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An algorithmic analysis of deliberation and representation in collective behaviour
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Lisowski, Grzegorz (2022) An algorithmic analysis of deliberation and representation in collective behaviour. PhD thesis, University of Warwick.
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Official URL: http://webcat.warwick.ac.uk/record=b3948233
Abstract
The selection of a nominee by a group of players in the process of selecting a winner is present in many contexts. In sports, it is a major strategic problem to select the best team members. Crucially, in politics, this problem is essential for the process of primaries. There, factions decide which of their candidates should take part in the elections.
We study the strategic behaviour of coalitions from the game-theoretic perspective. More precisely, we analyse the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium in the games capturing the strategic nomination problem. First, we adapt the well-known Hotelling-Downs model, capturing the strategic behaviour of political parties in primaries. Subsequently, we explore this problem for tournament-based rules. There, winners are chosen based on the pairwise comparisons between candidates. First, we study the setting of knockout-tournaments. Next, we investigate tournaments, in which participants do not compete in rounds. For each of these mechanisms, we analyse the computational complexity of checking the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium.
Nominee selection can also be influenced by the deliberation between the voters. To account for that, we investigate the complexity of checking the convergence of a synchronous, threshold-based protocol. There, in every time step all agents update their opinion if the strict majority of their influencers disagrees with them. Furthermore, we explore computational aspects of majority illusion. This phenomenon occurs when a large number of agents in a network perceives the opinion, which is a minority view, as the one which is held by the majority of agents. We study the problem of checking the possibility of assigning opinions to agents, so that it holds for a large fraction of them. We further address the complexity of checking the possibility of eliminating the majority illusion by changing a small number of edges in a social network.
Item Type: | Thesis (PhD) | ||||
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Subjects: | Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA76 Electronic computers. Computer science. Computer software | ||||
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | Game theory, Coalitions, Collective behavior -- Mathematical models, Computer algorithms, Political candidates -- Selection and appointment | ||||
Official Date: | October 2022 | ||||
Dates: |
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Institution: | University of Warwick | ||||
Theses Department: | Department of Computer Science | ||||
Thesis Type: | PhD | ||||
Publication Status: | Unpublished | ||||
Supervisor(s)/Advisor: | Turrini, Paolo | ||||
Format of File: | |||||
Extent: | viii, 184 pages : illustrations | ||||
Language: | eng |
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