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'Re-education': The Imperial Pre-History and Afterlives of a Pedagogical Conceit

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ABSTRACT

In the aftermath of World War II, the terms 're-education' and 'rehabilitation' were ubiquitous. Often employed almost interchangeably, these nouns named the aspirational outcomes sought by military government personnel, civilian administrators and relief workers – for entire national populations or particular encamped populations. This article traces the origins of these entangled efforts to 'remake' subject peoples, now primarily associated with the postwar occupations of Germany and Japan. The essay uncovers the hidden connections between re-education and democratization projects – typically projected as constructive and progressive – with Britain's brutal suppression of colonial counterinsurgencies, as well as the afterlife of the concept in the United States' Cold War era preoccupation with POW camps and brainwashing. By the 1960s and '70s, 're-education' in the Western political lexicon denoted something pernicious practiced exclusively by cold war nemeses: in murderous camps in China, Vietnam, and Cambodia. Yet at the dawn of the twenty-first century, George W. Bush's administration reanimated memories of the 'good occupations' that had transformed Axis foes into pacific and prosperous allies, hoping to persuade sceptics that 'de-Baathification' would be every bit as straightforward and successful as 'de-Nazification' had come to appear with hindsight. Re-education again provided a language of both obfuscation and legitimation.

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Introduction

Google the terms 're-education' and 'rehabilitation' today and a plethora of definitions will pop up. 'Re-education' might connote anything from pelvic floor exercises to retrain muscles slackened in childbirth to Chinese incarceration and forcible indoctrination of incarcerated Uighurs, while 'rehabilitation' is more likely to reference the reintegration of ex-offenders into society on release from prison. In the mid-twentieth-century these two terms were similarly ubiquitous. Their meanings, however, were quite different, albeit equally diffuse. For the victorious Allies, re-education was a capacious catch-all for attempts to reorient Germany's population: a goal agreed by the Big Three at the Potsdam conference that convened in July-August 1945.[1] Meanwhile, the newly formed United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) set to work among the millions of dislocated and destitute people in Europe and China. As relief

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workers construed it, rehabilitation denoted an end-state that exceeded the sum of UNRRA's charitable parts, suggestive of spiritual regeneration, not just the satisfaction of purely material needs. Postwar psychological reconstruction would be effected by 'helping people to help themselves', UNRRA's mantra maintained.[2]

In 1945, the twin terms re-education and rehabilitation – often used interchangeably – emitted an aura of novelty and positivity, at least to English-speakers, and compared with the dire alternatives – complete annihilation of former Axis foes – floated by opinion pollsters as postwar possibilities. Faith in the efficacy of reformative interventions was heralded by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Drafted in November 1945 and formally adopted in 1946, UNESCO's constitution proposed that 'Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed'.[3] After the most devastating war in human history, projects of psychological refashioning promised not only to remediate past harm but to direct mentalities onto more constructive paths. And if re-education named the process whereby people hitherto steeped in cultures of authoritarianism and doctrines of racial superiority would internalize new habits of deliberation and tolerance, then rehabilitation beckoned as its successful outcome. The kinship of these processes with 'liberalization' and 'democratization' was generally implied, and sometimes made explicit. At Potsdam, Allied leaders agreed that, after Germans had been brought to a proper awareness of their collective responsibility for Nazi criminality, Germany would be prepared for 'eventual reconstruction… on a democratic basis'. To this end, 'German education shall be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas'. Although Germany was the crucible of Allied re-educative ambitions, the American-led military government in Tokyo also strove to de-Shinto-ize, de-militarize and de-cartelize Japan, while simultaneously effecting a thorough reorganization of Japan's educational system. 'Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established,' the Potsdam declaration averred.[4]

Historians of postwar Germany and Japan have thoroughly examined both of these ventures. Noting a terminological shift in favour of 'reorientation' towards the end of the 1940s, the German term *'Umerziehung'* always freighted with Nazi connotations, scholars have located the western allies' transformative ambitions within the larger matrix of postwar geopolitics.[5] As tensions with the USSR hardened into a state of permanent cold war by 1948, Washington's overarching goal increasingly appeared less punitive than strategic: an attempt to anchor the liberal-capitalist system in Western Europe and East Asia through reoriented former foes turned allies. In parallel, scholars have dissected the various projects termed re-educative or rehabilitative by British administrators of colonies roiled by anti-colonial violence in the 1940s and 1950s, as National Servicemen swept Malayan 'insurgents' and Mau Mau 'terrorists' (among others) into camps that purported to remodel their inhabitants as pacific and pliable subjects. With approximately one third of the adult male Kikuyu population incarcerated, Britain's 're-educational' ventures reached their apogee in Kenya during the colony's prolonged Emergency (1952 to 1960). These and other colonial carceral exercises have been subjected to substantial historical scrutiny.[6] Yet rarely do scholars join the dots to connect these dispersed applications of disciplinary power, instead treating each instance as a more or less discrete and bounded case, explicable with reference to micro-historical context alone.[7] This essay, by contrast, strives to plot these scattered co-ordinates on the same map, charting colonial antecedents of the Axis powers' re-education along with imperial projects that went by the same name over the decade and a half following World War II.

In excavating the roots of re-education as well as tracing its postwar branches, this essay aims to probe the degree of family resemblance between efforts to reshape populations in diverse settings, colonial and otherwise. How much transference of ideas, vernaculars, and practices occurred between sites usually treated as separate? British and American efforts to re-educate postwar Germany, for all the air of originality Allied policymakers pumped into them, emerged from national and imperial traditions within (and shared between) Britain and the United States,

continuing a pattern of inter-imperial borrowing that belied American invocations of anti-imperial exceptionalism.[8] Over time, scholars and policymakers have increasingly come to locate the re-education of Germany and Japan along a continuum of US-led modernization schemes, stretching from the *fin-de-siècle* Philippines to twenty-first century Iraq and Afghanistan – rolling manifestations of the 'redeemer nation' at work.[9] But in its postwar incarnations, re-education needs to be understood in *trans*national terms, with Britain playing a more dominant role than scholars of US foreign relations have sometimes credited.

This essay comparatively appraises various practices that went by the name of re-education or rehabilitation in the 1940s and 1950s. Critically, however, the discourse of re-education itself requires deconstruction. These terms' various significations and functions must be disentangled and made explicit. What did Britons and Americans mean – or hope that others would infer – when they applied these terms to their undertakings? The semantic siblings, re-education and rehabilitation, were imprecise and expansive categories: shorthand for diverse policies from purging schoolteachers to rewriting text books; a synecdoche for occupation writ large; and a lexical screen. Imperial in their all-encompassing elasticity, these terms simultaneously evoked positive tutelary associations while deflecting attention from the manipulation and brutality that often accompanied – or constituted – what practitioners called re-education in colonial settings. Although sometimes characterized as an exemplary manifestation of 'soft power', re-education tended to be hard-edged, and sometimes violent to the point of lethality when applied to captive subjects in extra-European settings. Much of the scholarship on re-education (whether in postwar occupation settings or sites of colonial rule) employs a binary schism between hard and soft power in tandem with a Cartesian distinction between bodies and minds. Conceived in this way, hard power denotes physical pressure applied to the body; soft power, tactics of persuasion aimed at the mind. In practice, however, categorical distinctions between different methods– physical or psychological, punitive or pedagogical – of bending people and populations into new shapes tended to break down. Tracing the imperial genealogy of re-education helps foreground the coercive dimension of practices that announced an aspiration to reconstruct subjectivities.

This essay proceeds in four parts. First, it examines how wartime Britons and Americans acquired the self-assurance necessary to announce that they would re-engineer defeated populations along democratic lines, despite the obvious disjunction between military government as a form of rule that suspended sovereignty and liberalization as its intended end-state. The second and third sections appraise key characteristics of re-education as it was practiced in Germany, Malaya and Kenya in the 1940s and 1950s, noting the degree of divergence between these undertakings. What went by the name of 'political re-education' in Germany was considerably less brutal than practices so-described in British colonial settings, though across the empire detainees encountered place-specific versions of re-education. Racial ideology played a mediating role in establishing the parameters of what was thinkable and doable in different settings. Similarly, re-education undertaken during a state of emergency (war by any other name) tended to be more far-reaching and violent, involving wholesale relocations of population and mass incarceration, than re-educative policies pursued in the aftermath of conflict. Even in carceral sites, the way in which German POWs experienced British or American re-education bore scant resemblance to the extreme assault on personhood endured by internees confined to camps in late imperial Kenya.

Having established the centrality of re-education to the lexicon and praxis of mid-century imperialism, the final section of the essay asks *what happened?* By the early 1960s, re-education and rehabilitation seemed to vanish as descriptors that British and American policymakers and military commanders applied to their *own* actions. Along with a parallel language of 'brainwashing' and 'thought control' – terms that first emerged from the fledgling People's Republic of China (PRC) and then Chinese-run POW camps during the Korean War – re-education (in Western European and North American parlance) increasingly became something 'they' did on the far side of the so-called Iron and Bamboo curtains. But what did this linguistic shift betoken? Did British

and American civil and military authorities abandon their interest in reshaping human subjectivities in the late twentieth- and early twenty-first centuries, or did they simply give these endeavours new names?

Antecedents

Where did British and American wartime policymakers' enthusiasm for – and faith in – re-education originate? Scholars have identified several sources of inspiration, proximate and more distant.[10] In some interpretations, the impetus to re-educate Germans, along with the optimism that swirled around this mission, sprang from the perceived success of Allied wartime propaganda agencies that had sought to bolster morale on the home front and corrode the esprit of enemy forces and peoples. 'The concept of reeducation achieved common usage in World War II', observes James Tent, 'at a time when propaganda, psychological warfare, and mind control were the stock-in-trade of all combatant nations. The term, which had been borrowed from the jargon of psychiatrists became a pet phrase of politicians and journalists during the war'.[11] And there was certainly some organizational continuity between wartime psychological agencies and their postwar successors.

Other historians reach decades further back, tracing the source of America's commitment to re-education to the aftermath of the US Civil War. '[F]rom the idea of unconditional surrender to the military occupation, the installation of a military government, to the attempt through reeducation morally to improve the subject population', proposes Wolfgang Schivelbusch, American policy in Germany 'presented in essential points a repetition of what eighty years previously the victorious Union had conferred upon the defeated South after the Civil War.'[12] During the era of Reconstruction, Union soldiers occupied parts of the unregenerate South, presiding over a radical transformation of political life which saw formerly enslaved Black men enfranchised, eligible not only to vote but hold political office.[13]

More commonly, historians point to the pride that Britons and Americans took in their respective systems of education. In the United States, public schools were often viewed as incubators of democratic values, class mobility and national assimilation, turning millions of immigrant children into ambitious English-speaking citizens. Since the nineteenth century, ruling class Britons and Americans had employed schools as vehicles of colonialism. 'Indian schools' in the United States, pioneered at Carlisle, Pennsylvania (on a site now occupied by the US Army War College), stripped Native American children of their languages and cultural beliefs to produce obediently Christianized and Anglicized subjects. These institutions supplied a portable prototype that would be transported overseas at the dawn of the twentieth-century by American teachers who followed the flag to the Philippines. All told, over the course of the century, some 150,000 to 200,000 Americans travelled overseas to teach in Asia, Africa and Latin America.[14] Historian Nicholas Pronay notes that Britain's imperial tradition of education was more extensive, engendering even greater faith in efficacy than its American counterpart. Indirect rule, Britain's preferred mode of semi-detached colonial governance, was facilitated by the cooptation of an elite layer of indigenous society whose sons were schooled in Christianity, cricket, and 'fair play.' 'The success of this cultural and educational method in India and elsewhere fostered a particular predilection towards the belief that no matter how distant or alien or deep-rooted the political tradition or culture of another society might be, it was always possible to bring about a change of attitudes in depth through a combination of occupation and "education"'.[15]

The entanglement of empire and education was, however, decidedly knotty. Schooling in Britain's colonial empire often remained rudimentary or altogether absent over long decades of imperial rule for all but a thin stratum of the colonized population. Moreover, notions of racial hierarchy – and, more particularly, of white superiority – could be (and were) simultaneously invoked to buttress and undermine imperial projects. Where in some quarters 'Anglo-Saxonism'

imparted blithe confidence in white men's ability to 'uplift' non-white peoples, sceptics nevertheless clung onto notions of immutable racial alterity. Supremacist anti-imperialists insisted that the civilizing mission was a fool's errand: that it was wiser to leave 'unassimilable' others well alone. This view was not confined to America's turn-of-the-century debate over what to do with former Spanish colonial possessions in Cuba and the Philippines, acquired after US forces displaced Spain's crumbling empire.[16] A primer on *Military Government* written in 1920 by Harold Smith, and used at Fort Leavenworth to train a new generation of military officers for occupation duty, sternly intoned: 'There should be no attempt to Anglo-Saxonize what cannot be Anglo-Saxonized'.[17]

American military government doctrine more broadly, as enshrined in the War Department's *Basic Field Manual on Military Government, FM 27-5*, issued and re-issued during World War II, cautioned heavily *against* attempting to effect wholesale societal or cultural reorientation. 'The existing laws, customs, and institutions of occupied country have been created by its people, and presumably are those best suited to them', warned *FM 27-5*: a dictum at complete odds with the prescriptions of Potsdam which insisted that, however, well local mores might suit Axis populations, dangerous habits would have to be extirpated. The *Field Manual*'s contrary advice drew not only from the history of US empire-building overseas but the army's experience of occupation after the Civil War.[18] Schivelbusch's suggestion that an unbroken line connects the late 1860s with the 1940s overlooks the conspicuous failure of post-bellum military government to liberalize racial attitudes in the former Confederate states. A tranche of white Southern society proved obdurately resistant to re-education. The occupation's lack of success in remaking minds was most starkly evidenced by the emergence of the Ku Klux Klan, a white terror organization that sought to roll back the civil rights advances effected by the 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments. Equally striking was the failure of many Northern army officers to enforce Black Americans' rights or protect communities from white supremacist violence.[19] If Reconstruction were to provide a model for Germany's denazification, the lesson, warned popular novelist Howard Fast in 1944 (underscoring the didactic moral of his Reconstruction-era novel, *Freedom Road*), was that occupation would need to last longer and be more thorough-going in its commitment to root-and-branch change.[20]

In 1944, many Americans harboured doubts about, or expressed outright hostility towards, long-term postwar occupation, a project some opinion-leaders characterized as anathema to the nation's supposedly anti-imperial traditions.[21] In this context, it is not surprising that enthusiasts of military government sought to fashion a more affirmative image for this venture during its initial roll-out in Italy, stressing occupation's educational attributes. Liberal cartoonists, like the *Baltimore Sun*'s Duffy, depicted Sicilians as little, swarthy people towered over by a satchel-wielding AMGOT [Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory] officer, keen to impart the 3 Rs, reading, writing and arithmetic, to a hapless peasantry.[22] It was, in short, ideologically serviceable to construe military government as tutelary in essence – a selfless manifestation of national altruism rather than a self-interested projection of hegemonic power.

Re-education, as shorthand for how former Axis powers would be treated under occupation, evoked enlightened connotations (at least for its proponents). In the US zone of Germany, American personnel circulated copies of works by John Dewey, the doyen of liberal educational philosophers, who propounded the need for progressive schools that both fostered and modelled the larger goal of a participatory democratic society.[23] But the affirmative stories elite Britons and Americans told themselves about their respective successes in the field of education contained various blindspots and contradictions. Doubtless palpable to those denied public schooling or on the receiving end of corporal punishment, these democratic deficits appear even sharper with hindsight. In neither country was high quality schooling a universal right. In Britain and the United States, access to a superior education tended to be stratified by race, class and gender. Black American children, particularly those in the South, were relegated to institutions that were both separate and unequal – with segregation exacerbating socio-economic inequalities.[24]

Begging their own questions about educational democracy, Britain's public schools (that is, exclusive private schools) have loomed large in histories of re-education. Pronay cites these institutions as the well-spring for Britons' assurance that 'the right kind of education' could transform even the 'lower orders' into gentlemen. Writing in 1963, at a time when John Frankenheimer's *The Manchurian Candidate* had just breathed new life into the Korean War 'brainwashing scare', J.A.C. Brown mused 'whether the Communists have devised any method which is half as efficient in "brainwashing" (or with results which are half as permanent) as the English public school'.[25] Brown's wry proposition sought to dispel fears that mind control was a unique speciality of 'the Reds' with this reminder that there was nothing intrinsically mysterious or insidiously Pavlovian about the manufacture of conformity. Applied to postwar contexts, re-education connoted the salutary effect of firm (but ostensibly fair) discipline, team games, cold showers, hymn singing and rote learning – akin to the regimen of Britain's elite boarding schools. Yet viewed from a different vantage-point, public school was as troubling a model for re-education as it was telling. In these rigidly hierarchical institutions, order was underpinned by the spectre of corporal punishment, and the sting of its application by cane or leather strap to pupils' palms or buttocks. Through ritualized spectacles of degradation, masters conceived boys' pain and public humiliation as serving both corrective and deterrent functions.[26]

Pronay's contention that 're-education was chosen as a policy because it was felt that it went to the root of the problem [of German militarism] – and because it was thought to be more effective in the long run to go for minds rather than bodies' misses something crucial.[27] As in British public schools, pedagogy and punishment were inextricably bound up in postwar re-educative projects, entwined in a dense web of motives and impulses that sprang from a similarly fraught set of precursors and antecedents: born of a desire to teach, but also to teach lessons; to correct, but also to chastise; to exhort, but also to expunge; to set an example, but ultimately to force into submission. Something less than wholly benign was implied by J.M. Troutbeck (the Political Warfare Executive officer responsible for drafting Britain's original plan for German re-education) that the intention was to 'stamp out the whole tradition on which the German nation has been built' – a turn of phrase suggestive of the raw physicality and punitive animus that underpinned the rhetoric of re-education.[28] In practice, minds and bodies were routinely targeted by Allied re-educators. It's thus fitting that the British National Army Museum's online gallery of images documenting postwar Germany features a photograph of a British soldier taking a cane to the bare bottom of a German schoolboy with the caption: 'German youths being beaten for stealing from British troops, 1945'.[29]

Re-education in practice: Germany

The 'whole tradition' that British and American leaders sought to eliminate in Germany was not synonymous with Prussian militarism alone. As the horrifying scale of atrocities perpetrated by the Third Reich became clearer in the spring of 1945, with the liberation of concentration and extermination camps across central Europe, Allied leaders and military commanders became convinced that 'ordinary Germans' had not only endorsed the Nazi regime but known of the camps' existence and function. Having placed themselves willingly in the hands of their monstrous leaders, Germans would accordingly have to pay the price for their complicity. British and American experts on the 'German character' warned that, since most Germans would ardently deny all knowledge of the Third Reich's criminality, they would have to be forcibly confronted with evidence of forced labour, starvation, torture and murder.[30] A precondition of re-education was that Germans must first acknowledge 'collective guilt' shared by a nation in thrall to a murderous regime. For thousands of Germans, this forcible confrontation with atrocity took the form of mandatory tours of concentration camps in the spring of 1945. At the command of General Dwight Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces, German civilians, including

children, who lived in the vicinity of camps were required to tour through them, observing the aftermath of crimes committed in their name. In some cases, German men and women were set to work digging graves and burying corpses that had been flung into ditches or set alight by SS personnel hastily fleeing as the Allied armies advanced.[31]

First-person encounters between bystanders and victims found a celluloid counterpart in British-American plans to make all Germans in their respective occupation zones view a documentary compilation of footage from liberated Nazi camps shot by Soviet, British and American cameramen. This project, initially worked on together under the aegis of SHAEF's Psychological Warfare Division, soon splintered over Anglo-American differences in approach, particularly over the narration. But psywarriors set out with a common faith that graphic footage from the camps, exposing the Third Reich's crimes at their most horrific, would instigate a moral epiphany. To witness atrocity was to recoil from Nazi ideology – or so the filmmakers hoped. The difficulty lay in gathering incontrovertible proof that the footage had the desired effect. Germans' outward signs of contrition might, after all, be duplicitously performative. Conversely, manifestations of resistance could stem more from objection to policies of compulsion – forcible 'nose-rubbing' in the mire of atrocity – than rejection of the anti-Nazi message. In the end, delays with the project meant that *Die Todesmühlen (Death Mills*, the primary end product of the US initiative) was not ready for theatrical release until January 1946, by which time the policy of 'collective guilt' had been jettisoned. So, in turn, was the envisioned policy of compelling German civilians to watch the 'atrocity film'. Responses from Germans who *did* see *Die Todesmühlen* suggested that many resisted the message of shared moral responsibility. Some lambasted its stridently propagandistic tone, while others engaged in relativistic rejoinders about the Soviets' mistreatment of *German* prisoners.[32]

In spaces of confinement, British and US personnel could control more aspects of the environment, isolating the intractable and rewarding more compliant captives. In British and US-run Prisoner of War (POW) camps, German prisoners were made to watch atrocity films and intensely scrutinized as they did so. Prisoners who did not appear visibly stricken – or, worse yet, who reacted inappropriately by jeering or laughing – were required to sit through a second screening. Afterwards, British and American staff required POWs to complete questionnaires about what they had seen and the lessons derived from gruesome visual evidence. On the basis of these forms, camp personnel categorized German prisoners as 'black', 'grey' and 'white': codings that denoted gradations of perceived attachment to Nazism, from unregenerate 'blacks' who insisted that the footage was fake (or depicted German POWs in Soviet captivity, not victims of the SS) to 'whites' who exhibited encouraging signs of reformability. In Germany, as elsewhere, screening – and the classificatory taxonomies that resulted from interrogation – formed a *leitmotif* of re-education. It was, however, easier for camp personnel to manipulate the surroundings than to ascertain what was going on behind the impenetrable mask of prisoners' faces. Preoccupied with observable signs that Germans' moral compasses were swinging in the appropriate direction, occupation authorities commonly felt frustrated by their inability to verify the results of their ventures.[33]

British and US re-educational initiatives were not restricted to exposing Germans to evidence of genocidal violence. At its most narrowly scholastic, re-education involved screening teachers and university faculty to purge educational institutions of former Party members or those who ascribed to National Socialist doctrines. Administration of multipage questionnaires, *Fragebogen,* designed to probe Germans' past allegiances and present orientation was a central feature of American denazification policy. Teaching models and scholastic materials, from individual textbooks to entire curriculums, all required reconstruction to eliminate authoritarian methods and messages. Meanwhile, the personnel of German news media, the publishing industry and cultural institutions – key arteries though which ideas circulated around the body politic – were scrutinized and, where necessary, replaced.[34]

Re-education encompassed almost every aspect of life under occupation, particularly in the US zone where the commitment to de-Nazification was more fervent and persisted longer than

in Britain's quadrant of postwar Germany. Everything, it seemed, could be admiringly viewed through the prism of re-education. American military government officers construed the very presence of US troops and (less than a year after Germany's surrender) their wives and children as re-educative – 'setting an example for the natives', as Republican Congresswoman Margaret Chase Smith put it, making the case in 1946 for servicemen's 'dependents' to be allowed to join them overseas. That Americans failed always to comport themselves as exemplary democrats was conveniently obscured in this construction of an ambassadorial army of occupation, domesticated by soldiers' spouses and offspring.[35]

The most glaring blind-spot in affirmative American identity constructions related to questions of race. The US military was a segregated institution until President Harry Truman issued Executive Order 9981 in 1948, mandating integration of the armed forces. Hitherto, racial segregation prevailed, maintained both through formal institutional structures and informally 'from below'. Some white GIs took it upon themselves to enforce social apartheid, blocking Black peers' entry to places of entertainment and making their objections to inter-racial sociability all too palpably felt, particularly when it came to sexual relationships between German women and African American men.[36] American racism did not, of course, evade Germans' attention. Some shared the same prejudices; others skewered the double standards that permitted Americans to indict Nazi racial ideology while building white supremacism into the architecture of military government. For some Germans, especially those who worked directly for the occupiers, even more egregious was the fact that they too suffered the sting of segregation.

American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) director Roger Nash Baldwin took up this issue in 1948, during a visit made at the behest of military governor Lucius Clay to report on civil liberties. Baldwin lamented how the gospel of democratization was undermined by stigmatizing practices across the US zone. Evidence abounded of 'a sort of Jim Crow system under which Germans are denied access to U.S. facilities, such as toilets, eating places, residences etc.,' resulting in 'grave inconveniences and discrimination', Baldwin remarked. 'Germans calling on Americans in their hotels are faced with the sign "Entrance for Germans Prohibited". Toilets are marked commonly "For Allied Personnel," "For Germans," or most insultingly of all, the military jargon, "For Indigenous Personnel" or "Indigenous Men."' Germans bristled at both the experience of segregation and terminology jarringly redolent of colonial categories. In Munich, Baldwin learned that one German employee of OMGUS had affixed a sardonic notice above the bathroom he was forbidden from using: '*Nür für das Herrenvolk*' (For the Master Race Only). Yet despite the bad press, and despite pervasive sexual contact between Americans and Germans from the spring of 1945 onwards, it took years for OMGUS to normalize *social* intercourse. A US army study conducted in 1952, as the occupation formally ended, noted that amicable interactions between Germans and Americans had been 'amazingly few in view of the great number of persons involved'.[37]

Re-education and colonial counterinsurgency

German complaints about aloof and arrogant occupiers also reverberated across the British zone. Like Americans who denied Germans access to their lavatories, British administrators who insisted that Germans stand to attention whenever Britons entered the room or mandated separate facilities were similarly criticized for behaving like colonial panjandrums. Publisher Victor Gollancz likened the atmosphere he encountered at British officers' messes during a lengthy visit to Germany in late 1946 to 'Singapore in 1918': 'the same sense of happy relaxation, the same feeling you belonged to a privileged caste, the same climate of dignified well-being'. Another observer pointedly noted that British officers 'settled in the ruins as if they were in the White Highlands of Kenya'.[38]

Ironies abound in these invocations of Jim Crow, the colour line and colonial apartheid, not least because British and American liberals, like Gollancz and Baldwin, tended to amplify critiques

of occupation most vehemently articulated by German conservatives. Germans who protested that the country had become 'one gigantic camp' under occupation, or that it was ruled along colonial lines, ignored the increasingly light touch with which re-education was implemented, as US authorities (initially more zealous about eliminating all vestiges of Nazism than their British counterparts) extended greater latitude to Germans to police their own denazification.[39] And while social segregation was indeed practiced by British and US military government officers, the extent and nature of the 'caste system' in occupied Germany was considerably less pernicious than racialized forms of apart-ness that typified life under colonial rule.

To decry American racial segregation or British colonialism was a powerful rhetorical move, kicking at what Allied occupation personnel recognized as their most vulnerable Achilles' heels. But the distinction between an emotive trope and an empirically sustainable analogy is sharpened by examining colonial sites themselves. In the late 1940s, and throughout the 1950s, re-education and rehabilitation looked – and felt – decidedly more punitive in locations under violently contested British colonial rule than the ventures so labelled in postwar Germany or Japan. Even before VJ Day, Britain was fighting on several fronts to reconsolidate imperial control, temporarily dislodged by Japanese colonialism in Asia, and severely corroded everywhere by the rising tide of anti-imperialism. Before the decade's end, Britain confronted not only the loss of India, but armed Zionists in Palestine, communist nationalists in Malaya, land-hungry freedom fighters in Kenya and Greek Cypriots seeking *Enosis* (unification) with Greece. Malaya and Kenya were contested with particular ferocity. During protracted Emergencies, British administrators and armed forces deployed an array of stratagems – from area bombing to mass confinement and re-education – to defeat nemeses variously termed 'bandits' and 'Communist Terrorists' (CTs) in Malaya and Mau Mau 'terrorists' in Kenya.[40]

Counter-insurgency provided the umbrella under which operations to reassert British rule and delegitimize anti-imperial violence unfolded. In Malaya, population control played a dominant role as British personnel created 'new villages' into which rural communities were swept. The enunciated goal of villagization was to isolate insurgents from the population on whom they relied for supplies and cover, if not more direct support. But the strategic function of these barbed-wire enclosed settlements was obscured by narratives of progressive modernity that colonial personnel attempted to spin around them. Within the fortified circumference of the new village, inhabitants would find superior conditions – healthcare, sanitation, nutrition – than those endured by peasant-workers who squatted more tenuously on European-owned rubber plantations. If these new villages appeared disconcertingly camp-like, their carceral attributes were disavowed as a form of protective custody intended to shelter hitherto defenceless villagers from the depredations of CTs.[41]

British authorities simultaneously constructed 'rehabilitation' centres in more urban locales, the first such site at Taiping in Perak opening in December 1949. In the words of Taiping's superintendents, it aimed to 'be as much like… an ordinary kampong [village] as possible' with residents accommodated in 'kampong style housing for two bachelors', and a regime based on agricultural work and handicraft instruction. The goal was to steer communist-leaning young men onto a path of moderation. British colonial PR on Taiping emphasized that it was not a custodial institution. Residents could leave at any time and, if they stayed put, it was because they valued the training in agriculture and handiwork that Taiping imparted.

British official records reveal that colonial administrators in Malaya sought inspiration in diverse geographic locations, including a camp at Makronissos in civil war-torn Greece, where Monarchists confined their opponents (possibly as many as 100,000) in a site now remembered as a place of psychological torture and mass killing.[42] Writing to Labour Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin in 1950, the British Ambassador to Greece deemed Makronissos, with its emphasis on 'military training and some rather rough and ready indoctrination in democracy and patriotism', a flawed exemplar in its execution, though not in its overall aims:

> The system of education may be misconceived, conditions may be bad and there may even be some brutality. But, in as much as many of the prisoners are likely to be misguided persons rather than convicted traitors, there is much to be said in favour of trying to alter their attitude.[43]

Another officer of the Malayan Civil Service set off to study the re-education of German prisoners in Britain, visiting Wilton Park, an English mansion to which the *crème de la crème* of Wehrmacht POWs were dispatched for accelerated initiation into the liberal arts. Lest this outside observer's presence ruffle feathers, the official from Malaya was cautioned against revealing the objective of his mission: 'It would, of course, be most undesirable for the German students to think that methods at Wilton Park were being studied for use in the case of communists in Malaya', noted O.H. Morris of the Colonial Office, though it is unclear whether he thought Germans would object more on ideological or racial grounds to the implied kinship between German POWs and Malayan CTs.[44]

This expedition from Malaya to Buckinghamshire underscores the degree to which British personnel self-consciously sought to transfer knowledge across borders. Equally revealing, though, is the outcome of this attempt transpose lessons from German prisoners' re-education to an embattled Asian colony. The search for transplantable material bore little fruit. Formal political instruction such as Germans received at Wilton Park, with lectures from the likes of Bertrand Russell, E.H. Carr and Arnold Toynbee in a collegial setting conducive to deliberation, found no place at Taiping. Rather than extolling the virtues of liberalism to individuals destined to return to an altered – but scarcely democratic – polity, colonial rehabilitation ventured an education in 'civility': taming what British administrators regarded as extreme political aspirations and delegitimizing violence as a means of achieving them; shrinking expectations to more appropriately submissive models of subjecthood. Hence, as one colonial civil servant put it:

> [N]o attempt will be made to inculcate political views. The problem is to deal with unformed minds and progress will be sought by giving basic education by force of example. Importance is attached to moral rehabilitation by arranging for detainees to manage their own affairs through their own camp organizations and by outside contact through the visit of relations [and] others.[45]

'Political re-education' would be 'an effect rather than the cause of any change in their outlook'.[46] Unlike their German counterparts – the POW elite envisioned as the vanguard of Germany's democratic transformation – detainees in Malaya and Kenya were to be allotted subordinate roles on release, if (in the latter case) they survived the experience of incarceration itself.

In Kenya, encampment loomed much larger in counterinsurgency strategy than in Malaya, where colonial officials made heavy use of another expedient to quash armed rebellion: namely, mass expulsion of Malaya's ethnic Chinese population.[47] In Kenya, expelling Africans beyond the colony's borders was less feasible. But the same impulse to push 'troublesome' elements to the periphery found a counterpart in the British policy of relegating detainees to exile settlements in Lake Victoria and other insular or inhospitable locations. By mid-decade, Kenya had acquired a vast network of camps in which rehabilitation would supposedly occur. 'All Central Province was a prison in one way or another', one former detainee, Charity Waciuma, later noted.[48] This characterization was more warranted than some Germans' similarly worded protests about feeling stifled and immobilized in occupied Germany. Kenya's carceral 'pipeline' consisted of approximately one hundred camps, gradated in disciplinary regime, which at their peak housed as many as 320,000 detainees: mostly men, but also confining a smaller number of women and children.[49]

The nature and scope of re-education in Kenya was, to a greater degree than elsewhere, informed by colonial ethno-psychiatry. Leading practitioners diagnosed the Mau Mau rebellion as a form of psychosis that afflicted 'transitional man'. Perilously suspended between savagery and modernity, young Kenyans were viewed as existing in flux between traditional mores and European models, at risk of recidivism into criminality or outright 'atavism'. British experts, settlers and colonial administrators exhibited a particular fixation with Mau Mau oathing ceremonies

– rumoured to involve animal sacrifice and acts of bestiality – that bound new recruits to the group.[50] Although some Britons wondered whether they could bridge this cultural chasm to re-educate Mau Mau adherents, the key exponent of rehabilitation in Kenya, Tom Askwith, blithely announced that the camps' regime would be grounded in 'hard work, washing, discipline and games'. This ethos suggested inspirational models variously pedagogical, penal and medical: mission school, borstal (or juvenal reformatory), asylum. Since epidemiological analogies abounded, with Mau Mau characterized as a virus that had poisoned minds of Kikuyu en masse, the camps were routinely construed as quasi-medical institutions: antiseptic sites of quarantine that would check mass contagion. 'It is the same principle as is applied to mad people or those suffering from an infectious disease', Askwith opined in 1957. 'Such people must be prevented from mixing with others so that they do not harm them'.[51] The same language and logic could be, and was, also applied to prisoners: antisocial elements whose incarceration served simultaneously to protect others from predation while remaking, and redeeming, the prisoner in the process. Mixing punitive and curative metaphors and analogies, British colonial officials frequently articulated this liberal penological aspiration to legitimate a conspicuously illiberal carceral regime.[52]

The camps' typological indeterminacy was not merely functional but spatial. As rehabilitation's remit expanded, so did the camps' geographical footprint. By end of the Emergency, the detention centre at Manyani had become Kenya's third largest town, stretching out 'in an arid wilderness of stone and scrub', as a Reuters report described it, 'like some futuristic factory for three miles'.[53] As the camps acquired greater solidity and permanence, so the horizon of release receded. For those dubbed the irredeemable 'hard core', indefinite – or perpetual – detention beckoned. That some prisoners would *never* be released was apparently not part of the original plan. Advocates of Kenya's so-called pipeline envisioned detainees moving gradually from camps with a harsher regime to more minimally secured 'works camps' closer to their home communities prior to release. But the enunciated vision behind the camps and brutal conditions within them often bore little resemblance.

For new detainees, interrogation constituted the first chapter of life in confinement. This grilling purported to elicit serviceable intelligence for military operations, but since interrogation was often conducted by coopted 'loyal' Kikuyu it afforded an opportunity for local score-settling. Torture, committed by both Europeans and Africans, routinely accompanied interrogation. Screening of detainees also sought to determine how 'infected' or otherwise they were with the toxin of Mau Mau, and hence to which kind of camp they should be sent.[54] Detainees were categorized as 'black', 'grey' and 'white'. Identical to the labels applied to German POWs in British camps, these designations in East Africa bore every appearance of racial overdetermination – so pronounced that they were eventually dropped in favour of alpha-numeric labels.[55] Equating 'blackness' with malignancy, Britons frequently extrapolated detainees' states of mind from what Frantz Fanon termed a 'racial epidermal schema', as though Mau Mau were not only a 'mind-destroying disease' but a 'corporal malediction' legible from the prisoner's skin.[56] In this vein, British anthropologist Margery Perham noted, on visiting camps housing hard-core detainees, 'the dark look upon their faces seemed to add an extra darkness to the colour of their skin, and their look of settled hatred as they sat motionless on the ground'.[57]

How, then, did detainees work their way through the pipeline towards release? What went by the name of rehabilitation in Kenya involved several successive stages, but the key to relocation to a 'works camp' lay in public confession. British authorities' fixation on Mau Mau oaths found a counterpart in 'cleansing ceremonies' in which participants pledged loyalty to the colonial state. Governor Evelyn Baring also hoped that a 'simple form of Christianity' might be imparted to detainees. This avowedly spiritual dimension of rehabilitation meshed well with the camps' insistence on confession, whereby acknowledgement of sin formed the first step towards redemption.[58] But contrite words alone rarely sufficed to satisfy camp authorities of a detainees' bona fides. Work – or rather, submission to the camps' labour regime – underpinned their disciplinary function. Detainees were assigned tasks that were purportedly useful, such as irrigation

ditch-digging or brick-making, but compulsory hard work was intended to be corrective. Detainees who knuckled under could expect to move homewards down the pipeline, while those who resisted would be sent to exile settlements. Since Kenya's detainees were not accorded prisoner of war status, they existed outside the protections afforded by the 1929 Geneva Conventions, relegated to a liminal zone in which neither national nor international legal norms prevailed, akin to the legal no-man's-land of Camp Delta at Guantánamo.[59] Revealingly, when representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross visited Kenyan camps in 1957, they deemed them 'in keeping with humanitarian principles'. As Emily Baughan has recently proposed, the language of rehabilitation, encouraging outsiders to view these sites of incarceration through the lens of progressivism and redemptive possibility, offered protective cover for extreme brutality, torture and extra-legal killing.[60] In 1953 alone, only six months into the Emergency, 430 Africans were shot by British security forces with the threadbare defence that they had been 'trying to escape' or 'resisting arrest'.[61] Publicly denied, and indeed denounced by Nairobi, the indiscriminate shooting of Africans was known to Colonial Office personnel in London. One official ruefully noted that 'those of us who are fully aware that the situation cannot be handled with kid gloves are still a little concerned about the number of these shootings'.[62]

Despite pervasive brutality, visiting journalists – British and American alike – continued to insist throughout 1955 until 1957 that rehabilitation was succeeding, echoing the colonial government's boast that the camps' reformatory mission was yielding positive results – except when it came to the stubbornly resistant hard core.[63] The latter's vaunted intractability prompted the introduction of yet more draconian measures in 1957, aimed at moving the most obdurate detainees down the pipeline with the aid of what was termed the 'dilution technique'.[64] Small groups of unruly detainees were relocated to camps where the authorities' discipline was securely entrenched. But dispersal was only the beginning. On arrival at their new destinations, the hard core were to be subjected to 'a form of psychological shock': stripped naked, plunged into tanks of disinfectant, shorn of the long hair and beards that Britons believed to be markers of Mau Mau.[65] Again, insistent attempts were made to classify and categorize, not only to separate out reclaimable from irredeemable detainees, but to differentiate permissible and impermissible forms of violence that might be applied to the latter. With hair-splitting legalism, colonial administrators distinguished 'compelling force' – legitimate applications of violence (to be administered by Europeans) to elicit prisoners' compliance – from hot-tempered 'punitive violence' inflicted with a view to causing pain (disowned as excess brutality to which African guards were prone). Eric Griffith-Jones, the Attorney General, offered informal advice on what types of blows were permissible, cautioning that 'Boots should not be worn; any blows to the body should be to the front, which could be curled or covered up against serious harm, and never to the back where damage to organs could be fatal'.[66]

Dilution's goal, in the words of its advocates, was to break those 'particularly ugly customers' against whom 'orthodox methods of non-violent persuasion and normal camp punishments for disobedience' had proved 'quite useless and ineffective'. State-administered violence sought refuge in its habitual rationale: 'They are the type which understands and reacts to violence and offers no appreciable prospect of responding to gentler treatment'.[67] Dilution brooked no dissent. Detainees were beaten and subjected to other forms of torture. If 'compelling force' failed to elicit obedience, those who still refused to work were picked up and carried to the site of the work-scheme in question. Their bodies were then physically manipulated, made to perform the motions of manual toil, with hoes placed in their hands which warders wielded. This brutal charade was justified as a means of piercing the 'superstitious dread' that previously prevented detainees co-operating. Askwith later wrote that this performance was enforced as though 'some spell of resistance would then be broken and the detainee would, like some automaton, continue to hoe of his own accord'.[68]

The lethal consequences of 'compelling force' were entirely predictable. The policy culminated in the beating to death of eleven detainees at Hola camp in 1959. These were not the first

murders to occur under the penumbra of 'dilution'.[69] But the homicides at Hola were compounded by a crude cover-up that British administrators attempted. First, they blamed the deaths on detainees drinking too much water – or contaminated water – at the height of the day, before pointing an accusatory finger at African guards' reversion to 'primitive' brutality, unable to summon the restraint required by 'compelling force'. This time, the furore was intense, with outraged recriminations reverberating through the Houses of Parliament and the international press. 'I expect many of you have already read in your newspapers the story of how 11 hard core Mau Mau inmates of the Hola concentration camp were clubbed to death by their warders in an effort to break their moral resistance to rehabilitation by forced labour', noted Labour MP Richard Crossman in a plain spoken BBC broadcast.[70] Although the Colonial Office initially hoped that it could 'rehabilitate Hola in the eyes of the public as a suitable place to hold those ultimately exiled', the reputation of British rule in Kenya proved beyond rehabilitation.[71]

Aftermaths: from Kenya to Korea and beyond

If the Hola massacre hastened an end to Kenya's Emergency and accelerated the pace of decolonization, did it also help bring re-education itself into disrepute, explaining the term's subsequent disappearance from the lexicon of counterinsurgency? Perhaps in part. But, arguably, another set of camps in the 1950s did more to discredit the hitherto voguish vernacular of re-education than Kenya's carceral archipelago. The latter soon slid from public memory in Britain and North America until the early twenty-first century, with the publication of prominent studies by historians Caroline Elkins and David Anderson in 2005 and a series of legal cases brought by former Mau Mau detainees against the British state.[72]

In the early 1950s, while British authorities administered rough injustice in East Africa, POW camps proliferated in and on the peripheries of Korea. The major combatants in this three-year conflict, the People's Republic of China in alliance with North Korea, and a US-headed UN coalition in support of South Korea, confined tens of thousands of prisoners behind barbed wire, seeking to win adherents to their respective sides. Strikingly, British colonial officials in Kenya, though they looked to Malaya and beyond for transferable lessons in the handling of detainees, failed to reference what was transpiring concurrently in POW camps in Korea, despite Britain's participation in the UN alliance. Like their American counterparts, members of the British military found themselves variously captors and captives in Korea.[73]

In the UN-administered POW camps, American military personnel instigated a programme of indoctrination under the banner of 'Civilian Information and Education' (CIE), among the thousands of Korean and Chinese prisoners. A key aim was to encourage mass defection from the 'slave world' of communism: a symbolic substitute for the decisive military victory that eluded UN forces. Until recently, with the work of Monica Kim, David Cheng Chang and Grace Chae, these UN-run POW camps attracted far less scholarly scrutiny than their Chinese/North Korean counterparts.[74] In the imaginary of early cold war America, the latter registered as infamous sites in which terrifying new techniques of brainwashing, rumoured to involve drugs, hypnosis and Pavlovian conditioning of the reflexes, were pioneered and perfected. Chinese skill at mind control offered many Americans a convincing explanation for the pro-Chinese propaganda broadcasts made by several US and British prisoners during the war, and for the decision to defect to the PRC announced by one Scottish and twenty-two American POWs after an armistice was signed in July 1953.[75]

By the early 1960s, Britons and Americans rarely applied the term re-education to their own ventures. In tandem with 'brainwashing' and 'thought reform', 're-education' in normative western European and North American parlance now denoted practices employed by their cold war nemeses 'over there' – in North Korea, the PRC and North Vietnam. During Kenya's long Emergency, only the most damning critics of rehabilitation made connections between Britain's camps in

Kenya and North Korean/Chinese POW camps along the Yalu River, with occasional scathing references to British 'brainwashing' in Kenya appearing in left quarters of the British press. Retrospective accounts have more commonly drawn this analogy. Some former detainees, like Wa Wanjau, subsequently characterized the camp regime as 'brainwashing', while historian Marshall Clough asserts that 'rehabilitation was thought reform'.[76]

Rhetorically powerful, how empirically robust are these comparisons? What the British in central Kenya most obviously shared with the Chinese in North Korea was an insistence on detainees making public confessions in which they recanted past errors, combined with faith in interrogation as a mechanism for eliciting useful speech. But these convergences aside, what went by the name of rehabilitation in Kenya differed markedly from the Chinese 'brainwashing' activities that provoked so much anxiety in the 1950s and thereafter. In Chinese-run camps, the captors sought to win prisoners' allegiance to an alternative worldview and offered extensive instruction in Marxist-Leninism. Chinese cadres encouraged American and British POWs to espouse a new ideological orientation, a corrective lens through which to apprehend the flaws of the capitalist system into which they had been socialized.

By contrast, the formal curriculum (such as it was) in British camps in Kenya eschewed indoctrination in political philosophy. As in Malaya, civics was reduced to mores, with Kikuyu detainees pressured to behave with the docile submissiveness that Europeans expected: rising in their presence; standing to attention when the British National Anthem was played; not spitting in public, and so on. Revealingly, the Fairn Report, commissioned in the aftermath of the Hola massacre, announced that *political* reorientation was not the camps' goal. Rather, detainees were to be released as 'loyal and law-abiding members of the population, capable of earning an honest livelihood and opposed to violence as a means of enforcing political change. The object was moral not political re-education'. Despite the violent deaths at Hola, the Fairn committee continued to claim that 'The object of detention is not to punish but to rehabilitate'.[77] This verdict echoed Baring's insistence that Kenya's camps were 'designed to educate [detainees] to a better concept of citizenship', and better citizens, in this formulation, were not those with a sophisticated appreciation of political philosophy as it was imparted to German POWs at Wilton Park.[78] How could it be otherwise when the Kenyans in question would emerge from incarceration – *if* they emerged – to a colony in which Africans were barely represented in governance structures, and in which the rule of law was very far from being observed? Thousands had been swept into detention under far-reaching Emergency Regulations without either having committed a crime or being accused of any specific offence. Lacking recourse to due process, Africans in Kenya were largely rights-less subjects, not citizens. Kenyan detainees and former detainees knew better than anyone that rehabilitation was an evasive name for procedures aimed less at educating prisoners' minds than breaking their will.[79]

In the mid-1960s, when American forces and their allies waged war against Vietnamese communists and nationalists, they borrowed a different phraseology from the British in Malaya. In Vietnam, counterinsurgency practitioners announced that 'population-centric warfare' was angled at 'winning hearts and minds' among the South Vietnamese peasantry, thousands of whom were confined to fortified camps along the lines of Malaya's new villages. As in Malaya, the US Civil Affairs programme in Vietnam emphasized the provision of healthcare and sanitation as key to securing loyalty. 'Pacification workers' – trained political cadres under American auspices – spent their time denouncing the evils of the Viet Cong and chivvying 'chickenhearted' Vietnamese peasants to contribute more to their own self-defence.[80] 'Re-education,' as Americans used that term in the 1960s and 1970s, typically denoted the punitive practices undertaken to reform subjectivities in North Vietnamese camps – a project that acquired more notoriety in the aftermath of the war, as Hanoi sentenced tens of thousands of former ARVN soldiers and other perceived collaborators to protracted encampment and hard labour.[81]

Thirty years later, as George W. Bush's administration launched a 'global war on terror', it was the language of 'hearts and minds' that policymakers and military leaders again invoked, not re-education.[82] The US military rediscovered British counterinsurgency practice in Malaya, along with the fallacious

assertion that 'minimal force' constituted the essence of this approach. In the early phase of 'Operation Enduring Freedom' in Afghanistan, self-congratulatory volumes appeared suggesting that Afghans and Pakistanis could be weaned from the Taliban by Americans sipping 'three cups of tea' with village leaders, building schools, and liberating local women from their burqas.[83] Meanwhile, as the White House sought to build support for the invasion and occupation of Iraq in late 2002 and early 2003, George W. Bush, Condoleezza Rice and Donald Rumsfeld repeatedly invoked the 'good war' and its aftermath. In so doing, they appealed to American popular memories of the 'moral clarity' of this conflict, sharper in hindsight than at the time, as well as a victorious outcome that subsequent military engagements had failed to yield. More specifically, the architects of 'Operation Iraqi Freedom' pointed to America's success in denazifying postwar Germany and reorienting Japan to build confidence in the ease with which Saddam Hussein's Iraq could be 'de-Baathified'. Iraq's makeover as a bastion of Middle Eastern democracy, they proclaimed, would be a 'cakewalk' in comparison with the challenges posed by reconstructing the former Axis powers, and Iraqis would surely greet their American liberators with 'sweets and flowers'. If advocates of 'Operation Iraqi Freedom' failed to employ the term re-education, their preferred historical analogies nevertheless gestured towards the transformative outcomes of these earlier US occupations, even while they tiptoed around the 'O-word', as Paul Bremer coyly dubbed it.[84]

Did this avoidance of 're-education' mark merely a difference in preferred terminology, or did linguistic reticence betoken a change of underlying approach? No detainee was likely to be 're-educated' through confinement at Camp Delta in Cuba, Bagram in Afghanistan or Abu Ghraib in Iraq or not in ways that served the ends of US counter-insurgency. But neither were the inhabitants of British camps at Mwea, Hola and Manyani in Kenya 'rehabilitated' by their incarceration. Instead, then as now, camps sometimes functioned in ways subversive of their overseers' desired outcomes: as sites of radicalisation in which prisoners taught one another literacy, studied together and shared emancipatory visions below the radar of their captors. Continuities between mid-century colonial rehabilitation and the more recent treatment of detainees during the 'global war on terror' surface most conspicuously with reference to precisely those phenomena that the language of re-education sought to attenuate or disavow altogether: interrogations conducted with such brutality that torture would be a more apt descriptor, with force sometimes applied directly to the body, such as beating prisoners or subjecting them to 'waterboarding' (a practice first employed by US troops in the Philippines) or through more insidious techniques of psychological pressure, such as extended solitary confinement, exposure to loud noise or forcing detainees to maintain stress positions that turned them into their own torturers.

In captivity, re-education only sometimes involved what the word implied. Wilton Park, where German prisoners were invited to interact with leading scholars and political philosophers, like Oxbridge students dining at 'top table' with the dons, formed the exception to the generalized rule of re-education, especially as practiced in colonial settings. More often, initiatives that announced an intent to reconstruct minds took aim at the body with a view to breaking the will. Applications of blunt force were neither peripheral nor unintended outcomes, as practitioners tried to suggest when evidence of bodily harm came into public view. Rather, violence, albeit to varying degrees and in divergent forms, was integral to efforts to correct and retrain others along lines pre-determined by the re-educators: enacted with a view to deterring its victims from espousing violence themselves. From 'rehabilitation' to 'hearts and minds', 'compelling force' to 'enhanced interrogation', the liberal state at war has favoured a euphemistic vernacular, hoping positive semantic connotations might shield wounding somatic practices from exposure and critique.

Connecting British and US ventures in re-education under postwar military government and in colonial contexts, this essay has emphasized the flexibility of pedagogical discourse and punitive practice in the decade and a half after 1945. Progressive-sounding terms encompassed projects on radically different scales, from the ideological reorientation of whole populations (as in Germany and Japan) to the behaviour modification of prison populations and peasants herded into fortified stockades in Malaya, Kenya and Vietnam. These undertakings also involved discrepant levels of coercive force. Though 're-education' described both practices, compulsory completion of a *Fragebogen* was hardly

comparable with being beaten into forcible labour in a Kenyan detention camp. Critics of British and US occupation policy, invoking colonialism to amplify their critique of the oxymoronic character of democratization by military government diktat, tended to overlook the permissive function of racial ideology. In short, racialized antipathy – particularly evident in the punitive animus colonial regimes directed against towards those who challenged white rule – made re-education a far blunter instrument of disciplinary power in colonial settings.

But, as this essay has proposed, keeping the place- and race-specific variants of rehabilitation in focus should not obscure the larger contribution that imperialism made to British and US exercises in postwar re-education. Mutually imbricated domestic educational practices and imperial projects undertaken by Britain and the United States inspired confidence in both the legitimacy and efficacy of re-education, whether in defeated Axis countries or embattled colonies. Hitherto, scholars have commonly proposed that pedagogical models were (separately) transported overseas by British and American agents of rehabilitation, with these blueprints reflecting unique national traditions. But comparative analysis points to the limitations of imagining postwar re-education as a manifestation of *either* American exceptionalism – the 'redeemer nation' in action – *or* an export version of Britain's idiosyncratic public school system. Rather, expertise circulated *via* trans-Atlantic and trans-imperial routes. When, for instance, the State Department funded the British organizer of a rehabilitation centre for Kenyan boys on a visit to Los Angeles in 1960, it wasn't clear who was intended to learn what from whom. Would the 'tamer of Mau Mau' benefit from Angeleno social workers' experience in reclaiming delinquent teens from the grip of gang violence, or vice versa?[85] Perhaps, not just in this instance but more generally, we would do better to conceive such exchanges as occasions when disciplinary knowledge was *pooled*, rather than imparted uni-directionally. From Nairobi to California, Malaya to Indochina, this kind of reciprocity became increasingly pervasive. Britons and Americans schooled one another in the gospel of re-education, bolstering mutual confidence in the malleability of subject populations, despite scant evidence to support their shared faith that 'hearts and minds' could be easily won.

Notes

1. The Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, July 17-August 2, 1945; (a) Protocol of the Proceedings, August l, 1945 digitized by the Avalon Project, Yale University,. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade17.asp.
2. On UNRRA's origins, Jessica Reinisch and Elizabeth White (eds), *The Disentanglement of Populations: Migration, Expulsion, and Displacement in Postwar Europe, 1944-49* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); on the meanings attached to rehabilitation and relief workers' self-understandings, Silvia Salvatici, '"Help the People to Help Themselves": UNRRA Relief Workers and European Displaced Persons', *Journal of Refugee Studies,* 25 (2012), 428–51.
3. UNESCO's constitution can be found at https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000033223; on UNESCO's direct involvement in the re-education of Germany and Japan, Aigul Kulnazarova and Poul Duedahl, 'UNESCO's Re-education Activities in Postwar Japan and Germany: Changing Minds and Shifting Attitudes towards Peace and International Understanding' in Aigul Kulnazarova and Christian Ydesen (eds), *UNESCO Without Borders: Educational Campaigns For International Understanding* (London: Routledge, 2016): 52–74.
4. Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, Protocol of the Proceedings. On Germany, Nicholas Pronay and Keith Wilson (eds), *The Political Re-Education of Germany and Her Allies After World War II* (London: Croom Helm, 1985); Ian Turner (ed), *Reconstruction in Post-War Germany: British Occupation Policy and the Western Zones, 1945-55* (Oxford: Berg, 1989); Timothy R. Vogt, *Denazification in Soviet-Occupied Germany: Brandenburg 1945-1948* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); Perry Biddiscombe, *The Denazification of Germany: A History 1945-1950* (Stroud: Tempus 2007); Udi E. Greenberg, 'Germany's Postwar Re-education and Its Weimar Intellectual Roots', *Journal of Contemporary History,* 46, i (2011), 10–32. On Japan's reeducation, George F. Zook, "Japan and Germany: Problems in Reeducation," *International Conciliation*, *25* (1947): 3–42; John Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (London: Allen Lane, 1999); Eiji Takemae, *Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy* (Athlone: Continuum, 2002).
5. Christopher Allan Gehrz, 'The Reeducation of Germany and the Education of the West, 1945-1949', (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 2002, 4.
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(London: Leicester University Press, 1995). On counterinsurgency warfare, Charles Townshend, *Britain's Civil Wars: Counterinsurgency in the Twentieth Century* (London: Faber, 1986); Richard Stubbs, *Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1989); Thomas R. Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency, 1919-60* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990). There is a particularly extensive literature on Kenya: John Lonsdale, 'Mau Maus of the Mind: Making Mau Mau and Remaking Kenya', *Journal of African History,* 31 (1990), 393–421; Luise White, 'Separating the Men from the Boys: Constructions of Gender, Sexuality, and Terrorism in Central Kenya, 1939-1959', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 23, i (1990), 1–25; Caroline Elkins, 'The Struggle for Mau Mau Rehabilitation in Late Colonial Kenya', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 33, i (2000), 25–57; Caroline Elkins, *Britain's Gulag: The Brutal End of Empire in Kenya* (London: Jonathan Cape, 2005); David M. Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged: Britain's Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005); Marouf Hasian, 'The Deployment of Ethnographic Sciences and Psychological Warfare during the Suppression of the Mau Mau Rebellion,' *Journal of Medical Humanities,* 34, iii (2013), 329–45; Myles Osborne, 'The Rooting out of Mau Mau from the Minds of the Kikuyu is a Formidable Task: Propaganda and the Mau Mau War', *Journal of African History* 56, i (2015), 77–97; Bethwell Alan Ogot, 'Britain's Gulag', *Journal of African History* 46, 3 (2005), 493–505; David M. Anderson, 'British Abuse and Torture in Kenya's Counter-Insurgency, 1952-60,' *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 23, 4/5 (2012), 700–19; Katherine Bruce-Lockhart, 'Unsound Minds and Broken Bodies: the Detention of Hard-core Mau Mau Women at Kamiti and Gitmayu Detention Camps in Kenya, 1954-1960,' *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 8, iv (2014), 590–608.

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