Boukouras, Aristotelis (2011) Three essays on mechanism design and institutions. PhD thesis, University of Warwick.
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Abstract
This thesis is concerned with both mechanism design and political economy issues. The
first chapter examines the conditions under which information aggregation (through an
appropriately designed mechanism) can solve hidden-types (also commonly referred
as adverse selection) problems. The remaining two chapters adopt a contract theory
approach in order to explain prominent institutions of many contemporary political
regimes. Chapter two provides a theory on why laws, which restrict the freedom of
private parties to commit on certain transactions, may actually be beneficial for increasing
social surplus and promoting economic growth and how the evolution of these
laws interacts with the process of economic development. Finally, chapter three examines
the issue on how the separation between the legislative and the executive branch
of a government can complement political competition in order to achieve an efficient
provision of public goods.
| Item Type: | Thesis [via Doctoral College] (PhD) |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | Game theory, Information theory in economics |
| Official Date: | May 2011 |
| Dates: | Date Event May 2011 Submitted |
| Institution: | University of Warwick |
| Theses Department: | Department of Economics |
| Thesis Type: | PhD |
| Publication Status: | Unpublished |
| Supervisor(s)/Advisor: | Ohinata, Asako |
| Sponsors: | University of Warwick. Department of Economics; Greek State Scholarship Foundation (IKY) |
| Extent: | vi, 151 leaves. |
| Language: | eng |
| URI: | https://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/55434/ |
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