerging new form of security, collaboratively advocated by Japan and other middle powers, or the so-called 'human security' within the framework of the UN, has filled the gap of the relative disarray of the post-war UN-Centred Diplomacy. Unlike the concept of 'comprehensive security' that circulated among academia and policy makers during the 1980s but failed to establish any concrete policy implementation, the human security policy, which first appeared in official rhetoric during the mid-1990s, has helped to balance the political, military, social and economic facets of UN-Centrism.

¹⁷² Ogata (1987: 966)

As shown in Figure 3.3, the human security policy, which will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 6, is the link that holds the new UN-Centrism together and possibly the end result of the decade-long identity transformation process. Precisely put, the key to the attainment of the ‘new UN-Centrism’ is the ability of the government to manifest the coherent policy practises and the ability to relate Japan’s fundamental security ideas and political agenda, including the maintenance of peace and security, to the world at large via UN-based organs, members and activities. The security understanding being developed in the UN framework and the security functions of the new UN-Centrism are articulated in section (b).

Figure 3.3: Japan’s Security Policy in the UN



Source: Author’s Diagram

b) Security Functions of the Post-Cold War UN-Centrism

i. Enhance international status

The primary function of the UN-Centrism in the 1990s in Japan’s security policy is to enhance Japan’s international status and to put an end to the asymmetry between its economic and security projections. Unlike the post-war period, when Japan’s UN-

Centrism and the UN itself served only as a 'rubber stamp' confirming Japan's legitimacy in the international community, the 1990 UN-Centrism has been pursued with the aim of redefining its role in the new global context, to set political and security agendas and to exert ideational influence independent of the US within the framework of multilateralism through the UN.¹⁷³ As pointed out by Drifte, Japan's attempt to increase its responsibility and to increase its influence in agenda-setting in the UN during the 1990s is partly to fulfil the nation's long-awaited hope to achieve prestige and recognition.¹⁷⁴ The move towards a more active UN-Centrism has been developed in a series of pragmatic stages. To strengthen its international role, assertive multilateralism has been integrated into the master plan of UN policy since the mid 1980s. Through this assertiveness, it is believed that Japan should be able to deal with an extensive range of regional and global problems, especially via the UN.¹⁷⁵ In general, as shown in Figure 3.3, Japan's ideational exertion within the UN includes the serious reform in social, political, economic and security structures.

At first, the attempt to reform administrative functions and financial structure was meant only to strengthen and improve the performance of the entire organisation. Later in the 1990s, it was clearer that Japan has deliberately hooked up the issues of financial reform and administrative reform, including the reform of the UNSC, with the country's attempt to gain a permanent UNSC seat. Japan has been strongly convinced that financial reform should include the issue of fair representation in the permanent UN Security Council in accordance with the proportion of financial contribution.¹⁷⁶ In terms

¹⁷³ Tamamoto (1997: 3)

¹⁷⁴ Drifte (1998: 137)

¹⁷⁵ Iwanaga (1996: 26)

¹⁷⁶ Japan has constantly increased its share in the institution's financial burden, despite its decrease in GDP Per-Capita during 1996-1998. The latest assessment showed that Japan shouldered almost 20 percent of the UN regular budget in 2002, approximately a 10 percent increase from 1991. See annual publication of the United Nations Handbook, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (New Zealand).

of security and the development facets of the UN policy, Japan has used its quest for UN reform as a platform to further its policy agendas, which include such matters as disarmament, environmental protection, fights against other economic and social instability and so on. In the latter half of the 1990s, Japan also proposed its ‘new development strategy’, which was comprised of the following three components. Firstly, the combination of both a ‘comprehensive approach’ and a ‘country-specific approach’ that addressed the strengths of ODA, trade, investment and other modalities in bailing out those in need was emphasised. Secondly, cooperation among developed countries, IOs, NGOs and other parties in providing support and partnership to overcome short-term physical threats in developing countries was encouraged. Thirdly, a focus not on the amount of capital injection but the achievement of long-term quantity development was stressed.¹⁷⁷

These attempts accounted for later development for a more refined and coherent ‘human security’ policy, which will be discussed in Chapter 6. However, it is important to point out that the important characteristic of Japan’s endeavour to level up its international status during the early stage of the post-Cold War period via UN-Centrism was to promote its combination of security facets within the new UN-Centrism. The clear-cut divide between peace and security and development issues was palpable and the latter had long been a representation of Japan’s post-war UN-Centred Diplomacy. It was not until the latter half of the 1990s that the development of the idea of ‘human security’ reached its peak and the idea started to indicate the direction of genuine UN-Centred Diplomacy, which addresses both security and development aspects in the same agenda.

¹⁷⁷ MOFA, Diplomatic Bluebook 1998, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1998/I-a.html>, accessed 20/03/2004.

ii. Promote peace and security agenda

Apart from the general UN reform, to Japan, another top UN priority has been to promote peace and security via the ‘pacifist doctrine.’ The UN itself was certainly viewed as an arena where Japan could promote its own peace agendas and create a global environment that enhanced Japan’s national interests and stability. Thus, after WWII, Japan had consistently adhered to the concept of ‘one-country pacifism’, often known as ‘isolationist pacifism.’¹⁷⁸ The term is often used to refer to Japan’s unique conception of peace and the conduct of military operation, mostly advocated by the majority of people, political leftists and the communist party. ‘Isolationist pacifism’ contends that the importance of Japan’s survival was to strictly adhere to the ‘no-war’ clause of the Peace Constitution and there was no need for Japan to become involved militarily with any sort of collective security arrangements, even under UNPKOs. In other words, it was the conviction of the post-war Japan that it could simply contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security only through ‘anti-militarist foreign policy’, even if this meant that Japan had to pursue it unilaterally.

The end of the Cold War saw changing ideas among Japanese constituents – political parties, academics and public opinion – regarding Japan’s unilateral pacifism. The most important transformation of Japan’s UN-Centrism was the domestic recognition that unilateral pacifism could not prevent the outbreaks of either inter-state or intra-state conflicts; nor could it maintain peace and stability of the international system, as firmly believed in the post-war period. The post-Cold War UN-Centrism still undoubtedly regards the idea of the maintenance of peace and security as the uppermost priority. However, Japan has incorporated elements of ‘multilateral pacificism’ that have been manifested through the activities under ‘human security’ in its new UN-Centrism

¹⁷⁸ Hellmann (1988: 41-44). The term is originally coined by Takashi Inoguchi in the late 1980s.

in the post-Cold War period. This use of ‘multilateral pacificism’ indicates that Japan has begun to realise the inadequacy of unilateral pacifism and to acknowledge that the misconception about the maintenance of peace and security through such unilateral effort accounted for the incomplete nature of the post-war UN-Centred diplomacy. Secondly, multilateral pacificism, in the context of Japan’s UN-Centrism, literally means that Japan would expand its efforts to promote peace and security not only in terms of geographical extent or in the areas surrounding Japan for the benefit of its own national survival, but also in terms of scopes and activities that would lead to long-term sustainable peace and security, including conflict prevention, arms control, UNPKOs, development, environmental and drug issues, human rights, refugee assistance, culture and education, and so on.¹⁷⁹

In short, the most important feature of the new UN-Centrism is perhaps Japan’s ability to incorporate both development and security facets into the same coherent policy implementation, via ‘human security’ – the forte of the new UN-Centrism. Since the post-war period, Japan has long been renowned for its efforts to secure international peace and security through developmental and humanitarian efforts. However, those efforts merely address one aspect of peace and security affairs, which is the developmental aspect of conflict resolutions. Human security, on the contrary, addresses both the ‘downside-risk’ which concerns the menaces and deprivations that may occur to human survival, dignity and freedom, and ‘human development’, which deals with optimistic qualities or the expansion of people’s choices.¹⁸⁰ The inclusion of the former element into the overall framework of the maintenance of peace and security signifies

¹⁷⁹ MOFA, Japan (2004a: 6-9)

¹⁸⁰ Commission on Human Security (2003: 10)

several changes in Japan's position regarding peace and security and how it could exert its influence and ideas via the UN, all of which will be further discussed in Chapter 6.

iii. Quieting both domestic and international opposition

As Japan began to pursue a more assertive stance in both political and security policy in the 1990s, domestic and external responses to such moves were significantly divergent. On the domestic side, the debate revolved around the choice of assertive civilian power or normal power. The advocates of the former, which represents Japan's mainstream, argue for Japan's active role in the multilateral context without the use of military power. The latter, however, opts for a normal state, which could assume an active role in international affairs and a role in world leadership. The rationale behind this idea is that Japan's global military and political power might be symmetrically in line with its economic power.¹⁸¹

The new UN-Centrism has been a major catalyst, which, to some extent, helped compromise the differences between the two main streams. Under the umbrella of the UN, Japan could play a more assertive political role and assume the role of an agenda setter. The attempt to secure a permanent seat in the UN Security Council was agreed by the majority of Japanese people during the first half of the 1990s, when Japan started its campaign for UN Reform and its quest for a UNSC seat. On the issue of military use, although Japan still strictly adheres to Article 9 and the prohibition of any activity that involves military exercise, from 1995 onwards, Japan has attempted to revise its 1992 UNPKO Law and to lift the 'five principles', which hitherto prohibited the participation of SDF troops in any war-zone, and finally to allow the greater participation of the

¹⁸¹ Tamamoto (1997: 96-110)

Japanese SDF personnel to work shoulder to shoulder with other UNPKO staff.¹⁸² Via the new UN-Centrism, the proponents of civilian power are not too offended by the increasing military activities of the SDF. Simultaneously, those who advocate normal power are also appeased for Japan's previous lack of active participation in military activities in the UN. Both are believed to be satisfied with the increasing political and leading role in the multilateral context via the UN.

On the external front, it is widely known that Japan has been very careful in exerting its political influence and initiating any military and security moves due to negative responses from major neighbouring countries, such as China and North Korea. As suggested by Mendl, Japan's phenomenal economic success and its wartime experience are the major factors that restrain Japan and other mainland countries from deeper involvement in politics and security.¹⁸³ Besides, although Japan's close security tie with the US would guarantee its security from hypothetical threats, in a way, the close bilateral relations between the two countries have long been another factor that has created distrust among the mainland countries. However, in an era when Japan is on the quest for international symbolic recognition and prestige, political assertiveness and international responsibilities that might sometimes include the despatch of military manpower are a prerequisite. In order to attain the aforementioned international political goal without aggravating or causing too many anxieties among its Asian neighbours, the UN as the embodiment of the peaceful ideal seems to be the most feasible option for Japan, in which it could play an active political role and exert its influence.

The assessment of the development of Japan's security orientation under the Japan-US security alliance and the UN framework demonstrates that under both

¹⁸² IPCH, UN Peacekeeping Operations, http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_E/pko/index2_e.html, accessed 12/12 2005

¹⁸³ Mendl (1995: 125)

frameworks, Japan's security understanding at national and international level has become less dichotomised and less imbalanced in the post-Cold War period. On the one hand, it has been obvious that the development of security orientation under the Japan-US framework has been expanded in scope beyond Japan's national survival and regional stability, and includes the notion of responsibility towards the maintenance of international peace. On the other hand, it has been clear that Japan's security policy could also be understood via the UN framework, which is one of the key arguments in this research. The examination of the security understanding under the latter reveals even more about Japan's transformed ideas about the importance of international security to the maintenance of national security: that is, Japan's national survival is inextricably linked with well-maintained international peace and security. By promoting international peace and security, Japan's national security is also guaranteed. Before going into an examination of the transformation of such ideas about security policy under the UN framework in Chapters 4-6, the final section of this chapter will introduce the key actors involved in Japan's UN security policy decision-making process.

3.4 Key Actors in Japan's UN Security Policy Decision-Making Process

a) Government Officials: MOFA

The key actors in Japan's UN policy and international security issues are perhaps from Japan's government agencies – the MOFA and the JDA. In the case of Japan's UN security policy, to some scholars, government decisions tend to be more dependent on the development of internal debates among bureaucrats, the so-called 'middle echelon' within the MOFA, rather than originating from the initiatives of the Foreign Ministers or the Prime Minister themselves.¹⁸⁴ The main reason for the lack of leadership and visions

¹⁸⁴ Hosoya (1974: 357) and Minor (1985: 1229)

among the political elites partly stems from the short-term office tenure of those occupying the seats. This inherently prevents them from obtaining expertise in foreign issues and inevitably forces them to rely mostly on the suggestions of the MOFA bureaucrats, who are more familiar with the foreign policy problems. Ahn further supports this argument by pointing out that apart from setting up, formulating, implementing and reviewing feedback on policy agendas, the MOFA also plays an important role behind the scenes (*kuromaku*) in directing the change in foreign policy orientation.¹⁸⁵

Despite the above criticism of the MOFA's lack of clear definition of 'UN-Centrism'¹⁸⁶ and the clear asymmetry between security and development aspects of contributions, it is agreed that the MOFA is the most important actor in Japan's UN policy-making process. It is probably the most consistent actor within Japan's political structure, which has been advocating an assertive role in the international political arena. Since the 1970s, MOFA has attempted to forge new foreign policies that envision Japan as an assertive player, especially in UN affairs, to expand its contribution to the international community. Particularly, since the outbreak of the Gulf War, when the UN itself began to resume its importance, the MOFA and the UN policy have also undergone a great number of developments. In the 1990s, prior to the political realignment in 1994, the MOFA's stance was similar to that of the LDP, which adhered strictly to the Japan-US alliance. At the same time, the MOFA also found itself being the key actor in initiating a policy agenda that reflected the organisation's conviction that Japan 'must do something more'. During and following the Gulf Crisis, the MOFA's active pursuance of UN policy, especially on the PKO participation and the quest for a

¹⁸⁵ Ahn (1998: 45) and Zhao (1993: p.xi)

¹⁸⁶ Ueki (1993: 348-349) and Ogata (1987: 957)

permanent UNSC seat, was perceived as a repetition of views expressed by the US. Therefore, the MOFA often found itself clashing with other bureaucratic agencies as well as with opposition parties, who were obviously against the active UN policy under the US directives.¹⁸⁷

It was not until after the second coalition government between the LDP-SDPJ and Sakigake in the latter half of the 1990s that the MOFA could successfully compromise with both political parties and public opinion on the issue of the importance of UN-Centrism. After 1995, the MOFA laid out a more coherent and persuasive outline for the new revival of Japan's UN-Centrism, the participation in UNPKOs, the bid for a permanent UNSC seat and the promotion of human security. Simultaneously, the MOFA was also compromised by the former opposition party, the SDPJ, in emphasising Japan's principle of pacifism and less reliance on the US. According to Kono Yohei, Foreign Minister in 1995, the foreign decision-making process in this era would certainly be based on Japan's own 'national identity' rather than on attempts to please the Western alliance as a member of the West.¹⁸⁸ This also means that, in order to make the right decisions on foreign policy issues, Japan needs to establish firm values and principles in assessing its own identity and national interest.

b) Political Parties

During the post-war period, the rivalry between the LDP and the then opposition parties – the SDPJ, the JCP, and the DSP – were quite apparent on the Japanese political scene. Under the 1955 system, the 'camp-conflict' between the LDP and the opposition parties could not be avoided. To be more precise, it had been a strong tradition among opposition parties to vote against the LDP on foreign policy issues that were at the

¹⁸⁷ *Asahi Shimbun*, 20 April 1992.

¹⁸⁸ MOFA, Diplomatic Bluebook 1996, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1996/I-a.html#2>, accessed 20/03/2004

centre of public attention, such as the issue of the Japan-US alliance, policies towards Japan's neighbours and so on. During the Gulf Crisis and its aftermath, the major hindrance that accounted for the failure of Japan's UN policies, especially in the case of UNPKO and the bid for a permanent UNSC seat, was the result of both intra- and inter-party ideational discord, which will be discussed in Chapter 4.

As clearly put by Hosoya, for a country that most values 'consensus-building', the failure to reach consensus among civilian and military leaders often prevents the government from making vital decisions, keeping it in a state of indecision.¹⁸⁹ Nor could consensus be reached within the LDP government itself. The main reason for the disagreement was that the party was constituted of different factions, which viewed the situation regarding the UN and security matters differently. Although the LDP has been considered pro-UN, differences in perspectives between those calling themselves 'moderates' and 'hard-liners' within the party have been apparent.¹⁹⁰ For example, the LDP members who belonged to the LDP-moderate camp included such important names as Miyazawa Kiichi and Kono Yohei, who were cautious about the government's full response to the UN demands and quite satisfied with the 'gradual change' in the country's foreign posture. On the contrary, LDP-hard-liners like Ozawa Ichiro, Takeo Nishioka and Taku Yamazaki were convinced that Japan must fully participate in various security activities and hoped to revise the law in order to fulfil all UN collective security obligations.

The differences among LDP members were not as much of a hindrance as the complete differences between LDP and the opposition parties. Their dissimilarities ranged from the fundamental philosophy upheld by each party, opinions about the

¹⁸⁹ Hosoya (1974: 365)

¹⁹⁰ Heinrich, Shibata and Soeya (1999: 78)

constitutionality of Japan's contribution abroad and types of humanitarian assistances to trivia such as the operations of the SDF under UN command and control. The LDP has long been in favour of gradual rearmament and close ties with the US, which can be traced back to the end of World War II. Pacifism, to the majority of LDP members, was intimately tied to the idea of burden-sharing under the US security umbrella and to the UN in case of international crises. It is therefore inevitable that the LDP government would act in response to the US and UN demands. The left wing worshipped the essence of the Peace Constitution and Article 9, and were inclined to promote 'one-country pacifism' (*ikkoku-heiwashugi*). This, to their belief, did not require Japan to play an active part in any multilateral effort to maintain world peace and prosperity. Accordingly, the left-wing parties claimed that any move towards any involvement in UN-related force would mean that Japan would gradually resume its military functions, as implicitly expressed in the agenda of LDP since the end of the World War II. The failure of Japan's activism in the UN policy, therefore, was simply due to the inability of the LDP and other opposition parties to reconcile their ideational differences.

Nevertheless, the pattern of intra-party and inter-party discords somewhat disappeared in 1994 and a new political pattern, a coalition government between the former rivals (the LDP and SDPJ) and the emergence of a new party, the DPJ, replaced the previous one. The 'coalition government' generated two important impacts in Japanese politics. It basically altered the way political parties deal with each other, or the so-called 'ruling party effect'¹⁹¹ and it changed the view of the former opposition parties entirely on some important policy agendas, especially in foreign and security policy. The 1955 system, which consisted of one dominant political party versus the rest of the

¹⁹¹ The term largely refers to the changing stance of the SDPJ on the issue regarding Japan's participation in UNPKO and the rationality of Japan's assuming a more responsible role in the UNSC. The changing stance was mainly the result of the participation of the SDPJ in the first and second coalition governments in 1993 and 1994. Source: Yomiuri Shimbun, 30 September 1993

Japanese political parties, created the manner in which the dominant government pursued both domestic and foreign policies as it saw fit while the opposition parties devoted themselves to challenging and opposing everything proposed by the government. To a certain extent, the successful political realignment in August 1993 and especially in June 1994 between the LDP and SDPJ in fact provided an opportunity for the long-time opposition party to assume the role of policy decision-maker and expose itself to the problems, rather than only relying on the same old strategy as an opponent of the LDP. Together with the emergence of a new wave of politicians under the new opposition party – the DPJ – this meant that more constructive discussions on international security and UN matters started to materialise in Japanese politics in the latter half of the 1990s.

c) Media: Newspaper Writers and Polls

Another set of domestic factors that are undeniably important for the analysis of Japan's UN security policy are those representing the views of the Japanese public. The recent literature on Japan's policy-making has started to take into account the importance of non-governmental actors, especially those planting themselves in the societal sphere, including media and public opinion. In a way, the media might be treated as a mirror reflecting and transmitting what public opinion believes at a given time. Simultaneously, the media, especially the major newspapers and television, also play their parts by setting up their agenda and stimulating, evaluating and impinging on the policy framework of the government. As suggested by Pharr, the media also play different roles, ranging from a spectator, a watchdog or a servant to a trickster alongside the other governmental actors. In case of Japan, unlike other western democracies, the media – specifically newspapers – enjoy great credibility among the Japanese people.¹⁹²

¹⁹² Pharr and Krauss (1996: 5-8)

It is also interesting to see the close connection between newspapers and television, because the so-called ‘big five’ Japanese television networks – Nippon Television, TBS, Fuji Television, Asahi Television and TV Tokyo – are respectively owned by Yomiuri, Mainichi, Sankei, Asahi and Nikkei, the ‘big five’ national dailies.

As for public opinion, assessment of the polls made by several research institutions has made a significant contribution to a better understanding of the changes and continuities of the views and impacts of Japanese society towards the decision makers on foreign policy issues. It might be difficult to answer the question of whether there is a direct effect of public opinion on the decision-making process, unless one conducts a study evaluating how a certain government policy affects its electoral structure and outcomes. However, it cannot be denied that public opinion and polls have been effectively used by opposition parties to hinder the decisions of the executive branch. The first half of the 1990s, after the Gulf Crisis and the issue over the UNPKO bill, was perhaps the finest example of the impact of Japanese public opinion on the outcome of Japan’s foreign policy. During and immediate after the Gulf Crisis, public opinion played as important a role as any other domestic actor. Some academics even suggest that the main reason for the failure of the Kaifu government in securing the passage of the first PKO bill in 1990 was the negative responses from public opinion, which were repeatedly presented through the media.¹⁹³ Therefore, it is believed that the study of how the system of ideas and beliefs among the public regarding Japan’s UN security issues has been transformed over time, as will be discussed in the following 3 chapters, can also offer better insights into the reasons behinds policy preferences.

¹⁹³ Purrington (1992: 161-181)

3.5 Conclusion

In general, studies of Japan's security and its UN policy are normally located in separate arenas of academic interest. The majority of Japan's security study has also been anchored on the analysis of Japan-US bilateral relations and security arrangements. This is the case simply because during the post-WWII period, Japan's primary objective was to build up a peaceful nation based on the fundamental belief that the only way for Japan to ensure its national security was through Japan's and other countries' adherence to the pacifist sentiment of not resorting to war to settle conflicts. In a way, Japan's early understanding about a 'peace-loving nation' was somehow 'inward-looking', as it addressed only Japan's one-sided military self-restraint and put the rest of its faith in other members of the international community to maintain international peace, especially via the UN mechanism.

However, such idealistic sacrifice through the renunciation of war did not seem to be very realistic, given the Cold War situation of East-West ideological rivalry. In reality, throughout the post-war period, Japan had never succeeded in pursuing the ideal national or international security policy, relying on the UN, because of the obvious ineffectiveness of the organisation itself and Japan's concern mostly for national security, which was also limited to a narrowly defined geographical area. It is therefore not surprising that the original idealistic aspiration to link the issues of national and international security under the UN umbrella was neglected as soon as it originated. Instead, most of the issues revolving around Japan's national security were emphasised more strongly, and were practically tied to the Japan-US security alliance, as the axiom of Japan's post-war foreign and security policy.

Without an effective UN, Japan's national security has been solely anchored to Japan-US security arrangements, and this unique bilateral relationship is believed by the

majority of scholars to be the key mechanism that has dictated the overall direction of Japan's security policy at national, regional and international levels throughout recent decades. However, whether the Japan-US security arrangement has actually been the cornerstone upon which all of Japan's security dimensions were developed is still open to criticism. It is undoubtedly true that Japan-US security arrangements have not only protected Japan against external aggressions, but also have performed as strategic deterrent measures in the areas surrounding Japan and in the Asia-Pacific region, as clearly stipulated in the 1960 Japan-US Security Treaty and in other basic security and defence guidelines.

Nonetheless, issues of how to secure international security and the ways to pursue stabilised peace via these existing security arrangements have never been clearly outlined under Japan-US security arrangements. Therefore, it might be true to assume that the dichotomised ideas and understanding of Japan's security policy between the emphasis on national/regional security under the Japan-US security arrangements and the concern over issues of international security under UN-Centrism have played a pertinent role in steering Japan towards the imbalance of its post-war security policy: that is, the prioritising of national and immediate regional security with the US rather than highlighting its emphasis on international security. UN-Centrism, therefore, was left as only policy rhetoric and was diverted to deal with economic and social development issues rather than security concerns.

UN-Centrism in the post-Cold War era, on the contrary, has emerged as a new framework in which Japan could possibly develop its security policy based on its original desire to promote international peace and security. Prior to the Gulf crisis, the UN served only as an arena where Japan could identify itself as a strong ally of the western democratic countries and as a major contributor to development and financial

donor, none of which was even close to what Japan had hoped to achieve through the UN. On the contrary, after the Gulf war, Japan started to adjust its UN policy emphasis by exploring how the symmetry between its economic, political and security contributions could be correspondingly projected within the framework of the UN. The most pertinent feature of the new UN-Centrism emerging since the Gulf crisis was not Japan's increasing activism in the promotion of international peace and security via a doubling of its financial contribution alone, but the ability of the country to improvise the approach to which security and development could be fully integrated.

The emergence of the 'human security' approach also originated from the transformed understanding about national and international peace among the Japanese people and the government, in which the two spheres of security are no longer clearly dichotomised, but are closely intertwined. The increasing emphasis on international security in the post-Cold War period, however, does not signify Japan's autonomous stance or a parting of ways with the existing security arrangements with the US. It merely suggests that the emphasis has become more equalised, rather than being weighted in favour of the Japan-US alliance over UN-Centrism. Accordingly, the development of Japan's security policy under the UN framework therefore deserves a careful examination. In the following three chapters, which focus on the Gulf Crisis, the Cambodian peace process and the promotion of human security, the development of Japan's UN security policy will be observed simultaneously with the examination of the process of identity transformation, which is believed to be the key factor responsible for security development within the UN framework. In other words, each case will reveal each phase of the overall process of Japan's identity transformation in the post-Cold war period, which directly contributed to Japan's activism in the UN security policy.

Chapter 4 The Gulf Crisis and Peacekeeping Operations (1990-1992)

4.1 Background to the Gulf Crisis, 1990-1992

To give some background on the Gulf Crisis, in August 1990, governments and media around the world were startled by the unlawful invasion of Kuwait by the Iraqi government. It was the first military invasion in the post-war era, after the German annexation of Poland in 1939, and it confirmed that the possibility of physical threats to states' sovereignty still exists even after the Cold War. The reaction from the international community to Iraq's illicit advance was overwhelmingly disapproving. The majority of nations agreed with the UN measures to retaliate against the Iraqi government for its violation of international law and its disruption of world peace. The UNSC adopted its resolution 660 (1990), condemning the military invasion, demanding that Iraq immediately and unconditionally withdraw its forces from Kuwait and calling upon both countries to begin intensive negotiations. Subsequently, a dozen UN resolutions regarding necessary measures were adopted consecutively, including arms embargos, diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions.¹⁹⁴

Although the UN and the international community attempted to manage the crisis in a peaceful fashion, the rapid launch of military forces to expel the Iraqi troops from Kuwait was inevitable. Resolution 678 (1990) was adopted on 29 November 1990, issuing an ultimatum on Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait by 15 January 1991, but was again deliberately ignored by the Iraqi government.¹⁹⁵ Without any positive response from Iraq, the UN member states settled on the use of force to repel Iraq and liberate Kuwait. Kuwait's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and legitimate

¹⁹⁴ United Nations, United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNICOM), <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unikom/background.html>, accessed 11/01/2005. UNSC resolutions adopted during these past months were resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990), 665 (1990), 666 (1990), 667 (1990), 669 (1990), 670 (1990), 674 (1990), 677 (1990) and 678 (1990), respectively.

¹⁹⁵ United Nations, UNSC Resolution 678, 29 November 1990

government were successfully restored in April 1991 when all the Iraqi armed forces vacated the country's territory. With haste, the UNSC adopted resolution 687 (1991) to outline the detailed conditions for a formal ceasefire and to expedite the establishment of a machinery to ensure the smooth operations of the parties involved.¹⁹⁶

The Gulf Crisis demonstrates not only an attempt by the international community to address the post-Cold War international peace and security issue, which had usually been tackled unilaterally by major powers during the Cold War period, but also a great impact on several countries' foreign policy directions. In this chapter, the Gulf Crisis will be treated as the start of the process of identity transformation in the post-Cold War Japan. The set of ideas and beliefs regarding the nature of international threats, UN peace operations and Japan-US bilateral relations embedded in the international community and within Japan will be examined in parallel. The 'international-role' identities and the 'domestic-type' identities usually informed by these sets of ideas will then be outlined and compared. Through the observation of the degree of conformity between the two sets of identities, policy failure or success during this period will be explained.

4.2 International Response: Collective Ideas on Peace and Security during the Gulf Crisis

4.2.1 Collective Ideas on the Nature of International Peace and Security

The Gulf Crisis is considered a vital turning point, which has contributed to the transformation of international politics in many respects. To some scholars, physical threats in the post-Cold War world were substantially diminished and the end of the Cold War has led to the 'end of history' or the end of the East-West ideological rivalry.

¹⁹⁶ United Nations, UNSC Resolution 687, 3 April 1991

Fukuyama, for example, argued that the triumph of liberal democracy over the communist regime would end the long-term political and ideological battles, which had served as the fundamental reason for most conflicts in the Cold War period.¹⁹⁷ It might be true to assert that most of what had characterised the threats and conflicts in the Cold War period might have ceased to exist. The confined 'proxy' wars, which affected only those in the warring zones, and the source of threats that were more or less from the identifiable major powers, no longer held places in the equation of post-Cold War international politics. However, the dissimilarity between the Cold War and the post-Cold War conflicts was the difference in the 'source of threats' and 'scale of impacts' resulting from those conflicts.

Contrary to Fukuyama's belief in lasting peace, the Gulf Crisis demonstrated that the traditional threat to national security and integrity, in the most primitive form of territorial invasion, did not totally disappear, although it was significantly diminished. It also drew the attention of the international community to the source of threats in the post-Cold War era, which was also substantially 'vertical', in that state or national governments themselves are actually the cause of physical threats to their own people, as evident in the threat posed by the Iraqi government to the Kurdish minority following the Gulf Crisis or the ethnic cleansing of Bosnians and Croats in Bosnia Herzegovina by the Serbian government in the early 1990s. Since 1992, of all 41 peace operations, intra-state conflict accounted for 92 percent of the overall missions.¹⁹⁸ These predominant trends of 'intra-state' conflicts emerging from the disappearance of

¹⁹⁷ Fukuyama (1992: xi)

¹⁹⁸ Of 41 operations established since 1992, only three conflicts between Iraq-Kuwait (UNICOM), Croatia-Serbia-Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNPROFOR) and Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR), were considered inter-state conflicts. Source: United Nations, Timeline of the United Nations Peacekeeping 1948-2005, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/timeline/pages/ninetya.html> and <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/timeline/pages/twoo.html>, accessed 05/09/2004.

ideological rivalry required the international community to locate another means of managing post-Cold War conflicts and peace operations.¹⁹⁹

Another characteristic that contributed to the format of post-Cold War threats was the 'horizontal' scale of impact of the conflicts. In the post-Cold War world, those affected by physical threats are not limited only to people residing in the conflict zones. Nowadays, the impact of massive population displacement and refugees, as well as environmental degradation such as oil pollution in neighbouring countries, has significantly increased and become multifaceted. Hence, when the nature of threats and the format of conflicts were somewhat different from the Cold War inter-state conflicts and 'proxy wars,' the ideas that the international community embraced regarding the handling of security situations and maintaining international peace differed accordingly from the earlier period. One such idea was that the management of security and the maintenance of international peace should be based on the idea of joint or multilateral efforts, including the use of multilateral armed force. Unlike the American or the Soviet showcases in Vietnam and Afghanistan in the 1970s-1980s, in which both major powers took on unilateral military assertiveness to secure and maintain their self-defined peace, the Gulf Crisis gave rise to the first 'legitimate and effective' multilateral force that was multilaterally summoned in lieu of unilateral military intervention. Although such multilateral force was criticised to some extent as a US-led military force, it was undeniable that the force was endorsed both legally and in spirit by the consensus of the international community and the UN resolutions.

Another relatively important idea was that the international community finally viewed the UN as a capable messenger for peace. The reason behind this idea was that for the first time, the UN mechanism was effectively utilised both in terms of conflict

¹⁹⁹ Caballero-Anthony (2005: 1-2)

avoidance (diplomatic efforts) and conflict management (military functions). In a sense, this also indicated the transformation of the UN itself, from its former stance, which had been based largely on preventive diplomatic functions and on a clear distinction between conflict management and conflict avoidance, to the integration of both. To clarify, the diversification between the UNSC, where the conflict management approach was the key focus, and other UN organs, where the conflict avoidance approach was adopted, was believed to be responsible for the ineffectiveness of the UN during the first 50 years of its operations.²⁰⁰ The incorporation of the two approaches to how to deal with conflicts in the post-Cold War period certainly contributed to the changing ideas on the way in which peace operations should be effectively handled, as discussed in the following section.

4.2.2 Collective Ideas on UN Peace Operations

Compared to the Cold War period, when the UN peace operations were inactive for such reasons as the inhibited East-West rivalries within the UNSC during the late 1960s-1970s and the limited cooperative efforts from major powers, especially from the US in the 1980s or the administrative inertia within the UN itself, the post-Cold War period has been considered as the 'Expansion Period' of the UN peace activities, as more than 40 operations have been conducted since the end of the Gulf Crisis.²⁰¹ As well as quantifying the UN peace operations, the Gulf Crisis also acted as the main qualitative catalyst that transformed the consensus ideas and beliefs of the international community regarding peace operations and conflict management. As mentioned earlier, peace operations in the Gulf Crisis were distinctive because it was the first time since the 1950 Korean War that the UN had been successful in incorporating the idea of conflict

²⁰⁰ Fetherston (1994: 8)

²⁰¹ Ibid (1994: 25)

management into its peace operation activities. Taking the organisation's past endeavours into account, the UN had continuously adopted the ideas of 'conflict avoidance,' which includes the methods of 'preventive diplomacy or peacemaking,' 'peacekeeping' and 'post-conflict peacebuilding,' as the organisation's central, albeit passive, approaches to ensure lasting peace and security. The transformation of collective ideas about 'more assertive' peace operations emerging during and following the Gulf War period was believed to have major implications for the post-Cold War UN peace operations in a number of ways.

Firstly, 'preventive diplomacy and peacemaking' had been the core idea in UN conflict prevention and a primary political mechanism since its establishment. The ultimate aim of this mechanism was to prevent any potential tensions or disputes from escalating into full-scale armed conflicts. The early preventive measures included, for example, good offices and mediations undertaken by UN Special Envoys or representatives of the UN Secretary General prior to the eruption of possible disputes. Later prevention, on the contrary, focused on preventing existing disputes from intensifying into armed conflicts. The measures employed included fact-finding missions, early warning, recommendation of a specific dispute settlement procedure and attempts to make peace via diplomatic conciliations and negotiations with the conflicting parties.²⁰² Since the Gulf experience, the idea that other measures complementing preventive diplomacy should be included alongside the existing diplomatic efforts has been circulating among the international community. The current ideational departure of preventive measures consists of 'preventive deployment' and 'preventive disarmament,'

²⁰² Evans (1998: 63-64 and 79)

which suggests the transformation from ‘preventive diplomatic measures’ to ‘preventive military actions.’²⁰³

The ideas and beliefs that have evolved around the concepts and implementations of peacekeeping operations have also been greatly transformed. Traditional peacekeeping operations were conducted with the objective of containing the conflicts to the least precarious magnitude and tackling the root causes peacefully. The main activities of these operations, conducted by light-armed or unarmed military officers and civilian personnel from member countries, initially covered only such activities as monitoring, observing and assisting the peace process, which often includes power-transition arrangements, electoral support, law and order strengthening and economic and social development.²⁰⁴

Despite this, the development of ideas surrounding UN peacekeeping, as was the case during the Gulf Crisis, saw an increasing emphasis on ‘peace enforcement’ in addition to the existing un-armed peacekeeping operations. The thin line that had previously been drawn between peacekeepers and the multilateral forces has also become increasingly blurred, due to the changing nature of peace operations. As mentioned previously, the lesson from the Gulf Crisis precipitated a shift of ideas on how peace operations should be effectively managed. Due to the increasing complexity of contemporary conflicts, whose impacts are widely horizontal and experienced by a large number of populations across borders, the emphasis on the past ‘conflict-avoidance’ peacekeeping function would mean a doubling of war casualties. It is

²⁰³ The Report of the Secretary General (1995) highlights the fielding of peacekeepers to forestall and deter the escalation of probable conflicts as well as to provide ‘a thin blue line’ to help contain conflicts through confidence and trust building among conflicting parties, as seen in the missions in the Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia (UNPREDEP) and in the Central African Republic (MINURCA). The latter, however, focuses on reducing the number of small arms in conflict-prone areas, such as those in El Salvador (ONUSAL) or Mozambique (ONUMOZ).

²⁰⁴ United Nations, Meeting New Challenges, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/faq/q1.htm>, accessed 09/09/2004.

therefore inevitable that the international community must embrace the idea that effective peace activities may need a suitable synthesis between un-armed diplomatic efforts and the use of force to secure peace.

The idea regarding 'post-conflict peacebuilding' was perhaps the only one that did not experience an abrupt transformation as a result of the Gulf Crisis in the early 1990s. Peacebuilding was usually referred to as all external efforts accumulated by member countries to assist and ensure the former conflicting parties in smooth transitions from war to peace.²⁰⁵ Supposedly, effective peace-building operations were those that included myriads of integrated actions from all military, diplomatic, political, economic, social and humanitarian fronts, in order to guarantee a strong and lasting structural peace.²⁰⁶ The peacebuilding in the first half of the 1990s following the Gulf crisis shared similar characteristics with the traditional post-war peacebuilding: that is, it emphasised the developmental aspect of peacebuilding activities. The ideas regarding peacebuilding measures were reflected through the focus on such activities as agricultural, educational or cultural and infrastructure projects. Views regarding the extent to which negative effects resulted from the conflicts, especially ideas regarding human security and how to respond to it in post-conflict peacebuilding, were not specifically embraced during the early post-Cold War period. It was not until the latter half of the 1990s and the promotion of human security policy that the ideas underlying peacebuilding operations were transformed.

²⁰⁵ United Nations, Peacemaking and Peace-building, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/prev_dip/fr_peacemaking.htm, accessed 9/9/2004

²⁰⁶ More details in the Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the United Nations (1995). As suggested by the previous UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, peacebuilding can be divided into two stages. The first stage of peacebuilding can commence upon the end of conflicts or the start of peaceful settlement, in which the political, economic and social as well as the root causes of conflicts are thoroughly negotiated and settled. The main actors undertaking the task are essentially the on-site peacekeepers. The second stage of peacebuilding involves more resources and actors, and covers a wide variety of activities that lead to the creation of institutionalised peace.

4.2.3 Ideas and Beliefs of the US on the Gulf Crisis

As Japan's foreign policy in general and its UN security policy in particular have been predominantly influenced by the Japan-US relationship, an examination of the US ideas and beliefs behind political and diplomatic measures as well as UN peace operations during the Gulf Crisis is thus vital to the analysis of Japan's choice of its projected 'international-role' identity during the crisis. The US, like most members of the international community, reacted to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait with utmost contempt. The Bush administration, joined by the majority of the UN members, had launched successive diplomatic and political measures and economic sanctions aimed at persuading Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. A series of high-profile diplomatic offers and attempts to create political incentives that were acceptable to Saddam Hussein, conducted by both US Secretary of State, James Baker and the then-USSR president, Mikhail Gorbachev, were pursued without satisfactory results.²⁰⁷ The war against Iraq resulted from the failure of other peaceful efforts, and was said to be largely based on the ideas that the Iraqi invasion was a threat to US access to the Persian Gulf oil and areas that are vital to US national security. According to the National Security Directive 45 regarding the US policy in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the commitment to secure stability in the area also included the will to defend its interests by using military force if necessary, apart from freeing the Kuwaitis and restoring Kuwait's legitimate government.²⁰⁸

Nevertheless, the ideas surrounding the issues of US military retaliation against Iraq held by the US government as well as other UN members were not based solely on the need to secure access to oil in the Gulf. Based on an idea that has taken root in the

²⁰⁷ Warner (1990: 34-35)

²⁰⁸ National Security Directives 45, 20 August 1990.

American society since the late 19th century, the American-embraced ‘manifest destiny’ has evolved through time and added up to the justification of ‘just war.’ As pointed out, for example, by McGrath, the Spanish-American War of 1898 during Theodore Roosevelt’s administration laid out rules about US military engagements, stating that a mere national interest alone would never justify conquest and that foreign policy would have to be ‘moral’ and ‘virtuous.’²⁰⁹ Since then, American military engagements around the world have partly served the country’s own national interests and partly advanced its moral ideas through foreign military conduct, as evident in the promotion of democracy and liberty as part of its ‘liberal grand strategy’ in Vietnam and throughout Central America and the Caribbean.²¹⁰ The war against Iraq was no different: the commitment to establish the ‘new world order’ was repeatedly pronounced both by George Bush himself and by other high-ranking civilian and military officials, and labelled as the US moral ideal to help free Kuwait, to protect innocent lives and to restore a legitimate political regime. As straightforwardly put by George Bush:

‘[...] With unity and determination, and yes, patience, I am confident that these objectives are within reach. When we succeed, we will have returned a country to its people. We will have shown that aggression will not be tolerated. We will have invigorated a United Nations that contributes as its founders dreamed. We will have established principles for acceptable international conduct and the means to enforce them. In short, we will have taken a major step towards a community of nations bound by a common commitment to peace and restraint [...].’²¹¹

²⁰⁹ McGrath (1990: 38)

²¹⁰ Ikenberry (2000: 103-106)

²¹¹ Bush (1990: 29)

However, unlike previous military efforts conducted unilaterally under the name of ‘freedom’, ‘liberty’ or ‘democracy’, the US government itself has added to its foreign policy and foreign military manoeuvres another important characteristic by embracing the idea of utilising the UN as a settlement mechanism and the use of collective multilateral force endorsed by the majority of nations. The American leadership portrayed during the Gulf War, although it remained positive and constructive, did insinuate the changing pattern of foreign conduct that would engage the international community and its commitment towards the establishment of peace and security. The way in which these above sets of ideas and beliefs were shared during the Gulf Crisis and translated into ‘international-role’ identities, collectively embedded by the international community, will be discussed in the following section.

4.3 International-Role Identity Projection and the Expectations on Japan

4.3.1 On International Peace and Security:

‘Multilateral Pacifist’

Given the abrupt end of the Cold War, the international community found itself facing both the traditional threat of a state waging war against others for primal political and economic reasons and the increasing intra-state conflicts previously masked by the major powers’ ideological adversaries. The Gulf Crisis perhaps would not have gained so much attention if it had not provided the international community with the opportunity to reconsider how international peace and security should be maintained. Aside from the fact that the Gulf Crisis was the first international conflict in which clear Cold War ideological divergence or vested interests among the major countries was not the principal motive, it was the first crisis in which the whole international community was a stakeholder, facing the disorder of the international system and the breach of

international law. Such ideas led the international community to assume the identity of a ‘multilateral pacificist,’ whose main task was to restore and maintain international peace and security through multilateral rather than unilateral efforts and even through the UN mechanism rather than a single country’s political or military manoeuvres.

By assuming this identity as a multilateral pacificist, the international community collectively recognised the importance of strengthening the efficiency of the UN, which would surely involve much more vigorous and persistent efforts than those contributed to the UN in the past. In the Cold War period, the UNSC adopted only 15 resolutions, whereas this figure trebled to 53 resolutions in 1992. The number of countries contributing military and police personnel also significantly increased, from 26 in 1988 to 56 countries in 1992. Above all, the annual budget on UNPKOs was 6 times higher in 1992, comparing to the amount donated by the member countries in 1988, rising from US\$ 230.40 to 1,689.6 million dollars.²¹² These statistics not only show that the international community was extremely keen on utilising the UN as the main mechanism to restore and maintain peace and security, but also reflect a better understanding among the international community that peace could not be achieved through the sole effort of any individual country.

Another important development on the ideational position of the ‘multilateral pacificist’ embraced by the international community was the systematic layout of how to achieve peace both in the short and the long term. While ‘An Agenda for Peace’, submitted in 1992, fundamentally dealt with the Cold War peace operation problems encountered by the UNSC, the new process initiated in the 1994 publication, ‘An Agenda for Development,’ prompted the international community on the importance of

²¹² UN (1995) on the Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the UN.

‘comprehensive procedures’ that incorporate economic and social development into the maintenance of peace and security, as will be further discussed in section 4.3.2 and in Chapter 5, respectively. There was a clear intention on the part of the international community to collectively fulfil the identity of the ‘multilateral pacificist’, as evident through both the quantitative and the qualitative volume of activities. It was rather apparent in the early 1990s that neither the remaining inter-state conflicts nor the increasing intra-state conflicts could be properly solved through any one nation’s effort. Instead, the shared ideas and collective efforts through the UN were to be further developed and pursued in order to establish long and lasting peace.

4.3.2 On UN Peace Operations:

‘Peace Enforcer’

In the Cold War period, apart from the fact that UN peace operations were very limited in quantity and less accomplished in quality, the only area of UN operations that was constantly emphasised by the UN and the international community was ‘preventive diplomacy.’ Statistically speaking, the UN might receive insignificant amount of support and was considered inefficient in other areas of peace operations, specifically in peacekeeping. However, in the area of preventive diplomacy, there was no substantial difference in the numbers of disputes and conflicts in which the UN was actively involved. While there were 11 missions involving preventive diplomacy in the Cold War era, there were also 13 missions in the early post-Cold War period. The main reason for the UN’s focus on preventive diplomacy over other costly peace operation activities during the Cold War might have been the lack of faith and beliefs among the international community that the UN could perform as the primary international security

mechanism: hence their small contributions in terms of personnel, finance and ideas. As pointed out by one UNDP official:

‘[...] In the Cold War period, the UN could be a possible means in maintaining peace and security, in theory. But elsewhere in the world, nobody thought it was real. The UN at that time was still representing East-West conflicts. Nothing moved when the former Soviet Union and the US confrontation happened. That was the reality.’²¹³

Nevertheless, such ideas and beliefs started to be transformed after the success of the multinational force in restoring international peace and order in the Gulf Crisis. The embracing of the UN’s identity as the ‘peace enforcer’ was essentially a direct result of the Gulf experience and the transformation of ideas regarding the handling of peace and security by remedying the weakness of the Cold War peace operations. As mentioned earlier, it was agreed that the necessity of creating a more effective UN mechanism to deal with the post-Cold War international security, which was increasingly complicated, was a prerequisite to the post-Cold War maintenance of peace and security, especially the patterns and contradictions of deepening economic cooperation, increasing political nationalism and the emerging intra-state and root cause conflicts.²¹⁴ The ‘Agenda for Peace’ submitted by the former UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali in 1992, responded to the ideas suggested by the international community on how to handle post-Cold War international peace and security by emphasising the lack of enforcing units to respond to any form of aggression and the meaningless agreements on ceasefires violated by conflicting parties during the Cold

²¹³ Interview with a former MOFA official and a current high-ranking UNDP official, 07/03/2006

²¹⁴ UN (1992: 2) on An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping.

War period. The failure of the UN in the Cold War period, compared to its success in the Gulf Crisis, triggered the international community to reconsider the future activities of enforcing actions, which was believed to be the 'key' to the success of the UN peace operations during the Gulf Crisis.

According to the Agenda for Peace, the international community was clearly convinced that the three stages of peace operations were to be integrally related. 'Preventive diplomacy', for example, was action aimed at preventing disputes from arising between parties or preventing existing disputes from escalating into full-scale conflicts through confidence building, fact finding, early warning, preventive deployment and the creation of demilitarised zones. 'Peacemaking' was basically action to bring hostile parties to agreement through such means as the world court, sanctions, and most important of all, enforcement actions. Peacekeeping was the deployment of a UN presence in the conflicting areas, which normally involved military, police and civilian activities.

However, among the three stages of peace operations, the experience from the Gulf Crisis particularly stressed the importance of the use of force to respond to both imminent and actual aggression as well as to force the conflicting parties to comply with cease-fires agreements. 'Peacekeeping' was thus another area that the international community emphasised strengthening. The new departures of peacekeeping operations, which could provide flexibility in security demands, were discussed at length, especially the readiness of the international community to contribute military, police and civilian personnel.²¹⁵ In addition, the fourth stage of UN peace operations or the 'post-conflict peacebuilding' was also mentioned, but rather as follow-up projects that enhanced economic and social development to achieve a durable foundation. However, it is

²¹⁵ Ibid. (1992: 4-13)

important to note that during the early 1990s, each of the UN operations was mutually strengthened to respond to each individual step of peace restoration and maintenance. Although it was clearly stated by the former Secretary General that all of the UN peace operations must in theory be comprehensive and integrated, it was not until later in the decade that clear links between operations materialised, as will be further discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.

4.3.3 On Japan-US Relations:

'US Partner'

During the Cold War period, the wars against communism were waged mostly 'unilaterally' by the US government, and were numerous throughout several parts of the world, from the Vietnam War in Asia to several wars in Latin American countries, not to mention those 'proxy wars' supported behind the scenes by both the US and the former Soviet Union's governments. These ideological differences and military conflicts were the main political events characterising international politics during the Cold War period. The US's ideas on the rationale of unilateral attempts in military operations during the Cold War period were also transformed in some ways during the Gulf Crisis. As mentioned above, the most important ideational transformation among the international community, the US included, was that multilateral efforts, especially through the UN mechanism, became preferable to other methods in securing peace and security. To the US, the invasion of Kuwait and the start of the Gulf Crisis did not occur in ways with which the US had been familiar throughout the Cold War period. The nature of the war, which was a security threat waged by one against another, was not ideological but interest-based. The war was the first time in 40 years after the WWII when there was unprecedented territorial invasion and the shameless declaration of a 'comprehensive

and eternal merger'²¹⁶ of one country against the will of another. The US surely learned from the experience in Vietnam that such a large-scale war in the Gulf would certainly require not only military but also political support and reserves from the international community. As reiterated by Colin Powell:

‘[...] we can't go to war without them, a war of this size. One of the things that was done back in the mid-seventies, after Vietnam, was that the structure of the armed forces may have had more than the military motivation but a political motivation and made sure that the whole nations would get involved [...]’²¹⁷

or as further commented by James Baker, the then Secretary of State, on the US emphasis on depending on the UN mechanism and on cultivating ‘partners’ to win the Iraq war:

‘[...] I felt good about the fact that we were able to bring the international community on board for what was right. We had really been able to cobble together a rather unprecedented international coalition. I had the feeling that the United Nations was working that day in the way in which the founders had intended.

[...] It was after all the President's decision to go multi-laterally. That was not an easy decision. There were voices suggesting that we should do this under article 51. We knew we could do it under article 51. We had no problem with that. We knew legally we had the authority to do it under article 51. But we also recognised the importance of doing this in a way that it was not seen to be

²¹⁶ UN, UNSC Resolution 662, 9 August 1990

²¹⁷ Frontline, An interview with Colin Powell,

<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/powell/3.html>, accessed 15/03/2004.

America and the West against the Arab world and that it was not seen to be a cowboy operation. So the President [Bush] thought it was an important vote as far as he was concerned because it proved the wisdom of this approach. It proved that the United States was leading the international community and doing something that was right and that was unprecedented.’²¹⁸

The most vital ideational transformation was not only that the US needed the international community, let alone Japan, as its ‘partner’ in the Gulf War: the US also made it clear for the first time in post-WWII history that ‘multilateral pacificism’ – the ideas that echoed collaborative efforts of the international community to restore peace and maintain international security – was important. This sentiment was shown through the US attempt to pursue military actions through the UN mechanism, which has set standards for the maintenance of international peace and security in the post-Cold War period. The vote of the UNSC members in the UN Resolution 678 for the use of ‘all necessary means,’ including the use of force through multi-military means, was considered one of the key historical votes in the history of the UN and underscored how the maintenance of peace and security in the post-Cold War could proceed.²¹⁹ The transformation of ideas and beliefs, which constituted a new set of ‘international-role’ identities among the international community, did not occur only at the international level. At the domestic level, Japan experienced the same process of ideational and identity transformation as a result of the Gulf Crisis, as discussed below.

²¹⁸ Frontline, An interview with James Baker, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/baker/1.html>, accessed 15/03/2004.

²¹⁹ UN, UNSC Resolution 678, 29 November 1990

4.4 Domestic-Type Identity Formation: Japan's Political Identity during the Gulf Crisis

Japan's response to the Gulf Crisis was one of many classic cases that have been thoroughly examined by several scholars throughout these past years. It was widely agreed among the international community to be '*too little, too late*' and too forced to be credited. During the Gulf Crisis, Japan showed its reluctance and hesitation from the start by allotting an embarrassing package of US\$ 13 billion, some of which was 'in-kind', under pressure from the US and the international community.²²⁰ As pointed out by a Japanese scholar, none of the billion-dollar contributions announced on several occasions had been arrived at as an independent move based on the ideals and philosophy of the Japanese government. They were offered grudgingly as an appeasement to the US demands.²²¹ Internationally, Japan's crisis response was not only lacking in terms of physical input, but also in terms of such intangible efforts as ideational input. It was even worse in the domestic arena, when the Kaifu government's efforts to push through the 1990 Peacekeeping Bill were fruitless, leading to the abortion of the bill and criticism from the international community.²²²

Previous studies of the Gulf Crisis are certainly varied, depending upon individual scholarly interest, ranging from domestic political determinants and the changing international system to Japan-US bilateral relations. The most common approach adopted by scholars to explain Japan's Gulf response is probably the one focusing on domestic political factors or the interactions among the so-called 'ruling

²²⁰ Economist (1991a: 29-39)

²²¹ Ito (1991: 275)

²²² The 1992 UN Peace Cooperation Law (*Kokuren Heiwa Kyōryōku-Hō* – UNPKO Law), although eventually enacted, was also slated as 'untimely' – approximately 1 year after the conclusion of the Gulf War.

triad.’²²³ Some scholars, however, set their objectives to overcome the narrow viewpoint of the existing interpretation circulating in domestic politics and adopt the perspective of ‘ideational factors’, namely culture and norms, to explicate the possible reasons behind Japan’s response to the Gulf Crisis.²²⁴ This research takes on the same stance as the latter group but turns its focus to another set of ideational factors – ideas and beliefs that operate and inform Japan’s ‘domestic-type’ and ‘international-role’ identities. In the following section, the ideas and beliefs that informed Japan’s identities during the crisis will be discussed to explain why Japan’s response to the Gulf Crisis was ‘too little and too late.’ In the following section, Japan’s ideational responses and the adoption of ‘domestic-type’ identities during the Gulf Crisis will be thoroughly examined.

4.4.1 Ideas Surrounding International Peace and Security:

‘Unilateral Pacifist’

As pointed out by Hunsberger and Tamamoto, Japan has had the habit of looking to outsiders when shaping its national goals – from looking to China during the Meiji restoration in 1868 to the western civilisation in the post-WWII era.²²⁵ However, as regards peace and security issues, Japan’s ‘domestic-type’ identity as the ‘unilateral pacifist’ seemed to have been influenced by its own cultural attributes and historical experiences. The ideas behind the formation and the adoption of the ‘unilateral pacifist’ identity were firmly based on the historical experience of war calamity and defeat during WWII and on the spirit behind the 1946 Peace constitution. Throughout the post-war period, Japan had developed its own unique political identity, which focused on the idea that Japan was a devoted ‘peace-loving’ country. By placing all its security concerns

²²³ See C. Purrington (1992) and A. George (1993), for example.

²²⁴ See T. Berger (1996) and H. Dobson (2003), for example.

²²⁵ Hunsberger (1997: xxxi) and Tamamoto (1997: 3-4)

under the framework of the Japan-US alliance, Japan could effortlessly relinquish physical military capability and cling to the ideas of ‘love for freedom and devotion to peace’ (*Jiyu wo ai shi, heiwa ni tessuru*), as expressed in the 25th Meeting of the UN General Assembly by the government of Prime Minister Eisaku Sato.²²⁶ It was thus a consensus among political, economic and social segments in Japanese society that, given the Cold War environment and domestic sentiments, it was most appropriate for Japan to assume the identity of the ‘one-country pacifist’ (*ikkoku-heiwa shugisha*) or ‘unilateral pacifist’.

Fundamentally, the core ideas of this ‘domestic-type’ identity were that Japan’s survival, as well as sustainable international peace, could be attained only if Japan strictly adhered to the ‘no-war’ clause of the peace constitution and only if it did not get involved in any sort of military arrangement, even in the form of collective security under the auspices of the UN.²²⁷ In other words, there was a conviction that Japan could contribute to the maintenance of international peace by not becoming a military power, limiting its potential to invade others and pursuing a policy that discouraged military build-ups in other countries.

To some extent, the post-war ‘domestic-type’ identity as the ‘unilateral pacifist’ was essentially ‘passive’, as it addressed only Japan’s one-sided military self-restraint. Not only did it fail to suggest how to help promote peace in general: the formation of the ‘unilateral pacifist’ identity in Japan also theoretically and practically clashed with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which requires UN members to adhere to the concept of collective security in order to ‘maintain’, ‘restore’ and ‘enforce’ peace. As convincingly noted by a commentator from the Economist, Japan during the Gulf Crisis was the one

²²⁶ LDP, Period of President Sato’s Leadership, <http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/english/history/chapter5.html>, accessed 22/11/2004.

²²⁷ Hellmann (1988: 41-44)

country that did not really come to grips with what was happening in the world, what it was to do about it, or how its behaviour would fit with other people's.²²⁸ The essence of being the 'unilateral pacifist' country, for Japan during the Gulf War, certainly did not include the idea or the urge to do something for others, except to curb itself so as not to harm others. Ito has summed up the ideas of this passive peace endeavour very clearly:

'[...] the post-war unitary pacifist identity suggested not only Japan's intention 'not to experience the horror of war again', but also the thoughts to others that Japan wanted to 'banish such horror from every corner of the world'. However, this type of pacifist identity was 'unitary' because its altruistic side is totally divorced from any idea or belief of willingly sacrificing oneself for others.'²²⁹

However, the adoption of the 'domestic-type' identity as the 'unilateral pacifist' seemed to lose its validity during the post-Cold war period. Although in the first few years during and after the Gulf crisis, Japan had tried to project its 'international-role' identity in a manner that was collectively adopted by the international community through the despatch of the SDF to overseas operations, it was still considered 'untimely and inadequate' internationally and 'unjustifiable' domestically, as it completely clashed with its 'domestic-type' identity as the 'unilateral pacifist.' In fact, the earlier ideational adjustments and the tangible legal and political implementations emerged in a variety of ways. The Kaifu government took initiatives and worked out a specific plan in October 1990 to create a legal framework to send its SDF to participate in the UNPKO efforts. The draft legislation instantly became the focus of intense debates both inside and

²²⁸ Economist (1991b: 31-32)

²²⁹ Ito (1991: 288)

outside the Diet – among politicians, bureaucrats and the public alike. However, not only did the first attempt to pass the bill fail completely, it even rekindled the old debate regarding the constitutionality of the existence of the SDF itself and the violation of the famous Article 9. Nevertheless, the Kaifu government, again in September 1991, made another attempt to introduce a new draft legislation of the UNPKO Law that would permit the despatch of the SDF overseas. The UNPKO Law was eventually enacted in June 1992 under the Miyazawa administration, a year after the Gulf crisis. Although the SDF activities were largely limited by the above ‘freezes’, it enabled Japan, for the first time in the post-war period, to engage more fully in ‘manpower contribution’, and not only contribution in cash or in kind, to which it had committed for decades.²³⁰

Moreover, based on the 1992 UNPKO Law, the International Peacekeeping Headquarters (*Kokusai Heiwa Honbu* – IPH) was established within the Cabinet Office to administer and implement international peace cooperation plans and activities. The enactment of the UNPKO Law and the establishment of the new agency responsible for the administration and implementation of international peace cooperation was a further step for Japan and the SDF towards participation in the UNPKOs – this time with legal and systematic support. On the one hand, the enactment was regarded as an event of symbolic importance, since it would be the SDF’s first overseas mission since its establishment in 1954. However, in these early years after the enactment of the UNPKO Law, the types of activities that the SDF was permitted to participate in were strictly confined by the narrow interpretation of Article 9.²³¹ The seemingly unsuccessful,

²³⁰ The new draft legislation was carefully crafted to ease the constitutional and ideational tension among politicians and the public by tackling the most controversial issues, such as the use of force among SDF, the despatch of the SDF overseas under ‘civilian control,’ the inclusion of such activities as cease-fire agreement, medical care, police supervision and election monitoring as well as the right of the Japanese government to withdraw the SDF as it saw appropriate.

²³¹ Japan’s UNPKO contributions consisted of the despatch of personnel and SDF to un-armed units, the international humanitarian relief operations and the election monitoring.

reluctant and faltering UN policy during the Gulf Crisis could thus be attributed to the clash between Japan's projection of the 'international-role' identity induced by the collective ideas circulating the international community and the 'domestic-type' identity ingrained in the Japanese political and societal level. In short, whereas Japan's international role identity was supposed to be a 'full-fledged pacifist' as collectively expected by the international community, Japan's 'domestic-type' identity or its actual 'political self' still clung to the notion of 'unilateral pacifist.'

4.4.2 Ideas Surrounding UN Peace Operations:

'Traditional Peacebuilder/Developer'

Having been one of the most successful economies in the post-war period, economic development had occupied most of Japan's foreign relations. Prior to the Gulf Crisis, although Japan's unusual identities as the 'economic giant' and 'military dwarf' were fairly at odds with each other in the eyes of outsiders, they were precisely what the nation's post-war political founders had in mind. Not only had Japan taken advantage of the harmonious economic environment provided by the US and the liberal economic system, but it had also positively integrated its financial machinery into its own peace maintenance and strategy.

As well as the adoption of the 'unilateral pacifist' identity, Japan also viewed itself as a 'traditional peacebuilder/developer' that could employ its financial surpluses as an effective foreign policy tool both within and beyond the UN parameters. Although the promotion of close relations with free and democratic countries had been mentioned by Japan's senior officials since the early 1960s after the announcement of Prime Minister Sato's three main policy principles, exactly how Japan would cooperate with those countries was not set out in concrete terms. The principle did not fully materialise

until Japan reached its peak in transforming its identity into that of a ‘traditional peace-builder/developer,’ who provided financial aids not for charity but with a notable purpose and rationale in the late 1970s.²³²

Having identified itself as the ‘traditional peacebuilder/developer,’ the foreign policy that led towards closer cooperation with democratic countries also became linked with those that promoted ‘joint prosperity’ around the world. In other words, when it comes to Japan’s post-war insight about the maintenance of international peace, the fundamental element underlying sustainable peace was believed to be ‘prosperity’ rather than ‘security.’ It was clearer to Japan how international peace could be achieved through the promotion and the strengthening of prosperity, compared to its poor insight into the maintenance of world peace through security measures. Leading to the start of the Cold War period, Japan’s identity as the ‘traditional peacebuilder/developer’ was considerably strengthened through the idea that threats towards international peace were mainly the result of the lack of prosperity in most developing countries, which accounted for 30 percent of the total world economy.²³³

Accordingly, Japan made considerable efforts to establish a sustainable developing assistance regime and increasing additional funds available to developing countries, mainly through its ODA contributions and non-ODA financial cooperation in the form of loans, for instance, by the Export-Import Bank of Japan.²³⁴ It was during this period that Japan utilised its economic strength to the fullest via multilateral aid both at bilateral level and through multilateral organisations like the World Bank and the

²³² Fukushima (2000: 166)

²³³ The problems were grouped into three main categories: poverty, primary commodity shortages and accumulated external debt problems.

²³⁴ MOFA (1994a) Diplomatic Bluebook 1994, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1994/c1.html>, accessed 21/03/2004

International Development Association, as well as UN agencies such as the UNHCR, UNDP, WFP and UNEP.

On account of this, it is possible to point out that Japan's ideas about peace and security, as well as the format of peace operations, were generally consistent throughout the post-war period and even during the Gulf Crisis. While the international community had turned its focus to address physical security threats and how to effectively handle peace operations by redefining the essence of preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, Japan still held the idea that the promotion of joint prosperity around the world would finally lead to sustainable peace. Preventive diplomacy in the form of financial aid both through bilateral and multilateral ODA and non-ODA aids was seen as the key component of Japan's peace strategy in the early 1990s. As shown in the ODA White Paper, Japan's net ODA disbursement increased remarkably, from a few million dollars in the late 1970s to almost \$US 15,000 million in the mid-1990s.²³⁵ Although one could argue that Japan's adopted 'domestic-type' identity as the 'traditional peacebuilder/developer' was compatible with the international community's idea on the later stage of peace operations, especially in the peacebuilding process, it was not until the late 1990s that Japan's financial aid was systematically incorporated into the grand peacebuilding strategy, as will be discussed in Chapter 6.

4.4.3 Ideas Surrounding Japan-US Relations:

'US-Follower'

As suggested by several scholars, throughout the post-war period, successive Japanese prime ministers had repeated similar accounts emphasising the importance of

²³⁵ MOFA, Japan (1994b and 2002b) ODA Annual Report 1994, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/summary/1994/1.html#1> and ODA White Paper 2002, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2002/summary.html> accessed 05/04/2005

Japan-US bilateral relations and the shared ideals of freedom, democracy and a liberal economic system, and confirmed that bilateral ties and shared ideals were the major factors underlying Japan's post-war peace and prosperity.²³⁶ The Japan-US relationship has, to a certain degree, contributed to the formation of the Japanese identity in several crucial ways. Since the primary goal of both countries was to construct a new pacifist Japan, which strictly followed the economic and military guidelines laid out by the Japan-US Security Treaties, Japan had been positioned in the economic and security embrace of the US, which secluded it from foreign conflicts and entanglements.

As a result, Japan could build up its post-war identity as the 'unilateral pacifist' and was content to add 'US-follower' to its post-war set of identities. Japan's foreign conducts during the post-war period were essentially pursued under the format of this 'leader-follower' relationship. Seeing itself as the humble follower, Japan spent most of its post-war years pursuing foreign policies in a way that corresponded to those of the US, ranging from the policy towards the communist countries, the diplomatic revitalisation with some socialist countries like China in the early 1970s and the establishment of friendship and political connections with Southeast Asian countries in the late 1970s to the strengthening of close cooperation with the Third World as directed by the Reagan administration during the 1980s.

In contrast to the political sphere, throughout the course of its economic boom in the 1970s and 1980s, Japan began to develop another political identity independently of the political and security guidelines of the US and closer to the UN and multilateral organisations, as a successful 'traditional peacebuilder/developer' with ideas and conceptions of peace that were based on the solid form of national development and prosperity, as previously discussed. However, Japan's identity as 'traditional

²³⁶ Buckley (1992: 159)

peacebuilder/developer' was criticised as one of the many obligations carried on correspondingly to its identity as a good 'US-follower', and was simply the result of direct demands from the US on Japan to shoulder more international burdens. For example, it was argued that Japan's ODA and other financial aids were based on the policy to 'recycle surpluses' that Japan had with the US as well as other industrial countries, and these acts were not performed as a result of Japan's own understanding of the maintenance of peace and security.²³⁷

The 'leader-follower' syndrome, which had occupied the major part of Japanese political identities, ideas and conceptions about foreign relations, was examined again during the Gulf Crisis. Having fixed its identity as a loyal 'US follower' and client, Japan behaved accordingly against domestic opposition by despatching troops overseas as part of its alliance obligations rather than as an active response to international commitment. A huge financial contribution was again allotted because of pressure from the US rather than representing Japan's own initiative. Although it was made clear by the Bush administration that the US would rather see Japan behave as a US comrade and partner in constructing the 'New World Order,' it was obvious that Japan was still comfortable being cocooned in the previous framework of the Japan-US security arrangement. As mentioned by the Deputy Foreign Minister Takakazu Kuriyama in December 1990, Japan was still content to assume the status of 'a minor power.'²³⁸ Although the lessons and humiliation from the Gulf War, received from both the US and the international community, did lead Japan to consider whether it wanted to continue assuming the identity of 'US-follower,' it was not until after the Gulf Crisis that the

²³⁷ Levin (1993: 206) and Fukushima (2000: 162)

²³⁸ Judis (1991: 21)

transformation of Japan's identity concerning Japan-US relations and security position was thoroughly assessed by decision-makers and the public.

In addition to Japan's lack of ideational insights in terms of assuming an acceptable 'domestic-type' identity conforming to the expected 'role-identity' collectively shared by the international community, its inability to develop a more compatible identity as a key major power undertaking both political and financial responsibilities to meet demands from the international community also had a tremendous effect on Japan-US relations. Japan's response in the Gulf Crisis confirmed that the country was not yet ready to assume the same responsibility in parallel with its closest ally. Japan's financial contribution alone was obviously not enough to gain US acceptance. Furthermore, its previously defined identity as the 'leader-follower' was certainly no longer an option for the healthy relationship between the two countries. Japan's adoption of the identity of a 'secondary power' therefore needed a readjustment of both ideas and insights into how the nation would deal with the issue of international peace and security, especially with regard to peace operations under the auspices of the UN. The ideational settings within Japan that informed the above 'domestic-type' identities will be clarified in the following section via the key actors' systems of ideas and beliefs, including those of the bureaucrats, political parties and media/public opinion.

4.5 Ideas and Beliefs that informed Domestic-Type Identities

4.5.1 Bureaucratic Worldviews

The MOFA has been the main advocate for Japan to play a more assertive role in the maintenance of international peace since the end of WWII. However, without a clear danger in terms of global military crisis, the MOFA had simply injected general ideas about how Japan, as the 'unilateral pacifist,' should behave with respect to the securing

of world peace. One such idea involved securing world peace through arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. Since the country's ratification of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1976, successive cabinets have never failed to address Japan's three non-nuclear principles, used to describe the policy of not possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapon into Japan.²³⁹ The stance against the use of armed force could be counted as the fundamental element that constituted Japan's post-war 'unilateral pacifist' identity. For this apparent reason, the policy was pursued without external inducements. Japan had promoted this policy although it would mean that it might have to pursue the policy unilaterally, and even in times when the tension of the Cold War required countries to accumulate both conventional arms and nuclear weapons to protect themselves against the unfriendly security environment.

Contrary to this scenario, the Gulf Crisis introduced conditions in which the identity of the 'unilateral pacifist' was challenged. The MOFA actually recognised the ideas being exchanged among the international community in constructing a new framework for peace, and it was also aware of the necessity for Japan to lead active and creative diplomacy and to participate in the formation of collective ideas about peace and security. It was convinced that the ideas that constituted Japan's 'unilateral pacifism' should go beyond the simple notion of not becoming a military power and not invading other countries, moving towards active contributions that would effectively ensure peace on a larger scope and on a wider scale.²⁴⁰ As stated by the then Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe:

²³⁹ MOFA, Statement by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato at the Budget Committee in the House of Representative (First statement in history on the Three Non-Nuclear Principles), 11 December 1967 <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/nnp/announce.html>, accessed 12/12/2003.

²⁴⁰ MOFA (1994a) Diplomatic Bluebook 1994, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1994/c1.html>, accessed 21/03/2004.

‘[...] Japan could no longer enjoy peace within its borders while ignoring its international responsibilities towards peace [...].’²⁴¹

As repeatedly mentioned, it is worth noting that the Gulf Crisis did bring about questions regarding the validity of Japan’s existing domestic ‘self’ or the ‘domestic-type’ identity. The MOFA and the public alike knew that it was inevitable that Japan must adapt its own ideas and understanding about its appropriate ‘self’ and ‘identity’ regarding security matters in order to project a more sensible ‘international-role’ identity at the international level. However, during the Gulf War, Japan was still unclear about the new direction in which it had to move forward. During this period, the significant bureaucratic players – the MOFA and the JDA – both basically agreed ‘in general’ that the framework for peace and security would certainly include only the following:²⁴²

- a) A close security relationship with the US
- b) Attempts to ensure the movement of arms control and non-proliferation
- c) Close cooperation with developing countries
- d) Close cooperation with the UN and the promotion of the three main UN pillars – cooperation for peace, the strengthening of international cultural exchange and official development assistance (ODA).

Three items from the above framework, from (a) to (c), were simply repetitions of the existing ideas of foreign policy principles constituting Japan’s ‘unilateral pacifist’ identity, as previously mentioned. The latter, recently incorporated under Takeshita’s

²⁴¹ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 24/11/1991

²⁴² MOFA (1994a) Diplomatic Bluebook 1994, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1994/c1.html>, accessed 21/03/2004 and Japan Defence Agency, White Paper 1990 http://jda-clearing.jda.go.jp/hakusho_data/1990/w1990_03.html, accessed 21.03.2004.

administration after the ‘vision for international cooperation’ (*kokusai kyoryoku koso*)²⁴³, held no clear indication of Japan’s posture towards international peace and security, except on the developmental aspect. Notwithstanding the ambiguity of concrete ideas epitomising Japan’s Gulf War ‘unilateral pacifist’ identity, the MOFA’s ideas and beliefs on financial aid attempts and self-assigned status as ‘traditional peacebuilder/developer’ had never been clearer. The MOFA shared the same ideas as did other segments of the society that in coping with the increasing numbers of regional conflicts that were rooted mainly in economic difficulties and social discord, the most appropriate way was to address the causes themselves, including poverty, shortage of commodities, debts and so on. Since the late 1970s, Japan had repeatedly advocated the importance of equal development and prosperity as the best way to handle internal conflicts.²⁴⁴

With different ideas underlying how peace should be maintained and peace operations should be handled, in the 1990s, the MOFA and Japan took the usual track to secure a more prosperous and humane world. Whereas Japan was inept in responding to the demands of the international community in terms of both physical and military-related contributions during the Gulf Crisis, it was not slow in seeking ways to encourage efforts towards political and economic reform in the LDCs. Immediately after the Gulf Crisis, Japan took initiatives in stimulating the interest of international community in the problems faced by Africa, for instance. The UN was still the main forum where Japan usually expressed its enthusiasm in addressing the problems of the

²⁴³ LDP, Period of President Takeshita’s Leadership, <http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/English/history/chap12.html>, accessed 22/11/2004.

²⁴⁴ During Fukuda’s cabinet, for example, the ‘Fukuda Doctrine’ considered the main idea underpinning the transformation of Japan into a ‘traditional peacebuilder/developer,’ expressing the conviction that ‘relations between Japan and Southeast Asia must be based on spiritual bonds of friendship and cooperation that contributed to the region’s development and prosperity’. Source: LDP, Period of President Fukuda’s Leadership, <http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/English/history/chap8.html>, accessed 22/11/2004.

LDCs. The initiative to set up comprehensive and policy guidelines for African was started during the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) in 1993 and continuously enforced by the Japanese government.²⁴⁵

Alongside Japan's concrete attempt to build solid ground for sustainable peace in Africa, Japan's ODA in the early 1990s was also distributed to Southeast Asia and other countries in transition in the form of technical cooperation, grant-aid and aid through international organisations. In fact, Japan's assumed identity as 'traditional peacebuilder/developer' did find its place in a long line of Gulf War contributions. It could also be said that Japan's ideas about peace operations focused mainly on the latter part of the whole peace process, namely peacebuilding operations. As announced by the MOFA in the early 1990s, Japan's international peace efforts during the new post-Cold War era would consist of 'contributions to international humanitarian relief' and the operations of UNPKO.²⁴⁶ While concrete activities pertaining to the UNPKO were still seriously questioned, Japan's moves toward substantive contributions to international humanitarian missions were conspicuous, especially after the Gulf Crisis. According to the MOFA, solving those crucial economic problems would secure both the medium- and long-term political stability of the region concerned and would finally bring about international peace.²⁴⁷

Along with the ideas and beliefs about military self-restraint and prosperity-based international peace that underpinned the 'unilateral pacifist' and the 'traditional peacebuilder/developer' identities, ideas about the Japan-US alliance also accounted for much of Japan's direction towards UN peace operations. For the MOFA, the

²⁴⁵ MOFA, TICAD I Outline: Tokyo International Conference on African Development, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/ticad/outline.html>, accessed 09/09/2004.

²⁴⁶ Rose (2000: 122)

²⁴⁷ MOFA (1994a), Diplomatic Bluebook 1994,

http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1994/c2_2_1.html#3, accessed 21/03/2004.

significance of the Japan-US alliance has always been at the top of Japan's foreign policy agenda. In terms of ensuring national security, it was unlikely that the Gulf Crisis would influence any major change in Japan's ideas and identity as a 'US-follower.' The Gulf War merely confirmed that despite the end of the Cold War, international disputes and intra-state conflicts still existed. According to the MOFA, under these circumstances, the US strategic guarantee based on the Japan-US Security alliance remained vital to Japan's adherence to its peace and security ideas as the 'unilateral pacifist' and its belief in performing its function as an 'international lender/developer.'²⁴⁸

Some scholars have also suggested that another important reason why Japan was content to stay in the background of the international political arena at the end of the Cold War was not because it lacked the ability to influence the shaping of the post-Cold War world. On the contrary, it was simply that Japan was unwilling to exert its influence independently of its benefactor.²⁴⁹ Naturally, the most sensible option for Japan was to continue to preserve its identity as the 'US-follower' during the crisis. In contrast to the situation in the latter half of the 1990s, the possibility that the existing Japan-US alliance would mean the extension of a 'partnership for peace' beyond the areas surrounding Japan was neither in the mindset of Japanese decision-makers nor of the MOFA in the early post-Cold War period. In explicating Japan's inertia during the Gulf Crisis, it was thus not difficult to draw conclusions from this minimalist interpretation of the Japan-US alliance resulting in Japan's adopted identity as a 'US follower.'

4.5.2 Party Politics

Although the Kaifu government and the MOFA both initially announced their intentions to continue the country's foreign policy vision of 'international cooperation'

²⁴⁸ MOFA (1994a), Diplomatic Bluebook 1994,

http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1994/c1.html#1_2_3, accessed 21/03/2004.

²⁴⁹ Tamamoto (1997: 3)

laid out by the Takeshita government and embarked on the first legal attempt to play an active role in the Gulf Crisis by proposing the first International Peace Cooperation legislation to despatch the SDF to undertake non-combat tasks in the Gulf in autumn 1990, and even announced publicly that ‘Japan was becoming politically active in response to expectations from outside Japan and that each Japanese must think about what he or she can do to contribute to peace and prosperity in the region and all over the world’²⁵⁰, the positive and enthusiastic response to the Crisis and such forward-looking attitudes lasted only a few months. Since then, Japan’s response to the Gulf Crisis had become totally passive and was then criticised by the international community as ‘too little and too late.’

The reason behind such criticism was partly a result of the ideational tug-of-war among political parties about the essence of the country’s ‘domestic-type’ identity as a ‘unilateral pacifist.’ On the one hand, the principal reason behind Japan’s inconsistent response was the fact that under the 1955 political system, the bitter rivalry between the ruling party and the opposition parties was beyond any political principles. The Gulf Crisis became an issue when the Diet was at the centre of conflict between the LDP and the opposition parties over such domestic issues as consumption tax or government reform. It was simply one of several events in which the ruling and opposition parties exercised their ideational differences. On the other hand, although it could be considered a part of the political game, the stagnation of the first and second PKO legislations proposed by the government was also because it was the most sensitive issue or a long-standing political taboo in Japanese politics and foreign relations. Among those political parties themselves, the Gulf Crisis divided politicians into several factions based on their

²⁵⁰ Awanohara (1991: 44)

ideas regarding Japan's identity as a 'unilateral pacifist,' the need to revise the Peace Constitution and technical questions regarding the despatch of the SDF.

a) Intra-party Discord

As for the LDP, the intra-party discord was principally the result of different views towards the degree of SDF contribution to the Gulf Crisis and the issue concerning the reinterpretation of the Peace Constitution. Although the party has been considered pro-military and pro-US, there was an evident distinction between 'moderates' such as Kiichi Miyazawa or Yohei Kono and 'hard-liners' such as Ichiro Ozawa, Takeo Nishioka, Taku Yamazaki and Mutsuki Kato. Those belonging to the moderate group were very cautious about sending the SDF abroad and were fairly satisfied with the restriction imposed by the 1992 UNPKO Law. Under the Miyazawa government, the LDP thus found it easier to compromise with the opposition parties in order to push through the PKO Law, although it meant that the LDP had to sacrifice its position on the original draft regarding the technical functions of the SDF and the civilian control function of the National Diet.²⁵¹ On the constitutional issue, those moderates practically supported Japan's 'international contribution', especially via the UN, but argued against amending the Constitution. For them, interfering with Article 9 would simply end Japan's uniqueness as the 'unilateral pacifist' and would open the deadlock to becoming a military power.

The hard-liners, on the contrary, proposed that Japan perform a more active part in international crises by injecting both financial and human inputs and transforming the country's identity to a step beyond the 'unilateral pacifist' status.²⁵² To them, the way in which Japan could collectively contribute to secure international peace was through

²⁵¹ *Daily Yomiuri*, 04/03/1992

²⁵² Deming (2004: 5)

UNPKOs and the fulfilment of UN collective security obligations. Headed by Ichiro Ozawa, this faction advocated the reinterpretation of the existing Peace Constitution to allow the conversion from what he called 'passive pacifism' into a more active form. According to the then LDP Secretary General, the spirit indicated in the preamble of the Constitution is 'one of striving for sustainable peace and an honourable place in the world via cooperation with the international community.'²⁵³ The LDP has therefore consistently advanced several possible options for a new interpretation of the Peace Constitution in order to fulfil UN obligations, especially with regard to 'collective security.' Knowing that a full revision of the Constitution was not likely to be supported by others sectors of the Japanese society, in the aftermath of the Gulf Crisis, the LDP attempted to suggest only a new interpretation of Article 9, despite the lack of favourable responses from other parts of the society.²⁵⁴

b) Inter-party Discord

If the ideational differences within the LDP were easily spotted during the Gulf Crisis, the inter-party discord during the Gulf Crisis between the LDP and the opposition parties was even more pervasive. The progressive Japan Socialist Party (JSP, renamed the Social Democratic Party of Japan or SDPJ in 1996) and the Japan Communist Party (JCP) both opposed the despatch of the SDF abroad even for humanitarian purposes for no reasons other than seeing it as a first step towards remilitarisation. Among the opposition parties, the strong sentiment of the 'unilateral pacifist' country automatically planted the idea of an anti-militarist stance on their political activities.

Precisely put, for the JCP, the Komeito, the DSP and the JSP, 'pacifist' was simply equal to 'anti-militarist' and the role of the military in modern advanced

²⁵³ Ozawa (1999: 109-112)

²⁵⁴ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 10/12/1992

countries was beyond their comprehension.²⁵⁵ ‘Unarmed-neutrality’ was the marketable idea supporting Japan’s ‘unilateral pacifist’ stance among these opposition parties and was used as a campaign against the government’s Gulf War initiatives. The issue of the constitutional revision to allow SDF to effectively perform their duties overseas was also vehemently opposed by the fundamental believers who were in favour of the ‘no-war constitution.’ As suggest by Dore, along with the bias toward Japan-US bilateral relations, the left-wing political parties had long asserted that the constitutional revision had only originated because of the pressure exerted by the US and the initial Japanese plan to participate in UNPKO had little to do with the spirit of maintenance of international peace.²⁵⁶

As shown in Table 4.1, the Komeito and the DSP, nevertheless, were rather more centrist in this matter, although they were still divided on the issue of SDF participation in UNPKOs. The Komeito were mostly pacifists and therefore suspicious of plans to send the SDF abroad. The DSP, however, shared a similar view of the SDF despatch with the LDP moderates.²⁵⁷ Despite this, these two centrists acknowledged the importance of Japan’s international contribution and supported the government’s attempt to pass the second PKO bill, though with some restrictions regarding civilian control and the functions taken by the SDF. Despite these ideational differences, the opposition parties held a similar idea that the move towards active participation in the UNPKO and the despatch of the SDF abroad was essentially ‘unconstitutional.’

Apparently, the outright differences in ideas and beliefs between the LDP, the JCP and the JSP gave no opportunity for any political cooperation. Given the opportunistic nature of the JSP under the leadership of Takako Doi, which aimed at

²⁵⁵ Sato (2000: 24-25)

²⁵⁶ Dore (1997: 38-49)

²⁵⁷ Heinrich (1999: 37-38)

aggravating domestic resistance to the government's Gulf War initiatives without considering any constructive or strategic discussions on the situation Japan was facing, cooperation between these political rivals was even more difficult. Having learned from the first attempt to pass the UNPKO bill in 1990, the top LDP leaders and Ichiro Ozawa, who had assumed a new position as the chairman of the newly created intra-party special committee on international commission, agreed that the LDP must move beyond its past disagreement with some of the opposition parties – the Komeito and the DSP – in order to push forward the PKO Bill in August 1991. A series of negotiations were conducted and political concessions were reached before the final draft of the PKO Bill, which empowered the government to despatch personnel to participate in logistical aspects of UN peace operations, finally materialised.²⁵⁸

Table 4.1: Ideational Differences among Political Parties during the Gulf Crisis²⁵⁹

	LDP (Conservatives)	Komeito/DSP (Centrists)	JSP/JCP (Leftists)
Peace Conception	Unilateral pacifist International-lender Japan-US alliance	Unilateral pacifist International-lender Unarmed neutrality	Anti-militarist Anti-Japan-US alliance Unarmed neutrality
Constitutional Revision	Reinterpretation of Article 9	Against	Against
Technical functions of SDF in UNPKOs	Active	Moderate	Against
Despatch of SDF	Active (with some reservations)	Civilian control	Against

Source: Author's Table

²⁵⁸The three most important issues being negotiated and compromised between the LDP, the Komeito and the DSP were as follows:

- a) The SDF was allowed to carry automatic weapons for self-defence and to use armoured vehicles, provided that the five principles were strictly observed;
- b) The participation of the SDF in UNPKO was to be made subject to Diet approval;
- c) The PKO bill was subject to review after three years.

Source: Yomiuri Shimbun, 6 December 1991

²⁵⁹ The table is adapted from the author's table appearing in the Master's Degree Dissertation on 1990年代の日本の国連政策:PKO参加問題と常任理事国入り問題を事例に (Japan's UN Policy in 1990: the case on PKO participation and the bid for the UNSC permanent membership) submitted to Hitotsubashi University in 2003, p. 40

Unlike the conflicting ideas and beliefs embedded among politicians and political parties behind the ‘unilateral pacifist’ identity, there was a consensus among those involved in decision-making and in the Japanese political process that both the ‘domestic-type’ identities – as a ‘unilateral pacifist’ and as a ‘traditional peacebuilder/developer’ – must be developed in tandem. Since Japan was determined to use its economic power rather than its military capability as its main contribution to international peace, its foreign aid was the integral component of overall diplomacy and UN policy during the post-war period and during the Gulf crisis.²⁶⁰ Nevertheless, this is not to say that the Kaifu government did not face any resistance from the opposition parties. The earlier discords among political parties regarding Japan’s financial contribution towards the multilateral force during the Gulf Crisis derived from the fact that the opposition parties were against the idea of unattached aid to the multilateral forces. The Komeito and the DSP, especially, had questioned the use of Japan’s financial aid in armed activities, which, in a way, would be prohibited by the Peace Constitution.²⁶¹ Apart from this minor clash between the government and the opposition parties relating to the unattached contribution, Japan’s identity as the ‘traditional peacebuilder/developer’ was not an issue domestically during the Gulf Crisis.

In terms of international contribution during the Gulf Crisis, the criticism that Japan contributed ‘too little, too late’ even in the area of financial contribution was not much of a problem in terms of a clash between the ‘international-role’ identity as the ‘peace enforcer’ adopted by the international community and the embraced ‘domestic-type’ identity as the ‘traditional peacebuilder/developer.’ Compared to other areas of ideas and beliefs, the two identities were very much in tune as it addressed successive

²⁶⁰ Yasutomo (1995: 3)

²⁶¹ Purrington (1992: 167)

stages of peace operations. However, the problem that caused the reluctance and delay in Japan's financial contribution perhaps resulted from the fact that Japan had portrayed itself as the 'traditional peacebuilder/developer,' whose primary responsibilities were to engage and respond to conflicts at a much later stage of peace operations (such as the peacebuilding stage). Japan, therefore, was not prepared to respond promptly to the demands of the international community at other stages of peace operations, namely peacemaking/enforcing and peacekeeping efforts.

Despite Japan's generous financial contribution during the Gulf Crisis, the subsequent criticism could be considered the major catalyst that led Japan to consider the importance of a more coordinated and laudable contribution to the maintenance of peace and security. For a decade, since the Nakasone administration in the 1980s, the benefits and value of Japan's 'domestic-type' identity as the 'traditional peacebuilder/developer' had never been questioned by the international community. The most frightening thing for the Japanese government and the Japanese people alike was perhaps the revelation that such 'domestic-type' identity, which Japan had developed and had worked through with the intention to contribute to the international public good, was seen as incompatible with the new world order and even perceived as a 'diplomatic failure' by the whole community. During the Gulf Crisis, it was still unfeasible for Japan to find a more compatible alternative to simultaneously address both security and prosperity and the development dimension in the same UN peace strategies. However, the crisis did give Japan a 'wake-up call' to reassess the possibility of transforming its 'domestic-type' identity into a form that was more compatible with the 'international-role' identity collectively adopted by the international community.

Unlike the first two 'domestic-type' identities – 'the unilateral pacifist' and the 'traditional peacebuilder/developer' – for which the fundamental ideas supporting their

formation were collectively adopted by the majority of Japanese, the 'domestic-type' identity as a 'US-follower' was more controversial, especially among political parties. As previously mentioned, the secure environment under the Japan-US alliance would allow Japan to form and develop its 'unilateral pacifist' identity without having to worry about military questions. Simultaneously, under the framework of the Japan-US security alliance, Japan and the LDP government were also able to resume Japan's military capability and to adjust itself to the changing Cold War environment during the late 1970s and 1980s in response to US global military strategies without breaching the military prohibition stipulated in Article 9. As a 'US-follower,' under the Ohira, Suzuki and Nakasone administrations, Japan had complied with US requests by pursuing such measures as engaging in a firmer foreign policy against rogue states such as Iran as well as communist countries or agreeing to send the MSDF to participate in the Pacific Rim Exercise (RIMPAC) and increasing defence expenditure to 1% of GDP during the Nakasone administration. Such cooperation was thus believed by the LDP hard-liner faction to open the way for further military activities between the US and Japan.²⁶²

The opposition parties, on the contrary, believed that Japan's survival and the development of the 'unilateral pacifist' and the 'traditional peacebuilder/developer' identities should not be preconditioned by the framework of the hostile Cold War environment and especially not by the strong Japan-US Alliance. It was the opposition parties' conviction that Japan was supposed to promote peace not only among the western countries but also the eastern and the socialist camp, thus integrating the idea of 'overall peace position' into its core element of assuming the 'unilateral pacifist' identity. Apart from the ideational difference on how Japan should act in accordance with its

²⁶² LDP, Period of President Ohira's Leadership, <http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/English/history/chap9.html>, Period of President Suzuki's Leadership, <http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/English/history/chap10.html>, and Period of President Nakasone's Leadership, <http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/English/history/chap11.html>, accessed 22/11/2004

'unilateral pacifist' identity through disarming the country's military capability and maintaining a neutral international stance, the opposition parties also viewed the Japan-US alliance as a distortion of the ideals of Article 9 and the Peace Constitution.

Accordingly, to their understanding, Japan's diplomatic and economic course, biased towards the Western bloc and its rearmament question, was simply imposed by the Japan-US alliance.²⁶³ This line of argument had lingered throughout the post-war period, up until the 1990s and the Gulf Crisis. The JSP held a firm stance in opposing active support of the US-led multinational forces for the same reason that it had accused the LDP government for decades that the development of a Japan-US security treaty would simply lead to a breach of the Peace Constitution. As the source of Japan's rearmament, high military expenditure or substantive law, which allows the conduct of physical non-military exercise of SDF overseas, the US was still the main target of political attacks from opposition parties and Japan's identity as a 'US-follower' was still against the benign idea behind the 'unilateral pacifist' and the 'peacebuilder/developer' identities.

4.5.3 Public and Editorial opinions

National Newspapers

The early 1990s was a period when the Japanese public had settled with the idea about their 'self' and their 'role' in the world as the 'unilateral pacifist' whose major role was to contribute to international peace in financial and economic terms while simultaneously following the lead of its closest ally – the US. The Gulf Crisis was one of the turning points in modern political history that triggered the Japanese public to reassess the compatibility of the nation's own 'self' and its 'projected role' in the

²⁶³ Yamaguchi (1992: 157)

international arena. During the Crisis, the main Japanese newspaper editorials clearly reflected the dichotomy of ideas and beliefs held by the Japanese public, which could be generally divided into two groups – those who supported the government’s initiatives and shared similar ideas with the rest of the international community and those who opposed any radical or active physical and financial mobilisation to the Gulf area.

Table 4.2: Key Differences among Major Newspapers²⁶⁴

	Yomiuri	Asahi	Mainichi
Japan’s Pacificist identity based on the UN <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Active participation in UN missions, especially in UNPKOs • UN as the main mechanism of Japan’s foreign relations 	<p>Fast pace</p> <p>UN-based</p>	<p>Slow pace</p> <p>Existing unilateral pacifist</p>	<p>Entirely against</p> <p>Isolationist</p>
Japan’s participations in UNPKO (technical questions) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SDF despatch • Safety and procedural practices of SDF • Constitutional revision • Concern for foreign countries 	<p>Full-fledged</p> <p>Support</p> <p>Comprehensive (or at least the Art. 9)</p> <p>n/a</p>	<p>Cautious</p> <p>n/a</p> <p>Cautious</p> <p>Much</p>	<p>Suspicious</p> <p>Entirely against</p> <p>Entirely against (preservation of Art. 9)</p> <p>Much</p>

Source: Author’s Table

²⁶⁴ The table is adapted from the author’s table appearing in the Master’s Degree Dissertation on 1990 年代の日本の国連政策: PKO 参加問題と常任理事国入り問題を事例に (Japan’s UN Policy in 1990: the case on PKO participation and the bid for the UNSC Permanent Membership), submitted to Hitotsubashi University in 2003, p. 48

As summarised in Table 4.2, The *Yomiuri Shimbun* has been considered conservative and was the main advocate for Japan's transformation towards an assertive and responsible country. On the issue regarding the Gulf Crisis, the *Yomiuri Shimbun* consistently urged the government to reassess the ideas behind the country's 'domestic-type' identity as a 'unilateral pacifist' and what the responsibilities of such identity would entail. The newspaper has made clear in series after series of editorials that a discussion on the transformation of the country's identity from the 'unilateral pacifist', whose concern about peace could not go beyond its own territory to an 'absolute pacifist', which eschewed the necessary measures of 'full-fledged contribution', including the use of armed force to secure international peace, was an urgent matter waiting to be seriously and collectively addressed by the government, political parties and the public.²⁶⁵

According to the newspaper, international peace and the process of achieving it could not be more sustainable if Japan merely believed that the most important duty for the 'unilateral pacifist' was to limit its SDF force only for the benefit of defending Japan, to ignore international tensions as long as Japan remained peaceful or to disregard the evolving UNPKOs and its new function as peace-enforcer. For the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, Japan's enthusiasm for peace-building operations was not good enough.²⁶⁶ In addition, the *Yomiuri Shimbun* also took advantage of the Gulf War tension to point out the fixed, outdated ideas embraced by the opposition parties, specifically the JSP, who it considered to be responsible for the humiliation of Japan during the Gulf Crisis. It highlighted the lack of vision of the opposition parties and its inability to embrace and to

²⁶⁵ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 27/07/1991

²⁶⁶ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 07/09/1991

cope with the changing international ideational structure regarding the importance of 'collective efforts' to secure international peace and security.²⁶⁷

Compared to other newspapers, the *Yomiuri Shimbun* held the most consistent vision on the process of identity transformation from a 'unilateral pacifist' to a 'multilateral pacifist' country. The newspaper also utilised the Gulf Crisis to the fullest by pushing forward the discussion of Constitutional revision and the direction of Japan's future foreign and UN policy. It also pointed out the importance of Japan's assuming an identity that was more commensurate, not as one of the largest economic powers but as one of the most respected members of the UN, as clearly put in one of the series of editorials:

'[...] the UN is becoming more and more important as an organisation enforcing collective security; therefore, it is necessary to make the Japanese Constitution compatible with the UN Charter. All constitutions reflect the international and domestic political circumstances when they were drafted. Therefore, review is necessary after the passage of a number of years. Japan's Constitution was drafted under the allied occupation after WWII, when Japan had no international role to play.

Realistically, it might be impossible to revise the Constitution at this time. However, it is time for the ruling and opposition parties to engage in debate about the merits and shortages of Japan's Peace Constitution. Japan's Constitution has many merits, such as its protection of democracy, freedom and human rights and its advocacy for peace. But although Japan has caused no

²⁶⁷ For example, the *Yomiuri Shimbun* editorials blamed the JSP's rather narrow viewpoints and the manoeuvres of Takako Doi's and other opposition parties' infamous 'ox-walk' and 'a silent filibuster' for the pre-mature abortion of the first PKO bill and the standstill of the second PKO deliberations. Source: *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 24 November 1991

conflicts in the world, it has also contributed so little to the solutions for those emerging conflicts [...].’²⁶⁸

The second largest newspaper – the *Asahi Shimbun* – was rather cautious on the issue of the Gulf Crisis as well as the country’s transformation towards a new identity that would be developed based on the commitment towards the UN. Regarding the SDF’s participation in UNPKOs, the *Asahi Shimbun*’s editorials often presented its concerns, which were somewhat different from those presented in the *Yomiuri Shimbun*. Numerous series of infightings between the MOFA and the JDA were extensively transmitted with a view to counter the government’s overly vigorous endeavour to follow the command of the international community. The *Asahi Shimbun* also often cited evidence to show that other bureaucracies, apart from the MOFA, were not very much in favour of active participation in UNPKOs.²⁶⁹

The *Asahi Shimbun* also shared the same stance as most of the opposition parties: that the transformation of Japan’s identity from a ‘unilateral pacifist’ to a new identity with the attached element of military functions would certainly aggravate suspicions among neighbouring countries. The newspaper pointed out in its editorials that the government and the MOFA’s attempts to pass the PKO bill would draw too much attention from neighbouring countries and could possibly damage the existing amicable diplomatic relations. As the memory of occupation by the Japanese armed force still lingered in Asia, there was thus an overwhelming concern as to whether Japan’s move towards the reassessment of its ‘unilateral pacifist’ identity would be the first step to military rearmament.²⁷⁰

²⁶⁸ *Yomiuri Shimbun* 10/12/1992

²⁶⁹ *Asahi Shimbun* 24/12/1991

²⁷⁰ *Asahi Shimbun*, 14/04/1992 and 12/06/1992

The *Mainichi Shimbun*, a rather leftist newspaper whose major task was to unreservedly support the opposition parties and question government initiatives, also shared the same stance as the *Asahi Shimbun* on the matter of the Gulf Crisis and the reorientation of Japanese 'unilateral pacifist' identity. However, whereas the *Asahi Shimbun* was merely cautious about the pace of Japan's identity transformation, the *Mainichi Shimbun* expressed its suspicions about the government's moves, as did the opposition parties. At the opposite end of the spectrum, the *Mainichi Shimbun* crossed swords with the *Yomiuri Shimbun* by positioning itself against Japan's participation in UNPKOs and the revision of the Constitution. Together with several other NGOs, such as the 'Peace-Net Members,' the 'Non-Violent Action Net' and the 'Women's Democracy Club,' the *Mainichi Shimbun* expressed regular political support for the opposition parties. The Peace-Net and the Non-Violent Action Net, for example, in cooperation with the newspaper, campaigned extensively against the PKO bill and the despatch of the SDF overseas and held peaceful protests in front of the Diet to express their ideas and beliefs that they were anxious about the security and safety of SDF members involved in overseas peace operations.²⁷¹

Public Opinion

During the Gulf Crisis, ideas and beliefs circulating among the public played an important part in deciding the eventual outcome of the government initiatives, both on the despatch of the SDF to the Gulf and the passing of the UNPKO Law. It was fairly clear that the public mood towards the issues of PKO participation, the revision of the Constitution and the ideas about Japan's existing identity as a 'unilateral pacifist' were on a great swing. Having embraced the ideas that Japan was a 'devoted peace-loving


²⁷¹ *Mainichi Shimbun*, 14.07/1992

nation' and that the country had followed a respectable path in promoting peace mainly by limiting its military exercises and by contributing financially towards economic and social development in several Third World countries, the lesson from the Gulf crisis was the turning point that triggered the Japanese public to rethink its own political identity and practices. However, during the Crisis, Japanese public opinion showed much resistance to the notion of identity transformation and the assertive idea regarding Japan's participation in UNPKOs and the maintenance of peace based on the UN.

In general, the Japanese public agreed on principle that Japan should take part in UNPKOs: a poll conducted by NHK in 1991 showed that about 61 percent of a sample of 1,254 people believed as such. In the same poll, only 10 percent were entirely against participation in UNPKOs and 29 percent did not give any specific response.²⁷² However, whether the Japanese public agreed on how the SDF should participate in the UNPKOs was another matter. Three different polling agents – the *Asahi Shimbun*, NHK and the Shin Joho Centre – conducted surveys on the degree of support for the participation of the SDF in UNPKOs on different sampling groups, as shown in Chart 4.1. The results showed that the Japanese public was clearly divided into two groups of roughly equal sizes, consisting of those who supported the SDF participation and those who did not. Among 2,370 interviewees, 50 percent answered positively in the *Asahi Shimbun* poll, indicating that they supported the despatch of the SDF in UNPKOs. Approximately 40 percent disagreed with the idea and 10 percent did not respond to the question. The same trend occurred with the NHK poll conducted with 1,224 interviewees in the same year. This poll also showed that the difference between those who supported the despatch of the SDF and those who did not was only 3 percent, at 44 and 41 percent respectively. The poll conducted by the Shin Joho Centre, however, varied slightly and contrasted

²⁷² NHK, 1991, Japan Public Opinion Location Library (JPOLL)

with the two previous polls by showing that the people who supported the SDF activities was less than those who opposed it, at 42 and 47 percent respectively.²⁷³



Source: Author's Chart

These polls by different polling teams suggested that there existed a divergence of ideas and beliefs among the Japanese public regarding the role Japan should project internationally. It also reflected that those who wanted to see the transformation of a new 'domestic-type' identity were as numerous as those who were satisfied with Japan's existing identity as a 'unilateral pacifist' with limited involvement in international affairs. To some extent, during the Gulf crisis, the lack of consensus among the Japanese public about the nation's own 'domestic-type' identity – whether the country should stick with the idea of the 'unilateral pacifist' or move forward to a new internationally accepted identity – was perhaps one of the main reasons why Japan's contribution to the Gulf Crisis was 'too little and too late.'

However, it is important to note that during the Gulf Crisis, the Japanese public still had firm ideas and beliefs as to how international peace should be promoted and handled. Although the international community collectively adopted the idea that the

²⁷³ *Asahi Shimbun*, NHK, Shin Joho, 1991, Japan Public Opinion Location Library (JPOLL)

thin line between peacekeeping and peace-enforcing had become blurred and even that ultimately, peacekeeping operations would inevitably involve the use of force, the Japanese public did not move an inch on their idea about how to handle the peace process. Despite their different positions on the philosophical and political issue of national identity or technical issues regarding the despatch of the SDF, those who subscribed to the *Yomiuri* and the *Asahi Shimbun* did agree that the SDF should not be involved in peace enforcement efforts while participating in UNPKOs. According to the polls conducted by these newspapers, as shown in Table 4.3, those supporting the SDF's participation in peace-enforcement missions or operations that would involve the use of armed force accounted for only 36 and 33 percent in the surveys conducted by the *Yomiuri* and *Asahi Shimbun*, respectively. The remainder of the interviewees, which accounted for 50 and 58 percent from the respective newspapers, either disagreed with the ideas or did not give their responses.

For the Japanese public, the most preferable functions to be carried out by the SDF force in UN peace operations in 1992 were non-military duties such as medical assistance and election monitoring, which accounted for 46 percent of all 2,178 responses in the poll conducted by the *Yomiuri Shimbun*. About a quarter of the interviewees, however, were convinced that the SDF could contribute more to the UNPKOs by undertaking any functions assigned by the UN while the other participants, who altogether comprised 22 percent, agreed that such un-armed duties as monitoring conduct under a cease-fire and within the UN neutral zone were acceptable. The remaining 8 percent did not express their opinions on the matter.²⁷⁴ This also confirmed that the Japanese public were still against the general ideas collectively adopted by the international community regarding how the UN should perform their duties in securing

²⁷⁴ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 1992, Japan Public Opinion Location Library (JPOLL)

international peace and security. In the following section, the conclusion of the early process of Japan's identity transformation and the clash between the 'international-role' and 'domestic-type' identities during the Gulf Crisis will be summarised.

Table 4.3: SDF Involvement in UN Peace-Enforcement Missions²⁷⁵

	Yomiuri Shimbun	Asahi Shimbun
		Percent
Agree	36	33
Disagree	50	58
No response	14	9
Total	100	100

Source: Author's Table

4.6 Conclusion: the Clash of the Domestic-Type and International-Role Identity

Apparently, Japan's 'too little, too late' response to the Gulf Crisis suggested that the clash between the ideas that constituted the 'domestic-type' identities among the Japanese and those collectively shared by the international community, which influenced the projection of Japan's 'international-role' identity, accounted for much of the reluctance, hesitation and failure in the country's UN policy during the Gulf Crisis. Throughout the Gulf War interactions during the early 1990s, Japan was urged to project its 'international-role' identities in accordance with the ideas collectively adopted by the international community, whereas Japan's 'domestic-type' identities were fixed by Japanese experiences and beliefs from the post-war period. In the area of peace and security, the international community characterised the new possible threats as more

²⁷⁵ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 1991, Japan Public Opinion Location Library (JPOLL) and *Asahi Shimbun*, 1991, Japan Public Opinion Location Library (JPOLL)

vertical and horizontal, which signified that international threats were relatively 'intra', 'caused from above' and that they had more impacts across borders than was typical in the conflicts that had occurred before the Gulf War. Such primitive international threats or military invasions required collective and multilateral efforts from the international community to rightly address the problems, hence the adoption of the 'multilateral pacifist' identity. Japan's conviction that peace could be maintained merely by setting itself as an example of self-restraint and unilateral pacifism or by limiting its military urges had guided the country along the opposite avenue, which did not reflect the reality of the post-Cold War milieu.

Another clashing set of ideas between the international community and Japan surrounding UN peace operations was also unmistakable. In the post-war period, the ways to handle international conflicts and to maintain peace were initially based on three main principles – preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. However, the Gulf Crisis led the international community to realise that the transformation of UN peace operations to focus on preventive deployment, the merging of peace enforcement into peacekeeping operations and the embrace of the identity of 'peace enforcer' were inevitable. In contrast, Japan still clung to the idea that the final stage of peace operations – peacebuilding – was perhaps the most effective method of securing and maintaining international peace. While adopting the identity of the 'traditional peacebuilder/developer' and spending most of its financial resources and efforts in promoting social development in LDCs, Japan was entirely ignorant of the fact that the combination of the three principles of peace deployment, peacekeeping/peace enforcement and peacebuilding was a prerequisite to the effective maintenance of peace and security. Japan's focus on 'prosperity' more than 'security' as fundamental to the maintenance of international peace, although this was in line with its 'domestic-type'

identity as the ‘unilateral pacifist,’ lacked insight into the transformation of peace operations in the post-Cold War world.

The third set of ideas adopted by the Japanese during the Gulf Crisis was perhaps a product of the post-WWII Japan’s identity regarding Japan-US bilateral relations. The security alliance provided a favourable environment in which Japan could fully develop its major political identity as the ‘unilateral pacifist’ without crucial interruptions. Under the comprehensive military protection from the US, Japan could portray itself as a peace-loving nation that had restrained itself from building up active military capability. However, the question of whether the US was content for Japan to remain a ‘US-follower’ with no apparent international political responsibilities was another matter entirely. It was fairly evident in the economic sphere that the US had made the situation clear with Japan about its identity as the second major economic superpower and the responsibility that such a position entailed. In the economic realm, Japan had transformed its identity somewhat to meet demands from the US and the international community by sharing larger economic burdens and by continuing to assume the identity of ‘traditional peacebuilder/developer.’ In the political sphere, the US was in dire need of more assertive action from Japan as its partner and a sharing of ideas that were collectively embedded in the international community on the importance of securing international peace and security through multilateral efforts under the UN mechanism, including the use of force. For the US, Japan’s contribution in financial terms but not in physical or ideational inputs was not what the country expected.

Behind these three clashing sets of identities embraced by the international community and Japan during the Gulf Crisis, the ideas and beliefs of political actors whose views affected the outcome of Japan’s UN policy – bureaucracies, political parties and public opinion – were evolving in a way that was less in tune with the ideas

and beliefs adopted by the international community. As for Japan's bureaucracy, although the MOFA was the main force advocating Japan's assertive international stance, it was still at a loss in terms of the directions that Japan would take maintain 'peace and security.' As previously mentioned, the MOFA and the government had spent much of their efforts in promoting 'peace' based on 'prosperity', as evidenced by Japan's series of development aid programmes. With the exception of the promotion of arms reduction and non-proliferation efforts, the MOFA and the government had a solid idea about security only in terms of how to ensure Japan's own national security through the Japan-US security alliance. The ideas served Japan's identities as the 'unilateral pacifist,' the 'traditional peacebuilder/developer' and the 'US-follower' well.

Political games between the ruling LDP and the opposition parties were another factor that hindered Japan's sharing of ideas embedded in the international community during the Gulf Crisis. While the majority of LDP members were pro-military, pro-US and convinced that Japan should have made a greater human contribution towards the maintenance of international peace, the opposition parties were at the opposite end of the spectrum. The JSP, JCP, Komeito and DSP were all subscribed to the ideas that the essence of being a 'unitary pacifist' and a country whose peace strategy was based on strengthening prosperity was to strictly adhere to the 'no-war clause': the prohibition of the use of force stipulated in the Peace Constitution. The divergence of fundamental ideas about peace and how peace should be handled between the two political groups was responsible for Japan's response being 'too late' to pass the PKO bill and 'too little' to share the peace sentiment embraced by the international community, which would allow the SDF to effectively participate in UN missions overseas.

Ideas and beliefs reflected through public opinion also played an important part in impinging on Japan's response to the Gulf Crisis. As public opinion was the

fundamental reflection of the Japanese society that informed the government, bureaucracy and political parties as to how the ideational position of the people was evolving, the examination of the trend of ideas and beliefs was considered important in that sense. The media, especially newspaper editorials, played a major role in reflecting the ideas and beliefs that were evolving in Japanese society. During the Gulf Crisis, the *Yomiuri Shimbun* was the most conservative newspaper and advocated active moves towards human contribution and the transformation from the ‘unilateral pacifist’ to a more comprehensive identity, which would allow Japan to exercise military capability in order to maintain international peace. The *Asahi Shimbun*, on the contrary, was still cautious about the identity transformation and the revision of Japan’s Peace Constitution. As the main supporter of the opposition parties, the *Mainichi Shimbun* totally opposed any moves that indicated the transformation of the ‘unilateral pacifist’ identity and the possibility of Japan’s military involvement. These newspapers toyed with the ideas surrounding these issues throughout the crisis and paved the way to further discussion on the transformation of Japan’s identity in subsequent years.

Although there was a clear-cut divide among the media and newspapers on the ideas and beliefs about peace and Japan’s existing identities, Japanese society and public opinion were equally divided into two balanced clusters between those supporting active participation in the UN peace operations and those opposing these attempts. The answer to the question of why Japan was too late and too hesitant in extending its contribution or passing the PKO Law was largely the fact that the difference between the proponents and opponents was too close to call, hence resulting in the tug-of-war of ideational debates from the government and bureaucracy to ordinary Japanese people. Compared to the Gulf Crisis, the next chapter on the Cambodian peace process will reveal the

subsequent stage of Japan's identity transformation and the higher degree of conformity between the 'international-role' and 'domestic-type' identities.

Chapter 5 The Cambodian Peace Process (1990-1994)

5.1 Background to the Cambodian Conflict and the Paris Peace Process

The true cause of the Cambodian conflict in the post-WWII period could be attributed to a series of interventions from both regional powers – Vietnam and China – and external powers like the US and the former USSR.²⁷⁶ Because the civil war in Cambodia was the result of an ideological tug-of-war between the East and the West, it was hardly surprising that the Cambodian conflict also reached a stalemate when external powers, especially the major ones, turned their attention towards normalising diplomatic relations amongst themselves in the late 1980s. Exhausted by its economic difficulties, the former USSR began to rearrange its political priorities by withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan and its military support through Vietnam. This political move inherently triggered Vietnam to withdraw its military occupation in Cambodia and, as Kohno put it, to make the Cambodian conflict an ‘internal one.’²⁷⁷ The same scenario occurred in China as Beijing faced criticism from the international community after the 1989 Tiananmen incident. China started to reconsider the political repercussions of its continuing support of the Khmer Rouge, after its vehement genocide campaign against innocent Cambodians. The US and ASEAN’s active interests in reconciliation were mutually reinforcing when the USSR, Vietnam and China began to abandon their

²⁷⁶ As precisely summarised by several authors, Vietnam began its campaign in the 1960s by backing the fledging Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) to wage a civil uproar against King Sihanouk’s government, although the outcome was unsuccessful. King Sihanouk’s political legitimacy was challenged again during the 1970s in a bloodless coup carried out by General Lon Nol – a US-backed right wing of his own government. The Lon Nol government, however, was not a long-lived one, as it was overthrown by the Khmer Rouge, a communist guerrilla group from China. After a half decade of Pol Pot’s vicious regime and genocide scheme, the Cambodian people were freed in 1978, only to be governed by the so-called ‘Vietnamese puppet government’, also known as the ‘Phnom Penh Regime.’ The regime, led respectively by Heng Samrin and Hun Sen, had been logistically supported by the former USSR and administered by Vietnam from the late 1970s until the start of the Paris peace process.

²⁷⁷ Kohno (1999: 9)

doctrine of ‘irreversibility’ and look for a solution to end the long-standing conflicts in Cambodia.²⁷⁸

The process of extricating the four rival factions from political gridlock and restoring peace to Cambodia was far from easy. Although the influence of the surrogate external backers was removed from the equation, even if the major powers had poured their resources and energy into easing the enmity among the factions, the fundamental cause of internal dissention did not automatically evaporate, especially the question of power allocation and political legitimacy. Pike also argues that the central factor in the peace process had always been ‘governance and the institutionalisation of political power’ and the question of how the power was to be divided and under what arrangements it was to be maintained.²⁷⁹ The peace process itself did not tackle these intractable problems directly but rather was a product of the assumption that peace would consequentially be restored as a result of the establishment of a democratic government and general elections. Based on this supposition, the Cambodian peace process was carried out at two different phases and on two parallel diplomatic tracks – before and after the signing of Peace Agreements and at the formal and informal diplomatic levels, as summarised in Table 5.1.

Following the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements in October 1991, the UN was essentially the principal actor involved in the peacekeeping and peace-building rehabilitation process. The Agreements invited the immediate establishment of UNAMIC with members of the mission to be initially despatched to Cambodia to pursue the tasks of maintaining ceasefire, continuing close contact with the SNC and training civilians to avoid mine traps.²⁸⁰ The mission was soon absorbed into the subsequent

²⁷⁸ St. John (1995: 675) and Brown (1992: 89)

²⁷⁹ Pike (1989: 847)

²⁸⁰ UN, UNSC Resolution 717, 16 October 1991.

transitional authority, the UNTAC, in March 1992. During the transitional period and prior to the general election, UNTAC's mandates were divided into four phases.

Table 5.1: Chronology of Cambodian Peace Process

Date	Details	Diplomatic Endeavours	
		Formal	Informal
May 1993	* General elections held without Khmer Rouge participation	UNTAC	
November 1992	* Trade embargo on Khmer Rouge	P-5	
June 1992	* Talks with Khmer Rouge: Phase II disarmament violated * International Reconstruction Meeting held		Japan/ Thailand Japan
February 1992	* UNTAC established	P-5	
October 1991	* UNAMIC established * Paris Agreements signed	P-5 France- Indonesia	
September 1990- July 1991	* Guideline for political settlement finalised	P-5	
August 1991	* Ceasefire and cessation of foreign military assistance agreed by SNC	ASEAN	
July 1991	* Sihanouk elected as SNC president		China
June 1991	* 3 factions' talks on the draft political settlement	ASEAN	
December 1990	* Draft guideline for political settlement accepted by SNC	France- Indonesia	
September 1990	* Establishment of SNC * Comprehensive political settlement framework accepted by all parties	ASEAN	Thailand
August 1990	* Plans for SNC establishment agreed by 3 parties		China
June 1990	* Tokyo conference: joint communiqué signed by 3 parties, excluding Khmer Rouge		Japan
May 1990	* Thailand-Hun Sen Talk: ceasefire initiated		Thailand
February 1990	* Joint communiqué between Sihanouk and Hun Sen signed		Thailand
January 1990	* P-5 Talks: general principles of the political settlement agreed	P-5	
February 1989	* 1 st Paris Conference * JIM II: various solution discussed among the 4 factions, including Vietnam	France- Indonesia ASEAN	
July 1988	* JIM I: meeting of 4 factions	ASEAN	

Source: Author's Table

Firstly, immediately after its establishment, UNTAC was to implement the Paris Agreements and to be constantly in consultation with the interim SNC. The primary task was to ensure that the sovereignty of Cambodia would be intact and the implementation of further mandates was proceeding satisfactorily, with full cooperation by all factions.

As adopted in UN Resolution 728 on January 1992, the second phase of the UNTAC mission, which lasted from May to November 1992, involved the establishment of a mine-awareness programme among Cambodian people, the promotion of national reconciliation and the protection of human rights, the maintenance of a ceasefire among the four factions and the disengagement of forces, which included gathering information regarding the total strength of forces, their deployments, armaments and locations and ceasefire violations.²⁸¹ UNTAC was expected to enforce all parties concerned to ‘refrain from all hostilities and from any deployment, movement or action which would extend the territory they controlled or which might lead to renewed fighting.’²⁸²

The third phase was to establish a legal system, procedures and necessary administrative measures prerequisite to the ‘free and fair’ election scheduled in May 1993. UNTAC was also to design and implement a system of registering voters, a system of balloting, and the arrangements to facilitate the presence of foreign observers as well as to enable the repatriation of 150,000 refugees and displaced persons in cooperation with the UNHCR to participate in national election.²⁸³ Lastly, the fourth phase involved the post-election task of delivering appropriate international assistance towards rehabilitation and peace-building in the areas of food, security, health, housing, training, education, reconstruction and development in Cambodia via financial and physical contributions from the international community.²⁸⁴

Having laid out the background to the Cambodian conflict and the involvement of the international community in the Paris peace process, sections 5.2 and 5.3 will

²⁸¹ UN, UNSC Resolution 728, 8 January 1992.

²⁸² UN, UNTAC-background, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untacbackgr1.html, accessed 02/09/2005

²⁸³ UN, UNSC Resolution 783, 13 October 1992

²⁸⁴ UN, UNSC Resolution 880, 4 November 1993

assess the collective ideas being shared among the international community and the ‘international-role’ identities that were informed by such systems of ideas.

5.2 International Response: Collective Ideas on Peace and Security during the Cambodian Peace Process

5.2.1 Collective Ideas on the Nature of International Peace and Security

During the first half of the 1990s, the international community had formed collective ideas on the nature of post-Cold War peace and security through several international crises. Unlike the Gulf Crisis, which involved one rogue state attempting to invade another state and trying to challenge the existing international order, the nature of the Cambodian conflict was relatively multifaceted, both in terms of its root causes and the scale of impact. In other words, the international community faced a conflict that was largely characterised by the intervention of several external powers trying to secure their own spheres of influence and the typical realist’s struggle for power among the four Cambodian factions, which resulted in 13 years of incessant civil wars and social unrest. There were, however, certain dissimilarities regarding the origins of conflict between the Gulf crisis and the Cambodian conflict. Compared to the Gulf crisis, the Cambodian conflict was essentially characterised by the remnants of the Cold War and the source of threat was more ‘vertical’ or caused by its own government. However, both cases were also clear representations of conflicts in which the scale of impact was immensely ‘horizontal,’ with the flooding of war casualties into neighbouring countries and the collapse of the whole social system.

In terms of the source of threats and the format of the conflict, the source of threat in Cambodia was more ‘vertical’ than the case of the Gulf Crisis, and could be compared to the situations in Bosnia and Rwanda, where the respective governments

posed coercive threats to the Croatian/Bosnian minority and where Rwandans were war casualties of the fighting between their government and the separatist group. Aside from Pol Pot's regime in 1975-1978, during which millions of Cambodians were literally slain and the major threat against Cambodian people was the government's ruthlessness, it could be pointed out that the majority of Cambodia's difficulties were largely the result of the governments' failures – from Sihanouk's to Hun Sen's – to provide a fairly stable and sustainable environment or even to protect their people against the violence caused by the insinuation and intervention of external powers. As observed by Brown and Zasloff, civil dissent and each breakdown of Cambodian governments or shift of leadership naturally produced further widespread economic deprivation, anarchy, violation of human rights, destruction of infrastructure, violence and so on.²⁸⁵ Furthermore, although the format of political unrest in Cambodia could be characterised as an 'intra-state' conflict, unlike those mentioned previously, it is undeniable that the major condition that had dictated the course of the Cambodian conflict was the inability of successive Cambodian governments to avoid outside perpetrations. In other words, the antagonistic sentiments among the four factions were directly influenced by external powers.

The Cambodia case was significant not only because it was perhaps the last war in which both regional and major powers had exerted their political, ideological and military leverage over one another by proxy. It was also significant because the ideas regarding the scale of impact and the negative effects of the conflict began to be solidified among the international community. That is to say, the scale of impact of post-Cold War conflict was likely to be 'multi-dimensional' and would require a firm commitment by the international community to help sort out the problems. For example,

²⁸⁵ Brown and Zasloff (1998: 2)

the scale of impact of the Cambodian conflict was described as more horizontal because it covered a wide variety of negative effects resulting from a longer-standing conflict than the Gulf War, including food and health security, human rights, lack of educational programmes and training and inadequate basic infrastructure and so on. Not only were millions of Cambodians abused and killed by their own government; hundreds of thousands of Cambodians also had to take refuge in neighbouring countries. The remaining Cambodians were traumatised by the traces of Khmer Rouge atrocities, the internal turmoil caused by action against the Vietnamese-backed Phnom Penh regime as well as economic scarcity and social dysfunction.

5.2.2 Collective Ideas on UN Peace Operations

The Cambodian peace process took place during a period in which the ideas and beliefs in the UN as a messenger for peace were at their height. Due to the fact that the two UN operations were carried out at the same time and were of approximately the same magnitude, it is important to take sufficient account of the distinctive development of the UN peace operations in the Gulf Crisis and in the Cambodian peace process simultaneously. As we saw in the previous chapter, after 40 years during which it could only perform as a ‘paper tiger,’ the idea of transforming the UN into an efficient peace-enforcing agent was prevalent among the international community during the Gulf Crisis. The idea was finally realised when the UN peacekeepers – constituted of multinational forces – achieved their mandate by expelling Iraqi troops from Kuwait. This also suggested the transformation of the ideas regarding the role of peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War period. The peacekeepers are expected to embark on further complex operations, preferably as ‘peace enforcers,’ rather than simply maintaining law and order or containing existing violence.

It might be correct to assert that the UN peace operation in Iraq suggested a new phase of incorporating peace enforcement function into traditional peacekeeping tasks. Still, the mandates of the peace operations in the Gulf crisis under UNIKOM were limited to political and military functions – the capacity to take physical action to prevent small-scale violations of the demilitarised zone or to counter any violations of the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait.²⁸⁶ The role of ‘peace enforcer’ was not fully adopted until the involvement of UN operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH-1995) where the UN peacekeepers were to undertake their military tasks in close cooperation with a NATO-led multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) and its successor, the multinational Stabilisation Force (SFOR), and in Somalia, where the peacekeepers were authorised to use ‘all necessary means’ to establish a secure environment under the UNITAF – a multinational force led by the US.

However, due to the different nature of the conflict mentioned previously, UN peace operations in the UNTAC required the international community to procure distinctive sets of goals and mandates that would help implement the process of ending the long-standing internal conflict, instigate the course of establishing a new democratic government and execute the plan of rebuilding a war-torn country. Bentram was right in pointing out that the post-Cold War generation of peace efforts revolved around the two distinctive ideas of ‘moving towards greater UN military involvement’ with the aim to enforce peace in conflicting area and ‘moving towards a prominent role for the UN as an agent of democratic transitions.’²⁸⁷ While the former was witnessed during the Gulf Crisis, the idea of transforming the UN into an agent of democratic transition was evident in the Cambodian peace process. The peace process in Cambodia, therefore,

²⁸⁶ UN, UNIKOM: Background, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unikom/background.html>, accessed 9/9/2004

²⁸⁷ Bentram (1995: 388)

anchored the ideas among the international community of how sustainable peace could be reached via full-scale peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, which will be further discussed in section 5.3.

5.2.3 Ideas and beliefs of the US on the Cambodian Peace Process

Unlike other major powers involving in the Cambodian conflict, the US influence over the outcome was fairly limited during the internal unrest in Cambodia during the 1970s-1980s. While China was the major source of the Khmer Rouge's military assistance and political patronage and the former USSR openly supported Vietnam's military manoeuvres to overthrow the Khmer Rouge's regime, the US merely controlled its sphere of influence by providing only 'non-lethal support' to the non-communist resistance of King Sihanouk and the Son Sann faction via the diplomatic venues of ASEAN and its close ally, Thailand. Kohno points out that this was the case simply because the US had not yet fully healed from the aftermath of the Vietnam War in the 1970s.²⁸⁸ Above all, the US also suffered from a certain policy dilemma, between the urge to defy the Vietnamese-supported Phnom Penh regime and the fear of the Khmer Rouge's brutal political manipulation. The US Congress expressed its concern regarding this dilemma in its 101st Congress as follows:

'Whereas the withdrawal of Vietnamese combat forces from Cambodia, although strongly supported by the United States and the entire international community, nevertheless increases the prospects for increased fighting among the four Cambodian factions and raises the spectre of full-scale civil war and the return to power by the Khmer Rouge'.²⁸⁹

²⁸⁸ Kohno, (1999: 9)

²⁸⁹ US Congress (1990a), Concurrent Resolution 101st Congress, H.CON.RES.254, 6 February 1990

As a result of this dilemma, the US adopted a 'low profile' in taking a direct part in the Cambodian internal conflict throughout the final decade of the Cold War.²⁹⁰ However, when the Paris peace process started in 1989, the US ideas to pursue active involvements in the handling of peace restoration in Cambodia became more tangible. The belief that this was so is evident in the US attempts to normalise diplomatic relations with Vietnam, to end US support for the occupancy of a UN seat by the Khmer Rouge and to announce the 'Baker Initiative', which emphasised the key role of the permanent members of the UNSC in drafting guidelines for political settlements, for instance.²⁹¹

Nevertheless, the most significant gesture made by the US in muscling in on the peace process was perhaps to work together with other UNSC permanent members in arbitrating the conflict. By leaving other diplomatic efforts and trivial matters to other countries, the US focused on exerting its ideational position through its dominant role in the UNSC, as seen in its manipulation of the drafting of the guidelines for the political settlements, which excluded outside participation except for UNSC permanent members. In the light of collective experience of post-Cold War crisis management, the US and the international community shared similar ideas about managing the Cambodian peace process: that the long-standing conflict could be brought to an end and that the process of nation-building could be achieved only through positive interventions from the international community and specifically through the UN mechanism. Having outlined the sets of ideas embraced by the international community as well as the US on international threats and UN peace operations during the Cambodian peace process, the following section will demonstrate how these sets of ideas were translated into the

²⁹⁰ Sutter (1991: 47)

²⁹¹ US Congress (1990c), Concurrent Resolution 101st Congress, S.RES.321, 4 August 1990 and Van de Kroef (1991: 100)

‘international-role’ identities collectively embraced by the international community and how Japan was expected to shared similar sets of identities with the rest of the community.

5.3 International Role-Identity Projection and the Expectations on Japan

5.3.1 On International Peace and Security:

‘Political Arbitrator’

In the Gulf Crisis, the ideas surrounding the international community were that threats to international peace and security sometimes originated from traditional aggressors aiming at shaking the well-established international order. The understanding of such situations had led the international community to assume the so-called ‘multilateral pacificist’ identity, which basically signified the idea that international peace and security could be achieved through the will and efforts of ‘every nation’ in battling with the threats to resume and recreate international peace and order. In the Gulf Crisis, the banishing of Iraqi forces from Kuwait’s territory was the focus of the multilateral military action and the success of Operation Desert Storm indicated the success of the multilateral efforts. The international community also carried on with the identity of ‘multilateral pacificist’ and performed functions that helped to restore peace and security through the UN mechanism following the Crisis, as seen in the increasing numbers of multilateral operations under the UN, which rose from 5 missions in the 1980s to 35 operations in the 1990s.²⁹²

Despite this, the situation in Cambodia was rather similar to other intra-state conflicts and civil wars around the globe, as the start of the peace process in the early

²⁹² UN, Operation Timeline, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/timeline/pages/timeline.html>, accessed 10/09/2004.

1990s did not necessarily signify the culmination of long-standing problems in those countries. In other words, unlike the Gulf Crisis, the end of the political dissention among the four factions did not automatically translate into the start of peace, as was the case with Kuwait. As Doyle precisely put it:

‘[...] peace is not a single or simple good, such as an absence of war or violent conflict, but instead a complex and variable process. Especially if one looks for a long term peace, real peace requires more than an absence of violence [...]’²⁹³

Besides, the initial conflict was not solved merely through the collaboration of multilateral efforts from every nation. Rather, addressing post-Cold War intra-state conflicts differed from inter-state conflict because it required an ‘external arbitrator’ to help settle the differences and involved further implementations to re-stabilise the collapsed economic and social system. Essentially, the ideas surrounding the international community were perceptibly the enhancement of international mechanisms to help disentangle intra-state conflicts and help provide full-scale national rehabilitation schemes. The ideas literally informed the adoption of the ‘international-role’ identity as the ‘political arbitrator’ both through the collaborative efforts of several countries to solve the political divergence in the early stage and through the establishment of a mechanism to sort out the after-effects of the conflict. During the Cambodian peace process, the international community appeared to register the idea of a wider scale of political complex derived from the aftermath of long-standing external manipulations and internal political struggles.

²⁹³ Doyle (1998: 3)

The 'international-role' identity projected by the majority of nations was then transformed from that of 'multilateral pacificist' into that of 'political arbitrator' who could act upon the problem more actively, earnestly and systematically. In addition, as the conflict was addressed at approximately the same time as the Gulf crisis, the ideas surrounding the international community regarding the ability of the UN as a messenger for peace were still in place. Most important of all, the idea that 'the UN role in the resolution of the Cambodian problem will be enhanced' was clearly echoed by the permanent members of the UNSC and acknowledged by the international community.²⁹⁴ Still, there was an acute distinction separating the two cases in terms of the ideas surrounding UN peace operations, which will be further examined in the following section.

5.3.2 On UN Peace Operations:

'Peace Promoter'

The Gulf War and the Cambodian case were fundamentally different because the latter was categorically a civil war or an intra-state conflict. Such internal conflicts compelled the UN and the international community to cope with wider aspects of peace transition and restoration, including post-conflict political, social and economic reconstruction.²⁹⁵ While the UN was expected to fulfil its adopted identity as the 'peace enforcer' in the Gulf Crisis, the idea portraying the international community as the 'peace promoter' or the UN as the 'agent of democratic transition' which undertook

²⁹⁴ UN, United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), a summary conclusion for a resolution of the Cambodian problem, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unamicbackgr.html, accessed 14 06/2005.

²⁹⁵ The UNTAC mission was considered to be one of the largest post Cold War UN peace operations in terms of personnel and financial injections, that is, around 22,000 peacekeepers and a budget of US\$ 1.6 billion. Source: UN, UNTAC: Facts and Figures, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untacfacts.html, accessed 9 9 2004

more complex and multi-dimensional UN peace operations was further developed during the Cambodian peace process. With regards to UN peace operations, the ‘international-role’ identity as the ‘peace promoter’ moved one step further from the previously adopted ‘peace enforcer’ in the Gulf Crisis.

In short, by assuming the identity of ‘peace promoter’, the international community thus found itself handling the peacemaking, peace keeping and peacebuilding operation simultaneously. The first element of peace operations – the peacemaking effort – was closely and efficiently pursued by several parties during the Cambodian peace process. The activities were not only pursued by those major powers who had previously been involved with the conflict, but also by those who obviously had no stakes or vested interests in the conflict, such as Japan, Thailand and Australia.²⁹⁶ As mentioned in the previous section and in Table 5.1, good offices and diplomatic activities were conducted in dual tracks, both at formal and informal levels, which helped break any deadlocks that arose. After a series of ‘late diplomatic prevention’ exercises, which focused on preventing existing conflicts among the four factions from intensifying into further rounds of military attacks via good offices and intense diplomatic and negotiating activities, the collective ideas among the international community in strengthening ‘multi-dimensional aspects’ of UN peace operations were put into practise.

It is vital to point out that as in the case of the Gulf Crisis, where a thin line between peace enforcing and peacekeeping efforts could be witnessed, one could yet again observe a thin line between peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations in the Cambodian peace process. While peacekeeping involves such activities as monitoring and observing the peace process as well as helping the conflicting parties to implement

²⁹⁶ *Nikkei Shimbun*, 23 02 1991

the signed agreement, peacebuilding deals with external efforts to assist countries and regions in their transition from war to peace and to facilitate the implementation of peace agreements.²⁹⁷ It is evident that in terms of general functions and activities, the essence of the two operations was identical, except that they were usually undertaken in sequential order – from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. It is true that there are at least 10 separate peacebuilding operations established to facilitate only post-conflict national rebuilding, such as those in Somalia (UNPOS-1995), Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS-1999) and the Central African Republic (BONUCA-2000), and recently in Timor L'este (UNOTIL-2005).


However, after the Cambodian conflict, peace operations were further developed based on the idea that conflicts could not possibly be solved in sequential fashion but should rather be tackled in a parallel manner. Specifically put, while securing and maintaining a peaceful environment for both conflicting parties remains the direct mandate of peacekeeping operations, the efforts to build up national institutions, to promote human rights, to provide sustainable sources of livelihood to demobilised combatants and return refugees and displaced persons, as well as to reactivate economic functions and restore the social fabric are to be undertaken concurrently. Figure 5.1 also demonstrates that out of 35 UN peace operations from 1992-present, about half of the operations incorporated both peacekeeping and peacebuilding into the same mandates.

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²⁹⁷ Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UN 'What is peacekeeping?', <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/faq/q1.htm>, accessed 14/06/2004 and Department of Political Affairs, UN, 'Peacemaking and peace-building', http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/prev_dip/peacemaking.htm, accessed 14/06/2004 and Bentram (1995, p. 389)

²⁹⁸ Annex I, Paris Peace Agreements, Paris, 23 October 1991. As for the case of the Cambodian peace process, according to the Annex I of the Paris Agreements, UNTAC was to station 22,000 peacekeepers in 270 locations around the country and carried out crucial multi-disciplinary roles and most comprehensive of such UN history in organising general elections and protecting human rights in addition to civil administration and military functions. In brief, these multi-dimensional peacekeeping activities included civil administration, military functions, election and human rights protection.

Figure 5.1: Post-Cold War Peace Operations



Source: Author's Diagram

5.3.3 On Japan-US relations:

'US Supporter'

Unlike the Gulf Crisis, where the US was the main player in determining the operational outcome, it was rather a latecomer to active involvement with the process of arbitrating the conflict among the four factions. However, through the venue of the UNSC, the US started to play a major role in determining the guidelines of the political settlements of the Paris Agreements, as mentioned earlier. Essentially, the core ideas inserted into the guidelines by the US included firstly the right to self-determination for

Cambodian people, which ensured that all Cambodian would enjoy the same rights, freedom and opportunities to participate in the election process and to choose their own government. This signified that they must not be influenced in any way by those in positions of power, especially the Phnom Penh regime administration.

Secondly, the enhancement of the UN's role in conflict resolution was also emphasised. It was written clearly, as stipulated in the 101st US Congress concurrent resolutions regarding the UN role in the Cambodian conflict, as well as in the guidelines, that 'an effective UN presence would be required during the transition period in order to assure internal security' and that a special UN representative would be needed to supervise the process of transition.²⁹⁹ The UN roles also included the supervision of the withdrawal of foreign forces, ceasefire and the cessation of foreign military assistance to secure a neutral political environment, as mentioned above. The increasing and definitive role of the UN in the Cambodian peace process was questioned by the Cambodian factions, especially the Khmer Rouge and the Phnom Penh regime, which questioned the overpowering role of the UNTAC over the interim SNC.

As the US's closest ally in the region, Japan assumed a significant role in supporting the stance of the US and the P-5, albeit with some reservations. Several diplomatic efforts were made by Japan as well as Thailand to smooth out the differences in terms of how to handle the conditions set by the guidelines for the political settlement, such as the issue of arms reduction and the demobilisation ratio as well as the justification of the UNTAC's tight control of all factions, including the Phnom Penh government itself. Both the Khmer Rouge and the Phnom Penh regime were adamant on

²⁹⁹ UN, United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unamicbackgr.html, accessed 14/06/2004 and US Congress (1990b) Concurrent Resolution 101st Congress, S.CON.RES.101, 7 March 1990. <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query:C?c101:./temp/~c101ti9Nyt>, accessed 17/01/2005

these issues, as they left both parties with political disadvantages.³⁰⁰ This was to no avail, however: the efforts of those neutral countries did not materialise and there were some clear instances indicating US resistance towards any alteration to the original draft of the political settlement.

Despite these negative responses from some factions, the third tangible idea concurred by the US and the international community alike was the promotion of peace and security based on the strengthening of western democracy. The permanent members of the UNSC were convinced that:

‘[...] free and fair elections were essential to produce a just and durable settlement to the Cambodian conflict, thereby contributing to regional and international peace and security [...].’³⁰¹

The establishment of the democratic government and society was highlighted through the first full operation in holding free and fair elections under the direct administration of the UN. As pointed out previously by Bentram, there was increasing hope that the UN would perform both in the role of ‘peace enforcer’ and as an ‘agent of democratic transition’: the idea embedded in the mandates laid out for the UNTAC in Cambodia clearly reflected the latter hope. Coupled with the Gulf War euphoria, which resulted from the effectiveness of the UN’s role as peace enforcer, the ways in which political establishment and peace restoration in Cambodia should be best achieved were followed accordingly. As for Japan, whether the social interactions or the exchange of ideas and beliefs with the international community and within Japan itself during the Gulf Crisis and in the Cambodian peace process contributed to the transformation of

³⁰⁰ Brown (1993: 86)

³⁰¹ UN, UNSC Resolution 745, 28 February 1992.

Japan's system of ideas and beliefs regarding international security and its 'domestic-type' identities remains to be seen. An examination of such transformation, or the lack thereof, will be carried out in sections 5.4 and 5.5.

5.4 Domestic-Type Identity Formation: Japan's Political Identity during the Cambodian Peace Process

5.4.1 Ideas Surrounding International Peace and Security:

'Political Facilitator'

At the start of the post-Cold War period, an Asian scholar criticised Japan's pattern of involvement in Southeast Asia as follows:

'...there has been very little change in Japan's approach. The focus of Japanese policy remains overwhelmingly economic. Japan has also been obliged to play a modest political role in the region as a result of international pressure, especially from the US and ASEAN...'³⁰²

It cannot be denied that in the initial phase of the Cambodian peace process, Japan was not one of the major players who significantly contributed to the process of ending the 13-year conflict. However, Japan's political, economic and ideational contributions in the Cambodian peace process were far more enthusiastic than the past four decades put together. Its involvement in the Cambodian peace process can be roughly split into three phases of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, during which it contributed full political and diplomatic efforts as well as financial, physical and ideational inputs. Japan's late-coming status was perhaps the result of its passive

³⁰² Khamchoo (1991: 19)

economic interests in Indochina and its political immaturity in the late 1970s and 1980s. Similar to the US, Japan's concrete position on the Cambodian matter in the early stages was purely to follow the lead of ASEAN.³⁰³ Nevertheless, when the possibility of achieving a peaceful resolution began to materialise in 1989 and during the early 1990s, Japan started to engage itself earnestly in the process of 'late preventive diplomacy' and 'peacemaking' endeavours. According to Takeshi Ikeda, a leading Japanese diplomat who directly undertook a keen role in pursuing Japanese initiatives on behalf of the Japanese government, Japan's diplomatic efforts in utilising its political and diplomatic skills were evident at every stage of the peace negotiation process.³⁰⁴ A former MOFA diplomat who was one of the Japanese delegates in the Cambodian peace process also confirmed Japan's transformation of ideas regarding the way regional and international peace could be facilitated during its involvement in the peace process. He put it as follows:

'Japan has worked to solve international problems militarily, but in the framework of the UN. Japan has been asked by many countries to contribute, not to combat, but to facilitate conditions in difficult areas in the world. This is the reason why the Japanese government decided to adopt a special Law, the PKO Law, which was extremely difficult to pass in the Diet, because the opposition parties were against it: even now, some parties do not agree to it. But actually now I think most of the parties, I think including the opposition parties, are inclined to say 'okay' if it's good for world peace. So, this is the first case, Japan

³⁰³ Kesavan (1985: 1123)

³⁰⁴ Ikeda (1996: 15)

has contributed with our military forces in solving...in recovering peace in Southeast Asia.’³⁰⁵

Although Japan did not portray itself as a ‘political arbitrator’ as the other major powers had done, due to its political immaturity and late-coming status, it out-performed other nations in transforming its political identity from that of sole ‘unilateral pacifist’ to ‘political facilitator’ to undertake several political functions, as a result of extensive cultivation on a personal level with both non-communist factions (the Sihanouk and Son Sann factions) and the Vietnamese-backed Phnom Penh regime. In a sense, Japan had filled the void caused by the major powers’ inability to hold impartial talks with constructive diplomatic manoeuvres to lead these two antagonists to the negotiating table. The *Tokyo Conference* in June 1990, the follow-up event to the unsuccessful Paris peace talks in 1989 and the Jakarta Informal Meeting in February 1990, was the first instance in which Japan started to inject its political efforts to facilitate the peace process.³⁰⁶ The success of the 1990 Tokyo Conference in finding compromises between both military and political differences among the four factions implanted the idea of positive participation in Japan and simultaneously fulfilled the expectation of the international community regarding Japan’s contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security.³⁰⁷

The second diplomatic and peacemaking effort could be witnessed through Japan’s attempt to smooth out the differences of interests between the Khmer Rouge and the Phnom Penh regime over the guidelines on disarmament and demobilisation and to

³⁰⁵ Interviewed with a former MOFA official, 09/02/2006.

³⁰⁶ In essence, the Tokyo Conference invited the key factions to negotiate on the possibility of effective ceasefire and to form an organ for national reconciliation, later known as ‘Cambodia’s Supreme National Council’ (SNC). Although there was some controversy among the participating factions regarding the composition of the new national organ, Sihanouk, Son Sann, the Khmer Rouge and the Phnom Penh regime did agree in principle to the establishment of this authoritative body with a 2-2-2-6 formula.

³⁰⁷ Ikeda (1996: 66)

break the deadlock to the peace process caused by the heated contempt of both parties in early 1991. Japan held independent initiatives and informal negotiations to persuade both the Khmer Rouge and the Phnom Penh regime to accept the draft guidelines for political settlement drafted by the UNSC permanent members in the areas of disarmament and demobilisation, the strengthening of the UN mechanism and the confirmed cooperation of the four factions with the UNTAC.³⁰⁸ Although these initiatives were considered a trivial issue, which had no particular effect on the drafting of the political agreements, Japan's diplomatic effort on this matter was indispensable for the finalisation of the draft political settlement, which led to the signing of the Peace Agreement in October 1991.³⁰⁹

Another diplomatic endeavour and example of late preventive diplomacy conducted by Japan was again evident during the summer and autumn of 1992, after the signing of the Paris Agreement. In cooperation with Thailand, Japan was the only country that earnestly attempted to negotiate with the Khmer Rouge and to persuade the faction to abide by the rules of ceasefire stipulated in Phase II of the Paris Agreements, which would lead to a neutral environment and free and fair upcoming elections in 1993. Ikeda again reiterated Japan's effort to persuade the Khmer Rouge to disarm and to find a point of compromise with the faction regarding transparent administrative control of the UN over the former Phnom Penh regime's administrative bodies. Japan and Thailand thus put together a proposal whereby an 'administrative advisory committee under the control of UNTAC' would be established, although it was not accepted by the Khmer

³⁰⁸ St. John (1995: 676) and Takeda (1998: 556)

³⁰⁹ As seen in Section C of Annex I, the role of UNTAC in improving the transparency of the disarmament and demobilisation process was clearly emphasised. In Article V of Annex II of the Paris Agreement, all parties were requested to implement the process of demobilisation of at least 70 percent of their military forces, instead of the original total disarmament. Source: Annex I and II of the Paris Peace Agreement, 23 October 1991

Rough.³¹⁰ Because the UNTAC operation was based on the good will of the four factions and the unyielding diplomatic efforts of the UN members to facilitate the process of restoring peace in Cambodia³¹¹, the failure of the Khmer Rouge to meet the obligations under the Paris Agreement therefore needed to be addressed by independent and neutral countries such as Japan and Thailand. Although these diplomatic attempts did not materialise, the gestures were recognised by the international community as an integral element of the process of peace implementation.

5.4.2 Ideas Surrounding UN Peace Operations:

‘Peace Supporter’

While the international community had launched full-scale peace operations commensurate to its ‘international-role’ identity as a ‘peace promoter’, Japan was rather cautious in pursuing full-fledged UN peace operations due to its restricted legal and domestic conditions. Unlike the ‘domestic-type’ identity adopted during the Gulf Crisis as the ‘traditional peacebuilder/developer’, the adoption of the new ‘domestic-type’ identity as a ‘peace supporter’ had exposed Japan to the core functions in almost every step of peace operations, from peacemaking to peacekeeping to peacebuilding. Besides, myriads of active contributions, ranging from personnel to financial and ideational inputs, were also made via various channels.

Firstly, in addition to those Japanese diplomats involved in the late-preventive diplomacy and peacemaking operations mentioned above, which brought about the successful signing of the Paris Peace Agreements, the epochal contribution of the SDF’s participation in the UNTAC mission was no less important. Contrary to the awkward

³¹⁰ Ikeda (1996: 124)

³¹¹ Berdal and Liefer (1996: 36)

Gulf War, when Japan was condemned by the international community for its lack of personnel participation, the PKO Law enacted in June 1992 allowed Japan to despatch the SDF to engage more actively in peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, including election monitoring and civilian policing.³¹² According to the IPCH, Japan's contribution of 1,300 personnel in the UNTAC was divided into four key areas, namely ceasefire monitoring, election monitoring, civilian policing and logistic assistance.³¹³ It was the first time in its post-WWII history that Japan had sent its ground troops beyond its national border and was perceived by one a scholar as a 'litmus test' for Japan's future foreign policy posture and activism in global affairs.³¹⁴ Although the bill limited SDF missions to only unarmed peacekeeping activities and humanitarian assistance due to its severe restricted legal framework, it was considered a leap forward for Japan's contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security.

The third element involved in the Cambodian peace process was the peacebuilding operation, in which Japan's financial contribution was unquestionably an integral part of the process of Cambodian national reconstruction and reconciliation. In contrast to Japan's reluctance in the Gulf Crisis, the nation's dedication to the peacebuilding process in Cambodia did not furnish the international community with the image of a cash dispenser or a nation that would provide economic assistance without any principle attached. Rather, it was self-evident to the international community that Japan would want to portray itself as a prime mover in helping Cambodia to reconstruct its nation and achieve sustainable peace.

In detail, Japan's determination to lead a proactive role in Cambodian peacebuilding was first seen in its move to despatch a study mission to Phnom Penh in

³¹² *Daily Yomiuri*, 21/07/1992

³¹³ IPCH, Japan's Peacekeeping Cooperation in Cambodia, http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_E/cambo_e.html, accessed 14/06/2005

³¹⁴ Shin (1992: 3)

early 1992 to sort out a project list for official development assistance, which included agriculture, energy supply and basic infrastructure.³¹⁵ However, the most notable effort was Japan's initiative in pushing forward the idea of implementing the peacebuilding process via a concrete institutionalised framework. The attempt to provide methodical economic assistance in Cambodia materialised in the Ministerial Conference on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia, held in Tokyo in June 1992. The Conference mainly discussed the framework for international cooperation to promote short-term reconstruction and rehabilitation in developmental areas such as food security, health, housing, training, education, the transport network, basic infrastructure and public utilities.

As a result of this Conference, \$880 million in aid was pledged by the international community, of which approximately a quarter was promised by the Japanese government.³¹⁶ Furthermore, Japan also proposed to establish an international mechanism for medium- and long-term assistance for Cambodian reconstruction beyond the mandate of the Paris Agreements.³¹⁷ By setting up the 'International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC)', a consultative body connecting the international community with the Cambodian government under the chairmanship of Japan, the development of the country's rehabilitation process could be systematically

³¹⁵ St. John (1995: 676)

³¹⁶ MOFA (1994a), Diplomatic Blue Book 1994, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1994/c2_2_1.html, accessed 15/03/2005

³¹⁷ United Nations, Department of Public Information, Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict: Paris, 23 October 1991, pp. 47-49. From 1996 onwards, the Consultation Group Meetings for Cambodia were held in lieu of the ICORC meetings and were still hosted annually by Japan, alternating with France, except in 1998 and 2003. Financial assistance was steadily pledged by donor countries, from \$501 million in 1996 to \$635 million in 2002. Among major donors, Japan had ranked first, with the highest financial assistance throughout the period from 1992-2003, contributing a total of \$1,120 million, which accounted for 21.6 percent of the overall external development assistance to Cambodia. Source: Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC), Disbursements by Donor, http://www.cdc-crdb.gov.kh/cdc/7cg_meeting/dcr_english_2003/dcr_eng_03_2.htm, accessed 08/03/2005, and Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC), External Development Assistance, http://www.cdc-crdb.gov.kh/cdc/7cg_meeting/dcr_english_2003/dcr_eng_03_1.htm, accessed 08/03/2005

monitored and the body would become the central organ for the provision of further economic aid to Cambodia.

5.4.3 Ideas Surrounding Japan-US Relations:

'US Supporter'

In the Cambodian peace process, Japan succeeded in transforming one of its 'domestic-type' identities from 'US follower', as in the Gulf Crisis, to 'US supporter.' The significant element that could differentiate Japan's status from that of 'follower' to a decent 'supporter' was that the country did not have to be ordered to make political or ideational contributions, as had been the case during the Gulf crisis. Japan mostly supported the US and the international community on the guidelines of the Paris Peace Agreements, including the right of national self-determination, the enhancement of the UN's role and the strengthening of peace based on western democracy. Japan took voluntary action in facilitating the process by conducting several acts of shuttle diplomacy to fill the void in which the international community, specifically the US, could not perform. As stated by a Japanese diplomat:

'[...] If Japan is to become more deeply involved in the process of conflict resolution, unless the Japanese showed positive interest by taking action, neither the Cambodian nor other concerned countries would consult us on their own initiative. Through taking deliberate action, we were able to create a relationship of cooperation and support with the major countries concerned [...]'³¹⁸

³¹⁸ Ikeda (1996: 161)

In concrete terms, although the US declared its support for the three coalition factions (Sihanouk, Son Sann and the Khmer Rouge factions) from the outset, it was unable to communicate directly with the Khmer Rouge, due to its vicious conduct against human rights. Furthermore, Japan had also cultivated a trusting relationship with all factions, not only the non-communist ones. The Khmer Rouge and the Phnom-Penh regime were also equally on good terms with Japan, which alerted the international community and the US to the positions of these two problematic factions with respect to the implementation of the peace process. Although some of Japan's initiatives, especially the informal dialogues and the unofficial proposal presented to the four factions in order to find a compromise among them, went rather against the original ideas of the US and the permanent members of the UNSC, Japan made it clear that its stance was to limit these informal negotiations and diplomatic efforts to an area within the framework of draft agreements that was acceptable to the US and the international community. The efforts were obviously appreciated by the permanent members of the UNSC and the international community.³¹⁹

On the one hand, the set of 'domestic-type' identities adopted during the Gulf Crisis were transformed largely because Japan had exposed itself to social interactions at the system level for long enough to realise what kind of 'international-role' identities were projected and preferred by the rest of the international community. Such signals were sent back to Japanese society and contributed to the process of domestic identity transformation, resulting in the re-orientation of the ideational system on the maintenance of peace and security, as shown in this section. Although the 'domestic-type' identities were not yet precisely in tune with the 'international-role' identities, Japan showed some signs of policy activity in the international security arena under the

³¹⁹ Ibid (1996: 117) and UN, UNSC Resolution 792, 30 November 1992

UN framework. The ideational exchanges among key actors at the domestic level were partly responsible for the transformation of ‘domestic-type’ identities, as will be discussed in the following section.

5.5 Ideas and Beliefs that informed Domestic-Type Identities

5.5.1 Bureaucratic Worldviews

During the Gulf Crisis, Japan’s long-standing identities as the ‘unilateral pacifist,’ the ‘traditional peacebuilder/developer’ and the ‘US follower’ were major hindrances to the MOFA’s ability to project active diplomacy that corresponded to the expectations of the international community. The idea that peace could be maintained simply by Japan containing itself with no involvement in military affairs and purely by means of setting itself as an example of a peace-loving nation and concentrating only on international economic assistance was deeply embedded in the country and contributed to the post-WWII passive identities. While the MOFA recognised the need for ideational change, the Japanese domestic constituents were always a step behind on the expanding notion of international responsibility. However, the Gulf War and the Cambodian peace process, which were the two cases that occurred almost simultaneously, triggered the process of identity transformation from those mentioned above into forms that allowed Japan to take an active part in the promotion of international peace, as a UN ‘peace supporter,’ a ‘political facilitator’ and a ‘US supporter.’ The MOFA took note of the opportunity by pointing out that several ideational changes must be taken into account by Japanese society, as described below.

Firstly, as regards international peace and security, the MOFA perceived that the post-war ‘pacifism’ should be altered to consist of contributions that would ensure the peace and prosperity of the ‘entire’ international community and go beyond the simple

pacifism of not becoming a military power and of restraining itself from invading other countries. As underlined in the 1995 Diplomatic Blue Book, Japan was expected to play major role in building a new framework of international cooperation. In this respect, Japan should engage in combined efforts with other nations with common values to foster global cooperation and regional cooperation. To ensure the maintenance of international peace and security, Japan intended to cooperate with the international community, ASEAN and the US as ‘mature partners, jointly thinking and jointly acting’ for peace and security, especially in the Asia-Pacific region.³²⁰

As a matter of fact, the idea of transforming the country into the prime mover in the maintenance of international peace and security had been embraced by the MOFA even before the end of the Cold War. In 1988, the so-called ‘Takeshita Principles’ clearly emphasised the idea of ‘cooperation for peace’ – an approach enhancing Japan’s contributions to the maintenance and reinforcement of peace by positive participation in diplomatic efforts, the despatch of necessary personnel and the provision of financial assistance.³²¹ Unfortunately, it was not until the Cambodian peace process that these principles were actively adopted by the MOFA and supported by the Japanese public. This also included Japan’s political initiatives, which were deemed indispensable for the implementation of the maintenance of peace and security. The Cambodian peace process allowed Japan, especially the MOFA, to help facilitate the peace process by engaging Cambodian factions in the process of diplomatic dialogues, which led to the conclusion of the Paris Agreement. On several occasions during Japan’s close encounters with Indonesia, Taro Nakayama, the then Foreign Minister, also made repeated remarks on the importance of Japan’s playing a greater role in world affairs in proportion to its

³²⁰ MOFA (1994a and 1995), Diplomatic Blue Book 1994 and 1995, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1994/c2_2_1.html#2 and http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1995/chp1.html#6_a, accessed 21/03/2004

³²¹ Kohno (1999: 3)

growing economic might.³²² According to Ikeda Tadashi, a leading diplomat involved in the Cambodian peace process:

‘I sincerely believe that these diplomatic efforts as an ‘honest and sincere political mediator/broker’ represent an epochal phase in Japanese diplomacy in the post WWII era.’³²³

Secondly, with respect to the UN peace operations, the MOFA eagerly pointed out to the public that international conflicts, especially regional ones, were not only restricted to affairs between nations: there was also increasing danger of conflicts within nations, rooted in ethnic, religious and historical reasons. Under such situations, the international community was deploying various methods and efforts to maintain peace and build up security through such means as conflict prevention, political reconciliation, peace operations, humanitarian assistance and reconstruction and developmental assistance. The most significant idea stressed by the MOFA in 1993 during the process of implementing peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations in Cambodia was that ‘there is a growing recognition in recent years of the importance of linking peacekeeping/peacebuilding with humanitarian assistance and the reconstruction of development and aid.’³²⁴

Such emphasis signified the idea that it would not be enough for Japan to contribute its resources merely in terms of humanitarian assistance and development aid, which usually did not involve manpower in political and military functions. Rather, it was time for Japan to share both ‘sweat and pain’ and to allow Japanese personnel to face the same risks as others. However, unlike the ideas embedded among the

³²² *Daily Yomiuri*, 16/06/1991

³²³ Ikeda (1996: 16)

³²⁴ MOFA (1994a), *Diplomatic Blue Book 1994*,

http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1994/c2_1.html#1, accessed 21/03/2004.

international community and their collective identity as the 'peace promoter' whose functions in peace operations sometimes involved the enforcement and military measures, Japan would only assume a more proactive role corresponding to the newly adopted 'peace supporter' identity, which contended the vital elements of preventive diplomacy, non-military peacekeeping and proactive peace-building based on human rights, humanitarian and developmental aspects.

Thirdly, regarding Japan-US bilateral relations, the ideational position within the MOFA was relative stable, as the relationship remained as the cornerstone of Japan's foreign policy and national security in the post-Cold War era. It was clearly stated in the 1996 Diplomatic Blue Book that close cooperation and coordination between the two countries across the broad spectrum would serve as the foundation for advancing frameworks for regional and global cooperation.³²⁵ However, it is important to note that although the key ideas regarding Japan-US relations were broadly unchanged, Japan's pursuance of the maintenance of international peace and security and its participations in peace operations were considerably divergent from, if not clashing with, those of the US.

Some events revealed Japan's different ideas and efforts to try distinct approach and initiatives in dealing with the Cambodian peace process. Some of the ideas and proposals, especially how Japan dealt with the Khmer Rouge faction, Japan's acceptance of Vietnam's role in Phnom Penh regime faction and the unofficial proposal representing Japan's compromise approach to the details of the draft political settlements, were not totally welcomed by the US. It was clear during the Cambodian peace process that the MOFA's intention to pursue such autonomous tracks that did not contradict the US contributed to the transformation of Japan-US relations, with Japan's status changing

³²⁵ MOFA (1996b), Diplomatic Blue Book 1996, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1997/I-a.html#4>, accessed 21/03/2004.

from that of ‘follower’ to ‘US supporter.’ Hisashi Okazaki, former ambassador to Thailand, suggested the following, which could possibly sum up the ideational position of Japan’s involvement in the Cambodian peace process:

‘I do not say that Japan settled the Cambodian problem or that Japan’s scenario for a peaceful Cambodia has in fact materialised. But I think that peace in Cambodia could not have been restored so smoothly without Japan’s efforts to negotiate with the parties concerned to reconcile clashing interests. The countries involved in the Cambodian peace effort initially opposed Japan’s taking on its first post-war political move in Asia. But Japan gradually came to occupy the leading position in the peace-making process.’³²⁶

5.5.2 Party Politics

Unlike the Gulf Crisis, in which political parties played the most significant part in the process of ideational reorientation, the main actors dealing with the Cambodian issue were basically the government and the MOFA. The political stance of the LDP government was not much different from that of the MOFA: that is, to exert its political and diplomatic expertise as the ‘political facilitator’ and to treat the Cambodian case as a major foreign policy test.³²⁷ The major controversy among political parties during the Cambodian peace process seemed to revolve around Japan’s participation in peace operations rather than the political ramifications of Japan’s diplomatic pursuits in facilitating the peace process. As mentioned in the previous chapter, prior to the enactment of the PKO Law in 1992, the main debates among the political parties and within the LDP government centred around the domestic issue of the legality and

³²⁶ *Daily Yomiuri*, 1/1/1994

³²⁷ *Nikkei Shimbun*, 23/2/1991

technicality of SDF missions abroad. Regrettably, the situation in the Gulf Crisis did not extend much opportunity for Japan to exert its political and diplomatic efforts to influence the outcome of the conflict.

Despite the on-going debates about the failure in the Gulf Crisis, the LDP prime ministers who took office during the Cambodian peace process, such as Toshiki Kaifu and Kiichi Miyazawa, continued to assist the MOFA in several official diplomatic avenues, while the MOFA took a major part in the informal diplomatic track and regional diplomacy. Following the historical move in passing the PKO Law in June 1992, the LDP government under the Miyazawa administration put even more effort into confirming its ideational position in working with the international community as a 'peace supporter.' The Prime Minister made public remarks on several different occasions regarding Japan's relentless political efforts and contributions throughout various phases of Cambodian peace operations. Miyazawa expressed Japan's determination in extending logistical support by sending the SDF to assist the UNTAC in civilian functions, improving the social infrastructure and creating an environment that was conducive to the repatriation of refugees and by positioning the SDF to secure the safety of election monitors.³²⁸

However, the debate concerning the despatch of SDF abroad was rekindled once again in April 1993 when a Japanese election monitoring volunteer under the UNTAC, Atsuhito Nakata, was accidentally killed by the Khmer Rouge. The opposition parties, led by the SDPJ's Sadao Yamahana, signalled their concern for the safety of Japanese personnel in Cambodia and asked the government to pull out the SDF troops, as key legal preconditions for Japanese participation in PKO – the conditions of ceasefire – were no longer being met. Even among the LDP itself, the ideational positions of the

³²⁸ *Daily Yomiuri*, 21/7/1992 and 14/5/1993

party members were also divided. Junichiro Koizumi, the then Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, added his voice to the chorus of criticism from the opposition parties, telling the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono at a cabinet meeting in May 1993 that:

‘[...] You (Yohei Kono) said that the Japanese must sweat for peace, but must we bleed for peace?’³²⁹

Far from being deterred by such remarks, both the LDP government and the MOFA insisted on maintaining the course that Japan had pursued in UN peace operations. Kabun Muto, the Foreign Minister under the Miyazawa administration, retorted that:

‘Japan will not waver in its determination to continue its role in UNPKO in Cambodia despite the slaying of a Japanese UN worker there. Therefore, the government intends to continue despatching Japanese personnel to the country to take part in election monitoring and other PKO as previously planned [...]. In taking part in UNPKOs, one has to stick to a kind of idealism. Every country is making efforts to realise a peaceful Cambodia. Japan too has to join those efforts within the framework of what the country (Japan) can offer.’³³⁰

With the exception of the above discord between the LDP government and the opposition parties, during the course of Cambodian peace process from 1990-1994, the opposition parties did not present themselves as a major resistance towards Japan’s transformation of its ‘domestic-type’ identities. This was the case because the main

³²⁹ *Nikkei Shimbun*, 10/4 1993

³³⁰ *Daily Yomiuri*, 10/5/1993

opposition party itself, the SDPJ, also underwent a significant ideational change as a result of its total loss in the national election in 1992 and its gaining of the position as the ruling government for the first time in its political history in 1994, which in effect exposed the party directly to interaction with the international community. While the loss in 1992 pointed to the weakness in the ideational approach of un-armed neutrality and ‘unilateral pacifism’ that had been held by the SDPJ throughout the post-WWII era, Tomiichi Murayama’s election to the post of Prime Minister put the SDPJ in a position where the party’s political ideas were developed based on actual interactions with the international community.

According to Prime Minister Murayama, although the party had long maintained that the nation’s military forces violated the Peace Constitution, he was convinced that it was time for the SDPJ to change its basic policies in line with the end of the Cold War. He made several official statements emphasising that ‘the SDF’s existence is within the permissible framework of the Constitution and that the SDF exists legally by maintaining the doctrine of seeking a world without arms.’³³¹ The leadership proposal, entitled ‘Choices towards the 21st Century’, called on the party members to support not only the despatch of SDF troops on UN missions for humanitarian causes, as in the case of Rwanda, but also SDF participation in UN operations following their missions in Cambodia, such as in Macedonia. This also included further consideration of the establishment of a UNPKO training centre in Japan and a new organisation, independent of the SDF, as part of the grand scheme of supporting future UN peace operations.³³² The change of ideational position, especially within the former opposition parties like the SDPJ, contributed tremendously to the process of identity transformation in Japan, as

³³¹ *Daily Yomiuri*, 4/9/1994

³³² *Daily Yomiuri*, 24/8/1994

it brought about a more coherent foreign policy preference in the years to come. The transformation of ideas during the Cambodian peace process not only occurred among politicians: similar changes were also evident among the media and public opinion, as will be demonstrated below.

5.5.3 Public and Editorial opinions

National Newspapers

As repeated in the previous chapter, the *Yomiuri Shimbun* was the main advocate for Japan's proactive 'international-role' identity projection. It reflected the ideational position of the Japanese people who subscribed to the newspapers in supporting Japan's diplomatic manoeuvres and the country's active involvement in UN peace operations. The *Yomiuri Shimbun* was convinced that Japan's identity as the 'political facilitator', undertaking diplomatic efforts and sponsoring a series of peace conference since 1990, such as the Tokyo Peace Conference and the Conference for the Rehabilitation Process, contributed tremendously to the promotion of the Cambodian peace process, both at the stage of peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

In contrast to its frustration during the Gulf War, the *Yomiuri Shimbun* expressed its appreciation for the Miyazawa government's move in extending a constructive proposal to establish a strategy for long-term regional development, such as the 'Forum for Comprehensive Development in Indochina.' Furthermore, to assume the identity of an efficient 'political facilitator,' the *Yomiuri Shimbun* contended that Japan also had to establish a so-called 'comprehensive approach', including diplomatic efforts, participation in UNPKOs and humanitarian assistance, as well as reconstruction and

development assistance,³³³ which were in fact the three comprehensive stages of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. It was therefore not surprising that the *Yomiuri Shimbun*'s ideas for the promotion of peace and security were directed towards such efforts, which would further lead to a new order based on a new model with the UN at the centre.³³⁴

As for Japan's identity as a 'peace supporter,' the *Yomiuri Shimbun* differed from other national newspapers in the sense that it was concerned not only with Japan's ability to project an 'international-role' identity commensurate to the expectation of the international community, but also with how Japan would transform itself domestically to assume greater responsibility without having to wait for the '*gaiatsu*.' Several verbal indications appeared repeatedly in *Yomiuri Shimbun* editorials, such as the term 'a trustworthy state,' which was often used to refer to a combination of Japan's ideational position of not only becoming a military giant but also a strong UN-diplomacy advocate or a country that was willing to fulfil its international commitment through participation in UN peace operations. Although Japan despatched the SDF to participate in the UNTAC, the force did not engage in the tasks assigned to the peacekeeping force due to its restriction under the PKO Law. However, it also invited much criticism of the fact that the SDF did not fully bear the same responsibilities as other nations' forces. The newspaper voiced its opinion that the Japanese also learned from the experience in Cambodia that once a country took part in UNPKOs, a 'half-hearted approach' of not 'risking a single life or not exposing itself to a single dangerous situation' was not acceptable by anyone's standards.³³⁵

³³³ *Daily Yomiuri*, 5/3/1994

³³⁴ Editorial, *Daily Yomiuri*, 24/10/2991 and 17/1/1993

³³⁵ *Daily Yomiuri*, 25/5/1993

As regards Japan-US relations, it was apparent that the *Yomiuri Shimbun* was not satisfied with the 'US-follower' identity adopted throughout the Cold War period up until the Gulf Crisis. According to one of its editorials, this made it difficult for Japan to adjust and make positive efforts towards maintaining peace and security.³³⁶ Along with its identity as a 'US-Follower,' Japan's confined identity as a 'unilateral pacifist' was not benevolently recognised by the international community. One reason for this line of thinking was perhaps that while assuming the identity of the 'follower,' the framework of policy thinking could not possibly go beyond what the US expected from Japan or what should or should not be done under the framework of Japan-US bilateral relations. The question of what Japan could or should do for the international community was at the farthest corner of Japanese policy makers' minds. In the case of Cambodian peace process, the level of relationship between the two allies seemed somehow levelled. As a 'supporter,' Japan's scope to exert its own political and diplomatic initiatives was increasing accordingly.

The *Asahi Shimbun* and the *Mainichi Shimbun* together showed some signs of ideational change with regards to Japan's taking on the identity of 'political facilitator' and 'peace supporter.' These newspapers basically contained the idea that in fulfilling the role entailed by such identity, Japan must participate positively in settling regional conflicts, and it was necessary to assume a political function, to a certain extent, and not only an economic one. However, it was quite clear that in participating in the UN peace operations, especially the UNPKO in Cambodia, Japan should subscribe to 'Japanese-style PKO', which concentrated on 'non-military, civil domains and cooperation in rear support.'³³⁷ In peacebuilding, the *Mainichi Shimbun* had quite a vision of sustainable

³³⁶ Editorial, *Daily Yomiuri*, 14/8/1994

³³⁷ *Mainichi Shimbun*, 12/11/1992

development, suggesting that Japan should develop a ‘comprehensive reconstruction programme’ in cooperation with the UN and related countries. The programme should certainly go beyond the ongoing repair of roads and bridges by the SDF, and also encompass health, education, infrastructure, refugee settlement and agriculture.³³⁸ The *Mainichi*’s stance was in line with the SDPJ Prime Minister Murayama’s idea, specifically in terms of clarifying the nation’s future ideals to transform Japan into a ‘caring country’ by promoting ‘a world without arms’ via the support of UN operations.³³⁹ Although never properly defined, the ideas demonstrated the intention of the former opposition party to constructively engage Japan as a proactive ‘peace supporter.’ In this light, the *Mainichi Shimbun* and the *Yomiuri Shimbun* shared the same ideational position regarding the importance of the establishment of a long-term rehabilitation process and developmental approach. The main difference between these two leading newspapers was how the SDF should perform under the UN peacekeeping forces.

Unlike the *Mainichi Shimbun*, the *Asahi Shimbun* also perceived the issue of Japan’s identity change in terms of technical operations rather than political or philosophical ones. The newspaper was convinced that the country was not yet ready to contribute as much as expected by the international community. As it was clear that Japan’s basic concept in international cooperation in the post-Cold War era consisted of the despatch of the SDF for the UNPKOs and relief assistance in case of overseas disaster, the latter was relatively less diplomatic, as it involved only non-military missions. For the *Asahi Shimbun*, Japan’s active assistance in UNPKOs was still problematic. Even if Japan wanted to, it still lacked the organisation, equipment and

³³⁸ *Asahi Shimbun*, 15/10/1992

³³⁹ *Daily Yomiuri*, 19/07/1994 and *Mainichi Shimbun*, 05/02/1993

personnel to undertake such international functions as needed in the UNPKOs. Therefore, it was important that the government first established a 'rapid deployment' organisation devoted to relief operations, medical aid, refugee transport, the distribution of emergency supplies and so on, or a peace operation organisation apart from the SDF.³⁴⁰ In one of the *Asahi Shimbun's* 1992 editorials, the following message was sent across:

'In order for Japan to help in UNPKO, we must clarify that this country will concentrate on the non-military and civilian aspects through the establishment of an organisation devoted to this purpose distinct from the SDF. SDF troops may participate with a leave of absence, but only for missions that do not go beyond truce monitoring...'³⁴¹

In its editorials, the *Nikkei Shimbun* suggested the transformation of ideas arising among the Japanese people as a result of direct interaction with the international community since the Gulf crisis in the following ways. Firstly, the newspaper voiced the importance of defining Japan's 'political role' both at the regional and the global level. For the newspaper, it was important that Japan sent a message to the international community regarding its 'ideological pluralism,' which envisioned Japan as a country that dedicated itself strenuously to eliminating military conflict while respecting human rights and the principle of pacifism, instead of 'jumping on the Western nations' military bandwagon.'³⁴²

In other words, Japan should stick to its philosophy of not resorting to military might in resolving military conflicts. In the Cambodian peace process, the process of

³⁴⁰ *Asahi Shimbun*, 8/5/1991 and 4/8/1991

³⁴¹ Editorial, *Asahi Shimbun*, 12/5/1992

³⁴² *Nikkei Shimbun*, 22/2/1993

sending the signals happening during the first half of the 1990s, indicating that a clear and distinct political identity based on the country's ideational position of 'ideological pluralism' was of the utmost importance. Furthermore, with regard to Japan's participation in UN peace efforts, the transformation of ideas of the UN as 'something in the making' rather than 'something established' was evident.³⁴³ To the *Nikkei Shimbun*, throughout the post-WWII period, Japan's UN-centred diplomacy had long been mere rhetoric, simply because the Japanese people were familiar with the idea that the UN was a fully established organisation with the full ability to resolve disputes accordingly. Through this line of belief, the failure of Japan's post-war UN diplomacy was therefore a result of the incompatibility of Japan's expectations of the UN and the reality of the organisation, which finally led to the emphasis on a Japan-US security alliance and the dichotomy of national and international security, as discussed in Chapter 3. However, the transformation of such ideas and beliefs was evident during the course of the Cambodian peace process. Japan had become more positive in considering how to participate in the 'remaking of the UN'.³⁴⁴ Hence, Japan was more confident in transforming its 'domestic-type' identity, which largely corresponded to the 'international-role' identity.

Public Opinion

Although the Gulf Crisis and the Cambodian peace process were two international events that happened at approximately the same time, the Japanese public responded to these events differently. In the Gulf Crisis, the Japanese public was clearly against both physical participation in the multilateral force and financial contribution. On the contrary, the public response to the Cambodian peace process was relatively

³⁴³ *Nikkei Shimbun* 11/1/1993

³⁴⁴ *Nikkei Shimbun* 15/2/1993

more positive and more receptive to the sense of involvement in the ‘remaking of the UN’ and in supporting the process of the maintenance of international peace. The increasing support for Japan’s proactive diplomacy in maintaining international peace and in supporting UN operations was also echoed by other social actors. In the academic community, Susumu Nishibe, a social critic and former professor of social economics at Tokyo University, voiced the opinion that if being a pacifist country denied Japan the right to bear arms under any circumstances, such identity was merely a ‘cloak for moral laxity’.³⁴⁵ Apart from the pledge of Japanese individuals and firms to make ‘symbolic donations’ to speed up the rehabilitation process³⁴⁶, a sense of public support in the business sector could also be witnessed, even when the government faced severe criticism from the opposition parties following of the death of a Japanese volunteer working for the UNTAC. For example, Yukio Okamoto, the president of the Okamoto International Consulting Firm, criticised society in general over the death of Atsuhito Nakata:

‘[...] the older generation in Japan, including me, was so fainthearted that we made it impossible for our country to officially despatch SDF members, civilian engineers and physicians overseas to contribute to international peace, and the growing criticism of Japan’s hesitation in sending personnel had instilled in the young volunteers such heroic resolve.’³⁴⁷

³⁴⁵ *Mainichi Shimbun*, 8/7/1992

³⁴⁶ According to the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, Japanese firms such as Mitsubishi Motors, Takeda Pharmaceuticals, Kikkoman, Murata and Cannon, Bungei Shunju and Tokuma made donations both in kind and in cash. Besides, other business sectors such as Kinsho Mataichi and Joho Kikaku also contributed to help reinvigorate the domestic environment by expediting several shipments of donated goods at their own expense and by assisting in the operation of a printing press which would launch Cambodia’s first free and non-governmental newspaper, respectively. Source: *Daily Yomiuri*, 13/6/1992

³⁴⁷ *Daily Yomiuri*, 4/5/1993

Public opinion also demonstrated an inclination towards the transformation of ideas constituting the new political identities as ‘political facilitator’ and ‘peace and US-supporter.’ As shown in Table 5.2, the polls conducted in 1992 by Japan’s leading newspapers, the *Asahi Shimbun* and the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, indicated that the majority of Japanese people agreed with the despatch of SDF troops to participate in UN peace operations in Cambodia. Out of 2,178 interviews conducted by the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, eighty-eight (88) percent supported the move while 6 percent opposed the despatch. The remaining 6 percent did not respond to the question. In the poll conducted by the *Asahi Shimbun*, although signs of support were shown, only 52 percent out of 2,346 interviewees backed the despatch of the SDF to Cambodia. The remaining opinions were divided between opposing the participation and no response, at 36 and 12 percent, respectively.

Table 5.2: Public Opinion on Japan’s SDF Despatch to Cambodia³⁴⁸

	<i>Yomiuri Shimbun</i>	<i>Asahi Shimbun</i>
	Percent	
Support	88	52
Oppose	6	36
No response	6	12
Total	100	100

Source: Author’s Table

The discrepancy between the numbers of supporters between these two major newspapers fundamentally lay in the fact that their subscribers had different expectations for Japan with regard to both the process of self-transformation of ‘domestic-type’ identities and how Japan should project itself at the international level. Those who

³⁴⁸ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 1992. Japan Public Opinion Location Library (JPOLL) and *Asahi Shimbun*, 1992, Japan Public Opinion Location Library (JPOLL)

subscribed to the *Yomiuri Shimbun* normally approached the issues more actively, with the expectation that Japan would transform itself into a prime mover in maintaining international peace and security, while the *Asahi Shimbun*'s subscribers were relatively more cautious.


Irrespective of the differences outlined above, it is undeniable that there was a collective transformation of public ideas on Japan's political identity as a political facilitator and a peace supporter during the first half of the 1990s following the failure in the Gulf Crisis and the success of the Cambodian Peace Process. According to Chart 5.1, the percentage of positive responses from the Japanese public on whether or not Japan should contribute to peace and stability under the framework of and in close cooperation with the UN saw a constant increase. In 1991, the poll conducted by the *Yomiuri Shimbun* indicated that only 62 percent of 2,206 interviewees agreed to the close cooperation with the UN, while 20 percent were not in favour of adhering to the framework of the UN in maintaining peace and security. The remaining 17 percent did not respond to the question.³⁴⁹

A stark difference appeared when the same poll was conducted by NHK, which found that 81 percent of the 2,522 respondents were in favour of close cooperation with the UN and only 10 and 9 percent respectively indicated that they did not agree with Japan's adherence to the UN framework and did not have any opinion about the issue.³⁵⁰ The transformation of ideas regarding this issue was confirmed again in 1994 when the *Asahi Shimbun*, whose subscribers had once taken quite a cautious approach in accepting the change of ideational positions on Japan's move towards active peace support, conducted the same poll and revealed that 91 percent of 1,192 interviewees thought that

³⁴⁹ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 1990, Japan Public Opinion Location Library (JPOLL)

³⁵⁰ NHK, 1992, Japan Public Opinion Location Library (JPOLL)

Japan should cooperate with the UN. In the same poll, only 6 percent expressed negative opinions regarding Japan's adherence to the UN framework and 3 percent did not respond to the question.³⁵¹



Source: Author's Chart

5.6 Conclusion: Identities in Transition

The clash between Japan's 'domestic-type' identities and the 'international-role' identity collectively embraced by the international community and expected to be projected by Japan internationally during the Cambodian peace process was not as apparent as was the case during the Gulf crisis. The degree of conformity between the identities adopted domestically and projected internationally was fairly high, if not perfectly or completely matched. It was obvious that the soaring degree of conformity between the two identities resulted in a lower degree of policy passiveness during the peace process. Compared to Japan's reluctance and passiveness in engaging in positive contributions to the Gulf Crisis, its diplomatic endeavours and massive personnel,

³⁵¹ *Asahi Shimbun*, NHK, Shin Joho, 1994, Japan Public Opinion Location Library (JPOLL)

financial and ideational contributions to the success of the Cambodian peace process were omnipresent.

In the area of post-Cold War international threats, both Japan and the international community acknowledged the changing nature of post-Cold War conflicts from simply inter-state conflicts into something more fundamental and concerned with internal complexities within states. This does not suggest that intra-state conflicts or civil wars were new phenomena in international politics. However, one could not deny the way in which intra-state conflicts emerged and drew the attention of the international community as soon as the Cold War ended. The increasing numbers of intra-state and civil wars required the international community to assume the identity of 'political arbitrator' to help sort out internal problems, which otherwise could not have been disentangled. The Cambodian peace process was essentially a pilot case that provided the opportunity for the international community to fully engage itself in a new hybrid form of conflict resolution, which focuses as much on positive intervention to sort out the underlying problems as on the integration of peace operations via international organisations like the UN.

While Japan recognised the changing nature of international conflicts, during the Cambodian peace process, it still did not develop its political attitudes, ideas and beliefs to allow itself to fully engage in the process of conflict resolution as the 'political arbitrator.' Due to the long-standing involvements of several major powers who secured their places, by default, in arbitrating the conflict, Japan was not in such a significant position at the start of the process. Furthermore, Japan's lack of political experience in world affairs also raised suspicions among the four factions and some of the major countries like China. It is also important to take into account that the Cambodian peace process happened at approximately the same time as the Gulf Crisis, during which

Japan's political manoeuvres were assessed as policy and diplomatic failures. Japan's diplomatic and political moves in the Cambodian conflict, therefore, were undertaken in a relatively cautious manner.

However, Japan had adopted the identity of 'political facilitator' without difficulty, as the country was quite enthusiastic about proving its worth in international affairs. The ideas constituting this identity were largely developed as a result of domestic recognition that Japan had to do something politically in order to help sustain long-term international peace and security. Merely adhering to the 'one-country pacifist' identity, as it had done throughout the post-WWII period, was apparently inadequate as a member of the international community. Thus, Japan undertook several diplomatic tasks in cooperation with other neutral countries and some were even initiated by Tokyo to facilitate the arbitrating stage and the process that led to the signing of the peace agreements, as mentioned earlier.

As regards ideas about UN peace operations, in the early years of the post-Cold War period, the international community perceived the UN as a 'messenger for peace' and combined peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding into the same parallel functions. If the thin lines between peacemaking, peace enforcing and peacekeeping were literally blurred during the Gulf Crisis, the Cambodian peace process was one of the finest examples of an event when peacekeeping and peacebuilding were inextricably linked. Taking the trend of post-Cold War international conflicts into account, intra-state conflicts seemed to rank the highest. The need to address not only the issue of ceasefire or status quo among the warring parties but also the root causes of the conflicts, which require a multi-faceted approach of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, was apparent. Such ideas and beliefs reinforced the necessity for the international community to assume the identity of 'peace promoter.' In assuming this identity, the international community

undertook a multi-dimensional approach to restoring a peaceful environment to Cambodia and establishing sustainable development as part of the nation-building process. These functions consisted of not only the traditional peacekeeping activities of containing ceasefires or extending logistical supports to locals; also included in the process of peacekeeping and peace-building were the supervision of free and fair elections and short- and medium-term developmental programmes.

Also adopted by Japan during the Cambodian crisis was the 'peace supporter' identity. In contrast to Japan's ideational position as the 'traditional peacebuilder/developer' during the Gulf Crisis, the nation spent extra efforts to engage itself comprehensively in every level of UN peace operations during the Cambodian peace process. Japan dedicated enormous resources, ranging from personnel to money and ideas, to the peace process. During the stage of late-preventive diplomacy, Japan had portrayed itself as a keen supporter to facilitate the political and diplomatic efforts of the international community in bringing the four adversaries to the negotiating table and ultimately to a compromise agreement. In terms of personnel, Japan also made an epochal contribution of the SDF to participate in non-military areas such as ceasefire monitoring, election monitoring, civilian policing and logistical assisting. Ideational and financial inputs were also effectively injected during the peacebuilding stage through both short- and medium-term development programmes. Despite its massive contribution to the UN operations in the Cambodian peace process, Japan clearly still had some reservations about the military function of the peacekeeping operation due to the restricted domestic conditions. For this reason, although Japan's ideational position had inclined towards active cooperation with the UN and the international community, the collective idea of adopting the 'peace promoter' identity, within which full-fledged military contribution was expected, was not wholeheartedly embraced by Japan.

Regarding the US's ideas, beliefs and expectations regarding Japan's 'international-role' identity projection during the Cambodian peace process, it could be asserted that the US ideas and beliefs regarding the nature of international threats and the UN peace operations were collectively in line with those of the international community. Historically speaking, the US was not directly involved with the Cambodian conflict, other than using Cambodia as a military base to fight with Vietnam during the 1970s and passing non-military support to the non-communist factions of Sihanouk and Son Sann. In terms of assuming an identity as political arbitrator, the US played a major part via the P-5 only during the process of drafting the political settlements by enforcing its ideas on the right for self-determination, the promotion of western democracy and the strengthening of the UN as a medium for peace. Other trivial diplomatic matters were literally left to be tended by other middle powers and other neutral nations. As expected, like other countries, Japan was expected to fill in the gap as a 'US-supporter' by taking responsibility for smoothing disagreements among the four factions.

Largely, during the Cambodian peace process, Japan generally fulfilled the expectations of the US and the international community by making political and ideational inputs of its own accord, which contributed to the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements. However, although Japan was generally willing to transform its identity from that of 'US-follower' during the Gulf Crisis and slip into the identity of 'US-supporter' in the Cambodian peace process, it did not totally stick to the US lead, as it normally did. There were signs that Japan attempted to pursue diplomatic efforts and contribute ideational inputs that diverged from the US path. Many of Japan's own initiatives, which sometimes differed from, or even clashed with, those of the US and the international community, took place through informal talks with the four Khmer factions. Some of Japan's initiatives, such as the unofficial proposal to modify the original draft

political agreement of the P-5 on the issue of arms reduction, demobilisation or the role of UNTAC, were initially under suspicion from both the US and the international community. Nevertheless, some of Japan's attempts were taken into account and did finally materialise.

The transformation of Japan's 'domestic-type' identities, from the 'unilateral pacifist' into the 'political facilitator', from the flat, one-dimensional 'traditional peacebuilder/developer' into the multi-dimensional 'peace supporter' and from the 'US-follower' into the 'US-supporter' was a product of the changing ideational positions that stemmed from direct interactions with the international community during the Gulf Crisis and the Cambodian peace process, as well as changing ideas and beliefs within the domestic constituents. Precisely put, ideas and beliefs embraced by the bureaucracy, political parties and the Japanese public were transformed as a result of the process of self-understanding and self-perception about 'what is going on in the world' as the country interacted with others at the international level. Similar to the Gulf Crisis, during the Cambodian peace process, the MOFA was still the main advocate of the view that Japan should project an 'international-role' identity corresponding to what was expected by the international community, and specifically to discard the WWII 'unilateral pacifist' identity. Having been in direct interaction with the international community, the MOFA's ideas were much more advanced compared to other domestic constituents in portraying Japan as an active country.

The Cambodian peace process allowed the MOFA to transfer its ideas and beliefs to Japanese society by engaging Japan in every stage of the peace process, ranging from late-preventive diplomacy to peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. Firstly, as regards international peace and security, the MOFA filled Japanese society with the reality that the maintenance of peace and security, which was the cornerstone of

the Japanese constitution, could be realised only if Japan could comprehensively participate and cooperate with the international community in all personnel, financial and ideational respects. In other words, Japan had to become one of the prime movers in maintaining international peace and security. Secondly, the MOFA also transmitted its idea on the importance of peace operations as the fundamental mechanism for maintaining peace and security. Although Japan had specialised and preferred to take part in peacebuilding operations, active participation in other areas of peace operations, specifically in peacekeeping efforts, were as significant as the development side of peace operations. Thirdly, regarding Japan-US relations, although the MOFA's ideational position was relative stable and the bilateral relationship was still the cornerstone of Japan's international relations, the MOFA had made it clear to the Japanese public that Japan's autonomous diplomatic and political stance was commensurate to its transformation from a 'US-follower' to a more active 'US-supporter' identity.

The ideas and beliefs of political parties in Japan during the Cambodian peace process were very much linked with the Gulf Crisis. The debates among political parties, although to a much lesser extent, still revolved around the issue of the legality and technicality of the SDF mission abroad. However, their ideational positions seemed to be more positive regarding the despatch of the SDF to Cambodia after the enactment of the 1992 IPC Law and Japan's assumption of the identities of political facilitator and peace supporter and fully backing the process of maintaining peace and security without military involvement, seemed to sit well even with the opposition parties. This was the case because the main opposition party, the SDPJ, also underwent a significant ideational change as a result of its defeat in the 1992 national election and its subsequent election as the ruling party in 1994. The former opposition party's direct interactions with the international community also affected the ideational position of the party,

especially with regard to how Japan should transform its identity from ‘unilateral pacifist’ into something more acceptable to both the international community and to the domestic constituents.

Public opinion in Japan, reflected through major newspapers and polls, also showed signs of positive confidence in the country’s adoption of the political facilitator and the peace supporter identities. The opinions echoed by the *Yomiuri Shimbun* did not differ greatly from those associated with the Gulf Crisis, including the ideas that active political, diplomatic, military and humanitarian or so-called ‘comprehensive’ contributions must be promoted, which were widespread among the newspaper’s subscribers. During the Cambodian peace process, an additional idea expressed through the editorial section was the concern that the ‘half-hearted approach’ of not risking any lives and maintaining strict allegiance to the US would impede Japan from developing its own mature political identity.

The *Asahi* and the *Mainichi Shimbun*, on the contrary, demonstrated some noticeable signs of ideational change. Unlike the views they had echoed during the Gulf Crisis, they both contended that in fulfilling the responsibility of maintaining peace and security, Japan must participate positively in settling regional conflicts and assume a proactive political function, to a certain extent, and not only in the economic sphere. In addition, the newspapers also specifically supported the idea that Japan should invest in building up sustainable peace and development in cooperation with the UN at both the regional and the global level. The *Nikkei Shimbun* voiced an opinion along the same lines as the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, especially regarding appropriate international-role projection and the country’s regional and global functions as well as Japan’s effort to strengthen the UN and to fulfil its UN-centred diplomacy. The newspaper also shared similar ideas to those of the *Mainichi Shimbun* that the balance between assuming the

responsibility expected by the international community and respecting the country's principal philosophy of pacifism must be strictly observed.

In terms of public opinion and polls, the Japanese public demonstrated an inclination towards the transformation of ideas constituting the proactive political identities. The public's relatively warm reception of the despatch of SDF abroad contradicted its previous adamant response against the same move during the Gulf Crisis. The level of public support for full cooperation with the UN had also significantly increased, from 60 percent to almost 90 percent from 1990 to 1994. Coupled with these positive trends, other sectors within the Japanese public also expressed their support for the government's intention to make positive and active contributions via the UN in the Cambodian peace process. On their own accord, both the business and individual sectors had pledged what could be called 'symbolic donations' to expedite the rehabilitation process and the success of Japanese political activity during the peace process.

Although this chapter has demonstrated less divergence between the two sets of 'international-role' and 'domestic-type' identities, which determined the active choice of policy preferences and relatively successful foreign policy projection, it was not until the promotion of the human security policy in the latter half of the 1990s that Japan's process of identity transformation could be considered complete. In the following chapter, the sets of ideas that inform the 'international-role' and 'domestic-type' identities will be compared and the level of conformity between these two identities will be assessed.

Chapter 6 The Promotion of the Human Security Policy (1995-present)

6.1 Background to Japan's Human Security Policy

6.1.1 Human Security Policy and its Significance: An Overview

This chapter treats Japan's promotion of the human security policy as the final stage of the process of identity transformation. Before examining the sets of ideas embedded by the international community and embraced internally in the Japanese society as well as the sets of 'international-role' and 'domestic-type' identities, the background to the policy will be discussed in this section. Some scholars in the area of development studies argue that the origin of what is known today as 'human security' can be traced back to the late 1960s-1970s when the definition of security was broadened to include non-military aspects and the promotion of human development in less-developed countries.³⁵²

In fact, the term has also been coined and substantially developed by IR scholars, politicians, policy makers and practitioners throughout the past decade. As often cited by most IR scholars and government officials, the human security approach was initially introduced by the UNDP in its 1994 Human Development Report. It is clearly stated in the Report that 'human security' should not be equated with 'human development.'³⁵³ Although it was not clear precisely how human security should be approached, the Report distributes ideas outlining the integrative concept of human security to include the two fundamental elements of today's popular phrases – 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want', which address respectively the importance of safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression and the significance of the protection of

³⁵² Busumtwi-Sam (2002: 257-258)

³⁵³ UNDP (1994: 23-24)

people from sudden and damaging disruptions in the pattern of their daily lives and development activities.³⁵⁴

Although the concept is often criticised as ‘lacking, expansive, and vague’ or as ultimately trying to encompass everything from physical security to psychological well-being³⁵⁵, subsequent developments on the concept of human security have been pursued along the UNDP line and have been expanded to cover various aspects of the maintenance of peace and security. Throughout the years, scholars from different theoretical and professional backgrounds have helped define the substantive core of human security; for example, Caroline Thomas suggests that:

‘Human security describes a condition of existence in which basic material needs are met, and in which human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community, can be realised [...].

While material sufficiency lies at the core of human security, in addition the concept encompasses non-material dimensions to form a qualitative whole. In other words, material sufficiency is a necessary, but not sufficient condition of human security that entails more than physical survival [...].

The ‘qualitative aspect’ refers to material sufficiency. The ‘qualitative aspect’ of human security is about the achievement of human dignity which incorporates personal autonomy, control over one’s life and unhindered participation in the life of the community.’³⁵⁶

As vague and expansive as it is, the robust use of the term, particularly among policy makers, government officials and practitioners undertaking different missions in

³⁵⁴ Ibid, (1994: 24)

³⁵⁵ Paris (2001: 88)

³⁵⁶ Thomas (2001: 161-162)

both IGOs and NGOs, has contributed to a number of theoretical and policy implications on the understanding of state and international security and how to respond in case of the lack thereof. Firstly, it is still controversial whether the newly launched human security approach could replace the existing notion of traditional security, which is primarily concerned with undivided territorial integrity or the protection of people from external physical threats.

Despite the traditional view, it has been suggested that the security consideration from a global perspective or ‘common security’, rather than from the angle of an individual nation’s territorial integrity, should be reflected. The most common move, as suggested by King and Murray, is to replace traditional state security with a combination of economic development and existing military security.³⁵⁷ However, the human security concept is not a mere economic extension of state security; nor it is developed around the concept of poverty or economic deprivation alone. Rather, it ultimately challenges the notion of ‘state-centred’ security with a ‘people-centred’ security system, in which chronic threats are prioritised and considered to be just as vital as threats against national territory. In this sense, the human security concept precisely questions the state’s sense of duty to ‘protect’ people from ‘internal or chronic threats’ and to ‘enhance’, to use Caroline Thomas’s categorisation above, the ‘qualitative aspect’ of security through the assurance of people’s dignity, autonomy and creativity within their communities.

Secondly, prior to the emergence of the human security approach, the notions of ‘security’ and ‘development’ were literally placed in different locales of political interest. On the one hand, those working in international organisations might argue about the negative effects of protracted internal and international conflicts within the context of the absence of human rights protection, the inability to access food and health care, the

³⁵⁷ King and Murray (2001-2: 585-586) and The Commission on Global Governance (1995: 79)

lack of a basic guarantee of equal income distribution or ‘the lack of security.’ which require effective short-term humanitarian assistance and higher budget allocation for the organisations concerned.³⁵⁸ On the other hand, those dealing with the area of development tend to focus more on the strengthening of political, social and economic stability through ‘long-term’ structural schemes without acknowledging the sudden and disrupting effects on the absence of security derived from either the collapse of the states themselves or from protracted intra-state and inter-state conflicts. The human security concept, therefore, has helped to bridge the gap between the traditional domains of development assistance, which only addresses the positive side of the ‘long-term’ structural change, and insecurities in the form of sudden disruptions, by emphasising both the negative effects of the lack of ‘security’ and the positive effects of ‘development’ assistance.

Thirdly, the human security concept has not only contributed to the reassessment of traditional state security and national integrity; it has also questioned how international security and UN activities are being handled. From its appearance in the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report, it has been perpetually developed through the establishment of a substantive Human Security Fund in 1998, in the 2000 Millennium Summit and in the UN Secretary General’s 2001 Millennium Development Goals, respectively. Throughout the past decade, the human security concept has been gradually integrated into the core skeleton of the UN activities, specifically in the area of UN peace operations. In parallel with the changing nature of conflicts themselves, which are more intra-state and generate even more transnational and grass-roots problems, peace operations since the end of the Cold War have also become more complex and multifaceted in order to effectively respond to the echoing international tensions. Crucial

³⁵⁸ Interview with a UNHCR personnel, 09/02/2006

to this development is the fact that there is a necessity, even for the UN, to find a holistic framework to bridge the gap between each distinctive type of peace operation – peace making, peacekeeping and peacebuilding – as well as to simultaneously address the grass-roots problems disrupting people’s well-being in the ‘absence of political, economic, social and community security’ through both short-term humanitarian assistance and long-term humanitarian development. In sections 6.2 and 6.3, the sets of ideas and beliefs embedded by the international community and the ‘international-role’ identities resulting from the ideational interactions of ideas at the international level will be examined.

6.2 International Response: Collective Ideas on Peace and Security during the Promotion of Human Security Policy

6.2.1 Collective Ideas on the Nature of International Peace and Security

In the latter half of the 1990s, a shift towards a new ‘people-centred’ security consensus materialised among the UN member states. From the Gulf Crisis to the Cambodian peace process and other peace operations in between, the accomplishment in the employment of multi-dimensional strategies has completely transformed the international community’s understanding about post-Cold War international threats and their effects on people’s safety and survival. For one thing, the international community were in accord on the notion that although the threat of inter-state war has not completely vanished, as witnessed in some regional disputes in the Middle East, South Asia or North East Asia, the most acute and prevalent threats nowadays are no longer aggressive wars waged by one against another. As repeatedly pointed out in earlier chapters, ‘vertical’ or ‘top-down’ political threats caused by malicious governments against their citizens and ‘bottom-up’ social, economic and community disruptions have

led to foreseeable structural and grass-root vulnerability within these countries. Furthermore, the ramifications of ‘horizontal’ impacts resulting from both protracted intra- and inter-state conflicts, in terms of refugee problems, displaced persons or environmental degradation, are considerable. Apart from the fact that the complicated and multi-faceted threats arising from each individual internal conflict are interrelated, the possibility that such interwoven political, economic, social and community threats and disruptions would be contagious is exponentially imminent.

Such rendering and concerns have been echoing among high-ranking UN officials and experts, as evident in the Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change:

‘The UN was created in 1945 above all else ‘to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war’ – to ensure that the horrors of the World War were never repeated. Sixty years later, we know all too well that the biggest security threats we face now go far beyond States waging aggressive war. They extend to poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation; war and violence within States; the spread and possible use of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons; terrorism; and transnational organised crime. The threats are from non-State actors as well as States and to human security as well as State security.’³⁵⁹

Precisely, the transformation of the post-Cold War ideas regarding international peace and security is the result of the increasingly complicated threats and shifting focus from ‘state’ to ‘people’ and ‘community’ as the primary target of threats. This transformation has undoubtedly impinged on the choices undertaken to deal with these

³⁵⁹ UN (2004: 9)

interwoven threats and to enhance people's well-being by the international community, especially the UN, as the main player to maintain international peace and security. As we saw earlier, from its outset in the 1994 UNDP Report, the human security framework has been gradually developed by several national governments and academics as well as IGOs officials and perpetually ingrained into the philosophy, principles and functional organs of the UN. On several occasions, human security has been approved by high-ranking UN officials – more often than not, by the Secretary General himself – as a framework that is considered sufficiently broad to encompass the multiplicity of today's threats. The concept was specifically mentioned in the 2000 Millennium Report by Kofi Annan:

‘[...] no shift in the way we think or act can be more critical than this: we must put people at the centre of everything we do. Nor is that all, for even though the UN is the organisation of States, the Charter was written in the name of ‘we the peoples.’ It reaffirms the dignity and worth of the human person, respect for human rights and the equal rights of men and women, and a commitment to social progress as measured by a better standard of life in freedom from want and fear alike.’³⁶⁰

In short, it was the first time after WWII that the basic principle of the UN had informally integrated the ‘security’ and ‘economic and social’ issues into the same philosophical and operational framework. Practically speaking, the idea of ‘people-centred’ security was welcomed and echoed by several countries, especially Canada and Japan, where the Human Security Network and the Commission on Human Security were established respectively in 1999 and 2001. The independent Commission and

³⁶⁰ UN (2000b: 6-7)

Network, as well as other middle powers and some developing countries, such as Norway, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Greece or Thailand and so on, have embarked on the task of promoting the concepts and ideas to the international public and have also launched peace activities relating to human security through several international symposia and grass-root projects. Although the Japanese and the Canadian governments have placed different emphases and have provided different interpretations of how a 'better standard of life in freedom from want and freedom from fear' can be achieved through UN peace activities, the collective ideas shared by both countries and other members of the international community are to establish a new security framework in the post-Cold War period that defines different types of international threats, different players to provide security, different means to secure peace and different targets directly affected by such potential threats.

6.2.2 Collective Ideas on UN Peace Operations

As suggested earlier, the success of the peacekeeping and enforcement efforts in UN peace operations, particularly during the Gulf Crisis and the Cambodian peace process, had led the international community to believe that the UN has become the core mechanism to deal with international threats, both intra- and inter-state. However, the unsuccessful turns of events in Somalia (UNOSOM II, 1993-1995), Rwanda (UNOMUR, 1993-1994) or Haiti (UNMIH, 1993-1997), which were prematurely terminated and were not fully implemented due to the unyielding militant groups,³⁶¹ triggered the international community to question the practicalities of UN peace

³⁶¹ The mandate of these missions was to take enforcement actions under the US-led multinational force to defuse the tensions between confrontational stakeholders and to provide a secure environment, expedite disarmament and humanitarian assistance: UN, UNOSOM II Mandates, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unosom2mandate.html, UNOMUR Mandates, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unomurmandate.html, and UNMIH Mandates, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unmihmandate.html, accessed 15/03/2006.

operations, especially on the legality of enforcement actions vis-à-vis states' sovereignty, the significance of the renewed collective security system and the effective combination of peace making, peacekeeping and peace building and so on.

Furthermore, the limitations of peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations, coupled with the shortfall of the 'on-demand' peace operations, which lack the capacity to respond to the actual numbers of conflicts, are another concern of the international community. As the record shows, the UN peace operations, specifically peacekeeping operations, could address only one-third of the conflict situations of the 1990s.³⁶² On this basis, the international community has shifted its focus to 'conflict prevention', attempting to prevent potential conflicts before they erupt, as evident in many subsequent General Assembly resolutions stressing the importance of replacing the 'culture of reaction' with one of prevention through the pacific settlement of disputes.³⁶³ These demonstrated that the ideas collectively shared by the majority of the UN member states regarding conflict prevention were relatively broad. In a sense, peace operations have not been limited only to typical 'state-to-state' good offices or the usual preventive diplomacy as the core activities in conflict prevention. These UN peace operations have also been shifted to address the grass-roots difficulties, with the emphasis on the 'people-centred' approach, such as poverty, employment opportunities, education, health, resource depletion, arms reductions and broad-based economic growth.³⁶⁴

Aside from the transformation of ideas and beliefs regarding peace enforcement and preventive diplomacy, it remains now to consider another mutual concern among the international community – the issue of post-conflict situations. This concern is not

³⁶² UN, General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/53/87, 27 January 1999.

³⁶³ UN, General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/56/326, 6 September 2001 and A/RES/57/337, 18 July 2003.

³⁶⁴ UN (2000b: 43-45)

particularly the same as those discussed earlier in terms of how to effectively inject development projects and funds into post-conflict reconstruction programmes or how to handle so-called ‘complex humanitarian emergencies,’ and respond to situations where there is a dramatically increased cost of human lives, flows of displaced persons and refugees, or the suffering of human dignity and well-being.³⁶⁵ The principal concern is how these two phases of humanitarian assistance and development could be effectively brought together via the use of UN peace operations. The conviction that the issues and practices of humanitarian assistance and humanitarian development have become deeply intertwined is a significant ideational transformation within the international community. It is also collectively argued by the community of nations that post-conflict peacebuilding is not supposed to be implemented after the end of peacekeeping missions; rather, a new type of peace operation, which emphasises the need for a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to peace making, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, is indispensable. As agreed by member states during the 60th session of the General Assembly gathering:

‘[...] in order to achieve maximum impact in post-conflict countries, we need to bring together the distinct capabilities of the different parts of the UN system in a coherent way. Yet, these are not the only tasks required in a complex peace operation--human rights, elections, capacity-building and humanitarian and development activities are all critical components of the sustainable recovery process. Against this backdrop we need to forge strategic partnerships within the UN system that build on complementarities while reducing overlaps between the different actors. This is particularly the case for cross-cutting tasks

³⁶⁵ UN, General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/53/87, 27 January 1999

such as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, rule of law, security-sector reform, public administration and support for political processes.’³⁶⁶

6.2.3 Ideas and Beliefs of the US on Human Security

Given its powerful position and its financial commitment to the UN, there is reason to believe that the US government and the US Mission to the UN should have been the main player advocating such a vital ideational transformation of human security within the UN. However, since the time when high-ranking UN officials and the international community have deliberated on human security as an integrated peace and security practice, interestingly, the US government and the US Mission in the UN have never made use of the word in their official statements or remarks. This is not to suggest that the US is totally against the idea of human security. To avoid any misconception about the US’s ideational position towards the new concept of ‘people-centred’ security, it is vital to note that the US policy in the UN and in other international organisations has always been working towards advancing four main policy agendas – peace, security, democracy and human rights.³⁶⁷ As ‘democracy and human rights’ has always been the US commercial slogan for its UN policy since the establishment of the organisation, such official remarks stressing the spirit of building a world organisation that would strengthen peace and security and lay the foundation for a democratic globe has been frequently rehearsed.³⁶⁸

The US has also made it clear that it is not ignorant of the profound changing complexity in the maintenance of peace and security and the UN peace operations in the

³⁶⁶ UN, General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/60/640 (29 December 2005)

³⁶⁷ Bureau of International Organization Affairs, US State Department, Who We Are, Our Mission, <http://www.state.gov/p/io/c14685.htm>, accessed 15/03/2006.

³⁶⁸ Bureau of International Organization Affairs, US State Department (2001), ‘Why the US Joined the UN’ - Address of the Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs to the Swiss Parliament, 3 April 2001, <http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rm2001/2016.htm>, accessed 15/03/2006.

post-Cold War period. To be fair, those issues portrayed as core areas of the human security concept – political (protection of basic human rights), economic (basic income distribution), social (food, health, environmental) and community (cultural, dignity and creativity) security – have been essentially promoted under the Economic, Social and Development Affairs of the US Mission to the UN. From Table 6.1, the data gathered from the US State Department show that in comparison to Japan and other middle powers, the US has been relatively more active than others in promoting what is known today as human security.

Whether the US totally integrates the fundamental idea and philosophy of human security to its UN policy, which emphasises the combination of both ‘security’ and ‘economic and social development’, remains a curious question. Precisely put, a clear link between the ideas regarding ‘international threats’ and ‘people-centred’ security has not yet been established within the framework of the US’s UN policy agenda. For instance, when the US mentioned ‘the looming threats to international peace and security’, it often meant ‘state security’ rather than ‘people-centred’ security. Immediately after the end of the Cold War, in the area of political and security affairs, peace operations included, the US has made it apparent that threats to international law and order and the democratic regime are the priority of the government, as evident in its constant participations in the PKOs and its taking up the leadership of multinational forces to maintain democratic order. One could effortlessly pick up a clear dichotomy between the two spheres of US policy towards the UN, especially when looking at the situation in Somalia, Rwanda or Eastern Congo, where humanitarian issues and programs were not adequately considered, whereas critical political and military decision were taken seriously.

**Table 6.1: A Comparison of Foreign Policy relating to the UN
(US, Japan, Middle Powers)³⁶⁹**

Policy related to the UN Countries	Political and Security Affairs	Economic, Social and Development Affairs	International Law
US	Africa; Americas; Asia; Europe; Middle East; Chemical and Biological Weapons; Decolonisation; Disarmament; IAEA; Outer Space; Peacekeeping; Sanctions; Terrorism, UN Reform	Children; Corrupt Business Practices; Crime Prevention and Control; Democratisation; Development; Disabled Persons; Drug Abuse Control; Economic Conditions; Education; Energy; Environment; Financing for Development; Food-Agriculture; Foreign Trade; Health; Human Rights; Humanitarian Affairs; Landmines; NGOs and Civil Society, Older Persons; Population/Migration; Racial Discrimination; Refugees; Relief; Religious Intolerance; Sanctions; Social Development; Status Of Women; Sustainable Development; Trafficking in Persons	War Crimes; International Criminal Court; Terrorism; Law of the Sea; Human Cloning; Treaties; General
Japan	Arms Control and Disarmament; Atomic Energy, Conflict Prevention; Maritime Affairs; PKO and International Peace Cooperation; Security; Terrorism, Transnational Organised Crime	Agriculture, Fisheries and Forest; Climate Change; Disaster Prevention and Relief; Emigration; Environment; Health and Medical Care; G7/G8; Human Rights; Human Security; Narcotics; ODA; Population and AIDS, Refugees; Science and Technology; Social Development; Women's Issues	Piracy; Transnational Organised Crime; Terrorism; Treaties
Middle Powers	Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament; PKOs, Human Security, Children and Armed Conflicts; Responsibility to Protect; Peace and Reconciliation Efforts; Peace policy	Humanitarian Affairs, Human Rights, Human Security; Gender Equality and Women's Rights; Landmines; International development cooperation; Democratisation Aids and Election Observation	International Criminal Court; International Crime and Terrorism; Compensation for injustice in the national socialist era; Space; humanitarian law

Source: Author's Table

³⁶⁹ US Department of State, US States Mission to the United Nations, <http://www.un.int/usa/polsec.htm>, <http://www.un.int/usa/law.htm>, <http://usunnewyork.usmission.gov/econ.htm>, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/index.htm>, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Canada, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/global_issues-en.asp, accessed 15/03/2006, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway, <http://www.dep.no/ud/global/search/bn.html?sok=j&sokeord=human+security>, accessed 3/10/2006 and The Foreign Office, Germany, <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Aussenpolitik/Uebersicht.html>, accessed 3/10/2006.

However, in the area of peace operations, it is true to some extent that the US also shares the same ideas and beliefs with the international community on the urgency of complex and multidimensional UN peace operations. It has been often rehearsed by US officials that there is a significant correlation between complex emergencies, peace operations and other goals such as human rights, democratisation or the protection of sustainable development.³⁷⁰ One might argue that the US commitment to fight against terrorism has still been the topmost priority and it is sometimes seen, especially after the 9/11 terrorist attack, as a quest that is singled out from other UN-related policies. Nevertheless, it could be argued that the US focus on terrorism also has its benefits, as it addresses one of the core ideas of human security – that of ‘freedom from fear.’ Besides, the US’s original commitment to promote international peace and maintain international stability based on a ‘free-market economy’ and ‘good democratic governance’ and the ‘rule of law’ also underlines another important element of human security – ‘freedom from want.’³⁷¹

6.3 International-Role Identity Projection and Expectations on Japan

6.3.1 On International Peace and Security

‘Comprehensive Security Promoter’

The collective ideas of the international community in assuming an ‘international-role’ identity as the ‘multilateral pacificist’ during the Gulf Crisis truly reflected the emergence of the new approach to peace and security and how both can be restored and maintained through multilateral enforcing efforts. It triggered, first and foremost, the idea that the restoration and the maintenance of peace and security could

³⁷⁰ US Department of State (2000: 8)


³⁷¹ US Department of State (2004a). Statement by Ambassador Patrick Kennedy, US Representative for United Nations Management and Reform, on the Report of the High-Level Panel on Reform, in an informal meeting of the General Assembly, 31 January 2005

not be managed ‘unilaterally’ or ‘single-handedly’ but that a ‘multilateral mechanism’ through the UN was to become the core conflict settlement mechanism. The success in assuming the identity of the ‘political arbitrator’ during the Cambodian peace process was another leap forward by the international community in attempting to find the way to reconcile a far more complex situation characterising the post-Cold War intra- and inter-state conflicts. Assuming the ‘international-role’ identity as the ‘political arbitrator’ required the international community to reconsider the ideas of the ‘systematic’ and ‘all-round’ mechanism, from late-preventive diplomacy and peace operations to post-conflict peacebuilding. The successive transformation of these identities from ‘multilateral pacifist’ to ‘political arbitrator’ and finally to so-called ‘comprehensive security promoter’ has been attributed to the changing understandings among the international community of the development of international peace and security situations and the way in which both should be managed through the human security approach.

As shown in Diagram 6.1, coupled with the purpose of guaranteeing the basic freedom and safety of these security concerns, the human security approach provides a way in which problems regarding casualties of war, the victimisation of citizens or the issue of displaced persons, from both intra- and inter-state conflicts, could be handled by the members of the international community and not by national governments themselves. These so-called ‘protecting functions’ of human security, which emphasise the alleviation of acute suffering during the conflicts and the guarantee of people’s safety and survival in the vast arrays of the above-mentioned needs, require the international community to collaboratively contribute their efforts via humanitarian intervention and well-established humanitarian assistance. Under these ‘protecting functions,’ the idea of using military operations in the form of ‘humanitarian

intervention' under 'collective security' are extensively discussed and supported by most UN members.

Diagram 6.1: Scope of Human Security Approach and its Functions



Source: Author's Diagram

The Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change clearly states on this sensitive issue that if peaceful prevention fails, the Commission is of the opinion that effective security may require the backing of military force. This idea was in fact pioneered by the Canadian government and the Human Security Network, who advocate effective responses to situations that compel human needs with appropriate measures, including coercive manoeuvres like sanctions, international prosecution or even military intervention.³⁷² Despite this, it is important to distinguish between several

³⁷² ICISS (2001: xi)

different situations, from self-defence to situations in which a state is posing a threat to others and situations in which the threat is primarily internal, in order for the organisations concerned and member states to address the problem correctly and not to cause any offence to state sovereignty and the fundamental national philosophy to which the individual nation adheres.³⁷³ Although the majority of nations agree to the essence of this humanitarian intervention under the banner of ‘responsibility to protect’, as earnestly promoted by the Canadian government and the Human Security Network, the question of the use of force is nonetheless a matter of heated debate, especially in situations where threats are internal.³⁷⁴

Furthermore, by assuming the ‘international-role’ identity as the ‘comprehensive security promoter,’ the international community also embraces another important ideational component of the ‘empowering function’ of the human security approach, which introduces a long-term focus on development and is strongly advocated by the Japanese government and the Commission on Human Security. This function addresses the importance of optimistic qualities of human development or the expansion of people’s choices and equal access to public goods in order for them to live in a secure, stabilised community with sustainable development. The areas into which member states should invest their resources and assistance under the human security approach are no different from the areas suggested as the basic requirements for human welfare – economic, health, personal, environmental, community, cultural and political security.

However, it is the first time under the human security approach that the issues are being tackled in ‘a continuous and interconnected succession’ and that development under the human security approach is not treated as an end in itself, as it was previously

³⁷³ UN (2004: 61)

³⁷⁴ Commission on Human Security (2003: 21)

perceived. Rather, it is seen as a means to an end to achieve its final purpose of providing people with the basic needs of safety, survival, livelihood and dignity.³⁷⁵ It is, in a way, a fundamental ground for preventing the violent conflicts that are often caused by problems rooted in the absence of systematic and sustainable development. Besides, another added value of the human security approach is that, for the first time, it addresses the problem concerning the gap between humanitarian assistance and humanitarian development. Without a connecting approach, which accommodates continuous progress of humanitarian practises, there had always been a huge void, especially when the period of humanitarian assistance was terminated but the process of humanitarian development had not yet started. During this time, people in areas of conflict were left confused and hopeless, and it could even push the peace process back to its earlier stage of serious turmoil. This continuous and 'non-linear' approach to human protection and empowerment is also being applied not only in humanitarian assistance and development but also in other areas of operations to secure peace and maintain international stability, as will be discussed in the following section.

6.3.2 On UN Peace Operations:

'Humanitarian Peace Intervener'

UN peace operations during the Gulf Crisis, the Cambodian peace process and subsequent missions have reaffirmed several vital aspects of the post-Cold War UN peace operations. In the latter half of the 1990s, the increasing numbers of internal conflicts and the support for ideas regarding 'people-centred' security among the members of the international community paved way towards another development of the UN peacekeeping operations. As the threats confronting the international community

³⁷⁵ Newman (2001: 245)

nowadays are not generally issues of self-defence or situations in which a state is posing a threat against others, but rather situations in which the threat is primarily internal, the focus on the UN peace operation thus has to be adapted to address the problem of internal structural collapses and the victimisation of people. The idea has led the international community to largely agree to assume an 'international-role' identity as the 'humanitarian peace intervener.' The Canadian Government, through the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), has made the central idea very clear: that in the event of ethnic cleansing and significant numbers of victims, or 'when a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it,' the principle of non-intervention yields to the international 'responsibility to protect.'³⁷⁶ The novel idea of the 'responsibility to protect' then implies the need to modify several aspects of UN peace operations in many ways.

By assuming the 'international-role' identity as the 'humanitarian peace intervener,' it is the first time in its history that official consensus on the method of response in the event of a failed state or when there is a massive-scale of loss of lives has been established. The collective idea regarding humanitarian intervention, especially in intra-state conflicts, not only has implications for state sovereignty or the practices of collective security but also for the changing formation and combination of peace operations. From the Gulf Crisis onwards, the transformation of UN peace operations and activities have been incessant, from integrating enforcement measures and the enhancement of the multi-dimensional nature of UN peace operations to the synchronisation of the previously clear-cut mandates of the three main UN peace operations. Apart from the integral role in balancing and maintaining the traditional

³⁷⁶ ICISS (2001: xi)

rights of sovereign states and the rights of the international community to protect people from victimisation within those states, the collective ideas embraced among the international community also help to advance the systematic combination of conflict prevention and the pretext of military intervention (peace making), peace settlements, including quasi-enforcement measures, and humanitarian actions (peacekeeping and peace enforcing) and development assistance (post-conflict peacebuilding) into the same integrated and overlapping process.

In the area of prevention, the preventive measures cover both the immediate actions of consultations, good offices, military and political deployment and humanitarian relief within the timeframe of the conflicts and what is called ‘structural prevention,’ which emphasises the long-term support of the establishment of human security systems. According to Cockell, ‘structural prevention’ consists of preventive peacebuilding, preventive disarmament and preventive development, which basically includes governance, human rights and economic and society stability, to name a few.³⁷⁷ This structural prevention is, in a way, an integral part of the post-conflict peacebuilding process, or to put it another way, the peacebuilding components implemented as preventive measures during the peacemaking process. Simultaneously, peacemaking via the pretext of military measures and the quasi-enforcement measures of the peacekeeping stage have also become significantly intertwined. The mandate to use military intervention to defend humanitarian standards as conceptualised in the human security approach during the peacemaking process and the mandate for intervention to help UN agencies, NGOs and those involved with humanitarian assistance and

³⁷⁷ Cockell (2001: 27)

democratisation during peacekeeping operations by UN peacekeepers are increasingly indistinguishable.³⁷⁸

This highlights the important fact that the peacekeeping operations have been developed from the first generation of traditional peacekeeping, to use Yasushi Akashi's terminology, which focused only on cease-fire monitoring and non-military activities, to the second generation, which incorporated humanitarian components and the establishment of the rule of law and democracy into multifunctional peacekeeping activities. It is generally argued that the recent development of the third generation of UN peacekeeping, which integrated the enforcing actions into its usual mandates, as also been perpetually developed, with equal successes and failures. Although the fourth generation of peacekeeping has not yet been officially pronounced by international figures or policy makers, the succeeding development of peace operations through the overlapping combination of peacemaking or peacekeeping mandates and post-conflict peacebuilding measures is underway. At present, whether and when the mandates of the peacekeepers should be terminated and the mandates of the peacebuilders should commence is still controversial.

The current multifaceted tasks of UN peace operations, based on the concept of human security, raise questions as to whether continuous humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations are needed to fill the void before the peacebuilders and long-term humanitarian development projects reach the area. Given the fact that political change and some aspects of economic or social life need to be undertaken constantly, the withdrawal of peacekeepers and the humanitarian assistance provided by both UN specialised agencies and NGOs without the prompt replacement of peacebuilding operations and humanitarian development programmes would obstruct the recovery

³⁷⁸ Richmond (2001: 40)

process following such conflicts. Human security is therefore an appropriate approach to fill the existing operational void.

6.3.3 On Japan-US Relations:

'US Partner'

As shown in Table 6.1, the US policy towards the UN in the latter half of the 1990s can be divided into three main areas – political affairs, economic and social affairs and international law. As a permanent member of the UNSC, it is not surprising that the US government focuses more on the political dimension of its UN policy than on any other area. In terms of official statements released by the US Missions in the UN, there have been approximately 440 official statements and remarks accounting for such issues as UNPKOs and terrorism, while there are approximately 450 statements regarding disarmament. Nevertheless, the US government has not neglected its obligations to promote the UN policy in economic, social and development areas. The relative emphasis on humanitarian affairs and sustainable development is considerable, as seen in the 366 statements and 339 speeches on these issues during 1998-2006, respectively.³⁷⁹ It could be argued that the numbers of speeches and statements made during these past years highlights the US interest in both security and humanitarian issues. It is especially cited by the Department of State that humanitarian programmes have also gained a prominent place and occupied US overall foreign policy and that the humanitarian factor has become central to senior policy makers' deliberation over US foreign policy priorities.³⁸⁰

³⁷⁹ Speeches and Statements counted from the US States Mission to the UN website, <http://www.usunnewyork.usmission.gov/polsec.htm> and <http://www.usunnewyork.usmission.gov/humanit.htm>, accessed 04/07/2006.

³⁸⁰ US Department of State (2000: 3)

Regarding the policy towards human security, although the US had somewhat limited influence comparing to other major countries, even Japan, the relationship between the two countries in implementing UN policies in the latter half of the 1990s were more or less in line. As suggested earlier, although the US has never adopted ‘human security’ in any of its official policy rhetoric, it has not undermined Japan’s attempt to promote human security through the Commission on Human Security via the UN and also has consented to the principles behind the concept itself, though with some reservation regarding the predominance of state-to-state relationships rather than a people-centred approach to security.³⁸¹ Besides, the US government’s emphasis on promoting ‘fundamental freedoms’ and the so-called ‘non-negotiable demands of human dignity’, which are regularly repeated, also include almost all aspects mentioned under the human security concept generally advocated by Japan and the international community.³⁸²

In a way, Japan’s promotion of the human security concept could be considered as a ‘policy compatibility’ that helps substantiate the US’s assertiveness about ‘sustainable development.’ Accordingly, the two policy concepts, pursued differently by both partners, naturally complement each other. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the concept of human security, especially in the aspect of ‘freedom from want’ or the ‘empowerment’ element, embraced and consistently developed by the international community, is broadly similar to the US promotion of sustainable development. To put

³⁸¹ Interview with a high-ranking MOFA official and the former Japanese Mission to the UN, 21/02/2006

³⁸² The issues include the problems of refugees, human rights, food crisis, governance, education, health care and so on. Source: US Department of State (2004a), Statement by Mark P. Lagon, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organisation Affairs, Remarks at the Hudson Institute, 13 September 2004.

it more clearly, equality of opportunity and a life of dignity can only be achieved through development, which, in the US view, must be ‘sustainable.’³⁸³

In the other aspect of freedom from fear or the protecting function of human security, although the US has been renowned for its unilateral effort to secure peace and security by means of political and military interventions, it also shares the same ideas adopted by the international community that a ‘comprehensive’ approach to security and UN peace operations must be thoroughly assessed and put into action. It is therefore typical for the US to accept with open arms the shifting position of the international community in favour of humanitarian intervention, which has always been in line with the US policy in utilising the UN and its peace operations. As precisely put by Madeleine Albright in her appraisal of NATO’s embarking on building a new post-Cold War order by using force in Europe:

‘[...] while weakness invites aggression, strength is a parent to peace.’³⁸⁴

This clearly shows how the US believes in the power of force to establish long-term peace and therefore it has become natural for the US to expect not only on Japan, but also the international community, to assume the ‘international-role’ identity as US partners, especially during the time when such transnational threats as terrorism are overwhelming. In the area of UN peace operations, for example, the US has made it clear that there must be a focus on following aspects in managing UN peace operations. Firstly, in principle, it is widely understood among US officials that UN operations are nowadays a multifaceted task, which requires multilateral efforts based on human rights and democracy to achieve lasting peace and security. To a large extent, the US has

³⁸³ US Department of State (2002) Vision Statement for the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 23 May 2002)

³⁸⁴ *Asahi Shimbun*, January 2000

never deviated from its founding principles and framework of peace based on a democratic system and the rule of law. Secondly, the US government agrees that ‘multi-dimensional peacekeeping’ such as disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and rehabilitation of former combatants (DDRR) are now believed to be substitutes for the traditional peacekeeping function of only ceasefire monitoring.³⁸⁵

Furthermore, the US strongly emphasises civilian and military policing and the significance of institutionalising these functions to facilitate the increasing demands of complex peacekeeping operations.³⁸⁶ The emphasis is clearly an attempt by US and the international community to fill the gap between peacekeeping and peacebuilding as well as between short-term peacekeeping assistance and long-term institution development. In this sense, the US also shares the ideas of the international community that focusing on grass-roots complications offers a head start to maintain the overall structure of lasting peace and security and that the lack of a continuous presence of peacekeeping institutions or short-term humanitarian assistance would simply invite unrest in the immediate post-conflict period.

6.4 Domestic-Type Identity Formation: Japan’s Political Identity during the Promotion of Human Security Policy

As shown in previous sections, Japan’s own understanding about its political-security identity has undergone tremendous change and transformation throughout the past decade, from a mere reluctant player to an active peace promoter. To a large extent, Japan’s ideas surrounding peace and security and its ‘peace diplomacy’³⁸⁷ during the

³⁸⁵ US Department of State (2004b), Statement by Ambassador Stuart Holliday on UNPKO in the UNSC, 17 May 2004

³⁸⁶ US Department of States (2001a), Statement by Ambassador Patrick Kennedy in the 4th Committee of the General Assembly on the Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of PKO, 21 November 2001.

³⁸⁷ Yasushi Akashi’s terminology.

latter half of the 1990s have been influenced by its failure in the Gulf Crisis and its unexpected success in the Cambodian peace process. The most significant change of ideas seems to be the country's realisation that 'peace is no longer free' and that to get the most of the secured international security environment, Japan has to contribute. The following section will discuss the system of ideas and beliefs embedded within Japan and how far these ideas have informed Japan's 'domestic-type' identities during the promotion of human security.

6.4.1 Ideas Surrounding International Peace and Security:

'Comprehensive Security Promoter'

Since the end of the WWII, Japan's national security has been placed in a unique arrangement with the US, which allows it to refrain from full-scale military exercises outside Japan and from participating in collective defence. On the contrary, the maintenance of international peace and security has been placed upon the parameter of Japan's UN-Centrism without any substantial link to Japan's national security. Not only has the security discourse in Japan been sharply dichotomised; the policy priority has been clearly placed on national security and the close alliance with the US over the concern about international security and UN-Centrism. From 1976 until the emergence of human security, Japan started to release, through the MOD, the National Defence Programme Outline (NDPO), which clearly states that:

'[...] the international political structure of the surrounding regions and Japan's own domestic situation would not undergo any major changes for some time and judging that the existence of the Japan-US Security Arrangements

could continue to play a major role in maintaining the stability of international relations [...],³⁸⁸

The statement confirmed that Japan's primary concern regarding its national defence and the scope of the SDF's function could not extend beyond the parameters of the existing Japan-US security arrangements nor the area surrounding Japan. However, the same Outline revised in 1996 states differently, specifically regarding the role of the SDF and the ideas behind Japan's security understanding. It is rather obvious that in the latter half of the 1990s, in addition to the principal concern over its own national defence and the minimum necessity of the SDF exercise to ensure national safety, both ideational concern and the actual SDF functions have been extended to provide a more stable security environment through international peace activities. As stipulated in the 1996 Outline:

'[...] the expectations for the role of the SDF have been increased in such functions as providing aid in cases of large-scale disasters and contributing to building a more stable security environment through participation in international peace cooperation activities, in addition to their principal mission of defending Japan.'³⁸⁹

By adopting the 'domestic-type' identity of 'comprehensive security promoter,' Japan's new understanding about peace and security could be witnessed in the 2005 NDPO, which acknowledges that 'new threats and other various situations that affect peace and security, including proliferation of weapons' do in fact 'pose an imminent challenge to today's international community.'³⁹⁰ Apart from the fact that Japan started to recognise the new threats and changing environment, the country was also capable of

³⁸⁸ JDA (1976), National Defence Programme Outline 1976

³⁸⁹ JDA (1996), National Defence Programme Outline 1996

³⁹⁰ JDA (2005), National Defence Programme Outline 2005

visualising how to ensure its national security beyond the area surrounding Japan. The recent security understanding also implicates both Japan's defence and foreign policy to rely not only on the existing Japan-US security arrangements to prevent physical attacks on Japan but also on collective efforts via the framework of the UN to prevent international threats from arising in the first place. This so-called two-pronged 'Integrated Security Strategy' is also coupled with another layer of development in Japan's understanding about national and international security, specifically through the permission of the SDF to assume its primary mission in UN peace operations.³⁹¹ The corresponding policy implementation is essentially the result of the acceptance of the necessity of the use of force in the process of both conflict prevention and other UN peace operations. It could be argued that Japan's present security concerns have entered an unprecedented phase: a balanced framework between Japan-US security arrangements and the UN mechanism. As stipulated in the current 2005 Outline,

'[...] Under these circumstances, the international coordination and cooperation on security issues have taken root in the international community as the stable international environment serves the interests of all nations, and nations of the world are making wide range of efforts including those under the framework of international organisations such as the UN...

... Besides, military force has begun to play broader roles and is actively used for various purposes, such as preventing conflict and reconstructing failed states in addition to deterring and/or responding to armed conflict [...]'³⁹²

³⁹¹ Hughes (2004: 70-71)

³⁹² MOD, NDPO (2005: 2).

Despite its unique view on traditional security, further development of its human security policy emerged on the Japanese political stage as an alternative security course. In fact, human security has taken its roots from the concept of ‘freedom from fear and from want’ advocated in the Constitution Preamble.³⁹³ However, it was not until the promotion of human security that Japan could incorporate the idea of promoting international peace and security into its UN-Centrism and make it more concrete. Japan’s human security has been integrated into the bigger framework of both Japan’s UN and foreign policy via its generous contributions to the Commission on Human Security and its Grant Assistance for Grassroots Projects in early 2000 and through the incorporation of human security as one of the three basic principles of the ODA in 2005.³⁹⁴ At face value, Japan’s move to focus on human security activity is often understood as merely a response to ‘global trends’ or ‘international pressures’ or even to the logic of ‘burden-sharing’ between Japan and the US. It is also often understood that human security, in fact, is within close proximity to the humanitarian missions to which Japan has long adhered.

However, Japan’s insights into interconnected threats and the country’s experiences in UN peace operations have led to considerable convergence of the ideational differences regarding national and international security held by the JDA and the MOFA. The key basis from which the concept has materialised is that national security cannot be achieved unilaterally or through a narrow-minded ‘type-identity’ as

³⁹³ As quoted in section 3.1, p. 94 of this dissertation.

³⁹⁴ The concept materialised during Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi’s administration, when he expressed his views on human security and announced Japan’s support for establishing the Trust Fund on Human Security in the United Nations in December 1998. From then on, succeeding Japanese administrations have contributed financially to the Trust Fund on a regular basis and the concept itself has been gradually reviewed and developed to suit Japan’s original peace philosophy. In addition, in 2001, the Commission of Human Security was also established under the full sponsorship of the Japanese government and co-chaired by Ogata Sadako, the former High Commissioner of the UNHCR and the Cambridge professor, Amartya Sen. See further details on activities related to the Trust Fund on Human Security in MOFA, Japan (2004b: 7).

the ‘one-country pacifist.’ Having acknowledged security in this new light via the decade-long interactions with the international community within the UN, Japan has gradually integrated the idea that the concept of national security should go beyond the traditional assurance of Japanese and regional integrity to equal assurance of international security. The perpetual transformation of political identity to that of so-called ‘comprehensive security promoter’ is, therefore, the result of the transformation of Japan’s security insights. As seen in the 2005 NDPO, one of the three bases of Japan’s defence policy is to ‘improve the international security environment so as to reduce the chances that any threat will reach Japan in the first place.’ The obvious link between Japan’s national security and international security has become systematically rationalised and institutionalised, partly because the earnest promotion of human security policy, via active participation in the UN and other activities undertaken to enhance the international security environment as well as via the ODA and extensive diplomatic efforts, which are of the greatest advantage to Japan.³⁹⁵

6.4.2 Ideas Surrounding UN Peace Operations:

‘Development Peace Promoter’

Since the end of WWII, Japan’s idea about the maintenance of international peace and security was simply to put its faith in the UN and to place its strong dependence on bilateral relations with the US. Although Japan was more successful in utilising its new UN-Centrism as a platform to promote international peace and security in the post-Cold War period, as evident in Japan’s contribution to more than 20 UNPKOs and related UN peace operations throughout the past decade, the central policy

³⁹⁵ MOD, NDPO (2005: 7)

framework on which these contributions were based was nowhere to be found.³⁹⁶ The human security concept emerging during the Asian Financial Crisis – a concept directed to help solve the social and economic problems in Asia – happened to be the platform from which Japanese policy makers could link the new-UN Centrism to actual policy implementation to promote international peace and security.³⁹⁷ As mentioned earlier in Chapter 3 and as shown in Figure 3.3, human security is perhaps the policy manifestation of the new UN-Centrism.

In essence, since 1998, when the Obuchi administration started to introduce human security as Japan's concrete policy agenda, the working definition of the concept itself had been developed without much direction until it was officially conceptualised by the Commission on Human Security in 2001.³⁹⁸ The key elements of Japan's human security concept proposed by the Commission on Human Security, as described in Figure 6.1, consist of the strategies adopted to reach the goals of 'protecting and empowering' people, which can also be implemented into two different but intertwined levels – short-term and long-term. The two concepts of 'protecting and empowering' people are different to the extent that the former will be adopted to address both immediate effects and short-term conflict-related problems, while the latter will be implemented to emphasise long-term development assistance through aid, good governance and the promotion of democracy to 'prevent conflict' from taking place. The 'protecting function' is specifically concerned with how to help maintain human rights

³⁹⁶ MOFA (2001: 14-15), *Nihon to Kokuren* (Japan and United Nations).

³⁹⁷ Interview with a high ranking MOFA official responsible for human security policy, interviewed on 21/02/2006

³⁹⁸ The concept and its connection to UN peace operations itself was unknowingly pronounced by the late Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro in 1996, although he did not intend for the concept to be labelled 'human security'. He clearly announced Japan's intention to create a 'better world for future generations' through which the prevention and resolution of conflicts, PKO or other UN operations that are complementary to the collective security function, and the long-term development programmes which guarantee the well being of every human being, would all be simultaneously promoted by the Japanese government. MOFA (1996a), Statement by Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro at the 51st Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 24 September 1996.

and ensure the safety of people trapped in ongoing violence and conflicts. This would basically include preparation for the pretext of military intervention, humanitarian actions and technical assistance to disarm, protect casualties' rights and well being, and so on. It might well be stretched so far as to establish more legitimate and stabilised political and economic regimes, which would finally ensure sustainable peace for those people. All of these functions are believed to be fulfilled through UN peacekeepers and partly through UN peacebuilders in order to facilitate 'seamless assistance for peace consolidation.'³⁹⁹ On Japan's part, it has directed its efforts into undertaking UN peace operations involving disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) in Sierra Leone and Afghanistan, for example.

The 'empowering function' involves both short- and long-term supportive measures aiming at eradicating the root causes that account for the eruption of political and economic unrest as well as the rise of transnational organised crime and terrorism. The latter is specifically a new threat that can be countered only through the strength of people and communities rather than the traditional approach of military exercise through collective security.⁴⁰⁰ Apart from the significance of ensuring good health and better education through several development assistance programmes, the concept of empowering people is also founded on the belief that people and their communities should be reinforced with freedom of faith, dignity and fulfilment in order to make better choices for themselves and stay clear from violence. Accordingly, the concept of human security itself is broadly different from humanitarian actions. The latter simply addresses the narrow but positive side of development assistance, which Japan has undertaken for quite some time, either through its ODA or through UN organs such as the UNDP or the

³⁹⁹ See for further details in MOFA (2004c) on *The UN in the 21st Century: Time to Address New Challenges*.

⁴⁰⁰ Commission on Human Security (2003: 23-24)

UNHCR. The human security approach, on the contrary, is aimed at integrating the whole procedure of short-term difficulty alleviation and long-term maintenance of international peace and security.

Figure 6.1: Japan’s Human Security Approach

	‘Protecting Functions’	‘Empowering Functions’
Short-term	Violence and conflict	Health care Human rights Skills/knowledge/ education
Long-term	Arms reduction, Institutionalisation of protecting organs e.g. civilian police	Migration, Dignity Education, Health Economic security etc.

Source: Author’s Figure

It is obvious that Japan is not inclined to support endeavours to promote the ‘protection function’ under the new label of the Canadian’s government’s ‘responsibility to protect’ due to its ingrained philosophy of not using force to enforce peace. The emphasis on the connection between ‘peace operations and development,’ which broadens the focus of ‘preventing violent conflict (in order to establish peace) and eradicating deprivation such as impoverishment, ill health, illiteracy or maladies (in order to maintain balance and constitute long-term development,’ has been on actions that a development peace promoter like Japan is rather keen on. The ideas and beliefs of this slightly different shade of the human security concept inevitably result in the formation of the identity of ‘development peace promoter,’ whose focus is on development or the preventive approach, rather than on the protection approach as a

starting point to international peace. As suggested by one renowned Japanese international figure:

‘[...]‘humanitarian intervention’ is not what Japan pushed. On the contrary, the emphasis is on ‘protection from the top’, which deals with people when they are not being protected by their own government through UN peacekeepers, and ‘empowerment from the bottom’ which involves several combinations of short-term humanitarian assistance and long-term humanitarian development via the UN peacebuilding operations and other separate donor governments. These two main elements are something Japan and the Commission have seriously developed [...]’⁴⁰¹

Furthermore, by embracing such ideas and assuming the ‘domestic-type’ identity as the ‘development peace promoter,’ the major concern collectively shared by the Japanese government and the international community regarding the past implementation of the UN peace operations is the gap between each individual stage of the operations, especially between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The absence of an integrated approach to link short-term humanitarian assistance and long-term humanitarian development has become the main focus of the Japanese government and leading Japanese development agencies. Obviously, the difference between Japan’s previous development ideas and the current development implementation under the human security approach is that Japan’s development policy is now integrated into UN peace operations and is no longer a separate policy. One concrete example, as mentioned several times before, is the review of ODA Charter in 2003, with other key development

⁴⁰¹ Interview with a former head of the UN specialised agency who is currently the president of Japan’s leading development institution, 22/02/2006

agencies, such as the JICA, all placing human security as one of their leading criteria for Japan's ODA policy and development assistance.

6.4.3 Ideas Surrounding Japan-US Relations:

'US Partner'

Some raise questions as to whether the human security policy is an alternative to traditional policies for national security and whether Japan's future security orientation will part way with the US. It has been argued that Japan's action to promote human security does not approximate traditional security policy and merely centres on humanitarian issues.⁴⁰² One objection to this assertion might be that the development of Japan's human security concept and the ideas behind it is partly a product of ideational interactions with the international community on contemporary threats and security and partly a result of Japan's decade-long internal transformation of ideational understanding towards how to achieve peace and security. Peace and security for Japan, in Yukio Satoh's words, 'is not like water anymore because it's no longer free',⁴⁰³ and the increasing interlinking of Japan's national and international security have inevitably resulted in a shift in the idea that Japan's UN policy is best implemented in parallel with a Japan-US alliance, and vice versa, to ensure overall peace and stability for Japan. Former Prime Minister Koizumi also repeatedly emphasised the importance of making the Japan-US alliance compatible with Japan's cooperation in the international community.⁴⁰⁴ Further questions have been raised by a Japanese academic about the increasing importance of Japan's UN policy and the settlement of peace and security.

⁴⁰² Edstrom (2003: 220)

⁴⁰³ Interview with a former high-ranking MOFA official and a president of a Japanese research institute, 21/02/2006

⁴⁰⁴ *Daily Yomiuri*, 24/02/2004

The Japan-US alliance is no longer the only viable option that will help ensure the path towards the maintenance of peace and security. In Fujiwara Kiichi's words:

‘[...] if Japan and the United States give priority to their bilateral security relationship – a by-product of the Cold War era – over their relationship with the United Nations, and keep on updating it, will that ensure the maintenance of peace in Asia and the world? No. I think it would be even more difficult to maintain international peace and security [...]’⁴⁰⁵

On the one hand, the human security concept has not even been an issue that has had a direct impact on the relationship between the two countries. A Japanese high-ranking official even points out that Japan's promotion of human security policy does not obstruct any of the US interests in the UN and that the US still has no interest whatsoever in the concept of human security, compared to the Canadian or other European governments.⁴⁰⁶ This statement is at least partly correct. As mentioned earlier, the US has never actually registered the term ‘human security’ in any of its official statements and remarks in the UN. However, as the essence of the human security concept, including the protection and empowerment functions proposed by the Japanese government and the Commission on Human Security, are similar to the US promotion of comprehensive peace operations and sustainable development, the US interest in endorsing what it perceives, perhaps, as redundant to the existing concepts, is rhetorically far from active.

Notwithstanding the US ambivalence to the human security concept within the UN, the collective ideas regarding the increasingly complex security environment and

⁴⁰⁵ *Asahi Shimbun*, February 2000

⁴⁰⁶ Interview with a high-ranking MOFA official and a former Japanese Mission in the UN, 21/02/2006

how the UN peace operations should be handled between Japan and the US are fairly well synchronised. Occasionally, the US also pushes forward concrete policy implementations that complement definitions under the scope of human security. For example, the US government also argues for ‘fundamental freedom’, which emphasises the safety and well-being of people, especially from violation and punishment by their own governments.⁴⁰⁷ From the perspective of human security’s ‘protection element,’ the US policy to dispose of oppressive regimes and to enhance the free will and liberty of spirit inherent in all human beings is also considered to fall within the scope of Japan’s human security concept. Moreover, Japan has always recognised the importance of connecting preventive measures to post-conflict peacebuilding and national rehabilitation. The US generally agrees that ‘support for the efforts of the UN and the efforts of all states to engage in preventive measures – measures that identify causes of conflict and address them before they evolve into violence – are necessary.’⁴⁰⁸

In the area of peace operations, both countries also agree about the comprehensive approach in UN peace operations that address the missing link or the void between the transitional periods of each individual peace operation. The cooperation and synchronised ideas between the two countries are particularly evident through concern about the void between peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. For example, the US suggestion of the institutionalisation of the civilian police was earnestly reciprocated by the Japanese government and was also advocated as an important measure during the transition period from the peacekeeping to the peacebuilding process, because people’s safety and security is also in question when military peacekeepers have completed their mandates. Peacebuilders, on the contrary,

⁴⁰⁷ US Department of State (2004a), Statement by Mark P. Lagon at the Hudson Institute, 13 September 2004

⁴⁰⁸ US Department of State (2001b), Statement by Ambassador James B. Cunningham on Peacebuilding: Towards a Comprehensive Approach, 5 February 2001.

are mandated with missions that focus only on reconstruction and development. Apart from providing public security and criminal justice, the institutionalisation of law-enforcing missions or the civilian police for the purpose of preventing the re-emergence of social and political unrest during the post-conflict state also produce an integrated approach for integrated UN peace operations, which are considered by both countries to be an important agenda.

Besides, while Japan's 'seamless peace consolidation' addresses the problem of short- and long-term humanitarian assistance (during the peacekeeping stage) and humanitarian development (during the peacebuilding stage), the US's additional argument is that post-conflict activities are not in 'linear' progression. Therefore, peacebuilding measures must sometimes be organised even while peacekeeping operations are present.⁴⁰⁹ This line of argument, raised by both governments, was also emphasised by Ambassador James Cunningham, who argued that the real protection is to create a 'culture of protection' based on the rule of law. In this sense, he means that peacekeeping measures alone cannot substitute for the rule of law or the restoration of legitimate national authority and effective national rehabilitation, which must be constructed via international efforts during the peacebuilding stage. In the following section, the ideational positions of the Japanese key actors and the exchanges of ideas and beliefs among them, which are believed to have an impact on the transformation of Japan's 'domestic-type' identities, will be explored.

⁴⁰⁹ US Department of State (2004c), Statement by Ambassador Anne Patterson on Civilian Aspects of Conflict Management and Peacebuilding, in the UNSC, 22 September 2004.

6.5 Ideas and Beliefs that have informed Domestic-Type Identities

6.5.1 Bureaucratic Worldviews

Throughout the past decade, there has been a gradual change in Japan's ideas towards stabilising international peace and security, which have resulted in the identity transformation from the 'unilateral pacifist' during the Gulf Crisis and 'peace supporter' during the Cambodian peace process to 'comprehensive security promoter' in the late 1990s. The most vital change is the key idea or concept of 'peace' within Japanese society and the exchange of that ideational understanding about peace with others in the international arena. This transformation of ideas regarding peace and security is considered as one of the main influences on the transformation of Japan's political identities, which directly resulted in Japan's more active UN policy preference within the past 15 years. Aside from the changing ideas that 'peace is not free anymore,' there is also an obvious change in the Japanese understanding, as suggested by MOFA officials:

'In the past, the peace of our own country was peace from the direct threats through the direct wars that Japan was fighting against. But nowadays, peace has broadened into a complex of situations that have been taken place in different areas or different countries. We have more people and youngsters who are willing to work in more...difficult places...and in international organisations. I think the meaning of peace in my generation would have a more international meaning compared to the past generation [...].'⁴¹⁰

Within the MOFA, there have also been changes in ideas and beliefs regarding international peace and security, how Japan could contribute to UN peace operations

⁴¹⁰ Interview with MOFA officials, 06/02/2006

and the impacts towards Japan-US relations. Firstly, with regard to international peace and security, the most notable change of ideas is that Japan's national security cannot rely solely on the Japan-US alliance. This is not to say that the unique and special bilateral relationship based on the Japan-US security treaty has become less relevant in Japan's security course. Assessing the situation from the viewpoint of the decision-making structure, the major portion of Japan's security policy had traditionally been handled by the North American Bureau in the MOFA and its implementation shared by the JDA, with the former being in the dominant position. Japan's international security, however, was attached to another pillar of the UN, and had been principally handled by the UN Policy Division of the MOFA. Before the tenure of Hisashi Owada as Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs in the early 1990s, it was agreed among MOFA officials that the power leverage of the North American Bureau was fairly overwhelming.

However, this scenario of clear dichotomy between national and international security, with the former taking priority over the latter, has been somewhat transformed since Japan's participation in the Cambodian peace process in 1993. Owada's initiative to create a central policy coordinating organ – the Foreign Policy Bureau – in which the UN Policy Division and the National Security Policy Division were relocated, so that both issues could be dealt with in parallel within the same bureau, was a fine example of ideational transformation regarding the interconnectedness of national and international security, the changing priority of Japan's security policy and its unprecedented linkage with the UN policy. The reduced dichotomy between national and international security is clearly significant.⁴¹¹

⁴¹¹ Interview with a UNDP Senior Advisor and a former MOFA official, 07/03/2006, and interviews with an MOFA and a JDA official, 30/01/2006 and 01/02/2003, respectively.

Secondly, although Japan's human security policy was originally initiated with an aim to address the immediate problems of the 1997 Asian economic crisis, which had a substantial impact on the socially and economically vulnerable segments of the population, the approach itself has gradually been developed to cover several related aspects of Japan's international contributions, especially through the UN peace operations. The essence of Japan's human security, which originated within the MOFA under the supervision of the late Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo, initially consisted of only the so-called 5Cs for overcoming Asia's economic difficulties – courage, compassion, creativity, cooperation and confidence. These simple and intangible elements, which attached great importance to a 'human centred' approach to the crisis, were based on the MOFA and Prime Minister Obuchi's understanding about the interconnectedness of various kinds of international threat, such as environmental danger, transnational crimes, displaced persons, violation of human rights, infectious diseases and terrorism.⁴¹² From then on, the MOFA and the Japanese government have developed the concept of human security to accommodate its UN policy, which emphasises both sides of UN peace operations, that is, 'security and development.'⁴¹³

Japan's emphasis on human security, unlike the Canadian version of human security, which focuses on the responsibility to react to threats and the responsibility to protect people through humanitarian intervention by force, stresses the combined elements of effective 'conflict prevention' and the 'seamless operations of peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding.' Although Japan has long been the main advocate for 'conflict prevention,' the related measures in 21st century conflict prevention not only focus on preventing inter-state threats such as arms reduction, arms trafficking or

⁴¹² MOFA (1998b), Opening Remarks by Prime Minister Obuchi at an Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow, 2 December 1998.

⁴¹³ MOFA (1998c), Statement by H.E. Mr. Keizo Obuchi at the 53rd Session of the General Assembly, September 1998.

confidence-building measures, but also on positive contributions that address the root causes of social problems, especially inequalities of education, health care, basic human rights and poverty.⁴¹⁴ It is clearly emphasised by the Japanese government and the MOFA that the key to pursuing effective ‘conflict prevention’ is to enhance human freedom, potential and dignity or the ‘empowerment function’ of the human security approach. To a certain extent, the MOFA and the Japanese government have shown their appreciation of the notion of ‘responsibility to protect,’ especially when it was categorically defined in the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and the Report by the Secretary-General entitled ‘In Larger Freedom’, and have acknowledged the fact that the protection of people is firstly entrusted to each state. In the event when national authorities fail or are unwilling to ensure such protection, Japan believes that the responsibility simply falls to the international community to use diplomatic and humanitarian means or, as a last resort, the use of force to help protect those people. However, as stated by a high ranking MOFA official:

‘Japan gives priority to preventing the aggravation of the situations created by conflicts or crises. We believe that we should employ all kinds of measures to prevent such aggravation. In this context, the international community has a lot of things to do, such as development assistance, humanitarian assistance, human rights protection or police and PKO activities. We constantly attach great importance to protecting and empowering individuals and local communities in continuous phases from pre-conflict and post-conflict humanitarian relief to development.’⁴¹⁵

⁴¹⁴ MOFA (1999), Address by State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Keizo Takemi on ‘Capacity Building for Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in the 21st century,’ 1 September 1999

⁴¹⁵ MOFA (2003b), Statement by H.E. Kinichi Komano on the occasion of the 7th Ministerial Meeting of Human Security Network, held in Ottawa, 18-20 May 2005.

Despite the above favourable reception for the necessity of humanitarian intervention, the MOFA's primary focus is still on cementing the tie between peace operations and development activities. The 'seamless operations of peace keeping and peacebuilding' addresses the weakness of the previous generations of UN peace operations, who clearly defined the mandates of peacekeeping and peacebuilding in linear progression – the withdrawal of the peacekeepers followed by peacebuilding and post-conflict nation reconstruction, including the initiation of long-term development assistance. According to MOFA officials, the major hindrance to effective peace operations in the past was the so-called 'institutional gap' between the withdrawal of the peacekeepers or other short-term humanitarian assistance and the entrance of long-term human development agencies or other development assistance. Under the concept of the human security approach, the way in which the UN peace operation will be implemented is undoubtedly affected, especially the need for an integrated and comprehensive approach in the area of refugees, returnees, internally displaced persons or demobilised combatants.⁴¹⁶

In the context of Japan-US bilateral relations and human security policy, the linkage between the two has never been officially pronounced by either government. However, it has been made clear in Japan's Diplomatic Blue Book on developing and extending cooperation between the two countries in areas relating to people-centred security. For example, the cooperation between Japan and the US based on the so-called 'Japan-US Common Agenda for Cooperation in Global Perspective', launched in 1993, long before the announcement of the Japanese government about adopting human security as one of the main foreign policy agendas, has covered problems that today

⁴¹⁶ MOFA (2003c), Statement by H.E. Ambassador Haraguchi Koichi on the strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief assistance of the United Nations, including special economic assistance, Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, 21 October 2003 and interviews with high-ranking MOFA officials, 21/02/2006 and 30/01/2006.

would be called ‘human security related problems,’ including the promotion of health and human resources; the response to challenges to global stability; the protection of the global environment; the advancement of science and technology and the fostering of exchanges for mutual understanding.⁴¹⁷ Furthermore, in the area of human security conditions, both countries have been very active throughout the past decade in addressing major issues facing the international community. Another development is the agreement by both countries to strengthen the competency of UN peace operations, especially in the area of civilian policing.

6.5.2 Party Politics

In the latter half of the 1990s and after Japan’s direct experiences in UN peace operations, the change of ideas and beliefs regarding international peace and security as well as the nation’s identity transformation into an assertive ‘comprehensive security promoter,’ ‘development peace promoter’ and a genuine ‘US-partner’ have been visibly conceived among politicians. As well as the inspiration to create a world ‘free of fear and want’, as mentioned in the Constitution Preamble, such ideas as ‘the creation of a better world for future generation’ were advocated during the Hashimoto administration from 1996. The human security concept, pioneered by two prominent LDP politicians – Keizo Obuchi, while assuming his position as the Foreign Minister and Keizo Takemi, the then State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, through the pronouncement of the creation of ‘a century of peace and prosperity built on human dignity,’ has also been embraced by politicians.

Basically, the early human security concept understood by the LDP politicians signifies a comprehensive view of all threats to human survival, life and dignity and

⁴¹⁷ MOFA (1996b), Diplomatic Bluebook 1996, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1996/I-d.html#4>, accessed 26/03/2004.

stresses the need to respond to such threats via the simultaneous promotion of peace, development and the reform of the UN.⁴¹⁸ Based on Japan's political expertise in the development field, its increasing assertiveness to secure peace through UN peace operations without having to involve itself directly in military operations is more than a marriage of convenience. Earlier versions of Japan's human security developed within the LDP shared the very basic values of those humanitarian ways of thinking and human dignity, survival and life itself. However, Japan very carefully developed a concept of human security which does not totally deny the need for humanitarian intervention but places more emphasis on the aspect of 'protection' through systematic bilateral and multilateral humanitarian projects that address the fundamental problems of protracted conflicts and the continuous links between peace operations and development.⁴¹⁹

Compared to the old 'hard-liners' like Ichiro Ozawa, who was once, in the early 1990s, the main advocate for Japan's normalcy in embracing the ideas of shouldering full international responsibility, including the exercise of military operations, the LDP politicians and those in the Koizumi cabinet embraced the idea that Japan should be more responsible and base the country's foreign policy on a more comprehensive and 'well-rounded' approach to secure peace and security without stepping over the essence of peace philosophy stipulated in the Constitution. An LDP member of parliament observed that the younger generation of LDP politicians are striving for key words such as 'peace' and also see themselves and Japan as a promoter of peace rather than a passive beneficiary, as was the case in the old days. For example, in the areas of UN peace operations, there has been extensive discussion about the increasing responsibility of the SDF in peacekeeping missions and it is most likely that the expanded missions

⁴¹⁸ MOFA (1998c), Statement by Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi at the 53rd Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations 1998, September 1998.

⁴¹⁹ Interview with a senior LDP member and a current member of the House of Councillors, 20/02/2006

will include unarmed guard duties as well as the despatch of the SDF to participate in multinational forces. It is commonly agreed among the younger LDP members that in order to maintain a respectable place in the international area, it is important that the idea that ‘Japan cannot survive alone’ is fully embraced, and steps that must be taken to promote international peace and security must be further emphasised.⁴²⁰ This is agreed by a cabinet minister, who comments on this point as follows:

‘[...] Japan is now a big player. And if you’re a big player, you have to be a more all-round player. I think Japan should make its contribution – necessary contributions – in most areas, unless Japan finds itself extremely unprepared to do so. And in real life, so many of the functional areas are interrelated. For example, if you wish to solve conventional weapon problems, such as landmines or small arms and light weapons, you might have to look into development issues or gender issues because most of the victims are women and children, in fact. Or you might have to look into community development issues or capacity building issues such as law enforcement officers...

Human security is a rather broad concept and it’s the key concept. You can discuss development issues on the basis of poverty and deprivation. Then you can discuss human security from the aspect of freedom from fear. And then that relates to weapons and peace operation issues. So, indeed, human security is one of the areas that Japan can flag in [...].’⁴²¹

Since the end of 1955 political system and the start of the Murayama Administration, the discussion between the ruling government and the opposition

⁴²⁰ Interview with an LDP member of parliament, 10/02/2006

⁴²¹ Interview with a Cabinet Minister, 14/02/2006


parties regarding security issues has become more engaging and constructive, as evident during the Cambodian peace process and the despatch of the SDF to subsequent UNPKOs. Although the prominent role of the SDPJ has faded, the newly emerged opposition party, the DPJ, has become a constructive force in Japanese politics in terms of the discussion of Japan's foreign policy. As shown in Figure 6.2, the DPJ has made it clear that the Japan-US Alliance, close collaboration with the UN and close relationships with other Asian nations will be the three main pillars of the party's foreign policy. Although it seems that there is no obvious difference between the DPJ's and the LDP's stance on foreign policy, the nuances of emphasis on those three pillars between the LDP and the DPJ are clearly identifiable.

On the one hand, it might be correct that the LDP's transformation of ideas regarding security priorities is less dichotomised, with more parallels between national and international security. The idea that the UN mechanism is to be utilised to promote international peace and security, which will simultaneously ensure Japan's national security, is increasingly embraced by LDP members. At the same time, Japan-US security arrangements do not only serve the interest of national security, but could also be used to support the stability of international security, in addition to regional security. This parallel type of foreign policy orientation has come to replace the formulation that previously prioritised Japan-US bilateral relations at the top, as previously shown in Chapter 3 and in Figure 3.1. On the other hand, the DPJ does not have priorities in pursuing foreign policy but rather portrays an overlapping comprehensive policy framework that addresses both national and international security simultaneously.⁴²² Although foreign policy orientations between the two parties seem to be different in

⁴²² Interviews with DPJ's research team for the former President Katsuya Okada, 18/02/2006 and 10/02/2006

structure, the notion that the inseparable spheres of national and international security and the way in which the UN mechanism has become a prerequisite to secure both Japan's national security and international peace are embraced by both parties.

Figure 6.2: Comparison of LDP's and DPJ's Foreign Policy Nuances



Source: Author's Figure

Furthermore, the largest opposition party, the DPJ, under the leadership of both Okada Katsuya and Maehara Seiji, is also very positive in embracing the ideas of Japan's assuming leadership in international peace and security promotion. Since its equal merger with Minseito in 1998, the DPJ has embedded relatively more constructive ideas than the previous largest opposition party, the SDPJ, in discussing Japan's international postures with the LDP government. Several issues relating to international security have been discussed between the ruling and opposition parties and have helped to lay out a common background and understanding on Japan's international posture. For example, regarding opinions on the Constitutional revision and Article 9, Prime

Minister Koizumi once stated that ‘complicated questions can arise if we continue to proceed on the assumption that the SDF do not constitute a military. It is disrespectful to the SDF that we have been unable to end the controversy over whether the SDF is unconstitutional or not.’ This could be interpreted to mean that the SDF should be defined as a military under the Constitution or that Article 9 should be abandoned altogether. Yukio Hatoyama, one of the DPJ key leaders, has also voiced a similar view regarding this matter.⁴²³

Furthermore, the basic policy of the DPJ, which materialised during the presidency of Okada Katsuya, took a serious stance on assertive diplomacy through UN activities. The basic policy also stresses the importance of Japan’s active pursuit of preventive diplomacy, increasing participation in the UNPKO and Japan’s gaining of membership of the UNSC in order to effectively promote international peace and security on its own terms. Apart from this basic stance on foreign policy, which is to be continued during Maehara’s presidency, the DPJ also makes an advanced pronouncement by suggesting that the government should consider supporting the UN, within the limits of its Peace Constitution, in case the UN military force based on Articles 42 and 43 should materialise.⁴²⁴ The party also agrees with the LDP regarding the promotion of human security. The DPJ believes that ‘enhancing human security and the like’ would enlighten the national interest to achieve peace and security in the international community as a whole. Furthermore, the LDP has made it clear that moves towards the integration of ODA policy to facilitate sustainable development and the revision of the current five principles of PKO participation to be aligned with other

⁴²³ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 03/05/2001

⁴²⁴ DPJ (1999), ‘The Democratic Party of Japan’s Basic Policies on Security,’ http://www.dpj.or.jp/english_policy/security.html, accessed 10/02/2006

shared ideas of the international community through the mobilisation of the SDF and the civilian police force will be fully supported.⁴²⁵

6.5.3 Public and Editorial Opinions

National Newspapers

In the latter half of the 1990s, it could be pointed out that the ideational positions of Japanese leading newspapers regarding Japan's assertiveness in promoting international peace and security no longer represented a controversial issue, as was the case during the early 1990s. As for the ideas regarding international peace and security, it is quite clear that, among national newspapers, the main advocate for Japan's assuming the identity of 'comprehensive security promoter' is no other than the *Yomiuri Shimbun*. It is perhaps the only national newspaper that regularly raises concerns about Japan's identity or the lack thereof in the world arena. From its series of editorials, the frustration and worry that the international community tended to view Japan as a 'nation without a face' has led the newspaper to constantly nudge Japan's decision makers and the public to contemplate Japan's international standpoint and its belief in a national 'peace philosophy.' From the Gulf Crisis onwards, the newspaper has always urged politicians and the public 'not to pray for peace' but to promote debates about what Japan must do as a nation that plays active roles in building a peaceful and stable world.⁴²⁶ The newspaper's stance has remained consistent throughout the past decade in campaigning for the country to take on a 'well-rounded, comprehensive and assertive' approach to the maintenance of international peace and security.

⁴²⁵ See further in Okada (2005) on DPJ basic foreign policy.

⁴²⁶ *Daily Yomiuri*, 16/08/1995

With respect to human security policy, the *Yomiuri Shimbun* has consistently put pressure on the government since the early 1990s to consider the questions of security in ‘the wider sense of the term,’ such as how to cope with issues regarding grass-root problems of the conflict.⁴²⁷ Furthermore, the *Yomiuri Shimbun* also tagged along with the international community and the majority of the Japanese people on the transformation of ideas regarding the clear dichotomy of national and international security. During the Cold War period, as commonly argued by scholars and practitioners, the term ‘security’ often meant national and state-centred rather than international and people-centred security. Given the present post-Cold War era, the changing situations of intertwined threats and free flows of transnational problems and conflicts also call for the reorientation of the focus of the term ‘security’, from state-centred to human-centred security. The *Yomiuri Shimbun* clearly states that:

‘[...] such problems are spreading beyond their borders and creating a ‘cold peace.’ This is far from the affluent and peaceful world that people had expected with the end of the Cold War. If this situation continues, personal security cannot be guaranteed, no matter how much a nation strengthens its military power and enhances its national security. This is the reason why emphasis should be shifted from national security to ‘human security.’⁴²⁸

On the issues of UN peace operations, Japan’s identity as ‘development peace promoter’, which emphasises the empowerment functions of human security and addresses the problem of the missing link between short-term humanitarian assistance and long-term development programmes, was endorsed by the *Yomiuri Shimbun*. Since

⁴²⁷ Editorial, *Daily Yomiuri*, 03/05/1993 and *Daily Yomiuri*, 27/04/1999

⁴²⁸ *Daily Yomiuri*, 05/04/1995

1993, the newspaper has also called for a comprehensive approach in placing the ODA's priority on the basic ideal of 'holistic humanitarian considerations,' including not only short-term humanitarian relief but also the growing need for sustainable 'structural' and 'self-help' support.⁴²⁹ However, with its consistent advocacy for Japan to assume the full-fledged identity of a peace promoter, the newspapers is still of the opinion that the SDF should be able to participate in the major tasks of UN peace operations, including 'guard duty', which is believed to be an added virtue to the responsibilities of the SDF peacekeepers.

Although the government has deliberately excluded guard duty from the list of the SDF's responsibilities, due to the country's limitation on the use of force, the *Yomiuri Shimbun* believes that there should be no distinction between the SDF and other countries' peacekeepers in fulfilling UNPKO obligations.⁴³⁰ Japan's earnest contributions to UN peace operations and its assuming of the identity of 'comprehensive security promoter' and 'development peace promoter', especially in the latter half of the 1990s, also coincided with its identity as the 'US partner' in the area of maintaining international peace and security. The *Yomiuri Shimbun's* editorials clearly reflect its hope that 'Japan will grow into a wholesome and dynamic society ready to meet the various challenges presented by the new age' and that 'Japan, as a close ally of the US and a full-fledged member of the international community, will demonstrate its determination to think about other nations from a bilateral and a global point of view and act accordingly' and will ultimately 'end the nation's tendency to be solely preoccupied with its own national peace and security.'⁴³¹

⁴²⁹ *Daily Yomiuri*, 03/05/1993

⁴³⁰ *Daily Yomiuri*, 03/05/1995

⁴³¹ Editorial, *Daily Yomiuri*, 01/01 2000

As for the *Asahi Shimbun*, it has clearly voiced its opinion regarding Japan's national and international security as well as the assertive position on UN peace operations on two scores. Unlike the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, the *Asahi Shimbun* has remained doubtful about the use of force to intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign state, even in the name of 'human security'. The obvious concern of the *Asahi* is the extent to which the use of force under UN parameters, supported by the international community and especially the US, will inevitably be integrated into the US grand strategy of the existing Japan-US security alliance. On the one hand, the *Asahi Shimbun* advocates a more balanced UN-Centrism and reliance on the Japan-US security arrangement. That is to say, to the *Asahi*, Japan's progress towards the maintenance of peace and security should be conducted under the UN as much as retaining the close collaboration with the US, specifically in regional security matters. However, the collective ideas adopted by the international community regarding the use of legitimate military manoeuvres to enforce peace, even under the UN and in close cooperation with the US, raise concern among the newspaper's subscribers as to whether such 'military interventions out of the area' enunciated in the NATO strategy will finally be extended to 'situations in areas surrounding Japan' under the guidelines on Japan-US defence operations.⁴³²

With respect to UN peace operations, the concerns are often linked with the above-mentioned ideas on 'humanitarian intervention'. Although the *Asahi Shimbun* always advocates keen contribution to the UN operations, the notion of 'human concerns' of the international community that are sometimes forced upon other sovereign countries is the main reason why the *Asahi Shimbun* still takes a cautious stance in fully supporting Japan's participation in UN peace operations and the promotion of human security. However, the *Asahi Shimbun* clearly supports the ideas

⁴³² *Asahi Shimbun*, Annual Reports: Report 2000

that the human security approach truly addresses post-Cold War threats to people, which affect the long-term establishment of peace and security. It is not only that human rights or any humanitarian concerns should be selectively emphasised on a case-by-case basis. The *Asahi Shimbun* has often expressed the opinion that all humanitarian concerns should be addressed more systematically and universally and that Japan should be the pivotal country promoting such concerns. As mentioned in its publication:

‘[...] massacre of innocent civilians is a crime in any culture...the creation of an ‘intercivilisational’ concept of human right and human concerns based on the common, universal values underlying the many different cultures...Japan should become the leader in such innovative endeavours [...]’,⁴³³

The *Mainichi Shimbun*, the proponent of the former opposition party, the SDPJ, has shifted its ideational position since Japan’s successful contribution to the Cambodian peace process. In the latter half of the 1990s, the *Mainichi Shimbun* has acknowledged the ideological U-turn of the SDPJ, especially on the ideas regarding SDF participation in UN peace operations. Despite the overall change, it remains evident that the fundamental nature of the *Mainichi Shimbun*’s request for the political development or enactment of a basic law relating to Japan’s policy towards the maintenance of international peace and security merely focused on the traditional understanding of state-to-state security, which emphasised only such issues as nuclear weapons and arms reduction.⁴³⁴ The SDPJ and the *Mainichi Shimbun*, in its editorials, advocated that it was time for Japan to assume the identity of a ‘humanitarian nation’, which should take on non-military responsibilities among the members of the

⁴³³ *Asahi Shimbun*, 27/08/2000

⁴³⁴ *Mainichi Shimbun*, 09/06/1995

international community. Although the identities of ‘comprehensive security promoter’ and the ‘development peace promoter’ and the essence that these identities entail are not fully embraced by the former opposition party or the *Mainichi Shimbun*, a slight change in ideas regarding their preference to see Japan focus more on ‘human-centred security arrangements’ is more than evident in issues such as environmental problems and human rights.

Regarding peacebuilding operations, the newspaper has always advocated Japan’s promotion of peacebuilding development measures, though this scenario was dated and addressed only a fraction of the whole international security problems. In essence, the newspaper particularly suggested that ‘a grand design for making non-military contributions through peacebuilding operations’ should be encouraged. In the newspaper’s view, although Japan’s contributions towards the UNPKO have been successful, the government’s efforts in other areas of UN peace operations have been somewhat inadequate. The *Mainichi Shimbun* further stressed that Japan should still focus its efforts on peacebuilding measures that involves no military components but the skills of diplomats, soldiers and humanitarian workers from NGOs.⁴³⁵ By assuming the ‘domestic-type’ identity as ‘the comprehensive security promoter’, the newspapers agrees that it is vital for the country to keep the SDF from becoming involved in full-scale military activities, but not to prevent the SDF from making meaningful contributions such as the need to discharge weapons in self defence, to protect refugees, medical staff, patients and civilians works and so forth.

However, the *Mainichi Shimbun* has made it clear that in light of the increasingly multifaceted threats and the complex international situation, ‘Japan needs to formulate a pacifism that will be suited to the 21st century. If Japan takes the narrow

⁴³⁵ *Mainichi Shimbun*, 20/01/1999

view that its pacifism allows it to go alone, it will lose touch with the realities of the world and become self-righteous. It is important that pacifism be paired with international cooperation.’⁴³⁶ As for Japan-US relations, while the *Yomiuri Shimbun* clearly supports the government’s fundamental balance and linkage between its existing Japan-US bilateral security pact and the maintenance of peace and security, as seen in the 2nd Iraq crisis, the *Mainichi Shimbun* openly argues that the government’s enactment of the bill to allow Japan to despatch the SDF to provide logistical and other support to the US-led international coalition against terrorism or the anti-terrorist law signified ‘a radical departure’ of Japan’s security policy, which centred on the alliance with the US.⁴³⁷ With its cautious stance on Japan’s assuming the identity as the ‘US-partner,’ it gives the impression that the newspaper’s idea of how Japan should continue to promote international peace is to put the emphasis only on humanitarian assistance and development.

As for the *Nikkei Shimbun*, its liberal stance in pushing Japan to bear more responsibilities through a redefinition of Japan’s domestic and international identity has never changed even the slightest bit. In the area of securing international peace and security and ideas regarding UN peace operations, even though the human security concept is not a topic usually discussed in the *Nikkei Shimbun*, the newspaper still urges each of the LDP administrations to seriously clear the ‘hurdles’ that impede Japan from engaging in several active international political functions, especially via the UN, such as making an effective bid for a UNSC seat, increasing its effort in humanitarian contributions, clearly explaining to the Japanese about the importance of ‘collective self-defence’ or even participating in full-fledged peacekeeping operations.

⁴³⁶ *Mainichi Shimbun* 01/05/2002

⁴³⁷ *Mainichi Shimbun*, 07/10 2001

Along with the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, whose sentiment is in favour of Japan's re-interpretation of the right to collective self-defence in order to participate in other UN missions beyond the 'surrounding areas' of Japan, the *Nikkei Shimbun* also shares the same position, although less fervently, suggesting firstly that the government discuss the issues 'from several angles' and courageously explain it to the Japanese.⁴³⁸ Secondly, in early 2000, in order for Japan to effectively fulfil its obligations on UN peace operations, the newspapers also openly stated that Japan 'must allow itself to participate in UN peacekeeping by ending the freeze on the SDF.' Most importantly, the newspaper is of the opinion that because Japan is in the most advantageous position to further strengthen civilian activities in the UN peace operations, as it has long been the main advocate for non-military contribution, it should establish a legal infrastructure that enables the country to make such contributions more systematic.⁴³⁹

Public Opinion

Human security policy emerged during the period when the mindset and ideational position of the Japanese public regarding international peace and security was at its greatest maturity. In the Gulf Crisis, the ideational understanding of the Japanese public regarding international peace never looked far beyond the area surrounding Japan and the focus on the term 'security' rarely meant anything except the traditional concept of the country's survival based on the Japan-US alliance. One of the *Yomiuri Shimbun*'s editorials rightly portrayed Japan's strategic security understanding after the end of WWII and during the Gulf Crisis as 'an immature teenager struggling for full independence and adjusting to new responsibilities. Like young adults living with their parents, definitely, a comfortable situation of 'having it both ways' had existed for a

⁴³⁸ *Nikkei Shimbun* 12/02/2001

⁴³⁹ *Nikkei Shimbun*, 09/09/2000

long time.’⁴⁴⁰ In the latter half of the 1990s, it was clearly understood by the Japanese public that ‘to merely appreciate peace’ and ‘to actively promote peace’ were significantly different. Although peace had for a long time been perceived by the Japanese as ‘free’, the concept was also currently appreciated by the majority of the public in a real sense, in a very idealistic way, in which actively rejecting the military meant that they were actively promoting peace.⁴⁴¹

Furthermore, nowadays, it is rather a consensus among the Japanese that Japan’s own national security is simply indivisible from peaceful international security. The Japanese people are better aware of the cost of multifaceted conflicts and the significance of Japan’s participation in the process of maintaining peace and security via the UN and have started to embrace the idea that ‘international peace’ is significant and essential to Japan’s national survival.⁴⁴² Although it is clear that Japan also shares ideas with the international community about the ‘people-centred’ approach to peace and security, Japan’s human security approach also reflects its own preference for its ‘peace diplomacy’. In the narrowest sense of term, Yasushi Akashi suggests that it means ‘the efforts to assist disarmament and defuse tensions worldwide and the extending assistance to developing countries both in terms of financial and personnel contribution to UN peace operations.’⁴⁴³ On the other hand, the urge to transmit its own national ideas and beliefs on ‘active pacifism’ with sufficient and concrete tangible contributions to international peace and security has been evident since the mid-1990s.⁴⁴⁴ However, it was not until the latter part of the 1990s, after the process of transforming its identity based on its ideational maturity in dealing with the issues of the maintenance of peace

⁴⁴⁰ Editorial, *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 25/03/2000

⁴⁴¹ Interview with a former high-ranking MOFA official, 07/02/2006 and an interview with officials in the MOFA, 06/02/2006

⁴⁴² Interview with DPJ staff, 10/02/2006

⁴⁴³ *Daily Yomiuri*, 31/07/2000

⁴⁴⁴ *Daily Yomiuri*, 29/09/1996

and security, as seen in the human security policy, that Japan was able to concretely contribute to international peace in the form of ‘national philosophy’ under the transformed framework of its pacifism.

Public opinion, assessed from a series of polls throughout the past decade, also significantly demonstrates the changing trends of ideational position among the Japanese people regarding the maintenance of peace and security. Although polls regarding human security policy are nowhere to be found, related polls raising issues under the scope of human security policy can be used to suggest such changing inclination among the public. For example, the polls conducted by the Prime Minister’s Office throughout the past decade from 1991-2001 on samples of between 1,400 and 2,200 Japanese adults on the question of which foreign policy Japan should pursue through the UN demonstrate that the Japanese public has put the highest priority on the policy to promote humanitarian assistance, mediate regional conflict and secure international peace and security via the UN.⁴⁴⁵ From 1991 onwards, the policy that focuses on the maintenance of peace and security has been ranked on top, with an average of 34 percent of respondents preferring this policy in the first half of the 1990s. Public support for view that the Japanese government should pour further resources into the policy related to the promotion of humanitarian assistance and international peace and security also skyrocketed in the latter half of the 1990s, from 37.5 percent in 1996 to 40 percent in 1998 and to 50.3 percent in 2001.


This clearly suggests that in the latter half of the 1990s, the sentiment of the Japanese public has been inclined to utilise the UN as the core mechanism to resolve protracted regional and international conflicts and stabilise sustainable peace and security. The second-highest issue that the Japanese public believes Japan should pursue

⁴⁴⁵ Prime Minister’s Office, 外交に関する世論調査 (Polls about Japan’s Diplomacy), 1991 – 2003

through the UN is in the area of the protection of human freedom, democracy and human rights. Developing the world economy and assisting developing countries follow in the 3rd and the 4th place respectively. The least relevant issue area that the Japanese public think should be pursued via the UN is the policy that focuses on other global cultural and cooperation issues.

From Chart 6.1, another important policy within the UN that should be scrutinised is the decreasing tendency to associate the UN with the development of the world economy and assistance to developing countries. As mentioned in Chapter 4, during the Cold War period and in the early 1990s, Japan portrayed itself as the ‘traditional peacebuilder/developer’ and based the idea of the maintenance of peace and security on a stabilised world economy and prosperity. However, in the latter half of the 1990s, it became obvious that while the ideational position of the Japanese public is in favour of the promotion of humanitarian assistance, the mediation of regional and international conflicts, the securing of international peace and security through the UN and the use of the UN to develop the world economy or to assist developing countries to boost their prosperity are no longer the main priorities. From the polls, during the early 1990s, the focus on the political front on promoting humanitarian assistance and mediating in both regional and international conflicts and economic attempts to develop the world economy and to assist Third World countries were only 3.1 percent and 8.3 percent different. This shows that Japan weighted both issues at almost approximately the same level. In 1993, the difference between such political attempts and the promotion of economic development and assisting Third World countries was virtually none. The differences between the two policy fronts were only 2.7 percent and 0.1 percent, which literally demonstrated that the sentiment of the Japanese public was inclined towards the belief that both political and economic manoeuvres were efficient

ways to help alleviate protracted conflict, which happened to be the period when Japan was the main political facilitator and the peace supporter during the Cambodian peace process.



Source: Author's Chart


However, in the latter part of the 1990s, it became evident that economic factors had become less significant in the policy relating to the UN. In 2001, the gap between Japan's emphasis on the use of the UN to promote international peace and security via humanitarian assistance and the mediation of regional and international conflict and the use of the UN to develop the world economy and to assist developing countries was over 30 percent. This explicitly shows that Japan's UN policy focus has inclined towards non-economic efforts, which perhaps implied more assertive political and other concrete contributions to the maintenance of international peace and security.

The poll summarised above might not be able to clearly demonstrate what the Japanese public have had in mind regarding concrete measures to fulfil Japan's

obligation to promote humanitarian assistance, to mediate regional or international conflicts and to secure international peace and security. The following summary of the same polls, shown in Chart 6.2⁴⁴⁶, ask 1,400-2,200 Japanese people throughout 1991-2003 for details regarding the areas that the interviewees regard as essential for Japan to promote international peace and security through the UN. The polls show the complete details of the policies for which the Japanese public would prefer the government to cooperate with the UN both in economic and political areas. The polls give the idea that the maintenance of international peace and security via UN peace operations has ranked the highest, at around 68 percent, throughout the past 13 years. The second highest issue area in which the public would prefer Japan to cooperate with the UN is Third World development and assistance, at approximately 35 percent.

However, these polls show the same tendency as those mentioned previously: among the Japanese public, the preference for Japan to pursue UN policy in the areas of economics and Third World development is somewhat in decline. According to these polls, 43.8 percent of the Japanese public voted in favour of these policies in 1991, whereas the corresponding figure in 2003 was only 34.2 percent. Other issues areas in which the Japanese public perceive cooperation with the UN to be highly significant for Japan are those of refugee assistance, disarmament, environmental and drugs problems, all of which see the support of about 20-40 percent of those polled. The interesting point derived from these polls is that in the latter half of the 1990s, literally around the period when the human security policy was introduced, issues under the scope of human security, such as those of population protection, gender equality for women or crime prevention, were also seen by the Japanese public as issues that should be included in cooperation with the UN.

⁴⁴⁶ Prime Minister's Office, 外交に関する世論調査 1991-2003



Source: Author's Chart

6.6 Conclusions: The Conformity of the Domestic-Type and International-Role Identities

It is fairly clear in this chapter that the clash between the 'domestic-type' identities and Japan's 'international-role' identities during the promotion of human security policy has significantly diminished. The transformation of 'domestic-type' identities from the 'unilateral pacifist,' 'traditional peace builder and banker' and 'US follower' during the Gulf Crisis to the current 'comprehensive security promoter,' 'development peace intervener' and 'US partner' was the result of decade-long ideational interactions with other members of the international community and the gradual transformation of ideational positions within the key actors and among the public themselves. It is quite clear that in the area of international peace and security and the Japan-US alliance, Japan's adopted 'domestic-type' identities and its projected

‘international-role’ identities were in tune with each other. Although there is a slight difference in the areas of the UN peace operations between Japan’s ‘domestic-type’ identity as the ‘development peace promoter’ and the ‘international-role’ identity collectively shared by the international community as ‘humanitarian peace intervener,’ the two identities are considered complementary to each other within the framework of human security.

In the area surrounding international peace and security, the collectively shared ideas and beliefs among the international community regarding the current international threats confirm the established fact that the present threats are increasingly ‘internal,’ ‘vertical,’ and ‘horizontal’ with multifaceted and intertwined causes and solutions. Furthermore, the international community also agrees that the greatest transformation of ideas regarding international peace and security is perhaps the shift in the security approach from ‘state-centred’ to ‘people-centred’ security. This transformation of ideas regarding the way in which international peace and security should be approached affects the extent of ‘people protection measures,’ with which national governments and the UN will be directly involved. Two major strands of the human security approach were systematically introduced by the Japanese and the Canadian governments. Although both countries share central ideas about the new focus on ‘people’ rather than ‘states’ in contemporary security debates, the Canadian human security approach places more emphasis on the protection element, stressing the importance of humanitarian intervention, including military manoeuvres to ensure that people benefit from full protection measures. The Japanese version, on the contrary, focuses more on the empowerment function of human security by way of creating a seamless or a structurally secured mechanism between short-term humanitarian assistance and long-term

humanitarian development as well as addressing the root causes of conflict, especially social and economic facets.

The international community has perpetually transformed itself step by step from the 'peace enforcer' during the Gulf Crisis to the 'peace promoter' dealing specifically with various angles of conflicts, from political and arbitrary to social and development functions during the Cambodian peace process. In the latter half of the 1990s, the transformed identity into 'comprehensive peace promoter' is the result of an embracing of the ideational significance of the so-called 'responsibility to protect.' Such transformed identity has been based on a particular kind of interpretation of human security: the protection function, which addresses the problems of basic human needs, all of which require a minimum guarantee of safety, survival, livelihood and dignity. Another important function of the human security approach is the empowerment function, focusing on long-term human development in such basic areas as economic, health, personal, environmental, community, cultural and political security. Although this basic human welfare is nothing new to the concept of development, under the human security approach, it is treated as an integral and interrelated set of developments. This is believed to have contributed not only to post-conflict reconstruction but also to the preventive measures of peace operations. It is apparent among the international community that empowerment through development measures under the human security concept is not treated as an end itself, but rather as a means to an end to achieve the purpose of the protection function and to provide people with the guarantee of safety, survival, livelihood and dignity.

As for Japan, Japanese policy makers and the Japanese public had always placed ideas regarding international peace and security in the remotest corners of political concern. Japan was a country where the clear dichotomy between national and

international security were fairly marked, with the former being attached to the Japan-US Security alliance while the latter was officially or rhetorically placed in the hands of the UN. In a way, the traditional fashion of assessing security issues among the Japanese revolved only around the concern over the survival of Japan rather than seeing the interrelatedness of Japan's survival through the upholding of international security. Despite its unique view on traditional security, human security emerged on the Japanese political stage in the latter half of the 1990s after the nation had made several successful contributions to UNPKOs. The concept of human security has been developed and successfully utilised as an overall international security policy 'label.' The key basic contribution of the concept of human security is based on Japan's newfound ideational position that a certain country's national security cannot be achieved unilaterally or through the previous adoption of the narrow-minded 'one-country pacifist' identity. Such transformed understanding and ideas inherently resulted in the adoption of the 'domestic-type' identity as the 'comprehensive security promoter', which focuses on the idea of preventing violent conflict (in order to establish peace) and eradicating deprivation such as impoverishment, ill health, illiteracy or maladies (in order to maintain balance and constitute long-term development), and which is very well in tune with the expected role identity being shared by the international community.

In the areas surrounding UN peace operations, the Gulf Crisis, the Cambodian peace process and other subsequent missions have all pointed to the importance of countering multifaceted threats and of promoting peace with an effective multilateral system via the UN. Such understanding has also led the international community to assume the 'international-role' identities of 'multilateral pacifist' and 'peace promoter', whose major function was to partly respond to inter-state conflicts through collective security and partly to handle the complex issues of internal threats to humanity via

myriads of peace operations to restore peace and restructure war-torn countries. Based on the previous identity transformations, in the latter half of the 1990s, the newly transformed 'international-role' identity as the 'humanitarian peace intervener' was literally a result of the understanding that nowadays the threats confronting the international community are primary internal and that internal collapses and violence also have a direct impact on people rather than on states: hence the need for humanitarian protection and intervention.

The collective idea regarding humanitarian intervention, especially in intra-state conflicts, also has significant implications for UN peace operations in several ways. In the area of conflict prevention, the areas of focus are no longer preventive diplomacy or confidence building, as had been the case during the Cold War period. Instead, the preventive measures focus on structural prevention, which covers both immediate actions such as consultations, good offices, military and political deployment and humanitarian relief, and the long-term support of the establishment of human security systems. Furthermore, the line between peacemaking via the pretext of military measures and the quasi-enforcement measures of the peacekeeping state has also become conspicuously intertwined. This is also the case with the increasing interrelatedness of the peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, in which the mandates of the peacekeepers and peacebuilders have overlapped to include the tasks summarised as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR).

Japan also shares the ideas collectively embraced by the international community regarding UN peace operations. Notwithstanding Japan's substantial international contributions, the lack of an integral and national approach, coupled with its unusual military restrictions, made the attempts appear inconsequential throughout the early post-Cold War period. After the emergence of the human security concept,

which has been further developed through the course of international and domestic ideational interactions, Japan has clearly developed its own version of human security, which substantiates its contributions to the UN peace efforts. The key elements of Japan's human security concept proposed by the Commission on Human Security consist of the strategies adopted to reach the goals of protecting and empowering people, as emphasised by the international community.

Moreover, the transformation of Japan's 'domestic-type' identity from that of 'peace supporter' in the Cambodian peace process, during which enormous resources, ranging from personnel, money and ideas, were poured into the UN peace operation, to the so-called 'development peace promoter' has signified Japan's maturity in pursuing its UN policy. Japan's focus on the protective function has relied more on its aspiration to maintain human rights and ensure people's safety through the pretext of military intervention, humanitarian actions, technical assistance and so on. However, Japan has placed a relatively higher emphasis on the empowerment function, which involves both short-term humanitarian assistance during the peacekeeping stage and long-term development programmes in the period of peacebuilding. The ideas behind Japan's adopted identity as the 'development peace promoter' was the emphasis on the preventive approach rather than on protection as a starting point for international peace.

As regards Japan-US relations and their implications for the human security policy, although the US has never adopted human security in its official policy framework, nor has it undermined the Japanese effort to promote human security through the UN. This is partly because the US's existing emphasis on promoting 'fundamental freedom' and the so-called 'non-negotiable demands of human dignity' falls within the same categorisation of 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want', hence representing a complementary line of approach that tackles similar international

threats to international peace and security. It is, therefore, not surprising that the US government welcomes more 'partners' in the main scheme of the maintenance of peace and development through other complementary approaches from other countries, including Japan. In the areas of peace operations, the US is still the main advocate for multilateral efforts to maintain international peace and security and to reconstruct any failed nations based on democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Another important emphasis of the US government on the UN peace operations is the importance of the institutionalisation of civilian and military policing to facilitate the demands of complex peace operations. This emphasis is clearly one of the attempts by the US and the international community to fill the gap between peacekeeping and peacebuilding – a point that is also a concern of the international community.

For Japan, the human security concept does not have a negative impact on the relationship between the two countries. Despite the US's inactive response to the human security concept within the UN, the collective ideas regarding the increasingly complex security environment and the way in which the UN peace operations should be handled to ensure sustainable peace and security between Japan and the US are relatively mutual. Under the human security approach, Japan found itself more comfortable adopting the 'domestic-type' identity of 'US partner' to assist the US in disposing of oppressive regimes, to protect people from violations of their basic rights and to enhance free will and greater dignity. This was the case precisely because the US's argument for 'fundamental freedom' and Japan's perspective on human security's protection element are aligned and complementary. In the area of the UN peace operations, both countries also shared the same collective view on the void between the transitional period of peacekeeping and the peacebuilding stage. Furthermore, Japan also emphasises the importance of filling the gap during the same transition period between the humanitarian

assistance undertaken during the peacekeeping stage and humanitarian development during the peacebuilding period.

Among the key domestic actors themselves, the MOFA is still the core actor in the area of international peace and security. The most notable change of ideas within the MOFA is that Japan's national security cannot rely solely on the Japan-US alliance. In the Cold War and its immediate aftermath, this dichotomy was fairly clear, as the MOFA often linked Japan's national security with the security pact with the US, while leaving concerns about international peace and security with the UN. This dichotomy about national and international peace and security has become less acute and MOFA officials and the public have increasingly acknowledged the fact that the two spheres of security concerns have become more intertwined.

Another aspect of ideational change within the MOFA is the way in which Japan's international contributions have become directly linked with UN peace operations. The human security approach provides the opportunity for MOFA officials to effectively link the generous ODA to the establishment of peace and maintain long-term security. Instead of relying on forceful intervention or 'the responsibility to protect', the MOFA has been very keen on promoting Japan's version of human security, which emphasises the 'responsibility to develop' and 'seamless international contributions' that address the importance of the synchronisation of all three stages of peace operations: conflict prevention, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding. Through effective humanitarian support and long-term development assistance, the MOFA is convinced that such measures could effectively address the grass-root problem of conflicts.

Among the LDP politicians, the promotion of human security policy reflected their ideational position to integrate its peaceful inspiration with effective international contributions via the UN peace operations. Similar to the MOFA, the key ideational

transformation among the LDP politicians is the acknowledgement of the interconnectedness of national survival through stabilised international security, not only through the sole reliance on the Japan-US security pact but also through the UN mechanism. Precisely put, national security and international security are not mutually exclusive, but rather increasingly intertwined. Compared to the 'hard-liners' during the Gulf Crisis who advocated Japan's normalcy in shouldering full international responsibility through military operations, the new UN policy of activism through the human security policy emphasises a well-rounded approach to the maintenance of peace and security and a seamless humanitarian assistance and humanitarian development programme at every stage of UN peace operations.

The leading opposition party, the DPJ, has also become a constructive force in Japanese politics and has expressed a relatively constructive idea in the discussion of security by stressing the interconnectedness of national and international security. The DPJ also took a serious stance on assertive diplomacy through UN activities. Apart from the party's concern over such issues as the environment, population, human rights and poverty, the basic policy also stresses the importance of Japan's active pursuit of preventive diplomacy, increasing participation in the UNPKOs and gaining membership of the UNSC in order to effectively promote international peace and security on its own terms.

In the latter half of the 1990s, the most obvious transformation among the Japanese public was related to pacifist-based national security and the linkage between national and international security. Japan's increasing acceptance and enthusiasm towards contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security in the first half of the 1990s may largely have derived from the traumatic experience from the Gulf Crisis and the marked success in the Cambodian peace process and subsequent PKOs.

Via the process of interactions with others at the international level, the mindset of the Japanese public also began to absorb the ideas and beliefs collectively shared by the international community regarding international peace and security. Generally speaking, Japan's national newspapers, the *Yomiuri*, the *Asahi*, the *Mainichi* and the *Nikkei Shimbun*, all agreed on the importance of Japan's taking on a 'well-rounded, comprehensive and more assertive' approach in maintaining international peace and security.

In the areas of UN peace operations, the call for 'holistic humanitarian considerations', which include not only short-term humanitarian relief but also the growing need for sustainable growth and the effective eradication of grass-root threats to people, is emphasised. These leading newspapers' support for Japan's contribution to international peace and security also coincided with their understanding about the existing Japan-US alliance in some ways. Although Japan-US relations had been perceived by the Japanese public as the main cornerstone of Japan's national security and had little to do with international security, such ideas have significantly shifted in a way that enabled the alliance to be pursued in light of the maintenance of peace and security.

Furthermore, human security policy also emerged during the period when the mindset and ideational position of the Japanese public regarding international peace and security had reached its zenith. One of the examples is the shift of ideas regarding peace, which is no longer perceived by the public as 'free' or contemplated in an idealistic way. Nowadays, it is a consensus among the Japanese that Japan's own national security is simply indivisible from international peace and security. Although both politicians and MOFA officials have confirmed that the Japanese public has acquired a better understanding of the government's promotion of human security, polls representing

public opinion on the issue are nowhere to be found. However, other issues under the scope of human security, which can be used to indicate the changing inclination of the public regarding the approach to peace and security, can be seen in a series of polls conducted by the Prime Minister's Office. Through the examination of both 'international-role' and 'domestic-type' identities and the level of conformity between them, this chapter has confirmed that active promotion of the human security policy has resulted from the transformation of Japan's political identities in the area of international peace and security. To emphasise the decade-long process of identity transformation, the overall process will be summarised in the final chapter, in section 7.3 and Table 7.1.

Chapter 7 Conclusion

Following the empirical analyses of the three cases in Chapters 4-6, the final part of this research includes the theoretical summary of the 'recursive version' of Wendt's Constructivism and the application of 'identity transformation' on the analysis of Japan's UN security policy. The new interpretation on Japan's UN security direction and the essence of Japan's decision-making process is also wrapped up in this section. Also summarised below in section 7.3 is the detailed analysis of the case studies on the Gulf Crisis, the Cambodian peace process, and the human security policy. The final section is the concluding theoretical and substantive contributions made in this research.

7.1 Theoretical Wrap-up: Recursive Wendt's Constructivism

Although Wendt's Constructivism has been criticised by other post-modern constructivists that its epistemological essence is still very much positivist-based, it is clear among Wendt's Constructivists that the approach does serve the purpose of building up a middle ground theory that bridges the gap between positivism and post-positivism. In fact, the core objective of Wendt's Constructivism is to draw the attention of the mainstream positivist IR theorists to the importance of such 'non-material' factors as norms, identity or culture, which designate the course of foreign policy directions. In essence, Wendt's Constructivism emphasises ideas and discourse through the observation of either norms, cultures or identities and how these ideas and discourse, exchanged among states during system interactions, have shaped the structure of the international system. In other words, Wendt's Constructivism challenges the traditional mainstream IR theories in two related respects.

On the one hand, it questions the fundamental accounts of both Realism and Liberalism, specifically their neo-versions, which underscore 'structure' as the principal

factor generating international outcomes and social phenomena. Contrary to the rationalist theories, which stress the importance of 'system structure' in determining states' behaviours, Wendt's Constructivism underlines the 'structural idealism' which mainly suggests that non-material factors can be constructed, reconstructed and internalised by intersubjective or social aspects of the system structure – by the distribution of ideas and knowledge at the system level. Also relating to the fundamental accounts of the rationalist school, Wendt's Constructivism questions the validity of the material factors and the distribution of material capabilities emphasised by both Realism and Liberalism. The notion that structure alone and such material factors as military or economic capabilities affect states' behaviours constitutes a different set of ontological positions among Wendt's constructivists. Rather, Wendt's constructivists focus on the importance of non-material factors, the process of transformation of these factors and their impacts on the restructuring of the system.

The theoretical ground aside, it remains to consider the extent to which Wendt's Constructivism can be effectively applied to empirical cases. Several scholars have attempted to incorporate Wendt's theoretical construction of social theory into their analyses through the adoption of norms, culture and identity itself as the key analytical tools. However, it is strongly argued in this research that each of the analytical tools serves different research purposes. The majority of Wendt's constructivists choose to use 'norms' to represent the whole system of knowledge and shared ideas and beliefs. The examination of the constituent parts of identity, or even culture, through norms is agreed to be more practical, as the former are admittedly very vague concepts and difficult to grasp. Moreover, in the literature using Wendt's constructivism, norms and identities are sometimes mentioned interchangeably, signifying the same things.

However, this research argues that norms and identities are merely opposite sides of the same spectrum, serving different theoretical functions and operational purposes. Figure 2.2 and Table 2.2 clearly suggest that norm-led research observes how norms generate actions and behaviours in international politics or how such behaviours affect the changing structure at the system level. On the contrary, identity-led research basically deals with the system of knowledge, ideas and beliefs of system agents. The extent to which the transformation of ideas, beliefs, experiences and so on impinges on the preference of the state to adopt a particular ‘domestic-type’ identity, to project its ‘international-role’ identity and to reach a final ‘collective’ identity is the primary concern in identity-led research. This kind of research also takes the end-point of the newly emerging form of the shared conception of identity as a reflection of the state’s policy preference. Unlike norm-led research, the primary objective of identity-led research is to explore the source of policy choices and preferences of system agents rather than to explain the transition of the normative system structure. Also, as opposed to the original version of Wendt’s Constructivism, which focuses more on ‘role’ and ‘collective’ identity and the ‘linear’ process of social system interaction, this research takes the following route:

Firstly, this research focuses on observing the transformation of the system of ideas and beliefs at both the domestic and the international level. While Wendt’s constructivists often treat the ‘domestic-type’ identity as constant and exogenous to system interactions, this research observes how ‘domestic-type’ identities have been transformed and in what capacity the identities affect the direction of the state’s policy projection. It is true to some extent that ‘identity,’ by most constructivists’ definitions, is a label for the construction of statehood enacted domestically and projected internationally. Therefore, it could be assumed that domestic and international identity

should be one and the same. Under normal circumstances, the conformity between the 'domestic-type' and the 'international-role' identity is likely to be on a higher level, to the point where only the observation of the role-identity projected at the international level alone is academically justified. In some situations, Japan being a case in point, the foreign policy and decision-making process is so unique and complex that the projection of the 'international-role' identities does not always conform to the 'domestic-type' identity. The key assumption for a country like this is that unless the 'domestic-type' identity is in tune with the 'international-role' identity projected out of expectations from others at the system level, an active approach or a high level of policy activity cannot be expected. The clash between the two identities over Japan's policy towards the Gulf Crisis is a fine example of this, confirming the importance of the dual observation of the transformation of the system of ideas and beliefs at both the international and the domestic level.

Secondly, in cases employing Wendt's Constructivism, the observation of the process of identity or norm transformation is often applied to, for example, the process by which norms shape identity or the process by which norms and identity transformation shape the normative structure of the inter-state system. All of this basically proceeds in a linear fashion: the observation of the transformation of norms or identities is derived from social interactions only at the system level and from the way in which this transformation affects the changing structure of the normative system. The end product of this process of social interactions and transformation is the 'collective' identity or a new set of norms, which will transcend into a new system structure. This study slightly modifies the existing formulation of Wendt's Constructivism to suit the research's objective, which aims to observe the process by which 'identity transformation' shapes national interests and state policies. This research examines not

only the process by which social interactions at the system level affect the transformation of the 'domestic-type' at the domestic level, but also the process by which social interactions at the domestic level affect the projection of the 'international-role' identity at the system level.

As shown in Diagram 2.2, this research will not treat the 'domestic-type' identity as pre-given or as exogenous to the research observation, but will treat the overall process in a recursive fashion, based on the assumption that social interactions between or among states do not necessarily result in a collective identity at the system level. Rather, in some difficult cases, the result of social interactions at the system level is that a major signal is sent back to states as to what kind of condition or 'international-role' identity is expected. This is not to say that states will always transform their 'domestic-type' identities in accordance with the conditions set by the international community. The process of redefinition and transformation of the system of ideas and beliefs, or the transformation of the 'domestic-type' identity, will eventually be circumscribed by self-reflection and will in turn be communicated back to the system level. Therefore, whether the new 'domestic-type' identity at the domestic level will be transformed to correspond to the 'international-role' identity shared among the international community at the international level depends on the issue. In section 7.3, the projected 'international-role' and the adopted 'domestic-type' identity will be compared to examine the degree of conformity during the Gulf Crisis, the Cambodian Peace Process and the promotion of human security policy. The following section will summarise the substantive issue surrounding Japan's UN security policy and its development within the context of the UN.

7.2 Japan's UN Security Policy: A Balanced Security

At the substantive level, it is admittedly uncommon to put the words 'UN' and 'security' in the same policy rhetorical spectrum. Until recently, Japan's UN policy itself had always been pronounced as one of the top foreign policy agendas, despite its limited functionality. Since the end of WWII, Japan's UN policy focus had revolved only around non-military or non-security issues, especially those in the development, social and economic areas. The incorporation of the security layer into Japan's UN policy had never been a serious issue until its first involvement in the Gulf Crisis in early 1990s. Although the attention to Japan's possible military participation in the UNPKOs had taken centre stage within its UN policy agenda, along with its bid for permanent membership of the UNSC, there had been no extensive discussion of the overall development of the UN policy and the extent of its security element. This research, therefore, undertakes the primary task of assessing another possible aspect of the security function within the framework of the UN policy.

This research argues that Japan's security structure had been dichotomised since the end of WWII, with the country's ideal determination to establish not only a peace-loving nation but also to achieve the realisation of world peace through the UN mechanism. This clearly suggests that the layer of international security placed under the UN framework was separated from the issue of protecting national security and the areas surrounding Japan, which have always been placed in the hands of the Japan-US security arrangements. This dichotomy of national and international security, in effect, signifies an imbalance between the emphasis on the Japan-US alliance and Japan's UN-Centrism. This security scenario set the scene for most of the Cold War period. The shift towards the increasing concern for international security and the incorporation of both

national and international security dimensions was not complete until the late 1990s, as evident in the human security policy.

As evident, Japan's post-Cold War security concern has become more balanced and less dichotomised, with a more integrated security policy that extended beyond the area surrounding Japan. The term 'peace and security' is also re-defined to extend beyond Japan's national integrity to the promotion of international peace and security. In light of the increase in international instability, the UN has become the primary conduit for Japan to act upon its international security concern: hence the new or revived aspiration of UN-Centrism originally outlined by the post-WWII political founders. Furthermore, in terms of policy implications, human security has emerged as a product of the ideational interactions at both international and domestic levels. The essence of the human security policy did not emerge out of a vacuum, but is literally the product of such ideational and identity transformation of Japan's peace and security function to the world: that is, to promote peace is to work on it through communicating a substantial policy approach via the UN.

In short, Japan's post-Cold War security understanding is two-fold. On the one hand, the notion of Japan's 'security' has been extended beyond the concern for national survival under the framework of the Japan-US security arrangement to the concern for overall international peace under the parallel framework of the UN. On the other hand, via the human security policy, the post-Cold War UN-Centrism has also incorporated the 'security' layer into Japan's usual economic and social development tracks. To understand the post-Cold War Japan's security orientation, the three case studies are chosen to capture the process of the identity transformation throughout the past decade, which is believed to be responsible for such security policy transformation. In the following section, the transformation of both the 'international-role' identities

collectively adopted by the international community and projected by Japan in light of the expectations of others and the 'domestic-type' identities collectively adopted during the Gulf Crisis, the Cambodian Peace Process and the promotion of human security policy will be summarised and discussed.

7.3 From the Gulf Crisis to Human Security: From Clashes to Conformity

One of the primary objectives of this research is to reveal the process of Japan's ideational and identity transformation, which has taken more than a decade to complete, from the Gulf Crisis in the early 1990s to the promotion of human security policy in the late 1990s. As shown in Table 7.1, the three cases represent the whole process of Japan's ideational and identity transformation in the past decade. The recursive process of identity transformation, believed to have a direct influence on foreign policy preference, started to reveal itself during the Gulf Crisis when Japan engaged itself in the process of social interactions with others and was exposed to the ideas being shared by the international community.

Theoretically speaking, with such extensive interactions at the international level, Japan would inevitably have to project its international-role identity in accordance with others as a 'multilateral pacifist', 'peace enforcer' and 'US-partner' in dealing with the critical military operations during the crisis. Although Japan recognised the collective ideas embedded among the international community at the time and attempted to project its 'international-role' identity accordingly, the key problem that resulted in the passiveness and the failure of Japan's foreign policy in the Gulf Crisis lay in the incompatibility between the 'international-role' identities and the 'domestic-type' identity embraced within Japan itself. During the Gulf Crisis, Japan's 'domestic-type' identities were the products of the process of identity formation during the post-war

period. It is a known fact that Japan strictly adhered to the so-called 'unilateral pacifist' identity, the 'traditional peacebuilder/developer' and the faithful 'US follower.' The clash between the two sets of identities or the low degree of conformity between the two was an alternative explanation for why Japan was uncharacteristically reluctant to actively contribute to the Gulf Crisis.

The Cambodian peace process reveals the stage at which the process of transformation gradually took place. The low degree of conformity between the 'international-role' identity and the 'domestic-type' identity during the Gulf Crisis shows that social interactions at the system level do not necessarily result in a collective identity, as normally predicted by Wendt's original Constructivism. On the contrary, such discrepancy between two sets of identities often brings about a process in which signals from interactions at the international level are sent back to the domestic level. Within the domestic arena, the reorientation of the system of ideas, beliefs, knowledge and experiences, partly collected from interactions at the international level and partly embedded within the society, will take place and usually result in a new or transformed identity. This transformed identity will then be signalled to the international community through social interactions. This recursive process of identity transformation will usually involve a process of signals being sent back and forth within the domestic level and to the international level.

The Cambodian peace process was therefore the period when Japan started to reorient its system of ideas and beliefs on how international peace and security should be pursued through the tangible promotion and contribution towards peace and security, and not only through limiting itself to a self-military constraint version of one-sided peace promotion. During the Cambodian peace process, the international community collectively embraced the 'international-role' identities of 'political arbitrator' and full-

scale 'peace promoter' and Japan was also expected by the US to be a 'US supporter.' Japan's 'domestic-type' identities during the peace process had also undergone a process of reorientation into a higher degree of conformity with the international community as a 'political facilitator', 'peace supporter' and 'US supporter'. Although the degree of conformity between the two sets of identities was relative higher than that during the Gulf Crisis, this does not suggest that the process of identity transformation had been completed. Instead, the signals sent by Japan about its preferred 'international-role' identity during the Cambodian peace process were to inform the international community of Japan's ideational position and its policy preferences to facilitate and support the peace process and not to plunge itself into full-scale political involvement or full-fledged peace operations. The feedback gathered from social interactions at the system level was simultaneously signalled back to the domestic level for further possible ideational adjustments and identity transformation.

Following the Cambodian peace process, the promotion of human security policy is examined in this research to demonstrate the completion of the recursive identity transformation process. The positive response from the international community to Japan's policy endeavours to help facilitate the peace process through the adoption of the identities of 'political facilitator', 'peace supporter' and 'US supporter' also helped to confirm the direction of the identity transformation and the policy execution in the area of peace and security during the post-Cold War period. The promotion of human security is considered the most assertive policy initiation in the area of international peace and security. It is, in a way, the result of a decade of ideational reorientation and identity transformation through the exchange of ideational interactions at the system level and the reorientation of the system of ideas and beliefs within the society. The philosophical approach and system of ideas and beliefs behind the human security policy

are certainly less at odds with the rest of the international community, while at the same time, still holding the fundamental ground of Japan's pacifist approach to peace and security.

The human security policy could also be considered as a policy example resulting from the development of genuine ideational transformation in the area of peace and security from the 'narrowly-defined' approach to a 'well-rounded' international security approach that addresses both immediate aspects of in-crisis humanitarian assistance and long-term humanitarian development. As a result of the transformation of the system of ideas and beliefs, the transformed identity is the end product, demonstrated through the continuous and recursive process of social interactions at both the international and the domestic level. Compared to the previous two cases, the promotion of human security policy also demonstrates a higher degree of conformity between the 'international role' identities projected internationally and the 'domestic-type' identities adopted internally. While the international community also transformed its own ideas, beliefs and identity into that of so-called comprehensive security promoter and humanitarian peace intervener, and the US also expected Japan to be its US security partner, Japan was also more comfortable following the international community by adopting the similar identities of comprehensive security promoter, development peace promoter and 'US partner'. Although the degree of conformity was not a hundred percent exact, it was relatively higher than it had been during the Gulf Crisis and therefore resulted in a very active and successful policy implementation. In the following three sub-sections, the case studies will be discussed in more detail.

Table 7.1: Summary of the Identity Transformation Process

Elements		Cases					
		Gulf War		Cambodian Peace Process		Human Security Policy	
Nature of International Peace and Security	International-Role	Multilateral Pacifist	≠	Political Arbitrator	≈	Comprehensive Security Promoter	=
	Domestic-Type	Unilateral Pacifist		Political Facilitator		Comprehensive Security Promoter	
Peace Operations	International-Role	Peace Enforcer	≈	Peace Promoter	≈	Humanitarian Peace Intervener	≈
	Domestic-Type	Traditional peace-builder/banker		Peace Supporter		Development Peace Promoter	
US Factor	International-Role	US partner	≠	US Supporter	≈	US Partner	=
	Domestic-Type	US Follower		US Supporter		US Partner	
Degree of Conformity		Very Low	↓	High	↔	Very High	↑
Degree of Policy Passivism		Very High	↑	Low	↓	Very Low	↓

Source: Author's Table

Note: ≠ (least in-tune) ≈ (somewhat in-tune) = (well in-tune)

7.3.1 The Gulf Crisis: A Complete Clash of Identities

Japan's reluctance to contribute to the Gulf Crisis and its failure to implement a successful and assertive policy during the Gulf War was due largely to the complete clash between the collective ideas and beliefs embraced by the international community and those embedded within Japan. Throughout the Gulf War, the shared ideas and beliefs among the international community in the area of international peace and security were fundamentally transformed and eventually contributed to the formation of the new identity as the 'multilateral pacificist.' This collective identity was based on the shared ideas and understanding that the post-Cold War threat was largely characterised by new threats, which became more 'vertical', 'intra' and 'caused from above.' The impacts of such threats were also not confined only to limited geographical areas, as they had been during the Cold War, but created 'horizontal' impacts across borders. To maintain international peace and security in an era when such disorder was not limited only to a few states but affected the whole international community, the collective identity emerging from such shared knowledge and ideas was, therefore, transformed into the so-called 'multilateral pacificist' identity.

The collective identity or the 'international-role identity' as the 'multilateral pacificist' assumed by the members of the international community suggested *firstly* a renewed understanding that the main task to restore and maintain international peace and security was through 'multilateral' effort, especially through the UN mechanism, rather than 'unilateral' military manoeuvres by any single country. The assumption behind the formation of the 'multilateral pacificist' identity urged the international community to recognise the importance of strengthening the efficiency of the UN through the involvement of both tangible inputs and ideational contributions from the international community. *In addition*, another important development of the ideational position of the

'multilateral pacificist' embraced by the international community was the systematic layout of how to achieve peace through both short- and long-term programmes.

The clear intention of the international community in collectively fulfilling the identity of the 'multilateral pacificist' was evident in both the quantitative and the qualitative volume of activities. In terms of tangible contributions, the UNSC resolutions trebled in the early 1990s compared to the Cold War period. The numbers of countries contributing to the UN military and police forces also doubled. Among others, the annual budget on PKOs was 6 times higher in 1992 compared to donations by member countries in 1988. In terms of ideational input, while 'An Agenda for Peace' fundamentally dealt with the problems encountered by the UNSC because of the Cold-War security remnants, such as the problems regarding the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking or peacekeeping, the elaboration of 'An Agenda for Development' in 1994, for example, suggested the start of a dual approach to the maintenance of peace and security, which involved multilateral efforts from the whole community.

On the contrary, Japan's attempt to share the ideas embraced by the international community and to project its 'international-role' identity as the 'multilateral pacificist' was far more reluctant, to the point of failure. Japan's response to the Gulf Crisis was widely known among the international community as untimely and inadequate, and was commonly criticised as 'too little, too late,' despite its generous financial contribution of more than \$13 billion. It is argued in this research that Japan's reluctance was partly because its ideational position towards international peace and security was still fixated on the post-war belief that overall international peace could be simply maintained if Japan renounced war and restrained itself from any military activities. Japan's post-war adoption of the 'domestic-type' identity as the 'unilateral pacifist' was based on the

fundamental beliefs and ideas rooted in its historical experience of war calamity and losses during WWII. From then on, Japan's post-war state had developed its own unique political identity: a domestic-type identity that placed all security concerns on the Japan-US alliance and all faith in the international community's love for freedom and devotion to peace. The core idea behind Japan's adoption of the 'unilateral pacifist' identity was that Japan's survival and sustainable international peace could be attained only if it strictly adhered to the 'no-war' clause in the Peace Constitution. In other words, it was the conviction that Japan could contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security by means of not becoming a military power, limiting its potential to invade others and pursuing a policy that hoped to discourage military build-ups in other countries. The clash between the 'international-role' identity as the 'multilateral pacifist' collectively adopted by the international community and Japan's 'type-identity' as the 'unilateral pacifist' was certainly one of the factors that contributed to the passive and reluctant response of the Japanese government.

Another set of identity clashes between the international community and Japan during the Gulf Crisis was in the area of peace operations. During the Gulf Crisis, the ideational position of the international community in dealing with international security was firmly placed upon the UN mechanism and belief in the effectiveness of the UN as a messenger for peace. Accordingly, the international community's ideas and beliefs on the way in which the UN peace operations should function to ensure international peace and security were largely transformed after the success of the multinational force in the Gulf Crisis. After the Gulf Crisis, with the overwhelming success of the multilateral forces in the Gulf and the subsequent peacekeeping operations, the international community started to recognise the effectiveness of the UN mechanism and embrace the identity of 'peace enforcer' instead of only stressing the area of preventive diplomacy.

This assumption of the identity of 'peace enforcer' implies the changing emphasis of the UN peace operations towards legitimising the use of force to respond to both imminent and actual aggression as well as to force conflicting parties to comply with cease-fire agreements and so on. The international community's adoption of the identity of peace enforcer also reflected its shared ideas and beliefs that peace enforcement is an integral part of any peacekeeping operations and the combination of the two activities must be seamless and coherent in order to respond to the flexibility of security demands, specifically in activities involving the military, the police and civilian personnel.

During the Gulf Crisis, although Japan was well aware of the increasing importance and success of strengthening the UN via an effective response to security matters by the use of force, it was still very hesitant to part ways with its long-established identity as a 'traditional peacebuilder/developer' that would involve itself in the UN operations only in the later stages of development and nation-building. Alongside the adoption of the 'unilateral pacifist' identity, the adoption of the 'traditional peacebuilder/developer' identity was based on the idea that international security went hand-in-hand with prosperity. Accordingly, Japan's general foreign policy during this period, and the UN policy in particular, was led towards closer cooperation with democratic countries to promote joint prosperity around the world. In other words, when it comes to Japan's post-war insight into the maintenance of international peace and security, the fundamental element underlying sustainable peace was believed to be prosperity, possibly through development rather than any other means, such as military manoeuvres or other UN enforcement measures. It was therefore clearer to Japan that international peace and security could be achieved through the promotion of development and the strengthening of peacebuilding processes through financial contributions, which would facilitate the level of economic development in war-torn

countries. The clash between the international community's ideational emphasis on the use of force and the strengthening of the UN mechanism in the area of peacemaking and peace enforcing was thus apparent when Japan's domestic-type identity was still based on the ideas of prosperity or economic-based security rather than the use of force.

The final set of identity clashes during the Gulf Crisis involved the expected 'international-role' identity posed within the framework of Japan-US bilateral relations. In the Cold War period, wars against communism, waged mostly unilaterally by the US government, were numerous throughout several parts of the world, from Southeast Asia to Latin America, not to mention 'proxy wars' supported behind the scenes by both the US and the former Soviet Union's government. These ideological differences and military conflicts were the main political events characterising international politics during the Cold War period. The US's ideas on the rationale of unilateral attempts in military operations during the Cold War period were also somewhat transformed during the Gulf Crisis.

Apart from the nature of the Gulf War itself, which was in essence interest-based and not ideological and was the first time in 40 years, since the end of WWII, when international conflict had arisen in the form of a territorial merger, the US also shared similar ideas with the international community on collaborative efforts to restore peace and to maintain international security. This sentiment was seen through the US's attempt to pursue military actions through the UN mechanism, which had standardised the maintenance of peace and security processes in the Cold War period. Furthermore, the most vital ideational transformation was not only that the US placed formal emphasis on the UN mechanism; it also expressed its belief that the international community, including Japan, was an indispensable 'US partner' in the wars against rogue states.

As for Japan, the Japan-US bilateral alliance had contributed to the formation of the Japanese post-war political identity in a crucial way. As the post-war aim of both allies was to establish a peace-loving nation that placed its security concern on the Japan-US security arrangements, Japan thus had developed its unique identity as a 'unilateral pacifist' and a 'US-follower' that basically conducted its foreign policy under this 'leader-follower' pattern. During the Gulf Crisis, having fixed its own identity as a loyal US follower and ally, Japan behaved accordingly against domestic opposition by contributing a huge amount of financial support to the multinational force and by despatching minesweeping troops overseas as part of the alliance obligations.

These gestures were acted out according to the expectation of the US that Japan should behave as a 'US partner' to help the US in its attempt to establish a 'New World Order.' Despite the above tangible financial and personnel contributions, what was lacking in these attempts was that Japan did not embrace the collective ideas regarding the extent to which international peace and security should be pursued via multilateral efforts and that peace operations sometimes included the possibility of being enforced by military means. Among others, Japan was still apparently reluctant to transform itself into a true US partner and was still satisfied with its function as a secondary power. This simply signified that Japan's ideational position regarding international peace and security during the Gulf Crisis was still out of touch with the rest of the international community and was somewhat underdeveloped and narrowly defined. The process of ideational and identity transformation was not present until the start of the Cambodian peace process.

7.3.2 The Cambodian Peace Process: The On-going Transformation

The Cambodian peace process could be considered as the first of a new kind of conflict resolution undertaken by the UN and the international community, which addressed a whole new set of intractable intra-state political dissensions and grass-roots social and economic problems. Compared to the Gulf Crisis, when the idea dominating the international community was that threats to international peace and security sometimes originated from traditional aggressors who aimed at shaking the well-established international order, the Cambodian conflict was an intractable intra-state conflict that also disturbed the balance of regional and international peace and security. In a way, the Cambodian conflict was one of many post-Cold War threats that were more vertical, in that the population was socially and economically threatened by its own government.

Both the Gulf Crisis and the Cambodian conflict, however, shared the same magnitude of impact, which was immensely horizontal, including a flood of war casualties to neighbouring countries and the collapse of the whole social system. Nevertheless, the Cambodian peace process was significant not only because it was perhaps the last war in which the root cause involved the remnants of the ideological divergence of the Cold War, but also because it required involvement on an unprecedented scale to sort out the multi-dimensional problems and tasks that were necessary to restore peace and maintain international security. This understanding of the conflict situation and the ideas and beliefs being transformed since the Gulf Crisis thus led the international community to assume the identity of 'political arbitrator.' This transformed identity was literally based on the understanding that such a complex and wide-scale political scenario, deriving from the aftermath of long-standing internal struggles, cannot be unravelled by itself, and on the idea that the enhancement of

international mechanisms to help disentangle intra-state conflicts and help provide more systematic national rehabilitation schemes was indispensable.

Japan's idea surrounding international peace and security during the Cambodian peace process was basically a product of its social encounters and the exchange of ideas and experiences with the international community during the Gulf Crisis. Although Japan's ideas and beliefs regarding international peace and security did not take a sharp U-turn to conform to the views of others, the nation began to adjust its 'domestic-type' identity to a more acceptable and assertive style as a 'political facilitator' during the Cambodian Peace Process. Japan might not have portrayed itself as a political arbitrator like the other major powers, due to its political immaturity and late-coming status in international security affairs, but it nonetheless outran other countries in projecting itself as a political facilitator and undertook several political functions to assist the smooth political manoeuvres of other major powers. During the peace process, Japan positioned itself as a facilitator that helped to cultivate special relationships between all factions through both formal and informal talks and negotiations. Japan's political efforts also included attempts to smooth out the difference of interests between key factions through both informal talks and official proposals, which could not be effectively pursued by the major powers themselves.

The ideas and beliefs regarding the UN peace operations among the international community during the Cambodian peace process also transformed into another forward step. Unlike the Gulf Crisis, which could be categorised as an inter-state conflict and required the international community to emphasise the enforcement function of peace operations, the Cambodian case was literally a civil war or an intra-state conflict, like the majority of the post-Cold War conflicts, and required different sorts of peace operations. Such international conflicts compelled the UN and the international

community to cope with wider aspects of peace transition and restoration, including post-conflict political, social and economic rehabilitation. While the UN and the international community were expected to fulfil the identity of peace enforcer during the Gulf Crisis, the portrayal of the international community as a promoter of peace or the UN as an agent of democratic transition, which undertook more complex and multi-dimensional UN peace operations, was further developed during the Cambodian peace process.

As the international community adopted the identity of peace promoter, the first element of peace operations, or the peacemaking effort, was closely and efficiently pursued by several parties as part of the adoption of the 'political arbitrator' identity. During the Cambodian peace process, good offices and diplomatic activities were conducted in dual tracks, both at formal and informal levels, and especially through late diplomatic prevention by means of intense diplomatic and negotiating activities. Peacekeeping operations also addressed the multi-dimensional aspects, which included such functions as confidence-building measures, power-sharing agreements, electoral support, strengthening the rule of law and so on. Peacebuilding operations also became relatively more complex, requiring external efforts and integrated action in many facets to assist countries in transition, ranging from military to diplomatic, political, economic, social and humanitarian efforts. The identity of 'peace promoter' thus signified the idea adopted among the international community, which emphasised more coherent peace operations with systematic and overlapping stages of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

While the international community had launched a full-scale peace operation commensurate to its collectively adopted identity as the 'peace promoter'. Japan was rather cautious in pursuing full-fledged UN peace operations due to its restricted

domestic political conditions. Compared to Japan's ideational position regarding UN peace operations during the Cambodian peace process, its understanding of effective UN operations during the Gulf Crisis was relatively one-dimensional and focused only on the impact of financial intakes in sustaining international peace and security.

The Cambodian peace process, however, clearly demonstrated Japan's shift of understanding, ideas and attitudes regarding the way in which UN peace operations should be handled and directed. Japan's transformed 'domestic-type' identity as the 'peace supporter' was reflected through its undertaking of several core functions at almost every step of the peace operations, from peacemaking to peacekeeping and peacebuilding. It also supported multiple contributions, ranging from personnel to financial and ideational inputs, via various channels, ranging from Japanese diplomats involved in late-preventive diplomacy and peacemaking operations to SDF personnel who took charge of various stages of peacekeeping operations. In addition, the most significant aspect of Japan's contribution to the Cambodian peace process was still the peacebuilding stage of UN peace operations. Japan's 'domestic-type' identity as the 'peace supporter', although it reflected the nation's preference for contributing in all aspects of peace operations, still emphasised post-conflict peacebuilding operations. In contrast to Japan's reluctance in the Gulf Crisis, its dedication to the peacebuilding process in Cambodia did not furnish the international community with the image of a cash dispenser. Rather, it was evident to the international community that Japan would want to portray itself as a prime mover in helping Cambodia to restore peace and reconstruct its country.

Regarding the Japan-US bilateral relationship during the Cambodian peace process, the US was rather a latecomer in the process of arbitrating the conflicts among the four factions compared to other major countries. However, through the venue of the

UNSC, the US had played a major role, alongside other major powers, in outlining the contents of the political settlements of the Paris Agreements. Regarding the ideational position of the US and its expectation of Japan's projection of its 'international-role' identity during the Cambodian peace process, the US was very keen to ensure the basic rights of self-determination among the Cambodian people and the enhancement of the UN mechanism in conflict resolution. The ideas and beliefs embedded by the US were literally in tune with the international community, especially on the collective stance taken regarding the guidelines for political settlement via the UNSC and other P-5 members. It was natural, as a close ally, that the US would expect Japan to share the same sets of ideas and beliefs regarding the way in which the political settlement and UN operations should be conducted. Japan's projected 'international-role' identity as the 'US supporter' was certainly expected. Japan made several diplomatic efforts to smooth out the differences in how to handle the conditions set by the guidelines of the political settlements, such as the issue of arms reduction or the UNTAC's control of all factions, demonstrating that Japan had embraced the ideas shared by the US and the international community.

During the Cambodian peace process, it was easy to observe Japan's success in transforming its 'domestic-type' identity from that of 'US-follower' to 'US-supporter'. The significant element that could differentiate Japan's status from 'follower' to a decent 'supporter' was that the country did not have to be ordered to make political or ideational contributions, as had been the case during the Gulf Crisis. During the Cambodian peace process, Japan's adopted 'domestic-type' identity as 'US-supporter' conformed closely to the projected 'international-role' identity shared by others in the international community. The policy executed during the Cambodian peace process, which was the result of the identity transformation to active 'US-supporter', could be

seen through several diplomatic attempts and full-scale personnel and financial contributions to substantiate the collective ideas mentioned in the guidelines of the Paris Peace Agreements, such as the right to national self-determination, the enhancement of the UN mechanism via the administration of UNTAC and the strengthening of peace based on western democracy. The above general ideational guidelines aside, Japan also contributed tremendously as a 'US-supporter', especially in filling the void at the negotiating table between the US and some of the other factions. The harmony between Japan's projected 'international-role' identity and its 'domestic-type' identity during the Cambodian peace process gradually resurrected Japan from its policy failure in the Gulf Crisis and could be considered as an ongoing process of ideational and identity transformation in Japan's security within the framework of the UN.

7.3.3 The Human Security Policy: The Conformity of Identities

Although Japan's assertive promotion of human security policy in the UN could well be observed on its own, it is treated in this research as the culmination of a decade-long process of identity transformation. While the clash between the identities collectively developed and embraced by the international community and Japan's attempt to cling to its post-war identities was one of the significant factors explaining its reluctance and passive policy endeavours during the Gulf Crisis, the conformity between Japan's 'international-role' and 'domestic-type' identities is relatively higher and has led towards its assertive promotion of the new approach to the maintenance of peace and security via human security policy.

In the latter half of the 1990s and after the successful experience of the international community in the Cambodian peace process and some painful experiences in the Balkans and in African countries, a shift of ideas among the international

community towards a new 'people-centred' security system became the keenest ideational position on the maintenance of peace and security. For one thing, the international community was in accord on the notion that although the threat of interstate war has not completely vanished, the most acute and prevalent threats nowadays lies in internal political eruptions and structural or grass-roots social and economic vulnerability within countries. In other words, the transformation of post-Cold War ideas regarding international peace and security is a result of the increasingly complicated threats and shifting focus from 'state security' to 'people's security.'

This transformation has surely impinged on the ways in which the international community – especially the UN, as the main player – would choose to deal with these interwoven threats and to enhance people's well-being, dignity and creativity. The shifting ideas surrounding international peace and security in the latter half of the 1990s have led the international community to collectively develop and transform its identity from that of 'multilateral pacifist' and 'political arbitrator' into a so-called 'comprehensive security promoter' who addresses the importance of an all-round approach that provides both protective and empowering functions for countries in conflict. Precisely speaking, the protective function offers a way to handle problems regarding casualties of war, the victimisation of citizens or displaced persons from both inter- and intra-state conflicts. On the other hand, the empowering function of human security introduces a long-term focus on development and addresses the importance of the optimistic qualities of human development, especially the expansion of people's choices and equal access to public goods and to a secure and stabilised community.

Japan in the latter half of the 1990s has also developed its fundamental ideas on peace and security in relative harmony with the international community. Since the end of WWII, Japan's national and international security concern had long been

dichotomised, with the former being placed on Japan-US security arrangements while the latter was rhetorically and principally placed on the UN. With the inefficiency of the UN during the Cold War period and Japan's idealist position on how international peace could be achieved through mere good faith and the one-country pacifist belief, the nation's post-war security concern was therefore weighted more towards national security and the areas surrounding Japan, rather than towards attempts to pour its physical and ideational resources into securing international peace. This set of ideas has been transformed throughout the past decade, as a result of Japan's interactions with the international community during the Gulf Crisis and its direct experiences in the Cambodian peace process as well as in subsequent UN peace operations.

In the latter half of the 1990s, Japan also internally embraced the shared ideas among the international community regarding the 'people-centred' security system and the increasing understanding of the interconnectedness of national and international security. This reduced dichotomy between national and international security is significant, as it clearly shows the changing priority within Japan's security policy and a more coherent link between Japan's security and the UN policy in maintaining international peace and security. Japan's identity transformation into the role of 'comprehensive security promoter' is clearly reflected through its assertive promotion of the human security policy, with its aim to improve the international security environment and also to limit the possibility of any threats reaching Japan from areas beyond the region. Via the integration of human security into the core criteria of ODA and other development aid, these attempts clearly suggest that the link between Japan's national and international security has become institutionalised and systematically rationalised via the earnest promotion of human security and Japan's increasing involvement with the UN's security activities.

As a result of the transformation of ideas on international peace and security among the international community and its experiences in the UN peace operations during the Cambodian peace process, UN peace operations have entered a phase of multi-layered missions, which require an overlapping combination from the complete set of late-preventive diplomacy, a new prototype of peacekeeping operations and post-conflict national reconstruction. In the latter half of the 1990s, the increasing numbers of internal conflicts and the support for ideas regarding ‘people-centred’ security among the international community paved the way towards another transformed idea regarding UN peace operations. As the threats confronting the international community nowadays tend to be internal and rarely involve self-defence, the focus of UN peace operations thus has to be adapted to address the problem of internal structural collapses and human victimisation.

The idea has led the international community to largely agree to assume the identity of ‘humanitarian peace intervener’, which is based on the idea that in the event of high-volume genocide and major victimisation due to a state’s structural failures, the principle of non-intervention must yield to the international responsibility to protect, even via military means. By assuming the identity of humanitarian peace intervener, the UN’s peace operations have become integral in balancing and maintaining the traditional rights of the international community to protect people from victimisation within those states. The collective ideas and the ‘international-role’ identity embraced among the international community thus help to advance the systematic combination of conflict prevention and the pretext of military intervention (peacemaking), peace settlements, including quasi-enforcement measures and humanitarian actions (peacekeeping and peace enforcing) and development assistance (post-conflict peacebuilding) into the same integrated process.

Although Japan shares relatively similar accounts on the current approach to international peace and security and the way in which it should effectively be maintained, it has a slightly different view on the principles underlying the right of the international community to intervene or the responsibility to protect. Although it simultaneously addresses how to increase human freedom and fulfilment by way of protecting people from severe and widespread calamities, Japan's human security approach, which has been proposed alongside the Canadian version, highlights the empowering function of human security. Japan's adoption of the 'domestic-type' identity of the 'development peace promoter' is founded on the belief that people and their communities should be reinforced with the freedom of faith, dignity and fulfilment in order to make better choices for themselves and stay clear from violence. When these ideas and beliefs are translated into actual UN peace operations, Japan's human security promotion therefore very much emphasises the creation of a seamless link between short-term humanitarian assistance and long-term humanitarian development.

In a way, Japan's human security signifies a more coherent security and development policy in relation to its international security concern via the integration of security aspects into the new UN-Centrism. Therefore, its new UN-Centrism, centred around the emphasis on the empowering function and on bridging the gap between humanitarian assistance and long-term development, is literally an attempt to create a well-rounded approach that connects security functions to development programmes and vice versa. This includes the broadening of the focus on preventing violent conflict (in order to establish peace) and eradicating deprivation (in order to maintain balance and constitute long-term development) simultaneously. This could be considered a crucial motive in translating the idealist perspective of how international peace and security should be pursued by the international community.

On Japan-US bilateral relations during the promotion of human security, the US ideational position towards the common security concern in the post-Cold War period has been relatively in tune with the rest of the international community, specifically in terms of the format of threats, which are primary internal. However, the newly emerging human security approach has somewhat limited influence on the US policy agenda compared to other major countries, especially Japan. Despite the US's lack of official policy rhetoric supporting the promotion of the human security approach, it has not undermined Japan's attempt to promote human security through the Commission on human security via the UN. Furthermore, the US is also convinced of the principles behind the concept of human security itself, as evident in its emphasis on the promotion of fundamental freedom and the so-called demands of human dignity, and the assurance of other aspects of security being shared by the international community.

In fact, the US's expectation on Japan and the rest of the international community has been relatively consistent, as in other areas of maintaining international peace and security since the end of the Cold War: that is, to be US Partners. The human security approach has been considered as ideational and policy compatible, helping to substantiate the US's assertiveness on sustainable development, as it is fairly clear that the aspects of freedom from fear and the responsibility to protect are consistent with the US's eagerness to apply the right to intervene in areas where it is considered strategically at risk. The aspect of freedom from want or the empowerment function, embraced and consistently developed by the international community, is also fairly similar to the US's promotion of sustainable development. In other words, equality of opportunity and a life of dignity can only be achieved through development, which, in the US's view, must be sustainable.

Japan's transformation of the 'domestic-type' identity regarding Japan-US relations in the area of the maintenance of international peace and security from one of 'US-follower' to 'US-partner' has happened since the Cambodian peace process. Irrespective of the US's imprecise response to the human security approach within the UN, the collective ideas regarding the increasingly complex security environment and the way in which UN peace operations should be handled to ensure sustainable peace and security between Japan and the US are practically mutual. Unlike the Cambodian peace process, where assuming the identity of 'US partner' meant sharing ideas and projecting its policy to accommodate the political guidelines set by the US and other P-5 members and to fill the political void at the negotiating table between the major powers and the Khmer factions, Japan's adoption of the identity of 'US partner' in the latter half of the 1990s in the promotion of human security suggests its tangible contributions in terms of both ideational and physical inputs in security matters. Japan's commitment to fight against the domineering governments alongside the US has been rather extensive, as evident in Japan's participation in the Afghanistan conflict and the second Iraq War.

In the area of UN peace operations, apart from trivial configurations of UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, such as the institutionalisation of civilian policy or the focus on structural reconstruction in the post-conflict peacebuilding process, both countries also share the same conviction about the need for a seamless approach to UN peace operations that addresses the missing link between short-term humanitarian intervention/assistance and long-term humanitarian development. The most significant shared idea between the two allies regarding UN peace operations perhaps relates to the view that the linear progression from one stage of peace activities to another should be eradicated, with the creation of more organised and overlapping peace operations, from the early stage of peacemaking to post-conflict peacebuilding. In short, these sets of

identity transformation happening throughout the past decade clearly demonstrate the different levels of conformity between the ‘international-role’ identity shared by the international community and the ‘domestic-type’ identity adopted by Japan. It is evident that during the promotion of human security policy, the higher degree of conformity led to a more active policy projection, compared to the lesser degree of conformity during the Gulf Crisis.

7.4 Final Conclusion

This research’s original contribution is the attempt to establish an analytical tool that captures the understanding of how security policy choices are determined by such cultural factors as ‘identity’, by addressing both theoretical and substantive questions about the security dimension of Japan’s UN policy and how it could be approached through an alternative form of Wendt’s Constructivism and the process of identity transformation. As a means of analysing foreign and security policy preferences, ‘identity transformation’ as the key analytical tool suggests, in contrast to the existing traditional mainstream IR theories, that non-material or social factors are also appropriate tools with which to examine the issues of ‘high politics,’ such as security policy. Traditionally, the preference of security policy is argued to be largely determined by material factors such as power relations among states, while the process by which non-material factors such as identity affect the outcome of security policy choices is often taken for granted. This research demonstrates that identity transformation or the process of changing sets of ideas and beliefs with which states’ political identities are identified at a particular time contributes much to the preference and direction of states’ security orientation.

Taking identity as the central analytical tool, this research strongly argues that 'political identity' is neither static nor pre-given, but constructed. The process of its transformation, resulting from series of social interactions and the exchange of ideas and beliefs among key actors within states, reflects the change of self-understanding about who they are, which will define what they do and will finally bring about changes in security policy preferences. Unlike other cultural factors such as norms or culture, which are usually adopted as means of analysing foreign and security policy in the Constructivist literature, this research is convinced that norms and identities should not be coined interchangeably or treated as identical in signifying the same analytical goals or processes. It is suggested in this research that the two analytical tools differ significantly in their sets of research objectives, analytical questions, explanatory focuses and expected results.

The studies of norms may contribute to the understanding about how behaviours and practices are institutionalised into collective forms and offer clues about the impact of norms on the continuity and change of inter-state normative structures. However, it is still questionable whether the reverse process of studying institutionalised norms (what we repeatedly do) could explain the reasons behind the sets of ideas and beliefs constituting 'the self or identity' of actors or agents (who we really are). In contrast, the examination of the sets of ideas and beliefs that inform the dominant political identities (who we really are) and the observation on the transformation of these sets of political identities provides a clearer explanation of how and why certain sets of actions and social practices (what we repeatedly do) are formed and translated into foreign and security policy patterns and preferences. In sum, to understand the underlying causes and processes that determine foreign or security policy choices, 'identity' is perhaps more suitable as the key examining tool.

Adopting identity as the analytical tool to examine foreign and security policy preferences is not the only important contribution of this research. Unlike other Wendt's Constructivists, who often examine the process by which states' security choices are determined by series of interactions among states at the system level, this research emphasises the process by which the dual track of identity transformation at both the domestic and the international level is fashioned recursively and determines security policy preferences. This also leads to another point, strongly argued in this research, that the incorporation of a state's 'domestic-type identity' into the analytical process along with the examination of its international-role identity is indispensable. As captured in Diagram 2.2, the 'recursive' model of identity transformation developed in this research shows not only that the process of the transformation is lengthy, but also that it is complex. It is the process that allows certain sets of ideas and beliefs with which a dominant political identity is identified, to be constantly exchanged and constructed as much at the domestic level as at the international level.

The findings show that there are times when states do not project their 'international-role' identities in accordance with the 'domestic-type' identities embedded within the domestic level. There are also times when these two sets of identities clash, resulting in reluctant or passive security policy pursuits, as was the case with Japan during the Gulf Crisis. Thus, concerns about the pitfalls of pursuing Wendt's Constructivism, with its treatment of the domestic-type identity as static and exogenously given and the process of the interactions at the system level being treated as linear by most constructivists, are underscored in this research. It must be acknowledged that the same processes happen at the domestic level, with links between the recursive interacting patterns, and the sending back and forth of signals between the domestic and the international level should be equally emphasised. In other words, to better assess the

foreign or security policy decision-making process, it is important to take into account that security policy choices are often determined by the degree of conformity between the 'domestic-type' and the 'international-role' identities, as repeatedly mentioned in the preceding chapters. That is to say, an assertive security policy preference is essentially the result of a high degree of conformity between the 'domestic-type' and 'international-role' identities, whereas a lower degree of conformity between the two identities would inevitably bring about reluctant and passive security policy pursuits.

In connection with the above two arguments, this research not only highlights the use of identity transformation as a means of analysing security policy preference and demonstrates the validity of applying cultural factors to the issue of high politics, which had previously been poles apart. It also attempts to bridge the gap between the levels of analysis in the study of foreign policy and security issues. In the absence of an approach that considers factors and processes that could be traced and assessed simultaneously at the system and domestic level, a distinct separation of foreign and security policy analysis, focusing on structural determinants and domestic politics, has characterised and separated most studies of foreign and security policy issues.

To overcome such overly clear-cut theoretical classification, it is suggested in this research that a middle-ground approach should be introduced. Unlike previous applications of the Constructivist approach to Japan's foreign policy, which employ Wendt's model without any modification, this research significantly shows that the adaptation of Wendt's constructivism into a 'recursive' model improves the understanding of the foreign and security policy decision-making process. This is because the adapted 'recursive' model offers explanations about the origin of security preferences (the 'why' question), which are largely derived from repeated social interactions among key actors at the domestic level. The revised model also

demonstrates how such security choices are projected, communicated to, and transcend into collective choices of foreign and security posture through social interactions within the system environment (the 'how' question). Besides, the dual process of identity transformation essentially reveals how the separate levels of analysis could be linked through observation of recursive social interactions exchanged back and forth between the two levels, which also characterise the overall process of identity transformation.

Aside from the theoretical contributions stated above, the application of Constructivism and identity transformation as the central approach in this research also makes a significant contribution to the changing standard interpretations of Japan's security and UN policy in several ways. By using the identity transformation approach to examine Japan's security policy orientation in the UN, this research offers unique arguments about the source of Japan's passiveness or activeness in international security policy pursuits. On the one hand, traditional interpretations usually point out that Japan's reactivity or lack of enthusiasm in pursuing assertive foreign and security policy is due to its domestic and institutional constraints, such as constitutional restrictions or faction politics within key decision-making groups. On the other hand, Japan's occasional active political and security policy choices are typically tied with external pressure.

This research, however, attempts to offer an alternative model, which systematically assesses Japan's decision-making process regarding security and the UN and also suggests different sets of explanations. It argues that the key to Japan's activeness or passiveness in pursuing a certain foreign or security policy is the level of conformity between the two sets of political identities, embraced domestically on the one hand and projected internationally on the other. Similar to the core theoretical assumptions about the identity transformation stated above, the political identities

transformed and embraced within the domestic level or 'domestic-type' identities are not necessarily always in tune with the 'international-role' identity projected at the international level. This seems to be the case with Japan, especially when key actors' understandings about certain sets of ideas and beliefs are poorly developed during social interactions with others at the system level. However, such interactions and exchanges of ideas and beliefs between Japan and the international community are two-way communications, whereby the transformation of ideas and beliefs that inform political identity takes place respectively at both the international and the domestic level. Hence, the dual observation on the identity transformation at both levels is an integral part in this research and in understanding the process of Japan's foreign and security policy decision-making.

Empirically speaking, the process of social interaction between Japan and the international community at the system level throughout these past years, during such crucial events as the Gulf Crisis, the Cambodian peace process and its earnest promotion of human security, has occurred in tandem with social interactions and ideational exchanges within Japanese society itself. These recursive processes of ideational transformation, passing back and forth, led Japan to pursue a more proactive and sustainable projection of UN security policy in the latter half of the 1990s. This research confirms that the preference for projecting a passive or an active foreign policy is not merely due to international pressures, the changing international structure or short-term domestic political negotiations and constraints. Rather, the key determinants are the long-term adjustment of political identities, both 'international-role' and 'domestic-type,' via repeated exchanges of ideas and information at both levels. The level of conformity between the two sets of ideational systems or the two different sets of identities is thus the crucial factor that shapes Japan's choice of active or passive foreign

policy projection, from the Gulf Crisis to the promotion of human security policy, as pointed out several times in this research.

In addition, this research also argues against the existing tradition, which often examines Japan's security from the perspective of Japan-US bilateral relations or security arrangements. This research demonstrates that the development of Japan's security policy could also be investigated under the framework of the UN. Over the past fifteen years, following the Gulf Crisis, Japan has developed its new security understanding under the framework of the UN along with a new revival of UN-Centrism. This research simultaneously examines the development of security understanding in the context of this new UN-Centrism, which was previously focused only on the areas of economic and social development. It is clearly suggested here that as a result of the continuous social and ideational interactions with the international community and the continuous adaptation of its system of ideas and beliefs domestically, Japan's understanding of national and international security has become less dichotomised. The dichotomy between national and international security and Japan's concern over its survival during the Cold War period contributed to the imbalance between Japan's policy towards Japan-US bilateral relations and the promotion of international security via the UN. This scenario has been transformed throughout the past decade due to the changing sets of ideas and beliefs of both the international community and the Japanese domestic actors towards a more integrated approach to security projection within the UN framework, as evident in the active promotion of human security.

The examination of human security policy, in addition to the popular cases of the Gulf Crisis and the Cambodian peace process, provides further significant understanding of the future direction of both Japan's security policy and the new UN-Centrism. This research is strongly convinced that human security is the policy manifestation of Japan's

new UN-Centrism, with a strong element of the security dimension. This particular dimension of Japan's security policy pursuit, which is different from the existing security arrangements with the US, will be developed towards an equal emphasis on physical security contributions via UNPKOs and Japan's existing humanitarian assistance and development to establish international peace and security. This transformation from an imbalance between physical security contributions and humanitarian development projects has materialised through changing sets of ideas and beliefs about people-centred security as the core mechanism to maintain international peace and security, which will simultaneously ensure Japan's national security.

Furthermore, Japan's assertiveness in promoting human security via the UN framework is not the result of a simple process of securing consensus among domestic interest groups; nor is it merely because of pressure from external forces. Rather, it is clearly the outcome of a lengthy process of transforming sets of ideas and beliefs through repeated social interactions and exchanges at both the international and the domestic level, and is therefore treated in this research as the concluding result of a decade-long process of identity transformation. Also, as a policy which has not been systematically assessed before by other scholars, the examination on human security promotion under the context of Japan's UN security policy in this research is believed to have set out a preliminary work for further study.

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