Interactive proofs for differentially private counting

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Abstract

Differential Privacy (DP) is often presented as a strong privacy-enhancing technology with broad applicability and advocated as a de facto standard for releasing aggregate statistics on sensitive data. However, in many embodiments, DP introduces a new attack surface: a malicious entity entrusted with releasing statistics could manipulate the results and use the randomness of DP as a convenient smokescreen to mask its nefariousness. Since revealing the random noise would obviate the purpose of introducing it, the miscreant may have a perfect alibi. To close this loophole, we introduce the idea of Interactive Proofs For Differential Privacy, which requires the publishing entity to output a zero knowledge proof that convinces an efficient verifier that the output is both DP and reliable. Such a definition might seem unachievable, as a verifier must validate that DP randomness was generated faithfully without learning anything about the randomness itself. We resolve this paradox by carefully mixing private and public randomness to compute verifiable DP counting queries with theoretical guarantees and show that it is also practical for real-world deployment. We also demonstrate that computational assumptions are necessary by showing a separation between information-theoretic DP and computational DP under our definition of verifiability.

Item Type: Conference Item (Paper)
Subjects: Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA76 Electronic computers. Computer science. Computer software
Divisions: Faculty of Science, Engineering and Medicine > Science > Computer Science
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Data mining, Computer security, Data encryption (Computer science)
Series Name: CCS '23
Journal or Publication Title: CCS '23: Proceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Publisher: ACM
ISBN: 9798400700507
Official Date: 21 November 2023
Dates:
Date
Event
21 November 2023
Published
21 April 2023
Accepted
Page Range: pp. 1919-1933
DOI: 10.1145/3576915.3616681
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Re-use Statement: © ACM, 2023. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of ACM for your personal use. Not for redistribution. The definitive version was published in CCS '23: Proceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security pp. 1919-1933 https://doi.org/10.1145/3576915.3616681
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access
Date of first compliant deposit: 5 May 2023
Date of first compliant Open Access: 19 January 2024
RIOXX Funder/Project Grant:
Project/Grant ID
RIOXX Funder Name
Funder ID
UNSPECIFIED
UK Research and Innovation
EP/V056883/1
[EPSRC] Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council
UNSPECIFIED
Alan Turing Institute
Conference Paper Type: Paper
Title of Event: ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2023
Type of Event: Conference
Location of Event: Copenhagen, Denmark
Date(s) of Event: 26-30 Nov 2023
Related URLs:
URI: https://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/175621/

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